1 RiskNIS-FinalReport

STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH
Risk management and use of risk-based

approaches in inspection, maintenance
and HSE analyses of NIS a.d. plants
Final Report for Package B
(selected Annexes only)
Stuttgart, Belgrade, July 7, 2010
Report title:
Final report for Package B
Costumer:
NIS Petroleum Industry of Serbia
Project title:
Risk management and use of riskbased approaches in inspection,

maintenance and HSE analyses of
NIS a.d. plants
Customer order Nr.:
45/609
Internal project Nr.:
10027
Project start:
October 1, 2006
Project end:
December 31, 2010
Subproject:
Package B
Applicable codes/standards:
Workpackage:
WP2.11
Date of order acceptance:
Task:
Date of completion:
Additional
contract info:
Participants in the activity:
Participants /
Distribution:
A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, P. Stanojevic,

B. Orlic, S. Eremic, O. Tot, M. Ilic, Z. 1 x NIS a.d.
Pavlovic, D. Subotin, D. Jasin, R.
1 x Steinbeis R-Tech
Guntrum, B. Stojanovic
Author(s):
A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, R. Guntrum
Doc. Nr.:
Document
data:
Distribution (list):
Pages:
Status:
Keywords:
193
Version:
06
Annexes:
29
Date: July 7, 2010
Confidentiality:
NIS, petroleum industry, risk management, API 581, risk based inspection,
reliability centered maintenance, Seveso, Safety report
Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies GmbH, Willi-Bleicher-Str. 19, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany
Table of Contents
List of Figures ................................................... vi
List of Tables ................................................... viii
1
Management Summary Report .................... 1
Detail Technical Report .............................. 2

2.1 General part............................................. 2
2.1.1
Introduction ................................. 2
2.1.2
General about NIS a.d. .................. 3
2.1.2.1
Activities ........................................... 3
2.1.2.2
History of the company ....................... 4
2.1.2.3
NIS in numbers.................................. 4
2.1.3
Pancevo Oil Refinery ..................... 5
2.1.3.1
General data ..................................... 5
2.1.3.2
Location of Pancevo Refinery ............... 6
2.1.3.3
Description of the plant ..................... 17
2.1.3.4
Safety of the plant ........................... 23
2.1.4
Novi Sad refinery ........................ 27
2.1.4.1
General data ................................... 27
2.1.4.2
Location description.......................... 27
2.1.4.3
2.1.4.4
Safety of the plant ........................... 35
2.1.4.5
Description of processes ................... 37
2.1.5
Elemir Gas refinery ..................... 40
2.1.5.1
General data ................................... 40
2.1.5.2
Location description.......................... 40
2.1.5.3
2.1.5.4
Description of processes ................... 49
2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology .................. 50

2.2.1
General ..................................... 50
2.2.2
Preparation of data base .............. 50
2.2.3
Identifying the Damage

Mechanisms ............................... 52
2.2.4
Calculating the Likelihood of Failure52
2.2.5
Calculating the Consequence of

Failure ...................................... 53
2.2.6
Determine the Financial

Consequences ............................ 54
2.2.7
Calculating the Risk .................... 54
page ii
2.2.8
Remaining life assessment ........... 55
2.2.9
Developing an inspection plan ...... 56
2.2.10 Software used ............................ 60

2.3 General about HSE (HAZOP, Seveso II)
methodology .......................................... 60
2.3.1
HAZOP ...................................... 60
2.3.2
Seveso II Directive ..................... 62
2.4 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Pancevo

Refinery ................................................ 63
2.4.1
The scope of analysis .................. 63
2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad

Refinery ................................................ 64
2.6 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Elemir
Refinery ................................................ 64
2.6.1
Executive summary..................... 64
2.6.2
Introduction ............................... 66
2.6.2.1
Objective ........................................ 66
2.6.2.2
Scope ............................................. 66
2.6.2.3
Deliverables .................................... 67
2.6.3
Methodology .............................. 67
2.6.4
Performed activities .................... 67
2.6.5
Unit and process description ......... 68
2.6.6
Results of analysis ...................... 71
2.6.6.1
HAZOP Analysis Results .................... 71
2.6.6.2
Technical discussions ........................ 71
2.6.6.3
Management Systems Evaluation ....... 77
2.6.6.4
API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based)

analysis results ................................ 79
2.6.6.5
API 581 qualitative analysis

(component based) .......................... 79
2.6.6.6
RBI Detailed quantitative analysis ...... 81
2.6.7
Conclusions and recommendations 81
2.7 HSE (Seveso) report for Refinery Pancevo,

Unit FCC ................................................ 83
2.7.1
2.7.1.1
General ........................................... 83
2.7.1.2
Implementation of Seveso
requirements ................................... 83
2.7.2
Information on site, plant and unit 84
2.7.2.1
General data ................................... 84
2.7.2.2
Location of Establishment.................. 84
2.7.2.3
Policy the company is pursuing .......... 86
2.7.2.4
Safety management system .............. 86
2.7.2.5
Hazardous materials ......................... 86
2.7.2.6
Meteorological data .......................... 86
2.7.2.7
External activities ............................. 86
2.7.3
page iii
Introduction ............................... 83
Detail description ........................ 86
2.7.3.1
FCC unit S-2300 .............................. 86
2.7.3.2
Gas concentration unit S-2500 ........... 91
2.7.3.3
Flow charts...................................... 95
2.7.3.4
Condition of the processes ................ 95
2.7.3.5
Hazardous material .......................... 95
2.7.3.6
Utilities and effects ........................... 97
2.7.4
Safety of the plant ...................... 99
2.7.4.1
History of accident ........................... 99
2.7.4.2
Hazards identified ............................ 99
2.7.4.3
Frequency of occurrence of hazards .. 105
2.7.4.4
Consequences of hazards ................ 106
2.7.4.5
Domino effect from Event TOP1 ....... 115
2.7.4.6
Summary of Hazard Analysis ........... 116
2.7.4.7
Measures to prevent or mitigate the

hazards......................................... 116
2.7.4.8
Measures to reduce the consequences

of an accident ................................ 116
2.7.5
Risk assessment ........................117
2.7.5.1
Frequency ranking.......................... 117
2.7.5.2
Damage severity ............................ 117
2.7.6
Conclusions ..............................118
RBI / RCM Users manual ....................... 119
References ........................................... 120
Annexes .............................................. 121
Annex 1
Geographical position of Pancevo ............ 122
Annex 2
Industrial zone of Pancevo ..................... 123
Annex 3
General plan of Pancevo refinery ............. 124
Annex 4
Organization of Pancevo refinery ............. 125
Annex 5
General plan of Novi Sad refinery ............ 126
Annex 6
Substances in Novi Sad refinery .............. 127
Annex 7
Organization of Novi Sad refinery ............ 129
Annex 8
Responsibilities within management system

in Novi Sad refinery .............................. 130
A.8.1 According to the requests of the
standard ISO 9001:2000 (SRPS ISO
9001:2001) ............................... 130
A.8.2 According to the requests of the
standard ISO 14001:2004 (SRPS ISO
14001:2005) ............................. 133
Annex 9
Novi Sad refinery flow diagram of U 100 136
Annex 10
Refinery Novi Sad flow diagram of U 200 137
Annex 11
Elemir Gas refinery in NIS Naftagas ......... 138
Annex 12
Integrated management system policy of

NIS Naftagas........................................ 139
Annex 13
Flow diagram of Elemir Gas Refinery ........ 140
Annex 14
Position of unit FCC in Pancevo refinery.... 141
page iv
A.14.1 Blocks in Pancevo refinery ........... 141

A.14.2 General plan of refinery position of
FCC in Block 6 ........................... 142
Annex 15
QMS/EMS documents of RNP .................. 143
Annex 16
List of available drawings of FCC ............. 146
Annex 17
Main hazards in FCC .............................. 150
Annex 18
Block diagram of Pancevo refinery ........... 154
Annex 19
List of substances in Pancevo Refinery ..... 156
Annex 20
Flow diagrams ...................................... 160

A.20.1 FCC complex, Gas concentration unit Propylene splitter section ............ 160
Annex 21
Safety data sheets for substances in FCC . 161
Annex 22
Damage estimates based on overpressure

for process equipment (adjusted from CPS
2000).................................................. 163
Annex 23
Summary of hazard analysis ................... 165
Annex 24
FCC: Bow-tie analysis result ................... 168

A.24.1 TOP1: Release from FA-2514 ....... 168
A.24.2 TOP2: Release from DA-2503 ...... 168
A.24.3 TOP3: Release from DA-2509 ...... 168
RGE: API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for

year 2009 ............................................ 174
Annex 25
RGE: API 581 Qualitative, component based

- Inspection planning............................. 177
page v
List of Figures
Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work ............. 2
Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D. .................................... 3
Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d. ...................... 5
Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia ....... 6
Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia .................... 7
Figure 6: Industrial zone of Pancevo ........................... 10
Figure 7: Industrial zone of Pancevo - Location of
Refinery .................................................. 10
Figure 8: Wind Rose for Pancevo ................................ 16
Figure 9: Years of construction................................... 20
Figure 10: Second phase of expansion ........................ 21
Figure 11: Bombing 1999 .......................................... 22
Figure 12: Oil refinery in Novi Sad .............................. 27
Figure 13: Position of Novi Sad .................................. 28
Figure 14: Position of Novi Sad Refinery ...................... 28
Figure 15: Location of Zrenjanin in Serbia ................... 41
Figure 16: Location of Zrenjanin and Elemir ................. 41
Figure 17: Map of roads ............................................ 42
Figure 18: Distribution of relative wind frequencies per
year (%) ................................................. 45
Figure 19: Seismic activities ...................................... 46
Figure 20: Elemir Gas refinery ................................... 46
Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the
overall management system ....................... 51
Figure 22: Methodology and application of detailed RBI . 52
Figure 23: CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix........... 55
Figure 24: NIS risk matrix ......................................... 55
Figure 25: Flowchart of HAZOP Process ....................... 62
Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component
based applied on RGE equipment ................ 65
Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis
Component based applied on selected RGE
equipment ............................................... 65
Figure 28: Component count for RBI analysis of Elemir
Refinery .................................................. 66
Figure 29: Project web site Tools and analysis ........... 68
Figure 30: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 1 of 3 ...... 72
page vi

Figure 33: HAZOP Loop 1 .......................................... 75
Figure 34: Results of management system evaluation for
RGE ........................................................ 78
Figure 35: Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in
qualitative unit analysis matrix.................... 79
Figure 36: API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component
level, for year 2009 ................................... 80
Figure 37 Preliminary results of API quantitative
(detailed) Analysis Component based applied
on selected RGE equipment ........................ 81
Figure 38: Comparison of different inspection strategies 82
Figure 39: Financial Risk Prioritization ......................... 82
Figure 33: Position of FCC in Pancevo Refinery ............. 85
Figure 34: Access to the FCC complex ......................... 85
Figure 35: Flow chart of FCC ...................................... 88
Figure 36: HAZOP tool Main page .......................... 100
Figure 37: HAZOP tool - Loop description .................. 100
Figure 38: HAZOP tool Nodes ................................ 101
Figure 39: HAZOP tool Drawing ............................. 101
Figure 40: Loop1 - TOP1 Event, FA-2514 ................... 102
Figure 41: Column D 2503 debutanizer section of S
2500 ..................................................... 103
Figure 42: Column DA-2509 splitter section of S-2500104
Figure 43: General scenario ..................................... 107
page vii
List of Tables
Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery ..................... 8
Table 2: Medium monthly and annual values of the
precipitation quantity ( mm) in Panevo ....... 14
Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in
Panevo reduced recording to the data for
Belgrade .................................................. 14
Table 4:
Medium monthly and annual values of the air
humidity in Panevo, reduced according to

data for Belgrade ...................................... 16
Table 5: List of commercial products of Pancevo refinery 17

Table 6: Storage capacities of Refinery........................ 19
Table 7: Qualification structure of employees in Pancevo
Refinery .................................................. 25
Table 8: Number of employees in Pancevo Refinery by
type of work ............................................. 25
Table 9: Maximum concentration of employees, first shift26
Table 10: List of units in Novi Sad Refinery .................. 29
Table 11: Average temperatures (Source: Republic
Hydrometeorology Service of Serbia) ........... 31
Table 12: Novi Sad region - Frequency of the winds ...... 32
Table 13: Average value of cloudiness in sky/10 ........... 32
Table 14: Key units in Novi Sad Refinery - characteristics34
Table 15: Number of personnel in Firefighting unit of
Novi Sad refinery ...................................... 36
Table 16: Firefighting equipment ................................ 36
Table 17: Available fire extinguishing means ................ 37
Table 18: Dangerous substances in U 100 ................... 38
Table 19: Dangerous substances in U 200 ................... 40
Table 20: Statistical data on monthly weather
parameters for Zrenjanin region .................. 43
Table 21: Statistical data on seasons weather
parameters for Zrenjanin region .................. 43
Table 22: Temperature distribution in the region - July .. 45
Table 23: Temperature distribution in the region December ................................................ 45
Table 24: Frequency and velocity of wind .................... 45
Table 25: RGE supplies ............................................. 47
Table 26: Employees structure in Elemir Refinery ......... 47
Table 27: List of NIS-Naftagas certificates and scope of
certification .............................................. 47
page viii
Table 28: Fire fighting equipment ............................... 49

Table 29: Substances in Elemir Gas refinery ................ 49
Table 30: Proposed action for different category of
Likelihood Factor ....................................... 53
Table 31: Effectiveness of Inspection for General
Thinning .................................................. 57
Table 32: Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized
Thinning .................................................. 57
Table 33: CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels
Inspection Categories ................................ 58
Table 34: CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories 59
Table 35: Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage 59
Table 36: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection
Effectiveness for Furnace Tube .................... 60
Table 37: Typical steps for a Seveso assessment study.. 62
Table 38: HAZOP analysis for Loop 1 .......................... 74
Table 39 Management System Evaluation results with
audit comments ........................................ 77
Table 40: Implementation of Seveso II requirements .... 83
Table 41: Vacuum Gas Oil ......................................... 96
Table 42: C3/C4 Recycle From Alkylation Unit .............. 96
Table 43: Naphtha From LCGO Hydrotreating Unit ........ 96
Table 44: Quality of wet gas ...................................... 96
Table 45: Quality of raw FCC gasoline ......................... 97
Table 46: FCC supplies ............................................. 98
Table 47: Some effect of loss of electricity ................... 98
Table 48: Frequency of occurrence of accidental events 105
Table 49: Definition of Frequency Classes .................. 106
Table 50: Typical damages caused by overpressure .... 107
Table 51: Details on damage caused by pressure wave 108
Table 52: TOP1 Release from FA-2514, main
characteristics ........................................ 109
Table 53: TOP1 Release from FA-2514, scenario ...... 110
Table 54: TOP2 Release from DA-2503, main
Table 55: TOP2 Release from DA-2503, scenario...... 111
Table 56: TOP3 Release from DA-2509, main
Table 57: TOP3 Release from DA 2509, scenario ...... 112
Table 58: EVENT 4 Release from FA-2953, main
Table 59: Event 4 Release from FA-2953, scenario ... 114
Table 60: EVENT 5 Release from FA-2455, main
Table 61: EVENT 5 Release from FA-2455, scenario.. 114
Table 62: Level of damage (in percent) for the affected
structures .............................................. 115
Table 63: Selected TOP events and scenario .............. 117
page ix
Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes .................. 118

Table 65: Definition of consequence severity classes ... 118
Table 66: Risk matrix for considered scenarios ........... 118
page x
Management Summary Report
page 1
Detail Technical Report
2.1 General part

2.1.1
Introduction
Package B within the project RiskNIS Risk management and use of risk-based approaches in
inspection, maintenance and HSE analyses of NIS a.d. pl ants was ordered by the end of
August 2008. The aim of Package B is to additionally provide the guided / supported
implementation of the technology and tools already provided in the basic Package A to
approximately 20% of all equipment in NIS a.d. production units (the assumed most critical
equipment) ca. 5100 equipment. The scope of work in Package B is presented on the
Figure 1
Aopt. Optional CMMS
Full CMMS System containing:
Asset management
Maintenance Personnel planning
Preventive maintenance
Master plans
Reports
Aopt Optional CMMS

B Extended
package
A Basic package
C Full coverage
package
A. Basic package:
C. * Full coverage
(all identified equipment)
Feasibility study
Basic implementation for RBI, RCM and

RCFA: Software Licensing and first
year maintenance cost
Travel and subsistence
Basic package INCLUDED

FULL training INCLUDED
Project Management
Basic package INCLUDED

B. Suggested package:
200 Equip. RBI level 1
80 Equip. RBI level 2
20 Equip. RBI level l3 analysis
20 components analyzed by
RCM
10 components analyzed by
RCFA
Implementation of HSE, HAZOP and

Seveso II Directive
2529 pieces of equipment

for Level 1 analysis
for RCM analysis
38 pieces of equipment /
systems for RCFA analysis
12871 pieces of equipment for Level 1

analysis
analysis

analysis
12058 pieces of equipment for RCM

analysis
250 pieces of equipment / systems for

RCFA analysis
Introduction of the full scale CMMS (Aopt) is a
necessary precondition for this Package.
Basic training for RBI, RCM/RCFA and

HSE/HAZOP/Seveso II, first instance of the
training/certification
5.100 pieces of equipment

31,500 pieces of equipment
Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work

Kick of meeting for Package B was held on September 28, 2008 in Elemir Refinery and
preparation for data collection started immediately. Templates for data collection for RBI,
RCM / RCFA analysis have been developed and agreed with experts from three refineries.
page 2
Order of refineries to be treated with analysis has been agreed as RGE, RNS, RNP, according
to availability of experts to collected / verify data.
Data collection started by the end of December 2008 with Refinery Elemir and for other two
refineries in the first quarter of 2009. First preliminary RBI report prepared for RGE and
delivered in March 2009.
Several meetings were held in order to review the work progress (May 4, June 12, December
12, 2009) and to present plan for the further work. Two workshops were held as well in
Stuttgart (April 2010) with the aim to verify input data and to agree the type and contents of
the reports expected by NIS management.
Analysis have been done as required by the contract for Package B; based on their results
recommendation for improvement / optimization of inspection, maintenance and HSE
practice have been given.
Training, education and certification of NIS a.d. employees started in November 2008 and
finished in January 2010. Training has included both, theoretical courses in the field of risk
management and on-the job training in German companies.
2.1.2
General about NIS a.d.
2.1.2.1 Activities
NIS is the largest oil company in Southeast Europe. It is joint stock company and fifty one
percent of NIS shares is held by the Russian company Gazprom Neft. Corporate
headquarters are located in Novi Sad and Belgrade and production facilities are located
across the whole territory of Serbia. NIS is the only Serbian company which possesses an
integrated and well balanced system of production, refining and trade of crude oil and
petroleum products, as well as natural gas exploitation and which plays a significant role in
stability and security of energy supply.
The company deals with crude refining, sales of petroleum products, and exploitation of
hydrocarbons in Serbia and Angola. Annual NIS crude oil production totals ca. 1 million tons.
NIS owns two oil refineries (Figure 2), Panevo Oil Refinery and Novi Sad Oil Refinery, with
total refining capacity of ca. 7.3 million tons per year. There is an LPG production facility, so
called Elemir LPG refinery.
Oilfield services business deals with geophysical exploration, drilling and well testing , hydro
probing, transportation, workover and civil construction services. In addition to its retail
network (480 petrol stations), NIS also owns oil depots all over Serbia.
Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D.

The company's main business is the exploration of gas and oil in Serbia (mainly in
Vojvodina) for and the production, importing, processing, transportation and marketing of
hydrocarbons (oil and gas). It will hold hold monopoly on all oil imports except the high
quality diesel fuel, called "eurodizel" in Serbia, until 2011. The company is a leading supplier
of petroleum products in the Serbian market. It exports as well motor fuels, benzene,
toluene), road and industrial bitumens to the EU countries, Ukraine, Croatia, Montenegro and
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
page 3
2.1.2.2 History of the company

The development of the oil economy of Serbia began after World War II, when the research,
and a few years later, production of oil and natural gas, as well as distribution and sales of
petroleum products, began in this region. Soon after refineries have been constructed,
companies for transport and trade of natural gas were set up as well.
NIS predecessor company was the Company for Crude Oil Exploration and Production,
incorporated in 1949 by the Resolution of the Government of the Federative National
Republic of Yugoslavia, and which in 1953 was named Naftagas. In 1949 the first gas fields
discovered, in 1951 - started natural gas production and development of the gas
transmission system and first crude oil fields discovered. In 1968 Novi Sad and Panevo Oil
refineries started up and the largest oil field in the country, discovered (Velebit).
NIS-Oil Refinery Pancevo, a company for production of petroleum, power fluids and
electricity began to work in December 14, 1968 with capacity of 1.32 million tons of crude oil
per year. In the first phase of expansion, December 14, 1979 atmospheric distillation II was
put into operation, which has increased the primary processing capacity 4.82 million tons of
crude oil per year. By commissioning of secondary refinery plants Refinery has been aligned
with a modern European refineries with a modern structure of production facilities. During
the NATO bombing refinery was badly damaged. Direct damage is estimated upwards of 360
million dollars but production capacity is restored soon.
NIS-Oil Refinery Novi Sad for production of all types of motor gasoline, diesel fuel, road and
industrial bitumen, lubricants, and solvent began to work December 13, 1968. During the
bombing in 1999 heavily damaged. Material damage is estimated 320 million dollars. After
reconstruction atmospheric distillation reached the capacity of 500,000 tons per year of
crude oil processing, and platforming, bitumen plant and atmospheric distillation capacity of
2 million tons per year of processing.
NIS was established as a public company for the exploration, production, refining and trade
in crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas in 1991. It has integrated the following
companies: Naftagas, Gas, Energogas, Panevo Oil Refinery, Novi Said Oil Refinery, Belgrade
Oil Refinery and Kruevac Lubricant Factory (FAM).
Since 1st October 2005 NIS started to operate as a joint stock company dealing with
production of crude oil and gas, crude oil refining and trade in petroleum products,
production and marketing of liquefied petroleum gas.
The privatization of NIS started in 2007. Several companies, including Gazprom Neft, MOL,
OMV, Hellenic Petroleum, Rompetrol and Lukoil expressed interest to acquire the company.
However, on 25 January 2008, Serbia and Russia signed an agreement giving 51% of NIS's
shares to Gazprom Neft for 400 million and 550 million in investments until 2012.
Adjoining contracts signed with Gazprom are the contact about inclusion of Serbia in the
South Stream project and the construction of a gas reserve facility in Banatski Dvor. On 24
December 2008 final contract between the Government of Serbia and Gazprom were signed.
2.1.2.3 NIS in numbers
In 2009, JSC Gazprom Neft completed the acquisition of 51% of NIS shares, while the
Government of the Republic of Serbia remains the owner of 49% of shares. Instead of
previous business strategy mostly oriented to the market of Serbia and internal resources, a
new strategy has been defined for NIS as achievement of long term stable leadership at the
market of petroleum products in South East Europe.
NIS a.d. Novi Sad share capital is 81, 530, 200.000.00 RSD and owns the total of 163 060
400 of 500.00 RSD in nominal value. The structure of the shareholder capital of NIS a.d.
Novi Sad on January 2, 2010 is shown on Figure 3.
page 4
Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d.

Key task of the company is to increase the competitiveness and efficiency of the company
and improving the business management. Organizing of its business operation according to
international standards will enable NIS to feel secure both in times of globalization in general
as well as in the times when Serbia is entering the EU.
It has 11000 employees, 500 gas stations across Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Montenegro. 1600 internally serviced gas stations, 8 large terminals, 44 warehouses and air
fuel pumping facility at Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport.
Panevo Oil Refinery (yearly refines of 4.8m tones of crude oil) and Novi Sad Oil Refinery
(yearly refines of 2.6m tones of crude oil) are owned by NIS and gas Refinery in Elemir, near
Novi Sad.
NIS a.d. in basic figures for the year 2005:
contributing 20% to the state budget

719.560 t of crude oil production
295.430.633 m of natural gas production
7,3 mill. t - refining capacity
3,927 mill. t crude processed
In 2007 NIS had a profit of approximately 9 billion RSD (US$ 170 million) and 262 billion
RSD (US$ 5 billion) of revenues. In 2008 total revenues was USD 4.7 billion.
2.1.3
Pancevo Oil Refinery
2.1.3.1 General data

Panevo Oil Refinery is a fuel-type refinery which produces fuels, paraffin and aromatic
solvents, feed for Petrochemical Complex, bitumen and sulphur and feedstock for
petrochemical industry. Primary and secondary units for crude oil processing were
constructed in such a way as to enable the processing of various types of crude. Today it is
mostly imported crude oil that is being processed (70-80%). It is supplied by way of a
pipeline through Croatia or by barges on the river Danube from Romania and Hungary. The
rest of processed crude oil is of the domestic origin (oil fields located in the province of
Vojvodina).
Refinery's available processing capacity is 4,820 x 106 tons per year of crude oil, i.e. 14,660
tons per day. With this production capacity and with storage capacity of approximately
700,000 cubic meters of crude oil and derivates, it is the biggest factory of this type in
Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of
exporting 20% of its production. The assortment of derivates manufactured is extremely
wide.
Crude oil (domestic and imported) is delivered to the Refinery by oil pipeline and river barge,
and the derivatives are dispatched by product pipeline, tank truck, railway and barge.
Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) has financed the construction of a pipeline from the
island Krk (Croatia) to Petroleum refinery Pancevo, by way of which 6 x 106 tpy of crude oil
can be transported. Reloading facility at the river Danube enables a simple way of supplying
page 5
the crude oil and dispatching the derivatives by barges. Crude oil and its derivatives can also
be loaded and unloaded at the Refinery's own railway transport facilities. There are also
tank-truck loading & unloading facilities.
Head office of the refinery is in Pancevo, Spoljnostarcevacka b.b and legally it is a part of the
joint-stock company NIS - Petroleum industry of Serbia owned Serbia and JSC Gazprom
Neft. Total number of employees is 2300.
Some of planned development projects are:
meeting EU standards on product quality

reconstruction of the units and infrastructure in order to improve the process
efficiency and crude oil valorization
reduction of energy costs
improvement of environmental protection
joint projects with neighboring petrochemical company HIP-Petrohemija on better
valorization of by-streams.
2.1.3.2 Location of Pancevo Refinery

Macro location
Pancevo Refinery is situated at exceptionally favorable location - 14 kilometers from
Belgrade, the biggest consumer center in Serbia and about 4 km away from the town
Panevo on the left bank of the Danube River at its confluence with the Tami River. The
Panevo territory covers an area of approximately 760 square kilometers around the
confluence of the two rivers, between coordinates 2030 21 East geographic longitude
and (4440 45) North geographic latitude. Geographical location of town Pancevo in
Serbia is shown on Figure 4 and Error! Reference source not found..
Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia
page 6
Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia

Map of Serbia, scale 1:2000000, with position of Pancevo is given in Annex 1.
Panevo is an industrial town with a population of about 130,000 people; 86,000 live in the
city, the remainder in outlying settlements and villages. The largest companies on the
territory of the town Panevo is represented by an industrial complex (Figure 5a) which
includes the petrochemical plant HIP Petrohemija, Pancevo Refinery of NIS and the chemical
fertilizer plant HIP Azotara.
The industrial complex lays on the citys southern edge, southeast of Vojlovica (Figure 5b), a
major residential area. The three factories, which cover about 290 hectares, employ about
6,600 people and represent the major employer for the entire Panevo area. The map of
industrial zone is given in Annex 2 (scale 1:25000).
Micro location
Pancevo Refinery is located in the southeastern and eastern part of the southern industrial
zone, located about 4 km from the town of Pancevo, between settlements Vojlovica and
Starcevo. To the West of the refinery, at a distance of 2.5 km, runs Danube river, with docks
owned by the refinery. Channel Nadel flows to the East of the Refinery.
Residential area of Starevo is located to the Southeast at a distance of 1 km of Refinery
while residential area of Vojlovica located northwest at a distance of 350m. Several small
villages lie directly to the south of the industrial complex. Sensitive public buildings like
schools are in a distance of about 3 km. Furthermore no traffic routes or major transport
centers are nearby the establishment yet.
The refinery is surrounded by agricultural land. The nearest industrial facilities are located on
the northwestern edge of the refinery and plant Messer-Tehnogas and Petrochemical
Complex Petrochemical HIP-Pancevo.
Pancevo refinery covers an area of 145 hectares. Port on the Danube, area of 3.5 hectares,
and pipeline bridge connecting the port and the refinery, about 2.5 hectares, are located
outside of the refinery.
Refinery itself consists of 24 blocks where production and power units are settled, as well as
necessary infrastructure. Schema of blocks in Refinery is given in Annex 3 and list of blocks
in Table 1.
page 7
Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery

No
Description
Block I
Headquarter
Mashing workshop
Storage and garage
Technical security center
Trafo F
Entrance gate 2
Block II
Central wardrobe
Restaurant
Laboratory
Sample house
Trafo C
Block III
FCC Complex control building

Fire brigade house
Monastery Vojlovica and church
Development and Investment
Block IV
Flare I and II
Storage tanks for slop and oil water
API separator
Pumpe house PK-4 with annex
Vessels with hydrogen and nitrogen
Block V
Atmospheric distillation I, S-100

Visbreaking, S-200
Platforming S-200
HDS I, S-400
Gas treatment and fractionation, S-500, S-570
Merox TNG, S-500
Gasoline redistillation, S-600
Special gasoline merox, S-650
Udex, S-620
Souer water treatment, S-900
Flare gases recuperation, S-1000
Command room of Block |V
Air compresor room, S-1500
Auxiliary systems, Vapor condensate (S-1300), Fuel gas (S-1500), Alylation
system (S-1800)
Block VI
Atmospheric distillation II, S-2100

Vacuum distillation, S-2200
FCC with gas treatment, sour water treatment and amine washing (S-2300, S2500, S-2900 and S-2950)
HDS II, S-2400
TNG refination, S-2450
Alkylation, S-2600
Light gasoline merox, S-2650
Light cracked gasonile merox, S-2750
Heavy cracked gasoline merox, S-2850
Claus, S-2450
Control room for S-2200 and S-2100
Block VII
Storage area (15 tanks)
Block VIII

Pump house PK-8 with annex and control room
Block IX
Thermal power unit

Chemical treatment of water
Tanks for own fuel (2 tanks)
Raw water pool and cooling towers
page 8
No
Description
Pumps for fire fighting water
Block X
Storage area, (24 tanks)
Block XI
Block XII
Block XIII
Block XIV
Block XV
Block XVI
Bitumen production, S-250

Air compressors
Tanks for feed and bitumen products (11 tanks)
Trafo Bitumen
Auto and rail loading of bitumen
Auto and rail loading of LPG
Filling station for liquid derivates
Control building for loading station
Scale for trailers
Block XVII
Tanks for fuel oil (2 tanks)

Warehouse for investment equipment
Sowage
Parking
Trailers washing building
Trailer equipment building
Gate 3
Block XVIII
Crude oil tanks (4 tanks)
Block XIX
Block XX
Block XXI
Sulfolane unit, S-3600

Control building for Sulfoline unit
Trafo Sulfoline
Block XXII
Storage tanks for Sulfoline
Block XXIII
Trafo ST-35/6
Gate 1
Block XXIV
Railway building
Garage for locomotives
Loading installation for derivate
Unloading installation for crude oil and semi-products
Oil terminal with the building
Wagon
Sludge sediment
page 9
Figure 6: Industrial zone of Pancevo
Figure 7: Industrial zone of Pancevo - Location of Refinery
page 10
Access to the Refinery is provided by the following roads:
Entrance 1
o K-1 for the delivery of equipment investment
o K-1A for the workers and the fire exit and entrance
Entrance 2, K-2 entry for workers and materials for technical good stores
Entrance 3, K-3 input trailers for shipping products manufacturing
Industrial rail for transport of raw materials and shipping of products to the
production station Suburb
Docks on the River Danube on the right side of the road Pancevo - Starcevo.
Natural and protected areas

The territory of Panevo municipality encompassed the protected area Ponjavica Nature
Park, proclamated in 1995 which is located southeast of Panevo city. This area is significant
because of its connection with surface and underground water from the SZIC, on one side,
and because its importance for protection of natural wetland flora and fauna on the other
side (V level of IUCN protection and III level of national protection). The park, instituted in
1994, and managed by the public Enterprise "Omoljica", located in the homonymous village
of Omoljica3 has an area of 133,54 ha,, which include part of the Ponjavica watercourse and
adjoined areas. The park lies between two villages, Omoljica and Banatski Brestovac.
Ponjavica also includes two special nature reservations established in 1961 Ivanovo
and Danube River island Omoljicka Ada. In the northeast part of Panevo municipality,
near the village of Dolovo is located the Monument of Nature Tri stabla jasena. This
protected area, instituted in 1999, has three white ash trees estimated to be 200 to 250
years old.
The following natural areas are present in the municipal territory of Panevo:
Natural area named Pancevacki rit, between old and new road to Panevo
is very interesting wetland area. It is old type of environment, such used to exist
around all big lowland rivers in the past. This area is important for bird nesting. These
locations are in procedure for protection within international project Important Bird
Areas. This bog-land are also very interesting and important as place where could be
found different animal species which life circle and activities are closely connected with
nearness of water and bog-lends. It is important to notice that flora of this area has
not yet been investigated. Hence, there is a possibility to find there endangered water
plants.
Danube River islands (Forkontumac, Stefanac, Cakljanac, Brestovacka Ada,
Ivankovacka Ada) and natural, wooded area on the river banks of Danube and Tamis
river are natural areas important in many aspects of environmental point of view, but
without any level of protection. Like Pancevacki rit, this sites suppose to be under
protection as natural heritage and sites of potentially high biodiversity. These locations
are important for nesting a great number of birds; for example, one of them is
Haliaeetus albicilla, species considered as vulnerable according to IUCN ategorization.
It is important to notice that some fish species spawn on riversides and island sides.
River islands flora and fauna of the river banks, similarly to Pancevacki rit, have not
yet been investigated, so it can be expected to find there some endangered and
protected species. Jabucki rit and Glogonjski rit are remaining parts of marshes in the
lower reaches of the Tamis River, located northeastern of Panevo. These natural
areas are out of PTA of SZIC, but they are also important for protection of flora and
fauna biodiversity of this region. The importance of the residual wetland areas of
Panevo is also recognised at international level. According to the National Report
prepared for the 7th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the
Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) - 1995 marshlands around Panevo
are designated for inclusion in the Ramsar List in 2010.
Flora and Fauna

