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Toyota Motor Corporation and Nissan Motor Corporation were established in 1937 and 1933
respectively. They have been facing the same global challenges as well as the same politicoeconomic changes domestically and globally. They have similar business resources such as work
force, capital, products, technology, and information. How, then, can there be such major
differences in their overall business performance?
performance level, operation mode of Toyota and Nissan, their JIT implementation status. This
research also shows the similarities and differences in performance level of these two firms with
a view to show effectiveness as well as competitive advantage. It also addresses recent successes
and challenges Toyota and Nissan may face in the future.
KEYWORDS
Toyota, Nissan, Leadership, Governance, Strategy, Just-In-Time method, Toyota Production
System, Rules-in-Use, process improvement
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1.0 INTRODUCTION3
1.0 Introduction:
The automobile industry was born in France and emerged as a modern industry through the
assembly line mass production of Model-T (1913) by Henry Ford who established the Ford
Motor Company in 1903. William Durant established the General Motors in 1908, and Chrysler
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was founded in 1925. Nissan and Toyota were established in 1933 and 1937 respectively. The
two major Japanese automakers have been in the same industry, facing the same global forces as
well the same as the same politico-economic challenges domestically and globally. Although
they have had similar business resources such as work force, capital, products, technology, and
information, major differences in their financial performance began to emerge in the 1980s.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss factors that contributed to the gap in the performance of
the two automakers Toyota and Nissan during following JIT method in their production process.
It is argued the performance of the two firms can be related to lean production to increase
productivity, improve product quality and manufacturing cycle time, reduce inventory, reduce
lead time and eliminate manufacturing waste. To achieve these, the lean production philosophy
uses several concepts such as one-piece flow, kaizen, cellular manufacturing, synchronous
manufacturing, inventory management, pokayoke, standardized work, work place organization,
and scrap reduction to reduce manufacturing waste (Russell and Taylor, 1999).
In JIT
production systems, attempts are made to eliminate waste through continuous improvement of
processes of the entire value chain in the organization. Having nurtured a lean manufacturing
mindset among the employees, it facilitates achievement of continuous product flow through
physical rearrangement and control mechanisms. A study indicates that most western
manufacturers have been aware of the need to improve their performance and competitiveness
for nearly two decades.
They were using lean production system for taking advantage of most of the above benefits.
Another study (EPA, 2003) summarized the main reasons for adopting a lean system under three
broad categories: reducing production resource requirements and costs, increasing customer
responsiveness, and improving product quality. It concluded that all of these combine to boost
company profits and competitiveness.
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Finding the activities and performance level of the selected firms practicing JIT method.
Identifying the Operation mode or scenario of the selected firms.
Examining the JIT Implementation status of the selected firms.
Examining the manufacturing performance improvement experienced by the selected
Identifying the areas where changes have been made to implement lean in the selected
firms.
Highlighting the differences and similarities of performance between the companies.
Just -in -Time (JIT) production is a manufacturing philosophy which eliminates waste associated
with time, labor, and storage space. Basics of the concept are that the Company produces only
what is needed, when it is needed and in the quantity that is needed. The company produces only
what the customer requests, to actual orders, not to forecast. JIT can also be defined as producing
the necessary units, with the required quality, in the necessary quantities, at the last safe moment.
It means that company can manage with their own resources and allocate them very easily.
Figure 2 shows a drawing of the JIT concept.
Just-in-time (JIT) production or so-called lean manufacturing. The pioneers of these methods
were Taiichi Ohno, a former Toyota executive, and Shigeo Shingo, an eminent engineer and
consultant. In his 1989 book The Study of the Toyota Production System from an Industrial
Engineering Perspective, Shingo identified these basic features of TPS:
1. It achieves cost reductions by eliminating waste, be it staff time, materials, or other
resources.
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3. It reduces production cycle time drastically with innovations like the Single-Minute
Exchange of Die (SMED) system, which cuts downtime and enables small-lot
production.
4. It emphasizes that product orders should guide production decisions and processes, a
practice known as order-based production.
