White Paper 2014

HELLENIC REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
201 4
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Copyright: 2015,
ISBN: 978 - 960 - 86291 - 5 - 8

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Coordination - Copy Editing: HMoND Directorate of National Defence Policy

Texts: HMoND, HNDGS, HAGS, HNGS, HAFGS
English Translation by: Registry and Linguistics Directorate of the General Staff of
Army
Photographs Presentation: HMoND, HNDGS, HAGS, HNGS, HAFGS
Typesetting - Printing - Binding: Hellenic Army's Printing Office (HARPO)
Copyright: 2015, HMoND Directorate of National Defence Policy
ISBN: 978 - 960 - 86291 - 5 - 8
The republication or reproduction of this work as a whole or parts thereof is prohibited in any
way, as well as its translation or exploitation, according to the provisions of Law 2121/1993 and
international conventions. Furthermore the reproduction of the page set up, of the cover and of all
the artistic of the work in general is also prohibited in any means according to the Law 2121/1993.
WH ITE PAP E R 201 4
201 4
2014
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White Paper on
Defence 2014
In this unstable and volatile international environment,
full of challenges and threats to
defence and security, the publication by the Hellenic Ministry
of National Defence (HMoND)
of the White Paper on Defence
is the culmination of a series of
important actions, aiming at the
review and update of the institutional strategic
texts of Greece that have been recently successfully concluded.
Having the vision and the will to explore
new horizons, while taking into account the
strategic interests of Hellenism, we redefined
-through this White Paper- the principles and
the framework for action of our Armed Forces.
In addition, we analysed the international developments, the potential challenges, as well as
the latest developments in the fields of military
art and science.
Our ultimate objective is the continuous
evolution, the transformation and the constant
adjustment of the Hellenic Armed Forces to the
prevailing conditions of our times. The in-depth
reconfiguration of their organisational and operational framework , both at tactical and strategic
level, is performed in a way to fully guarantee
the defence, the security and the deterrence capability of our country.
Our ambition is to render our Armed Forces
more flexible and highly mobile, capable of rapidly deploying wherever needed, with great firepower and full crisis and emergency management
capabilities.
In this way, we support the overall effort
of our country to establish a security environment favourable to our national interests, and at
the same time, we provide our political leadership
with a wide spectrum of strategic options for effectively responding to conventional, as well as to
asymmetric threats against the interests of Greece.
Going through the text of this White Paper, the
reader can perceive the way in which our country
addresses current security challenges. Our approach
is an impartial and carefully prioritised overview.
It acknowledges the short-term restrictions and
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term opportunities for
cooperation, alliances and

benefits, on the global geo-political chessboard.
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Despite the economic crisis, our

country has one of the most reliable defence
systems in Europe. Moreover, its geo-political position renders Greece a reliable strategic
player and a valuable ally, at the crossroads of a
troubled area, where the countries, with real commitment to democracy and freedom and a stable
political system, are few.
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All the above are crucial, not only for those

responsible for our national defence and security,
but also for our nation as a whole, for our allies
and partners, as well as for our fellow travellers
in this regional security environment, especially
in these days of abrupt changes, subversion and
crises.
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The Hellenic Armed Forces adapt, transform, and apply new standards in both their organisational and operational planning, with a
view not only to managing todays challenges, but
also to shaping the future. These processes take
place at all the levels, namely at strategic, operational and tactical level. These levels are not
always distinguishable in our days.
We are leaving behind a legacy characterised
by institutional order and operational efficiency. We provide the Hellenic State with Armed
Forces of high morale, fully battleworthy and effective. We inaugurate a new era in our countrys
defence and security; an era that upgrades and
consolidates the geo-strategic, as well as the geopolitical role of Greece, in a period particularly
crucial for the interests of Hellenism.

Dimitrios L AVRAMOPOULOS
Minister of National Defence
of the Hellenic Republic
201 4

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What is the reason for

publishing the new White
Paper on Defence?
The publication of the
White Paper by the HMoND
coincides with a period of socio-political and geo-strategic
changes, which affect, indeed,
the relations between countries,
shape international alliances
and mobilise all the institutional potential of these countries.
As a consequence, the current international developments, which are associated with our country in political and geographical terms, challenge
us to consider not only the way, in which we
conceive our national defence and security, but
also the position itself and the very role of Greece
in the global environment.
Our country, given its strategic position in
respect to the regions of actual geo-political interest and through its participation in almost the
entirety of the regional and international defence
and security organisations, is invited to serenely
consider the consequences of such evolutions and
review its strategic and operational standards,
aiming at implementing its long-term strategic
vision.
In this respect, ten years after the issue of the
latest version of the White Paper and following the review of all the institutional national
strategic texts, it is now time to present again the
principles, the priorities and the framework for
action of our Armed Forces, for the implementation of the strategic vision of Greece over the
next decade.
Through the publication of the White Paper, in 2014, Greece illustrates how it approaches
the current security challenges. Its approach is
comprehensive and takes into consideration the
short-term restrictions and risks of the current
geo-economic situation, as well as the long-term
opportunities that emerge from the developments
in the region.
The White Paper shall constitute the mirror of
our strategic concept required for the achievement
of the above mentioned objectives, but should not,
nevertheless, be considered a given fact. The speed
at which the geo-political environment changes, the
achieve continuity and consistency in our national defence and security policy shall demand its periodical
review in accordance with the relevant revision procedures of all the institutional strategic texts; and this review should take place
more frequently than in the past.

