in Islamic Theology and Philosophy, ed. M.
Marmura (Albany: 1984), 172-187 Efficient Causality in Avicenna
CHAPTER 12
The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in
Avicenna (lbn Sina)
MICHAELE. MARMURA
I The otherness of cause and effect, we note, is included in the
That Avicenna's discussions of efficient causality are rooted in
Aristotle is hardly a matter for dispute-his language bespeaks this
at almost every turn. This does not mean, however, that in ex­
pounding a theory of efficient causality Avicenna is merely para­
phrasing Aristotle. His expositions exhibit differences in emphases
and include refinements and expansions that go beyond Aristotle.
Such expansions and refinements sometimes take the form of answers
to criticisms of the general Aristotelian causal position and sometimes
suggest Avicenna's own experience as a scientist and a practicing
physician. But above all, they include a distinctive Neoplatonic
element. For his theory of efficient causality is developed within a
metaphysical framework that is not purely Aristotle's. Rather, it
forms an integral part of Avicenna's emanative system which he
intimately connects with his ontology-his distinction between es­
sence and existence. His theory, though certainly owing a great deal
to Aristotle, has characteristics all its own.
The Neoplatonic element manifests itself in Avicenna's distinction
between efficient causality as conceived by the natural philosopher
and by the metaphysician. For the natural philosopher it is the
principle of motion, of change, "in something other than itself." The
metaphysician, however, does not confine his interest to this, but is
concerned with divine efficient causality. Divine efficient causality
is productive of existence itself. It is a "cause which bestows existence
172
that differs from itself."1 In order to avoid pantheism (this is never
explicitly stated, but is certainly suggested by the text), there is in
Avicenna an emphasis, almost a harping, on the distinctness of
efficient cause from its effect, its otherness. Both the metaphysical
concept of the efficient cause as productive of existence itself and
the emphasis on the otherness of cause and effect are found, not
only where one expects to find them, in the "Metaphysics" of the
voluminous Shifa' (Healing), but also in the "Physics" of this work
where the treatment on the whole follows Aristotle very closely. It
should be added that the discussions of efficient causality in these
two parts of the Shifa'(as well as the "Demonstration" of the "Logic"
of the same work) complement and shed light on each other.
To turn first to the "Physics," in Book I, Chapter 10, Avicenna
begins by giving a restricted definition of efficient causality "in natural
things." He defines it as that which "is said of the principle of
motion in something other than itself,"3 explaining that the term
motion refers to any change in .matter from potentiality to actuality.
definition. It is emphasized further by what immediately follows as
an answer anticipating a possible objection to the definition. What
about Aristotle's example-given in a different context and analyzed
for a different purpose-of the physician engaged in curing himself?
Is this not an instance contrary to the definition of efficient causality
as "the principle of motion in something other than itself?" Antic­
ipating such an argument, Avicenna immediately after giving his
definition writes:
The physician, moreover, in treating himself is also the prin­
ciple of motion in another by being another. For he would be
moving the patient, by way of his being the patient, not the
physician, whereas he would be administering treatment by way
of his being himself-that is, by way of his being a physician.
His undergoing treatment, his receptivity to treatment, and his
being moved by treatment, [on the other hand], is not by way
of his being a physician, but by way of his being a patient.3
Avicenna then gives a broader, metaphysical definition of efficient
causality, where again the distinction between cause and effect form
part of the definition.
�
If, howe er;. the efficient cause is taken, not according to
natural things, but in terms of existence itself (bi hash a/-wujud
173
 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
nafsihi), it would then constitute a meaning more general than
this. Then everything which is a cause of an existence different
than itself becomes-inasmuch as it is different and inasmuch
as the new existence is not for the sake of the former-an
efficient cause.4
We note in this broader definition not only the inclusion of the
emphasis on the otherness of cause and effect, but also the separation
between efficient and final causality. Both these points are conveyed
in the complementary and lengthier definition in the "Metaphysics"
where Avicenna makes a direct reference to divine causality.
