Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and right to information
2. Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws
HELD:
1. The MOA-AD is a public concern and should comply with the
constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to
information
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it
does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly
affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a splendid symmetry
to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides
that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The
right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the peoples
right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the
exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at
all times accountable to the people.
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await
the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is
merely directed to provide for reasonable safeguards. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same selfexecutory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say
that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already
enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its
transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an
enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a
status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under
our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims
to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-ADs provisions,
therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association -runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it
is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and
the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming
that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under
paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present
geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao
del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite
- Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically
part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas
under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the
present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities
voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another
plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these
areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision
states: The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development. An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity.
While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion
of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to
national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the constitution, the MOA-AD is also
inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. 9054 or the
Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled
with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that
the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between
the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the
protest moot and academic; and
2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly
the revamp of the entire local government structure.
RULING:
1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, the constitutional grant of privilege to
continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons
who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the
new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the
duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that
"subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of
the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention
of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the
statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the timeframe prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a
proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.
2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral
protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the
National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may
not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining
a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term,
salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any
change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
Belgica et. Al. v Ochoa, Jr. et. Al. November 19, 2013
G.R. No. 208566 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government
Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings,
schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical
assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or
concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the
Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around
since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel
system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is
that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings
of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected
from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI
of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have
to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
Sanidad v Comelec
Facts
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling
for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers. On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031,
amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions
of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of
votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD
1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its
"whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening
of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a
new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections
was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976National Referendum-Plebiscite. Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. On 30
September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction,
was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or
revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, his son, and Alfredo Salapantan, to
restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees.
Issue:
W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the
Constitution.
Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains
that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may,
by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention
or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such
a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides
that" Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or
revision."In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending
power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National
Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution.
Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article
16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition.
In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of
two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling
of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an
election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a
majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC,
had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of
peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact
that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to
when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's
decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon
found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 1015, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted,
the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In
the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim
National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the
proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be
initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of
Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its
inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already
resolved against it.In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state
undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not
in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it
Daza V. Singson
Case: Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments
andwas listed as representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganized
and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Because of this,
the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the
seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formedLDP. Singson was
chosen to replace Daza, in accordance to proportional representation.
Issues
1.Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable politicalparty
2.Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the CA
Held and Ratio: Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan
v. Tan. In the said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized
themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3 Nacionalista Congressmen,
originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by colleagues who joined the
Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanans ad interim appointment was rejected by
the CA. Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the
validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely a
temporary combination; officially, they were still part of the Nacionalista
Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on
proportional representation. The Court held that mere shift of votes should
not affect the organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the
mercy of the House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that LDP is not
a permanent party and has not yet achieved stability. However, the LDP has
already been inexistence for a year. They command the biggest following.
They not only survived but prevailed .Regarding being a duly registered
party, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party by the
COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration
is required
ABAKADA Guro Party List v PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
1.This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of
2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that,
by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s]
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J.
Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:
(a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives,
(b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered,
(c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty,
(d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and
(e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government With this backdrop, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
People V Vera
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was
convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the
Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge
Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No.
4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards
the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere
in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it
is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila
is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is
limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation
of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the
constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is
a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section
of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that
only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may
have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that
convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail
of their right to probation.
We note that the statute and the relevant regulations refer to employment
of Filipino workers overseas, i.e., outside the Philippines. The statute and
regulations do not limit their coverage to non-Filipino employers. Filipinos
working overseas share the same risks and burdens whether their
employers be Filipino or foreign.
Neither party disputes that Manuel Zaragoza, at the time of his death, was
covered by an existing contract of employment with Eastern and that the
deceased was at that time employed as a seaman (Chief Engineer) on board
the M/V Eastern Meteor, which vessel-then chartered by Eastern-was
engaged in plying ocean routes, outside Philippine waters and which, at the
time of Zaragoza's demise, was berthed in a foreign port (Japan). In addition,
the record shows that Eastern submitted its shipping articles to public
respondent POEA for processing, formalization and approval, 8 apparently in
recognition of POEA!s regulatory authority over overseas employment
under Executive Order No. 797. While not in itself conclusive proof of
employment by Eastern of people overseas, nevertheless, this latter
circumstance strongly suggests that Eastern must have regarded itself as
engaged in such employment, otherwise, it would not have found it
necessary or useful to submit its shipping articles to the POEA. We hold that
the complaint of private respondent widow of Manuel Zaragoza falls well
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of public respondent POEA. 9
We come to the issue regarding the amount of death benefits for which
Eastern may be held liable to private respondent. In assessing such amount,
the POEA relied upon Memorandum Circular No. 71 (effective 1 December
1981) issued by the now defunct National Seamen Board (NSB):
SECTION D. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS DURING THE, TERM OF THE
CONTRACT.
1. In case of total and permanent disability or death of the seaman during
the term of his contract, the company II pay the ,seaman or his beneficial
the amount of:
P100,000.00-for masters and Chief Engineers
75,000.00 - for other officers
50,000.00 - for ratings over and above the benefits which are provided for
abd are the liabilities of the Philippine government under the Philippine laws.
Provided that when the employment of a seaman is also covered by a
collective bargaining agreement or death/disability insurance which
provides for higher benefits than those enumerated above, in which case,
the seaman or his heirs/beneficiaries may elect under what scheme he is
they are claiming. Recovery under one scheme is a bar to any farther
recovery; except where there is a clear showing in the collective bargaining
agreement and/or death/disability insurance that benefits provided for in
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Decision of the
POEA in POEA Case No. L-86-01-026 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Temporary
Restraining Order of 8 April 1987 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Ynot v IAC
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which
not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well
as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting
6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to
be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by
EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to
curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process.
EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive.
The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading
the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that
the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds
for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.