Intelectual Warfare K

Capitol Debate 2011-12 Pedagogical Colonialism
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INTELLECTUAL WARFARE
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Framework 2NC ............................................................................................................................... 15
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2NR Link Extension New Mann Evidence ........................................................................................ 34
2NR Impact Extension New Mann Evidence ................................................................................... 35
2NR War Machine DA Extension .................................................................................................... 36

The avant-garde died of exposure. It died by revealing itself to its enemies. It put itself to death by continually
attracting itself within the discursive economy of the cultures it claimed to subvert. Paul Mann

The Affirmatives supposed resistance to war is the sign of potential combat of words Their
discursive armory is oriented towards exchange in the political sense. This metamorphosis of
discourse into war is concealed by their so called benign intent, repeating the masking they attempt
to reveal
Mann, 96
*Paul, Prof @ Pomona, Dept. English, The Nine Grounds of Intellectual Warfare, Postmodern Culture, Vol. 6 No.
2, January]
To repeat: The object of criticism is always a symptom, if you will, of the structure of critical discourse itself,
always a phenomenalization of the device. But this device tends to appear in a surrogate form, still
dissimulated and displaced; it appears and does not appear, makes itself known in ways that further
conceal its stakes. And it always appears too late, at the very moment it ceases to function: a kind of theory-
death, a death that is not a termination but a particular sort of elaboration. Now, everywhere we look, critics
will be casting off their clerical mantles and rhetorical labcoats for suits of discursive armor; the slightest
critical aggression or ressentiment will be inflated with theoretical war-machines and territorial
metaphorics. At the same time, the very rise of war discourse among us will signal the end of intellectual warfare
for us, its general recuperation by the economics of intellectual production and exchange. It might therefore be
delusional -- even, as some would argue, obscene, given the horrible damage of real war -- to think of this academic bickering as warfare, and yet it
remains a %trace% of war, and perhaps the sign of a potential combat some critical force could still fight. [5] It would be a mistake to
assume that this metamorphosis of discourse as war into discourse on war has occurred because criticism
has become more political. On the contrary, criticism has never been more than a political %effect% -- "policy" carried out, and in our case
dissipated, by other means. The long process of seizing politics as the proper object of criticism is one more tardy
phenomenalization of the device. What we witness -- and what difference would it make even if I were
right? -- is not proof of the politicization of criticism but an after-image of its quite peripheral integration
with forms of geopolitical conflict that are, in fact, already being dismantled and remodeled in war rooms,
defense institutes, and multinational corporate headquarters. War talk, like politics talk, like ethics talk, like all critical talk, is
nostalgic from the start. While we babble about territories and borders, really still caught up in nothing more than
a habitual attachment to disciplinary "space" and anxious dreams of "agency," the technocrats of warfare
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are developing strategies that no longer depend on any such topography, strategies far more sophisticated
than anything we have imagined. And we congratulate ourselves for condemning them, and for our facile
analogies between video games and smart bombs.

The inherent cooptation of power and knowledge will take the form of trickery. Although the
affirmative attempts to resist the creation of war, its very utterance and its symbolic demand for
subversiveness renders visible all that must remain invisible, making the worse argument seem like
the better one.
Mann, 96
2, January]
It remains to be seen whether and to what extent the turbulence of intellectual warfare obeys the theoretical laws of chaos. Perhaps
it will become possible to map the way epistemic breakthroughs stabilize themselves as singularities and fractal "eddies within eddies"
(De Landa), increasingly dense, detailed, and localized skirmishes in entropic disciplinary subfields. I imagine that the effect would be
at one and the same time to deepen the breakthrough, by intensifying subconflictual areas within the field, and to dissipate it. Again:
resistance, subversion, opposition, etc., stabilize quite as much as they destabilize. The deepening specificity
of gender criticism, for instance, might represent the regulation of gender conflict as much as its disruptive
potential: its increasing density becomes the paradoxical mark of its dissipating force. It is just as likely,
however, that attempts to apply chaos physics within analyses of discursive warfare will constitute nothing
more than another set of tropes, another pipe dream of a scientific humanities, another mathematical sublime: the same
contradictory desire for the rational conquest of phenomena that seem to escape reason and the
autodestruction of reason in the process that one finds in Clausewitz. [42] Even if fog cannot be reduced to a science without
being caught up in the mechanics of critical sublimity, one might still pursue its tactical uses. There is no question that the military is
committed to deploying the fog of war. The importance of disinformation, propaganda, jamming, covert operations, "PsyOps," and so
on increases as warfare becomes more dependent on technical and tactical knowledge. As the power of reconnaissance and
surveillance grows, so does the tactical importance of stealth technology. Virilio remarks that, in the hunt, the speed of perception
annuls the distance between the hunter and the quarry. Survival depends on distance: "once you can see the target, you can destroy
it" (WC 19, 4). Thus, from now on, "power is in disappearance: under the sea with nuclear submarines, in the air
with U2s, spyplanes, or still higher with satellites and the space shuttle" (PW 146). "If %what is perceived is already
lost%, it becomes necessary to invest in concealment what used to be invested in simple exploitation of one's available forces -- hence
the spontaneous generation of new Stealth weapons. . . . The inversion of the deterrence principle is quite clear: unlike weapons
which have to be publicized if they are to have a real deterrence effect, Stealth equipment can only function if its existence is clouded
with uncertainty" (WC 4). For Virilio, stealth is not a matter of radar-immune bombers alone: it involves a vast "aesthetics of
disappearance" that reaches an order of perfection in state terrorism: Until the Second World War -- until the
concentration camps -- societies were societies of incarceration, of imprisonment in the Foucauldian sense. The great
transparency of the world, whether through satellites or simply tourists, brought about an overexposure of
these places to observation, to the press and public opinion which now ban concentration camps. You can't
isolate anything in this world of ubiquity and instantaneousness. Even if some camps still exist, this overexposure of the
world led to the need to surpass enclosure and imprisonment. This required another kind of repression,
which is disappearance. . . . Bodies must disappear. People don't exist. There is a big fortune in this technology
because it's so similar to what happened in the history of war. In war, we've seen how important disappearance, camouflage,
dissimulation are -- every war is a war of cunning.^34^ The methods of strategic disappearance developed by terrorist
states are the most insidious form of secrecy. That is why Virilio, the anti-technologist, believes that the technology of
secrecy must be exposed. Every order of stealth weaponry is purely and simply a threat. The aesthetics of disappearance must be
reappeared. For Virilio, as well as for the reconnaissance cameras whose history he records, success depends on the logistics of
perception, on closing the distance between the critic and his quarry. But what if critics are not only hunters; what if they
are the quarry as well? [43] Michel de Certeau points out that, for Clausewitz, the distinction between strategy and
tactics is determined not only by scales of conflict (war vs. battle) but by relative magnitudes of power. Strategy is for the
strong, and it is deployed in known, visible, mapped spaces; tactics is "an art of the weak," of those who must operate inside territory
controlled by a greater power; it takes place on the ground of the "other," inside alien space.^35^ It must therefore deploy deception
in the face of a power "bound by its very visibility." De Certeau suggests that even in cases where the weak force has already been
sighted, it might use deception to great advantage. This is another lesson from Clausewitz: "trickery is possible for the weak, and often
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it is his only possibility, as a 'last resort': The weaker the forces at the disposition of the strategist, the more the strategist will be able
to use deception." In the "practice of daily life," in spaces of signification, in the contests of critical argument, such a
tactics of the weak would also apply: Lacking its own place, lacking a view of the whole, limited by the
blindness (which may lead to perspicacity) resulting from combat at close quarters, limited by the possibilities of
the moment, a tactic is determined by the %absence of power% just as a strategy is organized by the postulation of
power. From this point of view, the dialectic of a tactic may be illuminated by the ancient art of sophistic. As the author of a great
"strategic" system, Aristotle was also very interested in the procedures of this enemy which perverted, as he saw it, the order of
truth. He quotes a formula of this protean, quick, and surprising adversary that, by making explicit the basis of sophistic, can also
serve finally to define a tactic as I understand it here: it is a matter, Corax said, of "making the worse argument seem
the better." In its paradoxical concision, this formula delineates the relationship of forces that is the starting
point for an intellectual creativity that is subtle, tireless, ready for every opportunity, scattered over the
terrain of the dominant order and foreign to the rules laid down and imposed by a rationality founded on
established rights and property. (38) And yet it is rare that any of this ever occurs to critics, who seem to
believe that "subversion" consists of vicarious identification with subversives, and of telling everything one knows
to one's enemies.