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close
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interaction
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between the global
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economy and national
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Dr Polykarpos ADAMIDIS
Director General of National Defence
Policy and International Relations
201 4
2014
White Paper on
Defence 2014

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The publication of the

White Paper by the HMoND
is the outcome of great institutional and operational changes,
which contributed to radically
redefine our operational and
strategic principles.
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Defence, security and the

deterrence capacity of our country constitute our main and
strategic objectives.
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In order to efficiently ensure all the above,

our Armed Forces are continuously evolving and
adjusting to the new requirements of our age,
improving their effectiveness and remaining the
principal constant for the Hellenic Republic
that guarantees the defence of the country, constitutes an active cell of the society and a valuable
assistant of the Greek people through its social
contribution.

. 2013-2027
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The need to maintain the defence capacities

of the country at a high level is not an option,
but a demand and a duty for all of us. In this
context, we implement the Force Structure 20132027, principally aiming at the creation of flexible, rapidly deployable, innovative and mainly
efficient Armed Forces.
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The predictable recovery of the Hellenic

economy, the return of the country to positive
growth rates and the continuation of the intense
reform efforts are a unique opportunity for our
Armed Forces evolution into a modern and efficient operational apparatus, which will circumvent restrictions and compromises as to the level
and quality of the security provided to the Greek
people, as well as to the territorial integrity of
our country.
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As it becomes clear, threat assessment, in our

case, is not perceived in the same way as in other
European countries; it is not identified with the
risk assessment made at the level of NATO or of
the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, as
in addition to the above mentioned assessments,
we also face a regional problem.
All these, which draw up the geo-strategic
map, as seen from our perspective and are depicted
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We have to manage the challenges of the

modern world with confidence and conviction,
upgrading our good neighbourly and peaceful coexistence relations. Therefore, we also have the
duty to offer to the Greek citizen a secure and
stable environment, enabling him, in any possible
way, to cope with the difficult everyday situations.
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per, are vital and
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of great importance to
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the Greek nation, especially
in this era of abrupt changes,
upheavals and crises. We live history in the making, especially in the
area of South-eastern Mediterranean and
Northern Africa.
I invite you to study the White Paper on

Defence for 2014 and I am convinced that by going through its pages you will understand, for one
more time, the reason why Greece manages over
time to act as a stabilising factor in the region,
being credible, while at the same time avoiding
competition with other countries.

General Michael KOSTARAKOS

Chief HNDGS
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1.1
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1.2
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1.3
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1.4
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4.1 - . . . . . . . 90
4.2 . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3
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4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
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6 -
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2.1
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2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 . . . . . . . 38
2.4 . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6 . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.8 . . . . . . . . 53
2.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.11
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3.1

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3.2
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3.3
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6.1
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6.2 -
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6.3

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7 -
7.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.3

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8.1 -
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8.2 -
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8.3
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8.4
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8.5
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8.6 -
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CONTENTS
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CHAPTER 5 - HUMAN
RESOURCES
1.1 Shaping of the Geo-Political

Environment of Today. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 The Geo-Strategic Location of Greece. . . . . . 20
1.3 The Regional Security Environment Challenges and Threats in the Balkans
and the Eastern Mediterranean. . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4 New Threats to our National Defence
and Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1 Vision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

5.2 Strategic Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
CHAPTER 3 - THE CONTRIBUTION OF GREECE TO

INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY
3.1 Summary of the Developments in NATO
and EU Defence and Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 International Relations and Cooperation
- Relationship Building Strategy with
other Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3 Defence Diplomacy (Developments Planning). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
CHAPTER 4 - ECONOMY - TECHNOLOGY AND
DEFENCE
4.1 Defence Expenditure - Armaments. . . . . . . 90
4.2 Domestic Defence Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 New National Defence Industrial
Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4 Research and Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.1 Institutional Framework of National

Defence Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 National Defence Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 National Military Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Developments in the Armed Forces . . . . . . . 41
2.5 New Force and Command Structure Jointness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6 Operational Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 Jointness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.8 National Defence Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.9 Future Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.10 Crisis Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.11 Civil Emergency Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
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CHAPTER 2 - NATIONAL DEFENCE AND

