=
(1)
Besides, the demand is modelled as a decreasing
function of the price . As in many other market
studies, the function is considered to be afine, being
0
its slope, and D
0
its intercept.
0 0
.
yl yl yl yl
D D = (2)
The variables for the generation and the demand are
linked through the power balance equation:
1
E
yl eyl
e
D P
=
=
(3)
The total output of each group is limited by the
maximum capacity of one group multiplied by the
number of similar built groups x
gy
. This value must be
considered as a decision variable only for those groups
that are candidates to be built or to increase their output
capacity. For the other groups it takes the value 1, and
it is a constant. New plants are supposed to start
working at the beginning of each year:
gyl
gyl gy
P x P (4)
In addition, the number of installed groups must be
increasing. If demand increases every year, this
constraint is likely to be nonactive.
, 1 gy g y
x x
+
(5)
The discounted benefit B
e
obtained by a firm,
assuming remuneration at the marginal price, is:
( ) ( )
, 1
1 1
1 .
e e Y
Y L
y
e yl eyl eyl ey
y l
B B
d P C E
+
= =
= +
(
+ +
(
(6)
The cost function for the firm includes production
costs C
eyl
and also expansion cost E
ey
in case of any
new plant is installed. A discount rate (1+d
e
)
1
is
applied for each year; d
e
can be interpreted as the firm
WACC (weighted average capital cost). B
e,Y+1
represents the socalled residual benefit of the firm.
Note that, unlike traditional expansion models, system
reliability is not included as an objective for generation
companies.
Residual benefit B
e,Y+1
is computed under the
common assumption of uniform growing g
e
for each
firm, starting from last year in model scope for every
following years. If firm activities are considered as
unlimited in time, this expression has a finite value
whether g
e
<d
e
.
( )
( )
, 1
1
1 1
1
y Y
Y e e
e Y Y
y Y
e e e
B g g
B B
d d g
+
= +
+   +
= =

+
\ .
(7)
This representation implies two decision levels.
First, installed capacity is decided for every year.
Second, power output is decided for each load level.
The first decision involves a set of discrete variables
x
gy
, while the second one is represented by a set of
continuous variables P
eyl
. Solution of the model is
defined as a discrete NashCournot equilibrium for the
first level and as a continuous NashCournot
equilibrium for the second.
*
( ) ( )
e gy e gy gy
B x B x e y x g e >
( )
* *
, 0
e
eyl gy
eyl
B
P x
P
(8)
In this formulation of this twolevel equilibrium,
x
*
gy
and P
*
eyl
represent the equilibrium point.
After expansion decisions are taken, it is immediate
to compute Cournot equilibrium and obtain the value
of power output for every year and load level. Thus,
the second equation does not create any computational
problem. Unfortunately, in a real expansion study, a
huge number of possibilities should be evaluated to
find values that satisfy the first expression. The next
section proposes a methodology to obtain approximate
solutions.
III. RELAXED DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
This section makes use and extends the operation
model presented in [6]. Consider again the problem
described by equations (6). An approximate solution
for this problem can be obtained by considering x
gy
as
continuous variables. This is equivalent to accept that
firms can build a portion of a group. Under this
assumption, the cost function can be defined as
continuous and convex, and the existence of the
equilibrium is guaranteed. Now, the problem consists
of a single stage equilibrium, considering power output
in each year and level as the decision variable. Thus:
0 , ,
e
eyl
B
e y l
P
(9)
That leads to:
( )
0
,
0 , ,
eyl eyl gy eyl ey
yl
yl eyl eyl
C P x P E
e y l
P P
=
(10)
This equation states that at the equilibrium point,
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, including
operation and expansion cost.
It can be proved that the previous equilibrium
problem is equivalent to the following optimisation
problem:
( )
, 1
,
1 1 1
1
eyl yl
Y L E
y
eyl yl e Y
P D
y l e
mn d C U B
+
= = =
( + +
s.t.
1
:
E
yl eyl yl
e
D P
=
=
eyl gyl
g e
P P
g
gyl gy
P x P
, 1 gy g y
x x
+
(11)
Where
eyl
C denotes a term called effective cost
function and U
yl
is the utility function for the
demand. g P is the maximum output power of group g.
