HOW TO UNDERSTAND INTERNALISM

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I
Internalism about practical reasons (hereafter internalism) claims that there is a
necessary connection between what an agent has reason to do and what he would
be motivated to do if he were in privileged or optimal conditions.
1
Internalism is
traditionally supported by the claim that it alone can capture two (supposed)
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q:

1
See, for instance, C. Korsgaard, Skepticism about Practical Reason, Journal of Philosophy,
8 (:q86), pp. ..
conditions of adequacy for any theory of practical reasons that reasons must be
capable of justifying actions, and that reasons must be capable of explaining in-
tentional acts.
2
Robert Johnson has argued that versions of internalism which avoid
obvious problems nevertheless fail to capture both conditions.
3
In this paper I oer
some suggestions as to how the internalist might respond. II presents Johnsons
criticisms of recent versions of internalism. I argue in III that Johnsons main claim
rests upon a misinterpretation of the explanatory condition, and I suggest how this
condition should be understood. The challenge for the internalist at this point is to
arrive at a formulation which can capture the condition, understood in this way, and
in IV I take up this challenge. I conclude that at least one version of internalism
allows practical reasons to have both justicatory and explanatory force.
II
Johnson begins (p. 6) by noting that internalism faces the following problems. First,
it cannot express the connection between reasons and motivation in terms of a rela-
tion between an agents reasons and his actual desires, given that it must capture the
idea that reasons can justify action. (My present wants might be mistaken in a num-
ber of ways, and hence might fail to justify my actions; furthermore, I can have
reason to do things that I do not presently desire to do, owing to my being ignorant
of the reason, weak-willed, and so on.) So internalism must be expressed as a de-
feasible or conditional connection, i.e., between reasons and what an agent would
desire to do in optimal or privileged conditions. But and here is the second
problem the precise formulation of this kind of connection must avoid committing
what Johnson (pp. ) terms the conditional fallacy, i.e., the fallacy involved
when one ignores counter-examples which make the conditional come out false. To
illustrate this problem, we might attempt to express the connection as follows:
IR:. There is a reason for S to in C only if S would want to in C if S were fully
rational.
Following Michael Smith, we can say that full rationality consists in the agents
having (i) no false beliefs, (ii) all relevant true beliefs, and (iii) a maximally coherent
and unied desiderative prole.
4
According to Johnson (p. 6:), this version of inter-
nalism commits the conditional fallacy, since it fails to allow for the fact that our
reasons can depend upon our being less than fully rational e.g., the fact that I do
not know the means to a desired end gives me a reason to do things which will
enable me to nd out and so fails to capture the fact that we can have reason to do
things we would not want to do if we were fully rational. (Our fully rational self
would know the means to all of our desired ends, and so would not need to nd
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2
Bernard Williams takes this line in Internal and External Reasons, in his Moral Luck
(Cambridge UP, :q8o), pp. :o::.

3
R. Johnson, Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy, The Philosophical Quarterly,
q(:qqq), pp.:.

4
M. Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford UP, :qq), especially pp. :6:.
MICHAEL S. BRADY
them out.) If internalism is to be plausible, then, it must be formulated in such a way
that it avoids committing the conditional fallacy.
So much for the general problems. I turn now to Johnsons main argument,
which is addressed to versions of internalism that are specically designed to avoid
these problems. For ease of exposition I shall consider what he has to say about a
formulation of internalism due to Michael Smith.
5
(His argument is equally
applicable to other recent versions, such as that suggested by Railton.
6
) According to
Smith, our practical reasons are provided by the desires we would have if we were
fully rational; but this claim is not to be interpreted along the lines of (IR:). We are,
instead, to imagine two possible worlds, the evaluated world in which we nd the
agent in the circumstances she faces, and the evaluating world in which we nd
theagents fully rational self (Internal Reasons p. ::o). For Smith, what the agent
in the evaluated world has a reason to do is a matter of what his fully rational self
his self in the evaluating world would want his actual self his self in the evaluated
world to do in the evaluated world. In other words, Smith is committed to the
following understanding of internalism:
IR.. There is a reason for S to in C only if Ss fully rational self (hereafter referred
to as Sf ) would want S to in C.
Johnson claims that (IR.), as I call it, avoids committing the conditional fallacy.
Nevertheless he thinks that it does not prove superior to externalist accounts of prac-
tical reasons, because it fails to connect Ss reasons with what he, rather than his fully
rational self, wants to do, and thus fails to show how Ss reasons are to enter into the
intentional explanation of his action: it is pretty clear that no connection is secured
[by IR.] to states that might provide an intentional explanation of [Ss] ing. For
there is only a condition specied under which [S] will , and no condition under
which [S] desires to . Under ideal conditions conditions under which [S] is now
[Sf ] neither [Sf ] nor [S] desires to . Rather, [Sf ] desires that [S] should , even
if[S] does not himself desire to (p. 6; see pp. 66 for a similar line on Railtons
proposal). Accordingly, (IR.) cannot capture the explanatory condition. And since
the same argument can be applied to other versions of internalism which avoid the
conditional fallacy, Johnson concludes that internalists ought to give up the claim
that this theory can capture both the explanatory and justicatory dimensions that
practical reasons are thought to have.
III
It seems to me that Johnsons points tell against (IR.), and other versions of inter-
nalism, only if we interpret the explanatory condition as requiring that reasons must
be capable of motivating agents as they actually are; for only then is the fact that no
connection is made to what Ss actual self wants to do damaging to Smiths account.
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5
The Moral Problem pp. ::.. See also his Internal Reasons, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, (:qq), pp. :oq:.