In the territory of Panevo natural vegetation survives only in small areas along river banks
and canals and in marshes. The most of the area is agricultural nowadays. Autochthonous
vegetation exists only in the few, above mentioned, places. For this reason and for the lack
of information on plant species living in the area, natural areas with autochthonous
vegetation should be protected in this municipality. More than 430 species of plants are
present in the area, including some treathened species that can be found in the natural
areas. No punctual data on the flora and vegetation of Panevo are available at the moment.
page 11
Fauna of Fauna of the area comprises more than 280 species approximately. Some of these
species are threatened, according to IUCN categorization.
Population
According to the census in 2002. in the municipality of Pancevo lived 127,162 people and 23
different nationality, which speaks of a turbulent history and demographic situation of the
people in this region. About 8,000 reside in the Vojlovica and Topola quarters in the close
vicinity of Pancevo Refinery.
Geological and other characteristics
Geomorphology
Panevo is located in a flat area of fluvial deposits along the eastern banks of the Danube
River. The municipal territory is part of the Pannonian Basin. In a morphological sense, the
Danube river divides the region into 2 different units:
mountainous region, south to the river

plain region, north to the river.
The region located in the north of the Danube river is part of the Pannonian Plate, with
altitude increasing from southwest (around 68 masl) to northeast. The city of Panevo
belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45 masl (2). Panevo
is placed on the edge of Banat loess terrace, on the ontact of two big morphological units
Banat loess terrace and alluvial plains of Danube and Tamis rivers. Alluvial plains extend
along Danube and Tamis rivers, in the direction of their flows, with an average elevation of
70-71 masl. The Banat loess terrace is mainly flat with relics of Tamis old flow in the form of
local depressions and an average altitude of 70 to 85 masl. Both, terrace and plains, are
protected from Tamis and Danube high waters by embankments along the rivers banks. The
city of Panevo belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45
masl.
Hydrology of the Panevo area
The region is characterized by a well developed hydrographic network by two typical lowland
rivers, Danube and Tamis, with numerous branches, meanders, old flow streams and
channels. The hydro graphic and hydrological characteristics of this region are of special
significance for determining the general water balance as well as the quantity of water lost to
Danube.
The largest and by far the most important surface water body is the Danube River, flowing
west-southwest of the investigated area. The area from the left river bank to the river
terrace on the east is flat and its called alluvial plain. In the recent past it was an area
regularly flooded by high waters of the Danube. In the last century the flood plain of the
Danube was protected from floods to become agricultural land. Amelioration of the area
included digging of a dense canal network, construction of an embankment along the whole
riverbank, drilling a few groups of abstraction wells and installation of many pump-stations
for (ground) water pumping from canals to the river.
In addition, Danube water level rised around 2-3 m by construction of Djerdap dam in
1980s. The result of all the above-mentioned works is that the Danube water level often
surpasses the ground level of its alluvial plain around Panevo, and almost constantly
surpasses the water level in drainage network. Another important factor of flow regime is
also the regime of Djerdap dam exploitation, making it very hard to determine flow regime
in more detail. On the Panevo monitoring station the mean water level of the Danube river
for year 2002 was 70,84mas, with minimal 70.06 masl and maximum 71.94 masl.
As for hydrological characteristics, maximal flows of Danube occur beginning of spring,
usually in April when it is around 7400 m3/s, minimal is in September with 3200 m3/s.
Based on hydrological data for the period 1997 - 2000 on water measuring profile-Panevo,
mean Danube flow in this region is 5.326 m3/s (3) . Maximal flow is a consequence of spring
time rainfalls and snow melting throughout the Danube watershed. Strong rains combined
with soil saturated by water from snow melting enable fast water run off that affect river
flow.
Upstream of Panevo, Tamis and Sibnica Rivers flows into the Danube. Tamis River flows
from northwest to southeast. It is regulated in its lower
part, near its mouth, and therefore it is much deeper here than upstream. Its regime is
directly dependent on the Danube regime. During the Danube maximal water levels, Danube
page 12
can not receive all the water from Tamis, thus creating backwater at Tamis that floods the
surrounding area. At minimal water level in its upstream parts at some points it almost dries
completely. West of the Tamis river there is the Sibnica River and a network of natural and
artificial canals, which are all directly dependent on the Danube regime.
The narrow area of Panevo, South Industrial Zone of Pancevo, next to the flood plain, and
the SZIC were built on backfilled material, by which the ground level was raised to an
altitude of around 75 masl. This had to be done because of the high groundwater level
especially during the maximum water level in Danube and the influence of Djerdap dam.
This caused the creation of an artificial aquifer under the zone (Azotara and Petrohemija) in
its inner parts practically independent from the Danube River, which was the purpose of
these amelioration works. Between the city of Panevo and the South Zone Industrial
Complex two parallel open canals have been constructed for industrial purposes. The
northern wider canal connects the fertilizer plant to the Danube. This is a navigable canal,
used by ships to carry bulk of raw materials and products, and is itself used as a raw water
source by the fertilizer and the petrochemical industries.
The southern canal is a wastewater canal that is used for discharging industrial effluent. Both
canals are approximately 2 km long. They are divided and surrounded by embankments all
the way from the plants to the Danube. The two canals both originate from the fertilizer
plant HIP Azotara. Those two canals are of great importance for the hydrology and
hydrogeology of SZIC. One the main purposes of canals is to drain the backfilled area, the
shallow aquifer, of the Industrial Complex making a local underground (hydro geological) sub
watershed. At the same time, the canal waters infiltrate the lower alluvial deposits of the
Danube, which means that those canals connect the artificial shallow aquifer with the main
alluvial aquifer.
Geology and Hydrogeology
The wider region around Panevo is composed entirely of significantly thick quaternary
deposits settled on older Neocene sediments, which are found
only in deep research boreholes. Geology of South Zone Industrial Complex area can be
divided into:
Oil Refinery region, and

Region of Petrohemija and Azotara.
The Oil Refinery region belongs to the Banat loess terrace, southeast from Petrohemija. The
altitude of this first terrace from loessoide silt is higher then alluvial plain so there was no
need for backfilling as in case of Petrohemija and Azotara. There was just backfilling with the
purpose of levelling of original ground, which was slightly uneven. Oil refinery was
constructed on backfill heterogeneous material. Regarding the grain size analyses of this
heterogeneous material it is similar with sediments found beneath. The thickness of
backfilled material vary from 0 to 3,5 m. The altitude of Oil Refinery after backfilling is
around 74,21-76,93 masl, with slope from north to south. Sediments found beneath are
mostly presented by loessoide silt, since Refinery was built on Banat loess terrace made of
loess and loessoide silt. Thickness of this sediments, together with backfilled material, goes
from 4,5-12,5m, usually around 7-9m. Under this sediments starts the main aquifer made of
alluvial sands. Altitude of main aquifer overlying is on 61,72-70,94 m.a.s.l
Hydrogeology of Oil Refinery region do not have any specific characteristics comparing with
data given in chapter Hydrogeology of Panevo area. As it is mention before, backfilling of
this terrain has been done only to level the previous surface of the ground. There is two
underground waters with different hydrodynamic characteristics: aquifer with free water level
(formed in loessial loam) and confined aquifer formed in Quaternary and Neocene sediments.
Hydraulic conductivity of loessial loam is around 2x10-6 cm/s, and for main aquifer around
1,5x10-2 cm/s [RADUS doo, 2004]. Underground water level, for the period September
2001-August 2002, vary from 70,1-72,1 m.a.s.l. General direction of groundwater flow is
from north to south.
Terrain Tectonics
From geotectonic aspect, the investigation area of Panevo belongs to the south part of
Banat depression on the very border (Danube river) with the Zone of Uncover Neocene. The
oldest sedimentary rocks of Cretaceous age are folded and faulted during the Laramian
stage, between Senonian and Paleogene. During this period the basic tectonic framework
was formed. The tectonic movements in Neocene are weaker.
page 13
In the zone of bare (uncovered) Neocene, it is manifested by re-appearance of existing fault.

The most intensive products of neotectonics in this region according to B.Siric are faults that
divide the terrain on blocks, whose activity began before Neocene. He states as well, that
during Quaternary smaller fault-like structures formed that represent potential zones of
contemporary movements. In investigation area of Panevo Neocene sediments have
maximal thickness of 500m. Tectonics of the Quaternary was relatively quiet.
Meteorological data
Panevo is characterized by a continental to a moderate continental climate. The local
climatic conditions in this area are mostly affected by the presence of rivers Danube and
Tami, geographic latitude, distance from Mediterranean and Atlantic seas, as well as by its
isolated position in the Pannonian Basin surrounded by high-altitude mountains (Alps, Dinaric
Alps, Carpathian Mountains and Rodhopes). Moreover, significant forest belt located along
the two rivers could also influence on a local scale the municipal climate.
Rainfall
Precipitation distribution in Panevo area is characterized by an alternation of rather humid
and rather dry periods. Generally, years with lower precipitation show two rainfall seasons
during spring and autumn, characteristic for the continental climate.
During years with high precipitation the spring rainy season extends through the summer
period, showing the influence of the Mediterranean climate regime. Table 2 shows data on
rainfall for the period 1961 do 2003.
Table 2: Medium monthly and annual values of the precipitation quantity ( mm) in Panevo
J
Ann.
Mean
value
38.2
35
42.2
53.1
62.2
84.6
60
50.7
54.7
41.2
48.8
51.8
662.5
Maximum
103
189
164.4
89.8
146.4 927.8
Year of
max.
value
Minimum
Year of
min. value
100.1 128.8 132.9 171.5
195
227.7 259.7
1987
1978
1981
2001
1987
1969
1999
1975
2001
1974
1980
1969
1999
2.2
3.4
2.2
14.4
12.9
7.6
4.2
0.3
334.5
1990
1987
1972
1968
1988
2000
1989
1992
1986
1965
1986
1972
2000
Lightning is high frequency event in summer. The level of underground water is about one
meter deep. The surface is brick earth covered with concrete.
Air Temperature
Data on medium monthly and annual air temperatures for the period 1961 - 2002 is shown
in Table 3. Mean long-term air temperature value for the period 1962-2002 is 11.3 C.
Analysis of the average monthly air temperature shows that January is the coldest month
with an average of 0.4 C while July is the hottest month with an average of +21.8 C.
Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in Panevo reduced recording to the
data for Belgrade
J
Ann.
Mean
value
-0.4
2.0
6.3
11.7
17.1
20.2
21.8
21.5
17.2
11.7
6.0
1.2
11.3
Maximum
3.7
7.3
10.7
15.5
171.5
19.7
22.8
24.8
26.4
21.2
16.31
1.3
5.0
13.4
Year of
max.
value
1983
2002
2001
2000
2002
2000
1988
1992
1994
1966
1963
1985
2000
Minimum
-6.7
-4.0
0.6
0.6
7.5
18.1
19.3
17.7
13.6
8.5
0.8
-3.0
10.2
Year of
min. value
1964
1985
1987
1997
1991
1974
1979
1976
1996
1974
1988
2001
1978
page 14
High temperatures during the hot period of the year cause turbulences in the atmosphere
and strong vertical circulation that can favourably effect the dilution of emitted pollutants. It
is known that at a relative humidity higher that 55% and a temperature higher than 25C,
photochemical smog is formed.
In Panevo, these conditions are met on a couple of days of July and August. During the
winter period low temperatures and poor turbulences in the atmosphere enable temperature
inversions in Panevo. Under these conditions dispersion of polluting substances is poor and
concentration of polluting substances in the lower part of the atmosphere occurs. During this
period, therefore immission measurements can detect pollutants concentrations higher than
the law limit values.
Wind
Wind has an important and significant influence on Panevo climatic characteristcs and air
quality condition, since it could effect the transport and dilution of polluting substance.
Moreover, in specific climatic conditions, it could affect also the city of Belgrade. Wind profile
in the lowest layers of the atmosphere is greatly influenced by local topography, distribution
of water bodies and land ect.
The wind profile in the non-urbane part of Panevo is under the influence of relatively
smooth terrain. In case of break-through of large atmospheric systems cyclones, the
movement above Panevo is in accordance with the circulation in the system of synoptic
scales. At such times a medium to strong wind usually blows. In the urbane part of Panevo
we have increased ruggedness of urbane units that lead to modifications in wind speed and
wind direction. Meteorological station in Panevo doesnt have anemograph, so all the data
about wind are given from the Belgrade observatory. Frequency of winds from various
directions for Panevo wind rose - is given in
Figure 8.
page 15
Figure 8: Wind Rose for Pancevo

The dominant wind is the south-eastern wind, called Kosava. It is most frequent during
autumn, winter and early spring. The least frequent are north-eastern, easterly and southwesterly winds. Southeastern winds are the fastest higher than 3.5 m/s. Predominant wind
mean speed is 2,9 m/sec and annual average wind speed is 2,3 m/sec. Wind speed
influences the degree of smoke rise from the chimneys. Higher speeds are favourable for
dilution of pollutants from lower sources, but cause smoke rinsing from chimneys in case of
high-point sources2. The less frequent winds in Panevo have the lowest speeds. These
winds have a detrimental effect on dispersion of polluting substances from ground sources
but enable rising of smoke from high sources to higher altitudes enabling significant
dispersion, that is high degree of dilution of emitted polluting substances from higher
sources.
Air Humidity
The mean annual value of relative humidity for the Panevo region is around 78%, as shown
in Table 4. The highest monthly average values are recorded during winter season, in
December (88%) and January (88.1%), while the lowest average values are recorded during
summer period, in July and August (around 72%).
Table 4: Medium monthly and annual values of the air humidity in Panevo, reduced
according to data for Belgrade
Mean value
Maximum
Ann.
88.1
84.3
76.1
72.0
71.4
73.0
72.7
72.7
75.6
78.1
84.3
88.0
78.0
98
94
93
81
83
86
84
86
85
91
94
97
85.5
Year of max. value 1971 1971 1962 1966 1961 2002 2002 1975 1975 1975 1975 1970 1970
Minimum
Year of min. value
81
75
62
65
61
56
61
56
63
66
71
79
71.2
1985 1998 1972 1968 1992 2000 2000 2000 1986 1961 1963 1989 2000
page 16
2.1.3.3 Description of the plant

Activities
Head office of Pancevo

Refinery:
Address: 26000 PANCEVO,
Spoljnostarcevacka b.b.
Telephone: + 381 13 310 004
+ 381 13 310
Fax: + 381 13 345 255
WWW: http://www.rnp.co.yu
Legal status of the company:
part of the joint-stock company
NIS-Petroleum industry of Serbia
Main downstream markets:
petrochemical & chemical industry,
trading companies within
Petroleum
Industry of Serbia (NIS)
Main export products:
liquefied petroleum gases
(propane, butane, propylene)
Pancevo Refinery performs the following activities:
Production of petroleum products, thermoelectric power, chemicals and basic chemical

products
Storage of crude oil, intermediate products and products
Transportation of crude oil and transport through pipeline
Laboratory analysis and processing
Maintenance of process and other equipment
Development and research services.
With the processing capacity of 4.8 million tons per year, it is the biggest factory of this type
in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of
exporting 20% of its production.
Pancevo Refinery has several development projects (to be realized in next three years) in
order to reach the level of modern European refineries t three years to complete the
following development program:
MHC / HDT - Hydro treatment of FCC batch and diesel which allows reaching the
European specifications for gasoline and diesel fuel, increasing diesel production at the
expense of motor gasoline and increasing utilization by reducing fuel oil
Sour water stripper, Amine washing and Claus - supporting plants where extracted
sulfur is hydro treated and sent to be sale as elementary sulphur
On Line blending - which allows optimal mixing and shortens the time needed for
mixing and lower the number of tank
Modernization of facilities for receiving and shipping oil from tanks which includes
installation of modern measuring and control equipment and application of technical
solutions that enable the reduction of losses and the strict European emission
standards.
List of commercial products of Pancevo Refinery is given in Table 5 and storage capacities in
Table 6.
Table 5: List of commercial products of Pancevo refinery
Commercial
Standard
Code
Product
page 17
Commercial
Standard
Code
Product
Gases
Propane
PN
SRPS B.H2.130
Butane
BN
SRPS B.H2.132
Isobutene
IBN
PS RNP 36/99
Propane - Butane mixture
PBS
SRPS B.H2.134
Propylene
PLN
PS RNP 26/99
Motor gasoline
Premium
MB 95
SRPS B.H2.220
BMB 95
PS RNP 2/99
Unleaded gasoline
Premium
Special gasoline
Special gasoline 35/105
SB 35/105
SRPS B.H2.267
SB 60/80
PS RNP 35/99
SB 65/95
SRPS B.H2.267
SB 65/105
SRPS B.H2.262
Special gasoline medical
SBM
SB 75/130
SRPS B.H2.268
SB 80/120
SRPS B.H2.268
SB 140/200
SRPS B.H2.271

Special gasoline - pan 140/200
Ph.Jug.III
PAN 140/200 PS RNP 13/99
Aromatics
Benzene
BZ
SRPS B.H2.001
Toluene
TL
SRPS B.H2.002
Gasoline components
Primary gasoline for petrochemical plant
PB-PHK
PS RNP 37/99
PO GM
SRPS B.H2.310
GM
SRPS B.H2.331
Diesel fuel D1
D1
SRPS B.H2.410/1
Diesel fuel D2
D2
SRPS B.H2.410/1
NSD
SRPS B.H2.410/1
Petroleum
Lighting petroleum
Jet fuel
EKO EL
Diesel
Euro diesel
EKO 3 diesel
Fuel oil
Fuel oil extra light
EL
PS RNP 3/99
Fuel oil middle
PS RNP 7/99
Bitumen
Bitumen for road BIT 200
Bitumen for road BIT 60
Polymer bitumen
BIT 200
SRPS U.M3.010
BIT 60
SRPS U.M3.010
PMB 50/90
Other products
page 18
Commercial
Standard
Code
Product
Liquid sulfur
TS
PS RNP 29/99
Table 6: Storage capacities of Refinery

Product
m3
Crude oil
200000
YUNA terminal
40000
LPG
5000
Naphtha
100000
Middle distillates
220000
Fuel oil
240000
Organization and responsibilities

Organization of the refinery is shown given in Annex 3.
History of the plant
Construction years
Panevo Refinery was founded based on the Decision of Executive Board of the National
Republic of Serbia on 18 December 1959, under the name Panevo Oil Refinery a
company under construction, with the seat in Panevo, Spoljnostarevaka bb.
The contracts for engineering with the French company Lummus from Paris and for UOPUSA license were concluded in March 1964, and the first tank foundation was completed in
November 1965In August 1966, equipment worth 7 million pounds started being delivered.
This equipment was imported from England, and the first foundation for Atmospheric
Distillation AD-1 was laid on 1 March 1967.
Installation lasted for 18 months, and the unit was commissioned in September 1968. The
first derivatives were dispatched from the Refinery in October, and official commissioning of
the Refinery was performed on 14 December 1968. In December, Platforming Unit was
commissioned as well, and in 1969, the other units were successively commissioned: twostage thermal cracking, gas concentration, gasoline redistillation, Merox Unit for LPG, special
gasoline and kerosene, aromatics extraction Udex and HDS of middle distillates.
page 19
Figure 9: Years of construction

Commissioning of the first Refinery in this region was successfully conducted with the
Refinery's own human resources that had previously been trained according to the program
compiled and organized by the Refinery experts.
In parallel with the construction of the process units, auxiliary systems and associated
facilities were constructed as well: Power Plant, storage tanks, facilities, jetty at the
Danube...
First Years of Operation
Primary processing installed capacity was 1.32 million tons of crude oil per year. The oil for
processing mostly arrived by barge the Danube, and in the first year of operation, 1969,
1.055 million tons was processed. Already in 1970, the jetty was expanded, which made it
one of the biggest jetties of that type in the country.
In the following 1971, the Refinery processed 1.3 million tons of crude oil therefore, it
operated with full capacity. In that year, based on the increased market demand for the
derivatives, the Refinery prepared development and investment program for the Refinery
expansion.Naftagas Novi Sad that Refinery was a part of at the time, in 1973 adopted the
concept of Refinery development in phases. The Refinery was recognized as a fuel-type
refinery for the production of fuels, solvents, bitumen and feed for olefin and paraffin
chemistry. This concept covers the supply of fuel to the regional market, supply of the
required feed to Petrochemical Complex, construction of Yugoslav pipeline, gasification of the
eastern part of Yugoslavia, etc.
Capacity was increased immediately, as an inter-phase expansion, until the implementation
of the planned phases of development. In 1972, RNP used its own resources to reconstruct
the two-stage thermal cracking into atmospheric distillation, thereby increasing the primary
processing capacity to approximately 2 million tons per year.
First Phase of Expansion
For the purpose of developing oil and gas energy sector in SFRY, and for the purpose of
developing chemical and petrochemical industry in the eastern part of the country, the first
phase of Refinery expansion commenced by constructing a new primary unit of atmospheric
distillation 2. This phase of expansion was implemented in accordance with the Contract with
Petrochemical Complex in 1972, as a part of joint investment in which Petrochemical
Complex provided foreign loans from the east and west, and the Refinery provided the funds
in dinars for the customs and other financing within the country.
Installation of this unit was started in August 1976. The unit was designed by ICPRP from
Ploesti (Romania), and the equipment was also supplied from Romania, and from the west as
well. This unit, with the capacity of 3.5 million tons of crude per year, was officially
commissioned on 14 December 1979. This increased the Refinery's total installed primary
processing capacity to 4.820.000 tons per year. In 1976, Platforming Unit was reconstructed,
which increased its capacity by about 65%.
Oil Pipeline
At the end of 1979, on 22 December, Yugoslav oil pipeline from Omialj to Panevo was put
into operation. The first quantities of oil were delivered by pipeline to Panevo in March
1980. The pipeline, with the capacity of 34 million tons per year, connected all Yugoslav
refineries at the time, with a branch for the refinery in Lendava (Slovenia) and transit for
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Naftagas Novi Sad, i.e. Panevo Refinery that was a part of
it, was one of the founders and investors of the pipeline construction, and it had its reserved
transport capacity of 6 million tons per year.
Until the closing of the pipeline, which took place by unilateral decision of Croatian
authorities on 6 September 1991, almost all of the crude for Panevo Oil Refinery's
processing needs arrived by that pipeline. From the beginning of its operation, the pipeline
transported 34.088.000 tons of crude oil for Panevo Oil Refinery's requirements.
Cessation of crude oil transport by pipeline has not led to Refinery units shut-down. Soon
afterwards, a month later, delivery of crude oil was organized by rail and barge on the
Danube, as well as by pipeline in the part from Elemir via Novi Sad to Panevo.
The Refinery started using the pipeline once again, after signing the Contract with Croatia,
on 18 June 1996.
Second Phase of Expansion
page 20
Upon completion of the first phase of expansion and increase in primary processing in the
Refinery, it became necessary to build secondary units that provide deeper crude oil
processing, i.e. better crude oil yield.
Construction of the secondary units was implemented as the second phase of Refinery
expansion. However, before that, in 1982, Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen Units were
completed and commissioned. Design and equipment for both units were made in USSR.
Equipment and material for Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen were financed bythe guarantees
of banks from the loan of ex USSR to the Government of SFRY, and the funds in dinars were
provided by the Refinery.
Figure 10: Second phase of expansion

License and basic engineering for the main unit from the secondary unit complex, Fluid
Catalytic Cracking (FCC), were bought from US company TEXACO in 1978. Designs,
equipment and materials were bought in the west, by way of loans that the Refinery, with
the guarantees from our banks, secured in Great Britain.
Construction of secondary units with auxiliary and associated facilities, and adjustments to
the existing Refinery system lasted until November 1985, when the main unit was
commissioned. The other units from FCC Complex II phase of expansion (Alkylation, HDS,
Merox, etc.) were commissioned in the period from 1985 to 1988.
Financing of II phase of expansion, excluding Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen, was carried
out by way of western loans for those components that had to be imported. Payments in
dinars (customs, transport, insurance, civil works, installation and the like) were effected
from the Refinery funds, from the joint investment funds which mostly consisted of extra
profit from the production of oil and gas, and with considerable assistance and guarantees
from Privredna banka Panevo, Vojvoanska udruena banka Novi Sad, Jugoslovenska
investiciona banka Beograd, Genex Beograd, insurance corporations Insurance company
Dunav and Insurance company Novi Sad, and others.
Keeping Pace
In the period up to 1990, two-stage thermal cracking was reconstructed into vacuum residue
visbreaking, aromatics extraction unit (Sulfolane) was constructed, liquid sulphur production
unit (Claus) was commissioned, storage space was expanded, construction of the new water
chemical treatment unit, flare gas recovery unit and a new cooling water system was
completed. Several facilities were built and reconstructed in the Handling Department (new
tank truck loading facility, reconstruction and expansion of API-Separator, in-line blending of
refinery products). In Petrochemical Complex battery limits, a joint unit for secondary waste
water biological treatment was built.
page 21
By the end of nineties, it was already possible to compare the Refinery with the modern
world refineries. The built Refinery units enabled production structure in the ration 80% of
white, highly valuable products, to 20 % of black products.
Sanctions
Security Council introduced at the end of May 1992 sanctions to FR Yugoslavia. Embargo had
very serious consequences for the entire Petroleum Industry of Serbia, and thereby for the
Refinery as well. Direct damages from embargo are estimated to several billion dollars, and
indirect damages, in the form of delayed development, lost profit, and the like, can only be
assumed.
The last barges with the imported crude oil arrived in Refinery on 18 June 1992, and from
that moment on, Refinery was only processing domestic crude oil. Only about one sixth of
the available primary processing units were in operation, under the conditions of dinar and
foreign currency insolvency, multiple limitations in terms of procurement of spare parts and
chemicals, and the like.
At the time of embargo, S-100 was in operation, a small primary processing unit, and the
average processing capacity was 2.400 tons per day. This unit, before the sanctions, was
almost discarded it was used for occasional processing of slop as well as a spare unit. In
1991, this unit was revitalized and put on stand-by. It proved that the Refinery would not
have been able to operate without it during the sanctions. Namely, there was not enough
crude oil for the operation of big Atmospheric Distillation Unit. All through the sanctions, S100 operated without major shut-downs. During embargo, Platforming, Gas Concentration
and Udex with auxiliary units were in function, in addition to S-100.
Even in these conditions, continuity of crude oil processing was preserved, while the
development was not entirely neglected either. This time was used for reparation of process
equipment that had not been in operation, for the preparation of investment and
development projects, professional training and education of personnel, development of
information system.
Because of that, Refinery was ready when the sanctions were lifted: Primary processing units
were ready as early as November 1995. Immediately upon the arrival of greater quantities of
crude oil, the processing capacity was increased to 8.000 tons per day.
In 1996 and 1997, revitalization of all the Refinery units was carried out, and these were
successively being put into operation. This is without precedent that a refinery was
successfully restarted, after most of its units have been out of operation for almost 4 years.
Bombing and reconstruction
In the course of seventy-seven days of NATO bombing of Serbia, the Refinery was bombed
seven times. The first time it was bombed on 4 April 1999, when the Refinery Power Plant
was hit with two missiles. The following attacks took place on 12 April (twice), 13 April, 16
April, 18 April and 7 June. About 60 percent of Refinery units was destroyed, and almost all
of the units and facilities were damaged, to a greater or smaller extent. Direct damages from
the bombing were estimated to more than 400 million dollars, but considerable indirect
damages should be added to the final sum.
Figure 11: Bombing 1999
page 22
Refinery, with its own resources and means, with the employment of domestic contracting
companies, started reconstructing the damaged parts right away.
In the first phase of reconstruction, in less than three months, overhaul and reparation of the
damaged equipment on the major primary processing unit (AD-1) and on some of the units
in Block 5 were completed. In Handling Department and Power Plant, units and facilities
necessary for the operation of process units, acceptance of crude oil and dispatch of finished
products were made operational again. Derivative production was restarted as early as 26
September 1999.
The second phase, which implied a future modernization, was commenced right away.
Bitumen Production and Vacuum Distillation Units were reconstructed and commissioned. By
commissioning Boiler 1 in the Power Plant, Refinery repaired the unit that had been almost
completely destroyed. This resulted in the renewal of the Refinery's own generation of
steam.
The most complex and significant unit for a better crude oil yield in the Refinery, Fluid
Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCC), started operation on 1 September 2000.
In parallel with the reparation, reconstruction and modernization of many units also took
place. Some of the most important are as follows: replacement of the old control systems on
almost all units with the new ones that are used in EU countries, reconstruction of Vacuum
Distillation Unit in accordance with the design by Greek company Asprofos, for the purpose
of increasing the yield, improving the bitumen feed quality, more reliable operation and
easier unit management. FCC was modernized for the purpose of improving yield, and more
reliable and longer operation.
Refinery today
Panevo Oil Refinery is significant organizational part of and the biggest oil processing
company in NIS-Petrol, which is the biggest branch of shareholding company - Petroleum
Industry of Serbia. That is a fuel-type refinery which produces fuels, paraffinic and aromatic
solvents, feed for Petrochemical Complex, bitumen and sulphur. Primary and secondary units
for crude oil processing were constructed in such a way as to enable the processing of
various types of crude. With the processing capacity of 4,8 million tons per year, it is the
biggest factory of this type in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil
derivatives, with the possibility of exporting 20% of its production.
Crude oil (domestic and imported) is delivered to the Refinery by oil pipeline and river barge,
and the derivatives are dispatched by product pipeline, tank truck, railway and barge.
Refinery is situated at exceptionally favourable location - 14 kilometers from Belgrade, the
biggest consumer center in Serbia. It has its own Jetty on the Danube and pipeline that
connects them, also truck loading facilities and railway station with the facilities for
derivative dispatch and crude oil acceptance.
Top priority for all employees in Panevo Oil Refinery is crude oil processing and production
of sufficient quantities of oil derivatives according to the European standards for domestic
requirements and creation of conditions for export, at the same time meeting all
environmental standards. That is achieved by constant upgrading of operation process
quality, better crude oil yield, power optimization and reduction in production costs, and for
that purpose, it has been planned to implement development projects defined in cooperation
with the foreign engineering companies (JGC, SHELL, ABB).
Particular attention is paid to environmental protection. During units reconstruction from
1999 to 2001, by investing into modernization and overhaul of the existing units,
reconstruction and construction of storage tanks and facilities, as well as the preparation of
basic designs for the future modernization, environmental component was integrated into the
entire production cycle: starting from crude oil storing, derivative production, to derivative
dispatch into transport means. Implementation of the planned development technological
projects is of common interest both for industrial zone and for Panevo town as a whole.
These projects aim at reaching European standards by restricting and controlling detrimental
substance emission into the air, soil and water.
2.1.3.4 Safety of the plant
Management system
Pancevo Refinery has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO
9001:2000 standard, for all its operations. The system is certified by Lloyds Registrar
page 23
Quality Assurance. Internal audits and management reviews are conducted once in a year in
accordance with written procedures.
Top management has establish policy of improving the quality of products, services and
environmental protection, which is achieved in the following manner:
by permanent development of the company, by introducing state-of-the-art

technologies and processes in oil processing areas
by delivery of products and services to meet buyers' needs with minimum costs
by delivery of products and services in accordance with the requirements defined by
standards and regulations for petroleum industry
by consistent implementation and continuous improvement of designed quality
management system, in all operations, by employees
by continuous and planned specialized education of all employees and in accordance
with the requirements of modern business activities
by cooperation with scientific research and project organizations, regarding product
and process development projects
by motivation of employees and improvement of working conditions
by establishing and maintaining the documented environmental management system,
in accordance with the requirements of ISO 14000:2004 standard.
Environmental Protection Policy consists of the following:

Panevo Oil Refinery, being the biggest oil processing company in the Republic of
Serbia, for the purpose of its long-term successful business activities and assurance
of sustainable development, within its business policy, places considerable emphasis
on systematic approach to the environmental protection improvement activities.
For that purpose Panevo Oil Refinery performs the following:
introduces the environmental protection policy, programs and practice into every
activity, as an important element of managing all business operations.
Identifies all environmental aspects and puts under control the important ones.
Operates in accordance with the environmental protection laws and regulations.
Pursues permanent improvement in environmental protection.
Systematically reduces detrimental substance emission into the surroundings (air,
water, soil), saves resources and energy, minimizes use of detrimental substances
and the quantity of dangerous waste.
Minimizes the possibility of detrimental effect on the environment by preventive
measures and the measures to be taken in case of an accident.
Increases employees awareness of environmental protection significance, by
constant education and professional training, as well as by providing information in a
timely and proper manner.
Develops cooperation with the institutions of local and communal self-government,
responsible for environmental protection, as well as with all other interested parties.
Procures products not having or having minimum effect on the environment, and
induces suppliers to actively apply all the environmental protection measures,
including application of ISO 14001 in their business activities.
Safety Management System is a part of quality and environment management system and
includes some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to
identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation
and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for Health, Safety
and Environment issues is Risk Management division.
Critical situations, preparation for emergency situations
The Pancevo Refinery has for many years a fire protection plan, made according to the
requirements of fire protection regulation in Serbia. Existing plan prescribes in details the
behavior of workers in the event of fire and have been made for the following cases:
protection plan for unplanned production stop

fire protection plan
o technological preventive plan
o fire distinguishing tactical plan
In 2009 Pancevo Refinery has developed a risk assessment of chemical accidents separately
for all relevant production and technological units. Based on this, protection plan in the case
page 24
of chemical accidents was developed on the level of production units as well as for the whole
plant. Elements of the plan are:
Forces and assets of the Plan

Scheme for response to accident
Training and education program
Control program
Other instructions and information.
Total number of employees in the refinery is 1625. Qualification structure of employees is

given in Table 7 and number of employees in different section in
Table 8. Maximum concentration of employees in first shift during working days is given in
Table 9.
General Plan of Refinery Pancevo is given in Annex 1, map in scale of 1:2000, within which
are listed and identified the process unit and storage. The specific plans for individual
facilities are included in the vChapter V of the report.
Table 7: Qualification structure of employees in Pancevo Refinery
Number of
employees
Qualification
PhD
MSc
BSc
202
College
68
Highly skilled
201
High-school
953
Skilled
137
Elementary school
Semiskilled
Unskilled
56
Table 8: Number of employees in Pancevo Refinery by type of work

Number of
employees
Occasional
work in
field
Permanent
work in
field
Office work
Production
404
254
50
100
Power plant
108
88
10
10
Manipulation
218
Maintenance
286
286
Laboratory
124
10
Unit / Section
Research and
investment
65
HSE
114
ICT
33
Other (headquarter,
finance, commercial
affairs)
237
page 25
114
65
273
Total:
1625
Table 9: Maximum concentration of employees, first shift

Number of
employees
Location
Headquarter
441
Mashing workshop
227
Block V building
69
S-2100 and S-2200 building
29
FCC building
82
S-3600 building
17
S-0250 building
18
Power plant and HPV
57
Laboratory
126
HSE building
35
Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards

Preventive, organizational measures
Fire will be detected by optical control. Fire sensors do not exist. A new sensor system for
gas detection and continuous measurement has been installed in 2007. An internal
professional fire brigade is located in Block VI. 73 people are working there and 68 are fire
fighters. The available equipment is described in Annex 5. The advantage is a very short
alarm period for rescue operation. Nevertheless in the case of a major accident the fire
brigade will also be addressed by the accident and will not be able to perform the rescue
operations.
Rescue and emergency plans are under construction and do not exist at the moment. This
will be done by Risk Management division.
Preventive, constructional measures
The surface is brick earth covered with concrete. The level of underground water is about
one meter deep and will probably be affected by an accident. Therefore all tanks are build in
basins. A drainage system exists for fire extinguishing water. A new project is running at the
moment with the objective to separate normal water and waste water in different drainage
systems.
The maintaining department has developed a plan of fire water retention.
Technical measures
Due to the requirements of the national laws every three years the safety valves will be
maintained and controlled. The electrical department has developed an electrical emergency
supply system.
A monitoring system has been build up in 2006 and it is managed by the HSE department
and is just in the testing phase.
The waste management and classification will be done by Risk Management department. The
waste will be handled by a contractor.
Measures to mitigate an accident
The intended major maintenance period is every three years. In reality at the moment there
is a major maintenance shut down per year as the process has been modified to increase the
efficiency of the process. The modification can partly lead to erosion and corrosion. This has
to be controlled at the moment by a yearly inspection.
page 26
The pressure vessels will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the
pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU
regulations.
It is not an obligation in Serbia but regarding the topic explosion protection the Risk
Management division has started to consider the requirements of the ATEX Directives. An
explosion protection document has been developed which has been submitted to the
Ministry. The exchange of the equipment in regard to the requirements of the ATEX Directive
will be done step by step. Furthermore the German TA Luft will be implemented.
The inspection is in the responsibility of the production and maintaining department of RNP
and planning of safety aspects is in the responsibility of the Risk Management department.
No public utilities are affected by accident consequences as the line connections are
underground.
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to two accidents in the past. About
10 years ago a safety valve has been fired by lightning and last year a burning flare has
been addressed by lightning.
The normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the
protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance
and continuity will be done. All safety valves are protected by steam extinguishers. This task
is from 2007. in the responsibility of Risk Management division and will be done by an
external party.
Internal communication will be done by phone, radio and mobile phone.
2.1.4
Novi Sad refinery

Novi Sadl Refinery (Figure 12) belongs to NIS Petrol which is, further, an organizational part
of the joint stock company - Petroleum Industry of Serbia, NIS a.d. It is a refinery with
mostly western manufacture and origin technology and equipment dating from '70s and '80s.
In 1980s it was upgraded to 3.000.000 t/year hydro skimming refinery with two distillation
trains, one for domestic naphthenic, low suphur, crude and other for imported paraffinic
crudes. Storage capacity was 677.000 m3. Products were LPG, gasoline, diesel, heating oil,
fuel oils, lube oils and other special products.
On December 31, 1991 RNS became a part of the public company with certain rights and
liabilities in terms of legal transactions and continued business activities within NIS
Petroleum Industry of Serbia, as Novi Sad Oil Refinery, a part of the company for production
of petroleum products. It produces nowadays different types of fuels as well as raw materials
for basic lubes and bitumen.
The refinery itself and its headquarter is
located on the following address:
NIS-Petrol Novi Sad Refinery
Put Sajkaskog odreda 1
21000 Novi Sad
Figure 12: Oil refinery in Novi Sad

2.1.4.2 Location description
Macro location
Novi Sad Refinery is situated about 1 km away from the town Novi Sad and about 80 km
from Belgrade, on the left bank of the Danube River.
Novi Sad is located in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina (Figure 13 and Figure 14),
with land area of 699 km, while on the city's official site, land area is 702 km; and the
urban area is 129.7 km. The city lies on the river Danube and one small section of the
Danube-Tisa-Danube Chanel.
page 27
Figure 13: Position of Novi Sad