By agent, [we mean], the cause which bestows existence that
differs from itself. In other words, the essence would not be in
a . primary sense a receptacal of something that is informed by
it whereby it would possess within itself the potentiality for the
existence of the former, except accidentally. In addition to this,
it is necessary that the existence should not be for the sake of
the agent by way of its being an agent, but if inescapably so,
then in some other respect. This is because the metaphysicians
do not mean by agent only the principle of motion, as the
naturalists do, but they mean the principle and bestower of
existence as in the case of God with respect to the world. 5
The direct reference to God as the cause of the world's existence
is quite fundamental for understanding Avicenna's theory of efficient
causality.6 Not only is it an expression of his Neoplatonism (the
reference can only be properly understood in terms of his emanative
scheme), but it also provides us with a guide indicating the various
aspects of the relation between the efficient cause and its effect,
regardless, as we hope to show, of whether this effect is existence
itself or motion in one of its forms. For God and the world as His
effect suggest the model for the relation between cause and effect in
Avicenna's thought. A brief pause to consider such a model may
prove helpful to our endeavour to reconstruct his theory.
II
The model in its most general form would be that of God as the
efficient cause and the world as His effect, where the world, the
effect, is taken in its totality as a unit, its inner composition as a
174
Efficient Causality in Avicenna
system of successive emanations being for the moment ignored. A
more specific form of the suggested model, however, would take into
account Avicenna's emanative doctrine. The model would then con­
sist of God as efficient cause and the first intelligence directly em­
anating from Him as the effect. For, properly speaking, in the
A vicennian scheme, God is the proximate cause only of this intel­
ligence, the rest of the existents being caused by Him through
mediation.
To take the model in its general form first, God is the supreme
efficient cause, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of the world, the effect. The causal conditions are ideal. There is
and can be no impediment. Hence the effect follows necessarily. For,
according to Avicenna, as we shall indicate, God necessitates the
world's existence. Since God, the necessitating cause, is eternal and
changeless, the world, the necessitated effect, is eternal. Cause and
effect coexist, God's priority to the world being non-temporal. Since
the one cause necessitates the world, taken in its totality as a unit,
the i:nferential relation between God and the world is reciprocal.
Before turning to the model in its more specific form, one must
draw attention to the importance of this reciprocal inferential relation
between efficient cause and effect for Avicenna's metaphysical system.
It is in terms of this relation that he strives to achieve the high
point of his metaphysical endeavours, namely, to prove first of all
God's existence rationally, a priori, without reference to the sensible
world, the proof including an argument from effect to cause; and
then, inferring the existence of the world from the existence of God,
inferring that is the effect from the cause. Full expression of this
goal is given in the "Metaphysics" of his Shifa'.
It will become clear to you anon through an intimation that
we have a way for proving the First Principle not by the method
of evidential inference (al-istidlal) from the things perceived by
the senses, but by way of universal rational premises that renders
it necessary that there is for existence a principle that i� necessary
in its existence, that makes it impossible for this principle to
be in any manner multiple, and makes it necessary that it is
the principle of the whole of existence and that the whole is
necessitated by Him according to the order possessed by the
whole.
Because pf our own incapacity, however, we are unable to
adopt this demonstrative method which is the method of arriving
at the secondary existents from the [primary] principles and the
175
 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
effect from the cause, except with some groupings of the ranks
of existing things, not in detail.7
This important passage is a reminder of the need for making the
cause-effect model more specific. For it indicates that the inference
of the world from God takes place in successive steps corresponding
to the emanative scheme. This is conveyed by Avicenna's statement
that we are able to infer the effects from their principles only in the
case of "some groupings of the ranks of existing things, not in detail."
These groupings are none other than the emanations in the celestial
realm which include the triads proceeding from the first intelligence.
Detail here is possible because the number of emanated entities is
small and, moreover, each entity represents the sole member of its
species. It is when the emanative process reaches the terrestrial realm,
where plurality abounds and where the causal sequences and con­
ditions become complex, that detail becomes impossible for us and
the inferences of the effects from their causes have to be made in
terms of kinds of existents, not, as with celestial emanation, in terms
of individual existents as well as kinds.8
If, then, the world proceeds from God in successive steps, the
model for the cause-effect relation must be modified accordingly.
From the One, from God, as Avicenna proclaims, only one proceeds.9
The one direct effect of divine causality is the first celestial intelligence
from which the rest of creation successively emanates. This one
effect is necessitated by God. Cause and necessitated effect coexist,
God's priority to the first intelligence being non-temporal. There is
and can be no impediment to the divine creative act. The inferential
relation between proximate cause and direct necessitated effect is
reciprocal.
In this model, however, the effect is the existence of the first
intelligence; it is not motion. Does then the various aspects of this
model's cause-effect relation, namely their necessary connection and
coexistence, obtain when the effect is motion in one of its forms?
