Challenges from China

Need for defence modernisation

by Kamlendra Kanwar
INDIA’S just-retired naval chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta’s recent warning that China will
become a “primary challenge” for India in the future and that “in military terms, both
conventional and non-conventional, this country has neither the capability nor the intention
to match China force for force” was a candid statement of fact though it caused many
eyebrows to rise in policy-making circles.
The Chinese threat has generally been talked of in hushed tones. During NDA rule the then
Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, had disturbed a hornet’s nest when in 1998 he
stated that China was India’s enemy number one. Though he later expressed regret over
the remark, suspicion of Chinese intentions has been a reality in the Indian foreign affairs
establishment for long.
Admiral Mehta’s prediction that Beijing’s territorial claims would become more assertive as
its military capabilities continue to develop cannot be taken lightly. He surely knew what he
was talking about when he addressed the National Maritime Convention in New Delhi earlier
this month. As Admiral Mehta was dwelling on Chinese assertiveness, Beijing was all set to
launch its largest-ever military exercise involving 50,000 troops not far from the Indian
border.
While China holds on to 38,000 sq km in the western sector occupied during the 1962
hostilities, its growing assertion of its claim over nearly 90,000 sq km in Arunachal Pradesh
has a history to it. The legendary first chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao
Zedong, had once termed Tibet as the palm of a hand with its five fingers as Ladakh,
Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and the North-East Frontier Agency. He had claimed that these were
Chinese territories that needed to be ‘liberated’.
Mao often quoted a famous Chinese saying, “…If the east wind does not prevail over the
west wind, then east wind will prevail over the east wind.” This was interpreted as an
obsession to dominate other nations in their vicinity.
Though the spurt in Sino-Indian trade in recent times has encouraged the view that the
economic inter-dependence of the two Asian giants would ensure that they don’t go to war
again as they did in 1962, China’s consistent support to Pakistan, both overt and covert,
and its fanning of Naxalism in large parts of India leave no room for complacency.
It is no secret that nuclear weapons and missile technology were transferred to Pakistan by
China in an effort to build it up as a bulwark against India. Likewise, Maoists in Nepal
supported on the sly by the Chinese are in cahoots with the Indian Maoists who now control
40 per cent of India’s territory.
The Chinese have also seen to it that all of India’s neighbours —Nepal, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Myanmar and even Sri Lanka — remain under their spell.
India has indeed come a long way from the days when the shadow of China evoked great
fear in the establishment but there is still much ground to cover.
A recent manifestation of this country’s new-found confidence was the deployment of a full
squadron of 18 Sukhoi fighter aircraft a bare 370 km from the last post on the India-China
border. Considering that China had earlier deployed ground troops on a major scale in this
sensitive area, this was a much-needed Indian response to Chinese hegemonistic activity on
the northeastern border with India.
Earlier, in June last a leading Chinese newspaper, Global Times, which is the official organ of
the Communist Party of China, had editorially described the Indian decision to station
60,000 troops in Arunachal Pradesh as a “military provocation” and warned India that it
“needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of a potential
confrontation with China”.
The editorial linked this move to a statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that his
government would “make no concessions to China on territorial disputes” despite
cooperative India-China relations. Said the editorial: “This ‘tough posture’ may win Dr.
Singh some applause among India’s domestic nationalists, but this is dangerous if it is
based on a false anticipation that China will cave in.”
Apparently, the Chinese have been unaccustomed to India’s show of confidence and their
reaction stems from unhappiness over the growing clout that India enjoys in the world at
large.
While border talks have been continuing with both sides reiterating their position, there is
an undercurrent of strain that surfaces from time to time. The latest flashpoint was the
Asian Development Bank’s nod to the funding of an irrigation project in Arunachal Pradesh
late last year.
In the face of China’s objection, the ADB recently approved a $60 million loan for a
watershed development project in Arunachal, as part of its $2.9 billion India development
plan for three years to 2012. The Chinese claim that the area that India calls Arunachal
Pradesh belongs to it and that the ADB had no business including it in the India aid plan.
India’s stand was that while Arunachal was an integral part of its territory, China’s objection
on political grounds was a clear violation of the ADB’s charter which prohibits the Bank from
evaluating any proposal on grounds other than economic.
China angrily rejected India’s assertion that Arunachal Pradesh was its integral part,
insisting that Beijing never recognised the “illegal” McMahon Line and that the status of the
border state was “never officially demarcated”.
Though the Chinese are now clearly upping the ante on Arunachal, their designs were clear
nearly three years ago when, on the eve of the visit of their president, Hu Jintao to India,
China’s ambassador Sun Yuxi created a diplomatic flutter by reiterating Beijing’s claim to
Arunachal Pradesh.
Significantly, China is setting rail tracks very close to Arunachal Pradesh whereas the
nearest Indian railhead is far away.
All this may not presage war both because India is no longer weak and helpless as it was in
1962 and trade between the two countries is on an upward spiral to the benefit of both
countries, but it does not bode well for relations between the two neighbours. India can
hardly ignore the fact that the Chinese worked assiduously behind the scenes to block the
Nuclear Suppliers Group from allowing access of nuclear fuel and technology to this country.
That it failed to achieve its goal is quite another matter.
Clearly, India can ill afford to lower its guard. Beijing deploys the world’s biggest army, and
its defence spending is rising faster than any other power. According to official figures,
Beijing’s military budget in 2008 was 418 billion yuan — £35 billion — a rise of 17.8 per
cent on 2007. This already exceeds Britain’s defence budget of £34 billion and places
China’s military spending second only to the US.
According to figures from Jane’s, the military specialists, the Chinese defence budget has
risen by 178 per cent in the past seven years, even after adjusting for inflation. At this rate,
China will spend £180 billion — half of the Pentagon’s current budget and five times Britain’s
— by 2020.
India has to match up to Chinese preparedness through its own military modernisation
programme and also through strategic alliances. After the huge outgo on salaries of defence
personnel, there is sadly little left from the budgeted amounts for the modernisation of the
armed forces. But even that remains partially unspent. There is indeed a long way to go
before this country can consider itself duly equipped to face up to the Chinese threat.