6
In P. Railton, Moral Realism, Philosophical Review, q (:q86), pp. :6.o.
HOW TO UNDERSTAND INTERNALISM
But it seems obvious that we should not interpret the condition in this way. Indeed,
we can note Johnsons claim that if there is a reason for a person to , then it seems
that it must be possible for that reason, under the right circumstances, to explain why he
s (p. q, my italics). And it is readily admitted that the right circumstances are not
necessarily those in which we nd S as he actually is, since his circumstances might
include his being ignorant of the consideration which constitutes his reason, or his
being weak-willed, etc. (IR.) might therefore avoid Johnsons criticism, provided
that it is reformulated so as to make some connection between what Sf wants S to do
and what S would want to do in the right circumstances.
But does not the invocation of optimal or improved conditions invite again the
charge that (IR.), suitably adjusted, commits the conditional fallacy? For if we make
the right circumstances ones in which S is fully rational, we are at a loss to explain
how reasons which depend upon the fact that S is less than fully rational will ex-
plain,in the right circumstances, his acting for those reasons: if S is fully rational, he
will not necessarily be moved to do things his less than fully rational self has reason
to do. Again, however, this criticism rests on a misunderstanding of the explanatory
condition. For we need not understand the right circumstances as ones in which S is
fully rational, any more than we need think that the notion of full rationality
exhausts our understanding of what it is for S to be rational. There are, after all,
dierent senses of rationality which occupy the normative space between the (per-
haps minimal) rationality exhibited by S as he actually is and that of his fully rational
self. Indeed, if we take seriously the idea that an agents reasons for acting can
depend upon the fact that he is less than fully rational, we shall be inclined to under-
stand the explanatory condition as employing a sense of rational which is weaker
than full rationality a sense which we might term practical rationality.
If we do understand the explanatory condition in this way, it seems that inter-
nalism will be vindicated if it can guarantee that an agent who is rational in this
sense will be motivated by his practical reasons. So the challenge for the internalist is
to show that if Ss fully rational self wants S to in C, then S will want to in C in so
far as he is practically rational. The following section will focus on how the internalist
can meet this challenge.
IV
How might the notion of practical rationality be employed to guarantee that S is
moved by his reasons in so far as he is rational in this sense? One suggestion would
be to formulate internalism as follows:
IR. There is a reason for S to in C only if (i) Sf would want S to in C, and (ii) Ss
practically rational self (hereafter Sp) would want S to in C.
We might then try to explain the notion of practical rationality in such a way that
(IR) comes out true for all cases.
7
However, this proposal faces two problems, one
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7
See, for instance, Johnsons Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational, Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, (:qq), pp. 6:q., especially pp. 6..
MICHAEL S. BRADY
epistemic and one practical. The epistemic diculty is this: it is not obvious that we
can cash the idea of practical rationality in such a way as to guarantee that prac-
tically rational agents will believe that they have reason to act if and only if they have
reason to act. But unless this is guaranteed, it will be possible for S to have a reason
to and yet be ignorant of this reason despite being practically rational; and to me it
seems that this possibility is live. Practically rational agents can by denition fall
short of full rationality; and agents can fail to be fully rational by lacking information
which is relevant to what they have reason to do. Now since, sometimes at least,
such information can be beyond subjects epistemic reach (although not, of course,
beyond the reach of their fully rational selves), practically rational agents will have to
make use of the best available information in guring out what to do. But there is no
guarantee that agents in such circumstances will necessarily hit upon the right
answer; the best available information might, after all, be woefully inadequate for a
correct determination of their reasons. It will thus be possible for clause (i) in (IR) to
be true whilst clause (ii) is false S can have reason to in C, and yet Sp might not
believe that his fully rational self would want him to . This suggests that (IR)
commits the conditional fallacy.
Now this epistemic problem can be avoided by inserting an additional condi-
tional clause into (IR) which removes the need to build implausible epistemic
assumptions into the concept of practical rationality:
IR*. There is a reason for S to in C only if (i) Sf would want S to in C, and (ii)
Sp would want to in C if he were aware of the fact that (i).
8
Is internalism in this guise vindicated? Unfortunately it is not, since (IR*) faces a
practical diculty. (IR:) was rejected because it failed to allow for the fact that what
we have reason to do can depend upon the fact that we are less than fully rational.
(IR*) is open to a similar complaint, since it fails to countenance the possibility that
what it is (practically) rational to desire can be likewise dependent upon our falling
short of full rationality. What this means is that it might be practically irrational for S to
desire to do what Sf wants him to do, and so it is possible that he will not desire to do
what Sf wants him to do even though he is practically rational. To use a familiar
example: hedonists, let us assume, have reason to maximize their own happiness,
but will not desire to do this if they are practically rational if they are sophisticated
hedonists, in Railtons terms since their desiring in this way would prevent them
from being maximally happy.
9
(IR*), like previous versions of internalism, comes
out false. Indeed, examples like this seem to suggest that no version of internalism
will suce. For in order to capture the explanatory condition, internalism needs to
connect Ss reasons to desires he would have if he were practically rational; but since
S can have reason to do things he will not desire to do if he is practically rational, it
looks as though versions of internalism must necessarily fail.
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8
See S. Darwall, Reasons, Motives and the Demands of Morality: an Introduction, in
S.Darwall et al. (eds), Moral Discourse and Practice (Oxford UP, :qq), pp. o:., especially
p.o.