The answer is in the affirmative. Now there are causes that precede
their effect in time, but these are "accidental," not "essential" causes.10
For Avicenna, the essential, proximate cause in the realm of nature
(when all causal conditions, including the absence of impediments,
are fulfilled) necessitates its effect and coexists with it. To use his
own example, the hand's movement that turns the key, necessitates
the latter's movement and coexists with it.11 This, however does not
mean that in the realm of nature, particularly the terrestrial realm,
that the inferential relation between cause and effect is always re-
176
Efficient Causality in Avicenna
ciprocal. Moreover, when it is reciprocal, certain conditions, some
peculiar to the world of generation and corruption, must first obtain.
Nonetheless, the principle of necessitation underlying this relation
is there even, as we shall indicate, when voluntary agency is involved.
III
In any attempt to reconstruct Avicenna's theory of efficient caus­
ality, one must clarify the distinction between efficient causality as
treated in natural philosophy and in metaphysics. As we have seen,
Avicenna holds that for the metaphysician the efficient cause is not
confined to the production of motion (as it is for the natural phi­
losopher}, but produces existence itself. This, however, gives only a
partial criterion for this distinction. For he does not exclude the
concept of efficient causality as a principle of motion from meta­
physics. How then does the treatment of efficient causality as a
principle of motion in the realms of physics and metaphysics differ?
Avicenna's answer-very much in tune with Aristotle-has to be
extracted from contexts that sometimes yield nothing more explicit
than a passing allusion or example. It is to his discussions of the
nature of metaphysics that one first naturally turns for the answer.
The subject (al-mawdu') of metaphysics, as distinct from the things
sought after (al-matlubat) in it, he argues, is the existent inasmuch
as it exists. The ultimate causes of things are not the "subject" of
metaphysics, but are among the things "sought after" within this
branch of knowledge. The four causes, moreover, are concomitant
attributes (lawahiq) of existents inasmuch as they exist. This, how­
ever, is not a circumstance that is self-evident, but is something
argued for and established within metaphysics.
This applies to efficient causality, not only as productive of ex­
istence itself, but also of motion. For the concern here is not with
the manifestations of this principle as a specific kind of efficient
causality operative in a specific kind of material change. This latter
concern belongs to natural philosophy. Rather, the concern is with
the principle as a concomitant attribute of an existent regarded simply
as an existent. As such, it is a metaphysical principle, established
within metaphysics as a branch of knowledge.12
·
Such a view, extracted from the "Metaphysics" of the Shifa', is
complemented ,by Avicenna's discussion of metaphysics in the "Is­
agoge" of the same work. Here he confines himself to defining
metaphysics as that discipline whose object of knowledge is the
177
 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
immovable and the immaterial. Some existents, he maintains, are
necessarily dissociated from matter and motion-God and mind, for
example. There are "things" (umur), such as "individual identity
(huwiyya), unity, plurality and causality," that can mix with motion
but which can be considered in terms of what they are in themselves
(min haythu hia hia), abstractly.13 Causality, as we have seen, is
included among such things. When these things are looked on ab­
stractly, they are the object of metaphysical thought; when considered
in association with a specific kind of matter, they belong to natural
philosophy, for example, "causality inasmuch as it is either warmth
or coldness."14
As we have indicated, efficient causality as one of the four Aris­
totelian causes is something "sought after" and established in meta­
physics. Once established in metaphysics it is handed down, so to
speak, to natural philosophy where it serves as a general principle
(mabda')-this in accordance with Avicenna's Aristotelian demon­
strative methodology. This is partly conveyed by a brief remark in
the "Physics" of the Shifa'. The remark which is made almost in
passing is one of Avicenna's more explicit utterances regarding the
respective treatment of causality in metaphysics and natural philos­
ophy:
That for every generable and corruptible thing, for everything
occurring in motion, or everything composed of matter and
form, there are existing causes which are these four, this is a
matter which the speculation of the natural philosophers does
not undertake [to show], but belongs to the metaphysical. As­
certaining the quiddities [of these causes], however, and indi­
cating their states as they are given (wad'an), this is something
which the natural philosophers cannot do without.15
Efficient causality, hence, is a principle in natural science, estab­
lished, however, in a higher 'science', in metaphysics. We encounter
in Avicenna two metaphysical arguments to establish such a principle:
one is purely a priori, purely rational, that makes no reference to
the world observed by the senses; the other has an empirical com­
ponent. We will, however, postpone discussion of the second to the
concluding part of this paper where we will raise the question of
the relation of Avicenna's theory to the then current occasionalism
of the Islamic theologians, the mutakallimun.