The territory of Novi Sad covers an area of 21506 km 2 and its coordinates are 45 19 North
geographic latitude and 19 51 East geographic longitude. Novi Sad's landscape is divided
into two parts; one is situated in the Baka region and another in the Syrmia region. The
river Danube is a natural border between them. Baka's side of the city lies on one of the
southern lowest parts of Pannonia Plain, while Fruka Gora's side (Syrmia) is a horst
mountain.
Figure 14: Position of Novi Sad Refinery

Alluvial plains along Danube are well formed, especially on the left bank, in some parts 10
km from the river. A large part of Novi Sad lies on terrace deposit with an elevation of 80-83
m. The northern part of Fruka Gora is composed of massive landslide zones, but they are
page 28
not active, except in the Ribnjak neighborhood (between Sremska Kamenica and
Petrovaradin.
Refinery Novi Sad (NIS-RNS) is located in the economic zone of the city of Novi Sad - North
4. This zone is foreseen for building large commercial facilities and covers area of 1735
hectares. Refinery itself covers about 256 hectares of industrial space. The site is in northeastern part of the city of Novi Sad, south the site flows channel Danube-Tisa-Danube, while
on the north side is the street Put ajkakog odreda, the road for settlement Shanghai
(distance about 2 km). On the west side of the refinery are main storage are of NIS
NAFTAGAS-TRAFFIC with installations for filling oil and petroleum products.
On the south side are the production plants and warehouses, factories for the production of
artificial fertilizers "AGROHEM.
On the north-west side is located filling stations with storage tanks for liquid petroleum gas.
Distance from the bottling and storage space is about 250 meters. Along the east side lie the
pipeline installation.
This site has convenient traffic conditions. On the north side of the refinery site is a highway
E-7 (Belgrade - Novi Sad - Subotica) while on the west side is the main road M-7 (Backa
Palanka - Novi Sad - Zrenjanin). On the south side are lying waterways, the river Danube
and Novi Sad channel Savino Selo.
Micro location
Novi Sad Refinery is a complex of process and auxiliary facilities for processing crude oil,
storage facilities, transportation and manipulation utilities, research and laboratory space
and other supporting facilities. In the north part of the refinery there are pipeline
installations.
Refinery is fenced and secured, and the only access is possible from the street Put ajkakog
odreda where entrance gates are locating enabling access to the refinery from the road.
Inside the area of Novi Sad Refinery are located 13 production, manipulation and storage
units, including necessary infrastructure. General plan of the refinery is given on Annex and
list of units in Table 10. There are two main production lines in RNS:
lube oil and bitumen line and

fuel production line.
Table 10: List of units in Novi Sad Refinery
Unit
Unit ID
Specification
Storage and manipulation

Storage area with related equipment
Manipulation piping-product lines-crude oil
piping with related equipment
Pump station in storage area and
manipulation
Additives Systems
Blow down System with piping
Transport and delivery
Ponton 1 and Ponton
Oil Rail Ramp
Wagon Filling Station - Section 69
Ramp for refine products loading
Auto Filling Station
Wagon Filling Station - LPG
Half-industrial unit
1000
page 29
Half-industrial unit
Unit
Unit ID
Specification
02-0100
Water surge and related equipment
0200
HPV
Water preparation
Cooling towers
65
Fire water preparation system
Steam production and distribution of steam and gas

0300
Technological water production Boiler

Section
30
Steam and condensate unit reduction

station
53
Stream, natural gas, refine gas, fuel oil

distribution
KRB-400
Flare system with related piping and

equipment
U-2100
Atmospheric distillation with stabilization
U-2200
Vacuum distillation
U-2300>
Hydro treating with related tank T-1
U-2400
Plat forming unit with related tank T-2
U-2500
LPG production with tanks
U-2600
Unibon unit-Desulphurization
U-2700
Supporting systems
Waste water treatment
Flare
Fuel - secondary
U-5800
Sulphide water treatment units
U-4500
Instrumental air production unit
U-100
Atmospheric distillation
U-200
Vacuum distillation
HF-400
Hydro finishing
HFH-400
Hydrogen production unit
KR-500
Sour refining with Gurdon>
U-550
Percolation with re-distillation of gasoline
U-300
Bitumen production with raw materials

storage tanks (G10 i V1 do V6)
Lube oil 1
Lube oil 2
Bitumene production
Re-treatment and delivery with products

tanks (VT1 do VT9)
U-900
Supporting systems (hot oil system)
Novolin
Oil blending with piping and pump stations
Tanks area of profit centre Novolin
Meteorological, geological and other data
Climate
page 30
Novi Sad has a moderate continental climate, with four seasons. Autumn is longer than
spring, with long sunny and warm periods. Winter is not so severe, with an average of 22
days of sub-zero temperature. January is the coldest month, with an average temperature of
-1.9 C. Spring is usually short and rainy, while summer arrives abruptly. The coldest
temperature ever recorded in Novi Sad was -30.7C (-19.3F) on January 24, 1963; and the
hottest temperature ever recorded was 41.5C (110.7F) on July 6, 1950. Average
temperatures are given inTable 11.
The southeast-east wind Koava, which blows from the Carpathians and brings clear and dry
weather, is characteristic of the local climate. It mostly blows in autumn and winter, in 2-3
days intervals. The average speed of Koava is 25-43 km per hour but certain strokes can
reach up to 130 km/h. In winter time, followed by a snow storm, it can cause snowdrifts.
Also it can cause temperatures to drop to around -30C.
Table 11: Average temperatures (Source: Republic Hydrometeorology Service of Serbia)
Month
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Year
Avg.
high C
(F)
2.5
(36)
5.7
(46)
11.5
(57)
17.2
(67)
22.5
(76)
25.2
(81)
27.2
(85)
27.2
(85)
23.7
(77)
18
(68)
10.3
(54)
4.5
(44)
16.3
(65)
Avg low
C (F)
-4.4
(29)
-2.3
(32)
1.2
(38)
5.8
(46)
10.6
(55)
13.6
(60)
14.7
(62)
14.2
(62)
11.2
(56)
6.3
(47)
2.2
(40)
-1.9
(33)
5.9
(47)
Rainfall
mm
(in.)
38
(1.5)
35
(1.4)
41
(1.6)
47
(1.8)
57
(2.2)
82
(3.2)
61
(2.4)
55
(2.2)
36
(1.4)
35
(1.4)
46
(1.8)
44
577
(1.7) (22.7
)
Winds
The presence of winds opposites directions is characteristic of this region (Figure 14). Most
dominant winds are from two different directions; south-east (18.2%) and north-west
direction (17%). The third kind of wind is western and the least one which can be seen on
this area is Sothern wind. These winds are characterizing the whole Pannonia Basin.
The dominant south-east wind KOSAVA is blowing from December to March, in winter part of
the year. North-west wind is dominating from June to September, in summer part of the
year. The calm weather without the wind is mostly presented in June, July, August and
September. Strength of the wind is between 0,81 1,31 m/s.
page 31
Table 12: Novi Sad region - Frequency of the winds

Air humidity
Relative humidity of the air in the Novi Sad region is about 70 to 80 %. During a year it
decreases with temperature increase. The lowest humidity is in summers and the highest in
winters. Average yearly humidity is 76% and it is identical to relative air humidity in the
whole Vojvodina.
Cloudiness and sun
Cloudiness mostly follows the movement of the relative air humidity. The most cloudy,
7.8/10 of the sky, is in February, and the smallest in August, 3.9 (Table 13). The average
value in a year is 5.7/10 of the sky.
The sun shins 2080.2 hours in a year. The sunniest month is July, with average 279.5 hours;
the shortest is in December with only 51 hours of sun. Data for seasons are: springtime
413.3 hours, summer 837.7, autumn 479.7 and in winters only 247.8 hours.
The average number of days with fog in a year is 31.5, and average monthly maximum is
19.8 days (mostly December, less in January). The average maximum number of days with
fog in a year is 56.8 and the minimum is 13 days.
Table 13: Average value of cloudiness in sky/10
J
Novi Sad 7.1
F
7.8
6.2 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.4 3.9 4.2 4.7 7.1 7.7
Ann.
5.7
Bodies of water and flooding

In the region of Novi Sad underground waters, deep on up to 300 m and not so deep one,
are of big importance. In the alluvial water regime is directly depending on Danube river.
High underground water show important amplitudes, while the deep underground waters
show higher stability. On the lower parts of the alluvial valley the underground waters come
the surface and flood it.
page 32
On the loess terrace the level of the underground water rises from October to April.
Oscillations are within 1 to 1.5 m, while the deepness is mostly more then 4 m.
Freatske water are high polluted. Not treated waste water go to the open sewage line, cricks
from the mountain Fruska Gora and drain to the underground, to the not deep water layers
which are use for individual or public water supply. All human facilities in Backa and partly
Novi Sad are drained using open channels.
Areas of seismic activities
In the region seismic activities are possible with intensity 6 - 8 MCS. On location of Novi Sad
Refinery possible earthquake with intensity of 7 MCS.
Geological and hydrological characteristiques
Environment of Novi Sad is characterized by presence of two different morphological units:
Fruska Gora mountain and the Pannonian basin. Their genesis is related to strong orogenic
movements with the participation of deflection. Fruska Gora is an area of erosion, and the
Pannonian plain area reservoirs (lake sediments, les, sand) and erosion (alluvial plain).
Novi Sad Refinery lies on the oldest alluvial carbonate coat that is sandy clay and to some
extent consolidated. In the area of Novi Sad shallow groundwater and deeper ones, up to
300m are of the great importance. The water level in alluvial area is directly related to the
water level of the Danube. High groundwater show significant amplitude, in contrast to the
deep groundwater, which show greater stability.
Wastewater is directly discharged in an open canal network, creeks of Fruska Gora and
further drained in underground, in the shallow water-bearing layers, which are used for
individual and public water supply.
The entire area is Refinery fill-reflux sand thickness from 1:50-2.00m.
Flora, fauna and protected natural and cultural properties
Natural advantages for plant species in the area of Novi Sad and surrounding are not the
same. They are primarily caused by differences in relief, the differences in the amount of
underground water, in geological and pedological soil composition, anthropogenic influence
and other factors.
Biographical characteristics of the area corresponding to the rim of the Pannonia regions.
Observing the physical and geographical distribution of fauna, flora observed the following
characteristic areas:
region of Baka with complex agro eco systems
region of Fruka gora with complex forest
Fruska Gora Prigorje with cultural landscape and
Danubian region under the jack forests and flood meadows.
Distinctive forest vegetation of Fruska gora, plant communities loessial.plateau, vegetation of

the Danube alluvial plains, wetlands and meadow vegetation and anthropogenic forest are
developed.
On the location of Novi Sad Refinery there are no rare or endangered plant and animal
species, nor particularly valuable plant communities. Within the refinery, among certain
sections of reservoirs, installation, related facilities and internal roads, there is no other
vegetation except grass cover and low trees around the administration building. According to
the Office for Protection of no registered archaeological sites in the observed area.
Population
Novi Sad iis Serbia's second-largest city, after Belgrade. In its most recent official census
from 2002, the city had an urban population of 216,583, while its municipal population was
299,294. But according to the data from April 2010, the city had an urban population of
286,157, while its municipal population was 372,999. Shanghai, nearby village, occupies an
area of 13 ha, and lives about 1,600 inhabitants.
Activities
The main activities in Novi Sad refinery are:
page 33
production of derivates, thermalpower energy, chemicals and basic chamical

products
public transportation by rail, road and river
laboratory analysis and services
research - development services
public storage.
Characteristics of key units in the refinery are given Table 14. Novi Sad Refinery produces up
to 2.5 million tons of crude per year. There are two main production lines in the refinery:
lube oil and bitumen line and
fuel production line.

Table 14: Key units in Novi Sad Refinery - characteristics
Unit
License
Capacity
(t/year)
Constructe
d
Atmospheric Distillation AT-500
Pritchard
500.000
1968
Atmospheric distillation I Naphtha Stabilization

U-2100
USSR
2.000.000
1985
Vacuum Distillation U-2200
USSR
1.200.000
1985
Naphtha Hydro treating U-2300
UOP (TPL)
560.000
1985
Platforming U-2400
UOP (TPL)
430.000
1985
Gas treatment (LPG) U-2500
UOP (TPL)
60.000
1985
HDS Unibon (Kerosine /VGO) U-2600
UOP (TPL)
240.000
1985
Atmospheric Distillation U-100
Badger
500.000
1974
Vacuum Distillation U-200
Badger
550.000
1974
Bitumen
Badger
200.000
1974
Hydro finishing U-400
Texaco
240.000
1981
Acid Treatment U-500
Texaco
89.000
1985
Lube Oil Blending, Filling and Packaging
Texaco
56.000
1981
Substances present in the refinery are listed in Annex 6.

Organization and management system
Organization of Novi Sad Refinery is presented in Annex 7. Quality management and
environmental management systems are certified. Specification of responsibilities based on
certified management systems is given in
Novi Sad Refinery was established in 1968 as an Operating unit within a bigger company
named: Petroleum industry ''Naftagas''. The planned capacity was 500,000 t/ year.
Nowadays available capacity of the refinery is 2.500.000 t/year and the storage capacity is
410.000 m3 m.
In 1972 it is adopted Development Basis for Novi Sad Refinery for the period of 10 years.
The following courses of further development were adopted:
development of production of all types of lube oils and bitumen (program ''Lube Oil
Plant'' which was effectuated through phases Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II)
and
fuel production development (''Fuel Plants'' program). Lube oil and bitumen
production was effectuated through phases (Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II).
page 34
First phase of Lube Oil Plant I program in 1973 involved construction of the following
production units:
Atmospheric Distillation Unit (500.000 t/y)

Vacuum Distillation Unit (550.000 t/y)
Bitumen Production Unit (160.000 t/y).
In 1975 realization of the most elaborate RNS program, called Fuel II Plant was started
parallel with the commencement of Yugoslav pipeline construction, the founder of which,
amongst others, was RNS.
Fuel II Plant Process Units involved construction of following production units:
1.
2.
Primary Process Units with

Atmospheric Distillation unit, capacity 2.000.000 t/y
Gasoline Stabilization Unit, capacity 580.000 t/y
Vacuum Distillation Unit, capacity 1.200.000 t/y
Secondary Process Units with
Hydro Treating Unit, capacity 500.000 t/y
Platforming Unit, capacity 430.000 t/y
HDC Unibon, capacity 230.000 t/y
LPG Processing Unit, capacity 66.000 t/y
In 1976 Atmospheric Distillation Unit, Vacuum Distillation Unit and Bitumen Production Unit
(Lube Oil Plant I program) were commissioned.
Second phase of Lube Oil Plant II program involved construction of the following production
units:
Hydro Finishing Unit (240.000 t/y)

Acid Treatment Unit (80.000 t/y)
Lube Oil Blending Unit (56.000 t/y).
1979 Fuel II Plant process units construction was started and 1980 Lube Oil Blending Plant
was constructed and started up. 1981 Start-up of Hydrofinishing Unit and other
accompanying units. 1984 Fuel II Plant program Primary Process Units were started up with
the delivery of the first quantity of imported crude oil via Yugoslav pipeline 1986 Fuel II Plant
program Secondary Process Units were started up.
2.1.4.4 Safety of the plant
Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards
Preventive measures
There is no major maintenance period as the different establishment is only running between
20% and 50% or their normal capacity (missing feed).
regulations.
Safety valves and gas installations have an inspection period of once per year. Gas
installations will also be inspected if the duration of the shut down period is more than one
month.
Preventive constructional measures
underground.
Preventive technical measures
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to some initial fires (each time fire
on the top of a column). This part is also protected by earthing. In general the normal
protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the protection
measure earthing is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance and
continuity will be done.
Additional measures
Internal communication will be done by radio, phone and mobile phone.
Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident
page 35
The whole staff has a yearly fire extinguishing training and exercise. Evacuation training has
been only done for parts of the establishment. Rescue and emergency plans has been
establishment now. Sub contractors have to pass training (fire protection and workplace
safety) and to do an exam.
There is only one drainage system for fire extinguishing water and normal water. The fire
water retention (shown in Error! Reference source not found.) will be done by hydrants
connected to basins.
Fire extinguishing by foam can be down by fire brigade.
An automatic gas detection system does not exist. A fire detection will be done by optical
control. An automatic fire extinguishing system does not exist. A system for automatic
cooling of the tanks.
Fires will be detected by optical control. Fire sensors do not exist. A new sensor system for
gas detection and continuous measurement has been installed last year.
An alarm plan in the establishment exist. In the case of an accident or a fire the workers will
be informed by radio to leave the establishment.
Operating Fire fighting unit within the Fire protection Service is located on two locations on
refinery territory. Staffing of the unit, 82 persons, is designed by the Plan of Fire protection
of OD RNS, and approved by MUP of Serbia. Actually there are 69 persons working in this
unit, as shown in Table 1.
Table 15: Number of personnel in Firefighting unit of Novi Sad refinery
Position taken
Working position
Planned
Workers of
the refinery
Workers of
subcontractors
Total
number
Manager of operating
unit of fire brigade
Chief of operating unit

of fire brigade
Shift leader of
operating unit of fire
brigade
10
Fireman, department
leader
16
13
13
Driver, fireman
16
10
10
20
Fireman, operator
25
16
UKUPNO
69
39
19
58
Equipment and utilities of Firefighting unit are shown in Table 16.

Table 16: Firefighting equipment
Mobile equipment
Vehicles
Motor pumps
Type
Capacity
Mercedes VP 33/43
6000/6000
Mercedes VPS 26/36
4000/5000/1000
Mercedes VPS 26/32
4000/5000/1000
FAP S 2x2000
4000
TAM Technical vehicle
Rosenbauer
3 pcs
Ziegler
1pc
Honda
5 pcs
Flight floating pump
2 pcs
page 36
Mobile equipment
Type
Capacity
Turbine vacuum pump
2 pcs
stabile
14 pcs
Mobile
4 pcs
Fire extinguish monitors
Beside the above mentioned mobile equipment, operating firefighting brigade has the
following multipurpose equipment:
-
fire extinguishers ( type S-6A, S-9A, S-25A, S-50A, CO2-5, CO2-10 )
suction and discharge pipes (52 mm, 75 mm, 110 mm )
water/foam nozzles
manifolds / collectors
mixers for foam
vatrogasne armature
insulation facilities
personal protection equipment (suits for fire approaching, suits for entering
into fire, fire helmets
Systems for storage area extinguishing and cooling

The refinery is provided with ring hydrant net with over 500 hydrants, as well as hydrant
facility for continual maintenance of water pressure in hydrant net.
Firefighting system is separated in 5 stations with suitable capacity of firefighting substances
and utilities (motor and electrical pumps, regulating equipment). The reason for this
separation is the size of refinery. There are following stations:
Stara vatrogasnica
MIX-stanica
Meaona Blending benzina
Terminal JP Transnafta
Meaona Goriva II
Table 17 shows means for fire extinguishing and capacities.

Table 17: Available fire extinguishing means
Means
Storage tanks for Polifilm
Capacity
Available
75.000 liters
73.000 liters + 92.700 liters

(reserve)
Powder Monex
15.125 kg
Firefighting water tanks
10.000 liters
10.000 liters
Almost all tanks are provided with stabile firefighting and cooling systems.
Fire protection of Lube oil I and Lube oil II units
These units are provided with ring hydrant net, stable and mobile monitors, as well as with
numerous fire fighting devices of different types. A fire on process units segments is
extinguished from station MIX-stanica, with additional water pressure provision from
station Stara vatrogasnica (and if necessary from Meaone - Goriva II). Station MIXstanica is equipped with two tanks with extracte for fire extinguish, each with capacity of 16
m3, pumps and devices for extracted mixture, as well as with the piping for emulsion
distribution for fire extinguish on of process unit segments and related storage area.
The whole refinery is connected with Fire alarms system, with 24 hours service on both
locations.
2.1.4.5 Description of processes
Main units in Lube oil part of Novi Sad refinery are:
Gasoline Stabilization Unit, with capacity of 580.000 t/y

page 37
Vacuum Distillation Unit (U 200), with capacity of 1.200.000 t/y

Hydro finishing Unit, with capacity of 240.000 t/y
Acid Treatment Unit, with capacity of 80.000 t/y
Lube Oil Blending Unit, with capacity of 56.000 t/y
For the analysis within the project, units U 100 and U 200 are considered.
Atmospheric distillation unit, U 100
U-100 processes domestic crude oil Velebit and Kelebija, with capacity of 1500 t/day. Both
crude oil are naphtha origin.
Atmospheric distillation unit consists of following connected section:
desalter section
heating section
atmospheric distillation section.
The main products are:
Gasolin
Kerosene
Atmospheric gas oi
Light residue.
Simplified diagram showing process parameters is given in Annex 9. Operation of U 100 is

described in Process and operation book Job No BN-5010, 1975 Badger B.V. and in the
project for reconstruction of the unit Industroprojekt Zagreb. There are specific operation
instruction for heater HF 101, desalter and process pumps.
Available related drawings are:
PI diagrams: DWG.NO.BN-5010 1107A, rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 1107B,

rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 1107C, rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 1107D, rev.8,
DWG.NO.BN-5010 1107E, rev.7<
Process flow diagrams: S-3941-100-04D-01, rev.
Mechanical scheme: B-3941-100-06D-01, rev.
A detailed description of U 100 is given in the documentation of Quality management

system, in Q6P.U1.01 Postupak rada atmosferskog postrojenja U 100 (Operational
procedure of Atmospheric unit U 100).
Table 18 lists materials used in process and their basic characteristics in relation to the
toxicity, health and environment. More details about each substance may be found in safety
data sheet.
Table 18: Dangerous substances in U 100
Effect to the
health
Environment
effect
Crude oil
Cancerous
Water organism
Crude gasoline
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
2.200
Kerosene
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
16.000
Gas oil
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
41.200
Atmospheric residue
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
140.600
Name
Name
Raw
material
Product
By-product
Physical
properties
Quantity (t)
200.000
page 38
Name
Effect to the
health
Environment
effect
Physical
properties
Irritant
No data
available
corrosive
Deemulgator
Irritant,
Potential
cancerous
Risky for water

organism
stable
Anticorrosion
inhibitor
Irritant,
Dangerous to
drink
Harmful for
water organism
corrosive
Ammonium
hydroxide
Toxic, Irritant
Very toxic for

water organism
Toxic
Name
Chemicals
Sodium hydroxide
Quantity (t)
From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present: H2S in waste
gas, SO2 in flue gas
Vacuum distillation unit, U 200
Vacuum distillation unit U 200 treats atmospheric residue of crude oil Velebit, Kelebija and
imported crude oil. Products are:
vacuum gas oil
VD-1
VD-2
VD-3
VD-4
paraffins slop,
heavy residue.
Vacuum section consists of the following connected units:
Heating section,
Distillation section,
Vacuum group,
Tempered water section,
Fuel oil section.
The unit is connected with the following organizational units:
Production:
Atmospheric distillation U 100
Bitumen Blowing section unit 300 (compression station),
Other organizational sections
Technological preparation section
Power plant
Laboratory
Storage area and re-treatment and
Maintenance.
Simplified diagram showing process parameters is given in Annex 10 .Detail description of

the unit is given in the documentation of quality management system, Q6P.U2.01 Postupak
rada vacuum postrojenja U 200 (Operational procedure of the unit U 200).
Table 19 lists materials used in process and their basic characteristics in relation to the
toxicity, health and environment. More details may be found in safety data sheet.
page 39
Table 19: Dangerous substances in U 200

Category
Raw material
Product
Name
Effect to the
health
Environment
effect
Physical
properties
Quantity
(t)
Atmospheric residue
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
160.000
Vacuum gas oil
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
12.000
VD1
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
13.000
VD2
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
20.000
VD3
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
20.000
VD4
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
20.000
Paraffins slop
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
15.000
Vacuum residue
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
60.000
Anticorrosion
inhibitor
Irritant,
dangerous to
drink
Harmful for
water organism
corrosive
By-product
Chemical
Neutralizer
From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present H2S in waste
gas and SO2 given in U 100 while they have the common chimney.
2.1.5
Elemir Gas refinery

Elemir Refinery is a gas-type refinery which produces natural gas, Liquefied Petroleum Gas
(LPG) and gasoline. It is designed by J.F. PRICHAR & COMPANY, 4625 ROANOKE PARKWAU,
CANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, USA and delivered by EDWIN & COMPANY (OLDBURY) LIMITED
BIRMINGHAM ENGLAND Desing-Engineering Job No IN-1776. The refinery is located in
Elemir and was commissioned in 1963.
The natural gas from fields Mokrin, Srpska Crnja and Rusanda is a main feed for Refinery
and the main products are:
Propane, 45 t/day
n-Butane, 34 t/day
isobutene, 38 t/day
Debutanizer gasoline, 60 t/day
Process oil, 5 t/day and
Gasoline, Gt 4,2 t/day.
2.1.5.2 Location description

Micro location of the refinery
Elemir Refinery is located 3 km north-east from small town Elemir and 10 km from the town
Zrenjanin in Vojvodina and belongs to Srednje-banatski province (see Figure 15 and Figure
16 for location of Zrenjanin in Serbia and location of Elemir).
Zrenjanin Municipality covers 1.324 km2, out of which 112.340 ha is agricultural area and
1.392 ha are under forest. The Zrenjanin region has 22 inhabited locations with total
approximately 132.051 inhabitants.
page 40
Figure 15: Location of Zrenjanin in Serbia

Elemir Refinery lays down on 42ha, it is the flat area and the wider surrounding is basin. The
closest houses are in the area of 1km.
The closes industrial facilities are: NIS Petrol storage area, HIP Petrohemija Factory of
syntactic cauchuck, filling station and distribution unit of LPG of NIS TNG a.d, and main
regulating node for natural gas transportation GR Elemir JP Srbijagas. Map of roads is
shown on Figure 17.
In the close environment it could be between 100 to 500 people. There are no public
buildings, schools or hospitals in the surrounding.
Figure 16: Location of Zrenjanin and Elemir
page 41
Figure 17: Map of roads

Micro location of Elemir Gas refinery
General plan of the refinery is given on including position of each unit or building within the
refinery.
Legend:
1. Process unit
4. Separator
7. Control room
2. Process furnace
5. Workshop
8. Boiler
3. Compressor unit
6. Generator building
9. Storage area
page 42
10. Main building
17. Low flare
24. Washing area
11. Tanks for process oil
18. Water preparation unit
25. Cooling towers
12. Trafo station
19 Earth laguna
26. Spare parts storage
13. Production tanks
20. Separator of oil water
27. Firefighting water

retention
14. Filling station for tracks 21. Workshop
28. Main gate
15. Firefighting center
22. Storage of auxiliary

fluids
16. Laboratory
23. Technical gases storage
Geological, meteorological and other data

Air temperature
In the winter period the cold air from north causes significant decrease of temperature, while
the cold air from Carpathian brings dry, windy and cold weather. In springs southwest flows
are dominant causing temperature increase. On east, northeast and southeast cold air
appears mostly in the cold part of the year.
Table 3 and Table 4 show statistical data on metro parameters in Zrenjanin region in the
period 1991 to 2004.
In summers cold air from the north causes bad weather and storms. Cold air is getting fast
worm from the earth and transforms in continental warm air. In June, when southwest winds
blow in high region, the cold air spread in Pannonia, the weather development ends up with
storms.
Table 20: Statistical data on monthly weather parameters for Zrenjanin region
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAJ
JUN
JUL
AVG
SEP
OKT
NOV
DEC
0.3
3.3
2.0
6.6
6.5
12.2
11.7
17.3
17.5
23.4
20.8
26.7
22.3
28.3
22.3
28.9
16.8
23.1
11.9
17.7
6.3
10.3
0.8
3.8
Tn()
ApsTx()
-2.5
17.7
-2.0
20.2
1.7
27.7
6.4
30.1
11.4
33.5
14.7
38.0
16.0
38.7
16.1
38.7
11.6
34.2
7.3
30.0
3.0
23.6
-1.9
14.9
ApsTn()
b.d.mraz
-24.6 -17.9 -12.6

20.9 17.6 11.2
-6.7
2.2
-0.2
0.1
6.0
0.0
6.5
0.0
7.2
0.0
2.2
0.0
-8.6
2.7
-10.5 -23.1
8.2
19.1
0.1
66
1.9
63
7.4
65
11.8
65
12.6
64
1.8
71
0.1
75
Tsr()
Tx()
b.d.trops.
U(%)
SS(h)
b.d.vedrih
0.0
84
0.0
76
0.0
67
0.0
80
65.9 120.6 164.3 187.4 251.4 285.4 287.3 284.4 204.0 158.1 89.1
0.0
85
58.6
2.9
5.9
5.4
4.2
5.6
6.5
9.1
11.9
6.0
6.2
4.1
2.8
b.d.tmurnih
14.7
8.4
7.6
8.9
6.4
4.3
4.1
3.8
5.6
6.9
12.0
16.0
RR(mm)
34.3
24.1
26.1
45.9
51.0
81.9
66.5
39.3
62.2
51.5
52.8
50.4
maxRR(mm) 30.7
20.4
22.9
30.4
52.5
62.5
72.3
49.1
60.0
45.9
47.5
44.2
rr>0.1(mm)
10.9
8.7
8.8
11.4
11.4
11.7
10.2
7.7
11.0
8.9
10.8
11.8
rr>10(mm)
1.1
0.3
0.7
1.3
1.0
2.5
1.7
1.2
2.0
1.1
1.8
1.3
b.d.sneg
5.0
5.3
2.1
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
1.9
5.1
b.d.s.p.
11.3
7.6
1.5
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.9
8.4
b.d.grad
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
Table 21: Statistical data on seasons weather parameters for Zrenjanin region
GOD
PRO
LET
JES
ZIM
VEG
Tsr()
11.6
11.9
21.8
11.7
1.0
17.6
Tx()
16.8
17.6
28.0
17.0
4.6
23.6
Tn()
6.8
6.5
15.6
7.3
-2.1
11.9
ApsTx()
38.7
ApsTn()
-24.6
page 43
b.d.mraz
82.0
13.5
0.0
10.9
57.6
5.0
b.d.trops.
35.7
2.0
31.8
1.9
0.0
35.7
U(%)
72
65
65
75
82
67
SS(h)
2156.5
603.1
857.1
451.2
245.1
1658.0
b.d.vedrih
70.6
15.2
27.5
16.3
11.6
49.5
b.d.tmurnih
98.7
22.9
12.2
24.5
39.1
40.0
586.0
123.0
187.7
166.5
108.8
398.3
RR(mm)
maxRR(mm)
72.3
rr>0.1(mm)
123.3
31.6
29.6
30.7
31.4
72.3
rr>10(mm)
16.0
3.0
5.4
4.9
2.7
10.8
b.d.sneg
19.9
2.5
0.0
2.0
15.4
0.5
b.d.s.p.
31.8
1.6
0.0
2.9
27.3
0.1
b.d.grad
1.1
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.9
Legend:
Tsr ()
air average temperature ()
Tx ()
Tn ()
ApsTx ()
ApsTn ()
b.d.mraz
average max. air temperature ()

average minimal air temperature ()
absolute max air temperature ()
absolute minimal air temperature ()
number of ice days Tn< 0C
b.d.trops.
U (%)
SS (h)
b.d. vedrih
b.d. tmurnih
RR (mm)
maxRR(mm)
rr>0.1(mm)
rr>10(mm)
number of tropical days Tx30C

relative air humidity u %
sunshine in hours
number of clear days
number of sunshade days
precipitation (mm)
daily max. precipitation (mm)
number of days with precipitation 0.1 mm
number of days with precipitation 10.0 mm
b.d.sneg
b.d.s.p.
b.d.grad
number of days with snow

number of days with show ?
broj dana sa gradom
Cloudiness and sun

Analysis of weather seasons has shown that the smallest cloudiness is in August (3.5/10 of
the sky, 35%). December has the most clouds (77%). The average yearly cloudiness. e.g.
average daily cloudiness is 4.4/10, e.g 55%.
Comparing with the length of the sunshine in individual seasons it may be concluded that
sunshine in summers is 850.6 hours e.g 63.1% of potential, in winters only 226.7 hours e.g.
26.7 of potential. In vegetation period average sunshine isi1506.1 hours or 58.4 of potential.
Fog
The average number of fogy days in a year in Zrenjanin region is 22.4 days or 6.1%. Fog
appears in every month but the most often it appears in December, average 5.6 days
(probability is 18%). Ice days, days with average daily temperature is under 0 o C, most
often appear in January. The average number of icy days in January is 14. t
Relative air humidity
Air temperature distribution based on values of dry and wet thermostat for two months in a
year (July and December) are given in Table 22 and Table 23.
page 44
The average yearly air humidity value in the Zrenjanin region is 78.5%; the lowest monthly
value of daily relative air humidity in July is 69% and the highest in December 85%.
Table 22: Temperature distribution in the region - July
TSv (oC)
Tmv (C)
R (%)
14>
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
18,1
25,4
19,1
20,5
16,0
18,1
16,4
16,7
80
50
77
69
Table 23: Temperature distribution in the region - December

TSv (oC)
Tmv (C)
R (%)
14
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
-2,5
1,0
-1,4
-3,0
-3,0
0,0
-1,9
-1,8
85
90
76
85
Air pressure
In Zrenjanin and wider surroundings the air pressure decreases in the period January April,
and increases. The average value of the air pressure in a year is about 1006 mbar, the
highest is in January, 1010 mbar and lowest in April, 1003 mbar. In October this value is
about 1008 mbar (81 m of see-height).
Precipitation
Average frequency of days with strong precipitation (9.5 mm) is 16,4 days per year, e.g.
13,1% of total number of days with precipitation, what is very law value.
The most of those days appear in May, average 2.2 days, with probability of 7%, and the
lowest number of those days is in October. The highest value was recorded in July. In
summers it happens that one day precipitation is higher then in winter period or in transition
seasons.
Wind
Frequency (%o) and velocity of wind (m/s) are given in Table 24. Weather with no wind
appears mostly in July (91%o), and the lowest freqancy is in February (63%o). The Figure
18 shows wind rose for Zrenjanin and this applies for Elemir as well.
Table 24: Frequency and velocity of wind
N
NE
SE
SW
NW
Frequency
97
57
80
205
125
77
157
138
Velocity
2.4
1.4
1.9
2.9
2.8
2.1
2.6
2.8
Figure 18: Distribution of relative wind frequencies per year (%)

page 45
Bodies of water and flooding

The level of underground water is 2 4 meters. The surface is loam. There was one flooding
in 1998/99. The surrounding area of the establishment has been flooded but not the
establishment. The underground water has been polluted by gasoline because of leaks in the
gasoline pipeline. The relevant pipe has been changed.
Seismic and geological activities
In the area of the establishment there is no specific seismic (Figure 19) or geological risks.
Figure 19: Seismic activities

Activities
Head office of Elemir Refinery

Address:
23208 Elemir Proleterska bb
Telephone:
+ 381 23 758 101 + 381 23 758
Fax:
+ 381 23 738 702
Legal status of the company: part
of the joint-stock company NISPetroleum industry of Serbia
Figure 20: Elemir Gas refinery
Elemir Refinery (Figure 20) is a gas-type refinery which produces natural gas, LPG and
gasoline. It is designed by J.F. PRICHAR COMPANY, 4625 ROANOKE PARKWAU, CANSAS
CITY, MISSOURI, USA and delivered by EDWIN COMPANY (OLDBURY) LIMITED BIRMINGHAM
ENGLAND Desing-Engineering Job No IN-1776.
The refinery was commissioned in 1963. It was the first unit of the kind built in the country,
thus the design standards were the standard of the country that has designed the unit. The
delivery has included: Know-how, license, patents, base engineering and other services. In
the year 1988 reconstruction took place (equipment replacement) with no changes in
technological process. The major outside supplies for RGE and the connected safety
problems are shown in Table 25.
page 46
Table 25: RGE supplies

Type of
supply
Safety problem
There are no safety problems if no electricity will be
delivered. Within less than 5 minutes the internal
generator system will take over the supply of
electricity.
Electricity
Fuel gas
Nitrogen
No safety problems as the production will stop if no

gas will be delivered
It will only be used for maintenance
Organization and management system