( ) ( )
2
0
, ,
2
eyl
eyl eyl gy ey eyl eyl gy
yl
P
C P x E C P x
= + +
(12)
( ) ( )
2
0
0
0
1
2
yl
D
yl
yl yl yl yl yl
yl
D
U D D dD D D
 
= =


\ .
(13)
Under the hypothesis of continuity and convexity in
cost functions, it can be proved that the first and second
order conditions are equivalent to those of the Cournot
equilibrium problem. Note that the dual variable of the
demand constraint is the marginal price of the system.
Moreover, additional technical constraints may be
added to the optimisation problem.
The solution of this problem provides useful
information about trends that may be followed by the
firms planning, including an approximation of
capacity value in the studied horizon. However, in
many cases, fractional expansion values cannot be
accepted.
IV. STATIC PLANNING EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
In order to find an exact solution for the first stage
of the problem, a static planning equilibrium model is
proposed. This model is similar to the dynamic one (8),
but it is only computed for one year of the horizon.
Benefit function is slightly modified: expansion costs
for the year are computed dividing total expansion cost
among the expected life span of the plant s and
including a capital cost coefficient q computed under
the assumption of equal payments along life span.
*
( ) ( )
ey g ey g g
B x B x e x g e >
( )
* *
, 0
ey
el g
el
B
P x
P
(14)
1
.
L
ey
ey yl eyl eyl
l
E
B P C q
s
=
 
=

\ .
(15)
This problem can be established for every single
year. The number of plants in the previous years is
considered as independent decisions and the effect of
present expansion decision on subsequent years is not
considered. Under these assumptions, the size of the
problem is dramatically reduced and can be solved by
enumeration without relaxing the expansion variable.
However, as every year is solved separately, this may
not lead to an overall equilibrium. Other problem than
may arise is that the solution obtained with this method
may not satisfy equation (5), nevertheless under the
hypothesis of sustained increasing demand, this will
not happen.
V. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
The two previous algorithms do not obtain a
satisfactory solution for the expansion problem. The
relaxed dynamic obtains noninteger values for
expansion, while the static one finds a different
solution for each year without guarantying an overall
equilibrium, and probably with incoherence with
previous or following years.
These two algorithms can be combined to obtain an
approximation of the overall solution that satisfies
every constraint. The combined algorithm consists of
four steps for each year of the horizon. For the sake of
simplicity a similar size of new groups has been
assumed in the description.
Starting from first year, and moving forward:
1. Solve the relaxed dynamic problem. Compute and
discretise the number of accumulate groups to be built
until each year by each company. It will be considered
as a central value to search x
*
yg
.
( )
int 1
ye gy
g e
w x
(
= +
(16)
2. Compute the total accumulate number of groups
to be built in the system in one year as:
1
E
y ye
e
z w
=
=
(17)
This value will be used as an estimate value for x
*
y
(total accumulate new groups by year).
3. Enumerate for each year all the possible integer
values of x
yg
that satisfy:
ye gy ye
g e
w k x w k
(18)
0
gy
x
(19)
*
, 1
1 1
E E
g y gy
e g e e g e
x x
= =
(20)
Equation (18) means that we consider as possible
solutions those which lead to build a total number of
new groups each year, close to the total suggested by
the relaxed algorithm. In this equation, k establishes
how close this solution has to be. It should be an
integer small value to be chosen using heuristic criteria
based on experience.
Next equation (19), determines that values of x must be
positives. And finally, equation (20) fixes a lower
bound for system total number of built groups for each
year. This lower bound is the number of groups built
on previous year (zero for the first year).
4. Solve the static equilibrium for every value
enumerated in the previous step and determine Nash
equilibrium by inspection of the benefit matrix. In case
that equilibrium is not found, it should be fixed using
heuristic criteria. (See case study).
The algorithm can be easily extended if different
size of new groups must be considered. Instead of
using number of groups as reference and bound values,
accumulate power by year and company, and total
accumulate system power by year should be
considered.
Nevertheless, this is an unnecessary extension in
many systems, where only a single technology (as
combined cycle gas turbines, for example) is
considered for expansion. Anyhow, in order to reduce
computation time, candidate technologies should be
restricted to a maximum of two.
A simple example with two GenCos (E=2) for a
scope of five years (Y=5) is shown to illustrate the
methodology. Only one technology is considered as
candidate to be built.
