SANLAKAS V.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR 159085
February 3, 2004
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders
have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in
the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the
resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations
took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No.
435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners
contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a
state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18,
Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from
the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot
be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such
power to the President.
(3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo,
petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
(4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion
"opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime
of rebellion.
ISSUE :
The Court can adjudicate cases that are otherwise moot?
HELD :
As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the
determination of
actual controversies. Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
capable of
repetition yet evading review. The case at bar is one such case. Once before, the President
on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that
occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,
clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to break into
Malacaang. Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the Presidents
declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The
mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases precluded this Court
from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent similar questions from
reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a
state of rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the
petitions notwithstanding.