Int. j. econ. manag. soc. sci., Vol(3), No (11), November, 2014. pp.

675-680

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The Distribution of Political Power in Urban China After 1949

-The Mechanism of Its Modification
Huang Guan
Lecturer of Xiamen University TKK College; Ph. D. of Waseda University.
*Corresponding author: huangguan@xujc.com

Keywords

Abstract

Political Power
Regime Legitimacy
Cross-class Alliance
Echelon

This study focuses on the distribution of political power in the urban area of mainland China. The
independent variable in this study is the change of CCP's resource of its regime legitimacy. A change in the
Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) source of legitimacy is used as the independent variable, the partnership
between the CCP and its allies as the intermediate variable, the distribution of political power as the
dependent variable. Chinese political system has been used as the conditional variable. The hypothesis of
this study is that the distribution of political power in the urban area of mainland China would correspond
the changes of CCP's resource of its regime legitimacy.

1.

Introduction

The definition of political power in this essay is the capacity to impact the outcome from Chinese political system. This essay focuses on the
real, not the literal, face of political power distribution in the urban area of Mainland China. According to the newest vision of PRC's
Constitution (2004) (138 Articles, and 41 amendments),[ From 1949-nowadays, Chinese government has officially promulgated 4 editions of
Constitution. Generally, the newest edition of Constitution replaces the old editions.] the leadership of Chinese mainland has been officially
distributed to proletariat, the alliance of proletariat and peasants has been used as the foundation of the socialist people's republic of China
(PRC). According to 29 Article, the Chinese people's liberation army is the defense of PRC, but CCP controls Chinese violence departments
includes military[31]. Literally, the distribution of political power should favor proletariat and peasants, but the reality is different. Though the
dictatorship of CCP had only been stipulated in the former vision of PRC's Constitution, it controls the biggest political power, and also the
distribution of Chinese political power. Contrast to the Constitution, the partner of CCP is economy elites in nowadays China. CCP shares some
of its controlled political power with economy elites to encourage them to help CCP realize its economy developmental plans.
In China, the base of CCP's domination is its control of army. Its political philosophy is Guns create dominance[15]. Getting the position of
the chairman of central military congress (In China, there are two central military congress exist, one is in central government, and the other one
is in the central board of CCP. However, the two congresses are composed by the same committees) is the signal of a highest Chinese leader has
been full power. In other words, the most powerful man in China is the chairman of central military congress. For example, Deng Xiaoping had
never been the president of Chinese government or the Chairman of CCP, but he had been recognized as the highest leader after Mao Zedong,
because he was the chairman of the central military congress. However, the president of central government, the highest secretary of CCP's
committee, and the chairman of central military congress are usually being served by the same person.
After securing the base of CCP's domination, the political power has been firstly shared with state-enterprises, since state-enterprises are the
extension of CCP in economy. Those state-enterprises have been used to control the important economy areas by CCP. Nowadays, since the
increase of importance of economy elites, private enterprises have also been allowed to share a small part of political power. Generally, the
importance of factors that will impact the distribution of political power in the urban area can be viewed, as you can find in the table 1, from
macro and micro perspectives.
Table 1. Importance of Factors in the Distribution of Political Power in Urban China
Importance of factors arrange from high to low
Macro

Resources , relation with CCP, and ideology

Micro

Individual resources, position, and contract types, CCP membership

In the macro view, resources may decide whether CCP would ally with a class or not. It can also be expressed as the real partners CCP wants to
have are some kinds of resources. But, at different period, the CCP allies with different resources. Generally, CCP would share political power
with the people, organizations and classes, which control the resources (the resources should be really hard to be replaced, and cannot be gotten
by violence) that CCP needs. For example, if a man has that kind of resources, no matter he has an authentic contract or not, CCP would
distribute political power to him, and try its best to get a close relation with him. This kind of exchange has been existed ever since the setting up
of CCP.
In micro, though the attributes of labour contract (they can be generally distributed into two groups: authentic and inauthentic) is one of the most
important impacts of political power distribution, the position is more important basic determinant. As we know, Chinese society is a typical
two-tiers system. In nowadays China, there are still two kinds, authentic and inauthentic, of labor contracts exist[3]. The workers have authentic
contracts could enjoy a lot of political powers, but the inauthentic workers only share a so small part.
Besides the labor contracts, the membership of CCP would benefit a worker[13]. The membership of CCP cannot secure a position for its owner
in an official institution or a state-enterprise, but it would impact the distribution of political power among workers who have already have a
position. Positions are more important than the memberships of CCP in the micro political power distribution. The labor contracts would decide