178
Efficient Causality in Avicenna
IV
The causal principle which Avicenna strives to establish through
an a priori, purely rational argument, has two components: the first
is that every contingent existent must be caused by something other
than itself; the second is that every contingent existent that is caused
is caused by necessity-it is necessitated. This argument, it should
be remarked, does not occur where one expects to find it, in Book
6 of the "Metaphysics" of the Shifa', devoted entirely to causality,
but in Chapter 6 of Book 1, in Avicenna's pivotal discussion of
possible and necessary existence. There is a complementary argument
to this in Chapter 1 of Book 4,16 devoted to causal priority, but for 1:29-38
our purposes we will confine our attention to the argument in
"Metaphysics," Book 1, Chapter 6.
In order to appreciate fully the a priori nature of this argument,
however, we must tum briefly to the chapter preceding it (Chapter
5 of Book 1).17 In Chapter 5, Avicenna argues that just as there are
self-evident, purely rational propositional truths, there are also con­
cepts that are known immediately by the mind. Epistemologically
they are on a par with self.;evident propositional truths. These include
the concepts of 'the existent', 'the thing', and 'the necessary'. The
last is one of two other modal concepts, "the possible" and "the
impossible." Avicenna argues that it is difficult to determine which
of the three modal concepts is the more primitive since each is
definable in terms of the other two. Nonetheless, he maintains that
the concept of "the necessary" has the greater claim to be the more
(ta'akkud a/­
primary since it indicates the assuredness of existence
wujud).18 If the concept of the necessary is the more primary, then
the other two modal concepts would be derivable from it. They
would still be a priori since their derivation is purely rational and
does not depend on our observation of the external world. Hence
such ideas as 'the existent', 'the necessary', 'the possible' and 'the
impossible' are rational a priori concepts. It is in terms of these
concepts that Avicenna argues for his causal principle in "Meta­
physics," Book 1, Chapter 6.
Avicenna's argument can be paraphrased as follows. The impossible
cannot exist. Hence we know rationally that if anything enters the
realm of existence it would have to be either an existent that is in
itself necessary or an existent that in itself is only possible. If necessary
in itself, then such an existent cannot be caused. Otherwise it would
be necessary through another, not itself. Avicenna then argues that
such an existent would necessarily have to be numerically one, the
179
 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
only such existent, simple and changeless. If, on the other hand, the
existent is in itself only possible, this means that in terms of its
own quiddity it is something that can exist or not exist. Implicit
here is Avicenna's distinction in contingent things between essence
and existence. The quiddity or essence of the contingent does not
include existence. Thus, if such a contingent exists, then it must
have been •specified' with existence rather than non-existence. Sim­
ilarly, if it does not exist, this is because it has been specified with
non-existence rather than existence. But the contingent's own quiddity
cannot account for this specification. Hence, if the contingent exists,
its existence is due to something extraneous which is its cause;
similarly, if it does not exist then this is also due to something
extraneous, in this case the absence of the cause.
Thus far, Avicenna has argued for the first part of his causal
principle, namely, that the contingent, if it exists, must have a cause.
The argument for the second part of this principle, namely, that the
caused contingent is necessitated, can be paraphrased as follows. The
existing contingent, though in itself is possible, must become nec­
essary through its cause and 'with respect to it'. If it were not, that
is, if it remained possible with respect to its cause, then the fact of
its existence rather than its non-existence cannot be explained. We
would then have to suppose another cause and if again, in relation
to it, it remains possible, then we would have to suppose yet another
and so ad infinitum. But even if we allow the possibility of the
infinity of such causes, this will not explain the fact of the contingent's
existence, for it would remain possible, not only in terms of its own
quiddity, but also in relation to all these infinite causes. But we have
supposed the contingent to exist. Its existence can only be explained
in terms of a cause that renders it necessary. Thus it becomes
necessary through the cause and 'with respect to it'. In other words,
if the cause exists, all other conditions being satisfied, the effect must
exist necessarily.
We have remarked earlier that when Avicenna speaks of the
efficient cause that necessitates its effect he is referring to the essential
cause (al-sabab al-dhatiyy or al-'ilia al-dhatiyya). It is this essential
cause, as distinct from the accidental, that coexists with its effect.
Before returning to the reason why Avicenna insists on this coex­
istence, a comment on his terminology is needed.