TABLE I
SOLUTION FOR RELAXED DYNAMIC PROBLEM (STEP 1)
Year 1 2 3 4 5
GenCo 1 1,22 1,59 1,89 2,32 2,42
GenCo 2
0,53 0,97 1,39 1,81 2,16
TABLE II
ACCUMULATED GROUPS BY COMPANY AND YEAR (STEP 2)
Year 1 2 3 4 5
GenCo 1 2 2 2 3 3
GenCo 2
1 1 2 2 3
Total
3 3 4 5 6
TABLE III
MINIMIMUM/MAXIMUM VALUE FOR NUMBER OF ACCUMULATED
GROUPS BY YEAR (STEP 3)
Year 1 2 3 4 5
GenCo 1 0/4 0/4 0/4 1/5 1/5
GenCo 2
1/3 1/3 0/4 1/4 1/5
Consider that the second year is under study and
only one group has been decided to be built in the first
year, by company 1. A value of k=2 has been used for
this example. As shown in TABLE I, TABLE II and TABLE III,
company 1 should built more than 0 and about 4 new
units, whereas company 2 should built more than 0 (the
value 1 is not possible) and about 3. As one unit was
built in the first year and the maximum accumulate
built units for this second year is 3, about 2 new units
should be built in. This reduces the possibilities to be
evaluated in step 4 to the following: (0,0), (0,1), (0,2),
(1,1) and (2,0).
VI. CASE STUDY
A. Case Description
The case study represents a hypothetical largescale
electric power system. The scope is split into 10 years,
two subperiods for each year (working days and
weekends) and three load levels for each subperiod
(peak, offpeak1 and offpeak2). So, there are sixty
load levels. See TABLE IV.
There are five utilities (U1 to U5) in the market
with different sizes. The installed generation capacity
for each of them is detailed in TABLE V. Only utilities
U1, U2 and U3 are considered to be interested on
expand their capacity. The main characteristics of
thermal and hydro units by utility are shown,
respectively, in TABLE VI and TABLE VII. No expansion is
considered for hydro units.
TABLE VIII shows power demand for zero price in
first year. A sustained increase of 3% each year is
considered. Demand slope is 165 MW/(/MWh) for
every level. A single technology for expansion is
considered. Expansion cost is 500 k/MW. Groups for
expansion have a maximum power of 400 MW and a
variable cost of 2.3 /MWh. Discount rate is d = 5%,
growing rate g = 0, span life s = 20 years, and from the
previous values q = 1.605.
TABLE IV
DAILY LEVEL DURATION (HOURS)
TABLE V
UTILITIES INSTALLED GENERATION CAPACITY (MW)
TABLE VI
CAPACITY (MW) AND NUMBER (IN PARENTHESES) OF THERMAL
GROUPS BY UTILITY RANGED BY COST
/MWh
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
Up to 5 4600 (5) 400 (1) 1000 (1) 300 (1) 0 (0)
5 to 10 0 (0) 100 (1) 1000 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)
10 to 15 2800 (8) 1300 (3) 1500 (5) 600 (2) 0 (0)
15 to 20 1100 (6) 500 (3) 2800 (11) 1800 (4) 0 (0)
20 to 25 700 (28) 1000 (2) 2700 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Over 25 500 (3) 0 (0) 800 (3) 1000 (3) 0 (0)
TABLE VII
HYDRO GROUPS CHARACTERISTICS BY UTILITY
Utility U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
Number of groups 2 13 6 0 4
Total capacity (MW) 700 9700 2300 0 900
Total inflows (MW) 1400 1940 4600 0 3600
Max. energy (GWh) 600 15700 2300 0 400
Min. energy (GWh) 0 0 0 0 0
Initial res. level (GWh) 360 9420 1380 0 240
TABLE VIII
POWER DEMAND OF YEAR 1 FOR = 0 (MW)
B. Results
TABLE IX shows results for relaxed dynamic
equilibrium. Utility 2 is not interested on expanding its
capacity because it has a number of hydro groups and
its new groups would be scheduled for production few
hours a year, preventing them from investment costs
recovery. For the sake of simplicity it will not be
considered in the next steps. TABLE X contains the
results obtained using the proposed algorithm.
Higher values than those estimated by relaxed
equilibrium model are obtained. These discrepancies
between both methods may be firstly originated by the
definition of expansion cost in static and dynamic
approaches. Alternative definition of this yearly
expansion cost could lead to more similar results.