SECURITY POLICY
CHAPTER 1 - GREECE WITHIN THE CURRENT

GEO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
CHAPTER 6 - SOCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF

THE ARMED FORCES - DEVELOPMENT OF
INITIATIVES
6.1 Social Contribution of the
Armed Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.2 Armed Forces and Infrastructure Environment - Development
of Initiatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.3 Armed Forces Agencies with
a Comprehensive Social
Contribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
CHAPTER 7 - LEGISLATIVE WORK PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL
7.1 Legislative Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.2 Parliamentary Control Transparency Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.3 International Contracts on
Disarmament and Armaments
Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
CHAPTER 8 - IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ARISING
FOR A FUTURE STRATEGY REVIEW
8.1 Security Threats - Threat Forms International Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2 Demographic Issue - Impact on
the Armed Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3 Retaining the Same Level of
Defence Budgets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4 The development of Technology
and the Desirable Extent of its
Application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.5 The Geo-Strategic Environment in the
Broader Region of our Country. . . . . . . . . . .
8.6 European Integration Border Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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1.1

1.1 SHAPING OF THE GEO-POLITICAL

ENVIRONMENT OF TODAY
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Given the fact that current events, taking place both at home and at international
level, evolve at an unprecedented rate, our
effort to assess, on the long-term, the strategic risks and opportunities becomes more
and more difficult and precarious. Such an
effort should consider as a prerequisite that
the defence and security conditions of our
country will develop dynamically, and consequently, its success will be clearly based
on the right assessment of the basic parameters that shape the near and broader geostrategic environment of our country.
Political and Economic
Developments
The global fiscal crisis, which affects
most countries of the Western world, has
triggered a series of chain reactions not only
to the way the international and internal financial relations are built in the developed
world, but also in the way that we perceive
traditional terms that remain standard
over time, like national defence and security. Yet, the concept of this terminology acquires a new, broader and dilating scope, in
the way we understand it. It is in this direction, after all, that the events of the recent
years are pointing to, thus demonstrating
in the most irrefutable way, that the independence and vital interests of the countries are not threatened only by the creation
of a negative balance of power in the area of
their diplomatic and military relations, but
also by the corresponding imbalances in
their financial and energy balance.
In this context, the Armed Forces, being one of the main pillars for the operation of
a modern state, have an important and dual
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On the one
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the establishment of the
necessary security and stability environment that will allow
the state to give priority to the economic development and social welfare;
on the other hand, they are called to actively assist the state in its effort to restore
and maintain the national fiscal stability,
as a means of increasing national power.
Therefore, national defence and security
can no longer be examined as an issue separate from the citizens everyday life, but as a
question directly related to it.
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Changes in the role of leading

international players
In this second decade of the 21st
century, volatility and insecurity affect the
Western World in the most direct way. In order to respond to the current challenges of
the geo-political environment, the leading
international players (countries and international organisations) go through a period of
role seeking and profile building, with the
aim of ensuring their vital interests and restoring stability in their area of interest.
NATO, as a leading supranational
security institution at international level,
after completing a long
period of introspection
and following the decisions taken at the Lisbon
Summit and the adoption of the New Strategic
Concept in 2010, has now
entered a new period in
its history. Indeed, the
Euro-Atlantic Alliance is
evolving into a political-military security organisation, setting as its primary objectives
-apart from collective defence that remains
its cornerstone- crisis management and the
strengthening of ties with its partners.
In this context and a after a long period during which its forces have been engaged in territories of the Middle East and
Central Asia, the Alliance goes through a
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(Smart Defense),
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In order to respond to the existing

and emerging threats and fill the gaps in the
existing military capabilities, NATO invests
in the enhancement of interoperability
among Allies and Partners and encourages
the creation of synergies of scale (Smart
Defence) for the cooperative development
of high-cost capabilities. Moreover, since
the end of the Cold War, NATO has invested
in the continuous process for the establishment of an institutional dialogue with the
countries of the former Soviet Union, thus
contributing to the support of the overall
effort for the consolidation of regional security and stability.
NATO of course, in addition to the
new role and new missions it was called to
assume, continues to reaffirm its role as a
primarily collective security organisation,
and as such, it links its role and influence
with its capability to reliably project power
in geographical areas, where the major interests of the Alliance are at stake.
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period of readiness and preparedness of

structures and forces, with the aim of acquiring the capability to promptly respond
to the existing and emerging threats. These
threats include, among others, the spread
of terrorism and international crime and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These threats, apart from disrupting
the unimpeded transit through sea and
energy routes, also contribute to the uncontrolled spread of migration flows towards
the developed Western world.
At the same time, the European Union (EU) makes every effort to enhance its
footprint on the regional and international security activities, exploiting the institutional framework set by the Lisbon Treaty.
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At the same time, the EU is obtaining

an institutional framework to assume missions outside the geographical area of the
Union, with the aim of maintaining peace,
preventing conflicts and enhancing international security. The activation of operational
formations, such as the EU Battlegroups,
provides credibility to the operational arm
of the Union, without however, fully exploiting these particular institutional instruments so far.
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Common Security and Defence
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structures.
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On its part, the United Nations