Our alternative We will advocate absolute, irretrievable negativity, a form of nihilistic intervention
into the realm of overwhelming action. Our criticism operates as a form of self-negating, inaccessible
nothingness while the affirmative sharpens their knives on the simulated body of war.
Agamben, 93
*Giorgio Agamben, Badass, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, 1993+
It is possible, perhaps, to accept that a novel may never actually recount the story it has promised to tell. But it is common to expect
results of a work of criticism, or at least arguable positions and, as they say, working hypotheses. Yet when the term criticism
appears in the vocabulary of Western philosophy, it signifies rather inquiry at the limits of knowledge about precisely
that which can be neither posed nor grasped. If criticism, insofar as it traces the limits of truth, offers a glance of
truths homeland like an island nature has enclosed within immutable boundaries, it must also remain open to the
fascination of the wide open and storm-tossed sea that draws the sailor incessantly towards adventures
he knows not how to refuse yet may never bring to an end. Thus for the Jena group, which attempted through the
project of a universal progressive poetry to abolish the distinction between poetry and the critical-philological disciplines, a critical
work worthier of the name was one that included its own negation; it was, therefore, one whose essential
content consisted in precisely what it did not contain. The corpus of the European critical essay in the present century is
poor in examples of such a genre. Leaving aside a work that by its very absence is more than complete that of Felix Geneon, celui
qui silence (he who silences) there is strictly speaking perhaps only a single book that deserves to be called critical: the Ursprung des
deutschen Traverspiel (The origin of German Tragic drama) of Walter Benjamin. A certain sign of the extinction of such critical thinking
is that among those who today draw their authority more or less from the same tradition there are many who proclaim the creative
character of criticismprecisely when the arts have for some time renounced all pretense at creativity. If the formula of both poet
and critic (poietes hama kai kritikos), applied for the first time in antiquity to the Alexandrian poet-philologist Philitas, may once again
serve as an exemplary definition of the modern artist, and if criticism today truly identifies with the work of art, it is not
because criticism itself is also creative, but (if at all) insofar as criticism is also a form of negativity. Criticism is in fact
nothing other than the process of its own ironic self-negation: precisely a self-annihilating nothing, or a
god that self-destructs, according to Hegels prophetic, if ill-willed, definition. Hegels objection, that Mister Friedrich von
Schlegel, Solgar, Novalis, and other theoreticians or irony remained stalled at absolute infinite negativity and would have ended by
making the least artistic the true principle of art, marketing the unexpressed as the best thing, misses the point: that the
negativity of irony is not the provisional negative of dialect, which the magic wand of sublation (Aufhebung) is
always already in the act of transforming into a positive, but an absolute and irretrievable negativity that
does not, for that, renounce knowledge. The claim that a posture genuinely both philosophical and scientific (which has
provided an essential impetus to Indo-European linguistics, among other things) arose from Romantic irony, precisely with the
Schlegels, remains to be questioned in terms of the prospects for giving a critical foundation to the human sciences. For if in the
human sciences subject and object necessarily become identified, the idea of a science without object is not a playful
paradox, but perhaps the most serious task that remains entrusted to thought in our time. What is now more
and more frequently concealed by the endless sharpening of knives on behalf of methodology with nothing left
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to cutnamely, the realization that the object to have been grasped has finally evaded knowledgeis
instead reasserted by criticism as its own specific character. Secular enlightenment, the most profound project of
criticism, does not possess its object. Like all authentic quests, the quest of criticism consists not in discovering its object
but in assuring the conditions of its inaccessibility.
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GENERIC LINK EXTENSION
The affirmatives intellectual opposition to war shows the role of combat inherent in intellectual
discourse Instead of fighting with soldiers, the affirmative fights with words. This transforms
discourse into its own form of warfare, but through their initial critical resistance masks the expansion
of warfare into language Thats the first 1NC Mann card.

Specifically, from the Mann evidence
Symptom link the object of criticism is always a PRODUCT of that critical discourse, in the same way
that the affirmatives intellectual stance comes to mirror what they oppose. The affirmative operates
as a war on war, without realizing that a war on war is still a war.

Masking the concept this expansion of discourse into war is more dangerous than war itself not
only do they re-entrench the mindsets of combat that make war inevitable, but the affirmative masks
the expansion of warfare into the discursive arena with their benign action.

Transforming language instead of the traditional mapping process language serves, the affirmatives
totalizing intellectual stance turns language into a weapon. This weaponization of language re-
entrenches mindsets of warfare.
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GENERIC LINK EXTENSION
The affirmatives opposition to war produces the effect it names in the form of the
phenomenalization of the discursive device. Their so called revolutionary attack against the state is
nothing but the states advance guard, operating on the margins to secure more territory in this case
discursive for the expansion of total war.
Mann, 96
2, January]
The position is surrounded by a "border," a "margin." This circular, flat-earth topography mirrors larger
discursive models, which still map everything in terms of centers, lines of defense, and antagonistic
margins. It is little wonder that questions of colonialism have become so pressing: here too we encounter a
phenomenalization of the discursive device. Modern critical production consistently sees itself as a matter
of hegemonic centers (e.g., defenses of tradition) and marginal oppositions. But insofar as one wishes to retain
this topography of margins and centers -- and in the end there might not be much to recommend it -- it might be better
to see the marginal force as a function and effect of the center, the very means by which it establishes its
line of defense. Military commanders might be unlikely to deploy their most troublesome troops along their perimeter, but in
intellectual warfare the perimeter is marked out and held primarily by troops who imagine themselves in
revolt against headquarters. This is the historical paradox of the avant-gardes: they believe they are
attacking the army for which they are in fact the advance guard. The contradiction does not dissolve their
importance, it marks their precise task: the dialectical defense and advance of discursive boundaries. It might
therefore indicate the fundamental instability of cultural positions, but it does nothing to support the strictly oppositional claims of
marginal forces. That is why postcolonial criticism remains a colonial outpost of an older critical form. [25] Without exception, all
positions are oriented toward the institutional apparatus. Marginality here is only relative and temporary:
the moment black studies or women's studies or queer theory conceives of itself as a discipline, its primary orientation is toward the
institution. The fact that the institution might treat it badly hardly constitutes an ethical privilege. Any intellectual who holds a
position is a function of this apparatus; his or her marginality is, for the most part, only an operational
device. It is a critical commonplace that the state is not a monolithic hegemony but rather a constellation of disorganized and
fragmentary agencies of production. This is often taken as a validation for the political potential of marginal critical movements:
inside-outside relations can be facilely deconstructed and critics can still congratulate themselves on their "resistance." But the
contrary is clearly the case. The most profitable intellectual production does not take place at the center (e.g.,
Romance Philology), where mostly obsolete weapons are produced; the real growth industries are located
precisely on the self-proclaimed margins. It will be argued that resistance is still possible; nothing I propose here argues
against such a possibility. I wish only to insist that effective resistance will never be located in the position, however
oppositional it imagines itself to be. Resistance is first of all a function of the apparatus itself. What would
seem to be the transgressive potential of such institutional agencies as certain orders of gender criticism
might demonstrate the entropy of the institution, but it does nothing to prove the counterpolitical claims of
the position. Fantasies of resistance often serve as alibis for collusion. Any position is a state agency, and
its relative marginality is a mode of orientation, not an exception. Effective resistance must be located in
other tactical forms.

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IMPACT EXTENSION
Criticism turns and outweighs case the affirmative only re-entrenches warfare thats the second
piece of 1NC Mann evidence

The affirmatives supposed resistance to war only stabilizes and re-entrenches the power structures
and combative approach they seek to oppose for every destabilizing effect resistance has, it also has
a normalizing and stabilizing effect.

Total warfare the affirmative conceives warfare only in the literal sense, ignoring the way discourse
becomes warfare through opposition. This expansion of warfare that the affirmative creates leads to
a state of total war in which discursive armories reinforce physical and linguistic conflict.

Serial policy failure governmental reform of opposition has become the endless sharpening of knives
in the name of methodology searching for new discourses to violently oppose. This constant
methodological quest and totalizing opposition serves to make the worse argument seem the better
by emphasizing a constant need for action in the face of a linguistically constructed war.