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manufacturing system developed at Toyota by Taiichi Ohno. He in turn had drawn inspiration
from W. Edwards Deming, an influential statistician and quality-control expert who had played a
big part in developing the rapid-manufacturing processes used by America during the Second
World War. At the core of TPS is elimination of waste and absolute concentration on consistent
high quality by a process of continuous improvement (kaizen). The catchy just-in time aspect of
bringing parts together just as they are needed on the line is only the clearest manifestation of the
relentless drive to eliminate mud waste) from the manufacturing process. The world's motor
industry, and many other branches of manufacturing, rushed to embrace and adopt the principles
of TPS. Toyota's success starts with its brilliant production engineering, which puts quality
control in the hands of the line workers who have the power to stop the line or summon help the
moment
something goes wrong. Walk into a Toyota factory in Japan or America, Derby in
Britain or Valentines in France and you will see the same visual displays telling you everything
that is going on. You will also hear the same jingles at the various work stations telling you a
model is being changed, an operation have been completed or a brief halt called. Everything is
minutely synchronized; the work goes at the same steady cadence of one car a minute rolling off
the final assembly line. Each operation along the way takes that time. No one ushers and there
are cute slings and swiveling loaders to take the heavy lifting out of the work. But there is much
more to the soul of the Toyota machine than a dour, relentless pursuit of perfection in its car
factories. Another triumph is the slick product-development process that can roll out new models
in barely two years. As rival Carlos Ghosn, chief executive of Nissan, notes in his book Shift
(about how he turned around the weakest of Japan's big three), as soon as Toyota bosses spot a
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gap in the market or a smart new product from a rival, they swiftly move in with their own
version.
The result is a bewildering array of over 60 models in Japan and loads of different versions in big
overseas markets such as Europe and America. Of course, under the skin, these share many
common parts. Toyota has long been the champion of putting old wine in new bottles: over twothirds of a new vehicle will contain the unseen parts of a previous model. But TPS alone would
not justify the extraordinary success of the company in the world market.
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Its starting point is Toyotas ability to make sure that its engineers actually care about
what customers think of their product. This means both creating a strong vision for the
future product and communicating this vision to everyone involved in the development
process. Once expressed clearly, this early vision serves as a reference to arbitrate
conflicting constraints within the design process. In some cases, this vision can
fundamentally challenge the existing product.
The second key to the Toyota development process is that it limits late engineering
changes. While car makers are painfully aware of the disruptive power of late
engineering changes, few have learned to limit them. Toyota has perfected a process
which mostly avoids such late changes. Indeed, the Camry project manager at the Toyota
Technical Center in Plymouth, Michigan, claims that the cars chief engineer, Mr.
Yamada, pushed for what he called perfect drawings, or Zero EC in Toyota-speak:
no engineering changes were allowed after production drawings were released.
The third recurrent issue is mastering the flow of drawings and tool elaboration. The aim
of any design process is to industrialize drawing production to increase overall design
effectiveness. This is rarely possible because of the on-going changes which cross-impact
throughout the development process. Having largely solved key issues upfront in its
design process, Toyota focuses on precise, tightly scheduled production of the actual
drawings. In the Camrys case, the number of vehicle prototypes was cut by 65 per cent,
and the number of crash tests halved by the use of digital assembly software.
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This links to the final key to an efficient development process: focusing on quality and
cost in production itself. Drawing on its expertise in lean manufacturing, Toyota
examines all aspects of the cars production to make sure that it will be built within the
targeted cost brackets once the design is released. Toyotas emphasis on lean production
and waste reduction starts at source.
development process.
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triggered signals that the line worker was in need of assistance. Exactly this same approach was
taken with other assembly line jobs at Toyotas Kentucky plant, and seat installation and other
work at other Toyota plants (NUMMI, Takaoka, Tsutsumi, Kyushu) also was specified with
built-in, self-diagnostic tests. In contrast, I installed seats and did other assembly line work at a
Toyota competitor, and the work was not precisely defined. Furthermore, there was less ability
to signal immediately that a problem had occurred. At Toyota, a line-workers problem
immediately triggered a specific team leader to do his or her assistance work, and the team
leaders problem in providing assistance immediately triggered a specific group leader to provide
assistance. In contrast, at the non-Toyota plant in which I labored, problems were entered into
computer consoles for later attention with no mechanism in place to call the first and second
level supervisors for immediate help.
This emphasis on specifying activity designs with built-in tests was peculiar to and pervasive at
the TPS-managed organizations in which I gathered data. Toyota team is teaching TPS to a firsttier supplier, one of our objectives was to reduce the changeover time on the stamping presses in
the plant. Our first step in this was to document how a die change was done. We then repeated
that sequence of work-elements with the workers. As problems impeded the set-up specialists
from replacing the tool used to stamp one part with the tool used to stamp the next, we
immediately developed a counter-measure, a change in the work design, so that the activity
could be done with greater efficiency and effectiveness. For instance, one of the workers
recognized that the forklift operation had trouble centering the die on the bed of the press
because the tool obstructed the drivers view. The workers counter-measure was to develop a
simple target for which the driver could aim. From one try to the next, this modification shaved
50 seconds from the changeover. On a subsequent trial, a worker realized that his associate was
matching scrap chutes to each tool in a trial and error fashion. As a counter-measure, they color
coded scrap-chutes of different widths with the location to which they were to be attached to the
die. Having defined the die-change work with high-resolution, another person realized that
considerable time was spent getting confirmation that the new die was making acceptable parts.