One can distinguish two senses of the term dhat, from which the
term dhatiyy 'essential' derives. There is a general sense that refers
to the entity which is the cause, as when we say, ••x itself is the
cause," and there is a more restricted sense that refers specifically
180
Efficient Causality in Avicenna
to the agent's essence or quiddity, where the action is a consequence
of this essence. This restricted sense is quite properly used for the
efficient causes in the celestial realm and for the natural, as distinct
from voluntary agents, in the terrestrial world. Avicenna refers to
the natural, non-voluntary, efficient cause as an essential accident
('arad dhatiyy),20 'accident' here being used in the sense of •attribute'.
But it is not appropriately used with reference to voluntary agents.
As we shall see shortly, the question of voluntary agency, particularly
human agency, poses difficulties in our attempt to understand the
Avicennian theory of efficient causality.
To return to the question of why Avicenna insists on the coex­
istence of efficient cause and its effect, there is to begin with a
metaphysical reason relating to his denial of a doctrine of creation
ex nihilo. 21 If the world's existence was preceded by nothingness, by
privation (al- 'adam), then God's relation to this privation is inexpl­
icable-he can neither act on it (there is nothing to act on) nor can
He create it (there is nothing to create). But closer to home, and
indeed underlying the above argument, is the concept of the cause
necessitating its effect. Let us take our paradigm of God as cause
and the first celestial intelligence as the effect. Here there is one
proximate cause and one necessitated effect. The cause is prior in
existence to the effect, indeed, it produces its existence. Embodied
in this relation between cause and effect are the conditions of suf­
ficiency and necessity. If the cause exists, the effect exists, and if
the cause does not exist the effect does not exist. If we suppose a
temporal priority of such a cause to its effect, then there must be a
span of time in which the cause existed without the effect, and this
would be a contradiction. Similarly, it would be a contradiction if
the cause ceases to exist but we affirm that the effect persists without
it. In natural things this only seems to be the case, as for example,
the house continues to exist when the efficient cause, the builder,
no longer exists. But this, Avicenna argues, is only seeming, because
its continuation is due to new causes contemporaneous with it that
sustain it.22
Ideally then, efficient cause and its proximate effect, are coexistent
and the inferential relationship between them is reciprocal. But as
we pursue the A vicennian emanative scheme as it descends to the
terrestrial realm, we encounter diversity and variations in the rela­
tionships between efficient causes and their effects. This does not
p
mean that the reci rocal inferential relation no longer obtains, but
it now obtains when conditions, many peculiar to the terrestrial
realm, are satisfied. Thus, for example, the efficient cause must be
181
 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
the proximate, specific cause and must represent the only kind of
cause productive as a specific effect. 23 It must be actual, the effect
in itself possible.24 In natural, non-voluntary agents, the cause must
relate to the essence or nature of the agent and, for the effect to
follow, the recipient of the action must exist and must be properly
disposed for the reception of the act. 25 This in tum means the activity
of other causes, preparatory causes that predispose the recipient for
accepting the act. Moreover, in the terrestrial realm all the other
Aristotelian causes are involved forming part of the conditions to
be satisfied for the production of the effect.26 Last but not least,
there must be no impediments.27
All these conditions are not always present. Thus, for example,
the conditions of sufficiency and necessity do not always combine.
Sometimes the efficient cause may be a necessary condition, but not
a sufficient one. The wall, for example, is a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for the existence of the ceiling.28 The same cause
may have different effects on differing receptive substrata.29 Without
knowledge of these substrata, one cannot infer the effect from the
cause. Again, the cause may be a sufficient but not a necessary
condition for the production of the effect.30 The same effect may be
produced by any one of a number of alternative proximate causes.
In such a case, one can infer the effect from the cause, but not the
cause from the effect. The inference, however, can become reciprocal
if it is established that the alternative causes share a common element
sufficient for producing the effect.31 For then this element is in reality
the one proximate cause that is coexstensive with the effect. Another
example of this causal diversity mentioned by Avicenna is the case
where the same cause produces more than one effect, for example,
a disease and its symptom. From the symptom we can infer the
presence of the disease-or the likelihood of such a presence. The
inference here, however, is from one effect to another, both being
the effects of the same cause. 32
It is, however, when we come to voluntary agency, particularly
human agency, that one encounters a major difficulty in understand­
ing Avicenna's theory of efficient causality. Is there a necessary
relation here between voluntary cause and effect and if so in what
sense? Part of the difficulty is that Avicenna's actual statements on
this question are sparse and, in addition, seem to be conflicting at
first glance. In the "Demonstration" of the Shifa', for example, he
states that when the existing cause is not natural, but is one of the
human "technical, voluntary or appetitive powers," the effect need
not follow, even if the recipient of the action exists.33 On the other
182
Efficient Causality in Avicenna
hand, in "Metaphysics," Book 4, Chapter 1, he speaks of the will
as necessitating the effect.34 One suspects that Avicenna is using the
term will or its equivalent in these two passages in different senses.