Secondly, the use of a short horizon for the study (ten
years) in comparison with groups life span (twenty
years) may be also producing this underestimation.
Finally, more specific for this case, are analysed below.
TABLE IX
RELAXED DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS (NUMBER OF GROUPS)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U1 0 1.13 2.26 3.69 4.92 6.14 7.05 8.06 9.33 10.65
U2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
U3 2.05 3.22 4.26 5.26 6.43 7.58 8.63 9.58 10.41 11.61
z 3 6 8 10 12 15 17 19 21 23
TABLE X
PROPOSED ALGORITHM RESULTS (NUMBER OF GROUPS)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U1 2 3 4 8 10 11 11 14 14 18
U2          
U3 4 4 8 9 11 12 16 19 19 20
Total 6 7 12 17 21 23 24 33 33 38
The results for first year are shown in TABLE XI.
Maximum values for utility 1 in each row is shown in
bold type. Maximum values for utility 3 are similarly
highlighted in each column. Building two new groups
for utility 1 and four groups for utility 2 is the only
option marked as maximum for both utilities and
consequently it is the solution for Nash equilibrium.
Note that the result (2,2) could be almost considered as
an equilibrium point, with a low difference with the
previous. This solution is closer to the one proposed by
the relaxed algorithm. This small difference shows that
the algorithm is very sensitive to modelling of system
and to precision in computation of results.
TABLE XI
UTILITIES 1 AND 3 BENEFIT FOR YEAR 1 FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF
ACCUMULATED NEW GROUPS (M)
U1
U3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5078.8 5077.3 5086.1 5082.2 5074.7 5075.3 5070.2
0 4958.7 4949.0 4900.7 4885.0 4869.8 4844.4 4827.3
5041.0 5039.6 5057.9 5054.0 5051.5 5044.1 5036.6
1
4971.7 4961.6 4908.3 4895.0 4877.4 4853.8 4836.6
5017.8 5015.6 5020.8 5011.0 5002.3 5001.9 4997.0
2 4974.5 4964.4 4919.3 4903.4 4894.3 4867.7 4849.1
4984.3 4987.5 4999.0 4997.4 4990.6 4986.9 4973.7
3 4983.0 4962.2 4920.2 4901.7 4891.2 4864.6 4851.6
4970.8 4971.5 4980.1 4978.2 4974.3 4974.2 4966.2
4 4981.1 4956.8 4920.2 4901.8 4885.7 4858.7 4845.5
4965.6 4971.5 4975.0 4969.7 4962.4 4952.2 4942.0
5 4973.8 4946.8 4912.5 4895.7 4881.3 4856.2 4846.7
4929.0 4938.6 4938.7 4936.2 4933.4 4932.0 4921.9
6 4982.4 4938.3 4917.1 4898.7 4878.8 4853.7 4844.3
Situation is more complicated in year 2 (see TABLE
XII). There is not a point of equilibrium, but there are
four states that establish a 2x2 region of equilibrium. If
decision of U1 is to install 3 groups, then U3 finds its
maximum installing 5 groups, these decision leads U1
to add a group to reach a maximum. In this situation
U3 prefers to reduce one group to maximize benefit.
For this decision of U3, the best option for U1 is to
build up 3 groups, that was the starting point. The
values (3,4) has been chosen heuristically as
equilibrium point first because the increment that U3
would obtain changing its decision is lower than the
other three changes that appear in the previously
described dynamic. Besides, the difference is
negligible.