Elemir Gas Refinery is a part of production division of NIS-Naftagas as shown on NISNaftagas organizational scheme in Annex 11. Total number of employees in RGE is 123.
Qualification structure of employees is given in Table 26.
Table 26: Employees structure in Elemir Refinery
Number of employees
Qualification
RGE
PhD
M.Sc.
B.Sc.
10
College
Naftagas
Highly skilled
High-school
43
Skilled
14
Elementary school
Semiskilled
Unskilled
Total
45
77
46
Responsible for safety aspects in the whole NIS a.d. is the central HSE department of NIS
a.d. and NIS Naftagas Safety department (Department for systematic support - EMS, Safety,
QMS, IMS) and this department is delegating one person to the RGE for HSE duties.
Nevertheless safety is one of the major points of the philosophy of the company.
Management systems are certified and scope of certification is shown in Table 27. Policy
established by top management withing integrated management system is presented in
Annex 12.
Table 27: List of NIS-Naftagas certificates and scope of certification
Organizational part
Evrocert certificates
IQ Net certificates
Issue date
Number
Issue date
Number
Research and production
04.12.2003
1081/00
22.12.2003
AT-2808/0
Geophysical Institute
07.12.2003
1052/01
22.12.2003
Drilling
04.12.2003
1055/01
22.12.2003
AT-2840/0
Special works
06.12.2003
1047/01
22.12.2003
AT-3338/0
Maintenance
10.12.2003
1049/01
22.12.2003
AT-2448/0
Transport and building
12.12.2003
1058/01
22.12.2003
AT-3120/0
page 47
Organizational part
Evrocert certificates
IQ Net certificates
Issue date
Number
Issue date
Number
Hidrosonda
05.12.2003
1059/01
22.12.2003
AT-3121/0
Drinking water factory Jazak
18.08.2006
18.08.2006
1226/00
1023/00
28.09.2006
28.09.2006
AT-00085/0
AT-05400/0

NIS-NAFTAGAS is founded by the decision of FNRJ Government on 10.02.1949. as a
company for research and crude oil and gas production. Since 31.12.1991. It works within
Petroleum Industry of Serbia.
In 28.09.2005. the Company for research, production, treatment, distribution and trade of
crude oil and its derivates and research and production of gas is founded (Drutvo za
istraivanje, proizvodnju, preradu, distribuciju i promet nafte i naftnih derivata i istraivanje i
proizvodnju prirodnog gasa) "NIS" a.d.
NIS-NAFTAGAS is it part dealing with research and production of crude oil, natural gas,
underground water and geothermal energy, engineering in the field of oil industry and design
and construction of facilities.
As for accidents, there was a jet fire in a compressor for fluidisation of Propane (Incoming
pressure 1.6 to 2.8 bar, outgoing pressure 13 to 15 bar). There was a leakage in the
compressor which leads to a jet which was ignited. The fire has been extinguished by closing
the incoming line.
Measures to prevent or mitigate an accident (general)
Organizational measures
There is a major maintenance period once/year. The pressure vessels and columns will have
an inside inspection every three years and every six years the pressure will be tested. This
inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU regulations.
Safety valves and gas installations have an inspection period of once per year.
Equipment for use in explosive atmosphere has a visual inspection twice a year and an
inspection by external authorized persons every three years.
Constructional measures
underground.
Technical measures
In general the normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control
of the protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the
resistance and continuity will be done.
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to one accident in the past. At a
top of a small chimney for steam the lightning ignited the steam. The flow has been stopped
and the fire has been extinguished hereby. As a result the instrumentation and control
system has been damaged. This part was not protected by earthing.
Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident (General)
The whole staff has a yearly fire extinguishing training and exercise. The evacuation training
will only be done for a rescue brigade.
Rescue and emergency plans exist partly for the buildings. Fire fighting equipment in RGE is
specified in Table 28. In the case of an accident or a fire the workers will be informed by
sirens to leave the establishment.
The surface is loam. The level of underground water is about 2-4 meters deep. All tanks are
built in basins. A drainage system exists for fire extinguishing water and normal water. The
fire water retention will be done by hydrants connected to two basins (900 and 250 m3).
Fire extinguishing by foam is also possible. A gas detection system has been installed. A fire
detection system is under construction. An automatic fire extinguishing system does not
exist. A system for automatic cooling of the tanks is existing.
page 48
Table 28: Fire fighting equipment

Type
Description
3
1.
Stable hydrant system
1100 m
2.
Stable system for foam
2 m3 of foam
3.
Portable systems with S-9
30
4.
Portable systems with S-50, 250
10
5.
Portable systems with S250
6.
Portable systems with CO2
10
7.
Water guns with foam
2.1.5.4 Description of processes

RGE is designed for maximal processing and preparation as follows:
1200000 m3/day of natural gas,
21.6 t/day of gas condensate and
10 t raw gasoline
Main products of the refinery are:
Propane 45 t/day
n-Butan 34 t/day
izo-Butan 38 t/day
Debutanized gazoline 60 t/day
Process oil 5 t/day and
Gazoline Gt 4,2 t/day.
Process may be separated in six main technological operations: separation, dehydration,

absorption, desorption, distillation and rectification.
Natural gas and gas condensate, after separation, go to the dehydration column for drying
with three-ethylene glycol. Dry gas goes for deep cooling and further to the absorption
column where propane, butane, pentene and hexane are absorbed from the natural gas. For
absorption oil is used (150 g/mol).
The processed natural gas is taken from the top of the column. The used absorption oil, with
above mentioned products, goes for stabilization to the de-ethanizer where methane and
ethane are separated from the absorption oil. Further oil goes to distillation where C3 and C8
are distillated and from the column bottom process oil is going out and further heated in the
furnace. This oil is used as a heating fluid in the process unit.
Distillates are condensed and led to the rectification columns where clean components are
derived. In the first rectification column (depropanizer) propane is separated as the pure
component, and the mixture of hydrocarbons from the bottom of the column is led to the
debutanizer. In the second column (debutanizer) the mixture of butane is derived from
debutanizer gasoline on the column bottom. Butane mixture from the debutanizer column
goes to the de-isobutanizer where isobutene is separated from n-butane.
Flow diagram of the refinery is given in Annex 13. Substances present in the refinery are
given in Table 29 and complete description
Table 29: Substances in Elemir Gas refinery
R.br. Substances or group of substances
30.
Verry toxic
1)
Quantity (t)
5
2)
31.
Toxic
32.
Oxidizing
3)
10
Explosive
4)
10
33.
34.
Eco toxic
10
5)
10
page 49
35.
Flamable gases
36.
7)
Slef flamable
6)
10
50
8)
37.
Solid flamable
38.
Materije koje u dodiru sa vazduhom i vodom
39.
Verry flamable liquids
40.
Flamable liquids
50
9)
10)
50
1000
5000
2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology

2.2.1
General
It is commonly accepted that some inspection on the equipment and piping is necessary to
validate the expected condition of the items as well as to assure the integrity of the plant.
However it is difficult to determine exactly how much inspection effort is required. An RBI
analysis assists to determine the required effort by providing three key parameters, the
likelihood of failure of the item, the consequence of failure of the item and the risk from the
combination of likelihood and consequence of failure.
The purpose of a RBI analysis is to focus inspection activities on those pieces of equipment
where failure risks associated with an active damage mechanism are highest.
It should be noted that releases have two main causes, one is failure due to material
degradation, which can be inspected for and the other is a system error, e.g. an operator
error where inspection cannot assist.
Risk based inspection planning is a methodology which prioritizes inspection activities on the
basis of the actual risk reduction associated with each specific activity. It does this through
the following steps:
Prepare a suitable database
identify the main active damage mechanisms and possible scenaria HAZOP analysis
Perform qualitative Risk-based assessment according to the CEN CWA 15740
Performed detailed analysis based on API RP 581:2008 - Risk Risk-Based Inspection

Technology
Calculate the likelihood of failure for each piece of equipment as function of the
different damage mechanisms, the rate of degradation and time in service
Calculate the consequence of failure associated with each piece of equipment
Combine the likelihood and the consequence numbers to calculate the risk associated
with each piece of equipment and rank the equipment according to the risk results
Calculate the reductions achievable in the likelihood of failure through a suitable

inspection program (This is achieved by removing the uncertainty in the actual rate
of degradation or condition of the item and thus reducing the chance of failure)
Develop the inspection program based on the inspection costs versus the inspection
benefits.
2.2.2
Preparation of data base
The summaries of process description and PFDs for each plant were first reviewed to obtain a
preliminary understanding of the process and the equipment functions. The equipment and
piping items were identified from the PFDs.
Each item was entered in the master workspace in process order. This database was
supported by piping specifications, equipment data sheets, process stream compositions,
operating conditions and other relevant documents. The preparation of this database was an
extensive process.
The datasheets in Excel format were used to gather the data. The key data are also marked
on the PFDs for easy reference.
page 50
Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall management system
page 51
Figure 22: Methodology and application of detailed RBI
2.2.3
Identifying the Damage Mechanisms
The damage mechanisms of interest are those which develop over a period of time, gradually
weakening the pressure boundary integrity of components until failure is predicted. These
damage mechanisms include internal corrosion and external damage under insulation.
Damage mechanisms for the process units were identified based on supplied data, interviews
with the staff, standard industry process knowledge and using the API documents, together
with R-Tech material and corrosion expertise.
The following inspectable active or potentially active damage mechanisms have been
identified and the corrosion circuits are also developed.
The potential damage mechanisms include:
2.2.4
External Damage (Corrosion under insulation) CUI

Internal thinning (generalized / Localized thinning)
Fatigue damage on the piping systems
Creep and other elevated temperature related damage mechanisms
Potential of brittle fracture in the process parts operating under temperatures below
the ambient temperatures
Calculating the Likelihood of Failure
The likelihood of failure of a piece of equipment or pipe is a direct function of the nature and
rate of the degradation mechanisms to which it is subjected. The essential steps are to:
page 52
Identify the damage mechanism(s)
Predict the rate of degradation
Assess the inspection history
Consider the age (Note - in this study a (5) years look ahead was made to give a risk profile
for June 2012), this is to identify equipment with risk that could exceed the inspection
targets between the upcoming and the following plant shut down.
When the likelihood of failure is being assessed, the calculation routine is based on the
simple premise that unexpected catastrophic failures occur when degradation happens faster
than expected. The routine therefore looks at the what if scenarios of the corrosion rate
being either twice or even four times the predicted rate and calculates the likelihood of
failure compared with the operational conditions.
It also takes into account the current confidence in the condition based on the nature of the
inspections previously performed and their ability to characterize the extent and rate of the
different damage mechanisms.
These factors are combined by the software to produce a value for the likelihood of failure for
each damage mechanism. This is expressed as a Likelihood Factor, which is a number to be
applied to the generic failure frequency of the particular item. If no damage mechanisms
have been identified, the Likelihood Factor may be 0.5 indicating that the component is 50%
less likely to fail than the industry average for such components. If a severe damage
mechanism is found and the item has not been thoroughly inspected for some time the
Likelihood Factor may be in the thousands indicating that the component may be much more
likely to fail than the industry average and that an inspection is needed urgently.
The general approach is to address those items in the order of the decreasing Likelihood
Factor, as indicated in Table 30.
Table 30: Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor
Likelihood Factor
Value
Likelihood Factor
>1000
100<Likelihood
Factor<1000
10<Likelihood
Factor<100
1<Likelihood
Factor<10
2.2.5
Action
Immediate action should be taken, prioritised by risk. Select
the highest risk item with a value in this range and perform
appropriate action. A first step should always be careful
checking of the input data for errors. If this does not resolve
the problem, a highly effective inspection appropriate to the
damage mechanism should be performed.
Address these items next, again prioritizing by risk.
Address these items next, again prioritizing by risk.
Address these items last. Since values in this range indicate
a potential, but not necessarily severe, problem. Action on
these items may be delayed until all other items have been
addressed or until a convenient time, such as a scheduled
shutdown within the time frame considered in the RBI
analysis.
Calculating the Consequence of Failure
Based on the process flow diagrams (PFDs) and discussion with the risk & process engineers,
each item of equipment was assigned to an inventory group. This group represents the fluid
that could escape in the event of a leak at any one of the items in the group. Each
equipment item is then associated with two inventories, its own and the group inventory.
The consequences are calculated taking into account the nature and amount of the fluid
released. The amount and rate of fluid released depends upon factors such as the size of the
hole, the fluid viscosity and density and the operating pressure. The rupture of a large
diameter high-pressure pipe or vessel obviously has a different consequence than a pinhole
leak at a small diameter low-pressure pipe and this method quantifies that difference.
Each piece of equipment or piping has a certain generic (industry average) probability of
failing either by a pinhole type leak, a medium size hole, a large hole or a rupture. The
page 53
consequence of each type of failure is calculated and combined with the probability for that
failure; to calculate the overall risk associated with each piece of equipment.
2.2.6
Determine the Financial Consequences
There are many costs associated with any failure of equipment in a process plant. These
include, but are not limited to:
Cost of equipment repair and replacement

Cost of damage to surrounding equipment in affected areas
Costs associated with production losses and business interruption as a result of
downtime to repair or replace damaged equipment
Costs due to potential injuries associated with a failure
Environmental cleanup costs
The approach used in API RBI is to consider all of these costs on both an equipment specific
basis and an affected area basis. Thus, any failure (loss of containment) has costs associated
with it, even when the release of the hazardous material does not result in damage to other
equipment in the unit or serious injury to personnel. Recognizing and using this fact presents
a more realistic value of the consequences associated with a failure. Since the costs include
more than just business interruption, the approach used for quantitative API RBI analysis is
called the financial consequence approach.
The financial consequence of a loss of containment and subsequent release of hazardous
materials can be determined by adding up the individual costs discussed above:
FC=FC
cmd+FC
affa+FC prod+FCinj+FCenviron
The basic method of risk analysis as presented in API RBI is not changed for the financial risk
analysis. The risk is still calculated as the consequence of failure (now expressed as cost in
dollars) times the probability of failure.
For a rigorous and flexible analysis, the consequences (costs) are evaluated at the hole size
level. Risk is also evaluated at the release hole size level by using the probability of failure
associated with each release hole size. The total risk is calculated as the sum of the risks of
each release hole size.
2.2.7
Calculating the Risk
This is now a very simple step, where the risk associated with each piece of equipment is
essentially given by the formula:
RISK = Likelihood of Failure x Consequence of Failure
The risk is the combination of two key terms:
Likelihood of failure and
Consequence of failure
Understanding the two-dimensional aspect of risk allows new insight into the use of risk as
an inspection prioritization tool.
The consequences are calculated based on fluid properties, temperatures, pressures and
inventory.
The likelihood is based on generic or average failure frequency data.
An analysis is then performed considering important failure mechanisms for each piece of
equipment to determine if it is more, or less likely to fail than average. The result is then
used to modify the likelihood of failure in this study. The consequence and the likelihood are
then combined to give a risk value for each piece of equipment.
A high-risk item may be high risk due to either a high likelihood of failure or a low
consequence of failure or conversely a high consequence of failure and a low likelihood of
failure.
An inspection program can only influence the value of the likelihood of failure, not the
consequence. No matter how much inspection is performed the consequence is unchanged.
Therefore, where a high-risk item is driven by the consequence value, other actions such as
more precise analysis such as Quantitative Risk Assessment and upgrading of mitigation
system may be considered.
page 54
The overall ranking is then done according to the RIMAP risk matrix, shown in the Figure 23.
Alternatively, the risk can be represented in the NIS risk matrix, as shown in Figure 24.
Figure 23: CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix
Figure 24: NIS risk matrix
2.2.8
Remaining life assessment
The remaining life for the equipment and piping items based on the hoop stress was
performed according to the recommendations given in the API 581 BRD, and Steinbes R-
page 55
Tech Software iRIS-Petrol has been used for the analysis. It accounts for both internal
thinning and external corrosion rates. The remaining life is calculated as follows:
1.
2.
First, determine the Minimum Wall Thickness (tmin) to be used.

There are 3 options available for specifying this tmin:
using the Design Corrosion Allowance taken from design documents (which is a
default option)
using User-defined Minimum Thickness taken from local codes or other
considerations such as structural stability.
using Calculated Minimum Thickness which is based on ASME code formula:
Determine the Remaining Corrosion Allowance where:
in which,
Initial Corrosion Allowance is determined from step (1)

and
Total Wall Loss = Internal Wall Loss + External Wall Loss
3. The Nominal Remaining Life is then calculated as follows:
NomRemLife = (RemCorrAllow) / (Total Corrosion Rate)
in which,
Total Corrosion Rate = Internal Thinning Rate + External Corrosion Rate
Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petro also provides an alternative calculation for remaining life known
as the probabilistic remaining life. It is based on a weighted average of the nominal
remaining life for all possible thinning scenarios.
For internal thinning, 3 states are assumed and the probabilistic remaining life equation is as
follows:
Whereby
State i = 1, is when the thinning rate is as given by the user
State i = 2, is when the thinning rate is 2 times the given rate
State i = 3, is when the thinning rate is 4 times the given rate
Pi is the probability of state i.
(Nominal Remaining Life)i is the remaining life calculated for state i.
A more complex equation is used when external thinning is included or where liner is
involved.
2.2.9
Developing an inspection plan
The key piece of data for the development of an inspection plan is the Likelihood Factor. The
Likelihood Factor for each piece of equipment is a composite i.e.
Likelihood Factor (LF) = LFThinning + LFCUI(ClSCC) +
page 56
Since an inspection needs to be tailored to fit the particular type of damage expected at a
particular piece of equipment, the key considerations are:
High total Likelihood Factors
High overall risks
The Likelihood Factor per damage type.
Short or zero probabilistic remaining life.
As agreed with NIS, inspection planning targets are adopted for this inspection planning. For
each equipment item, the driving damage mechanism is identified for inspection. Based on
the inspection planning targets the Likelihood Factor for the relevant driving damage
mechanism is then reduced by assigning appropriate number and effectiveness of inspection.
This is generated by software as inspection.
The actual inspection scope to satisfy the assigned effectiveness is then developed based on
API inspection guideline for each relevant damage mechanisms, as given in the tables below.
Table 31: Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Intrusive Inspection
Non-intrusive Inspection
A
Highly Effective
50-100% examination of the

surface (partial) internals
removed) and accompanied by
thickness measurements
50-100% ultrasonic scanning

coverage (automated or manual)
or profile radiography
B
Usually Effective
Normally 20% examination (no

internals removed), and spot
external ultrasonic thickness
measurements
Normally 20% ultrasonic scanning

coverage (automated or manual),
or profile radiography, or external
spot thickness (statistically
validated)
C
Fairly Effective
Visual examination without

2-3% examination, spot external

ultrasonic thickness
measurements, and little or no
internal visual examination
D
Poorly Effective
External spot thickness readings

only
Several thickness measurements,

and a documented inspection
planning system
No inspection
Several thickness measurements

taken only externally, and a
poorly documented inspection
planning system
E
Ineffective
Table 32: Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized Thinning

Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
A
Highly Effective
100% visual examination (with

removal of internal packing,
trays, etc.) and thickness
measurements
50-100% coverage using

automated ultrasonic scanning, or
profile radiography in areas
specified by a corrosion engineer
or other knowledgeable specialist
B
Usually Effective
100% visual examination (with

partial removal of the internals)
including manways, nozzles, etc.
and thickness measurements
20% coverage using automated

ultrasonic scanning, or 50%
manual ultrasonic scanning, or
50% profile radiography in areas
page 57
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
C
Fairly Effective
D
Poorly Effective
E
Ineffective
Nominally 20% visual

examination and spot ultrasonic
Nominally 20% coverage using

automated or manual ultrasonic
scanning, or profile radiography,
and spot thickness measurements
at areas specified by a corrosion
engineer or other knowledgeable
specialist
No inspection
Spot ultrasonic thickness

measurements or profile
radiography without areas being
No inspection
Spot ultrasonic thickness

measurements without areas
being specified by a corrosion
engineer or other knowledgeable
specialist
Table 33: CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels Inspection Categories
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Insulation
Removed
Insulation Not
Removed
Remove >95% of the insulation

A
Highly Effective
AND
For the total surface area:

visual inspection of the exposed >95% profile or real-time
radiography
surface area with follow-up by
UT, RT or pit gauge is required
> 95% external visual
inspection prior to removal
of insulation
AND
B
Usually Effective
remove >60% of total surface

area of insulation including
suspect areas
AND
visual inspection of the exposed
UT, RT or pit gauge as required

> 95% external visual inspection
AND
follow-up with profile or real time
radiography of >60% of total
surface area of insulation
including suspect areas

>
95% external visual

inspection prior to removal
of insulation
AND
C
Fairly Effective

suspect areas
AND

>95% external visual inspection
AND
>95% external visual inspection For the total surface area:
page 58
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Insulation
Removed
Poorly Effective
Insulation Not
Removed
>95% external visual inspection
prior to removal of
insulation
AND
AND


suspect areas
AND
E
Ineffective
<5% insulation removal and

inspection
No inspection or ineffective
inspection technique or <95%
visual inspection
OR
no inspection or ineffective
inspection technique
Table 34: CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories

Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Intrusive
Inspection
Non-intrusive
Inspection

A
Highly Effective
No inspection techniques yet

95% dye penetrant or eddy
available meet requirements of
current test with UT follow-up of "A".
relevant indications.
>

B
Usually Effective
95% automated or manual

ultrasonic scanning

current testing with UT follow-up OR
of all relevant indications.
AE testing with 100% follow-up of
relevant indications.
C
Fairly Effective
D
Poorly Effective
E
Ineffective
>

current testing with UT
follow-up of all relevant
indications.

>67% automated or manual
ultrasonic scanning
>5% dye penetrant or eddy

current testing with UT
follow-up of all relevant
indications
>30% automated or manual

ultrasonic scanning
Less than D effectiveness or

no inspection or ineffective
inspection technique used
Less than D effectiveness or no

inspection or ineffective inspection
technique used
OR
>60% radiographic testing
Table 35: Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage

Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
A
Highly Effective
Inspection
Visual inspection of >95% of the exposed surface area with
follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required
page 59
B
Usually Effective

C
Fairly Effective

D
Poorly Effective

E
Ineffective
Visual inspection of <5% of the exposed surface area with

Table 36: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace Tube
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Inspection
A
Highly Effective
Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes and

strapping at UT measurement locations. FMR at various
locations
B
Usually Effective
Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes
C
Fairly Effective
Visual inspection with UT thickness measurements of 75% of the

tubes
D
Poorly Effective
Visual inspection with spot UT measurements
E
Ineffective
Visual
2.2.10
Software used
Software used for analysis, R-Tech iRIS-Petro RBI, is fully based on API methodology and
recommendadtion contained in the document API RP 581 Risk Based Inspection Technology,
Second edition (see references [1]).
The software is used for assessment of the risk on equipment/subequipment level and for
developing and evaluating inspection plan and strategies.
Software is described in Chapter 3, together with instructions for the users.
2.3 General about HSE (HAZOP, Seveso II) methodology

2.3.1
HAZOP
The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) technique provides a means of systematically reviewing
the design and operation of a system to identify the potential occurrence of hazardous
events (impacts on people, property, or the environment), or operability problems (impacts
on process efficiency or productivity). It is based on the premise that a hazard is not realized
if the process is always operated within its design intent.
The HAZOP technique involves structured brainstorming to look for deviations from the
design intent. Structure is provided by the use of a set of guidewords. The guidewords are
applied to various aspects of the design intent, i.e. process parameters, to develop
deviations. The team determines if the deviation could realistically occur and, if there are
realistic causes, evaluates whether the consequences are significant, as defined by the scope
of the study.
The team may then evaluate whether existing safeguards are adequate considering the
causes and consequences of the deviation. The safeguards may be either in the form of
hardware or procedures. In some cases, the team may make recommendations for corrective
action, for study to determine an optimal solution, or for additional investigation to
determine whether a problem exists that warrants action.
The primary objective of the classical form of HAZOP study is the identification of problems
or possible accident scenarios. This information alone is not sufficient to make decisions on
page 60
what should be done. It is useful if a simple risk estimate can be provided for each problem
in order to provide a basis for deciding on the best allocation of resources to address key
problems. Consequently HAZOP-PC provides a means for qualitatively estimating the
likelihood and severity of each problem identified in order to develop a risk estimate.
HAZOP studies can be performed for new plants where the design is nearly firm and
documented, or for existing plants where a significant redesign is planned, or where no
previous study has been performed. HAZOP studies can be conducted not just for processes
but also for storage, transportation, and other systems.
While the HAZOP technique is the most comprehensive hazard analysis method of those
available, it cannot provide complete assurance that all hazards have been identified.
HAZOP Team
HAZOP team members need to be knowledgeable of the process and its operation, at least
some of the team should come from the operating facility. A typical team may consist of the
following members:
Team Leader
Process Engineer
Operations Supervisor
Safety Engineer
Maintenance/Inspection Supervisor
Facilities/Mechanical Engineer
HAZOP Process
Typical HAZOP process is illustrated on the Figure 25.
page 61
Figure 25: Flowchart of HAZOP Process
2.3.2
Seveso II Directive
The Seveso II Directive is based on Article 174 (ex-Article 130s) of the EC Treaty. It is
important to mention that, according to Article 176 (ex-Article 130t) of the EC Treaty,
Member States can maintain or adopt stricter measures than those contained in the Seveso
II Directive.
The aim of the Seveso II Directive is two-fold. Firstly, the Directive aims at the prevention of
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances. Secondly, as accidents do continue
to occur, the Directive aims at the limitation of the consequences of such accidents not only
for man (safety and health aspects) but also for the environment (environmental aspect).
Both aims should be followed with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout the
Community in a consistent and effective manner.
The scope of the Seveso II Directive is solely to the presence of dangerous substances in
establishments. It covers both, industrial "activities" as well as the storage of dangerous
chemicals. The Directive can be viewed as inherently providing for three levels of
proportionate controls in practice, where larger quantities mean more controls.
A company who holds a quantity of dangerous substance less than the lower threshold levels
given in the Directive is not covered by this legislation but will be proportionately controlled
by general provisions on health, safety and the environment provided by other legislation
which is not specific to major-accident hazards. Companies who hold a larger quantity of
dangerous substance, above the lower threshold contained in the Directive, will be covered
by the lower tier requirements. Companies who hold even larger quantities of dangerous
substance (upper tier establishments), above the upper threshold contained in the Directive,
will be covered by all the requirements contained within the Directive.
The Directive was amended again in December 2003.
The key elements of preparation of a Seveso assessment are described in the Table 37.
Table 37: Typical steps for a Seveso assessment study
Item
Section heading
No.
Summary
Comments
Executive
summary
Summary of findings and

intended methods of control of
accidents and hazards
Introduction and
overview
Must cover the plant features,

process and layout, and if
Description of plant, special
nearby to populated areas
features and any limits to the
must describe issues in local
scope of the Seveso assessment.
communities that may impact
hazard management.
Methodology the
Outline of the approach taken by
This section describes the
hazards and
the assessment team to
assessment methodology
effects
illustrate a rigorous approach
undertaken.
management
and use of appropriate data.
process
A listing of the hazards that

apply to the plant under
assessment.
In addition to the identification
of the major accident hazards,
Hazard
identification study the safety-critical elements and
performance standards (i.e. the
manner in which the safety
critical elements perform in the
context of the major hazard).
page 62
A key first step to describe

what accidents and hazards
apply to the plant being
assessed.
Item
Section heading
No.
Hazard checklist
Summary
Comments
A supporting list of typical

hazards to assist the
comprehensive review of
applicable hazards.
Many HAZID exercises are

carried out using a
brainstorming team review,
the checklist is a very useful
element to support this review.
A term used in the UK as a
short-hand description but the
step to identify the safety
critical elements (SCEs) is a
key identification of the
valuable systems used to
prevent, detect, control or
mitigate the incidents.
Safety-critical
elements
A further description of the

safety critical elements (those
items that help to protect the
plant and adjacent
communities).
Setting of
performance
standards
Formal statement of the

performance required for the
safety systems for this plant.
A collation exercise of the

performance measures
required to be in place to
enable the SCEs to do their job
effectively.
Qualitative risk
assessment
Usually making use of a generic

risk matrix, a risk ranking table
of the identified risk associated
with the plant.
Assigning risk levels against

each identified hazard.
Risk tolerability
A section stating the grouped

acceptance criteria, covering not
just safety issues but also,
ecological and amenity
consequences criteria plus
environmental performance and
manageability criteria.
Often based on corporate

standards adopted by the plant
operators.
May be already completed,
otherwise will require a
search of standards accepted
by the plant operator and
collating values.
Demonstration of
major hazards
management
A section describing the manner

in which the plants
management intend to manage
the identified major hazards and
identifying a range of HSE
critical tasks, (in order to
prioritise effort and budgets).
The means by which the plant

operators demonstrate to their
regulators and corporate
management that the hazards
foreseen on the plant will be
able to be controlled in some
manner by the HSE
management systems in place.
Escape,
evacuation and
rescue
Noting that the management

approaches will require effort to
be assigned to manage escape,
evacuation and rescue of
affected personnel on the plant
and adjacent affected
communities.
10
11
2.4 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Pancevo Refinery

2.4.1
The scope of analysis
According to the plan for Package B, a
page 63
List of components
2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad Refinery
2.6 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Elemir Refinery
2.6.1
Executive summary
The overall proposed inspection plan for the equipment based on screening results (Table 10
API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009), shows overall reduction of
almost 50% of equipment to be inspected pro year in next 3 years.
On the other hand, about 10% of equipment has to be inspected more intensively with more
adequate methods and scope than it was practiced so far.
page 64
Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component based applied on RGE equipment
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
D
0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 ED-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T110 T-5
9
E-1A/B E-2 T-4
T-6 T-8
18 - 72%
D-27A T-1
2 - 8%
D-300
T-101 T-2
D-102 T-3
5 - 20%
0 - 0%
0 - 0%
5 - 20%
14 - 56%
6 - 24%
0 - 0%
25
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on
selected RGE equipment
page 65
2.6.2
Introduction
2.6.2.1 Objective
The objective of the study was to assess the risk profile of the RGE equipment through the
application of the Risk based inspection methodology and to prioritize equipment for
inspection. Moreover, the goal was to demonstrate the applicability of the overall approach
to the NIS units.
2.6.2.2 Scope
The scope of the RBI study covered all the equipment items and related piping as originally
agreed prior to the project.
Figure 28: Component count for RBI analysis of Elemir Refinery
Number of
items
Component type
Pressure vessel
41
Condenser, Shell
17
Heat Exchanger, Shell
13
Column Top
10
Filter
Furnace Tubes (general)
Other Equipment
Heat Exchanger, Tube Side
The scope of work covered the following activities:

1.
Understanding the system

This includes activities like HAZOP analysis, review of design assumptions, process
flow diagrams, P& IDs, survey of all maintenance, inspection documents (location,
nature and criticality of flaws, thickness measurements, corrosion rates etc.), repair
and modification records, operating conditions, PSV settings, stream data, materials
of fabrication, vessel coating and insulation details. Review of financial data
including cost of plant shut down and averages cost of process plant.
2.
Preparation of Simplified Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with all data essential to
the RBI analysis of the equipment items.
3.
Development of corrosion circuits and determination of expert corrosion rates.
4.
Data entry and analysis using Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petrol software.
5.
Preparation of documentation of corrosion rates and assessment of damage

mechanisms and mode of failure.
6.
Review of inspection records.

page 66
7.
RBI analysis and results checking.
8.
Preparation of RBI analysis report.
2.6.2.3 Deliverables
The deliverables of the RBI project include:
1)
Database of equipment for the process units studied.
2)
RBI analysis report for the units include the followings:

a)
Six (6) sets of process flow diagrams showing the basic information used in the
analysis.
Inspection plan guidelines for selected high risk items based on a plan period
agreed with RGE. This consist of tables and reports indicating the overall risk,
likelihood and consequence factors, the recommended inspection methods and
coverage for each equipment item and the active or potential damage
mechanisms identified per equipment item.
The assumptions and conclusions of the RBI analysis.
b)
c)
2.6.3
Methodology
General details on applied RBI / RCM methodology and HAZOP are presented in Chapter 2.2
of this report.
A HAZOP study is performed by a HAZOP team, consisting of experienced engineers and
operating personnel from appropriate disciplines, facilitated by an independent chairman
experienced in the use of the HAZOP methodology. The team may include representation
from both the design contractor and from their client who is to operate and maintain the
facility. Typically the team may include process engineers, project engineers, electrical &
instrument engineers, maintenance engineers and senior operating personnel. Other
specialists may be drafted in to the meeting when appropriate.
The HAZOP review is normally based on P&IDs of the planned facility, while PFDs, Cause and
Effect Diagrams, Hazardous Area Classification drawings and Layout Drawings may also be
used to provide additional information. During a HAZOP, the P&IDs will be broken down in to
logical sub-systems (nodes), which may be a vessel, a line interconnecting equipments, or
some other logical sub-system.
The HAZOP technique involves the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Identify the node to be studied.

Define the design intent of the node and the normal operating parameters.
Apply a HAZOP deviation (e.g. NO/LESS FLOW) to the node.
Identify all possible causes for the deviation.
Identify for each cause all possible consequences, without regard for the
safeguards in place.
Identify all available safeguards to prevent the cause or to limit the
consequences.
Recommend any new safeguards where judged necessary.
Repeat steps 4 to 7, using the next HAZOP deviation.
Repeat steps 3 to 8 until all HAZOP deviations have been applied to the
node.
Select the next node to be studied, repeating steps 1 to 9.
Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until all the guide-words have been applied and discussed and
the team is satisfied that all meaningful deviations have been considered. The team then
goes back to Step 1 and repeats the process for the next section or node. Figure 3illustrates
the normal workflow of a HAZOP study.
When a recommendation was proposed, the risk was ranked based on consequences and
frequency, using the COMPANY Risk Ranking Matrix.
2.6.4
Performed activities
In order to be able to perform the given analysis, the following activities have taken place:
1. Training in RBI methodology and presentation of qualitative methods during the
Training RBI from October 30 to November 3 2006
2. First Certification RBI on November 27, 2006
page 67
3. Complete implementation of the qualitative assessment tool in a form of Web-based

software tool (see Figure 8)
a) Integration of the software tool in the project web site (Figure 29)
http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com
4. Export facility in the software in order to allow offline completion of the questionnaire
(example of offline questionnaire is given in Error! Reference source not found.)
5. Basic demonstration of the methodology and training in Stuttgart, December 2007,
O. Tot, D. Subotin
6. Data collection and assessment performed by NIS RGE team, extended with the
representatives of NIS, RNP and RNS in two sessions:
a.
October 2008
b.
December 2008
Figure 29: Project web site Tools and analysis

List of inputs
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
2.6.5
Input PFD diagrams from RGE

Description of the process and systems as discussed during the Workshop
Dec. 2007
Detailed process analysis December 2008
Detailed data collection for the selected equipment types October and
December 2008
Answers to the NIS BRD questionnaire June 2007 March 2008
Management system evaluation, last performed in June 2008
Overview of inspection results for the given equipment December 2008
Unit and process description
General description of Elemir Gas refinery is given in Chapter 2.1.5.