The counter-measure for this problem was to place a jig by the side of the press so that
confirmation of part-quality could be nearly immediate, at the work-site, rather than delayed, and
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implemented in response to individual problems, part production on this press went from 15,080
in first week of April to 23,140 in the final week of the month. Changeover time dropped from
several hours to 18 minutes, on average. Cumulative overtime for the press, which had been 30
hours in the first week of April, was eliminated, and lot sizes were driven down from 3 weeks of
demand to 4.7 days.
In short, the Toyota approach was to specify the work associated with this machine. The purpose
of the specification was not to entrench best practice, per se. Rather, it was to use the current
best practice as the basis for discovering large and small problems. These, when remediated, are
contributed to substantial improvements on multiple performance measures.
Solving these
individual problems, one-by-one, was the means by which I was learning TPS and we were
teaching it to the suppliers workforce.
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and complexity required to change a die in a manufacturing process. A time-consuming diechanging process is wasteful in two ways. First, while it is happening production is often at a
standstill, increasing cycle times and all the costs associated with longer cycle times. (However,
it is important to note that idle time for individual machines in a system is not always viewed as
wasteful under the TPS philosophy.) Second, workers' time and effort are spent on activities that
aren't directly related to production (i.e., no value is being added by changing a die). As a result
of such concerns, the push at Toyota was to reduce significantly the time it took to change dies.
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capacity and strengthened its sales network. As a result of rapid expansion, Nissans debt rose to
$19.4 billion by 1998. When the Japanese economy went into recession in the early 1990s,
Nissan found itself in a debt trap. Nissans productivity and financial problems turned for the
worst in the 1990s, and in 1993 it recorded its first loss since going public in 1951. The efforts
of restructuring of the 1990s did not improve Nissans financial performance and by 1998 it had
incurred losses for seven years of the prior eight years. Ultimately, to avoid bankruptcy, Nissan
was forced to enter into alliance with French Renault in March 1999.
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The Times 100 series of case studies cover a wide range of real business situations, one of which
is a study of the production methods in use at Nissan's Sunderland car plant. The plant is one of
the most modern car plants in Europe and has consistently been in the very top of the
productivity league tables. The case study helps you to have some understanding of the factors
that contribute to this success.
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is a reflection of the state of the motor industry and manufacturing in general in the UK. The
proliferation of low cost countries (eastern Europe, China and India) is fueling a migration of
manufacturing from the UK. In response to this, UK manufacturers are having to cut costs in
order to survive in an increasingly competitive world market. The pay negotiations were
suspended for 2009/10 due to the instability in the world markets, effectively meaning there has
been no pay award agreed.
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Toyota:
Toyota mostly relied on indirect technology transfer that consisted of selective coping of designs
and manufacturing techniques from different foreign automakers, whereas Nissan relied mostly
on direct technology transfer through formal tie-ups with foreign automakers like British,
American, and German automakers or part manufacturers. For Nissan, tie-ups had an advantage
of speedy introduction of new models comparable to imports, but this approach locked Nissan
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into designs that were not the most advanced and suppliers that most often were not cost
efficient. Toyotas advantage with indirect technology transfer was three fold:
First, Toyota engineers were able to duplicate proven technologies selectively from
different manufacturers and to incorporate advanced features much faster than Nissan in
their automobile designs.
Moreover, Ohno devised a revolutionary approach to assembly of parts and lean manufacturing
through the reversal of the information flow from a forward push to a backward pull. The
classical forward push system of assembly line resulted in a tremendous amount of work-inprogress inventory or idle parts sitting at different stages of production line. The backward pull
asked workers to go back to the previous stations to take only materials or parts they needed, and
a rule was established that no station should produce more parts than the next station could
handle immediately. By reversing the system, Ohno could identify waste in manufacturing,
transport, buffer stocks, equipment operation, worker motions, defective production, inspection,
and finished product inventories.
improvement. By 1970, the backward pull (Kanban) and Just-in-time inventory system had
become the most important techniques that increased productivity and at the same time reduced
the production cost at Toyota.
Nissan:
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Nissan managers were aware of the Ohnos techniques from early 1950s, but some major factors
inhibited them to copy Toyotas manufacturing techniques.
First, the types of machinery that Nissan had were highly specialized and not suitable for
reconfiguration to be used for multiple purposes as was the case for Toyotas machinery.
