People v Nazario- G.R. No.

L-44143,August 31, 1988

J. Sarmiento
Facts:
Nazario, a fishpond operator, refused to pay 362 pesos for taxes for 1964, 1965,
and 1966. He stood his ground despite repated demands by the treasurer to pay.
In the trial court, he was found guilty of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955,
as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and made to pay a fine.
He assailed the ordinance in the Supreme Court.
The provisions read:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of
fishpond on part thereof per annum.
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of
fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of
municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting
from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any
fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964.
Issues:
1. WON the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain.
2. WON the ordinances can be said to be ex post facto measures.
3. WON the ordinance only covers private fishpond owners and not lessees of public
land.
4. WON the questioned ordinance cant be enforced beyond the territorial limits of
pagbilao and cant cover non-residents.
Held: No to all. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15,
series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966

1. The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not
covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise
maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas
Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of
three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of
Fisheries." Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year
1964."
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the act must be utterly vague on its
face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not
be challenged whenever directed against such activities.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of
vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls
within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the
term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the
fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to
maintain them. While it appears that it is the National Government which owns
them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is
therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
SC agreed with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue
measures designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And
obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach,
for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes
and for another, since it is not the Government that had been making money from
the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the
recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for
the municipal taxes in question.

There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an
uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond'
by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started
operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or
individuals."
Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years
starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," is
unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12,
reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," does not give rise to any
ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established.
The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates
as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned presents
a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in
operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after
their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the
amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent
fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With
respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.
2. The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September
19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year
1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that
is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto."
As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14,
1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is
being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date
of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative
measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the
originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. 39 Moreover, the act (of nonpayment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said
that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty.
3. Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan- held that local governments'
taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act
No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force.
First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is
based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" ). Secondly, fishponds are not
forest lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. By definition,

"forest" is "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and
underbush; a large wood."
They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance.
They are not charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine
enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation
4. No merit