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IMPACT EXTENSION
Critical opposition to war only perpetuates and expands the reach of warfare. By intellectually
opposing structures of war, the affirmative rationalizes the contestations of thought that make
human violence inevitable, until the subject of their mastery war spirals out of control into
massive annihilation.
Mann, 96
2, January]
VII. High Ground: Is this what Pierre Bezukov hoped to observe when he climbed a fortified hill to gaze down on the Battle of
Borodino? Kant: "War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has something sublime
about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a measure a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers
to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude."^30^ Perhaps that is what Tolstoy would have us believe
Pierre did see: all the sublimely ennobling horrors of war. But let us imagine that he also witnessed the sublime from
another perspective, that he saw the flatness of the abyss, a flat figure of lofty visions of bottomless depths.
In Daniel Pick's account of the war machine, two contending forces are in play: the increasing technical efficiency
and rationalization of warfare, and an insistent figuration of war as a destructive energy that surpasses
every effort of rational control. Warfare "assumes a momentum of its own which is difficult, even
impossible to stop. . . . Battle is now nothing more than the autonomy . . . of the war machine," the "unstoppable engine of war"
(11). It is as if this machine obeyed the familiar logic of the Frankenstein mythos, in which the most rationalized human technology
must eventually reveal its madness and destroy everything, including its creator. War too is reason's war against itself:
"nothing less than a catastrophic eclipse of sense, a bestial and mechanical descent into anarchy" No
%Kritik% can ever master it; one can never rise to the exact height above battle, high enough to see but not
so high that one loses its detail, because the exact height doesn't exist; it is an ideal standpoint. In respect to
war, thought always shoots past its mark. That is why there is a war in _On War_. "Questions of friction, illness, madness, morals, fear
and anarchy continuously need to be mastered by [Clausewitz], converted back into manageable currency which enables decision-
making. He presides over and marshalls his thoughts, like a general seeking to retain control over potentially wayward troops" (40);
and, as every reader of Clausewitz, including Clausewitz himself, knows full well, the war in _On War_ gets out of hand.
That is part of the attraction of the new war studies: even as warfare becomes a function of knowledge production it
reveals itself as the transgressed limit of knowledge, as the very agent of its destruction. The thought of war is
the sublimely desirable experience of thought's abyss. War is sublime.^31^ The theory-war in Clausewitz's text, the war between
knowledge and everything proper to it that surpasses and destroys it, signals the way war takes its place beside tragedy as a sublime
%for% philosophy, theory, and critical studies. The sublime of war study is one of theory's recuperated figures of its own imaginary
abyss, an abyss in which it seeks its deepest reflection. Whatever the truth of war, what we witness here first of all is
thought's fascination with an imaginary and quite compelling depth projected out of an obscure "drive" for
its own "death." If the self-destruction of the family in classical tragedy is an interior form of this paper abyss, the contemplation
of warfare serves as one of its public forms, as the sublime for a %political% criticism, already scaled down from the recent, imaginary
apocalypses of nuclear criticism.^32^ "The issue," Rose writes, seems to be not so much what might be the truth of
war, but the relationship of war to the category of truth. . . . Friction, dissolution, fluidity . . . surface in
defiance of a resistant totalization. . . . In Clausewitz's text, war seems to figure as the violent repressed of its
own rationalization. It becomes, so to speak, the unconscious of itself . . . an intruder or foreign body that fastens
and destroys. It is the perfect image of the alien-ness that Freud places at the heart of human subjectivity, the alien-ness whose
denial or projection leads us into war. In Clausewitz's text, the theorization of war seems finally to be taken over by
its object. The attempt to theorize or master war, to subordinate it to absolute knowledge, becomes a way
of perpetuating or repeating war itself. (23-24) Under the aegis of a critique of war technology, critical
discourse becomes a machine that both rationalizes the contests of thought and surpasses rational control.
The end of this conflict, of intellectual warfare as such, is a terminal image of reason's self-destruction, of
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the Endlightenment, an ideal we will fight to the death to fall short of. Hard critical knowledge will no more
lead us past this end than knowledge of war leads humanity past armed conflict.
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ALTERNATIVE SOLVES K
Our alternative is complete negativity thats the 1NC Agamben evidence we advocate a nihilistic
intervention into the notion that action is the only necessary solution to methodological problems.
Only this complete self-negation is capable of overcoming the deadlock of the affirmative and the
status quo. Modern opposition has taken the form of the endless sharpening of knives on the
simulated body of war the affirmative believes that with the right political action exposing and then
opposing enough flawed methodologies, war can be overcome. The alternative instead recognizes
that any attempt to KNOW war, the object of the affirmatives criticism, is bound to reproduce the
effect they attempt to resist. The truly revolutionary criticism is one that includes its own negation,
one that remains open to the fascination of the open sea regardless of the results.

Any arguments against the alternatives effectiveness are reasons to affirm the uncertainty of the
alternative the quest for constant action manifests itself in the sharpening of knives on the world,
totalizing opposition that is inevitably co-opted. Acknowledging the LIMITS of knowledge and
criticism are the only way to avoid the phenomenalization and PRODUCTION of what the affirmative
resists.

The objective of criticism should not be any attempt to know the future, but a total negation and
criticism of war structures, without attempts to replicate the way they work.
Mann, 96
2, January]
I would propose two distinct diagnoses of the rise of war talk. On one hand, war talk is merely another exercise in
rhetorical inflation, intended to shore up the fading value of a dubious product, another symptom of the
imaginary politics one witnesses everywhere in critical discourse, another appearance of a structural device
at the very moment it ceases to operate. On the other hand, war talk might still indicate the possibility of
actually becoming a war machine, of pursuing a military equivalent of thought beyond all these petty
contentions, of realizing the truth of discourse as warfare and finally beginning to fight. It will be crucial here not
to choose between these diagnoses. In the domain of criticism they function simultaneously, in a perpetual mutual
interference; there is no hope of extricating one from the other, no hope of either becoming critical
warriors or being relieved of the demand that we do so. The real task of this prediction is thus not to make
any claim on the future, but rather to pursue a sort of genealogy, in Nietzsche's or Foucault's sense, in reverse: a
projective genealogy, so to speak: an account not so much of the future as of the present, of the order of knowledge at this very
moment. War here is a way to theorize discourse as collective behavior, to reconceive shifting positions,
alliances, defenses, attacks, casualties and losses, logistical strengths and weaknesses, the friction and fog
of discursive conflict. I will sketch out nine grounds of intellectual warfare: Logistics, Logomachia, Fortification, the Desert, the
Screen, Number, High Ground, Chaos, and the Cemetery.^8^ These grounds are not exhaustive and do not constitute a singular field;
they are not arranged in a logical sequence and do not amount to a single argument moving toward a single conclusion. War looks
different from the vantage of each ground. During a given campaign an army or a writing might find itself, at different times, in
different tactical situations and encounters, occupying several or all of these grounds, and deploying its forces in different
arrangements. In this essay, the nine grounds do not amount to any telos, any whole, nor even an intellectual
position, but in my movement among them I hope to indicate, in the most preliminary and doubtless futile
manner, strategies for a critical writing that might actually learn from the war machines it studies.

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ALTERNATIVE SOLVES CASE
Alternative is the only way to truly prevent the escalation of conflict and solve case thats 1NC
Agamben evidence

The affirmatives constant opposition is nothing but the sharpening of knives against the world with
nothing left to cut. Recognizing the limits of discourse and the ability of opposition is the truly
revolutionary criticism, capable of overcoming the political deadlock of the status quo and the
affirmative. Instead of expanding warfare into discursive argumentation like the affirmative does, the
alternative acknowledges the failure of any discursive opposition; instead of the constant quest to
discover the object of criticism, we ensure the inaccessibility of war, ultimately making it impossible.

Only complete negativity that acknowledges the inaccessibility and incompleteness of criticism is
capable of overcoming the power structures inherent in the affirmatives resistance that only expand
the reach of war.
Mann, 96
2, January]
It is necessary to comprehend the force of extremely difficult ideas: the nomadic war-machine's exteriority to the state and its precise
relation to battle; the nomads' territorial engagement with smooth space, without "striation," interiority, or chrono-historical
organization; their indifference to semiological systems and their particular epistemological orientations (ornament instead of sign,
ballistics and metallurgical science, numbering, speed, etc.); the strange relation of _A Thousand Plateaus_ to texts that would seem to
treat the same matters in a more disciplinary way -- its relation, for instance, to psychoanalysis and philosophy (and what is the
strategic connection between this book and Deleuze's extraordinary and in many ways quite scholarly treatments of the history of
philosophy?); indeed, the very ontology of the nomadic %idea% itself: all of these must be explored in considerable detail, without
ever descending to any merely exegetical commentary, and without reducing what is at stake in this book to an intellectual position.
Deleuze and Guattari challenge us to rethink our whole relation to books and to writing, to the very order of our thought -- a task in
which they themselves often fail. One must begin by reading them at a loss, but a loss that is not only the result of
their work's difficulty, which careful analysis would eventually overcome; rather, a loss that reaches down
into our deepest epistemological attachments. It will be necessary, for instance, to reconceive the very
notion of intellectual rigor (the order of argument, demonstration, proof) and communicative clarity: not to abandon
them for the sake of some impressionistic indulgence, but to relocate them outside the striated space of
the state apparatus that has always provided their structure. One might find oneself, for instance, no
longer putting forth positions, outlining, defending, and identifying oneself with them: one might find
oneself engaged in an even more severe, more rigorous discipline of affirming ideas without attaching
oneself to them, making them appear (as Baudrillard suggested in another context) only so as to make them
disappear.^22^ One might find oneself developing a logic that is no longer striated and arborescent (a trunk
and its branches) but smooth, rhizomatic, turbulent, fractal, self-interfering, labyrinthine, subterranean.
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ALTERNATIVE SOLVES CASE
The affirmatives depictions of war become mirrors, reflecting the reality they seek to prevent. Their
discursive opposition to warfare reifies the structures of war they critique no solvency and only a
risk it turns case.
Mann, 96
2, January]
V. Screen: Much of what we will be given to read in the new war studies will be rehearsals of older critiques
of representation, heated by a certain love-hate toward cyber-technology; critiques of aestheticized
violence as violence against real suffering, with the critic posing heroically beside the figure of the real. This
moral reconnaissance of video games and smart bombs will be accompanied by historicist accounts of the
spectacular aspects of warfare, perhaps along the lines of Virilio's _War and Cinema_, in which, it is argued, "war is cinema and
cinema is war," a "deadly harmony . . . always establishes itself between the functions of eye and weapon" (26, 69). This facile but
suggestive conflation of military and cinematic epistemologies into a single logistical project will also lend
itself to the familiar critique of the phallic violence of the cinematic "gaze." The limit of these reflections is
liable to be the logic of the "simulacrum," greatly reduced from its development in either Baudrillard or Deleuze. Let me
suggest that the problem before us is not, however, only the spectacularly telegenic appearance of the Gulf
War but the fact that these critical reflections on spectacular screens are produced on the spectacular
screens of critics' computers. It will be necessary to investigate the cybernetic and epistemological
apparatus of critical debates in the light of developments in military technology and the conduct of actual
warfare, but it will be some time before the extraordinarily complex ways in which their integration occurs
can be adequately described, and one should avoid collapsing differences between these networks. They are
not to be mapped onto each other in any sort of simple homology; the means by which intellectual "cyberwar" serves the state
remain, to some degree, obscure. I would hope that enough thinkers soon become sufficiently bored with the standard critical tropes
about military simulation to move on to a more incisive critique of the connections between our software and the military's. For the
moment, this one observation: %simulation% means that intellectual warfare is always fought on %other% grounds. It is precisely the
sort of virtual war it condemns. It is not a pure extension of politics but a form of ritual warfare, a phenomenon of the ritual
dimension of politics and of the political deployment of ritual. War games of every kind present us with modes of
simulation, of surrogation, that should not be addressed solely by reference to some terrible, displaced
reality that criticism can or cannot locate behind the veil of the video image.^28^ What we witness is rather
the oblique necessity of virtual violence itself, of surrogate conflicts even in the very critique of surrogacy:
the necessary satisfaction of a demand for warfare that war alone cannot fully satisfy. So perhaps we still face
nothing more than a Mirror: All discursive warfare is autoaggressive. We sacrifice ourselves in the name of
an ego-ideal and become the enemy that we behold.
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FRAMEWORK 2NC
Our interpretation is debate should be a question of competing intellectual strategies the
affirmatives strategy is one that operates through political action, while the alternative is one of total
negation. This interpretation solves all their offense they get to weigh their case because its a
justification for the intellectual strategy, but we get to garner links off the discourse and methodology
of the 1AC that constitutes their intellectual stance. This interpretation is preferable