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whether a worker could have a chance to share political power, and the position would decide how big the political power a worker could share.
An authentic worker may not have a membership of CCP, but he would share big political power if he has been set on an important position.
Sum up, CCP, as the controller of Chinese political power[30] and a modern political party, desperately desires to continue its domination of
China. CCP, the biggest party in the world,[ The vice-minister, Qintong Wang, of the central organization of CCP announced that the number of
members of CCP was 80.269 million at the end of 2010.] wants to fuse itself with Chinese society. Nobody could clearly divided CCP from
Chinese society. Generally speaking, there is a general line of political power distribution in China: the base of the CCP's control of Chinese
political power is its control of army; after securing its control of political power, CCP firstly distributes political power to the insiders of the
CCP and Chinese official institutions; besides above, CCP distributes political power to the social classes those control the resources that CCP
needs to strengthen its domination and cannot get them by violence. In order to show the detail of the changes of the distribution, in the
following parts, the record of the distribution of political power after 1949 has been divided to 3 periods according to the changes of the ways
that CCP used to achieve its legitimacy. Each period has been divided by a edition of constitution, since any kinds of fundamental changes
would be marked by modifying constitution by CCP government.

2.

The Record of the Distribution of Political Power in Urban China 1949-1976

2.1 1949-1954
In 1949, CCP achieved its nationwide domination and began to set up its socialist political system. On 29, Sept1949, 'Common Program of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference' had been promulgated and acted as the temporal Constitution. The Common Program did
not stipulate CCP as the leader of Chinese political system, but it allowed CCP to practice militarized control in new surrounded areas until CCP
satisfied (Article 14)[1]. The Common Program made it legally possible for CCP to control nationwide political power after it won the civil war.
Since then, CCP became the big controller, not the only one, of Chinese political power. From 1949 to 1953, other Chinese democratic parties
and social actors also controlled some political power, though CCP practiced demilitarized control nationwide. CCP achieved its nationwide
domination, but its dictatorship of political system had not been established. During that period, CCP had to cooperate with other democratic
parties, social actors, represents of proletariat and peasants to strengthen its domination. Meanwhile, CCP tried its best to permeate the
nationwide political system. At that moment, the membership of CCP was the key factor in the distribution of political power, which had been
pushed by CCP [7].
In 1954, after strengthen its nationwide dominance, CCP called the First National People's Congress and promulgated 'PRC's Constitution' which
had been marked as '54 Constitution'. The leadership of CCP had been mentioned in its introduction, but not been clearly stipulated in any
articles. Since the '54 Constitution' stipulated 'People's Democratic Dictatorship' as the characteristic of socialist PRC and also marked working
proletariat as the leader, CCP logically became the leader of China (at that moment, CCP is the only party officially represented proletariat).
2.2 1954-1976
During the period 1954-1956, CCP established its control of nationwide political system and strengthened its dictatorship. The political impacts
of democratic parties and social actors had been significantly shrunk, since the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference had been
replaced by People's Congress. At that moment, the membership of CCP was the most important factor in political power distribution, since all
of workers had authentic contracts. Besides that, civilians' original classes became more and more important. The CCP controlled political power
had been mainly shared with proletariat and peasants [22].
Though the '54 Constitution' had been published, it had never been fulfilled. Short after its promulgation, CCP practiced arrange of political
movements, as 'Great Leap Forward', 'Anti-Rightist' and 'Culture Revolution', etc., and disturbed the operation of Chinese official political
system. During 1956-1976, personally cult of Mao Zedong climaxed. He became the synonyms of CCP and 'Great Leader'. Political power also
became his private property[29]. By those ways CCP undoubtedly secured its control of political power.
That period has been officially marked as 'a decade of chaos'[14], Mao Zedong was the only person who really controlled political power. He
shared political power with his wife and the subordinates that he trusted. Their top principle of political power distribution within the party was
that the subordinates should never challenge their leadership. For example, Lin Biao, the so-called successor of Mao Zedong, was dead, when he
planned to replace Mao before he dead [6]. Outside the party, political power had been distributed mainly depended on classes. Since all of
Chinese people were so-called proletariat or farmhands, the original class identification became the most important factor.
In 1975, a new edition of PRC's Constitution had been promulgated and that had been marked as '75 Constitution'. In its article 2, the leadership
of CCP had been firstly clearly expressed, and it also stipulated the way of proletariat to administrate China[ Working class's administration of
China should be realized by CCP.]. It stipulated 'Philosophy of Mao Zedong' as the officially political philosophy (Article 11)[19], and
proletariat had been described as the only dictator in all fields (Article 12)[19].
Since Chairman Mao was on the way to death, the in-power cadres and civilians wanted to secured their political power by manipulated the
People's Congress to pass the '75 Constitution'[26]. The dictatorship of CCP and the way to realize political power by regularly political
movements had been officially recognized by '75 Constitution'. At that minute, the Chairman Mao chosen cadres and proletariat controlled the
major part of political power. The CCP members, who had not been trusted by Chairman Mao, but had irreplaceable abilities, began to earn
more and more political power. Though the loyalty to Chairman Mao was still the most important key factors in the distribution of political
power, irreplaceable abilities began to get important.
During the period 1949-1976, Chinese political power had been collected and controlled by CCP. It officially established its dictatorship.
Though the membership of CCP was the key factor in the distribution of political power at beginning, the loyalty to Chairman Mao became more
important soon after. At that moment, class identification, especially the class origin, of civilians was the most decisive factor to decide whether
they would have a chance to share political power. Though CCP officially encouraged civilians to be common, it had shared political power with
the persons who had irreplaceable abilities. At beginning, CCP cooperated with democratic parties and social actors that controlled some
political power. After CCP established its dictatorship, it shared political power with proletariat and farmhands who composed mass society. At
the end of this period, CCP distributed more political power to the CCP members that had irreplaceable abilities.