Organisation (UN) remains the basic pillar of the international security system,
mainly in the area of disarmament and deployment of
complex peacekeeping and
humanitarian
operations
across the globe. Despite
the occasionally noticed delay in keeping up with international developments, the
value of the Organisation is
confirmed by the legitimisation accorded by Security Council decisions to main international operations of
both NATO and the EU.
In addition to international organisations, the international environment is also
characterised by the redefinition of roles
and policies of the traditional world powers and countries that struggle to increase
their influence in international affairs, often
referred to as emerging powers.
As a consequence of the international economic crisis, the United States
try hard to adapt to a relatively unstable
environment. The unrivalled military power
of the US, given their military expenditure
in absolute terms, as well as in terms of
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Research and Development (R&D) investments, is expected to be maintained in the

medium-term. The need, however, to control the budgetary deficits already exercises
pressure on the US military budget, with obvious consequences for their power projection and international presence.
At the same time, the focus of the
US on the security and power distribution
system being redefined in the broader area
of the Eastern / South-eastern Asia and the
Pacific, is expected to create new conditions
for the security and defence demands in
the European area. The aforementioned
strategic re-orientation does not
imply a step back by the US side
from its commitments to the
security of the Euro-Atlantic
area, as evidenced by the
decisive contribution of
the United States to the
ballistic missile defence
programme of Europe.
It is certain,
however, that in the
long-term there will
be a need to maximise the coordination
between policies and
actions of NATO and
the EU and to re-design
the allocation of burdens
and resources in individual
security areas among European countries. This particular
effort is expected to be long and
painful, as it coincides with a period
of economic crisis that has brought about
respective cuts to the European countries
budgets, our own countrys budget included, with relevant impact on the power projection capability of the European powers.
This difficulty is aggravated by the
fact that European solidarity is put to the
test, a concept that is essentially linked to
the European acquis, as a result of the dissimilarity in priorities set by the countries of
the European North and South, in the fields
of economy and, more recently, defence
and security.
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The first category includes Russia

that is on its way to re-establish its position as the second pole of the international
power system, with an increasing influence
on the European and Asian affairs and a
continuous and particularly active military
and economic policy.
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eo
,
, , , ,
. ,
.
Wi
thi
I n
nt
he
addition
Cu
to the above
rr
mentioned Western
en
t
actors, there are three
distinguishable categories
of countries that aspire to a
more active role for themselves
in the international security environment, as follows:
,
,
,

.
e e ce
The second category includes a series of countries of the developing world,

such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa.
These countries are exploiting the increasing special weight of their economic and
military power to pursue a very active engagement in international security affairs,
seeking a role and a voice in international
matters.
The third category includes a
number of other medium-sized countries,
with a key geo-political position and high
growth rates compared to other countries
in their region (i.e. Japan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, and Iran). In the near
future, they are expected to claim an increasingly regulatory role in their regional
security matters and simultaneously to try
to become privileged players, vis--vis the
respective international security organisations in their regions.
Further to national and institutional
inter-governmental actors, there are numbers of other informal and often uncontrollable entities that claim an ever-increasing
role in the international correlations, affecting in a clear way national and international security. This category includes
big multi-national business groups, the
new international financial entities and a
number of Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGO) with international presence.
19
201 4
20

() .

,

,
,
. ,
, (commercial off-the shelf technology)

(reverse-engineering).
,

.
1.

,

, , ,
.
, .
Technological Developments
It is recognised that a basic parameter
that will drastically affect the establishment
of the international security environment in
the medium and long term, is the variability in
the level of access, management and production of technological innovation. Nowadays,
there is a growing tendency to interconnect
civil and military applications through the
use and copy of commercial applications and
hardware (commercial off-the shelf technology), as well as reverse-engineering. This tendency undermines the correlations of power
between technologically developed and
developing countries, allowing at the same
time, access to relevant military capabilities
and a variety of non-governmental actors.
Investments in dual use cutting edge
technologies, with particular emphasis on
unmanned surveillance and target acquisition systems, biometric systems, integrated
artificial intelligence systems, and cyber
warfare could provide, in the medium term,
several governmental and non-governmental actors with a qualitative advantage. Such
investments are favouring financially weak
countries and can change the established
correlations of military power, further limiting the supremacy of power of big international actors.
1.2

1.2 THE GEO-STRATEGIC LOCATION OF

GREECE
From a geo-political and geo-strategic
point of view, Greece historically belongs
to the broader European geo-political
environment and is inextricably linked to
1. G r
ol
it i
ca
lE
nv
i ro
nm
e nt

.
,

,

.
-P
, ,

, . ,
,

.
eo

,
, ,
.
Wi
thi
t h e
nt
he
Balkans
Cu
and
Eastern
rr
Mediterranean, geen
t
ographical regions that
allow Greece the privilege to
exercise its political and financial influence. The strategic value
of Greece in the geographical space
concerned is determined, on the one
hand, by its central location in
this area of high strategic interest, and on
the other hand by the
fact that our country
constitutes a point of
contact and the bastion of Europe in relation to Asia and Africa.
, .