Here are repeated and grouped main data.
Purpose of the unit/plant natural gas refining separation of the higher fractions of the
carbon hydrates from the lighter ones.
Feed: natural gas
page 68
Outputs: refined gas, Propane 45 t/day, n-Butane 34 t/day, iso-Butane 38 t/day,

Debutanised gasoline 60 t/day, process oil 5 t/day and Gasoline Gt 4,2 t/day
Year of construction: 1963
Re-engineered and re-constructed for operations up to -23C in 1969.
Design life time- not given in the project documentation, most of the equipment has been
designed according to the ASME Section VIII, edition valid at the time of construction. This is
equivalent to approx. ASME Section VIII, Division 1 according to the current standard
edition. Re-qualification of the equipment to the latest code of construction (ASME) has not
been performed. Analysis of the design and qualification to the current regulation of pressure
vessels in Serbia has been performed on several occasions, mostly by the local Universities.
Elevation above see level: 80 m
Seismic zone: 7 (Mercalli), zone 3 according to API 581 classification.
Typical wind direction: NE-SW
Maximum soil load: 16 N/m2
Expected soil deformation: 6-10cm for 1,85 m depth of foundations
Underground water level: 4m below
Depth of soil freezing: 60 cm
Temperature range: 36 in summer to -30C in winter, corresponding to the -30 to -5 class
in API 581
Wind loads (to be considered in strength calculations for equipment):
structures lower than 10 m: 687 N/m2
structures from 10-30 m: 803 N/m2
structures from 30-60m: 1003 N/m2
structures higher than 60m: 1177 N/m2
Snow weight: 740N/m2

Maximal rainfall in 24 hours: 120mm
Temperature zone: Temperate (rainfall between 500-1000 l/(m2 year)
Process stability: from 0-1 unplanned shutdowns per year, from 0-1 planned shutdowns
per year. Process is very stable
Detection systems: Process instrumentation i.e. high level of liquid propane detector,
regulation and automation system for operating parameter maintenance, security
system AMOT for automatic shutdown of compressors, high concentration of
hydrocarbon detectors, 24 hour human supervision of the process parameters with
hand logging and hourly walk-around, local detectors, visual detection.
Insulation systems: Most of the insulation systems are manually activated, on the spot.
The only exception is the AMOT system for automatic shutdown of the compressors, AMOT,
that can automatically shut down the compressor in cases of high number of rotation, high
level registered in D-1, increased vibrations, low pressure of the fluid (oil), high temperature
of cooling water.
Fire-fighting equipment: Portable fire-fighting equipment S-9, S-250,CO2-10,CO2-30,
water cannons with foam
Temporary repairs and signs of deterioration: some signs of deterioration are present,
however, they are logical consequence of the overall equipment age. Temporary repairs and
repairs with inappropriate materials have been made during the 1990s, mainly due to the
fact that it was not possible to obtain better equipment
Modification of the original design:
Re-design of the input part of the system T1, T101....
Change of the working fluid instead of the proprietary oil, refining-generated oil is
used
History of incidents:
page 69
Propane leakage on the compressor, and auto-ignition of the fluid. Apart from
material damage, there was no other damage to the people or environment mainly
due to an early detection of the incident and fast fire extinguishing
Leakage of propane, butane and gasoline from the underground lines due to the
corrosion of the underground lines. Consequences propane and butane was easily
spotted, and quickly fixed. Gasoline leakage was discovered at a relatively late stage,
due to the fact that it did not evaporate. Soil remediation has been done by pumping
up the gasoline from the soil, the whole operation lasted 2,5 months
Problems at the furnace firing the firing process is manual and can in some cases
lead to the explosive concentrations inside the furnace and consequent injury of the
person performing firing. So far no serious injuries have happened.
Safety and relief valves: the process is inherently clean, there is a potential for some
corrosion mainly from the outside. No significant fouling of the RV has been registered,
however, in the general process of control, some of the valves have been found not to be
functioning.
Fluid information:
Present fluid in the system are:
Natural and refined gas - 3,8-17,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition
temperature 640-645C, gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in
higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12,
information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39
Approx. fluid composition: methane ~ 93%, ethane ~ 2,50%, propane ~ 0,30%,
butane ~0,03%, other carbon and nitrogen maximum 3,50%,mostly containing
fractions C1-C4, daily throughput of 1200000 m3 per day (or 500t)
Propane - 2,1-9,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 465C,

gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might
cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks
S9,S16,S36/37/39
Present quantities on site:
Process 12m3 as liquid, 8m3 as gas
Storage: maximal 926 m3(as liquid) and 232 m3(as gas)
Butane - 1,5-8,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 365C, gas
with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause
suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks
S9,S16,S36/37/39
o
Debutanized gasoline - 1,3-7,6% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition

temperature 257C, liquid with no color, flammable and polluting for soil and water.
Danger mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks
S36/39,S45,S61,S62
o
Storage: maximal 36 m3(as liquid)
Methyl-alcohol 7,3-36% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature

455C, liquid with no color, flammable and poisonous. Danger mark T,F, Risk marks
R11 R11,R23/24,25, information marks S-2,7,16,24
o
Heavy gasoline - 1,3-8,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature

205-220C, liquid with no color, flammable and polluting for soil and water. Danger
mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks
S36/39,S45,S61,S62
o
Process: 50l (as liquid)
Water and steam
page 70
The overall view of RGE is shown on Figure 20.

Figure in Annex 13 shows the overall PFD diagram for RGE, whereas Error! Reference
source not found. show the same diagram in more readable form.
2.6.6
Results of analysis
2.6.6.1 HAZOP Analysis Results

During the first HAZOP Session, several technical issues have been discussed, one of those
being analyzed with the HAZOP methodology (Figure 33 and shows loop analyzed and
The results are available on-line using the link:
http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com
in the member-area section of the project web site.
2.6.6.2 Technical discussions
Technical problem 1
On the top of column T-5 sometimes a valve has to be opened. In some cases the gas
(Decane) ignites and a flame appears on the top of the valve. In this case the valve will be
closed again.
Discussion: The temperature of the gas is 260 0C. There are two possible ignition sources.
The first possibility is electrostatic ignition. The second possibility is an ignition by hot
surfaces. More probable is the ignition by a hot surface. The gas will heat up the surface of
the gas. Autoignition temperature of Decane is about 210 0C. By turbulence at the end of the
valve an explosive air/Decane mixture will be formed which ignites at the hot surface and
lead to the flame.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possibility to mitigate
the formation of an explosive air/Decane mixture is to use a three way valve instead of the
existing one. The third line will be connected to a steam line. Both lines have to be opened
instead of only the Decane line. This will have two effects. The surface will be cooled down
under the autoignition temperature and the explosive atmosphere will be inerted. Therefore
an ignition on the surface will not took place.
Technical problem 2
In combination with a pressure drop it may be that there is no liquid phase of Decane at the
bottom of T4 (distillation unit). This will lead to a gas flow to the connected pumps instead of
a liquid flow. The gas will be ignited in the pumps. Same problem will arise if no cooling is
available for the pumps (will be cooled by water and cold oil). Normally two pumps are in
operation and one is stand by. A flow indicator for Decane is responsible for the flow of the
cooling liquids to the pumps.
Discussion: The reason for the ignition is the hot surface of the pumps where an air/Decane
mixture will be ignited.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possible solution is as
first a temperature measurement at the pumps. In the line between distillation T4 and pump
a valve can be integrated. This has to be opened if the flow indicator for Decane and the
temperature indicator at the pump indicate that there is no flow of liquid Decane. The open
line can be connected to the flare. The valve can be closed again if the flow indicator gives a
signal for liquid Decane flow.
Technical problem 3
Once per year the gas pipelines outside the establishment will be cleaned. Different kind of
liquids and dusts has been accumulated over the period of one year. The Naftagas plant is
responsible for the collecting of these wastes. The waste is delivered by a pressure wave
through the incoming line for gas and is collected in the separator D-300. The technical
problem is twofold. In the loop1 discussed during the Hazop analysis a pressure surges occur
(e.g. water hammer, cavitational hammer). These pressure surges can lead to damages of
plant's equipment (valves, pumps, pipe bends) up to leakage of the pipe system. After the
cleaning the gaseous line will be opened again. Again pressure surges occur and parts of the
equipment can be obstructed completely or partly by remaining particles. This is actual the
case for the heat exchanger E-110.
page 71
Figure 30: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 1 of 3
page 72
page 73
Table 38: HAZOP analysis for Loop 1

Parameter
Guide
Word
Cause
Consequence Description
Safe Guards
Safe Guard
Independent
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Flow
Less
Less Gas Supply
No safety problem, shut down or

continuation depending on flow
Two Safety valves

on D-300
FALSE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Flow
No
No Supply Cleaning gas

line
No safety problem
Two Safety valves

on D- 300
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Pressure
Lower
Less Supply
No safety problem, shut down or

continuation depending on flow
Two Safety valves

on D-300
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Composition
Higher
Supply changes, More

C1-C2 Gas
Valve (LCV 301) to F301 will be partly or

completely closed
Two Safety valves

on D- 300
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Composition
Less
Supply changes, Less

C1-C2 Gas
PV 401 is an overflow valve and will mitigate

increase of level. Storage tank D-27A.
Two Safety valves

on D- 300
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Pressure
Higher
Filter in F-301 dirty. .
Filter has to be cleaned. Indication: Pressure

increase continuously
Two Safety valves

on D- 300
TRUE
ID
Node
page 74
Figure 33: HAZOP Loop 1
page 75
Discussion: There was only a general discussion on the hammer effect on the lines where the
liquid phase is in. A more detailed discussion was about the pressure wave which took place
when the gaseous line will be reopened. As the heat exchanger is not really working at the
moment based on pollution with dust particles the questions raised up what can happen
furthermore in other parts of the plant.
It has been proposed not to concentrate on the possible damages and instead to concentrate
of a mitigation of the pressure wave. At the moment a valve in a 12 inch line with a 3 inch
pipepass will be opened, It has been proposed to include another valve in a 6 inch line with a
2 inch bypass to reduce the pressure wave.
The following proposals have not been discussed in this meeting.
The typical scenarios for the origin of pressure surges are fast closing valves triggered by the
breakdown of auxiliary power and fast acting control devices. The fast deceleration of the
liquid results in high pressure surges upstream the valve, because kinetic energy is
transformed into potential energy. This effect is called water hammer that is explained by the
following example. In a horizontally installed 500 m long pipeline of the size DN 200 which
transports water with a velocity of 3 m/s at ambient temperature, the pressure increases by
a fast closing valve from a stationary pressure of 6 bar up to 40 bar. Hereby the forces
induced to pipe supports exceed the design criteria from 1-5 kN to 125 kN. Due to liquid
inertia, the transported liquid continues to flow downstream the valve with the initial speed,
the pressure decreases and a large expanding vapour bubble is formed directly downstream
the valve. The pressure falls up to saturation pressure of the liquid and is thus lower than the
pressure in the system. Thereby the liquid stream is decelerated and finally accelerated
towards the closed valve (back flow). As a result of fast re-condensation of the vapour
bubble, the liquid flows against the closed valve and is stopped rapidly. The resulting
pressure surge is referred to as cavitational hammer. The amplitude of the first cavitational
hammer downstream the valve is nearly as high as the amplitude of the first water hammer
upstream the valve.
Well-known methods for the prevention of water hammer in pipeline systems are e.g. the
application of air vessels, surge shafts, bladder accumulators, as well as the prolongation of
closing and opening times of valves. The latter is the easiest and the most favourable
method. Due to technical and legal requirements for pipeline operation within the chemical
industries and power plants it is not always possible to decelerate the closing process
undefined.
Air vessels, surge shafts or bladder accumulators are used if the pipeline system is not
designed on the same level. These applications are installed upstream the closing valve in its
immediate proximity. When shutting off the medium flows in to the loft and is braked by
this.
Another possibility is the expansion of valve gears with facilities which decelerate the closure
as soon as the last third of the flow cross section is nearly reached. These can be dampers
(often used with swing check valves) or programmable positioners..
Technical problem 4
There is a leakage in the product lines C3 and C4 to the tanks. As the lines are underground
the leakage and the size of the leakage can not be detected. There is no leak detection
system installed.
Discussion: Leakage is visible by bubbles on the ground if it is raining and by parts of non
growing grass.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. As the amount of gas is
unknown there is the hazard of an explosion. The only possible solution is to repair or to
exchange the lines or to build new lines on the ground and to close the old ones.
Technical problem 5
There is a compressor in use where gaseous Propane will be compressed from 1.7 to 13-15
bars. There are two problems. The first problem is in the case of a leakage in the compressor
(Jet fire, explosion). Hot surfaces near by have a temperature of 500 0C. The volume of the
compressor is about 0.5 cbm. The second problem may occur if liquid propane flows into the
page 76
compressor. This will normally be mitigated by a measurement of gaseous and liquid phase
in the separator before. If this is not working an explosion is possible.
Discussion: This has not been discussed during the meeting.
Technical solution: There will be possibilities by using quick closing valves. This will mitigate
the flow of liquid Propane to the compressor. Further technical specification possible but not
done.
2.6.6.3 Management Systems Evaluation
According to the API 581, Management system evaluation (self-assessment) has been
performed. After this, an audit of the results has been performed in order to revise the
scores achieved.
The results are given in the table below and shown on Figure 34.
Table 39 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments
Id
1.
Section Title
Leadership and
Administration
Maximal
Points
Actual
Score
Audit
results
Audit comments
70
43
40
The self assessment evaluation is

confirmed
2.
Process Safety
Information
80
72
65

confirmed, however, it seems
that not everyone has instant
access to needed safety
information needed (ie MSDS)
3.
Process Hazard
Analysis
100
49
45

confirmed
40
Version control of the documents

and agreed procedure of the
where the latest version of the
i.e. PFD seems not to be known
to everyone
4.
Management of
Change
80
58
5.
Operating Procedures
80
57
50
Operating procedures are not

visibly enough available to
everyone. However, due to the
size of the team, this is
compensated in quick direct
consultations. Problems only in
cases when one of the
responsible is not reachable (i.e.
illness, holidays etc.)
6.
Safe Work Practices
85
72
70

confirmed
75
In the last couple of years a lot

has been done to improve the
knowledge, however the lack of
training in the previous periods
has left some traces.
90
The team is capable of

maintaining the integrity of the
equipment as it is. However, reengineering or process
improvement initiatives are not
always considered as possible
solutions
7.
8.
Training
Mechanical Integrity
100
120
82
111
page 77
Id
9.
10.
11.
Section Title
Pre-Startup Safety
Review
Emergency Response
Maximal
Points
60
Actual
Score
58
65
51
Audit
results
45
Due to the danger of the current

startup procedure, more has to
be done to make sure that the
startup is not considered as
routine task
40
Not all elements needed for

safety report and emergency
response are available on
demand
The incident investigation
practice is normally performed,
however, the damage
mechanisms are often not
investigated, instead of root
causes often only symptomatic
reactions.
Incident Investigation
75
65
40
Contractors
45
42
25
Contractors are usually good

managed, however, there are QA
problems in the procurement
process for the small
equipment (i.e. valves, safety
valves, etc.)
Assessments
40
20
20

confirmed
12.
13.
Audit comments
Total
1000
780
645
The RGE has obtained the above

average score even after the
auditing process. The overall
impression is that the overall
team of process, maintenance
engineers and management is
functioning very well
Figure 34: Results of management system evaluation for RGE
page 78
2.6.6.4 API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based) analysis results

The evaluation according to the API 581 qualitative method has been performed, and the
overall risk of the RGE has been determined to be MEDIUM (or C3). This has several
reasons:
1.
Size of the refinery it is rather small compared with other refineries or other units
that are supposed to be benchmarked by the same methodology
2.
The process is fairly simple and stable
3.
On the other hand, the process fluids (natural gas, propane, butane, gasoline) are
both explosive and flammable, therefore giving the C consequence class
4. The age of the equipment and the history of damage mechanisms result in the
likelihood ranking of 3.
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
D
RGE-1 Procesno
postrojenje
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 35: Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative unit analysis matrix
2.6.6.5 API 581 qualitative analysis (component based)
According to API 581, edition 1998, the qualitative analysis has been performed for 99
components, without connecting piping and rotating machinery. The work for this equipment
is still in progress.
Risk matrix for qualitative analysis is shown on Figure 36. The risk assessment results are
shown in Annex 24.
According to the ranking in the risk matrix, the inspection plan can be constructed, for next
two years. According to the risk assessment, the equipment having high and medium high
risk should be inspected at least once a year. Furthermore, for items with high risk, it is
recommended to increase the inspection efficiency from class D (spot testing) to class C, in
order to have better risk control.
For the equipment that has annual maintenance tasks (heat exchangers cleaning, filters,
condensers), the same inspection interval has been maintained (i.e. each year), although
according to the risk ranking this interval might be increased. This is in line of maximization
of the effort invested, i.e. to use the opportunity to inspect the equipment when normal
maintenance tasks are done.
page 79
The corresponding inspection plan (Annex 25) results in increase of inspection on equipment
identified as critical (6 pieces of equipment), while decreasing the number of equipment to
be inspected each year (i.e. in 2009 from 99 to 51).
0 - 0%
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
D
D-101
D-102
C1A/B (potis) C1A/B

D-1 T-3 T-4 T-6 T- T-1 T-101 T-2
(usis) C2A/B (potis)
8
T-5 T-7
C2A/B (usis)
D-27B D-27C D-27E D-103 D-104 D-11

E-10 E-102 E-103 D-111 D-112 D-12
E-104 E-11 E-110 D-120 D-121 DE-101/A E-101/B
E-113 E-116 E-12 122 D-16 D-2 DE-1A/B E-20A FTE-120 E-13 E-14 E- 27A D-27D D-27F
103A FT-103B FT15 E-16 E-17 E-18 D-28A D-28B D104 FT-302 HP-1
E-19 E-2 E-20B E- 28C D-28D D-28E
HP-2 JI-1 JI-2 PF21 E-22 E-23 ED-28F D-28G D1 PF-2 SP-1
24/A E-24/B E-25 E- 29A D-29B D-29C
3 E-4 E-5 E-6A/B E- D-4 D-5 D-6 D-7
7 E-8 E-9
D-8 D-9 FT-301
D-300 T-9
2 - 2%
14 - 14%
83 - 84%
0 - 0%
0 - 0%
15 - 15%
40 - 40%
36 - 36%
8 - 8%
99
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 36: API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component level, for year 2009
page 80
2.6.6.6 RBI Detailed quantitative analysis
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
D
0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 ED-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T110 T-5
9
E-1A/B E-2 T-4
T-6 T-8
18 - 72%
D-27A T-1
2 - 8%
D-300
T-101 T-2
D-102 T-3
5 - 20%
0 - 0%
0 - 0%
5 - 20%
14 - 56%
6 - 24%
0 - 0%
25
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 37 Preliminary results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based

applied on selected RGE equipment
2.6.7
Conclusions and recommendations
Presented results so far have DRAFT status; further refinement is planned for the level of
detailed analysis in order to obtain results that are acceptable for plant personnel.
The proper identification of damage mechanisms and inclusion of rotating equipment and
piping is planned for the next cycle of data update.
The preliminary analysis of potential savings in inspection costs is given in Figure 38. The
overview of financial risk for the whole unit is given in Figure 39.
THIS Chapter will be elaborated in the next version.
page 81
Comparisonofcostsperinspection
strategy
6,000,000Din.
CostsRSD
5,000,000Din.
4,000,000Din.
3,000,000Din.
Currentpractice
2,000,000Din.
1,000,000Din.
RBIoptimized
0Din.
2009
2010
2011
Inspectionyear
Figure 38: Comparison of different inspection strategies
3,500,000
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
T7
D2
T9
T4
D4
T8
D7
D6
T6
T5
D1
T1
E1A/B
E101/B
E2
D5
E101/A
E110
E102
T3
D27A
D27B
D27C
D27D
D27E
D27F
D28A
D28B
D28C
D28D
D28E
D28F
D29A
D29B
D29C
T2
D102
T101
HP1
HP2
JI1
JI2
SP1
D300
C1A/B(potis)
C1A/B(usis)
C2A/B(potis)
C2A/B(usis)
Figure 39: Financial Risk Prioritization
page 82
2.7 HSE (Seveso) report for Refinery Pancevo, Unit FCC

2.7.1
Introduction
2.7.1.1 General
Law on changes of the Law on Environmental Protection adopted by the Assembly of the
Republic of Serbia May 2009 contains some of the requirements of Seveso II Directive
(96/82/EC). Between other, Seveso plant is defined as a facility in which activities are carried
out and in which one or more dangerous substances are present in quantities equal or
greater than prescribed. Further obligations of Seveso plants operators are defined, who
must submit information, or to develop a policy to prevent accidents and report safety and
accident protection plan.
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning of Republic of Serbia has identified facilities
that are subjected to Seveso II Directive and published a preliminary list (14 May 2009).
Refinery Pancevo has been preliminary identified as upper-tier "Seveso" plant.
Corresponding sub-lows which will allow full implementation of the Directive are currently in
preparation. Full implementation of this regulation will provide prevention, preparedness and
rapid response to a chemical accident.
This chapter of Detailed Technical report presents Safety report for a part of Pancevo
refinery, FCC complex (Fluidized Catalytic Cracking) following the requirements of the
Directive and on the base of Safety report for Pancevo Refinery done within the Package A.
Some of general data needed for the report are contained in Volume I of the Detailed
Technical report.
For easier understanding and reading, Cross-reference table is prepared (Table 1) showing
relation between part of reports and requirements from Article 9 of the report.
2.7.1.2 Implementation of Seveso requirements
Table 40 shows relation between requirements of Seveso II directive and individual parts of
Detailed Technical report.
Table 40: Implementation of Seveso II requirements
Minimum data and information to be included in
the safety report referred to in Article 9
Information about management system and organization

of the establishment in relation to the prevention of
major accidents, this information must consider the
items listed in Annex III
II
Surrounding of the establishment
Description of site and its surrounding, including the

geographical location, meteorological, geological,
hydrographic conditions and, where appropriate, its
history.
Identification of installations and other activities of the

establishment which could present a risk of a major
accident.
Description of areas that may experience a major

accident.
III
Description of the establishment
Description of main activities and products of major

parts of the plant in terms of safety, sources of major
accident hazards and the conditions under which such a
major accident could occur including a description of
proposed preventive measures.
Description of processes, in particular the operating

methods.
Description of hazardous substances:
page 83
Corresponding
paragraph of the
Safety report
1.
2.
3.
the inventory of dangerous substances,

including: - identification of hazardous
substances (chemical name, CAS number, name
according to IUPAC nomenclature), the
maximum quantity of dangerous substances
present or possible;
physical, chemical, toxicological characteristics
and indication of hazards, both immediate and
delayed for man or the environment;
the physical or chemical in normal use or under
foreseeable accidental conditions.
This Safety Report is updating the Safety report prepared in May 2008. It therefore
incorporates the organizational changes and technological changes occurring in plant and
refinery from that date.
2.7.2
Information on site, plant and unit

Name and Address of Operator:
Fluid Catalytic Cracking complex (FCC) is a part of Refinery Pancevo and further of NIS
Petroleum Industry of Serbia which is owned by Government of Republic Serbia (41%) and
JSC Gazprom Neft (51%),
The address of the headquarter and refinery itself is:
NIS Petrol Pancevo Refinery
Spoljnostarcevacka 199
26000 Pancevo
Name and Location of Activities
Data about location and activities of the Refinery are given in Chaper 2.1.5Volume I of
Detailed Technical Report.
Basic design of the plant
License and engineering: TEXACO Development Corporation
Detailed engineering:
Foster Wheeler
Responsible for preparation of the Safety Report

This report is prepared by Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies,
Haus der Wirtschaft, Willi-Bleicher-Strae 19,
70174 Stuttgart, Germany
2.7.2.2 Location of Establishment
Geographical map of Pancevo Municipality and location of Pancevo Refinery are given in
Annex 1 and Annex 2.
The FCC complex covers 41860 m2 in Block 6 of Refinery Pancevo (see A.14.1 and A.14.2).
Position of FCC is shown on Figure 40.
Complex is located between other blocks of refinery, 3 of them are with production units:
North - Block 5 with units for oil production built in the first phase of Refinery
construction,
South - Block 21 with Sulfolan unit,
Est - Block 9 with power production units.
Block 3 is located on the West side of FCC complex with following buildings: control room for
FCC complex, buildings of fire protection brigade and investment and development unit.
Monastery Volovica with a church is also located west of the Block 6.
Access to the FCC complex (Figure 41) is possible by internal roads - from the East, Street
No. 3, from the West Street No. 2, from North Avenue C and from the South Avenue D.
page 84
Figure 40: Position of FCC in Pancevo Refinery
Figure 41: Access to the FCC complex
page 85
Some accidents took place in the past. 1986 there was a fire in a pressure vessel and a
separator of fuel gas. In 1989 an accident caused by abrasion occurred. The result has been
a small steam leak in a reactor. In 2003 a slide valve was closed caused by a cut cable. The
pressure inside the regenerator increased and cyclones were damaged.
2.7.2.3 Policy the company is pursuing
RNP has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO 9001:2000
standard, for all RNP's operations. Details are given in chapter 2.1.4..
List of RNP QMS and EMS documentation is given in Annex 15.
2.7.2.4 Safety management system
Safety Management System is a part of RNP quality and environment management system
including some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to
identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation
and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for HSE issues is
Risk Management division.
2.7.2.5 Hazardous materials
FCC ensures deep conversion of vacuum gas oils into gases, gasoline components, diesel
components and fuel oil. Catalytic cracking process breaks or cracks long chain hydrocarbons
into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to increase gasoline and
diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30% distillate and 30%
butanes and lighter.
Accordingly, hazardous materials in RNP FCC are:
Propane
Butane
Gasoline
light cracked gas oil
H2S and
for internal use fuel gas.
The complete list of hazardous materials is given inError! Reference source not found..
2.7.2.6 Meteorological data
Chapter 2.1.3.2 of this report contains data related to
Meteorology
Hydrology
Geology
Seismology.
2.7.2.7 External activities

Industrial activities external to the establishment of Refinery Pancevo are described in
Volume I of Detailed Technical Report.
FCC complex is located in Block VI of Refinery Pancevo and it includes following units:
2.7.3
S-2300:
S-2500:
S-2550:
S-2600:
S-2750:
S-2850:
S-2900:
S-2450:
Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit (hereafter FCC)

Gas concentration unit
Merox unit LPG extraction
Alkylation
Merox, Light naphtha sweetening Unit
Merox, Heavy naphtha sweetening
Sour water stripper
Sulphur recovery unit (Klaus)
Detail description
2.7.3.1 FCC unit S-2300

General about process
Catalytic cracking is a key process used to increase the quality and quantity of gasoline
fractions. The most commonly used process is the fluid bed type, which uses a finely
page 86
powdered zeolite catalyst that is kept in suspension in the reactor by the incoming oil feed
from the bottom of the reactor. Upon contact with the hot catalyst, the oil vaporizes and is
cracked into smaller molecules. Vapors from the reactor are separated from the entrained
catalyst and fed into a fractionator, where the desired products are removed and heavier
fractions are returned to the reactor. The catalyst is deactivated by thermal degradation and
through contact with heavy metals in the feed, necessitating regeneration or replacement.
FCC is used in processing of vacuum heavy gas oil which is pumped into the pipe reactor
RISER where the actual reaction of cracking is taking place. Unit area is 90 x 100=9000
m2, construction is open and mainly made of concrete. It incorporates also a concrete
chimney with 150m in height and 13m diameter base. This process breaks or cracks long
chain hydrocarbons into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to
increase gasoline and diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30%
distillate and 30% butanes and lighter. If you do the math you will see that the volume of
products is greater than the volume of the feed.
Capacity of the unit
FCC unit is designed to manufacture 3000t/dan (1.000.000t/year) of heavy vacuum gas oil
that is derived from crude oil Kirkuk. The Pancevo Refinery is mostly processing crude oil of
"REB" and "Kikinda" and processing capacity depends on the availability of supplies and the
market requirements for final products. Flow chart is shown in Figure 42.
Description
Process flow Diagrams Flow through the Unit is shown schematically on the following Process
flow Diagrams:
Drawing No.
Title
2231-0-50-2331
Reactor - Regenerator Section
2231-0-50-2332
Catalyst Storage &Air Surge Drum Section
2231-0-50-2333
Feed Preheat and Main fractionator
2231-0-50-2334
Main fractionator Strippers and Overhead

System
2231 -0-50-2531
Compression Section
2231-0-50-2532
Absorption/Deethaniser Section
2231-0-50-2533
Debutanizer Section
2231-0-50-2534
Naphtha Splitter Section
2231-0-50-2535
H2S Scrubber Section
2231-0-50-2536
Depropanizer Section
2231-0-50-2537
C3 Drier Section
2231-0-50-2538
Propylene Splitter Section
Flow charts are given in 0.

The unit is designed for two regimes:
Winter - maximum production of diesel

Summer - maximum production of gasoline.
Feed for the unit is heavy vacuum gas oil from the unit S-2200, Vacuum distillation. Block
diagram of Pancevo refinery is given in
page 87
Figure 42: Flow chart of FCC

Reactor / Regenerator section
Fresh feed to the Unit is normally supplied as hot vacuum gas oil from the Vacuum
Distillation Unit. Unit 2200. Cold gas oil from storage can also be used to supplement the hot
feed or as the major source of fresh feed. up to 60% of design throughput. if desired. Excess
hot feed is cooled in the VGO Cooler. EC-2307, and returned to storage. Both feeds are fed
independently into the Feed Surge Drum, FA-2303.
Fresh feed is pumped from the feed Surge Drum by the Fresh Feed Pumps, GA- 302/S, under
flow control through the feed preheat train to the Feed Heater,BA-230l. The preheat train
consists of the Feed/LCGO Product Exchangers, EA-230l A/B, the Feed/ICGO Reflux
Exchangers, EA-2302 A/B, and th~ Feed/Fractionator Bottoms Exchangers)EA-2303 A/B. The
feed is then heated in the Feed Heater and routed to the FF Riser. Provision is made for the
Feed Heater to be bypassed. The additional capability of routing fresh feed to the RF Riser is
provided.
As eparate riser is provided for cracking recycle feed. Recycle feed is pumped to the RF Riser
from the ICGO Stripper, DA-2302,by the lCGO Recycle Pump,GA-2306/S.
Fresh feed and recycle feed enter the Reactor-Stripper, DC-2301, at the base of the FF Riser
and RF Riser respectively, where each feed is vaporized and raised to the reactor
temperature by mixing with hot regenerated catalyst returned from the Regenerator, OC2302. Each feed begins to crack immediately on contacting the hot catalyst. The cracking
reaction takes place in the Risers of the Reactor after which most of the catalyst is separated
from the Reactor vapours and falls down to the Reactor stripping section.
The catalyst fines still entrained with the Reactor vapours are disengaged in two two-stage
Reactor Cyclones, FC-230l A/D. Catalyst separated in the Cyclones is returned to the Reactor
bed section by the Cyclone diplegs. The Reactor vapour product passes to the Main
Fractionator, DA-2301, where it is fractionated.
During the cracking reaction carbon is deposited on the surface of the catalyst in the form of
coke. After passing through the Reactor stripping section where stripping steam removes
entrained hydrocarbon vapours, spent catalyst passes from the Reactor through a slide
va1ve to the lower section of the Regenerator, DC-2302, for coke removal.
Coke is removed from the catalyst by combustion to carbon dioxide in the Regenerator using
air supplied by the Air Blower, GB-230l. Mixing of the spent catalyst with hot regenerated
catalyst supplies the heat to start burning." The burning of the catalyst occurs in two stages.
The "primary combustion" stage produces CO and CO2 and releases heat which almost
page 88
instantaneously raises the burning temperature. The "secondary combustion" stage occurs
simultaneously as the CO burns with oxygen to form C02. Combustion of the coke to carbon
dioxide is almost complete at the temperature in the Regenerator. Duri ng start-up the Ai r
Preheater, BC-2301, is used to heat up the Regenerator.
The Air Blower is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being condensed by the
Surface Condenser, EC-2510. Condensate from the condenser is collected in the Condensate
Drum, FA-2520,and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the Turbine Condensate
Pump,GA-2520/S,via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2520. The Inter/After Condenser
condenses the'vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation equipment. Any condensate
formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is vaporised in the Reevaporatbr, EA-2522.
Hot gases produced by the combustion of coke leave the dense phase of the Regenerator
and enter the dilute phase where entrained catalyst is removed in three twostage
Regenerator Cyclones, FC-2302 A/F and returned to the Regenerator catalyst dense phase
via the cyclone diplegs. The hot regenerated catalyst leaves the Regenerator via the Fresh
Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe and the Recycle Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe
and passes through the slide valves to the FF and RF Risers.
The hot gases leaving the Regenerator Cyclones pass through the Flue Gas Pressure Control
Valve, PA-2305, the Ori fi ce Chamber, PA-2307,and the Fl ue Gas Diverter Valve, PA2306,to the CO Boiler, BF-2301,before exhausting to atmosphere via the Stack. CA-230l.
The CO Boiler produces HP steam (44.1 bar g) by recovering sensible heat, and the heat of
combustion of CO when operating with non promoted catalyst, from the Regenerator flue
gas. The CO Boiler is supplementary fired with fuel oil or fuel gas to provide sufficient steam
to meed the demand of the FCC complex. Boi1er feed water enters the CO Boiler under flow
control and passes through a preheater and economiser to improve the overall efficiency of
steam generation. The steam and water mixture produced in the convection bank is
separated in the steam drum and the steam is then passed through a two-stage superheater.
The steam temperature is controlled by taking a slip stream of steam from the fi rst stage of
the superheater and passing it through an attemperator. The attemperator and preheater are
located inside the steam drum.
Fresh catalyst is fed to the Regenerator from the Fresh Catalyst Hopper, FE-230Z, using the
Continuous Catalyst Addition Device, GB-2302. Equilibrium catalyst for start-up is stored in
the Equilibrium Catalyst Hopper, FE-2301.
Main Fractionator Section
Superheated Reactor vapours from the Reactor, OC-230l, enter the bottom section of the
Main Fractionator, DA-230l. The Reactor vapours are desuperheated by contact with a large
circulating stream of cooled fractionator bottoms over six disc and donut trays. The
fractionator bottoms is circulated by the Fractionator Bottoms Pump, GA-2303/S, and cooled
in the following four parallel heat exchanger circuits:
A. The Feed/Fractionator Bottoms Exchangers,EA-2303 A/B
B. The LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304.
C. The Debutaniser Reboiler, EA-2505, in the Gas Concentration Unit.
D. The Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B.
Controlling the rate and return temperature of this coolant affects the rate of reflux required
higher in the tower. The down flowing coolant for desuperheating the vapour feed also
serves as a scrubbing medium which collects catalyst entrained in the vapours. Catalyst
concentration is reduced to a satisfactory amount by withdrawal of a fractionator bottoms
product at the appropriate rate.
The fractionator bottoms product is drawn off downstream of the Fractionator Bottoms
Steam Generators and cooled in the Fractionator Bottoms Product Cooler, EC-230l, before
being pumped to tankage by the Fractionator Bottoms Product Pump, GA-2304/S. Facilities
exist for the return of fractionator bottoms to the RF Riser should this operation be dictated
by mechanical problems or special product requirements.
lntermedi ate Cycle Gas Oi 1, 1CGO, is withdrawn from a total draw-off tray in the Main
Fractionator. Part is circulated by the lCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S,under flow control, and
page 89
is cooled in the following four parallel heat exchanger ci rcuits before returning to the
colurnn:
A. Feed/ICGO Refl ux Exchangers, EA-2302 A/B.
B. Deethaniser Reboiler,EA-2502,in the Gas Concentration Unit.
C. Naphtha Splitter Reboiler,EA-2507,in the Gas Concentration Unit.
D. 1CGO Reflux Steam Generator,EA-2307.
The main part of this ICGO Reflux Stream is returned to the Fractionator above the draw off
tray. The remainder is returned to the bubble cap trays below the draw off pan in order to
scrub out any entrained catalyst remaining in the vapour from the baffled section, and also
to provide additional cooling of the vapour.
The balance of the ICGO from the total draw off tray passes to the ICGO Stripper, DA-2302.
The ICGO Stripper is reboiled by circulating ICGO Recycle through the ICGO Recycle Reboiler
Pump, GA-2j07/S, to the ICGO Recycle Stripper Reboiler, BA-2302, under flow control. The fi
red heated serves the dual purpose of stripping and preheating the Recycle Feed. Recycle
feed is pumped from the ICGO Stripper by the ICGO Recycle Pump, GA-2306/S, under flow
control to the RF Riser. The ICGO stripper vapour is returned to the Main Fractionator.
Light Cycle Gas Oil, LCGO, is removed from a partial draw off tray in the Main Fractionator.
Part is circulated by the LCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2308/S, under flow control and is cooled
initially by preheating boiler feed water in the LCGO/BFW Exchanger, EA-230S, and
preheating the Debutani ser Feed in the Debutaniser Feed Preheater, EA-2S03. These
combined streams are then cooled by passing some of the LCGO Reflux through the Lean
Sponge Oil Cooler. EC-2305, before returninq to the Main Fractionator. Some of the LCGO
Reflux from the outlet of the Lean Sponge Oil Cooler is pumped by the Lean Sponge Oil
Pump, GA-2309/S, to the Sponge Oil Absorber, DA-2501, in the Gas Concentration Unit
before returning to the Main Fractionator, and some ;s passed to the Gland and Flushing Oil
Surge Drum, FA-2307, to be used as gland and flushing oil.
The remaining LCGO from the Main Fractionator passes to the LCGO Stripper, DA-2303t
where light ends are stripped from the light cycle gas oil with heat supplied by fractionator
bottoms in the LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304. The stripped vapours are returned to the
Main Fractionator. The LCGO product is pumped by the LCGO Product Pum~ GA-2310/S,
through the Feed/LCGO Product Exchangers, EA-2301 A/~ to the LCGO Hydrotreating Unit
(Unit 2400) or to storage via the LCGO Product Cooler, EC-2303.
A naphtha sidestream is withdrawn from the Main Fractionator between the LCGO draw-off
and the column overheads. Thi s stream is ci rcul ated under f1 ow control by the Top
Pumparound Reflux Pump, GA-23l1/S,to the Propylene Splitter Reboi1er, EA-2515,in the Gas
Concentration Unit before being returned to the Main Fractionator.
Fractionator overheads are cooled and partially condensed in the Fractionator Overhead
Condenser, EC-2306. Water soluble corrosion inhibitor is injected upstream of the
Fractionator Overhead Condenser using the Fractionator Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump,
GA-2514, to prevent hydrogen blistering. Unstabilised gasoline and vapours are separated in
the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304, with the vapours flowing to the GCU Gas
Compressor, GB-2501. Unstabilised gasoline is pumped under level control by the
Fractionator Overhead Pump,GA-2312/S,to the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-2501, in the Gas
Concentration Unit and is also used as pumpback ref1 ux to the Main Fractionator to control
overhead temperature. The condensed water phase and sour water passed into the boot of
the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator from other Units is pumped by the Sour Water Pump,
GA-2313/S,to the Sour Water Stripper Unit (Unit 2900).
Process Steam Generation and Blowdown
Boiler feed water from offsite is preheated in the LCGOI BFW Exchanger, EA-2305,and
passed to Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B,and the ICGO Steam
Generator, EA-2307,for generation of medium pressure steam. Steam generated in these
exchangers is superheated in the superheat coil of the ICGO Stripper Reboi1er, BA-2302,
and passed to the M.P. Steam Header.
Continuous and intermittent b10wdown from the Steam Generators and the CO Boiler, BF2301,are passed to the M.P. B1owdown Drum, FA-2521,where L.P. steam generated passes
to the L.P. Steam Header. The b1owdown passes under level control to the Atmospheric
page 90
B1owdown Drum, FA-2522, where it is quenched with raw water before passing to the oily
water sewer.
Slide Valve Air System
Dry plant air, with a water dew point of -40 C, is provided to supply the power to actuate
the automatic slide valves. The air supplied to each valve passes to an air motor operated
power unit which directs the air supply to drive the valve in either direction, depending on
the signal being received from the automatic controller. Alternatively, the slide valve can be
moved by the manual operation of a local 4-way valve which performs a similar function. The
Slide Valve Air Surge Drum, FA-230l, is provided to operate the valves during an emergency.
The drum is sized to hold sufficient air to close each operating valve once from the wide open
position without the reservoir pressure dropping below 4.1 bar g.
Spry Water System
In the event that any portion of the Regenerator exceeds 730 c for short periods, spray
water from the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302, should be injected into the Regenerator by the
Spray Water Pump, GA-2301 IS. Spry water should be removed from the Regenerator at the
first opportunity to prevent catalyst deactivation and .to regain optimum combustion air
control.
Gland and Flushing Oil System
Light Cycle Gas Oil is normally used as pump gland flush oil and flushing oil for instruments,
the supply being taken from downstream of the Lean Oil Cooler, EC-2305. An alternate diesel
supply is provided at start-up from offsite storage. The LCGO passes into the Gland and
Flushing Oil Surge Drum FA-230~and is continuously circulated around a ring header system
using the Gland and Flushing Oil Pump GA-23l4/S. This system is also used for flushing
equipment which can be taken out of service while the rest of the unit is in operation.
2.7.3.2 Gas concentration unit S-2500
Gas Compression Section
Vapours from the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-230~ are compressed in the two
stage, turbi ne dri ven GCU Gas Compressor, GB-2501, after passing through the First Stage
Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2501. Liquid removed in the Compressor Suction Drum, flows
under gravity back to the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator. Off gas from the LCGO
Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) is also fed to the First Stage Compressor Suction Drum.
Flashed condensate is injected into the first stage discharge to protect the lines from
hydrogen blistering together with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the First Stage
Compressar Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-25l5. This stream is then cao1ed and partial1y
condensed by the First Stage Compressor Condenser, EC-2501, befare enteri ng the Second
Stage Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2502. The interstage liquid from this drum is pumped
by the Second Stage Compressor Suction Drum Pump, GA-250l/S to the Deethaniser Feed
Coalescer, FA-2505. Sour water, separated from the hydrocarbon phase in FA-2502,is sent
under level control to the Fractionator FA-2502 are compressed in the second stage of the
GCU Gas Compressor and then injected with steam condensate together with corrosion
inhibitor from the Second Stage Compressor Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2S16, and routed
to the HP Separator Condenser, EC-2502.
The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being
condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected
in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the
Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The
Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation
equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is
vaporised in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521.
Absorption/Deethaniser Section
The vapours from the compressor second stage are combined w;th liquid from the Raw
Gasoline Absorber,DA-2501 ,and overhead vapours from the Deethaniser ,DA-2502, the C3
Drier Overhead Accumulator,FA-2513,and the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator,FA2514,and passed to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler,EC-2502. Flashed condensate
page 91
is injected into the inlet of the airfin to protect the exchanger from hydrogen blistering
together The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being
condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected
in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the
Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The
Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation
equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is
vaporized in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521, with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the
Second Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2516. The combined
stream is cooled and passed to the High Pressure Separator,FA-2504,where hydrocarbon
vapour, hydrocarbon liquid and water are separated. Water i s continuous 1y removed from
the boot and transferred to the Main Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,before
pass ing to the Sour Wate r Stripper.
The vapour stream from the Hi gh Pressure Separator, FA-2504,is introduced at the base of
the Sponge Oi1 Absorber/Raw Gaso1 i ne Absorber, DA-250l ,where i t i s scrubbed with raw
gasoline and then with 1ean sponge oil to remove C3's and heavier. The raw gasoline is fed
from the Maln Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,by the Fractionator Overhead
Pump,GA-23l2/S, via the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-250l,to the Raw Gasoline Coalescer, FA2503. Water removed i s returned to FA-2304. The raw gasoline enters DA-2501 where it
contacts the vapours from the High Pressure Separator over slotted ring packing. Ouring
winter operation, debutaniser bottoms recycle from the Debutani Sf'r Bottoms Recyc1e
Pump,GA-2504/S, is pumped with the raw gasoline into the Raw Gasoline Absorber. This is
done to provide suffieient liquid loading both in the Raw Gas01ine Absorber and in the
Deethaniser to effect the desired C3 recovery. The raw gasoline leaves the bottom of the
ABsorber and is pumped by the Raw Gasoline Absorber Bottoms Pump,GA-2502/S,into the
inlet of the High Press ure Separator Ai rfan Cool er, EC-2502.
The vapours emerging from the Raw Gasoline Absorber pass up the co1umn through a
chimney tray and are contaeted with 1ean sponge oil aver slotted ring packing. The lean
sponge oil whieh is unstripped LCGO is pumped fram the FCCU by the Lean Sponge Oi1
Pump,GA-2309/S~and enters the top of the Sponge Oil Absorber,DA-2501, where it removes
a major part of the C315 and C4's from the vapour. The rieh spange oi1 1eaving the
Absorber passes to the Rich Sponge Oi1 Surge Drum, FA-2516. Any vapours whi eh di
sengage are returned to the Absorber be10w the top packed bed. Rieh sponge oil is returned
to the coo1ed LCGO reflux stream which passes to the Main Fractionator, DA-2301. Water
removed from the boot of FA-25l6 is returned to FA-2304.
The overhead gases from the Spange Oi1 Absorber,DA-2501, consisting mainly of hydrogen.
Cl's, C2'5 and hydrogen sulphide flow to the Fuel Gas Scrubber KO Drum,FA-2509, and on to
the base of the Fuel Gas Scrubber, DA-2505. where lean amine is used in the countercurrent
extraction of hydrogen sulphide.
Liquid hydrocarbons from the High Pressure Separator, FA-2504,are pumped by the
Deethaniser Feed Pump, GA-2503/S. together with interstage liquid from the Second Stage
Compressor Suction Drum Pump. GA-250l/S. to the Deethaniser Feed Coalescer, FA2505.before passing to the top tray, tray 21, of the Deethaniser.DA-2502. Water from the
coalescer boot is passed to FA-2304.
Light ends are stripped out in the Deethaniser, DA-2502, in order to control the C2 content
in the resulting C3 streams. The overheads from the column are returned to the High
Pressure Separator Airfin Cooler,EC-2502. The column is reboiled by circulating hot intermedi
ate cycle gas oil (ICGO) pumped by the ICGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S, through the Deethani
ser Reboi1er. EA-2502. Reboiled vapours return to the column and the liquid product is fed
to the Debutaniser.DA-2503. The flow from the bottom of the Deethaniser represents the
total liquids recovery of the sys tem.
Any free water trapped in the Deethani ser i s removed in the Deethaniser Water Draw Off
Pot, FA-2506, which takes liquid from tray 15 of the co1umn.
Debutaniser Section
The Debutaniser DA-2503, is designed to separate C4'5 and 1ighter from C51S and heavier,
with the overhead having less than 0.3 wt.% pentanes and heavier and bottoms containing
less than 0.5 wt.% butanes and lighter. The feed to this tower is the Deethaniser bottoms
stream. This stream is preheated by circulating hot LCGO. pumped by the LCGO Re fl ux
Pump, GA-2303jS. through the Debutaniser Feed Preheater. EA-2503, and by Debutaniser
page 92
bottoms in the Debutanizer Feed/Effluent Exchanger. EA-2504. Partial1y vaporized feed