3.

The Distribution of Political Power in Urban China 1977-1989

After Chairman Mao Dead, the political system based on Chairman Mao's personal charisma began to shake, and the arrest of the so-called 'the
Gang of Four'[ the Gang of Four is composed by Jiang Qing (Mao's wife), Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen. It is a

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official political phrase in China.]on Oct. 6, 1976 was the signal of the collapse of that system. Meanwhile, the new leaders group of CCP, got
the support from military, did a lot of political corrections and that was also the progress through which CCP redistributed political power. The
political power that had been controlled by mass had been redistributed to the former cadres, who had been suppressed in the former period, and
the new selected cadres.
Unlike Chairman Mao, the partners of CCP's new leaders group were cadres, especial the senior cadres[27]. They tried their best to strengthen
CCP's dictatorship and re-collect political power from the mass, though the distribution of political power within the new leaders group was not
stable. Until 1978, CCP mainly distributed political power within itself and its most important partner -- military. At that moment, military had
so powerful impact on Chinese political system. The mass began to lose their political power from then on.
In 1978, the People's Congress promulgated a new edition of 'PRC's Constitution' (78 Constitution) to replace the '75 Constitution' and show the
new orientation of the new incumbent government. This '78 Constitution' still officially acknowledged the dictatorship of CCP and some
disciplines, had been initiated by '75 Constitution', had also been maintained. The most important modification is the rebuilding of the destroyed
law system that brought rules to the in-chaos society (Article 9)[20]. '78 Constitution' did not dare to do revolutionized change to '75
Constitution', but it did a lot of basic amends on key fields [5].
In '78 Constitution', the CCP's leadership had been reinforced and bureaucracy system had also been revived. Though the new leaders group did
a lot of political corrections, they had to find a way to realize those works without destroy CCP's credit [32]. To solve that, the new leaders group
decided to revive the law and judicial system that had been destroyed in 'Culture Revolution' by massively political movement. Position became
the key factor in the distribution of political power, since the CCP's new leaders group needed bureaucrats to rebuild rules in Chinese society.
And bureaucrats had special abilities began to earn more and more superiority in the distribution of political power.
In 1982, People's Congress promulgated a new edition of 'PRC's Constitution' that has been marked by '82 Constitution'. '82 Constitution' is valid
nowadays. It abolishes the dictatorship of CCP and proletariat, and stipulates the term of in charged highest cadres. It also returns the right of
selection of president, government and committees of military to People's Congress. For the first time, CCP's government officially announces
that the dignities of civilians' should be protected.[ Civilian is a political letter in China. It has been officially defined as the persons who
benefit society and state.] The most important change is that it officially acknowledges the existence of private ownership (Article 5)[21]. That
makes it possible to distributed political power to economy elites in the following period.
After Chairman Mao's death, CCP has to find a new foundation to replace Chairman Mao's charisma for its domination. Deng Xiaoping made
sure of his leadership in the CCP's new leader group, and he began to reform Chinese economy system to secure the CCP's dictatorship [11]. To
do that, CCP had to re-accept the existence of bourgeoisie. Since bourgeoisie had already been eradicated in China in the last period, CCP had to
revive the local capitalists and bring the new capitalist from foreign states. CCP began to give capitalists some political privilege to encourage
them to serve CCP's needs. Though economy factors had more and more impacts on Chinese political system, CCP still strictly limited the
distribution of political power within CCP and official institutions. Position and membership of CCP were still the key factor in that distribution,
but the importance of the membership began to get lower.
Because of the principle of political power was transforming and the impact of 'Culture Revolution' still acting, in 1989, '64 riot' (CCP officially
identified), which had been mainly composed by college students happened and lasted for about two months (Though it officially demanded
CCP to eradicate corruption, its philosophy was not clear. For example, the students highly asked for democracy, but they never asked CCP to
end its dictatorship). That severely impacted Chinese society. CCP frapped its control on society. After that, CCP got stricter in the distribution
of political power, strengthened its control on education and army.
Since CCP frapped the control of bureaucrats after 1976, the outsider-activators got a chance to educate and manipulate the mass to participate
political movements and impact the operation of political system. After '64 Riot', CCP got quicker in collecting political power from mass and
more strictly selected its partners. From then on, the mass had lost the main part of their political power. Though the individual dictatorship of
Chairman Mao had collapsed, the CCP's collective dictatorship had been strengthened. CCP began to share political power with economic elites,
after secured its dictatorship. Resources became a more important factor in the distribution of political power.
During this period, the distribution of political power was in chaos both in macro and micro views. Firstly, CCP secured its dictatorship and
redistributed political power within itself depended on positions. Secondly, CCP revived bureaucracy and distributed political power to
bureaucrats, after Deng Xiaoping achieved his leadership. Meanwhile, CCP slowly recollected political power from the mass. Thirdly, CCP
became to control society stricter and recollected political power from the mass. Resources became a more and more important factor, when
CCP selected its partners. Though CCP tried to limit the distribution of political power with the official institution, it had to share some political
powers with its partners that controlled the resources, which were irreplaceable and could not be gotten by violence.