,
,
.
e e ce
The special importance attributed to

Greece is further enhanced by the fact that it is
the sole country in the region participating
actively as a full member in all international
and regional security organisations such as
the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE.
At the same time, the country has invested, politically and from an infrastructure
and assets point of view, in its capability to
provide reliable security to international
trade routes between Europe and the Asian
and Middle Eastern international markets
that cross Hellenic territories and areas of
Hellenic strategic interest. The importance
of the above has been strengthened over
the past years, since the international community is seeking a stability backbone in
the region, in light of a wide instability arch
stretching from the coasts of Northern Africa to the Black Sea and somehow encircling
Europe.
In this respect, the island of Crete is playing a key role from a geographical and infrastructure point of view. The island constitutes a basic pillar of strategic planning for
the whole country, as well as for all our Allies and Partners, since its location and the
Naval and Air Bases deployed on the island
render it a stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean region.
21
201 4
22
, ,
,
, , ,

.
At international level, Greece, a country

deeply loyal to the UN contribution to the
maintenance of global peace and security
and to the resolution of international disputes, has always supported and will continue to support related initiatives of the
Organisation and to participate in relative
international bodies and contracts.
1.3
-

1.3 THE REGIONAL SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT - CHALLENGES AND
THREATS IN THE BALKANS AND THE
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
South-eastern Europe

() ,

,

,

.
1.

, , . , ,

,
, , ,
.
, ,
,
. ,
The area of South-eastern Europe,

after a period of relative stabilisation and
normalisation during the first half of the
previous decade, has been experiencing
over the past years increasing uncertainty
at political and strategic level, caused by
the economic crisis and the deterioration
of the geo-political situation in the Black
Sea.
The outbreak of the international
economic crisis has affected the South
of Europe to a great extent, including of
course SE Europe. As a matter of fact, the
countries located in the region were the
ones to experience the repercussion, since
the majority of them had already been at
a precarious financial situation before the
eruption of the crisis, as a result of either
their transition from the socialist model to a
free market one, or the outbreak of conflicts
within their territories.
Apart from the financial variables, the
security environment in the region remains
volatile, since there are still covert nationalist tensions, while corruption and transnational organised crime continue unabated.
The aforementioned phenomena constitute potential asymmetric threats, which
may finally manifest themselves as political,
social, financial and military threats, all of
which have been taken into consideration
for the defence planning of Greece.
Additionally, the redistribution of
power in the broader region of SE Europe
and the Black Sea in progress, combined with
the constant reshaping of the regional and
European map of energy transit, gives rise
1. G r
eo
-P
ol
it i
ca
lE
nv
i ro
nm
e nt

,

. .
Wi
thi
to a
nt
he
series of
Cu
security conrr
cerns and opportuen
nities for defence coopt
eration among the countries of the region, as well as
with other geo-strategic partners.
As far as our country is concerned, the decision of the Shah Deniz
Consortium (SDC) in favour of the construction of the TAP pipeline, which will
mostly go through the Hellenic territory,
provides special geo-strategic value to
Greece and puts it right on the energy map
as an energy-transit country. Furthermore,
the construction of branching interconnection pipelines for the transportation of gas
to the other countries, favours its potential
utilisation for the transportation of natural
gas to Europe.
The countries of the region aspiring
to enhance their financial stability and build
up their security, despite the current slowdown of the enlargement procedures at EU
and Euro-Atlantic level, continue the efforts
for their accession in the EU and NATO structures. In such cases, Greece, a traditional
member of the above-mentioned organisations, is keeping a consistent and initially
positive stance on the Balkan candidacies,
subject to the respect of good neighbourly
relations and to the principles of international law.
, ,
.
,
,

,
.
,
Shah Deniz (Shah Deniz
Consortium-SDC)
,

,
- . ,

.
,
,

-

. , ,

, .
e e ce
Eastern Mediterranean - Middle

East Region
The broader region of Eastern Mediterranean, Maghreb and the Middle East is
perhaps the top geo-strategic and geo-economic hub globally. This is the area where
the biggest energy and international trade
routes converge, as well as the area with the
largest oil and natural gas reserves in the
world.
This geo-strategic value is enhanced
by the slow rate of renewable energy sources exploitation, the weakness to fully exploit the hydrocarbon reserves in Africa and
the Arctic and the shift of the international
community against the use of nuclear energy, following the nuclear accident in Japan
in 2011.
23
201 4
24