enters the Debutanizer. which has 42 trays, on tray 18.
The Debutaniser overheads are totally condensed in the Debutaniser Overhead Condenser,
EC-2504, and passed to the Debutaniser Overhead Accumu1 ator, FA-2507. Water soluble
corrosion inhibitor is injected into the in1et of the condenser by Debutaniser Overhead
Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2517~ to prevent hydrogen blistering. Water removed in the
boot of the Overhead Accumu1ator is returned to the Main Fractionator Overhead
Accumu1ator, FA-2304 Reflux is returned to the column via the Debutaniser Overhead Ref1
ux Pump, GA-2505/S, and the C3/ C4 product is pumped by the Debutaniser Overhead
Product Pump, GA-2506/S, via the Debutaniser Overhead Trim Cooler, EA-2506, to the C3C4 H2S Scrubber, DA-2506,where H2S is removed by contacting with amine.
The column is reboiled by circu1ating hot fractionator bottoms pumped by the Fractionator
Bottoms Pump, GA-2303/S, through the Debutaniser Reboiler, EA-2505. The bottoms s
tream i s used to preheat the tower feed in the Debutaniser Feed/Eff1uent Exchanger,EA2504,and then to reboi 1 the Depropani ser, DA-2507, in the Depropani ser Reboi1er, EA2509, before passing to the Naphtha Splitter, DA-2504. Provision is made to cool and recycle
a portion of the Debutani ser bottoms to the Raw Gasol ine Absorber, DA-250l, in order to
improve C3 recovery when operating at other than maximum gasoline operations. The
Debutaniser bottoms stream is taken off downstream of the Depropaniser Reboiler and is
cooled in the Debutaniser Bottoms Recycle Cooler, EC-2503, before being pumped by the
Debutaniser Bottoms Recycle Pump,GA-2504/S, to the Raw Gasoline Absorber DA-2501.
Naphtha Splitter Section
Debutaniser bottoms 1S charged to tray 10 of the 20 tray Naphtha Spl itter, DA-2505. The
Sp1 itter i s operated to produce light and heavy naphtha streams, with the light naphtha
having an ASTM end point of 700C and there being a 5.6 0C minimum gap between the light
naphtha 95% ASTM point and the heavy naphtha 5% ASTM point.
The tower overhead is tota11y condensed by the Naphtha Splitter Overhead Condenser,EC2505,and passed to the Naphtha Splitter Overhead Accumulator,FA-2508. Part of this liquid
is pumped by the Naphtha Splitter Reflux/ Product Pump,GA-2508/S,as reflux to the Naphtha
Splitter. The remainder is sent to the Light Naphtha Merox Unit (Unit 2750) before passing to
storage.
The tower is reboiled by circulating hot ICGO pumped by the ICGO Reflux Pump, GA-2305/S,
through the Naphtha Sp 1i tter Reboi 1er. EA-2507. The hea vy naphtha bottom product
stream is pumped by the Heavy Naphtha Product Pump, GA-2507/S, via the C Drier Reboiler,
EA-2512, to the Heavy Naphtha Product ~ooler) EC-2507, before passing to the Heavy
Naphtha Merox Unit (Unit 2850) and storage.
Fuel Gas H2S Scrubber Section
Overhead gas from the Absorber, DA-2501, together with off gas from the LCGO
Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) and sour gas from several sources offsite are fed to the Fuel
Gas Scrubber KO Drum, FA-2509, and passed to the Fuel Gas H2S Scrubber, DA-2505. Lean
DEA (Diethanolamine) from theAmine Regeneration Unit (Unit 2950) is fed into the Scrubber
near the top and contacting with the gas takes place in two 3 metre beds of 38mm ceramic
saddles. The sweet gas leaves the tower at the top and passes to the Refinery Fuel Gas
System. The Rich DEA, containing the absorbed H2S and CO2, passes to the bottom of the
tower and is mixed wlth rich amine streams from the C3-(4 Scrubber, DA-2506, and the
Hydrotreating Unit. This combined stream is then routed to the Amine Regeneration Unit
(Unit 2950).
C3-C4 Scrubber Section
Cooled LPG from the Debutaniser Overhead Trim Cooler, EA-2506, is introduced into the
bottom of the C3-C4 Scrubber, DA-2506. Lean DEA (Diethanolamine) is fed into the top of
the tower and contacted with the LPG in two 3 metre beds of 38mm slotted rings where
transfer of the H2S and C02 from the hydrocarbon to the amine takes place. The rich amine
is taken from the bottom of the Scrubber and routed to the bottom of the Fuel Gas Scrubber,
DA-2505, where 1t is flashed to remove soluble and entrained hydrocarbons before passing
to the Amine Regeneration Unit (Unit 2950).
At the top of the C3-C4 Scrubber, the amine and hydrocarbon are allowed to separate by
gravity. The separated hydrocarbon is then passed through a 1 meter coalescing section to
remove any traces of the aqueous amine before passing out of the tower. The C3-C4 stream
page 93
is then routed to the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) to remove mercaptans before being
pumped by the Depropaniser Charge Pump, GA-2552/S to the Depropaniser, DA-2508.
Depropaniser Section
C3-C4s from the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) together with C3-C4 recycle from the
Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) are fed, through the Oepropani ser Feed/Effl uent Exchanger, EA25G8, to the Depropani ser, DA-2507. The feed enters on tray 27 of this 53 tray column.
Reboil heat is suplied to the Depropaniser by the Debutaniser bottoms stream in the
Depropaniser Reboiler, EA-2509. The butane/butylene praduct from the bottom of the
Depropaniser is first cooled in the Depropaniser Feed/Effluent Exchanger, EA-2508) and then
by cooling water in the C4 Product Cooler, EA-25l0 , before being routed to the Alkylation
Unit (Unit 2600) or to offsite storage.
The overheads from the column are tota11y condensed in the Depropaniser Overhead
Condenser, EC-2504, and passed to the Depropaniser Overhead Accumulator, FA-25l0.
Water, separated_ out in the boot of this drum,is passed to the Main Fractionator Overhead
Accumulator, FA-2304. Part of the condensed hydrocarbon stream is pumped by the
Depropani ser Refl ux/Product Pump, GA-2509 IS, as refl ux to the Depropani sero The rema
inder i s routed to the (3 Drier, DA-2508.
C3 Drier Section
Water contained in the overhead product of the Depropaniser is separated fram the C315 in
the C3 Drier, DA-2508, in order to produce a propane cut with a dew pOlnt less than -30 c.
The feed to the C3 Orier t DA-2508 ,is cooled in the C3 Orier Feed Cool er, EA-2511, and
passed through the C3 Drier Feed Coa1escer t FA-2511 t to remove free water. The feed
enters the 30 tray column on tray 18. The tower overheads are partially condensed by the
C3 Drier Overhead Condenser t EA-2513 and fed to the C3 Drier Overhead Accumulator t FA2513. The liquid hydracarbon from the Accumu1ator i5 pumped back to the tower as reflux
by the C3 Drier Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2511/S, via the C3 Drier Reflux Coalescer, FA2512. Vapour from the Accumulator i5 recycled to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler,
EC-2502, in the Absorption/Deethaniser Section.
Propylene Splitter Section
Dried C3s enter the Propylene Splitter t DA-2509 ton tray 41 of tne 101 tray column. The
co1umn overheads are partia11y condensed in the Propylene Splitter Overhead Condenser,
EC-2508 t and pass to the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator, FA-2514. The liquid
hydrocarbon from this drum is pumped back to the tower as reflux by Propylene Splitter
Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2513/S, while the vapour is recycled to the High Pressure
Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, in the Absorption/ Deethaniser Section.
Propylene product is withdrawn from tray 91 as a side draw and routed to storage offsite via
the Propylene Product Cooler, EA-2516.
Reboil heat to the co1umn is provided from two separate sources. The majority of the heat is
supplied by a top pump around reflux stream from the FCCU Main Fractionator t DA-2301,
and is circlated by the Top Pump around Reflux Pump,GA-2311/S through the Propylene
Splitter Reboiler/Top Pump around Refl ux Exchanger, EA-2515. The remaining heat is
supplied by the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA~25l4, which
uses high temperature steam condensate from the High Temperature Condensate Drum,FA2517, as the heating medium.
The propane product is taken from the bottom of the tower and is pumped by the Propane
Product Pump, GA-25l2/S, through the Propane Product Cooler, EA-2517, to offsite storage.
Condensate Collection System
Steam condensate from the Sour Water Stripper Reboiler, EA-2902, and the Amine
Regenerator Reboiler, EA-2952, together with condensate from the M.P. condensate header
is passed into the High Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2517.
Flashed steam is fed into the LP steam main. The hot condensate is primari1y used as a heat
source and is passed to the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA25l4, before entering the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518. Excess condensate
passes directly to the Low Temperature Condensate Drum. If insufficient condensate is
available for reboiling the'Propylene Splitter, boiler feed water is fed into the High
Temperature Condensate Drum.
page 94
Condensate from the LP condensate header is also fed into the Low Temperature Condensate
Drum, FA-25l 7. Flashed steam is exhausted to atmosphere. Flashed condensate is fed by
the Compressor Condensate Booster Pump, GA-25l8/S, to the First Stage Compressor
Condenser, EC-250l, to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, and to the
Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) to be used as water wash in the DP Water Wash Settler, FA-2509,
and the DIS Water Wash Settler, FA-26ll. Additional condensate is supplied by the Process
Condensate Pump, GA-2521/S, vi a the flashed condensate header to theCondensate Surge
Drum, FA-2404, in the Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400), to the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302,
in the FCCU, and to other intermittent users. The excess condensate fram this pump is
routed to the offsite deaeration facilities. If insufficient condensate is available, boiler feed
water is fed into the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518.
Corrasion Inhibitor System
In order to protect certain items of equipment fram corrosion and hydrogen blistering a
water soluble based corrosion inhibitor system has been provided. The corrosion inhibitor i5
mixed with turbine condensate in the Corrosion Inhibitor Drum, FA-2515. The solution is
mixed using fuel gas which is vented to the flare system. The following items of equipment
and its downstream piping are protected by injecting the material using the following pumps:
Injection Pump
Main
Equipment
GA-2514
Main Fractionator OH Corrosion Inhibitor Pump
EC-2304
GA-2515
First Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump
EC-2501
GA-2516
Second Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump
EC-2502
GA-2517
Debutaniser Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump
EC-2504
GA-2524
Sour Water Stripper Reflux Corrosion Inhibitor Pump
DA-290l
Fuel Gas System

Fuel gas from the Refi nery Fuel Gas Sys tem i s fed i nto the Fuel Gas Mixing Drum FA-23l0
before passing to the fuel gas header. At start-up or when insufficient fuel gas is available
fram the Refinery system, fuel gas is provided by vaporising LPG, taken from offsite or from
the feed to the Depropaniser, DA-2507, in the LPG Vaporiser, EA-2310. This is mixed with
the fuel gas from the Refinery in the Fuel Gas Mixing Drum.
The fuel gas header feeds fuel gas to the FCCU heaters via the Fuel Gas KO DrUm,FA-2305,
to the HTU heaters via the Fuel Gas KO Drum, FA-2425, to the Sulphur Recovery Unit via
Fuel Gas KO Pot, FA-2318, and to all other users.
Flare Header System
All safety reliefs resulting fram the lifting of pressure safety relief valves are fed to the
Refinery Flare System via the FCCU/GCU Flane KO Drum,FA-2523. This drum handles reliefs
from the FCCU, GCU, Amine Regeneration L1nit and Sour Water Stripper. Any hydrocarbon
liquid knocked out in the Flare KO Drum is pumped by the Fl are KO Drum Pumps t GA-2525
A/B,to the light slops header. This drum also serves as an atmospheric flash drum at start-up
when raw gasoline from the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-250l,is run down, via this drum.to the
light slops system.
2.7.3.3 Flow charts
Complete list of available drawings of FCC complex is given in Annex 16.
2.7.3.4 Condition of the processes
The use of electricity of FCC is 35.4 Mega Watt per day.
Steam is needed as well:
High pressure steam (45 bar, 4129 C) 620 tons per day.
Medium pressure steam (16 bar, 3200 C) 410 tons per day
Low pressure steam (4.5 bar 2000 C) 60 tons per day.
2.7.3.5 Hazardous material

Feed Characteristics
page 95
Following tables give characteristics of main feed for FCC.

Table 41: Vacuum Gas Oil
Crude Source
TBP Cut Range (C)
KIRKUK
REB
340 500
380 590
Gravi ty (oAPI)
25.4
o
Specific Gravity at 15.6 C (kg/m )
0.9315
Pour Point ( C)
32
31
Sulphur (Wt%)
2.2
2.35
Basic Nitrogen Wt (ppm)
150
Conradson Carbon Residue (Wt%)
0.3
Characterization Factor
0.5
11. 85
Molecular Weight
360
Table 42: C3/C4 Recycle From Alkylation Unit

Crude Source
KIRKUK
REB
C3 (Mol%)
1.99
1.5
IC4 (Mol%)
93.37
93.33
NC4 (Mol%)
4.59
5.11
IC5 (Mol%)
0.05
0.06
57.9
57.9
119.9
119.7
Molecular Weight
o
Specific Gravity at 15.6 C (kg/m )
Table 43: Naphtha From LCGO Hydrotreating Unit

Crude Source
KIRKUK
REB
H2S (Mol%)
1.1
0,8
C2 (Mol%)
1.1
1.7
C3 (Mol%)
2.2
2.5
IC4 (Mol%)
1.1
0.8
NC4 (Mol%)
2.2
2.5
IC5 (Mol%)
3.4
2.5
NC5 (Mol%)
5.6
4.1
Naphtha (Mol%)
40.5
23.1
LCGO (Mol%)
42.8
62.0
Products of FCC
Products from FCC unit are:
Wet gas
Raw FCC gasoline
Light cycle gas oil
Products from the bottom of fractionators
Intermediate cycle gas oil for production process in FCC
Characteristics of some products are given in next tables.

Table 44: Quality of wet gas
page 96
Regime 1
(%mas)
Regime 2
(% mas)
H2S
5.84
7,68
H2
0.15
0.38
2.24
5.63
C2 H6
2.17
6.66
C2 H4
1.72
2.76
C3 H8
4.86
10.61
Propylene
22.38
16.56
i-butane
24.78
22.23
n-butane
6.67
6.82
Butilene
29.19
20.67
Component
CH
Table 45: Quality of raw FCC gasoline

Regime 1
(%mas)
Regime 2
(% mas)
9.41
100.8
65.9
58.7
IBP
2.24
5.63
10%
2.17
6.66
30%
1.72
2.76
50%
4.86
10.61
RON
22.38
16.56
MON
24.78
22.23
6.67
6.82
0.160
0.169
Component
Molecular weight
o
Specific Gravity at 15.6 C
Distillation ASTM C
70%
90%
EP
Octane number
paraffin
PONA (%vol)
olefins
naphthens
aromats
Total sulfur
Safety data sheet
Safety data sheets for dangerous substances in FCC are given in Annex 21.
Main hazardous materials in FCC
Quantity of substances contained in FCC is given in Annex 19. Refinery is reporting to the
state authority on type and quantities of substances each year using defined form.
The list of potential explosion hazards is given in Annex 17 as determined in the document
Explosion hazardous zones in Block VI of NIS - Refinery Pancevo (Elaborat o zonama
opasnosti od eksplozije za Blok VI, u NIS Rafinerija nafte, Panevo, April Juni 2003.)
2.7.3.6 Utilities and effects
Major supplies
page 97
The major outside supplies for FCC and the connected safety problems are shown in Table
46.
The internal electrical distribution system is working now without any problems. In the year
2006. the transformer unit has been completely rebuilt.
Table 46: FCC supplies
Type of supply
Safety problem
Electricity
Possible problem could cause that no electricity

will be delivered and this, further, could cause a
safety problem.
A hazard analysis does not exist.
Fuel gas
No problems
Steam
Sometimes problems but no safety problems
Instrumental air
Only problems if electricity is not available
Nitrogen
No problems
Cooling water
Smaller problems. Up to now cooling water

delivery was reduced in two cases caused by leaks
in the system.
Loss of electricity
One of the most important outside supplies for FCC is electricity. Hazard analysis has never
been done for this case. Loss of electricity could cause safety problem, even may lead to a
Domino effect if something else goes wrong simultaneously. Loss of electricity could affect
differently some types of equipment as shown in the following table.
Table 47: Some effect of loss of electricity
Equipment/
installation
affected
Possible safety problem
Reactor
Slide valves will close and reaction will stop. Some

valves will opes due to their basic function and the
steam will be released. Result will be steam in the
reactor and the process will stop. (less than 10
seconds).
Temperature will increase as no cooling exists.
Regenerator
Regenerator will be a separate unit as all slide valves

are closed. The remaining coke and catalyst will still
react. There are about 90 tons of catalysts in the
regenerator. A balance of the remaining coke and air
is difficult regarding the high reaction speed.
Nevertheless as the concentration of Oxygen is
reduced the concentration of CO may increase and
may cause explosion problems.
Column
Temperature and pressure will increase as the

ventilator used for the air coolers are not longer
working. The safety valve at the top of the column
will open.
Air coolers
No problem as the temperature will go done very

fast if the feed will not be continued.
Pressure vessel
No problem as functioning is not depending on

electrical equipment.
Sensor/
Instrumentation
Are still working as using a 24 V line.
page 98
Computers
2.7.4
Still working as supplied by an internal electricity

line.
Safety of the plant
2.7.4.1 History of accident

The establishment has been build up from 1981 up to 1984. The production started in 1985.
From 1985 to 1992 there was a period of normal operation. From 1992 to 1996 there was no
operation. From 1996 to 1999 was again a period of normal operation. The establishment
has been bombed in 1999 and rebuild in 2000. From 2000 up to now there is again a period
of normal operation. The average production is about 80% of the total capacity.
2.7.4.2 Hazards identified
The Hazards related to the operation of the FCC Unit are associated to uncontrolled release
of hazardous materials, mainly due to failure of components due to causes not directly
related to process deviations (Loss of Containment events).
The cases of possible loss of containment identified and analyzed in the report are chosen to
represent the possible range of hazardous materials that can be released and the process
conditions of the release.
Possible accidental scenarios caused by process deviations are controlled and protected by
the Process Control System and by the Shut Down System, so that their probability of
occurrence can be considered to be negligible. They are therefore not further analyzed in this
report.
The Release cases (Top Events) identified for the analysis are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
TOP1
TOP2
TOP3
TOP4
TOP5
Release of propylene from the bottom of Vessel FA-2514

Release of gasoline from the bottom of column DA-2503
Release of propane from bottom of propane splitter DA-2509
Release of toxic gas (H2S) from FA-2953
Release of mixture of toxic gases from FA-2455.
The above cases allow to represent hazards related to the presence of both, flammable
materials and toxic materials, from vessels, columns and furnaces.
For the Propylene splitter section, including FA-2514, an HAZOP analysis has been done. This
section contains the largest inventory of hazardous material in the Unit, therefore an
assessment of the process deviations for this unit was conducted, to assess if there is any
specific process deviation that can contribute to leaks in this Section.
HAZOP analysis has been done using web based tool designed by R-Tech (Figure 43 - Figure
46) and following .
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of Pressure Vessel FA 2514
In the loop, shown in Figure 47, a pressure vessel (FA 2514) and a condenser (EC 2508)
have been considered. The vessel is a part of the propanizer section; short description of this
section is given in subsection 3.1, simplified flow diagram is given in Annex 1.
The pressure vessel has a volume of 21 m3. The operational pressure is 19.9 bar and the
operational temperature 44 0 C. The pressure vessel contains propylene. The vessel is filled
by max. 10 12 m3. The stream is coming from the top of the column with 140 m/hour. The
intention is to recycle the condensed phase to increase the purity of the product. The stream
will be re-circulated in the column.
Sensors are measuring the level and the pressure and are responsible for the regulation.
External sensors are measuring the gas concentration outside the vessel.
The pressure vessel is protected by two safety valves acting by 22 bar. The vessel is design
for 22.5 bar and 52 0 C. The safety valves are designed as a redundant system as one valve
is able to protect the vessel. The design of the valves for one phase dispersion or two phase
dispersion is unknown. (Probably done for one phase dispersion which will not consider the
real situation.) Additional a sprinkler system is installed for cooling the vessel in the case of a
fire.
The whole flow is based on the pressure difference between column and vessel which is 400
mbar.
page 99
No flow to the vessel is possible if a valve is closed but will cause no safety problem.
Figure 43: HAZOP tool Main page
Figure 44: HAZOP tool - Loop description
page 100
Figure 45: HAZOP tool Nodes
Figure 46: HAZOP tool Drawing

More flow is not possible as the pressure in the vessel will increase which will decrease the
pressure difference between column and vessel and will reduce automatically the flow.
Furthermore the heater of the column will be stopped automatically. The deviation flow is
directly connected with the deviation pressure. Therefore pressure is not further considered.
Temperature can not increase or decrease in this loop.
page 101
For a shut down all lines will be cleaned with steam and for a start up all lines will be cleaned
with nitrogen,
Figure 47: Loop1 - TOP1 Event, FA-2514

The Hazop analysis has confirmed that a leak in the pressure vessel is a scenario to be
quantitatively assessed, while no specific process deviations able to cause a more significant
scenario have been identified.
Scenario identification
Following a mechanical failure due e.g. to corrosion, material defects etc, it is postulated that
a complete rupture of a 6 pipe connected to the pressure vessel FA-2514 will occur.
This scenario is chosen to represent a credible worst case of release from the FCC Unit,
giving the process characteristics and the full-bore rupture considered.
In case the resulting pool is not ignited, the accidental scenarios develops as a flammable
gas dispersion with possible Flash Fire or UVCE.
In case of immediate ignition, a Pool Fire will occur.
The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in following
Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
TOP2: Release of gasoline from bottom of Column DA 2503
Column DA-2503 is a part of debutanizer section of Gas concentration unit; description given
in chapter 2.7.3.2 and flow diagram in Annex 20. Simplified flow diagram showing position of
the column is given on Figure 48.
The column has pressure of approx 13 bar and a temperature of 190 C.
This event represents the release of a flammable material at high temperature and pressure,
giving possibly rise to a two-phase jet.
page 102
Figure 48: Column D 2503 debutanizer section of S 2500

Two possible release scenarios are postulated, one corresponding to a significant leak
(diameter approx 1) and one corresponding to a major leak (diameter approx 4).
The release will be in form of a two-phase jet causing, if ignited, a jet fire. In case of late
ignition of the dispersing cloud, Flash Fire or Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE) will
occur.
The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in sections 2.7.5.
TOP3: Release of propane from the bottom of column DA-2509
Propylene splitter DA-2509 is a part of Gas concentration unit, Propylene splitter section;
description of the unit given in chapter 2.7.3.2 and flow diagram in Annex 20/
Column DA-2509 has pressure of approx 21 bar and a temperature of 62 C. Simplified flow
diagram showing position of the column is given on Figure 48.
This event represents the release of propane at relatively high temperature and high
pressure, giving rise to a two-phase jet.
Two possible release scenarios are postulated, one corresponding to a significant leak
(diameter approx 1) and one corresponding to a major leak (diameter 3, pipe diameter).
The release will be in form of a two-phase jet causing, if ignited, a jet fire. In case of late
ignition of the dispersing cloud, Flash Fire or UVCE will occur.
page 103
The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in sections 2.7.5.
Figure 49: Column DA-2509 splitter section of S-2500

TOP4: Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953
Vessel FA-2953 is a part of section for amine regeneration; description of unit given in 4...,
simplified technological scheme in Annex 3.
In case of failure of vessel FA-2953, a mixture rich in H2S (approx 90%) will be released.
This case is chosen to represent a possible leak of a toxic material within the Plant.
The release scenario postulated is a leak of diameter of approx 2, chosen considering the
actual conditions and characteristics of the vessel.
The release will be in form of a gas jet dispersing in atmosphere causing a toxic cloud.
Sections 5.3 and 5.4
TOP5: Release of toxic mixture from the vessel FA-2455
Vessel FA-2455 is a part of of Claus unit; description given in ...; flow diagram given in
Annex 4.
In case of failure of vessel FA-2455, a mixture of H2S (approx 70%), SO2 and CO2 will be
released. This case is chosen to represent a possible leak of a toxic mixture within the plant.
The release scenario postulated is a leak of diameter of approx 4, chosen considering the
actual conditions and characteristics of the vessel.
The release will be in form of a gas jet dispersing in atmosphere causing a toxic cloud.
page 104
2.7.4.3 Frequency of occurrence of hazards

The frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios is assessed on the basis of historical
data on leaks and ruptures from typical process components. Statistical data available are
summarized in Table 48.
Table 48: Frequency of occurrence of accidental events
Frequency
(events/ year)
Event
Fonte
Leak from Flange seal
4,0 10-4
Cremer & Warner, A report to

the Rijnmond Public Autority
Leak from pump mechanical seals
6,0 10-2
Tab. A 9-2 Lees
< 50
9,0 10-6
50 200
5,0 10-6

>200
3,0 10-6
Leak from piping

Frequency in /meter
of pipe/year)
Piping rupture
Frequency in /meter
of pipe/year)
diameter
(mm)
diameter
(mm)
< 50
9,0 10-7
50 200
3,0 10-7
>200
9,0 10-8
Catatrophic tank rupture

Leak from tanks
1, 10-5
1, 10-4


The data above are derived from experience up to the eighties; to date the availability of
tools and procedures specifically dedicated to the improving of safety like Safety
Management Systems, RBI etc makes it realistic to consider that the frequency of failure
should be lower than those experienced up to 20 years ago or more.
To take this into account, a factor of reduction of 0.1 is applied to the all the values given in
the Table 2.
The frequency of occurrence of the final scenario depends on the probability of ignition
(immediate or delayed). From technical literature, the following values for the probability of
ignition are considered:
Immediate ignition of gas/flashing leaks: 0.3 0.01
Immediate ignition of a liquid pool fire: 0.05 0.01
Delayed ignition of flammable cloud: 0.15 0.01
Probability that the delayed ignition will cause an UVCE: the possibility that an UVCE
occurs depend on the amount of flammable material in the cloud. It is considered
that for a quantity of gas within the flammable limits lower than 1000 kg, the UVCE
can not occur, and only a flash fire is considered. For quantity of gas within the
flammable limits higher than 1000 kg, the probability of having UVCE following
ignition is considered to be 0.3.
The frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios is calculated by Event Tree analysis, on

the basis of estimation of the above values. The frequency of occurrence of the scenarios can
then be classified according e.g. to the classification given in Table 49.
On the basis of the above classification, events having a frequency of occurrence lower than
10-7 per year are considered to be practically not credible and are therefore not further
analyzed.
The frequency of occurrence of the Hazards identified is assessed as described in the
following sections.
page 105
Table 49: Definition of Frequency Classes

Classification
Frequency
(events/year)
Probable
> 10-2
Unlikely
10-4 10-2
Very unlikely
10-6 10-4
Extremely unlikely
< 10-6
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of Pressure Vessel FA 2514

The frequency of occurrence of the release (full rupture of a 6 pipe) is estimated considering
20 m of piping.
The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the order of 5E-7 events/year.
The frequency of occurrence of a pool fire is estimated to be (considering the probability of
ignition) 5E-8 events /year.
The frequency of occurrence of a VCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 2E-9 and 4E-9
events /year.
Notwithstanding the low frequency of occurrence of the scenarios, the consequence analysis
will be done to assess the consequences of a worst case scenario (even if the frequency
assessment makes it to be considered not credible).
TOP2: Release of gasoline from the bottom of Column DA 2503
The frequency of occurrence of the release (significant and major leaks of a 6 pipe) is
estimated considering 20 m of piping. The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the
order of 1E-5 and 5E-7 events/year.
The frequency of occurrence of a jet/pool fire is estimated to be (considering the probability
of ignition) 3E-6 and 1E-7 /year respectively.
The frequency of occurrence of a UVCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 1E-7 and 5E9 events/year.
TOP3: Release of Propane from the bottom of Splitter DA-2509
The frequency of occurrence of the release (significant and major leaks of a 3 pipe) is
estimated considering 20 m of piping.
The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the order of 1E-5 and 5E-7 events/year.
The frequency of occurrence of a jet fire is estimated to be (considering the probability of
ignition) 3E-6 and 1E-7 /year respectively.
The frequency of occurrence of a UVCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 1E-7 and 5E9 events/year.
TOP4: Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953
The frequency of occurrence of the release is assessed considering the leak from the outlet
section piping of FA-2455. Considering the leak from a tank wall, the frequency is estimated
in the order of 1E-5 events/year.
TOP5: Release of toxic mixture from the vessel FA-2455
The frequency of occurrence of the release is assessed considering the leak from the outlet
section piping of FA-2455. Considering the leak from a tank wall, the frequency is estimated
in the order of 1E-5 events/year.
2.7.4.4 Consequences of hazards
General model
The scenarios that can derive in general from a release, leading to a given outcome, are
represented in the Figure 50. This path was followed while deriving scenarios for FCC
analysis.
page 106
Hazardous
substance
Unpressurised leak
Pressuried
leak
Discharge
Gas
2-phase
Liquid
pool
Liquid
Flash and rainout
Jet
Jet fire
Explosion:
Condensed phase
Runaway
reaction
Dust
Physical
Evaporation
Dispersion
Fireball
Other
incident
Dense
Neutral
Flash fire
Toxic effect
VCE
Thermal effect
External
fire
Pool fire
Bleve
Explosion effect
blast and fragment
Outcome
Figure 50: General scenario

The consequence analysis assess the type of release (hazardous substance, type of leak) and
calculate the expected outcome by application of suitable analytical models.
Criteria for damage assessment
Damage caused by accidental scenarios are related to the level of overpressure, heat
radiation and toxic gas concentration reached at given distance from the release source.
The following tables give the criteria, from International technical literature, adopted to
define the damage to equipment or people associated to physical effects of accidents.
Table 50: Typical damages caused by overpressure
Overpressure Observed Effect
1kPa
Glass breakage.
page 107
Overpressure Observed Effect

3kPa
90% glass breakage, gauges break
7 kPa
Repairable damage to internal partitions and joinery. Cone

roof storage tank collapse
14 kPa
House uninhabitable and badly cracked. Fired heater bricks

crack.
21 kPa
Wagons and plant items overturned. Half filled cone roof

storage tank uplifts. Unreinforced masonry bearing wall
building destroyed
35 kPa
Regenerator bracing fails and frame collapses. Unreinforced

steel or concrete frame building destroyed.
70 kPa
Many types of process vessels overturned or destroyed.