A. Understanding of discourse and methodology is a pre-requisite to understand political action
especially in the context of the affirmative where they argue that their intellectual stance has political
implications means were necessary to any political or intellectual education.

B. More real world debaters are intellectuals discussing strategies for advocating change utopian
notions of fiat presuppose political action is necessary and the ideal form for resistance if we win
that political action is bad, weve disproved the affirmative
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A2 AFFIRMATIVE OUTWEIGHS
Affirmative re-inscribes the conflicts they claim to solve and makes violence inevitable
A. They expand war into the field of discourse functioning not against warfare, but as an agent of it
the advance guard fighting for what they believe they oppose.
B. Total war Were controlling the internal link to escalation war only spirals out of control when
the affirmative believes they can CONTROL and REGULATE it through a precise knowledge of its
origins and how to stop it this results in a false sense of security culminating in violent annihilation.

Criticism fails by revealing itself to its enemies, and by getting caught up in the very cultural
commodification they criticize, positioning and circulation guarantee the AFFs failure. This is the
ultimate impact takeout and makes their impacts inevitable
Mann, 99
*Paul, Prof @ Pomona, Dept. English, Masocriticism: The Afterlife of the Avant-Garde, 1999, Pg. 3-4]
Now autopsies of the putative corpse of the avant-garde usually reveal a predictable etiology. In general, it
seems the avant-garde died because it was unable to sustain its alterity, its difference, its otherness. It
produced too many signs of the same and hence exhausted its credibility. The avant-garde died because all major forms of
anti-art or aesthetic resistance end up in the museums and cultural institutions that they began by calling
into question; because the avant-garde insistence on innovation reduced itself to the most trivial market for novelties; because
its attacks on tradition became tradition; because its attacks on the culture of the commodity only
produced more cultural commodities; because it could not at one and the same time oppose main-stream culture and serve
as its research and development agency; because anti-art succeeded despite itself in becoming Art; because, in short the avant-
garde continually turned itself into everything it denounced: fashion, commodities, high art, museum culture, Western
civilization, bourgeois self-indulgence, and academic commentary. These are the causes or symptoms of the avant-
gardes fatality in the standard accounts. For the most part, I was more interested in what those accounts suggested about
the perceived order of contemporary culture than in whether or not any of them was, strictly speaking, true; but in any case, let us
accept them for the moment as a set of facts and gather them into another diagnosis: The avant-garde died of exposure. It
died by revealing itself to its enemies. It put itself to death by continually attracting itself within the
discursive economy of the cultures it claimed to subvert. It buried itself alive in the very manifestoes,
events, collages, poems, and assemblages in which it proposed to live in a disruptive and utopian existence.
It died by putting itself in a position where people like me can appropriate it. It died of discourse. It talked, wrote, and
painted to death. Now this diagnosis suggests, first of all, that the avant-gardes death was not an event
that occurred at the end of a long and healthy life: from the very outset everything it produced was its
death; everything it produced delivered it into the arms of an economy in which death itself can be
reproduced as a commodity. European culture invented the avant-garde both to immunize itself against its opposition and to
profit from a representation of opposition. The avant-garde is capitals homeopathic cure for the disease of cultural opposition.

A war on war is still a war Critical resistance to war replicates the militant thought it seeks to
prevent in the discursive struggle against war Any benefits to their intellectual stance are illusionary,
for their discursive transformation of war is nothing but a maintenance of the status quo.
Mann, 96
2, January]
As the economy in general and technological development in particular come to be seen in logistical terms,
so the critical industry too will be taken as a logistical system, and war discourse as pure war carried out by
Reservoir RS 17/38

other means. But it is all too easy to conflate military, technological, and intellectual production. It might be that the forces of
deterrence or nuclear war really do extend into criticism, into the study of texts, into the colloquium and critical journal, but even if
there is some economic coordination between them, it would be a mistake to elide their differences. There is no question that
military success is increasingly determined by access to technical knowledge and that logistical
development is a laboratory for new technologies, but to recognize this is not to prove that all fields of
knowledge are connected to military research in the same ways. Such claims will certainly be made, with fantastic
effects, just as the critical truisms that fictions are informed by political realities and that politics is dependent upon fictive forms are
turned around, without careful examination of the reversability of these propositions, into the quite dubious but productive thesis that
therefore criticism of these fictions constitutes political action. What pure war indicates, however, is that intellectual warfare is
not oppositional: it is a form of systems-maintenance, and a feature of the status quo of capital. [11] Hence
war discourse will cast intellectuals as agents of a general logistical economy and at the same time offer
them an array of quite useful and quite delusional critical fantasies about their combat for and against the
warfare state. But let me suggest another economics here, another fantasy, one not restricted to the familiar terms of use- and
exchange-value for the military-industrial-knowledge complex, but based as it were on waste-value: a general economy, in Bataille's
sense: an economy like that of the sun, which gives life but is utterly indifferent to it, burns itself out as fast as it can, expends most of
its energy into the void. Bataille's image of war-economics is the ritual practice of the potlatch, a form of symbolic combat most likely
associated with funerary observances, but which he sees as a solar means of purging the superabundance of natural and cultural
energy. The purpose of art and thought is the purest expenditure, waste, %depense%.^11^ Intellectual warfare can be seen
in this light, as ritualized combat whose value is that it has no value: a means of squandering useless
wealth. Intellectual production is the production of superfluities tricked out with beautiful illusory truths,
and we meet to exchange ideas only in order to destroy thought itself with these ludicrous gifts.

The affirmatives intellectual warfare is already dead discourses critical of war phenomenalize the
combat they oppose, ignoring the way their claims of understanding are nothing but simulations,
already vanished.
Mann, 96
[Paul, Prof @ Pomona, Dept. English, The Nine Grounds of Intellectual Warfare, Postmodern Culture, Vol. 6 No.
2, January]
When the notion that knowledge is not only power but a mode of warfare has gained sufficient currency, criticism will take it upon
itself to develop the strategic implications of thought, and to combat the coordination of the "knowledge industries" with the military-
industrial complex. Here, however, on this final ground, already razed by the self-consuming turbulence of battle,
the project of war study is neither to serve the state nor to oppose it, but rather to trivialize the very idea of
war, as we trivialize everything we take up as sublime. Even as it imposes itself with unprecedented force,
intellectual warfare is already dead. It is death carried out by other means. Do not mistake this claim. It has nothing to
do with saying that war talk will stop; on the contrary, we will be subjected to it as never before precisely
because it is dead. Let me repeat this essay's fundamental law: The object of criticism is always a phenomenalization
of some systemic device of discourse, and it always appears in a surrogate form at the very moment it is no
longer functional. The task in respect to the knowledge and critique of war is thus not developmental but
%simulacral%, a term whose own recent fate attests to its truth. Everything that Baudrillard's theory of simulation was about
happened to the theory itself: the sublime disappearance of its own referent through its obscene overexposure, its precipitous
reduction to a mere bit of intellectual currency that quickly expended all its value and force. But what if that is the task of intellectual
warfare as well: not to advance and defend the new truths of war but to ruin them in the very act of construing them, to level
whatever criticism has assigned to itself of war's sublimity, to recast it in the proxy forms of mental war toys and pitch them about in
mock combats, in ritual battles for possession of the dead, waged in the name of the dead and on dead ground, and most of all to cast
their shades across the future. We -- and who really is speaking here? is it the dead themselves? -- we come to fight
discourse's war against itself. We are soldiers of an intellectual "suicide state" that practices the politics of
its own disappearance (PW 90). War for us is no longer an idea, a historical object, or even a sublime image:
all these are only symptoms of an autoaggressive drive, a rage for self-destruction, a turbulent movement
that distributes and evacuates every image and idea. We are like Kleist's Kolhaas or Penthesilea, in a question posed by
Deleuze and Guattari: "Is it the destiny of the war machine, when the State triumphs, to be caught in this alternative: either to be
nothing more than the disciplined, military organ of the State apparatus, or %to turn against itself%, to become a double suicide
machine?"^36^ It is certainly one task of _A Thousand Plateaus_ to avoid reducing its field to such alternatives, such ethico-political
Reservoir RS 18/38

choices -- to project and affirm different possibilities. But here, at this moment and on this ground, imagine Kolhaas on the scaffold,
reading the future of the state in a text that he always carried close to his heart but never before considered, and swallowing it
without uttering its truth at the very instant he expires.
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A2 AFFIRMATIVE RESISTS WAR/MARGINALIZATION
Thats the point your opposition to war becomes a war on war a claim to know and combat forms
of thought that make war inevitable this only results in the expansion of warfare as DISCOURSE
thats 1NC Mann evidence.