,

, 2011.
,

,
,
, , .
,
, ,

. , ,
,

.
1.
, ,

,
, , ,
.
,

,
(, )
Therefore, the developments in the

region in progress over the past years go far
beyond their initial regional background,
directly depending upon the course of the
international economy and the vital defence and security interests, not only of the
countries close to this region but also of the
whole Western world.
More specifically, the developments
following the Arab Spring indicate that
the political and social changes in the Arab
World and Muslim societies cannot be dealt
with according to the terms and standards
of the Western political thought and planning. On the contrary, these changes, if
they expect to have any luck at all, require
respect by the political and ideological selfconsciousness of the peoples and the longterm support commitment by the Western
world.
Furthermore, the bloody and almost

year-long crisis in Syria, coupled with the
ambivalence of the international community and the conflicting interests of the countries in the broader region, has given rise to
new, more radical trouble spots of religious
and ethnic fundamentalism, now threatening to disrupt and cause the collapse of a
great part of the Middle East.
Under these circumstances, the roles
and the relations among the dominant actors in the region, as well as all the open issues (the Middle-East issue, the Iran nuclear
programme, etc.) are renegotiated and seen
in the light of extended demographic pressures and security threats emerging from
1. G r

.
ur
re
t
Apart from the
recent developments, the
region is still characterised by
a frozen conflict, a blatant international problem of illegal invasion
and occupation of a great part of the
territory of an independent EU member
state, the Republic of Cyprus. This problem
is not only a tension and destabilisation
factor for the region, but also operates as
a constant reminder of the international
institutions weakness to impose the much
needed international legal order and rule
of law in the region.
ol
it i
ca
lE
nv
i ro
nm
e nt
,
,
eC
-P

, ,

.
, ,

.
th
eo
, ,

.

,
.
Wi
thi
t h e
n
spread of
radical extremism in the region.
, ,
,
, -
, .
,

.
e e ce
Our country, with its geographic and

socio-political attributes, constitutes in our
days the bastion of Europe in this region
and is determined to play a crucial part
in its current geo-political developments.
Our main objectives in this effort are to
safeguard the vital national and European
interests in the integrated SE Mediterranean region, by strategically cooperating
with the Republic of Cyprus and the rest of
our regional and international partners.
To this end and in order to settle all
issues pertaining to the maritime sovereignty zones and at exploiting their marine
and mineral resources, our country pursues
a constant policy of principles and positions, strictly adhering to the Decisions of
the United Nations Security Council and
the provisions of international law. Guided
by the above-mentioned principles, we are
equally developing bilateral relations with
the countries in the region and we are concluding cooperation agreements with principal diplomatic and military partners in the
region.
Moreover, the geographic location
of our country renders it extremely exposed
to the waves of immigrants and refugees
provoked by the generalised instability in
the region. At the same time, the peculiarity of the area (extended sea borders and a
vast number of islands, islets and rock-islets)
facilitates the conduct of illegal activities,
25
201 4
26
, . , (
, ) ,
,
:

1.4

- ,
,
, ,
,
.
1.
,
, ,
.
,
,
,
.
which are potential asymmetric threats and

could be:
Political
Military
Social
Economic
Environmental
1.4 NEW THREATS TO OUR NATIONAL

DEFENCE AND SECURITY
Definition of Threats to National
Defence and Security
In contrast to most EU and NATO
member states, Greece, in an effort to define the threats to its national defence and
security, has to take into serious consideration several crucial regional characteristics,
which exceed the threat assessment, as
seen under the respective European or Euro-Atlantic perception.
It is obvious that the everlasting
instabilities in SE Europe and the former
USSR, although they do linger to a certain
extent, cannot be considered traditional
and high-risk threats to our national defence and security.
On the contrary, the developments
in Northern Africa and the Middle East, the
imperative to discover and exploit resources
in the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the
shaping of the regional system of energy
transit, give rise to new forms of threats in
the broader geographic environment. These
threats do not belong to the traditional context of military disputes; they are, however,
characterised as asymmetric, or even hybrid
threats, and can have a disproportionate result in relation to the assets utilised.
The New Security Threats
Greece, being a NATO and EU member and due to its geo-strategic location, is
1. G r
,

.
thi
called to
th
eC
play a crucial
ur
part in regional
re
nt
security issues, which
in their majority form the
so-called grid of new security
threats.
International Terrorism
International terrorism in
our days has transcended the traditional
ideological or subversive attributes of the
past and is now becoming a major manager
of financial flows globally; an accelerator of
political developments; and an appreciable
factor of military power in conflicts of asymmetric and regional nature.
Due to the results produced, the
publicity received by the media and its
impact, modern terrorism transcends the
stereotypes of the internal security services
management and is being transformed into
a threat of global interest, with particular
consequences to security at personal and
international level.
In our days, the ideology of members of terrorist organisations is based on
political, religious, social, racial and financial
factors and is fuelled by sentiments of economic inequality, deprivation of social rights,
religious fanaticism and lust for power.
At the same time, the developments in the Middle East highlight, in the
most irrefutable manner the fact, that especially orientalism-type terrorism poses
a threat of particular nature to international
security. Movements like the ones emerging in Syria and Iraq have a remarkable
eo
-P
ol
it i
ca
nv
i ro
nm
e nt
lE
,
,

,
.