There is evidence to show this.
In "Metaphysics," Book 4, Chapter 2 Avicenna differentiates be­
tween two meanings of 'will'. There is, first of all, what he terms a
will that inclines(irada rnurnila), that is, that inclines the soul towards
some action. Such a will is not sufficient for producing the effect.
He then speaks of a "decisive will" (irada jazirna), which is "the
resolution (al-ijrna') that necessitates the motion of the organs."35
The "decisive will" hence necessitates its effect. This explanation
resolves the apparent conflict in Avicenna's statements. But the
perennial question remains: What renders the will a "decisive will"?
Are the causes (teleological for Avicenna) that render it decisive
necessitating?
v
It was not Avicenna's views on human agency (however these are
interpreted) that brought his philosophical system into a headlong
clash with Islamic theology (kalarn), more specifically, with Ash'arite
kalarn. Rather, as far as causality was concerned, it was the neces­
sitarianism of his system, particularly as it pertained to the concept
of divine agency. The Ash'arites rejected the view that the divine
act proceeded as the necessary consequence of the divine essense.
The divine act, they maintained, was the voluntary decree of the
divine will, an attribute additional to the divine essence. They went
farther than this to deny that any act proceeds from an existent's
essence or nature. They denied natural causes, adopting the occa­
sionalist doctrine that real causal efficacy resides with God alone.
Now, as we know, the conflict came to a head some half a century
after Avicenna's death with the Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence
of the Philosophers) and other related works of the Ash'arite theo­
logian al-Ghazali (d. 1 1 1 1). Al-Ghazali is particularly noted for
articulating the epistemological argument that necessary causal con­
nection in nature cannot be established empirically. Observation only
shows concomitance, not necessary causal connection. 36 But this
argument did not originate with al-Ghazali. It has a background in
early kalarn, and w� find its essentials in the writings of the Ash'arite
al-Baqillani who died in 10 13, some twenty-five years before Avi­
cenna's death. Thus the question arises: To what extent, if at all,
183
 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
was Avicenna reacting to Ash'arite occasionalism in his discussions
of efficient causality'?
The question is a tantalizing one. For with one exception, Avicenna
makes no explicit references to the Islamic theologians on causal
questions. The explicit reference is in the Najat where he criticizes
theologians for their doctrine of a/-huduth 'origination'. There are,
however, in addition to this, two arguments that provide-whether
by accident or design-answers to two criticisms of efficient causality
encountered in kalam. These two criticisms are found in al-Baqillani.
Before turning to them, however, we must consider briefly Avicenna's
criticism of the theologians' concept of huduth.31
Avicenna agrees that huduth 'origination', means 'coming into
existence after non-existence.' But this posteriority (al-ba 'diyya) is a
posteriority in essence, not in time. All existents other than God,
whether eternal celestial beings or transient existents, are 'originated'
in this sense. In the case of transients, it is true, in addition to the
essential posteriority of non-existence, there is also a posteriority
which is temporal. But this temporally prior non-existence has noth­
ing to do with the cause that brings them into existents. This is
where the theologians err. For, not only do they maintain that all
existents other than God are temporally preceded by non-existence,
but that their being originated in this sense requires an originator,
God. This is a mistaken doctrine because there is no causal action
on the temporally prior non-existence of which they speak. What
demands a cause is the contingent, that which is in itself only possible,
regardless of whether or not it is preceded by temporal non-existence.
This argument, it should be remarked, is not necessarily directed
specifically against Ash'arite occasionalists since non-Ash'arite Is­
lamic theologians also subscribed to the doctrine that origination is
always temporally preceded by non-existence. But it shows Avicenna's
concern with theological views pertaining to the causal question.
Turning to the criticisms of necessary causation encountered in
al-Baqillani, the first has all the elements of al-Ghazali's empirical
critique. Al-Baqillani writes:
Regarding the thing about which they rave so much, namely,
that they know through sense perception and necessarily (hissan
wa ittiraran) that the occurrences of burning and of becoming
intoxicated are due to the heat of the fire and to excessive
drinking, this is monumental ignorance.
This is because what we observe and perceive with the senses
is only the change of state of the body when drink is consumed
184
Efficient Causality in Avicenna
and fire approached and its present state of being intoxicated,
burnt, and changed from its previous condition-nothing more.