The aff attempts to use those in the margins for their own political purpose their resistance to
marginalization is already accounted for by the instruments of power they oppose. The introduction
of war into discourse serves only to expand these instruments.
Mann, 96
2, January]
I am fully aware of how treacherous, how complex and self-contradictory a gesture it is even to refer to these ideas in such a form and
such a forum as this one, how properly absurd it would be to pursue writing, to pursue knowledge itself, in the following manner: The
hydraulic model of nomad science and the war machine . . . consists in being distributed by turbulence across a smooth space, in
producing a movement that holds space and simultaneously affects all of its points, instead of being held by space in a local
movement from one specified point to another. . . . The nomadic trajectory . . . distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one
that is indefinite and noncommunicating. . . . [S]edentary space is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures,
while nomad space is smooth, marked only by "traits" that are effaced and displaced with the trajectory. Even the lamellae of the
desert slide over each other, producing an inimitable sound. The nomad distributes himself in a smooth space; he occupies, inhabits,
holds that space; that is his territorial principle. It is therefore false to define the nomad by movement. . . . [T]he nomad is on the
contrary %he who does not move%. Whereas the migrant leaves behind a milieu that has become amorphous or hostile, the nomad
is one who does not depart, does not want to depart, who clings to the smooth space left by the receding forest, where the steppe
or the desert advance, and who invents nomadism as a response to this challenge. (TP 363, 380-81) How shall we read this passage,
which so clearly bears on the organization of thought itself, even in respect to the question of the historical, empirical factuality of its
account? How shall we read work that conceives nomadism in a way that has nothing to do with the standard distinction between
stasis and movement, that never defines nomadism simply as movement opposed to sedentary positions? Can we ourselves move and
distribute our thought across a deterritorialized discursive field, now conceived as smooth space, living off it without attachment to or
support of any state form? And how can one %write% nomadically, since Deleuze and Guattari consign writing to the state apparatus?
23 What then is writing to them? One's very attempt to appropriate nomadology in a critical essay serves as
another instance of the state's never quite successful appropriation of the war machine, and of the never
fully addressed logistical-economic order of one's own thought. Let me advance here -- as a preliminary gesture
toward work being carried out elsewhere and precisely in other forms, and perhaps only in order to help put an end to the delusional
use of such terms as nomadology, deterritorialization, and the rhizome in almost every academic forum that tries to employ them -- a
tactical figure that has nothing to do with sedentary and fortified positions: the assemblage. I am concerned
here with the "numerical" organization of intellectual work. 24 Such work is of course highly institutional, hierarchical,
regimental: intellectuals labor as individuals but their individualism is for the most part the atomic form of
social and discursive systems entirely reliant on this atomization. The assemblage represents a mode of
intellectual organization quite distinct from the pyramid scheme of individual in the service of discipline
(whatever its ideological orientation) in the service of institution, etc., under which the professional intellectual
currently labors. The notion of the assemblage can be traced, along one of its lines, to the nomad on horseback.
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A2 PERMUTATION
Permutation links the alternative is complete negation recognizing that the affirmatives need for
action is simply the endless sharpening of knives on the world, believing that some political reform is
capable of introducing the change we need.

This means they either link or sever out of the intellectual endorsement of political action if the
permutation links, the alternative is preferable
A. Avoids the co-option disad on the link debate the political reform is a way for the state to co-opt
the intellectual resistance originally present in the 1AC this results in the expansion of warfare into
discourse.
B. Avoids phenomenalization argument attempting to KNOW warfare results in the affirmatives
discourse BECOMING a war against war absent totalizing negation, criticism always becomes a
symptom of its subject.

And, if the permutation severs out of their intellectual advocacy, thats a voting issue
A. Destroys negative ground we cant garner offense off of anything in the 1AC, meaning the 2AC
would just spike out of every position in the 1NC and by then its too late for the negative to recover,
leading to shallow debates.
B. Time skew we wasted half the 1NC on a position they argue doesnt link anymore they get to
spend twice as much time on every other argument.