Table 51: Details on damage caused by pressure wave
Peak side on overpressure
(psi)
(kPaa)
Annoying noise (137dB), if low frequency (1-15

Hz)
0.02
0.2
Occasional breaking of large glass windows

already under strain
0.03
Loud noise (143 dB), Sonic boom glass failure
0.04
Breakage of windows, small under strain
0.1
0.7
0.15
1.0
0.3
2.0
0.4
2.8
0.5 - 1.0
3.5 - 6.9
Minor damage to house structure
0.7
4.8
Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
1.0
6.9
1-2
6.9 - 13.8
1.3
9.0
13.8
2-3
13.8 - 20.7
Lower limit of serious structural damage
2.3
15.9
50 % destruction of brickwork of house
2.5
17.3
20.7
Typical pressure for glass failure

"Safe distance" (probably 0.95 no serious damage
beyond this value)
Missile limit
Some damage to house ceilings; 10% window
glass structure
Limited minor structural damage
Large and small windows usually shattered;
occasional damage to window frames
Corrugated asbestos shattered

Corrugated steel or aluminum panels, fastening
fail, followed by buckling
Wood panels (standard housing) fastenings fail,
panels blown in
Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced,
shattered
Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building

suffer little damage
page 108
Peak side on overpressure

(psi)
(kPaa)
3-4
20.7 - 27.6
Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured
27.6
Wooden utilities poles (telegraph, etc.) snapped
34.5
5-7
34.5 - 48.3
48.3
7-8
48.3 - 55.2
62.1
10
69.0
300
2000
Steel frame building distorted and pulled away

from foundation
Frameless, self-framing steel panel building
demolished
Rupture of oil storage tanks
Tail hydraulic press (40 000 lb) in building slightly

damaged
Nearly complete destruction of houses
Loaded train wagons overturned
Brick panels, 8 - 12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail
by shearing or flexure
Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
Probable total destruction of buildings
Heavy (7000 lb) machine tools moved and badly
damaged
Very heavy (12 000 lb) machine tool survived
Limit of crater lip
Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from CPS 2000)
are given in Table 51.
Consequence analysis modeling
The analysis of the consequences of the accidental scenarios has been done using computer
codes, with the process data and assumptions discussed in the preceding chapters. The
analysis has been done considering two meteorological conditions: low wind velocity
associated with stability class F (stable atmosphere) and medium wind velocity associated
with stability class D (neutral atmosphere).
In the following sections, the main results of the consequence analysis are given.
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of pressure vessel FA-2514
The analysis considers the full bore rupture of the 6 pipe at the outlet of the FA-2514
vessel.
The following tables summarizes the main characteristics of the scenarios associated to the
event.
Table 52: TOP1 Release from FA-2514, main characteristics
LEAK
FULL BORE RUPTURE
EQUIPMENT
Bottom line of F-2514
SUBSTANCE
Propylene
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW
SECTION
Not analyzed
152 mm
TEMPERATURE
Not analyzed
43.3C
PRESSURE
Not analyzed
19.9 barg
OUTFLOW RATE
Not analyzed
509 kg/s
page 109
LEAK
FULL BORE RUPTURE
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
The Propylene leak is considered to be directed downward,

forming a pool of liquid that, in case of ignition, will cause a
Pool Fire.
If the pool is not ignited, it will start evaporating and the
resulting cloud will disperse. If the cloud is ignited at
distance from the source, where the gas concentration is
still within the flammable limits, it can give rise to an UVCE
or a Flash Fire, depending on the congestion conditions.
If no ignition is found, the cloud will disperse without any
further consequences.
RELEASE
DURATION
< 1 minute (considering shutdown activation)
The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following
Table.
The analysis is done also if all scenarios have frequency of occurrence lower than 1E-7
events/year, practically not credible, to obtain an assessment of the damage distances
associated to a major release case.
Table 53: TOP1 Release from FA-2514, scenario
SCENARIO
Pool Fire (1)

S1
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
LEVEL
DAMAGE DISTANCE
(m)
Flame height
29
37.5 kW/m2
20
42
12.5 kW/m
1.5F/ 5D
55
5 kW/m2
63
80
7 kW/m
3 kW/m
UVCE(1)
S2
Flammable mass
7000
0.3 bar
150
0.14 bar
260
0.07 bar
570
0.03 bar
1000
LFL
562
LFL/2
758
LFL
400
LFL/2
538
1.5F/5D
Flash Fire(1)
S3
1.5F
5D
((1)
The scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not credible.
Distances calculated to give assessment of a worst case scenario
TOP2: Release of gasoline from bottom of Column DA-2503

The analysis considers the release from the 6 pipe at the bottom outlet of the DA-2503
column.
The following Table 54 summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to
the event.
Table 54: TOP2 Release from DA-2503, main characteristics
LEAK
EQUIPMENT
Bottom line of DA-2503
page 110
MAJOR RUPTURE
LEAK
SUBSTANCE
MAJOR RUPTURE
Gasoline (Modeled as Octane)
DIAMETER OF OUTFLOW
SECTION
TEMPERATURE
PRESSURE
OUTFLOW RATE
191 C
191 C
12.7 barg
12.7 barg
13 kg/s
208 kg/s
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally,

forming a two-phase jet that, in case of ignition, will
cause a Jet Fire and a Pool fire of the rain-out
quantity.
If the jet is not ignited, it will disperse. If the cloud is
ignited at distance from the source, where the gas
concentration is still within the flammable limits, it
can give rise to an UVCE or a Flash Fire, depending
on the congestion conditions.
If no ignition is found, the cloud will disperse without
any further consequences.
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
RELEASE DURATION
10 minutes
< 1 minute (considering

shutdown activation)
Table. The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible.
Table 55: TOP2 Release from DA-2503, scenario
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
1.5F/5D
Jet /Pool
Fire
S4
1.5F
UVCE
S5
5D
Release Size 4
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
Flame
length
14
Flame
length
20
37.5
kW/m2
37.5
kW/m2
12.5
kW/m2
15
12.5
kW/m2
16
7 kW/m2
20
7 kW/m2
25
25
28
5 kW/m
3 kW/m
Flammable
mass
5 kW/m
31
3 kW/m
37
660
Flammable
mass
3000
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1)
0.03 bar
(2)
0.03 bar
(1)
Flammable
mass
250
Flammable
mass
2600
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1)
page 111
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
0.03 bar
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
(2)
0.03 bar
(1)
LFL
85
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
LFL
83
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
1.5F
Flash Fire
S6
Release Size 4
5D
(1)
Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not
credible.
(2)
Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg
and the explosion is to be considered not credible.
TOP3: Release of propane from bottom of Splitter DA-2509

The analysis considers the release from the 3 pipe at the bottom outlet of the DA-2509
column.
The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the
event.
Table 56: TOP3 Release from DA-2509, main characteristics
LEAK
MAJOR RUPTURE
EQUIPMENT
Bottom line of DA-2509
SUBSTANCE
Propane
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW SECTION
62 C
62 C
PRESSURE
21 barg
21 barg
OUTFLOW RATE
2.8 kg/s
25 kg/s
TEMPERATURE
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming

a two-phase jet that, in case of ignition, will cause a Jet
Fire.
If the jet is not ignited, it will disperse. If the cloud is
ignited at distance from the source, where the gas
concentration is still within the flammable limits, it can
give rise to an UVCE or a Flash Fire, depending on the
congestion conditions.
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
RELEASE DURATION
> 1 hour
10 minutes (considering
shutdown activation)
table.
The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
Table 57: TOP3 Release from DA 2509, scenario
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
Jet Fire
S7
Release Size 3
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
1.5F/5D
Flame length
19
Flame
length
46
page 112
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
37.5 kW/m2
37.5
kW/m2
14
12.5 kW/m2
12.5
kW/m2
30
7 kW/m2
11
7 kW/m2
42
14
50
5 kW/m
3 kW/m
Flammable
mass
1.5F
UVCE
S8
1.5F
Flash Fire
S9
5D
5 kW/m
20
3 kW/m
60
100
Flammable
mass
3400
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1)
0.03 bar
(2)
0.03 bar
(1)
Flammable
mass
5D
Release Size 3
10
Flammable
mass
260
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1), (2)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1), (2)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1), (2)
0.03 bar
(2)
0.03 bar
(1), (2)
LFL
85
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
LFL
83
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
(1)
Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not
credible.
(2)
Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg
and the explosion is to be considered not credible.
Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953

The analysis considers a release from FA-2953. The following Table summarizes the main
characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event.
Table 58: EVENT 4 Release from FA-2953, main characteristics
LEAK
MAJOR RUPTURE
EQUIPMENT
FA-2953
SUBSTANCE
H2S (90%)
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW
SECTION
50 mm
TEMPERATURE
77 C
PRESSURE
OUTFLOW RATE
SCENARIO
Not considered
5 barg
2.2 kg/s
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a
page 113
DEVELOPMENT
RELEASE
DURATION
dispersing jet.
15 minutes (considering shutdown activation)
Table.
Table 59: Event 4 Release from FA-2953, scenario
Release size 100 mm
Scenario
WEATHER
CONDITION
1.5F
Toxic Dispersion
S10
5D
LEVEL
DAMAGE DISTANCE
(m)
LC50
420
IDLH
1300
LC50
230
IDLH
720
Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2455

The analysis considers a release from FA-2455. The following Table summarizes the main
characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event.
Table 60: EVENT 5 Release from FA-2455, main characteristics
LEAK
MAJOR RUPTURE
EQUIPMENT
FA-2455
SUBSTANCE
H2S (70%), SO2 (30%)
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW SECTION
100 mm
TEMPERATURE
102 C
PRESSURE
1 barg
OUTFLOW RATE
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
Not considered
2.9 kg/s
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a
dispersing jet.
RELEASE
DURATION
Approx 45 minutes
Table.
The distances given in the table refer to the concentration of H2S, that is the main
component of the mixture.
Table 61: EVENT 5 Release from FA-2455, scenario
Release size 100 mm
Scenario
Toxic Dispersion
S11
WEATHER
CONDITION
1.5F
5D
page 114
LEVEL
DAMAGE DISTANCE
(m)
LC50
360
IDLH
1100
LC50
255
IDLH
670
2.7.4.5 Domino effect from Event TOP1

Domino effects from Event TOP1 can be mainly due to overpressure effects. The criteria for
the definition of damage levels associated to overpressure are given in Table 50. Table 62
shows the level of damage (in percent) for the affected structures.
Table 62: Level of damage (in percent) for the affected structures
Structure parts,
equipment
(example only!)
Atmospheric
distillation
Scenario Nr. 1 (EML1)
Scenario
probability (p)
Value
(milion )
500
0.0000015
%
Damage
5 - 10
Damage
(k)
1200
Description
Overpressure of 0.05bar
Damage of 90% glass
Instrumentation
damage
In worst case scenario,

about 10% damage
Command center
10
0.0
Overpressure of 10kPa
(0.1bar).
Damage of structures of
Vacuum
distillation
1100
10
2400
60%, process equipment

10%
Metal frames slightly
moved
Small amount of damage
inside; can be repaired
Damage of light roof
constructions
Overpressure of 15 kPa
(0.15 bar)
Damage, but not
destruction of structures
FCC
11000
30
9000
Glass and
instrumentation damaged
Electrical cabling and
control equipment
damaged
The inner part of the
cooling tower damaged
Overpressure of 10kPa
(0.1bar).
Structural damage of
Sulphurisation
700
10
70
Alkylation
Total
1000
100
14310
1000
13670
page 115
60%, process equipment

of 10%
Metal frames slightly
moved
Small amount of damage
inside; can be repaired
Damage of light roof
constructions
total damage
VAR (k )
20.505
2.7.4.6 Summary of Hazard Analysis

The results of the hazard analysis are summarized in Annex 23. The following information
are given:
initiating event
accidental scenarios deriving from initiating event
frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios
damage distances.
2.7.4.7 Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards

Measures to avoid the occurrence of leaks and ruptures, to avoid ignition of leaking
substances, to limit effects of fires/explosion, to avoid or control process deviations are
Organizational and/or Technical and are described in Chapter 2.1.3.4.
Organizational measures
The intended major maintenance period is every three years. In reality at the moment there
is a major maintenance shut down per year as the process has been modified to increase the
efficiency of the process. The modification can partly lead to erosion and corrosion. This has
to be controlled at the moment by a yearly inspection.
regulations.
It is not an obligation in Serbia but regarding the topic explosion protection the Risk
Management division has started to consider the requirements of the ATEX Directives. An
explosion protection document has been developed which has been submitted to the
Ministry. The exchange of the equipment in regard to the requirements of the ATEX Directive
will be done step by step. Furthermore the German TA Luft will be implemented.
The inspection is in the responsibility of the production and maintaining department of RNP
and planning of safety aspects is in the responsibility of the Risk Management department.
Lighting protection
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to two accidents in the past. About
10 years ago a safety valve has been fired by lightning and last year a burning flare has
been addressed by lightning.
The normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the
protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance
and continuity will be done. All safety valves are protected by steam extinguishers. This task
is from 2007. in the responsibility of Risk Management division and will be done by an
external party.
2.7.4.8 Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident
Constructional and technical measures are presented in Chapter 2.1.3.4.
Further, bow-tie analysis has been done for selected top events described in Chapter 2.7.4.2
and summarized in Table 63.
The bow-tie is a structured method to assess risk where a qualitative approach may not be
possible or desirable. The success of the diagram is that it is simple and easy for the nonspecialist to understand. The idea is a simple one of combining the cause (fault tree) and the
consequence (event tree). When the fault tree is drawn on the left hand side and the event
tree is drawn on the right hand side with the hazard drawn as a "knot" in the middle the
diagram looks a bit like a bowtie.
page 116
The exact starting point of the Bowtie Methodology has been lost in time but it is believed
that they were originally called Butterfly diagrams and evolved from the Cause
Consequence Diagram of the 1970s. It is then thought that David Gill of ICI plc developed
the methodology and called them bowties in the late 70s. It is generally accepted that the
earliest mention of the bowtie methodology appears in the ICI Hazan Course Notes 1979,
presented by The University of Queensland, Australia.
Bowtie diagrams for FCC have been created for selected top events which are to be
prevented by
analyzing threats that could cause the event to occur

analyzing consequences of the event occurring
using available controls to prevent the event occurring and
using available controls to mitigate against the consequences
Table 63: Selected TOP events and scenario
No
Description
Content
Phase
Component
propylene
liquid
FA-2514
gasoline
liquid
DA-2503
propane
liquid
DA-2509
90% H2S,
gas
FA-2953
(mixture)
H2S, SO2,
Co2
gas
FA-2455
Vessel, Leak, inside

S1: pool fire
TOP1
S2: delayed VCE

S3: BLEVE
S4: Flash fire
Column, Leak, bottom
TOP2
S5: jet fire

S6: UVCE
S7: Flash fire
Splitter, Leak, bottom
TOP3
S8: jet fire

S9: VCE
S10: flash fire
TOP4
TOP5
Vessel, leak of toxic gas

S11: Dispersion
Vessel, Leak of toxic
gas from the
combustion chambers
S12:
Corresponding bow-ties are given in Annex 24.
2.7.5
Risk assessment
The risk associated to the FCC operation is assessed through a Risk Matrix.
2.7.5.1 Frequency ranking
The frequency of occurrence of scenarios is assessed according to the classes given in table :
2.7.5.2 Damage severity
The severity of damages associated to each scenario is assessed according to the following
classes, where the severity is related to the maximum distance at which the damage levels
page 117
are experienced. It shall be noted that the definition of severity considers major hazards
having a potential impact on the population, as required by the Seveso II directive.
Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes
Frequency
(events/year)
Classification
PROBABLE
> 10-2
UNLIKELY
10-4 10-2
VERY UNLIKELY
10-6 10-4
Scenario
S10, S11
-6
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY
< 10
S1 S9
Effects limited to the plant personnel are therefore in this context considered as not defining
a major hazards. These are assessed and controlled by Occupational Health procedures and
analyzes.
Table 65: Definition of consequence severity classes
Classification
Damage
Neligible
No significant effects if not in the vicinity of the

involved equipment
Significant
Effect dangerous for life (12.5 kW/m2, 0.14 bar,

IDLH) reached within the FCC Unit.
Serious

IDLH) reached outside the FCC Unit, limited
within the Refinery fences.
Major

IDLH) reached outside the refinery fences.
On the basis of the above definition, the risk associated to each scenario can be assessed as
in the following Risk Matrix, where three levels of risk are sown: an High risk area (in red)
where prevention and protection measures shall be considered to reduce the risk, a Medium
Risk area (in yellow) where prevention and protection measures should be considered to
reduce the risk, a Low risk area (in green) where the risk can be considered to be tolerable
and no further measures are necessary.
Table 66: Risk matrix for considered scenarios
Negligible
S3, S5, S6,

S8, S9
Significant
S1, S4, S7
Serious
S2
S11, S10
Extremely
unlikely
Very unlikely
Major
2.7.6
Conclusions
page 118
unlikely
Probable
RBI / RCM Users manual
Due to size and for easier use of the manual it is given as a separate book.
page 119
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
Contract No: 45/609 of September 8, 2006

API RP 581, Risk-Based Inspection Technology, Second edition, September 2008
CEN CWA 15740 RIMAP, 2008
[4]
HSE RNP, Implementation of HSE in NIS a.d. Plants NIS RNP Safety report, May 2008
[5]
Understanding explosions (2003) By Daniel A. Crowl. Center for Chemical Process Safety of the
AIChE, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 16, Issue 5, Page 449
[6]
page 120
Annexes
page 121
Annex 1 Geographical position of Pancevo
page 122
Annex 2 Industrial zone of Pancevo
page 123
Annex 3 General plan of Pancevo refinery
page 124
Annex 4 Organization of Pancevo refinery
page 125
Annex 5
General plan of Novi Sad refinery
page 126
Annex 6
Nr
Substances in Novi Sad refinery
Generic, chemical or other

name or chemical formula
Place in process
Raw
material
1.
Crude oil
2.
LPG
3.
Primary gasoline
4.
Motor gasoline MB-95
5.
Intermedi
ate
Byproduct
Final
product
Waste
Mas (t)
Transport
Transfer
Storage
Max.
daily
Av.
monthly
Av.
yearly
558527
847
27042
6957
Motor gasoline BMB-95
20527
6.
Dizel
157221
7.
Fuel oil
11591
8.
Mazut
154034
9.
Bitumene
31320
10.
Oil distillate
55796
11.
HCl
2530
12.
NaOH
1791
13.
NH4OH
14.
Na OCl
x
x
page 127
Nr
Generic, chemical or other

name or chemical formula
Place in process
Mas (t)
15.
NALCO 71221 (Coagulant for

raw water)
5,2
16.
NALCO 71601
1,1 t
17.
Na3PO4
0,3 t
page 128
Annex 7
Organization of Novi Sad refinery

RNS Director
Directors Office
Secretariat
Business Coord.
Department
Technical-Technological
Department
Information and
PR Service
Production
Center for MS
Manipulation
Maintenance
Laboratory
Development and
Investment
Risk Management
Legal, personnel and

General Affairs
Finance and
Counting
Commercial
Business
Power Plant
ICTI Economics
Goods Management
page 129
Annex 8
A.8.1
Responsibilities within management system

in Novi Sad refinery
According to the requests of the standard ISO 9001:2000

(SRPS ISO 9001:2001)
ISO 9001
Requirement
Quality management system
4.1
Function/job position
Comment
General requests
- determinig,
documenting,
RNS director,
implementation,
management representative management representative is
maintenance and constant
main responsible
improvement of QMS
effectiveness
- QMS implementation
top management,
management representative
4.2
Requests refering to documentation
4.2.1
General requests
Overall management system for

top management,
all QMS documentation and
records
4.2.2
Quality manual
management
4.2.3
Documentation
management
Official management with all

top management,
management representative documentation, records and
computer media used in QMS
MSC manager
4.2.4
Records management
top management
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1
Management
responsibilities and
activities
Development, implementation
top management,
and improvement of QMS
effectiveness
5.2
Focus on user
Ensurance that users

top management,
requirements are determined and
met
Quality policy
- declaring quality policy
RNS director
- implementation and
maintenance of quality
policy
Communication and
top management,
interpretation of quality policy to
all people in the organization
- quality policy review
top management,
5.3
5.4
5.4.1
Development, management and

maintenance
Records management and

removal
Planning
Quality objectives
Setting quality objectives at

certain functions and levels
within the organization,
top management,
management representative measuring quality objectives,
compliance with quality policy
and constant improvement
page 130
ISO 9001
Requirement
Comment
obligation
In order to accomplish quality

top management,
objectives, QMS has to be
planned
5.4.2
QMS planning
5.5
Responsibilities, authorizations and communication
5.5.1
Responsibilities and
authorizations
Defining and communicating

top management,
authorizations in the organization
5.5.2
Management
representative
Direktor RNS
Appointing management
representative
5.5.3
Internal communications
top management
Establishing appropriate
communication processes in the
organization
5.6
Review by management
top management,
QMS review in planned intervals
6.
RESOURSE MANAGEMENT
6.1
Provision of resources
- defining required
resources
organizational parts
managers
- provision of required
resources
RNS director
Defining and providing required

resources
6.2
Human resources
6.2.1
- general provisions, (staff

RNS director
allocation)
6.2.2
- qualification, awareness
and training
top management
head of the Personnel
Section
Infrastructure
- defining required
infrastructure and its
maintenance
top management
Operations director
- establishment of the
required infrastructure
RNS director
6.4
Working environment
top management
Defining and managing human

and physical factors of working
environment
7.
PRODUCTS REALIZATION
7.1
Planning of products
realization
top management
Planning and development of

processes required for products
realization
7.2
Processes applying to customers
7.2.1
Determining requests
related to products
(services)
Director of Department for

Materials Flow Management
(MFM),
Director of techncial and
technological operations
Ensuring that agreement related

to customers requests, changes
and amendments has been
achieved
7.2.2
Revision of requests
related to products
(services)
Functions of participants in
the revision process
Ensuring the organization has an

ability to meet requirements
7.2.3
Communication with
customers

(MFM),
Director of techncial and
Ensuring potential additional

requests are fullfiled
7.3
Design and development
6.3
page 131
Ensuring staff is competent

based on adequate qualifications,
training, knowledge and
experience
Defining, establishing and

maintaining infrastructure
ISO 9001
Requirement
Comment
7.3.1
do
7.3.7
From planning design and

development to managing
changes of design and
development
top management,
director of Department for
development and
investments
Managing and coordinating

design and development by
planning, input elements, output
elements, revisions, verifications,
validation and changes
management
7.4
Supply
7.4.1
Supply process
7.4.2
Supply information
7.4.3
Verification of supplied
products

commercial operations
Selection and rating of suppliers

and receipt of supplied
products/services
7.5
Production and servicing
7.5.1
Production and servicing

management
Planning, producing and servicing

in conditions of management
7.5.2
Validation of production
and servicing processes
Validation of processes whose

resulting output elements can
not be verified by follow-up
monitoring and measurements
Director of technical and

technological operations,
Director of Operations
Director of Handling Dept
Director of Energy Plant
Identification of products and

management with unique
identification of products
7.5.3
Identification and
reproducibility
7.5.4
Users assets
Identification, verification, safety

and provision of customers
assets
7.5.5
Products perservation
Maintaining compliance of
products during the realization of
internal processes
7.6
Managing tracking and

measuring devices
8.
MEASUREMENTS, ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENTS
8.1
General provisions
8.2

top management
Determining management
method by monitoring and
measuring devices
Planning and conducting

processes of monitoring,
measuring, analysis and
improvements
Monitoring and measurements
8.2.1
Meeting customers
requirements

(MFM)
Tracking information about

customers observations related
to meeting requirements
8.2.2
Internal audit
management
representative,
MSC manager
Contrinuous rating of QMS

compliance and effectiveness
8.2.3
Monitoring and measuring

processes performances
top management
Showing processes abilities to

achieve planned results

products characteristics

Director of Laboratory
(MFM)
Verification of requests for

products (controlling,
examination, monitoring)
8.2.4
8.3
Managing inconsistencies
in a product

page 132
Analysis and treating

inconsistencies in a product
ISO 9001
Requirement
8.4
Data analysis
8.5
Improvements
8.5.1
do
8.5.3
- Constant improvements
- Corrective actions
- Preventive actions
A.8.2
ISO
14001
Comment
top management
Determining, collecting and

analyzing data about a process
and product and taking measures
based on the obtained data
Improving QMS effectiveness by

using quality policy, quality
objectives, results of revisions,
top management,
management representative data analysis, corrective actions,
preventive actions and
assesment by the management
According to the requests of the standard ISO

14001:2004 (SRPS ISO 14001:2005)
Requirement
Comment
General requests
4.1
determining,documenting, top management,

implemetation,
MS management
maintenance and
representative
continuous EMS
improvement
MS management representative
is main responsible
Announcement, development,
top management, MS
maintenance, communication to
management representative all employees; revision and
audit.
4.2
Environmental policy
4.3
Planning
4.3.1
Environmental aspects
top management,
MS management
representative
Identification of important
environmental aspects,revision
and constant updating.
Legal and other

requirements
top management,
MS management
representative,
EMS coordinator
(Environmental Dept
manager)
Determining identification
procedures and approaches to
legal and other reqests that
relate to environmental aspects
and RNS activities, products or
services.
top management,
MS management
representative
Determining application and

maintenance of documented
general and specific
envionmental objectives in
compliance with adopted policy
and obligation to prevent
environemntal pollution.
Development and maintaining of
a program for accomplishing
defined general and specific
objectives that specifies
responsibilities, assets and
deadlines for their realization.
4.3.2
4.3.3
General and specific

objectives and programs
4.4
Application and implementation
4.4.1
Resources, objectives,
authorizations
Director of RNS
Providing resources availability.

Setting, documenting and
communicating objectives,
authorizations
Appointing one or more
management representatives for
environment.
4.4.2
Qualifications, training
and awareness
top management,
MS management
Identification of needs for

professional improvements.
page 133
ISO
14001
4.4.3
4.4.4
4.4.5
4.4.6
Requirement
Comment
representative,
Head of the Personnel
Section
Education, professional
improvements and gaining
experience for competency
purpose.
Presenting EMS to staff and
creating awareness about
environment, motivation of
people.
top management,
MS management
representative
Implementing and maintaining

internal and external
communication.
Documentation
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Determining different types of

documentation that are being
managed, application and
maintenance of efficient working
procedures and controls related
to EMS.
Documentation (information) can
be on paper and/or in an
electronic form.
Documentation control
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Establishing, applying and

maintaining documented
procedures for documentation
control that is required by EMS
and standard SRPS ISO
14001:2005.
Operations controls

maintaining documented
procedures for the control of
operations and activities related
Managers directly
to determined important
responsible for performance
environmental aspects.
of a specific operation,
Determining working criteria in
direct operations executors.
procedures.
Introducing suppliers and
contractors with specific
procedures and requests.
Communication
4.4.7
Alertness to response in
emergency situations
4.5
Revision
top management,
other employees within the
defined competencies and
responsibilities.
Identification of potential
accidents and hazardous events,
response and prevention and
mitigation of their environmental
impact.
Periodic assessment, if required,
revision of responsiveness in
emergency situations as well as
examination of response
procedures.
Establishing, application and

maintenance of regular
monitoring and measuring
procedures of crucial operations
characteristics that may have an
important influence on
environment and information
documentation.
Ensuring that calibrated and
verified equipment is used ofr
monitoring and measuring,
keeping records of related
documentation.
Establishing, application and
maintenance of procedures of
4.5.1
Montoring and measuring
EMS coordinator
(Environmental Dept
manager)
MS management
representative,
4.5.2
Compliance evaluation
EMS coordinator
(Environmental Dept
page 134
ISO
14001
4.5.3
4.5.4
4.5.5
4.6
Requirement
Comment
manager)
MS management
representative,
periodic evaluation of compliance

with applicable legal and other
requests which RNS approved.
MS management
representative,
Inconsistencies, corrective MSC manager,
other employees within the
and preventive actions
defined competencies and
responsibilities.

maintaining procedures for
determining inconsistencies,
identifying the cause of
inconsistencies, taking corrective
and preventive actions in
proportion to the difficulty of a
problem and its influence on the
environment.
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager

maintaining procedures for
records management required by
the standard JUS ISO
14001:2004 and by standards
used in EMS.
Internal audits
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Establishing and maintaining one

or more programs and
procedures for performing
planned controls to determine
whether EMS is in compliance
with planned EMS solution, is it
properly introduced and
maintained and communication
of process results to the
management.
Revision by management
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Management has a responsibility

to do EMS revision in planned
intervals to enable its suitability,
adequacy and effectiveness.
Records control
page 135
Annex 9
Novi Sad refinery flow diagram of U 100
page 136
Annex 10 Refinery Novi Sad flow diagram of U 200
page 137
Annex 11 Elemir Gas refinery in NIS Naftagas
page 138
Annex 12 Integrated management system policy of NIS

Naftagas
page 139
Annex 13 Flow diagram of Elemir Gas Refinery
D-300
TROFAZNI
SEPARATOR
F-301
FILTER ZA
GASNI
KONDENZAT
D-101
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
T-1
DEHIDRATACIONA
KOLONA
E-110
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
T-9
KOLONA ZA
SUENJE
KONDENZATA
T-101
DEHIDRATACIONA
KOLONA
D-16
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
E-102
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
E-101 A/B
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-1 A/B
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-2
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
E-120
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
D-120
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
T-2
APSORBER
D-102
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
E-104
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-3
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
D-1
PRIHVATNI
SUD
E-5
D-104
IZMENJIVAC SEPARATOR
POSUDA
TOPLOTE
E-103
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
D-5
PRIHVATNI
SUD ZA
PROPAN
E-7
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
E-6 A/B
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
D-103
PRIHVATNI
SUD ZA PARE
PROPANA
D-4
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA ZA
PROPAN
D-121
E-15
SC-1
VODENI CENTRIFUGALNI SEPARATOR ZA
RABLJENO ULJE
HLADNJAK
SEPARATOR
E-116
VODENI
HLADNJAK
E-4
VODENI
HLADNJAK
C-1,2 A/B
C-102
KOMPRESOR
KOMPRESORI
WEIR KLARK COOPER-BESSEMER
D-122
F-1; F-201
KOALESCER
PEC
E-24 A/B
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
T-3
DEETANIZER
E-1A
HO
LCV
152A
T-9
TRC
151
LC
4
1
E-1B
200.2
E-104
E-24A
PREMA
D-9
TIC
204
D-120
C3
LC
1
LC
208
D-104
C3
FIQ
102
C-2A
C3
LC
153
E-21
RIBOJLER
E-23
KONDENZATOR
E-22
VODENI
HLADNJAK
D-8
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA ZA
IZO-BUTAN
F-302
FILTER ZA
SIROVI
GAZOLIN
CW
C-2A
C-1A
C-2B
TS
150
FRC
10
FRC
11
F-201
FRC
13
29
T-8
19
24
D-8
35
T-4
29
CW
PRC
8
T-7
PRC
7
13
25
FRC
7
E-4
E-5
TRC
10
T-6
HIC
150
TS
1
E-116
C-1B
LC
10
30
CW
D-2
F-1
D-7
D-6
35
TRC
5
35
CW
E-19
E-10
E-15
E-22
TRC
9
TRC
8
C3
D-103
E-20B
PRC
4
16
TIC
6
23
OD/PREMA
C3
LC
19
E-21
LC
8
13
E-101B
LC
20
GS ELEMIR
T-8
DEIZOBUTANIZER
E-23
FRC
9
E-110
19
C-1B
TRC
3
D-16
E-20 A/B
KONDENZATOR
E-18
15
E-9
18
od E-4
C3
LI
19
LCV
101
CW
LC
5
D-102
E-102
LS
157
D-1
LC
114
LC
129
LI
6
CW
LG
155
SC-1
LG
156
D-121
11
LC
7
D-4
SV
7
TRC
7
TRCAH
160
TSH
163
FS
8
FRC
5
PREMA E-2
TRC
128
LOIVI GAS
C-2B
PRC
152
C-1A/B
E-5
E-101A
LC
152
LC
3
C-1A
E-7
E-102
E-7
E-3
T-2
PCV
24
PREMA
LC
2
LC
101
D-7
PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA
SMEU N-BUTANA I
IZO-BUTANA
E-11
E-2
E-3
26
LC
154
UV
154
D-101
E-19
RIBOJLER
FRC
6
E-24B
TIC
4B
PC
6
od
LC
151
T-7
DEBUTANIZER
PRC
9
T-3
PC
5
E-3
E-7
301B
10
E-18
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
8
PRC
19
E-2
D-6
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA ZA
PROPAN
PREMA
E-6B
PCV
E-17
RIBOJLER
E-8
13
E-6A
E-2
PCV
301A
E-16
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
TIC
4A
LC
9
FI
TRC
152
E-12
KONDENZATOR
E-12
1
PREMA
T-5
200.1
T-101
T-1
D-2
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA
E-20A
II
FI
PIC
210
E-110
PC
301
T-4
DESTILATOR
HCV
150
C-102
I
D-5
KA T -3
E-10
RIBOJLER
PRC
3
PRC
151
E-120
LCV
2
E-11
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-103
LC
131
HO
E-9
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
PREMA E-3
FRC
14
P RCA
SV
6
160
FRC
8
PREMA E-7
PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA RABLJENO ULJE
C3
KA D -9
PRERAENI
GAS
ULAZNA AHTA
FIQ
103
KA T-4; T-6;
T-8
FIQ
03-01
ULAZ GASA
FIQ
100
FIQ
D-300
LAH
301
LAL
301
PREMA
GR-1/GR-102
OD E-25
P-120A/B
PS-4
P-1A/B/C
P-2A/B
LIC
301
FIQ
106
PCV
201
FIQ
104
FIQ
NORMALNI
BUTAN
IZOBUTAN
F-302
U PRELIVNI
AHT
FIQ
107
AS
150
D-122
LCV
101
P-4A/B/C
P-5A/B
OD
D-9
GAZOLIN
PROPAN
P-11
P-8A/B
P-7A/B
SMEA
PENTANA
P-9A/B
SMEA
BUTANA
P- 30
F-301
SIROVI GAZOLIN IZ
PROIZVODNIH
REZERVOARA
Legenda:
Propan
N-butan
U PRELIVNI
AHT
24.08. 2006
D-27A
Jain/Subotin
Izobutan
Gazolin
Prirodni gas
Preradeni gas
S.Josipovic
Projektni zadatak za izr. URP

rekonstr. sist. za prikupljanje i spaljivanje
fluida u pogonu za proizv. NTG El.
Apsorpciono ulje
Kondezat ugljovodonika
Toplo ulje
Rashladni propan
Bogato ulje
Rashladna voda
NIS Naftagas
TEG
Loivi gas
Pogon za proizv. NTG ELEMIR
page 140
A.Ilic
TEHNOLOKA EMA POGONA TNG