Knowledge of the agent of this new occurring state, however,
does not come about by experiencing such an agent, but is
something apprehended through subtle examination and probing.
Thus some say that it is the act of an eternal being, a creator
out of nothing (mukhtarn, powerful-and this is the truth we
uphold. Others say it is the act of the human who came close
to the fire and who took the drink, that it is generated by his
action which is the cause of the body's burning and intoxication.
Some say that it is the act of the nature in the body, although
I do not know whether this is the very body imprinted with
the nature or some other 'notion' (ma'na) in it. Then there are
those who say that the nature is an accident.38
It is in connection with this criticism that we will now consider
Avicenna's second argument (referred to earlier) to establish his
causal principle. In his writings there is no concrete evidence to
indicate that in formulating his argument he was also responding to
this type of Ash'arite criticism. On the other hand, there are grounds
for at least suspecting that this might well have been the case. For
he repeatedly acknowledges that the observation of regularities in
nature by itself shows only concomitance, not necessary causal con­
nection. To this extent he is in total agreement with the Ash'arite
empirical position. But, he then goes on to argue, in a very Aris­
totelian fashion, that in addition to the observation of regularity,
there is a hidden syllogism (qiyas khafiyy) to the effect that if this
regularity were accidental or coincidental, it would not have contin­
ued always or for the most part.39 From this he concludes that the
regularity is essential and derives from the causal powers in natural
things. It should also be remarked here that when Avicenna speaks
of the occurrences happening "for the most part," he is not relin­
quishing necessitarianism. The exceptions to the natural regularities,
he maintains, are due to impediments that are causally explicable.
The second argument al-Baqillani uses is directed against the theory
that the efficient cause is a nature that necessitates its effect and
coexists with it. More specifically, it is an objection to those naturalist
thinkers-discussed iq kalam literature-who maintain that the world
is the necessary product of the four eternal natures and is hence
eternal. He argues:
185
 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
If the nature is pre-eternal and post-eternal and the thing
generated by it is likewise pre-eternal and post-eternal, then why
is it more proper for one of the two to necessitate and cause
the other than it is for the [supposed] effect to be the cause (al­
sabab) and ground (a/-'i//a)?4o
Now we encounter in "Metaphysics," Book 4, Chapter 1, an
argument that has a kinship to the above and which Avicenna
introduces as a possible objection to his own theory of the coexistence
of cause and effect and which he proceeds to answer.
Someone may say: If each of the two things are such that if
one exists, the other exists, and if one is removed from existence,
the other is removed, then one is not the cause nor the other
the effect, since neither has the better claim to be the cause in
existence than the other.41
Avicenna then gives a detailed answer,42 pointing out the ambiguity
of the statement, "if one exists, the other exists." He distinguishes
between the existence of cause and effect in external reality, their
existence in the mind, and the indication to the mind of the existence
of either in external reality. In external reality, he argues, it is only
when the cause is removed that the effect is removed. Thus when
the effect is removed, we have the certain knowledge that this is
because the cause has been removed. The idea that concomitance
alone does not prove necessary causal connection, which formed
part of his argument to justify the causal principle, is conveyed in
part in the concluding statement of this detailed answer.43
It is not conjunction that rendered one of the two existents
necessarily the cause so that neither has the better claim to be
the cause than the other, since with respect to conjunction they
are at par. Rather, they differ because we supposed that the
existence of the one is not rendered necessary through the other,
but with the other, whereas in the case of the second, just as
we supposed its existence to be with the other, likewise, we
supposed it to be through the other. 43
Was then Avicenna-whether wholly or in part-responding to
occasionalist criticisms of the concept of natural efficient causality?
A conclusive answer to this question cannot be given. The indications,
however, point to the affirmative answer as the more probable one.
186
Efficient Causality in Avicenna
We have to begin with the arguments themselves. In the first there
is the parallel positions of Avicenna and the occasionahsts on the
role of experience (by itself) in causal investigations. The second
argument is a response to an objection that has a striking similarity
to the one used by the Ash'arite al-Baqillani. But while this parallel
and similarity do not prove Avicenna's acquaintance with kalam
criticisms of natural causation, they are not irrelevant. Other factors,
however, must be taken into account.
We encounter in Avicenna's writings discussions and allusions to
views that are definitely identifiable as belonging to kalam, indicating
that he was not oblivious to developments within this discipline.