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A2 PERMUTATION
The permutation is impossible faced with the impenetrable fog of war, the affirmative attempts to
analyze, order, and master its existence, sharpening their knives on the world. This is an impossible
task for fog and indecipherability is the IRREDUCIBLE element of war. The alternative instead maps
this indecipherability in its own self-negation.
Mann, 96
2, January]
VIII. Chaos: Consider what Clausewitz calls the fog of war -- its untheorizable turmoil, error, accidents, chance, the sheer disorientation
of combat terror. The fog of war is quite literally noise, war's resistance to language, to objectification, to the
code: both its problematic and its seductiveness, the limit of its intelligibility and the depth of its sublimity.
There are two approaches to this fog. One can try to burn it off with the bright intensity of analysis, as if it
were only a surface effect, even though everything would lead one to believe that fog is an irreducible
element of war, something that must be taken into account, that cannot simply be withdrawn. Then perhaps
one ought instead to attempt to map this fog, not in order to eliminate it but to put it to use. The fog of
war might be more than an enemy of reason: it might be a tactical advantage. But how to map the fog of war? I anticipate an
increase in references to chaos theory, discourse analyses deploying language like the following: military interest in turbulent phenomena revolves around the question of its
negative effects in the performance of weapons systems or the effects of air drag on projectiles or water drag on submarines. But for our purposes, we
want an image not of the external effects of turbulent flows, but of their internal structure. We are not
concerned here with the destructive effects that a hurricane, for instance, may produce, but with the
intricate patterns of eddies and vortices that define its inner structure. . . . In order to better understand
turbulence, we must first rid ourselves of the idea that turbulent behavior represents a form of chaos. For a
long time turbulence was identified with disorder or noise. Today we know that this is not the case. Indeed, while turbulent motion appears as irregular or chaotic on the
macroscopic scale, it is, on the contrary, highly organized on the microscopic scale. The multiple space and time scales involved in turbulence correspond to the coherent
behavior of millions and millions of molecules. Viewed in this way, the transition from laminar flow to turbulence is a process of self-organization.^33^ It is
nonetheless already the case that, in critical discourse, behind all the humanistic myths of communication,
understanding, and interpretive fidelity, one finds the tactical value of misinterpretations. In an argument it
is often crucial for combatants not to know their enemy, to project instead a paper figure, a distortion,
against which they can conceive and reinforce their own positions. %Intelligence%, here, is not only knowledge of
one's enemies but the tactical lies one tells about them, even to oneself. This is so regular a phenomenon of discursive
conflict that it cannot be dismissed as an aberration that might be remedied through better
communication, better listening skills, more disinterested criticism. One identifies one's own signal in part
by jamming everyone else's, setting it off from the noise one generates around it. There is, in other words, already plenty of
fog in discursive warfare, and yet we tend to remain passive in the face of it, and for the most part completely and uncritically committed to exposing ourselves to attack. Imagine
what might be possible for a writing that is not insistently positional, not devoted to shoring itself up, to fixing itself in place, to laying out all its plans under the eyes of its
opponents. Nothing, after all, has been more fatal for the avant-gardes than the form of the manifesto. If only surrealism had been more willing to lie, to dissimulate, to abandon
the petty narcissism of the position and the desire to explain itself to anyone who would listen, and instead explored the potential offered it by the model of the secret society it
also hoped to be. Intellectual warfare must therefore investigate the tactical advantages of deception and clandestinity over the habitual, quasi-ethical demands of clarity and
forthrightness, let alone the narcissistic demands of self-promotion and mental exhibitionism, from however fortified a position. If to be seen by the enemy is
to be destroyed, then intellectual warfare must pursue its own stealth technology. Self-styled intellectual warriors will
explore computer networks not only as more rapid means of communication and publishing but as means for circumventing publication, as semi-clandestine lines of circulation,
encoded correspondence, and semiotic speed. There will be no entirely secure secrecy, just as there are no impregnable positions -- that too is Virilio's argument -- but a shrouded
nomadism is already spreading in and around major discursive conflicts. There are many more than nine grounds, but the rest are secret.
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A2 PERMUTATION WAR MACHINE DA
The affirmative results in the appropriation of their opposition by the state the action of reform is
simply a way to appropriate the affirmatives criticism, turning the oppositional nature of the war
machine into the tool of the state. The affirmatives discourse of opposition becomes violent when
employed by the state.
Mann, 96
2, January]
The task is to develop a war machine "that does not have war as its object." It is a persistent theme for Deleuze and
Guattari: the war machine only takes military conflict as its primary object when it is appropriated by the
state; nomadology indicates other directions and ends. Reducing the war machine to warfare: in the realm
of intellectual warfare, that would involve reducing it to conflicting binaries, to dialectics. If warfare as such
indicates the most reduced dialectical forms of positionality and negation (no use imagining oneself
"beyond dialectics," since the %beyond% still drags the dialectic along with it), even the state army's
distribution of its forces might already suggest a more nomadic form of organization: deployed like a herd
across a whole field, communicating rhizomatically, etc.^26^ Witness then this strange twist on Clausewitz: the
distinction between absolute war as Idea and real wars seems of great importance. . . . The pure Idea is not that of the abstract
elimination of the adversary, but that of a war machine which does not have war as its object, and which only entertains a potential
or supplementary relation with war. Thus the nomad war machine does not appear to us to be one case of real war among others,
as in Clausewitz, but on the contrary the content adequate to the Idea, the invention of the Idea, with its own objects, space, and
composition of the %nomos%. . . . The other pole seem[s] to be the essence; it is when the war machine, with infinitely lower
"quantities," has as its object not war, but the tracing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and of the
movement of people in that space. At this other pole, the machine does indeed encounter war, but as its supplementary or synthetic
object, now directed against the State and against the worldwide axiomatic expressed by States. (420, 422) It is crucial to note that
Deleuze and Guattari are not critics, of Clausewitz or anything else. For all its talk of "against the state," very little about
their work has to do with critical dialectics. They are committed rather to a certain %affirmation%,
generated perhaps most of all out of their nomadic encounters with Nietzsche's thought. In that sense, a proper
approach to their work will never take the form of elaborating critical objections to it, even when they would seem to be warranted.
Nonetheless, I would argue that the greatest obstacle to deploying nomadology in a smooth space outside the state lies in the fact that
nomadology, or something like it, might also represent the current form of the state's own development. Sedentary armies are being
defeated and replaced by nomadic strategies still directed toward warfare, in the service of deterritorializing states.^27^ If the end
of global deterrence has hardly resulted in anything resembling a more pacific internationalism, but rather
in a more ferocious and, it is often claimed, atavistic nationalism -- represented in western eyes, as usual, by
Africa (e.g., Rwanda) and the Balkans -- at the same time we are also witnessing a reorganization of the state
apparatus through the movement of multinational capital, information technologies, and high-tech
international military interventions, as in Somalia and the Gulf. It is tempting, for some, to see these changes as signs
of a shift from an old world order to a newer, braver one, but one ought to see them instead as the most complex of knots. The
Bosnian conflict represents at one and the same time an especially vicious nationalism and the resurgence
of nomadic war machines; the allied forces of the Gulf War represent interests at one and the same time
external to the state and entirely in its employ; multinational capital represents at one and the same time a
nomadic form of deterritorialization and the state's attempt to survive what it believes to be its imminent
demise. In the light of these events intellectual warfare confronts the complexities of its own
appropriations and lines of flight. It also confronts massive proof of its utter triviality.
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A2 PERMUTATION WAR MACHINE DA
Total and utter extinction the violent war machine is the underlying logical of all impulses to
destroy. This cooption of the war machine provides the mechanism for redeployment of their
movement as a project of the violent identity of the state, crushing other modes of resistance.
Deleuze & Guattari, 87
[Gilles, University of Paris VII Professor, Felix, Badass, A Thousand Plateaus, 1987, Pg. 420-421]
When the State appropriates the war machine, the latter obviously changes in nature and function, since it is afterward
directed against the nomad and all state destroyers. After the war machine has been appropriated by the
State in this way that it tends to take war as its direct and primary object. The State apparatus appropriates a war
machine, that the war machine takes war as its object, and that the war becomes subordinated to the aims of the State. The State
apparatus is able to lay hold of war and thus turn the war machine back against the nomads. The capture of the
warmachine by the State took place by constituting it in accordance with rules corresponding to civil society
as a whole. The distinction between absolute war as Idea and real wars seems to us to be of great importance. For a war machine
that does not have war as its object. Nevertheless, it is still an Idea, and it is necessary to retain the concept of the pure Idea, even
though this war machine was realized by the nomads. It is the nomads rather who remains an abstraction, an Idea. This does not
affect the purity of the concept but introduces always mixed objects, or combinations of space and composition, which react back
upon the war machine from the beginning. The nomad war machine necessarily effectuates its synthetic relation with war as
supplement, uncovered and developed in opposition to the state-form, the deconstruction of which is at issue. Without the State,
for its part, finding the opportunity to appropriate the war machine, and the means of making war the direct
object of this turned around machine (thus the integration of the nomad into the state is a vector traversing nomadism from
the very beginning, from the first act of war against the state). The state apparatus appropriates the war machine,
subordinates it to its political aims, and gives it war as its direct object. The factors that make State war
total war are closely connected to capitalism : it has to do with the investment of constant capital in
equipment, industry, and the war economy, and the investment of variable capital in the population its physical and mental
aspects. Total war is not only a war of annihilation but arises when annihilation takes as its center not only
the enemy army, or the enemy State, but the entire population and its economy. Total war remains subordinated
to State political aims and merely realizes the maximal conditions of the appropriation of the war machine by the State apparatus.
When total war becomes the object of the appropriated war machine then at this level in the set of all
possible conditions, the object and the aim enter the relations that can reach the point of contradiction.
States tend to unleash, reconstitute an immense war machine of which they are no longer anything more
than opposable or apposed parts. This worldwide war machine, which in a way reissues from the States,
displays two successive figures: first, that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited movement with no
other aim than itself; but fascism is only a rough sketch, and the second postfascist, figure is that of a war
machine that takes peace as its object directly, as the peace of Terror or Survival. The war machine reforms
a smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth.
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****LINKS****
Reservoir RS 25/38

DISCURSIVE WARRIOR LINK
The transformation of discourse into war is inherent in the affirmatives resistance to war. The
critique of warriors transforms the affirmative into a new discursive warrior, concealing the expansion
of total war.
Mann, 96
2, January]
It is commonplace to reduce intellectual production to economic terms. There is a vast, indeed a surplus critique of the
commodification of thought, but critics are only just beginning to believe, as perhaps our travelling CEO has long
believed, that there is some advantage in seeing their own business as warfare, and that it is possible to do so
because culture, business, and defense are always %to some degree% integrated.^9^ Any executive who
entertains the notion that he or she is a corporate warrior is no doubt engaged in a fantasy, but one should not be too quick to dismiss
the utility of such fantasies, their ability to inspire performance. And perhaps we too should make a more rigorous
accounting of our own investments in various critical ideologies, which so often presume to combat the
institution while sustaining its discursive economy by the very means of our attacks. Everyone is aware that
thought has been reified and transformed into a commodity, but that awareness has never inhibited
production. The critique of the commodity produces perfectly marketable commodities. The half-conscious
fantasies of the truth-warrior energize the intellectual economy quite as much as the samurai fantasies of
the corporate factotum fuel the marketplace. Virilio would argue that they are not fantasies at all; stripped of
narcissistic ornament, we would still have to see ourselves as soldiers. Writing in the high years of the Cold War,
Virilio developed a theory of "pure war," global war so efficient it never needs to be fought, rather like William Burroughs's notion that
a functioning police state needs no police. What is most crucial for Virilio's conception of the warfare state is his extreme emphasis on
logistics. "Logistics is the beginning of the economy of war, which will become simple economy, to the point
of replacing political economy" (PW 4).
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INTELLECTUAL STANCE LINK
The affirmatives intellectual stand is nothing but the fortification of a certain discursive structure.
Resistance in the form of intellectual positions has already undermined itself and planted the seeds
for its own destruction as every position must eventually be abandoned.
Mann, 96
2, January]
III. Fortification: Nothing is more important to the intellectual than a position. Even the fabled collapse of foundations
has done little to change this: economically, discursively, this collapse turns out to be yet another position,
something to believe in and hold true, the consolidation of "flows," "drift," etc., into the most familiar academic architecture.
You must have a position, and if you do not, one will be assigned to you, or you will simply not exist. The
homology of position as standpoint and position as job, budget line, FTE, is a matter of a great deal more than analogy or vulgar
marxism. With a position, everything is possible. You are supported by a truth, a discipline, a methodology, a
rhetorical style, a discursive form, a mode of production and exchange. You know where you stand, you recognize
yourself by your position; you see yourself there because you see yourself seen there. Your position is your identity and
value; it authorizes your work, circulates it, constitutes it as property, lends you the security of ownership. But at the same time
nothing is possible with a position. To hold a position is to be held by it, to be caught up in its inertial and
economic determinations, to be captured by an identity that you might not, finally, believe to be quite your own. Nothing
could be more difficult than really, substantively, radically to change one's mind, change the forms in which
one works, risk everything by leaving behind a position on which, it seems, everything has come to rely. The
position is a fundamental form of civilization. Recall Virilio's remark that the city itself originates in a position, a garrison, a defensive
posture, a logistical form.^17^ To adopt the terminology of _A Thousand Plateaus_, the position is a "sedentary
fortification" of "state armies"; it is entirely contained by the state apparatus.^18^ In academic criticism, the
symbolic place of the state is occupied and held by the text or %oeuvre%, around which the defending force of
commentaries is deployed; in a field such as English or Comparative Literature, the state or national form of the text is clearly
and hence problematically manifested. The critic defends the text by the elaborate construction of interpretations around it; at the
same time, in a kind of fractal homomorphism, the critic's own position is defined and defended by the construction
of the paper circle of his or her own works. The more forces occupy a position, the stronger it will be. The
barrage of words projected from the most heavily fortified strongholds (currently: New Historicism, postcolonial criticism, certain
orders of gender and race theory) can repel critiques by sheer force of numbers. Indeed, conflict between positions is itself
one of the chief means by which they are defined. As Rose points out, for Freud war "not only threaten[s] civilization, it
can also advance it. By tending towards the conglomeration of nations, it operates [not only] like death [but also] like the eros which
strives to unify" In intellectual warfare, the strategic form of this erotic unification is the discipline, in every
sense of the word.^19^ Mechanisms of regimental identification are crucial here. It would be impossible to overestimate the
importance of %esprit de corps% to garrisoned forces. Healthy competition keeps troops battle-sharp and singles out the most
effective officers, but such conflict must be contained and focused toward strategic goals. If, on one hand, it is a mistake to refer
to intellectual movements%, since their force is always institutional, static, on the other hand it is the fixity
of the intellectual position that proves to be illusory. A position must not only be held, but advanced. The surrounding
territory must come under its influence and control. Furthermore, as Clausewitz indicates, defenses tend to become offensive. It is
not simply that the best defense is a good offense; defenses, like attacks, exceed the limits of strategic
reason. The escalating, offensive character of nuclear deterrence has long been noted. So also for the
provocative force of the most striking cultural formations: defensive postures escalate beyond the power of whatever threat they face.
More importantly, the position is never more than a temporary establishment: once consolidated, its
termination is assured; the more force it generates, the more certain that its walls will be breached. That is
Virilio's brief against deterrence: it exhausts its own resources, it destroys the societies it defends. There is no
indefensible position, and no position that can be defended for very long. At the moment a position is
Reservoir RS 27/38