4.

The Distribution of Political Power in Urban China after 1990

After 1989, CCP quickly recollected political power from the mass and redistributed to its new partners step by step. In the period of the third
generation of CCP leaders group, the economy development had been used as the main tool to support the legitimacy of its dictatorship. In the
period of the forth generation of CCP leaders group, besides the economy development, traditional morel had been revived and used as the
replenish tool to sustain CCP's dictatorship [11]. From the third generation, CCP began to share more political power with economy elites.
The main task of Deng Xiaoping led second generation of CCP leaders group kept on transforming Chinese totalitarian regime to authoritarian
regime [8]. The third generation of CCP leaders group inherited that mission from the second one, and tried to continue and strengthen CCP's
dictatorship [10]. In order to complete its mission, the third generation had to develop Chinese economy as quick as possible. To encourage
economy elites, CCP distributed more political power to their class. From then on, capital and economy related ability became the key factors in
the distribution of political power.
The forth generation of CCP leaders group faced more severe challenges. They could not make sure of social stability just by encouraging
economy increase, and had to extend its partnership with other social classes [16]. By highlighting the Chinese traditional morality, the forth
generation tried to secure obedience from social members before it distributes political power to them [28]. Capital and economy related ability
were still the most important factors in the distribution of political power. Before the economy was reformed, the establishment of social
organization was forbidden; today, however, 499,268 social organizations have legal standing [2], since the right of permitting any association to
register had been controlled by the CCP, this was a signal that the CCP had allied with capitalists and economic elites. Meanwhile, favored by
CCP's desire for social stability, mass community begun to have more impacts on the distribution of political power. CCP had to bring their
requirements in consideration when it made policies.
Since the successor of the forth generation had been selected before the forth generation's assumption of duty, the forth generation had to follow
the line had been portrayed by the former generations (this is a significance of atavism in Chinese political system, and it will be discussed in
detail in the following part)[12]. The forth generation faced a more severe political environment and did not dare to introduced revolutionized

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rules that had been settled by the former generations. As maintain the stratification became the aim of the forth generation, they tried to limit the
political power distribution within the existed partnerships. Though CCP still kept the mass outside the political power distribution, it still had to
respond the demands from mass, since mass composed the main body of human resource.
After the fifth CCP leaders group went up onto the platform, the distribution of political power has been strictly frapped. The distribution
principle in this period is different, CCP limits the political power that has been distributed to economy elites. Though the new leaders group
punished a lot of corrupted cadres, they did those to cut the ways that economy elites could use to impact CCP's government. Meanwhile, they
also want to earn the support from mass by stressing the threaten from foreign countries, reviving the cult of Chairman Mao, socialist ideology
and racism. Though the new leaders group limits the distribution of political power, the source of its regime legitimacy is as ever as economy
development.