For our purposes the most pertinent of these is the one we have
discussed, his criticism of the Islamic theologians' doctrine of orig­
ination (al-huduth). As we have pointed out, Avicenna does not only
make an explicit reference to the theologians-something he seems
normally to avoid, but criticizes a doctrine that involved the causal
question. It is true that the doctrine though adopted by the occa­
sionalists was not confined to them. Nonetheless, his criticism of it
reveals his acquaintance with aspects of kalam causal theory.
All this, as we see it, makes it quite probable that Avicenna was
acquainted with occasionalist criticisms of natural causation and that
he was-in an unobtrusive way-replying to them. But the conflict
between philosophy and kalam on causal matters was still relatively
dormant, and one surmises that Avicenna was not particularly anx­
ious to have it aroused.
187
 NOTES Notes

7. Ilahiyyat, 1:21. See also, Ibn Sina, al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, ed. S. Dunya, vols
3&4, (Cairo, 1938), 482.
8. See M.E. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge
of Particulars," Journal of the American Oriental Society 83 no. 3 (1962):299-312.
9. Ibid., 305.
IO. Ilahiyyat, 2:265.
11. Ibid., I:165.
12. Ibid., Chs. 1-4, particularly pp. 7-9 and 26.
13. Ibn Sina, al-Shifa': al-Mantiq I; al-Madkhal "lsagoge", ed. M. Khudayri, G.C.
Anawati, and A.F. Ahwani (Cairo, 1953), 13.
14. Ibid. For a translation of the relevant passage, see M.E. Marmura "Avicenna
on the Division of the Sciences," Journal for the History of Arabi� Science 4
(1980):244-45.
15. Tabi'iyyat, 21.
16. Ilahiyyat, 2:165-67. For a translation see my article, "Avicenna on Causal
Priority," in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. P. Morewedge (Delmar' N.Y.,
1981), 75-77.
17. Ilahiyyat, 1:29-38.
18. Ibid., 36.
19. Ibid., 37-39.
20. Ibn Sina, al-Shi/a': al-Mantiq IV; al-Durhan "Demonstration" ed. A.E. Affifi
(Cairo, 1956), 140. This work will be abbreviated, Durhan, in the notes.
21. Ibn Sina, al-Najat (Cairo, 1938), 213-214; Ilahiyyat, 2:266-267.
22. Ibid., 274-65.
23. Durhan, 299, 319-310.
24. l/ahiyyat, 2:276-78.
25. Durhan, 298.
26. Ibid., 181, 298, 321.
27. Ibid., 96; Ilahiyyat, I: l 80.
28. Durhan, 303.
29. Ilahiyyat 2:271-72.
30. Durhan, 322-21.
31. Ibid., 322-24.
32. Ibid., 79-80.
33. Ibid., 298.
34. Ilahiyyat, I:166.
35. Ibid., 174.
36. See M.E. �arm�ra, "Ghazali's �ttitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic," in
Essays on Islamic P�1losophy and Science, ed. G.F. Hourani (Albany, N.Y., 1975),
100-111; "Al-Ghazah's Second Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of his Tahafut"
in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. P. Morewedge (Delmar, N.Y., 1981), 65-8J .
Chapter 12. Michael E. Marmura. The Metaphysics of Efficient 37. See above, n. 21.
Causality in Avicenna (lbn Sina) 38. Al-Baqillani, al-Tamhid, ed. R.J. McCarthy (Beirut, 1957), 43, para. 77.
39. Ilahiyyat, 1:8; Durhan, 96, 223, 4249-50.
40. al-Baqillani, al-Tamhid, 38, para. 67.
I. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Shifa': al-Ilahiyyat (Metaphysics), ed. G.C. Anawati, S. 41. Ilahiyyat, 1:167.
Dunya, M.Y. Musa and S. Zayid. 2 vols. (Cairo, 1960), 2:257, I:I0. This work will 42. Ibid., 167 ff.
be abbreviated Ilahiyyat in the notes. 43. Ibid., 169.
2. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Shifa': al-Tabi'iyyat (Natural Philosophy I; al-Sama' al­
Tabi'i "Physics," (lithograph, Tehran, 1885), Bk. I, Ch. IO, 21. This work will be
abbreviated Tabi'iyyat in the notes.
3. Ibid. See also Ch. 12, 24.
4. Ibid., 21.
5. Ilahiyyat, 2:257.
6. See Barry S. Kogan, "Averroes and the Theory of Emanation," Mediaeval Studies
43 (1981):384 If.

304 305