,

,
.

,
,
.

, , , , .
, , , , .
,

Wi
e e ce
27
201 4
28
1.
(, , )

,

( , ,
).
- ()

.
, ,
,
,
,
,
.

,
,
.
,
,

(),

ability to adjust and exploit all the means of

the globalised environment (i.e. the internet, the media, financial transactions, etc.),
and combined with investing in extreme
violence and the violation of the structural
principles and values of Western societies,
they cause chain reactions extending far
beyond their area of operation (eruption of
migration flows, disturbance of the energy
market, reinforcement of extremist elements in the interior of Western communities, etc.).
Uncontrollable Trafficking of
Weapon Systems - Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
The uncontrollable trafficking
and the proliferation of technologies for
the development and production of modern weapon systems of a conventional and
asymmetric nature constitute some of the
most important factors of destabilisation at
international level.
As far as conventional small arms
are concerned, the collapse of the Soviet
Union, as well as the dissolution of African
and Middle Eastern regimes, has caused an
exponential increase of the illegal flow of
arms and ammunition towards state and
non-state factors, resulting in the creation
of significant hubs of illicit funds trafficking,
and contributing to the organised use of
force at internal, regional and international
level.
The use of small arms, which are
cheap and easy to handle, provides domestic and international terrorism and extreme
nationalist and religious movements with
unprecedented power capabilities and operates as an accelerator of national and regional destabilisation.
However, apart from conventional
weapons, international security continues to
be threatened by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which are
no longer an exclusive privilege of state
actors, but, on the contrary, they can end up
in the hands of terrorist groups and other
non-state actors. The possibility of such an
unfortunate event happening increases the
feeling of uncertainty and insecurity experienced by modern Western societies.
1. G r
thi
th
Greece,
eC
located in a
ur
re
region where the
nt
sea and land routes connecting most illicit weapon
trafficking sources in the world
converge, with its extremely extended land and sea borders, acknowledges the specific security problem as of key importance for its internal
security, as well as for regional stability.
eo
-P
ol
it i
ca
lE
nv
i ro
nm
e nt

, ,

, , . ,
( , ,
) ,
.
Wi

.
,

, , , ,
,
.
e e ce
Migration and Organised Crime

The inequalities caused and
spread by globalisation, the political, demographic and economic imbalances between
the Western and the developing world, as
well as regional and civil conflicts, promote
and increase illegal migration. The tendency of illicit human trafficking also continues
unabated and is linked with other traditional criminal activities, either directly (drugs
/ weapons trafficking, etc.) or indirectly, by
exploiting the same infrastructure and trafficking networks.
This phenomenon is greatly exacerbated in areas, which link and bridge the
developed world with crisis spots globally.
Over the past years, due to the consistent
conflicts and tensions in Central-Northern
Africa and the Middle East, the countries of

. ,

-
,
29
201 4
30

. ,

, .
1.

, ,
,

.

,
.

,

.
,

Southern Europe have to bear most of the

burden of managing illegal immigrants at
global level. This fact, in conjunction with
the distortions brought about by the EU immigration policy, exacerbates the problem
and upgrades it to a major challenge for national and European security.
Cyber Attacks
The Internet and Cyberspace in
general, combined with the ever-increasing
dependence of more and more governments,
organisations, enterprises and individual users upon technological systems directly or indirectly interconnected, shape a new critical
sector for national security and defence.
Cyber warfare and cyber attacks,
being a means of exercising influence of
an asymmetric nature and disrupting the
most vital functions of a country, constitute a genuine threat to national integrity
and prosperity of a country and should be
treated as such.
Energy Security
Energy security is one of the top
priorities and parameters of policy making
for the majority of the developed and developing countries.
The energy dimension of security
has a dual character, involving numerous
institutions apart from those traditionally
serving defence and security as follows:
On one hand, it deals with all the
institutions operating at national level for
the development of capabilities and the
drafting of alliances in the energy sector.
The main objective of the above activities
is to minimise the energy dependence on
third countries, to develop renewable energy source technologies and to fully exploit
the indigenous resources and reserves.
1. G r
eo
-P
ol
it i
ca
nv
i ro
nm
e nt
As far as Greece is concerned, its

geographic location in SE Europe and the
Eastern Mediterranean renders it a critical
factor for the security of trade routes and
energy networks between Europe and Asia,
Europe and Northern Africa, as well as Western Europe and Eastern Mediterranean.
At the same time, the emerging
energy environment and the safeguarding
of the rights to exploit indigenous resources
and reserves generate additional security
requirements, especially in the marine environment.
lE