9
See Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality, Philosophy and
Public Aairs, : (:q8), pp. ::.
HOW TO UNDERSTAND INTERNALISM
Despite these problems, the internalist still has room to manuvre. For the above
argument rests upon the assumption that the explanatory condition can only be
captured by establishing a connection between Ss reasons and the desires he would
have if practically rational. But this assumption is false, given the fact that agents can
be indirectly motivated by their reasons, these reasons thereby entering into the
correct explanation of what they do, without their desiring to do what they have
reason to do. Sophisticated hedonists, again, who will not desire to maximize their
own happiness in so far as they are practically rational, will instead adopt a pattern
of other-regarding concern upon realizing that this will enable them to attain their
goal. Hedonists are thus indirectly motivated to do what they have reason to do; and
since they adopt the pattern of concern because they are aware both that they have
reason to maximize their own happiness and that their desiring to do this will
preclude them from attaining this end, their reason enters into the correct explana-
tion for what they do.
If this is the case, then formulations of internalism need not connect Ss reasons
with his (practically rational) desires if they are to capture the explanatory condition;
they can instead forge a connection between what S has reason to do and what
hewould be (directly or indirectly) motivated to do if he were practically rational.
This would mean that Ss practically rational self would also have to be aware of
facts about what his fully rational self would want him to desire, in order to guar-
antee that he can be indirectly motivated by his reasons. But this in itself should not
cause a problem for the formulation; we simply replace clause (ii) with the condition
that Sp would be motivated if he were aware of all the relevant facts, including facts
about the means to his rational ends, what his fully rational self would want him to
desire as well as do, and so forth.
The suggestion is, then, that we understand internalism as follows:
IR. There is a reason for S to in C only if (i) Sf would want S to in C, and (ii) Sp
would be motivated to in C if Sp were aware of the fact that (i), and aware of
any other relevant facts.
It seems to me that (IR) is well placed to meet Johnsons criticisms. For it avoids
making agents reasons depend upon their actual desires, it avoids counter-examples
which render it susceptible to the conditional fallacy, and it indicates how agents
practical reasons can enter into the explanation of their actions under certain
conditions. There is, however, one nal worry: if formulations of internalism are to
allow for indirect motivation, is there not a possibility that they might fail to capture
the justicatory condition? For if hedonists (for example) cannot rationally desire to
maximize their happiness, but have some other-regarding pattern of concern, then
their justication or their reason for promoting the well-being of others i.e., that they
care intrinsically for their welfare will not be the justication or the reason, i.e., that
caring in this way will benet them. Such agents will be alienated from their
reasons.
10
So (IR) might be capable of capturing the explanatory condition, but
only at the expense of the justicatory.
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10
See Johnson pp. q6o for his comments on the justicatory condition.
MICHAEL S. BRADY
This objection is misplaced. For one thing, it confuses the reason S has for
promoting the well-being of others with the reason he has for caring about this end. For
another, it depends upon a misinterpretation of the relevant condition. The
justicatory condition, like the explanatory, should be interpreted as the claim that
the reason S has for ing will be his reason for ing under certain conditions, i.e.,
conditions where he is practically rational and aware of the relevant facts. And if Sp is
aware of the relevant facts that Sf wants him to maximize his own happiness, and
that this gives him a reason to care intrinsically about the welfare of others then
quite obviously he will give as his reason for caring what is in fact the reason.
(IR) can, therefore, capture the justicatory and explanatory dimensions of
practical reasons. This is not to say that internalism is, all things considered,
vindicated as the best theory of practical reasons. But it is to say that it can retain its
claim to two theoretical virtues.
University of Stirling
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