1
Annex 14 Position of unit FCC in Pancevo refinery

A.14.1
Blocks in Pancevo refinery
page 141
A.14.2
General plan of refinery position of FCC in Block 6
page 142
Annex 15 QMS/EMS documents of RNP

No
Document full name, English
File name
1.
Environment Management Manual
2.
Identification of environmental aspects
EP01.doc
3.
Validation of environment impact
EP02.doc
4.
Legal and other requirements
EP03.doc
5.
Environment goals and objective
EP04.doc
6.
Programs for environment

management
EP05.doc
7.
Communication in EMS
EP06.doc
8.
Waste management
EP07.doc
9.
Dangerous materials management
EP08.doc
10.
Oil management
EP09.doc
11.
Readiness for emergency situation
EPO10.dok
12.
EPO11.dok
13.
Nonconformities resolution in EMS
EPO12.dok
14.
Quality plan
PQ000.doc
15.
Plan for implementation and

certification of EMS
PQ002.doc
16.
Start up and shut down of the unit
QG45-01.doc
17.
Instruction for operation and

maintenance of swimming roofs
QG46-09.doc
18.
Work order
QG55-01.doc
19.
Conduction of maintenance works in

RNP
QG55-02.doc
20.
Equipment control,
QG55-03.doc
21.
Quality Manual
22.
Formatting of quality management

system documents
QP01.doc
23.
Control of management systems

documents
QP02.doc
24.
Standards and
QP03.doc
25.
Control of records
QP04.doc
26.
Strategic studies development plans
QP05.doc
27.
Business analysis and planning
QP06.doc
28.
Job descriptions
QP08.doc
EMS_Poslovnik.doc
QMS_Poslovnik.doc
page 143
No
29.
Management review
QP10.doc
30.
Education and training
QP11.doc
31.
Knowladge of management systems in

RNP
QP12.doc
32.
Personnel evidence
QP13.doc
33.
Maintenance
QP16.doc
34.
Maintenance planning
QP17.doc
35.
Preventive, corrective and investments

maintenance
QP18.doc
36.
Unit and equipment overhaul
QP19.doc
37.
Hardware
QP20.doc
38.
Security
QP21.doc
39.
Sales
QP23.doc
40.
Contracting, contract elements and

contract review
QP24.doc
41.
Business communication and protocol
QP25.doc
42.
Product development
QP26.doc
43.
Development and investments
QP27.doc
44.
Facilities construction
QP29.doc
45.
Development of information system
QP33.doc
46.
Software
QP35.doc
47.
Design and construction in

maintenance
QP36.doc
48.
Purchasing
QP38.doc
49.
Suppliers validation and selection
QP39.doc
50.
Production
QP44.doc
51.
Control of production process
QP45.doc
52.
Manipulation
QP46.doc
53.
Finalization
QP47.doc
54.
Crude oil and derivates reception
QP48.doc
55.
Power plant
QP50.doc
56.
Technological steam production and

distribution
QP51.doc
57.
Chemical and technological preparation

of water
QP52.doc
58.
Electricity production and distribution
QP53.doc
59.
Work order for works in refinery
QP55.doc
60.
Product servicing
QP56.doc
61.
Material balance counting
QP58.doc
62.
Legal, general and personnel affairs
QP59.doc
63.
Library of RNP
QP60.doc
64.
Product identification and traceability
QP61.doc
page 144
File name
No
65.
66.
Customer supplied product control
QP63.doc
67.
Delivery of oil products
QP65.doc
68.
Measuring, control and monitoring

equipment
QP66.doc
69.
Customer satisfaction measuring and

monitoring
QP67.doc
70.
Internal audits
QP68.doc
71.
Technical surveillance over the

equipment and conduction of
maintenance works in RNP
QP69.doc
72.
Control plans
QP70.doc
73.
Sampling and samples marking
QP71.doc
74.
Customers complains
QP72.doc
75.
Corrective and preventive measures
QP74.doc
page 145
File name
Annex 16 List of available drawings of FCC

Drawing Title
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP
Standard symbols
Foster
Wheeler
(FW)
2231-0-50-2300.B
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Reactor stripper.
FW
2231-0-50-2301.F
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Regenerator.
FW
2231-0-50-2302.G
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Air blowers and air

heaters.
FW
2231-0-50-2303.F
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Catalytic transport

and storage
FW
2231-0-50-2304.F
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Air surge & Spray

water drums
FW
2231-0-50-2305.F
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Engineering details
FW
2231-0-50-2306.F
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Feed preheat system.
FW
2231-0-50-2307.G
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Main fractionators.
FW
2231-0-50-2308.F
LO 03A18A
FCC process. ICGO&LCGO strippers
FW
2231-0-50-2309.G
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Fractionator OH

System.
FW
2231-0-50-2310.F
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Gland & flushing oil

system.
FW
2231-0-50-2311.E
LO 03A18A
FCC process. CO Boiler
FW
2231-0-50-2312.E
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Fired heaters burner

and decoking detail
FW
2231-0-50-2313.D
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Evaporization system

for of LPG and gas fuel
FW
2231-0-50-2314.E
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Battery limit pipelines
FW
2231-0-50-2321.B
LO 03A18A
FCC process. Light cycle gas oil

hydrotreating unit (2400). Feed
exchangers section.
FW
2231-0-50-2401.F
LO 03A18A
Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating

unit (2400). Feed exchangers and
reactor section. FCC complex.
FW
2231-0-50-2402.F
LO 03A18A

unit (2400). Effluent separators &
recycle gas scrubber section. FCC
complex.
FW
2231-0-50-2403.F
LO 03A18A

unit (2400). Compress section. FCC
FW
2231-0-50-2404.G
LO 03A18A
page 146
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP

unit (2400). Stripper section. FCC
complex.
FW
2231-0-50-2405.F
LO 03A18A

unit (2400). Product exchangers
section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2406.E
LO 03A18A
Flare header system. Hydrotreating

unit 2400, SRU 2450 LPG Merox
unit 2550, light naphtha sweetening
unit 2750 Heavy naphtha
sweetening unit 2850. KO drum FA2420. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2407.E
LO 03A18A
LCGO hydrotreating unit.

Compressor GB-2401A/B & GB2420 A/B Auxiliaries. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2408.A
LO 03A18A
Sulphur production & storage unit.

Sulphur recovery unit, sheet 1. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2451.F
LO 03A18A
Sulphur production & storage unit.

Sulphur recovery unit, sheet 2. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2452.B
LO 03A18A
Gas concentration unit (2500).

Compression section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2501.F
LO 03A18A
Gas concentration unit (2500). Gas

absorption section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2502.G
LO 03A18A
Gas concentration unit (2500). Deethanizer section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2503.F
LO 03A18A

Debutanizer section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2504.F
LO 03A18A

Naphtha splitter section. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2505.F
LO 03A18A
Gas concentration unit (2500). H2S

scrubber section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2506.F
LO 03A18A

Depropanizer section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2507.G
LO 03A18A
Gas concentration unit (2500). C3

drier section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2508.H
LO 03A18A

Propylene splitter section. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2509.G
LO 03A18A

Corrosion inhibitor section. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2510.F
LO 03A18A

Condensate recovery system. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2511.F
LO 03A18A
Drawing Title
complex
page 147
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP
Condensate collection and

blowdown systems. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2512.F
LO 03A18A
Steam distribution. HP steam. MP

steam. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2513.E
LO 03A18A
FCC Process. LP steam system. FCC

complex
FW
2231-0-50-2514.D
LO 03A18A
FCC Process. Cooling water supply.

FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2515.D
LO 03A18A
Plant air. Instrument air. Flashed

condensate. Boiler feed water. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2516.E
LO 03A18A
Fire protection system
FW
2231-0-50-2517.D
LO 03A18A
Flare header systems. FCC (2300),

GCU (2500) SWS (2900) Amine
regeneration. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2518.E
LO 03A18A
Nitrogen. Closed amine drain. Light

slops. OffSpec LPG. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2519.E
LO 03A18A
Utility and potable water. FCC

complex
FW
2231-0-50-2520.E
LO 03A18A
Cooling water balance. Summer

and winter cases. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2521.B
LO 03A18A
Cooling water balance. Summer

and winter cases. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2522.B
LO 03A18A

Compressors auxiliaries. GB-2301
and GB-2501.FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2523.C
LO 03A18A
Cooling water return. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2524.C
LO 03A18A
LP condensate. MP condensate. FCC

complex.
FW
2231-0-50-2525.D
LO 03A18A
Merox unit (2550). LPG extraction.

Sheet1. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2551.E
LO 03A18A
Merox unit (2550). LPG extraction.

Sheet 2. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2552.E
LO 03A18A
EFFL refrigeration alkylation

process (2600). Coalescer section.
Sheet 1 of 11. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2601.D
LO 03A18A

process (2600). Reactor section.
Sheet 2 of 11. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2602.E
LO 03A18A

process (2600). Refrigeration
section. Sheet 3 of 11. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2603.E
LO 03A18A
Alkylation unit (2600). Refrigerant

compression. Sheet 4 of 11FCC
complex..
FW
2231-0-50-2604.F
LO 03A18A
EFFL refrigeration alkylations

process Unit (2600). Sheet 6 of
11FCC complex. OP feed caustic &
FW
2231-0-50-2605.D
LO 03A18A
Drawing Title
page 148
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP

11FCC complex. DB feed caustic
and water wash. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2606.E
LO 03A18A

11FCC complex. De-isobutanizer
section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2607.E
LO 03A18A

process Unit (2600). Sheet 8 of 11.
Re-run section. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2608.E
LO 03A18A

process Unit (2600). Sheet 9 of 11.
Acid neutralization. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2609.E
LO 03A18A

11. Flare and acid blowdown
section.FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2610.E
LO 03A18A

11. Acid and caustic tankage. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2611.E
LO 03A18A
Distribution systems. Flare, acid

blowdown, fresh caustic. FCC
complex
FW
2231-0-50-2612.C
LO 03A18A
Light naphtha sweetening Unit

2750. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2751.E
LO 03A18A
Heavy naphtha sweetening. Unit

2850. Sheet 1 of 3. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2851.E
LO 03A18A

FW
2231-0-50-2852.E
LO 03A18A

FW
2231-0-50-2853.E
LO 03A18A
Sour water stripper (Unit 2900).

FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2901.E
LO 03A18A
Amine regeneration unit. Sheet 1 of

2. Diagram 1. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2951.F
LO 03A18A
Amine regeneration unit. Sheet 2 of

2. Diagram 2. FCC complex
FW
2231-0-50-2952.F
LO 03A18A
Drawing Title
water wash. FCC complex
page 149
Annex 17
Main hazards in FCC
Sign
Name of the source
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
Flow
(t/h)
G/F
Vrh
350oC
Dno
560oC
3,2/
3,5
89,5
m3/h
Vrh
390oC
Dno
430oC
3,5
61
m3/h
3,5
123,8
m3/h
Class
Columns in FCC
Sirovi benzin
DA-2301
V=600
H=42
D= 4,5
Fractionation column
DA-2302
V=60m3
H=10
D=2,2m
Striper ICGO
Meuciklino plinsko ulje
Lako ciklino plinsko ulje;

Meuciklino plinsko ulje;
Produkt dna kolone
Meuciklino plinsko ulje
ICGO
Striper LCGO
(lako ciklino plinsko ulje)
LCGO (lako ciklino plinsko

ulje)
Vrh
270oC
Dno
300oC
DC-2301
V=350m3,
Reaktor - striper
Vakuum plinsko ulje
512
2,52
138,8
m3/h
DC-2302
V=700m3,
Reaktor regenerator
katalizatora
Katalizator, koks, CO,CO2
S/G
590730
1,7
FE-2301,
FE-2302
V=250m3,
Ciklon posude regeneratora i

reaktora za katalizator
Katalizator vazduh
400
DA-2303
V=35m3,
H/D=8m/1,5m
page 150
Sign
Name of the source
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
300/240 20/24
300/240
20/24
340/290 12/24
340/290
12/24
330/380 24/11
330/380
24/11
Flow
(t/h)
Class
138,8
m3/h
Heat exchangers
EA- plinsko ulje
2301A/B
EA2302A/B
EA2303A/B
EA-2304
EA-2305
EA-2306
EA-2307
Plat izmenjivaa
Vakuum EA- plinsko ulje
Cevni snop izmenjivaa
LCGO (Lako cik. plin. ulje)
Plat izmenjivaa
Vakuum
plinsko ulje
Refluks
Plat izmenjivaa
Vakuum plinsko ulje
Produkti dann frakcionatora

(Uglj.+360oC)
Plat izmenjivaa
Plat izmenjivaa
300
LCGO (striper rebojler)

LCGO (Lako ciklino
plinskulje)
380
F
250
Plat izmenjivaa
Produkt dann frakcionatora

(Uglj.+360oC)
235
Para
380
Refluks Meucik. plin.ulje

(ICGO)
Plat izmenjivaa
Para
235
5/11
330
16
330
20/11
340
20/12
340
340
Pumps
GA2301/S
Pumpa za vodu
Voda
100
11
18m3/h
GA2302/S
Napojna pumpa za vakuum

plinsko ulje
Vakuum plinsko
ulje
190
15
168m3/h
355
50
90
13
GA2303/S
GA2304 /S
Pumpa dna
frakcionatora
DA-2301
gotov
proizvod
Ugljovodonici
+360oC
page 151
Sign
Name of the source
GA2 305/S
Refluks pumpa ICGO
GA2 306/S
ICGO recirkulaciona pumpa
GA2 307/S
ICGO rebojler pumpa.
GA2308/S
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
Flow
(t/h)
310
370
400
170
390
450
Class
ICGO
(Meuciklino
plinsko ulje)
LCGO refluks pumpa
LCGO (Lako
ciklino plinsko
ulje)
210
10
320
GA2309/S
Uljna pumpa apsorbera
Benzin
45
20
70
GA-2310/S
Pumpa za LCGO gotov

proizvod
LSGO (Lako
ciklino plinsko ulje)
250
13
80
GA2311/S
Pumpa za refluks
frakcionatora DA-2301
benzin
140
165
GA2312/S
Pumpa za vrne produkte

frakcionatora (iz posude FA2304)
benzin
50
20
150
GA2313/S
Pumpa za vodu frakcionatora

FA-2304
Voda+ugljovodonici
45
12
GA2314/S
Pumpe za ulje za ispiranje
LCGO (Lako
cikl. plins. ulje)
15
25
GA2315/S
Pumpa za kiselu vodu od FA2304 do S-2900
Kisela voda
Vessels and tanks

FA 2303
Rezervoar za vakuum plin.

ulje
vakuum plin. ulje
217
3,87
50m3/h
FA 2304
Akumulator za vrni produkt

frakcionatora
Benzin, loivi
gas
G/f
74
3,52
40
FA 2307
FA 2307 Posuda za ulje za

ispiranje
LCGO (Lako cikl.

plins. ulje)
74
5,3
10
FA 2305
Rezervoar za smeu
gasovaloivi
Loivi gas
72
7,03
page 152
Sign
Name of the source
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
Flow
(t/h)
Class
gas
FA - 2308
Posuda za dekoksovano VPO
vakuum pl. ulje
T 345
8,5
FA - 2310
Posuda za TNG
TNG
72
8,8
50
Furnaces
BA 2301
Pe postrojenja S-2300
Vakuum plinsko
ulje
420
20
138
m3/h
BA-2302
Rebojler ICGO
Loivi gas, ICGO
420
24
340
BF-2301
CO bojler
CO, CO2
450
14
BC-2301
Pe za grejanje vazduha
Lo ulje
G/F
420
420 10
page 153
Annex 18 Block diagram of Pancevo refinery
page 154
page 155
Annex 19 List of substances in Pancevo Refinery
Substance
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
Total
Quantity
(t)
Maximum present quantity

(t) for the application of
Article 9
In process
Stored
Annex I, Part 1
Ammonium nitrate
Ammonium nitrate
Arsenic pentoxide, arsenic (V)

acid and/or salts
Arsenic trioxide, arsenious (III)

acid and/or salts
2500
5000
0,1
Bromine
100
Chlorine
25
Nickel compounds in inhalable

powder form (nickel monoxide,
nickel dioxide, nickel sulphide,
trinickel disulphide, dinickel
trioxide)
Ethyleneimine
20
Fluorine
20
Formaldehyde (concentration
90 %)
50
1 This applies to ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate compounds in which the nitrogen content
as a result of the ammonium nitrate is more than 28 % by weight (compounds other than those
referred to in Note 2) and to aqueous ammonium nitrate solutions in which the concentration of
ammonium nitrate is more than 90 % by weight.
This applies to simple ammonium-nitrate based fertilizers which comply with Directive 80/876/EEC
and to composite fertilizers in which the nitrogen content as a result of the ammonium nitrate is
more than 28% in weight (a composite fertilizer contains ammonium nitrate with phosphate and/or
potash).
page 156
Substance
Hydrogen
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
Total
Quantity
(t)
50
5.72
All units
Hydrogen chloride (liquefied
gas)
Lead alkyls
Liquefied extremely flammable

gases (including LPG) and
natural gas
250
50
200
Acetylene
50
Ethylene oxide
50
Propylene oxide
50
Methanol
5000
4, 4-Methylenebis (2chloraniline) and/or salts, in

powder form
0.01
Methylisocyanate
0.15
Oxygen
2000
Gaseous oxygen
100
64.8
64.8
0.75
Arsenic trihydride (arsine)
Phosphorus trihydride
(phosphine)
Sulphur dichloride
Sulphur trioxide
/
/
Toluen
Carbonyl dichloride (phosgene)
In process
33.3
2109.1
Toluene diisocyanate

Article 9
75
page 157
Stored
Substance
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
Polychlorodibenzofurans and
polychlorodibenzodioxins
(including TCDD), calculated in
TCDD equivalent
0.001
The following CARCINOGENS:

4-Aminobiphenyl and/or its salts,
Benzidine and/or salts, Bis
(chloromethyl) ether, Chloromethyl
methyl ether, Dimethylcarbamoyl
chloride, Dimethylnitrosomine,
Hexamethylphosphoric triamide, 2Naphtylamine and/or salts, and 1,3
Propanesultone 4-nitrodiphenyl
0.001
Benzen
Automotive petrol and other

petroleum spirits
Total
Quantity
(t)
84.9
50000
Heavy, light and special

Gasoline (UN 1993)
1232.2
Crude oil (UN 1267)
7955.9
Virgin Naphtha
Gazoline
99.6
Other gasoline
9597.31
Annex I Part 2
1. Very toxic
20
0.62
2. Toxic
200
422.2
3. Oxidizing
200
OXIGEN (Refrigerating Liquid)

4. Explosive (where the substance
or preparation falls within the
definition given in Note 2 (a))
200
--5. Explosive (where the substance

definition given in Note 2 (b))
50
--6. Flamable (where the substance

definition given in Note 3 (a))
50000
17.1
page 158

Article 9
In process
Stored
Substance
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
7a. Highly flamable (where the

substance or preparation falls within
the definition given in Note 3 (b)
(1))
200
7b. Highly flamable (where the

substance or preparation falls within
the definition given in Note 3 (b)
(2))
50000
Total
Quantity
(t)
137.5
8. Extremly flammable (where
the substance or preparation falls
within the definition given in Note 3
(c))
50
147.8
9a- DANGEROUS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT (R50)
500
7121.41
9b.- DANGEROUS FOR THE

ENVIRONMENT (R51/53)
2000
1.08
10. OTHER CATEGORIES not

covered by those given above in
combination with risk phrases:
(i) R14/15)
500
10. OTHER CATEGORIES not

covered by those given above in
combination with risk phrases:
(ii) R29: in contact with water,
liberates toxic gas (R29)
200
page 159

Article 9
In process
Stored
Annex 20
A.20.1
Flow diagrams
FCC complex, Gas concentration unit - Propylene splitter

section
page 160
Annex 21
Safety data sheets for substances in FCC
page 161
page 162
Annex 22 Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from
CPS 2000)
Overpressure
psi
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
7.5
8.5
9.5
10
12
14
16
18
20
bar
0.0
34
0.0
69
0.1
03
0.1
38
0.1
72
0.2
07
0.2
41
0.2
76
0.3
10
0.3
45
0.3
79
0.4
14
0.4
48
0.4
83
0.5
17
0.5
52
0.5
86
0.6
21
0.6
55
0.6
90
0.8
28
0.9
66
1.1
03
1.2
41
1.3
79
Control House Steel

Roof
Control House
Concrete Roof
Cooling Tower
Equipment
Tank: Cone Roof

Instrument Cubicle
N
D
K
A
LM
Fire heater
Reactor: chemical
Filter Filter
T
I
Regenerator
Tank: Floating Roof
V
IP
Pine supports
D
I
SO
Q
page 163
T
U
Reactor: cracking
Utilities: gas meter
Overpressure
Equipment
psi
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
7.5
8.5
9.5
10
12
14
16
18
20
bar
0.0
34
0.0
69
0.1
03
0.1
38
0.1
72
0.2
07
0.2
41
0.2
76
0.3
10
0.3
45
0.3
79
0.4
14
0.4
48
0.4
83
0.5
17
0.5
52
0.5
86
0.6
21
0.6
55
0.6
90
0.8
28
0.9
66
1.1
03
1.2
41
1.3
79
Utilities: electronic
transformer
Electric motor
Blower Duvaljke
Fractionation colum
I
T
R
Pressure vessel:
horizontal
T
PI
Utilities: gas regulato
Extraction column
MQ
I
Steam Turbine
Heat exchanger
Tank sphere
T
M
T
I
Pressure vessel:
vertical
Pump
Legend:
A - Windows and gauges broken
G - Brick cracks
M - Controls are damaged
S - Piping breaks
B - Louvers fall at 0.2 - 0.5 psi
H - Debris-missile damage occurs
N - Block walls fall
T - Unit overturns or is destroyed
C - switch gear is damaged from roof collapse
I - Unit moves and pipes breaks
O - Frame collapses
U - Unit uplifts (0.9 tilted)
D - Roof collapses
J - Bracing falls
P - Frame deforms
V - Unit moves on foundation
E - Instruments are damaged
K - Unit uplifts (half tilted)
R - Frame cracks
F - Inner parts are damaged
L - Power lines are severed
Q - Case is damaged
page 164
Annex 23
Summary of hazard analysis

Consequences
Nr.
Event
Frequency
of the
event
Data
Accident Scenario
1. Pool fire
(immediate ignition)
TOP1
Leak from bottom of

the vessel FA-2514
5E-7
Substance:
Propylene
leak: 6"
2. VCE
(delayed ignition)
Occurrence
frequency
5E-8
2E-9
Damage distance
(m)
Fire heat radiation
(kW/m2)
4E-9
37.5
20
0.3
LC50
42
0.14
IDLH
55
0.07
LFL
63
0.03
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
150
LC50
12.5
0.14
260
IDLH
0.07
570
LFL
562
0.03
1000
1/2 LFL
758
0.3
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
0.07
LFL
TOP2
Leak from the bottom

of the column DA-2503
1E-5
Substance:
gasoline
leak: 1"
4. Jet fire
page 165
3E-8
Dispersion Toxic/
Flammable
threshold
12.5
37.5
3. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
Explosion
overpressure
(bar)
0.03
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
15
0.14
IDLH
20
0.07
LFL
25
0.03
1/2 LFL
Consequences
Nr.
Event
Frequency
of the
event
Data
Accident Scenario
Occurrence
frequency
Damage distance
(m)
Fire heat radiation
(kW/m2)
37.5
5. VCE
(delayed ignition)
6. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
TOP3
Major leak from the

bottom of the column
DA-2503
5E-7
Substance:
Gasoline
leak: 4"
7. Jet fire
TOP4
Leak from the bottom

of Splitter DA-2509
1E-5
1E-7
1E-7
12.5
37.5
Mass in flammable
condition
< 1000 kg.
VCE is not credible.
0.3
LC50
IDLH
LFL
1/2 LFL
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
0.07
LFL
85
0.03
1/2 LFL
112
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
16
0.14
IDLH
25
0.07
LFL
28
0.03
1/2 LFL
8. VCE
(delayed ignition)
Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible.
9. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
5E-9
10. Jet fire

Substance:
Propane
leak: 1"
Dispersion Toxic/
Flammable
threshold
Explosion
overpressure
(bar)
11. VCE
(delayed ignition)
12. Flash fire

(delayed ignition)
page 166
3E-6
1E-7
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
11
0.07
LFL
14
0.03
1/2 LFL
LC50
IDLH
LFL
37.5
12.5
Mass in flammable
condition
< 1000 kg.
VCE is not credible.
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
Consequences
Nr.
Event
Frequency
of the
event
Data
Accident Scenario
Occurrence
frequency
Damage distance
(m)
Fire heat radiation
(kW/m2)
7
TOP5
Major leak from the

bottom of the splitter
DA-2509
5E-7
Substance:
Gasoline
leak: 3"
13. Jet fire

14. VCE
(delayed ignition)
15. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
TOP6
TOP7
Leak of toxic gas from

FA-2953
Leak of toxic gas from

combustion chamber
FA-2455
1E-7
1E-5
Substance:
H2S (90%)
leak: 50
mm
Release
height: 3 m
Substance:
H2S + CO2 +
SO2
leak: 100
mm
Release
height: 1 m
1E-7
16. Toxic dispersion
17. Toxic dispersion
page 167
5E-9
Dispersion Toxic/
Flammable
threshold
Explosion
overpressure
(bar)
0.07
LFL
85
0.03
1/2 LFL
112
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
16
0.14
IDLH
25
0.07
LFL
28
0.03
1/2 LFL

1E-5
1E-5
37.5
0.3
LC50
1300
(1.5F)
12.5
0.14
IDLH
420
(1.5F)
0.07
LFL
0.03
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
LC50
1100
(1.5F)
12.5
0.14
IDLH
360
(1.5F)
0.07
LFL
0.03
1/2 LFL
Annex 24
FCC: Bow-tie analysis result
A.24.1
TOP1: Release from FA-2514
A.24.2
TOP2: Release from DA-2503
A.24.3
TOP3: Release from DA-2509
A.24.4
A.24.5
page 168
page 169
Training
Other
Any other
Functional /
Functional
related
problems
Impact on other
equipment
Other
incident
page 170
HAC ignition control
Fire fighting system

Blast design
Shutdown system
Gas detection
Person hit by
jet flow
Thermal
effects
Emergency planning
Procedures
Proactive
protection system
Fire,
explosion
and similar
PPE
Acces control
Mistake in
transport /
loading
Environment
effects
Flash
VCE
Man made
disturbance
s
Mistake in
maintenance
Domino effect
Leakage from
DA-2509
VCE
Liquid
pool
Pool fire
Acces control
Mistake in
process
Discharge
Liquid
Shield-ing
Sabotage
Pool
explosion
SMS
Repair / errors
Pressurized
leak
Acces control
Manufacturing
errors
Change
management
Disturbances in
the process
Shielding
Other
structural
damage
mechanism
Jet
dispersion
Thermal
effects
Jet fire
Fire detection
Error in material /
design
Material /
Structural
related
problems
Shutdown system
Error in material /
design
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Discharge
2-phase
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Shielding
Overloadin
g
Fire detection
Maintenance
Fatigue,
thermal
fatigue
Vibration
monitoring
Corrosion
fatigue
Fire jet
Disturbances
in the process
Inspection
General
corrosion
Maintenance
Error in
discovering
defects
Inspection
Error in material /
design
Environment
effects
Thermal
effects
Training
Other
Any other
Functional /
Functional
related
problems
Impact on other
equipment
Other
incident
page 171

Blast design
Shutdown system
Gas detection
Person hit by
jet flow
Thermal
effects
Emergency planning
Procedures
Proactive
protection system
Fire,
explosion
and similar
PPE
Acces control
Mistake in
transport /
loading
Environment
effects
Flash
VCE
Man made
disturbance
s
Mistake in
maintenance
Domino effect
Leakage from
DA2503
VCE
Liquid
pool
Pool fire
Acces control
Mistake in
process
Discharge
Liquid
Shield-ing
Sabotage
Pool
explosion
SMS
Repair / errors
Pressurized
leak
Acces control
Manufacturing
errors
Change
management
Disturbances in
the process
Shielding
Other
structural
damage
mechanism
Jet
dispersion
Thermal
effects
Jet fire
Fire detection
Error in material /
design
Material /
Structural
related
problems
Shutdown system
Error in material /
design
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Discharge
2-phase
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Shielding
Overloadin
g
Fire detection
Maintenance
Fatigue,
thermal
fatigue
Vibration
monitoring
Corrosion
fatigue
Fire jet
Disturbances
in the process
Inspection
General
corrosion
Maintenance
Error in
discovering
defects
Inspection
Error in material /
design
Environment
effects
Thermal
effects
page 172
page 173
RGE: API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for

year 2009
ID
Name
Likelihood
Consequence
Risk
2903
C1A/B (potis)
Medium
2902
C1A/B (usis)
Medium
2905
C2A/B (potis)
Medium
2904
C2A/B (usis)
Medium
2845
D-1
Medium High
2855
D-101
Medium High
2856
D-102
High
2857
D-103
Medium
2858
D-104
Medium
2853
D-11
Medium
2859
D-111
Medium
2860
D-112
Medium
2861
D-12
Medium
2862
D-120
Medium
2863
D-121
Medium
2864
D-122
Medium
2854
D-16
Medium
2846
D-2
Medium
2906
D-27A
Medium
2907
D-27B
Medium
2908
D-27C
Medium
2917
D-27D
Medium
2918
D-27E
Medium
2919
D-27F
Medium
2909
D-28A
Medium
2910
D-28B
Medium
2911
D-28C
Medium
2912
D-28D
Medium
2913
D-28E
Medium
2920
D-28F
Medium
2921
D-28G
Medium
2914
D-29A
Medium
page 174
ID
Name
Likelihood
Consequence
Risk
2915
D-29B
Medium
2916
D-29C
Medium
2865
D-300
Medium High
2847
D-4
Medium
2848
D-5
Medium
2849
D-6
Medium
2850
D-7
Medium
2851
D-8
Medium
2852
D-9
Medium
2875
E-10
Medium
2893
E-101/A
Low
2894
E-101/B
Low
2895
E-102
Medium
2896
E-103
Medium
2897
E-104
Medium
2876
E-11
Medium
2898
E-110
Medium
2899
E-113
Medium
2900
E-116
Medium
2877
E-12
Medium
2901
E-120
Medium
2878
E-13
Medium
2879
E-14
Medium
2880
E-15
Medium
2881
E-16
Medium
2882
E-17
Medium
2883
E-18
Medium
2884
E-19
Medium
2866
E-1A/B
Low
2867
E-2
Medium
2885
E-20A
Low
2886
E-20B
Medium
2887
E-21
Medium
2888
E-22
Medium
2889
E-23
Medium
2890
E-24/A
Medium
2891
E-24/B
Medium
2892
E-25
Medium
2868
E-3
Medium
2869
E-4
Medium
page 175
ID
Name
Likelihood
Consequence
Risk
2870
E-5
Medium
2871
E-6A/B
Medium
2872
E-7
Medium
2873
E-8
Medium
2874
E-9
Medium
2931
FT-103A
Low
2932
FT-103B
Low
2933
FT-104
Low
2923
FT-301
Medium
2922
FT-302
Low
2925
HP-1
Low
2926
HP-2
Low
2927
JI-1
Low
2928
JI-2
Low
2929
PF-1
Low
2930
PF-2
Low
2924
SP-1
Low
2835
T-1
High
2844
T-101
High
2836
T-2
High
2837
T-3
Medium High
2838
T-4
Medium High
2839
T-5
High
2840
T-6
Medium High
2841
T-7
High
2842
T-8
Medium High
2843
T-9
Medium High
page 176
Annex 25
RGE: API 581 Qualitative, component based - Inspection planning

Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
1969
2009
High
0.5
T-1
ulazni separator
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
T-101
kolona za suenje
gasa
Column
1988
2009
High
0.5
T-2
apsorpciona kolona
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
T-5
preista posnog
ulja
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
T-7
deetanizer
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
D-101
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium High
D-1
prihvatni sud
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium High
D-300
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
2000
2009
Medium High
T-3
deetanizer
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
Column
1963
2009
Medium High
Name
Description
D-102
T-4
T-6
depropanizer
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
T-8
deizobutanizer
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
page 177
Name
Description
T-9
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
C1A/B
(potis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
C1A/B
(usis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
C2A/B
(potis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
C2A/B
(usis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-103
meusakuplja
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-104
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-11
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-111
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-112
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-12
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-120
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-121
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-122
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-16
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-2
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
page 178
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
Name
Description
D-27A
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1963
2009
Medium
D-27D
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-27F
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28A
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28B
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28C
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28D
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28E
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28F
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28G
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-29A
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-29B
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-29C
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-4
prihvatni sud
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-5
ispariva
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-6
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
1962
2009
Medium
page 179
2009
2010
2011
Name
Description
Component
Type
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
Medium
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
1962
2009
2010
2011
vessel
D-7
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
vessel
D-8
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-9
prihvatni sud
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
FT-301
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Medium
D-27B
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-27C
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-27E
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
E-10
rebojler
Boiler Furnace Tubes

for Fired
Heater
1962
2009
Medium
E-102
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-103
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-104
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
1962
2009
Medium
E-11
predgreja

for Fired
Heater
E-110
izmenjiva
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-113
izmenjiva
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-116
izmenjiva
Heat
1962
2009
Medium
page 180
Name
Description
E-12
kondenzator para
Component
Type
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
2009
Medium
1962
2009
Medium
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Condenser
1962
Heat
Exchanger
Exchanger
E-120
E-13
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-14
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-15
kondenzator
propana
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-16
predgreja
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-17
rebojler

for Fired
Heater
1962
2009
Medium
E-18
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-19
rebojler

for Fired
Heater
1962
2009
Medium
E-2
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-20B
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium

for Fired
Heater
1962
2009
Medium
E-21
rebojler
E-22
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-23
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-24/A
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-24/B
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
page 181
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
Name
Description
E-25
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-3
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-4
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-5
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-6A/B
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-7
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-8
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium

for Fired
Heater
1962
2009
Medium
E-9
meubojler
E-101/A
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1963
2009
Low
10
E-101/B
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1963
2009
Low
10
E-1A/B
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Low
10
E-20A
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-103A
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-103B
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-104
Filter sa aktivnim
ugljem
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-302
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
HP-1
Hidroforska posuda
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
HP-2
Hidroforska posuda
Other
1962
2009
Low
10
page 182
Name
Description
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
Equipment
JI-1
Jono izmenjiva
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
JI-2
Jono izmenjiva
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
PF-1
Peani filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
PF-2
Peani filter-bona
filtrac.
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
SP-1
Posuda za so
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
Total to be inspected:
1
51
page 183
94
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STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH

Risk management and use of risk-based

Final report for Package B

NIS Petroleum Industry of Serbia

Risk management and use of riskbased approaches in inspection,

Customer order Nr.:

Internal project Nr.:

December 31, 2010

Date of order acceptance:

A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, P. Stanojevic,

A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, R. Guntrum

Date: July 7, 2010

STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH

Management Summary Report .................... 1

Detail Technical Report .............................. 2

General about NIS a.d. .................. 3

History of the company ....................... 4

Pancevo Oil Refinery ..................... 5

General data ..................................... 5

Location of Pancevo Refinery ............... 6

Description of the plant ..................... 17

Safety of the plant ........................... 23

Novi Sad refinery ........................ 27

General data ................................... 27

Description of the plant ..................... 33

Safety of the plant ........................... 35

Description of processes ................... 37

Elemir Gas refinery ..................... 40

General data ................................... 40

Description of the plant ..................... 46

Description of processes ................... 49

2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology .................. 50

Preparation of data base .............. 50

Identifying the Damage

Calculating the Likelihood of Failure52

Calculating the Consequence of

Determine the Financial

Calculating the Risk .................... 54

STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH

Remaining life assessment ........... 55

Developing an inspection plan ...... 56

2.2.10 Software used ............................ 60

Seveso II Directive ..................... 62

2.4 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Pancevo

The scope of analysis .................. 63

2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad

Performed activities .................... 67

Unit and process description ......... 68

Results of analysis ...................... 71

HAZOP Analysis Results .................... 71

Technical discussions ........................ 71

Management Systems Evaluation ....... 77

API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based)

API 581 qualitative analysis

RBI Detailed quantitative analysis ...... 81

Conclusions and recommendations 81

2.7 HSE (Seveso) report for Refinery Pancevo,

Information on site, plant and unit 84

General data ................................... 84

Policy the company is pursuing .......... 86

Safety management system .............. 86

Hazardous materials ......................... 86

Meteorological data .......................... 86