founded, its destruction has begun. Defections to other positions, other cities of words, are doubtless already under way. The
intellectual position is therefore not simply a ground, let alone a foundation, however attached to or identified with it its garrison
becomes, even in the act of arguing that there is no foundation. On the contrary, the position turns out to be a point along a vector, a
line of advance or retreat, a temporary encampment, a bivouac, of strategic or tactical importance alone, and supportable only by
means of its relation to other positions, other forces, counterforces, and logistical agencies all along the line. There is no question that
the strength of the sited force's investment in its ground, however temporary, is crucial. But in the end every position will turn
out to have been a relay-point or intersection, the temporary location of an intellectual army whose
grounding is not to be measured by its "rightness" -- the archaic notion of %truth proven by combat% may be said to
survive only in the academy -- but by its force and resistance in relation to other quantities of force, velocity,
intensity, logistical power, tactical skill, etc., all of which will not only support but eventually help to detach
that army from its ground.
Reservoir RS 28/38

KNOWLEDGE LINK
The conflation of power and knowledge results in a violent destruction that creates the wars the
affirmative attempts to resist.
Mann, 96
2, January]
That is why Clausewitz distrusts theory, even as he engages in what would seem to be a theoretical exercise. According to Garry Wills,
that is also why Clausewitz insists on the distinction between theory and %Kritik%, the broadest empirical assessment
possible in any strategic or tactical situation, without reference to absolute laws of warfare that the realities
of battle may well disprove, with disastrous results for those who adhere to them. It is not that Clausewitz refuses
any generality -- his dictum about war as politics is certainly theoretical, and rules of warfare are proposed everywhere in his text --
rather that tactical and strategic considerations should never be determined by rules alone; rules need to be
tested, and what is most important is close critical observation of the field of battle from the highest
empirical ground available. But if Wills believes that the distinction between theory and %Kritik% resolves the problem of
analyzing the friction of war, Pick is just as adamant that theory and %Kritik% themselves are at war in Clausewitz's own analysis, in
any consideration of warfare, and the notorious inconsistencies of _On War_ reflect the truth of this conflict. %Kritik% is
compromised by its own forms of friction. As Peter Paret observes, in published studies of war even the most factual
descriptions of battle ought to be printed in a different colored ink to indicate the discrepancy between a battle and every account of
it.^14^ War is absolute force pushed past the limit of dialectical recuperation; it involves the theoretical
experience of the destruction of theory, which cannot be alleviated by any resort to empiricism. Jacqueline
Rose makes a similar point in respect to Freud. As a fundamental instance of human aggression, war could be said to constitute a
proper field for psychoanalytic investigation, an object of scientific knowledge. The problem is that [if] Freud offers . . . an explanation
of war, he does so by means of the death drive. But the death drive, and hence the truth of war, operates, it has so
often been pointed out, as the speculative vanishing point of psychoanalytic theory, and even more boldly,
of the whole of scientific thought.^15^ Hence war is not only an object of knowledge but its "crisis," its
proper logomachia, "the instability, the necessary failure, of knowledge as resolution that [Freud] places at
the foundation, or limit, of all scientific thought."^16^ War . . . operates in Freud's discourse, and not only in that of
Freud, as a limit to the possibility of absolute or total knowledge, at the same time as such absolute or total
knowledge seems over and again to be offered as one cause -- if not %the% cause -- of war. . . . The end of
war [is] the end of knowledge. (16-17) What is most challenging about this formulation is that the destruction of
knowledge, its vanishing point, is both its foundation and its limit, the condition of its existence even as it
destroys it. The impossibility of knowledge becomes the very order of knowledge. This device too must
eventually rise into discourse and manifest itself as a proxy object of inquiry.
Reservoir RS 29/38

OTHER LINK
The affirmatives identification with the other in supposed resistance to oppression re-inscribes the
otherization it claims to oppose by masking the expansion of discourse as war throughout their
intellectual stand.
Mann, 96
2, January]
IV. Desert: The standpoint, identification with and defense of one's own thought, the demand that one be on
one's own side, that one stand by one's word, is so standard a feature of intellectual ethics and politics that
it has been taken completely for granted. But the entrenched position is a vestige of archaic forms of warfare. The Tofflers
argue that the Gulf War demonstrated the failure of entrenchment -- Iraq's older, industrial, sedentary strategy -- against advanced
military technologies of speed, stealth, and coordinated intelligence. "[T]he allied force was not a [conventional military] machine, but
a system with far greater internal feedback, communication, and self-regulatory adjustment capability. It was . . . a 'thinking system'"
(80). For Napoleon as well, Virilio notes, "the capacity for war [was] the capacity for movement" (WC 10). In the same manner, those
bound to intellectual positions remain blind to the tactical advantages of mobility and secrecy, and the new war studies will be used to
suggest strategic figures outside the position's fortified walls. I will return to the precisely oxymoronic, self-canceling figure of secrecy
in a later section. Here, I will proceed by suggesting that the new war studies should come to quite rigorous and
unromantic terms with the nomadology of Deleuze and Guattari.^20^ In their work, the war machine is
essentially exterior to the state, even if the state appropriates it. The problem is, therefore, how to pursue
exteriority in disciplinary and epistemological structures that are themselves entirely defined by their
institutional interiority. It will certainly not be through any of the current specular and spectacular modes
of narcissistic identification with the "other." One should treat every text that peddles its vicarious
nomadism while elaborating the most conventional analyses with the greatest suspicion, and at the same
time with some confidence, perhaps still quite groundless, that an intellectual nomadology might still be
carried out elsewhere.^21^
Reservoir RS 30/38

POWER STRUCTURE LINK
The affirmatives intellectual warfare against war itself is not a criticism of power structures, but their
proxy the force expanding the reach of warfare into discourse itself.
Mann, 96
2, January]
II. Logomachia: The quasi-conflictual structure of the colloquium; the nationalization of intellectual outlooks
(e.g., French vs. Anglo-American feminism, English studies vs. German philology in the wake of the First World War); the
diversification" of disciplines carried out as the conquest and colonization of discrete areas of academic territory, and all the ensuing
turf wars between departments, methodologies, etc.; rising concern about the invasive, "violent" force of
interrogation and argument in even so innocuous an act as literary interpretation; all the petty jockeying for
personal advantage that will pass for intellectual combat: these are horizonal phenomena, indications of more
prevalent and insistent orders of conflict that structure intellectual work and, perhaps, work in general. Beyond
these familiar instances, imagine for a moment (it is a fable, not philosophy) that Hegel, or at least Kojeve's Hegel, was right:
consciousness, history, civilization begin with combat: "man, to be really, truly 'man,' and to know that he is such, must . . . impose the
idea he has of himself on beings other than himself," in a fight to the death in which no one dies, and in which the stakes are only
recognition, the establishment of a certain narcissistic regime, the invention of nothing more than the subject.^12^ Perhaps then
the first violence is the formal and ideal reduction of the complexity of conflict to a dialectical system. Let
me modulate the fable a bit further: When imposition is collective, the fight becomes battle. When it is strategically
directed, it becomes warfare. When we fight to impose not our own idea but an idea that has been
imposed upon us, and with which we identify so intensely it is as if the idea were our own, we become
soldiers. The soldier is essential to the dialectic: neither master nor quite simply slave but the device that mediates between them.
The soldier is slave as hero, risking death in order to impose the master's will on another slave. Perhaps intellectual soldiers
too are not slaves who can comprehend their slavery and still revolt but hoplite phalanxes marshalled in
order for the day of intellectual battle; Plato's guardians in the chariot of reason, and a chariot is, after all, a military
transport. It is not even precisely that some specific other has imposed his idea on us: the master is always in
part a figure out of our own imagination, out of our desire and fear, a stand-in for a "true" master we can
never quite locate and who need not even really exist, and we confront "death" in his name, in various
surrogate forms, so that we will never have to confront our death. Any veteran of combat could testify to the folly of
this project, even though the veteran might only have shifted his or her own allegiance to another ideal. The slave's fear of
death is thus overcome as a warrior fantasy, itself in the service of a master the slave has to some degree
invented. For the intellectual warrior as well, fear of death -- of not being recognized, and thus of not being
-- is not overcome but displaced, sublimated, pursued through a vast array of surrogates, including the
sublime study of death. Intellectual warfare is not a culmination of the master-slave dialectic but its proxy,
its aesthetic.
Reservoir RS 31/38