Second, the union at Nissan opposed cycle time reduction and workers overtime.
Finally, geography affected how Nissan and Toyota reacted to the production
management since Toyotas rural workers had lower consciousness of labor and
management distinction, i.e. higher power distance, versus Nissans urban labor force
that demanded greater role in running the company.
So, Nissans answer to Ohnos techniques was wide spread use of high speed single function
machine tools with the goal of higher productivity through automation. During the 1970s, as
manufacturing volumes and product complexity rose, Nissan improved its computer based
production system and linked factories to main suppliers through on-line terminals and added
highly automated robots. Nissan managers expected to bring the same results as Ohnos
techniques, but by mid 1980s the Toyota workers produced more cars, added more value, and
yielded more profit per employee than Nissanites.
manufacturing due to the proximity and ease of part transportation in the supply chain. This was
not the case for Nissan who had plants in the urban areas of Japan mostly close to large
metropolitan areas. The unions of Toyota and Nissan also played an important role in the
differences between productivity and the manufacturing cost structure of the two companies.
The union at Nissan, unlike Toyotas, opposed methods to compress cycle time, raise assembly
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line speeds, or use overtime when the demand was high. Figure 3 shows the productivity per
employee at Toyota and Nissan from 1950 to 1983.
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One reason why Toyota is overtaking GM (General Motors) in the market is its highly
efficient production system. Toyota groups its workers on the assembly line in teams, and
gives them individual responsibility to correct mistakes before the cars reach the end of the
line.
In the graph you can see how 'The Big Three' take more time to build a car than a Japanese
company like Nissan, Toyota and Honda. Toyota produces more environmentally friendly and
reliable cars. Now Toyota is set to overtake GM as the worlds largest carmaker, ending 70
years of dominance.
Nissan:
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Cost Reduction:
Like Toyota, Nissan uses 'Kaizen' and a 'Just-in-Time' production system. Nissan, however,
have taken 'Just-in-Time' a stage further. A separate company makes parts on the same site as
the car plant in order that components may be delivered just in time for assembly. This saves
transport and storage costs as well as theft and is an innovative system for a car plant.
Thats a crude indication of what is involved. Management is particularly keen to monitor total
machine-hours and total labour-hours that each vehicle requires.
Other facilities of Toyota and Nissan for implementing JIT method in their production process
are:
Employees who possess multi-skills are utilized more efficiently - the company can use
workers in situations when they are needed, when there is a shortage of workers and a
high demand for a particular product;
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Supplies continue around the clock keeping workers productive and businesses focused
on turnover - employees will work hard to meet the company goals.
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category resisted by Japans current generation, forced the importation of less-skilled foreign
labor, in turn negatively impacting quality and productivity advantages, and requiring
inspected-in quality tactics (Cusumano, 1994). In general, the foundational culture on which
Japanese production methods rely does not translate well; consider the difficulty Toyota
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managers encountered in persuading adoption of their traditional familial references, ie, where
direct laborers are referred to as "children" of the company.
Nissan
Nissan began to experience difficulties with JIT deliveries in congested, urban areas as early as
the 1970's when they adopted the Toyota style, difficulties not then experienced by suppliers
enjoying the proximities of Toyoda City. In recent years, increasing congestion effected by
rising rates of JIT deliveries forced the Japanese government to launch a media campaign
encouraging companies to actually reduce the frequency of their material deliveries (Cusumano,
1994).
9.0 Conclusion
After all, I think that if the company wants to have a JIT concept it does not mean that
everything must be done very fast. The most important thing for the company is to have
good organized resource allocation. Also, the management and employees must have on
their mind that this concept can help the organization to solve many problems in logistics.
It is true that implementation and development of JIT is a long-lasting and expensive process,
but if the company can manage with these difficulties it is possible to achieve high levels
of workflow.
The JIT concept is only one part in the value chain that brings the satisfaction to the customers.
It means that the JIT concept cannot must solve existing problems in other organization
processes. Everything in enterprises is needed to be healthy, through the hierarchy of employees
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and all workflow processes. Synergy is the only thing that can improve business results. And in
the bottom line, the JIT concept is just one link in the whole chain, but very important.
10. References:
JIT: A Process with Many Faces; JIT. Purchasing (04 Sept. 1997)
Johnson, G.S. JIT Makes Big Three Vulnerable to Strikes. Journalof Commerce (18
Sept. 1997).
Lambert, D.M., and J.R. Stock. Strategic Logistics Management, 3rd ed. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1993.
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Porter, A.M. The Problem with JIT; JIT Inventory Systems.Purchasing (18 Sept.,
1997).
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