TABLE XII
UTILITIES 1 AND 3 BENEFIT FOR YEAR 2 FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF
ACCUMULATED NEW GROUPS (M)
U1
U3
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5467.1 5485.3 5484.5 5481.8 5483.4 5476.9 5461.3
4 5507.9 5453.1 5434.0 5416.2 5387.5 5369.0 5360.6
5459.1 5466.7 5467.4 5461.5 5463.6 5459.3 5449.0
5
5502.9 5453.5 5428.9 5417.1 5386.7 5366.7 5356.9
5450.3 5465.2 5467.5 5458.7 5460.7 5446.0 5433.3
6
5493.1 5444.2 5419.0 5408.4 5378.1 5362.9 5354.1
5426.6 5425.9 5423.2 5417.2 5417.9 5412.8 5402.3
7 5485.5 5446.5 5427.5 5415.0 5386.3 5367.3 5357.4
5415.1 5416.9 5413.9 5407.9 5408.5 5403.4 5393.0
8 5474.8 5438.4 5419.4 5406.9 5378.1 5359.2 5349.2
5407.7 5415.6 5414.0 5407.9 5408.6 5395.7 5380.1
9 5462.7 5425.8 5406.1 5393.4 5364.8 5349.4 5341.8
5400.6 5401.0 5394.2 5386.3 5375.7 5365.5 5354.7
10 5449.4 5419.9 5402.7 5379.6 5359.8 5349.4 5339.1
Year 3, presented in TABLE XIII, raises a different
situation. Two different Nash equilibriums are founded
(7,5) and (4,8). None of these two equilibriums is
dominant with respect to the other. Additionally both
of them have the same total groups value, so the value
of z
y
, cannot used as reference value. An additional
heuristic criteria is required. The later point has been
choosen, because it distributes differences with
continuous equilibrium results for each firm (w
ey
) more
equally.
TABLE XIII
UTILITIES 1 AND 3 BENEFIT FOR YEAR 3 FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF
ACCUMULATED NEW GROUPS (M)
U1
U3
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5971.6 5995.2 5999.5 6001.7 6004.1 5997.5 5984.8
4
5851.5 5815.0 5801.6 5787.6 5773.3 5754.9 5746.0
5928.6 5965.5 5964.9 5966.2 5967.6 5965.0 5955.3
5 5882.4 5836.7 5818.3 5800.9 5785.7 5763.3 5752.9
5921.2 5954.7 5954.4 5952.6 5949.3 5945.1 5934.9
6
5878.3 5834.8 5816.0 5801.3 5780.7 5761.1 5751.3
5914.9 5947.8 5947.0 5948.2 5949.3 5944.9 5933.6
7 5875.2 5831.9 5813.2 5795.7 5770.6 5751.2 5741.2
5906.3 5919.6 5912.1 5902.9 5905.7 5901.5 5891.2
8
5873.9 5839.0 5822.6 5808.7 5776.5 5756.1 5746.2
5883.8 5905.8 5900.4 5893.3 5896.1 5891.9 5881.6
9
5848.4 5832.0 5816.2 5800.7 5768.6 5748.2 5738.3
5876.3 5898.0 5894.6 5891.1 5893.9 5889.8 5878.1
10 5882.9 5820.2 5805.8 5788.5 5756.3 5735.9 5725.9
There is another interesting result for this year. The
point (4,5) is a local equilibrium. A unilateral change
of one group for U1 or U3 causes a benefit decrease.
This point is close the value obtained with continuous
algorithm (2.26,4.26). This kind of situations may also
explain discrepancies between both algorithms, as the
continuous one is based in a local definition of
equilibrium.
Results for year 4 are detailed in TABLE XIV. In this
case a 4x2 equilibrium region appears, similar to the
one presented for year 2. Equilibrium point is selected
with the same criterion used before.
TABLE XIV
UTILITIES 1 AND 3 BENEFIT FOR YEAR 4 FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF
ACCUMULATED NEW GROUPS (M)
U1
U3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6403.5 6422.9 6425.6 6426.4 6439.3 6439.1 6431.3
8
6503.1 6466.8 6441.9 6424.6 6394.5 6380.8 6373.6
6402.2 6411.1 6405.0 6398.7 6410.0 6409.5 6401.2
9
6494.6 6465.2 6442.1 6428.9 6401.6 6387.7 6380.9
6361.6 6383.7 6387.6 6384.7 6395.3 6394.9 6386.7
10 6506.9 6459.1 6434.2 6396.1 6396.2 6382.3 6375.5
6351.8 6373.7 6377.3 6374.4 6385.0 6384.7 6376.4
11 6499.2 6451.3 6426.3 6412.0 6388.3 6374.5 6367.6
6351.8 6368.4 6372.2 6366.5 6369.5 6366.0 6353.8
12 6485.8 6443.3 6418.1 6406.9 6390.0 6378.6 6371.8
6332.7 6344.6 6352.0 6350.9 6357.8 6357.4 6343.0
13 6492.2 6454.1 6434.7 6408.2 6386.7 6370.9 6361.7
6327.3 6336.5 6343.8 6345.4 6352.1 6346.0 6336.1
14 6482.3 6447.3 6418.0 6398.3 6376.6 6360.8 6349.2
Finally, TABLE XV presents results for year 9. In this
case there is a single equilibrium at the corner of the
table, and both firms decide not to expand their
capacity.