5.

The Analysis of Chinese Political System and Mechanism of its Modification

After the above review of the political power distribution in urban China, then we can compare the record with the table 2. Table 2 shows the
key factors of totalitarianism and authoritarianism, it is easy to find those factors in the record of CCP controlled Chinese politic. In detail, the
China during 1954-1977 built up a typical totalitarianism regime, whose regime legitimacy came from Chairman Mao's charisma [25]. Within
that regime, the ends of power was mass and the official ideology - communism - was enforced. Besides Chairman Mao, there was no other
independent political leader.
During the chaos of political power distribution after Chairman Mao's Death, the second generation of CCP leaders group found it hard to
continue the former totalitarianism regime. Since they already lost the base (Chairman Mao's Charisma) of that regime, they had to find a new
way to strengthen their domination and sweep away the tradition of 'Culture Revolution'. Though the new highest leader also dreamed to have
the Chairman Mao's power, the most of CCP cadres wanted to assure of their security and political power [23]. Ever since 1989, the second
generation of CCP leasers group started to use economy development to earn legitimacy of its regime, but its legitimacy shaken so intensively as
the same as all the other authoritarianism states'.
Table 2. Comparison between totalitarianism and authoritarianism
Totalitarianism
Charisma
Role Conception
Ends of Power

Authoritarianism

High

Low

Leader as function

Leader as individual

Public

Private

Corruption

Low

High

Official Ideology

Yes

No

Limited Pluralism

No

Yes

Legitimacy

Yes

No

Source: This table has been summarized from Sondrol, P. C. 2009. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators:
A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner, Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 23 (3), 599.

The figure 1 describes the macro political power distribution in nowadays urban China, it looks like a kind of hourglass.. It is easy to see that
CCP control the biggest share of political power, the bureaucrats and democratic those have close relation with CCP shares the second biggest
part. Both of the above two groups are encompassed by political power, when the other classes do not have enough political power. However,
the mass is the biggest group in China, it shares the smallest part of political power.

Figure 1, General Political Power Distribution in Nowadays Urban China

Nowadays, a typical authoritarianism regime is in charged, there are lots of ideological conflicts in urban China. The leadership in CCP
government is limited pluralism and the ends of power become private. According to Transparency International, corruption rate in current
China is higher than the most of the other countries [24]. Besides above, the legitimacy of CCP regime has been queried much severer than ever
before. Thus, compared to Chinese former totalitarian systems, nowadays Chinese authoritarian regime leave a larger sphere for private life.

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Though it lacks a guiding ideology, tolerates some pluralism in social organization. It also lacks the power to mobilize the whole population in
pursuit of national goals, and exercise their power within relatively predictable limits.
Besides the political power distribution outside the CCP system, the inside political power distribution also need to be analyzed. An echelon
system exists in CCP's insider political power distribution [9]. That echelon has been introduced from military affair, it is a relique of the semimilitary CCP in the wartime of modern China. The essential of that system is 'there is always a successor' [4]. Within that system, there are four
main stages (Zero--Third) existing. The Zero stage is composed by in charged cadres that control the right to make decisions at provincial or
upper level governments; the First stage is composed by reserved successors of the Zero stage, the amount of those successors is 1,000; the
amounts of Second stage at prefectural level and Third stage at counties are 6,000 and 40,000 [17]. The distribution of political power within this
system can also be shown by hourglass picture as figure 2. The trend of the political power distribution outside CCP also appears in the inside
CCP political power distribution.

Figure2. General Political Power Distribution in CCP's Echelon System

Conclusion
The CCP desperate to continue its domination of China, no matter its regime is authoritarian or totalitarian. Though CCP's domination bases on
the control of violence, it has to share political power with its partners. The partners that have been chosen by CCP would respond the change of
its regime legitimacy resource. Since the basement of Chinese society is transferring from politics to economy, Chinese political regime is
transferring from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, the regime legitimacy resource is also transferring from Chairman Mao's charisma to
economy development, the partners of CCP are also being transferred. After the economy reform, the political power sharer has been changed
from mass to economy elites, but the political power distribution began to get strict as soon as the fifth generation leaders in charged. The
incumbent CCP leaders group wants to get mass support without share any political power with them, they want to limit political power
distribution within the CCP. The main ways they use to realize that goal are highlighting nationalism, stressing the threaten from foreign
countries, manipulating education and public voice, etc. That's why the CCP government's international policy become more and more
aggressive. Though we show the echelon system within CCP, we lack of resource to analyze the detail of political power distribution in that
system. That is the subject we are going to hand in the future.

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