VIOLENCE LINK
The affirmatives resistance to war manifests itself in an obsession with the notion of violence,
bringing it into the discursive sphere. War ruins thought, re-establishing dominance.
Mann, 96
2, January]
The sentimental violence of dialectics. Today almost everyone seems to believe that, at the end of this struggle,
what we confront is not the triumph of absolute reason but the collapse of the entire project, the idea, the
hope and dream of the absolute. I would argue that this %theoretical% collapse is the event-horizon, the
phenomenal threshold, of intellectual warfare. The theoretical abandonment of the absolute is rarely
accompanied by its disappearance: the absolute returns in a ghostly form, haunting precisely those
discourses that claim to have left it behind, and that continue to orient themselves around its evacuation.
Nevertheless, this half-waking from the half-dream of absolute reason returns us to a primal dialectical scene,
to a war for recognition now %without stakes%. In the farcical relativism that results, dominance is ever more
explicitly a matter not of truth but of force. And if we discover that we have never gone further, that force is all that ever
mattered, can we say that the dialectic ever occurred at all? This self-consuming conflict is visible from another perspective. If war,
as an extension of logistical, tactical, and strategic knowledge, is an extension of thought, it also ruins
thought. It exceeds every effort of dialectical containment. The same forces that drive military conflicts
past the limits of rational control, in Clausewitz's view, drive the idea of war past the limits of conception. As
Daniel Pick observes, For Clausewitz, war is always to be understood as subordinate to political will. That is an iron law. But it also
slips out of control, threatening to become jubilantly and anarchically autonomous. It is willed, but all too prone to chance and
accident. . . . The practice of war, Clausewitz contends, can be shown to undermine the consistency of thought and theory upon war.
. . . [War is] an idea, an abstraction, a supposed structural necessity; but also . . . an impossible subject, the
subversive force in the account that seeks to master it.^13^ The "friction" of war can never be reduced to a
system.
Reservoir RS 32/38

WAR DISCOURSE LINK
The affirmative transforms intellectual discourse into war, creating and reflecting the representations
of war they attempt to criticize, masking the pervasive expansion of violence and conquest into the
intellectual arena.
Mann, 96
2, January]
Perhaps this imminent frenzy of production will open another front in the current campaign against the
aesthetics of ideology. To the extent that modern warfare depends on the eclipse of the real by images,
cultural critics would seem especially qualified to analyze it. Elaine Scarry: "it is when a country has become to its
citizens a fiction that wars begin."^2^ If this is the case, if war arises from an investment in certain fictions, then critics
of fiction ought to be able to teach us to read war critically -- and, along the way, to establish the moral and
political gravity of their own work. What is at issue here, however, are not only analyses of war but also
analogies of it. We will burrow into the archives of warfare because we will see, or at least want to see,
criticism itself as a form of warfare. We will project an image of ourselves onto a field of study and
recognize our reflection in it. Gender critics already study war discourse in order both to attack its violent phallicism and to
conceive gender struggle itself along strategic lines. We have theory wars, PC wars, linguistics wars, Gerald Graff's culture
wars, Avital Ronell appropriating the war on drugs for a theory of reading.^3^ Vast energies will be expended
not only on the archives and rhetoric of warfare but on the warcraft of rhetoric and critical inquiry, on the
"violence" of the question, on the "mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms" that,
for Nietzsche, make up what is called truth.^4^ We will pursue the subject of warfare because we will
increasingly see a relationship between our own activity and warfare. Let me articulate the law that governs this
movement: Critical discourse always tends toward the eventual phenomenalization, as objects of study, of the
devices that structure it. War becomes a field of critical study when critics come to believe, however
obliquely, that criticism has always been a field of warfare. And warfare not only in the narrow terms of intellectual
difference, but in the most material terms as well. If, for Clausewitz, war is an extension of policy, for Paul Virilio the reverse is true:
politics and culture are, from the outset, extensions of warfare, of a logistical economy that encompasses
and ultimately exhausts all of society. Standard critiques of the coordination of scientific research with the "military-
industrial complex" are already being extended to include the ideological state apparatus; for Virilio, technology as such is a logistical
invention and in one way or another always answers logistical demands, and the same point will be made about technologies of
representation.^5^ The humanities are in a mood to see the complicity of what Enzensberger called the "consciousness
industry" in the military-industrial-knowledge complex, to see themselves at one and the same time as ideological
agents of the state's "war machine" and as warriors against the state.^6^ I will have more to say about this
contradiction.
Reservoir RS 33/38

****2NR STUFF****
Reservoir RS 34/38

2NR LINK EXTENSION NEW MANN EVIDENCE
New Mann evidence read on the link debate serves as a co-option disad to the affirmative

The affirmatives reliance upon marginalized knowledge is not a return to discourses outside of the
dominant institutionalized power structures, but rather the advance guard for the power structures of
the status quo. The marginalized force is a function and an effect of the center the way it
establishes its line of defense instead of opposing the structures of war, the affirmative represents
the expansion of warfare into discourse, the final frontier because of its reliance upon traditional
notions of COMBAT and OPPOSITION.

This turns any risk of solvency effective resistance to the state apparatus of warfare can never occur
on the margins when resistance is a function of power structures themselves. Any position is a state
agency and its marginality is a temporary situation, before it is fully incorporated into dominant
power structures operating in these places only leads to the inevitable co-option of the affirmatives
so called revolutionary discourse through the political REFOMS of state action.

Reservoir RS 35/38

2NR IMPACT EXTENSION NEW MANN EVIDENCE
Were controlling the terminal uniqueness on the escalation of warfare the Mann evidence from the
2NC impact debate says that war only spirals out of control into massive annihilation when attempt to
CONTROL, REGULATE, and KNOW IT. The affirmative proclaims their intellectual stance as the
solution to conflict, ignoring the way that this critical opposition only perpetuates warfare as an
institution by supporting the notion of COMBAT, CONTROL, and DOMINATION.

This means its try or die for the alternative in traditional debate lingo warfare is inevitable
because knowledge alone is incapable of making us more aware of its causes the affirmative,
however, expands the reach of war AND gives it the ability to spread out of control by transforming
discourse into warfare. Under the guise of criticism, the affirmative becomes a machine that
rationalizes the contestation of thought that makes violence inevitable AND the means for this
violence to spread through the illusion of safety and control.

This also turns any of the rationality or solvency claims the end result of the affs expansion of
warfare is the termination of ALL reason, resulting in serial policy failure. The fight to oppose war
becomes warfare in and of itself.

Reservoir RS 36/38

2NR WAR MACHINE DA EXTENSION
Affirmative doesnt answer the War Machine disad correctly this is not only a disad to the
permutation, but also a co-option disad to the affirmative thats the first piece of Mann evidence.

The affirmatives resistance to war and the violence of the state becomes appropriated by the state
apparatus through the language of political reform this turns the once oppositional nature of the
affirmative into a tool of the state, used to oppose and suppress other revolutionary movements.

This turns and outweighs case it results in the largest amount of violence possible thats the 2NC
Deleuze and Guattari evidence
When the state appropriates critical resistance, war becomes the target of the war machine and all
oppositional structures not only does the capacity for war expand into the field of discourse through
their discursive war on war, but the actual violence occurs when war becomes the object of their
resistance. This results in the violent suppression of alternative forms of thought and movements,
turning any benefits to the affirmatives advocacy as well as total annihilation as war becomes the
object and result of all resistance.

Reservoir RS 37/38

Framework 2NR

Our interpretation is debate should be a question of competing intellectual strategies:

This interpretation is preferable

A. Understanding of discourse and methodology is a pre-requisite to understand political action

B. More real world debaters are intellectuals discussing strategies for advocating change

Cross apply both from the overview in the 2NC

Reservoir RS 38/38

A2 Perm: Overview 2NR

Permutation links the alternative is complete negation recognizing that the affirmatives need for
action is simply the endless sharpening of knives on the world, believing that some political reform is
capable of introducing the change we need.

This means they either link or sever out of the intellectual endorsement of political action if the
permutation links, the alternative is preferable
A. Avoids the co-option disad on the link debate the political reform is a way for the state to co-opt
the intellectual resistance originally present in the 1AC this results in the expansion of warfare into
discourse.
B. Avoids phenomenalization argument attempting to KNOW warfare results in the affirmatives
discourse BECOMING a war against war absent totalizing negation, criticism always becomes a
symptom of its subject.

And, if the permutation severs out of their intellectual advocacy, thats a voting issue
A. Destroys negative ground we cant garner offense off of anything in the 1AC, meaning the 2AC
would just spike out of every position in the 1NC and by then its too late for the negative to recover,
leading to shallow debates.
B. Time skew we wasted half the 1NC on a position they argue doesnt link anymore they get to
spend twice as much time on every other argument.

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Capitol Debate 2011-12 Pedagogical Colonialism

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