TABLE XV
UTILITIES 1 AND 3 BENEFIT FOR YEAR 9 FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF
ACCUMULATED NEW GROUPS (M)
U1
U3
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
9239.6 9223.5 9236.1 9199.7 9149.1 9178.8 9158.7
19 9029.2 9021.4 8983.4 9003.1 9210.7 9078.2 9069.0
9231.2 9235.2 9389.1 9517.9 9250.5 9132.8 9021.0
20 9016.9 9003.3 8857.4 8835.1 8866.2 8985.2 8968.5
9230.6 9227.9 9080.5 9049.2 9185.2 9187.0 9183.2
21 9000.8 8998.3 9090.7 8967.3 9142.3 8991.7 8955.3
9230.8 9227.3 8985.4 9490.6 9162.1 9133.6 9124.9
22 8984.5 8946.6 8992.8 8958.2 8918.0 8904.4 9048.2
9231.2 9227.9 9224.7 9294.1 9120.6 9116.4 9180.0
23 8968.7 9034.6 8952.5 8803.9 9050.6 9141.2 8997.0
9231.2 9249.4 9176.3 9139.2 9202.6 9392.2 9145.1
24 8952.6 8923.8 8954.7 9328.3 8897.6 8693.7 8852.6
9231.2 9227.1 9040.3 9195.6 9210.5 9166.0 9170.5
25 8936.7 8967.4 9020.8 8813.6 8702.6 8891.3 8995.8
The rest of the years present similar behaviours to
some of the presented ones.
From previous results, the value of parameter k, can
be established for future computations. Heuristic search
need large values of parameter k for the reason that
relaxed equilibrium underestimates discrete ones.
TABLE XVI shows minimum required value for each year
as a result of the extensive exploration performed for
the study case.
TABLE XVI
MINIMUM REQUIRED VALUE FOR SEARCHING PARAMETER K
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
k 2 1 3 4 5 4 7 9 8 8
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A methodology that allows the computation of
capacity expansion in a competitive framework has
been presented. The market equilibrium has been
represented using a twostage model. One level is
based on a continuous Cournot equilibrium and
computes a market equilibrium approximation for the
entire model horizon. A second level discretises this
solution separately for each year.
Results obtained show remarkable differences
between the results obtained using both methods. The
definition of expansion cost in static and dynamic
approaches, the use of short horizons in comparison
with groups life span and the existence of local and
multiple equilibriums are the origin of this
dissimilarities. Nevertheless the approximate method
arises as a useful aid to define equilibrium in an
approximate way.
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors gratefully acknowledge the
contributions of Andrs Daz Casado for his work on
the original version of this document.
IX. REFERENCES
[1] B. F. Hobbs. "LCP Models of NashCournot Competition in
Bilateral and POOLCOBased Power Markets". Proceedings
of IEEE Winter power Meeting, New York, 1999.
[2] C. J. Day, B. F. Hobbs. Oligopolistic competition in power
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X. BIOGRAPHIES
Efraim Centeno obtained a Degree in
Industrial Engineering (1991) and a PhD in
Industrial Engineering (1998) at the
Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid. He
belongs to the research staff at the Instituto de
Investigacin Tecnolgica . His areas of interest
include planning and development of electric
energy systems.
Javier Reneses obtained a Degree in Electric
Industrial Engineering at the Universidad
Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid in 1996. At
present, he is Researcher at the Instituto de
Investigacin Tecnolgica. His areas of interest
include operation, simulation models and
planning of electric energy systems and risk
management strategies in electricity markets.
Rul Garca obtained a Degree in Industrial
Engineering (2001) at the Universidad de
Valladolid. At present, he is Researcher at the
Instituto de Investigacin Tecnolgica. His
areas of interest include planning and
development of electric energy systems.
Juan Jos Snchez obtained a Degree in
Industrial Engineering (2002) at the
Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid. At
present, he is Researcher at the Instituto de
Investigacin Tecnolgica. His areas of interest
include planning and development of electric
energy systems.