,

. ,
, .
Wi
thi
O n
nt
he
the other
Cu
hand, it deals
rr
with the capability
en
of a country to reliably
t
project its national power
and legitimacy in the broader
area of its sovereignty zones, aiming at steadfastly implementing the
above-mentioned strategic and economic options.
:
,
, .

,
.
,
, ,
.
,
,

, ,
-
.
,
, , .
e e ce
Modern Forms of Piracy

The modern forms of piracy constitute a phenomenon that emerged over the
past years mostly in the Indian Ocean and
off the coasts of Western Africa, with serious
consequences for global navigation. Greece,
being a country of a great maritime tradition,
but also with one of the largest merchant
fleets globally, is cautiously dealing with
these phenomena and participates with its
diplomatic and military bodies in international efforts made to safeguard the unhindered operation of trade and sea routes.
31
201 4
32
1.
- -

. ,
, , ( ,
) ,
. ,
, , , .
, , ,
,

- , (mega-cities)
.

,

,
:

,

.
,

A E
A,
Environment - Resources - Health

Climate changes and the everincreasing occurrence of devastating
natural disasters have a significant impact
on the environment globally. Additionally, the limited sufficiency in goods vital
for human survival and prosperity (food,
potable water and energy) as well as their
continuous uneven distribution among
various regional systems triggers tensions
and ethnic conflicts. Finally, the extended
under-development in regional zones of
Africa and Asia, depriving great parts of
the populations from their basic needs,
causes the re-emergence and proliferation of infectious diseases, rapidly spreading especially due to the global transport
network expansion.
The above-mentioned shortages
and changes, beyond the ethnic regional
conflicts that they trigger, may also cause
a chain reaction of side-effects, such as uncontrollable displacement of populations,
inclusion of food and water in the financial
sector, establishment of conditions of oligopolistic competition, the uncontrollable
urbanisation especially in Asia and Africa
(mega-cities) and the expansion of national
and energy-related competitions in areas,
such as the polar regions of the globe.
Threat Management
The Hellenic Armed Forces, apart
from having to deal with external threats,
are called to contribute to the management
of the above-mentioned threats by implementing the following actions:
Short-term
Cooperation among the
Armed Forces, the Security Services and,
1. G r
Wi
thi
gen nt
he
erally
Cu
speaking, the
rr
state apparatus at
en
national, transnational
t
and international level.
Updating, improvement and drafting of Contingency Plans, where appropriate.
Coordination of decision-making procedures.
Establishment and operation of a Crisis Management / Asymmetric
Threats System.
Establishment of Working
Groups for non-stop monitoring and assessing of new forms of asymmetric and hybrid
threats.
Mid-term
Re-adjustment of the national and international law system to the
new facts.
Prevention of engagement
in local or regional conflicts by stabilising
the security environment and, when necessary, only on the basis of decisions adopted
in the context of international organisations
and international law.
Protection of maritime activities at national and international level
(counter piracy operations).
Long-term
Drafting of strategies for the
provision of relief and development programmes in countries needing them.
Promotion of Human Rights.
Participation in actions of
the international community for the democratisation of countries and consolidation of the Rule of Law.
Promotion and implementation of strategic integration of deprived
countries in advanced societies.
eo
-P
ol
it i
ca
nv
i ro
nm
e nt
lE
.

/ .

.

.

,
.
( ).

.
.

.

.
e e ce
33
201 4
34
2.
2. N
at i
on
al
ef
en
ce
an
d
Se
cu
r it
yP
ol i
cy
35
201 4
36
2.1

2.1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF

NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING
O 2292/1995, .3883/2010
.
Law 2292 / 1995, as amended by Law

3883 / 2010, specifies the framework of institutional documents that govern the National Defence Planning of Greece.
The key documents that constitute the

said framework are the following:
National Strategy.
Political Leadership Guidance.
National Defence Policy.
.
.
.
.
.

().
,

3230/2004

,
.
, , ().
2.
Military Situation Assessment.

National Military Strategy.
General Defence Plan of the country.
Armed Forces Structure.
Long-term Defence Equipment Procurement Programme.
Three-year Rolling Programme for
the Procurement of Defence Equipment for
the Armed Forces.
Apart from the above institutional documents, HMoND participates in the procedures of exercising command by setting objectives as provided for by Law 3230 / 2004
and has established the Armed Forces Objectives system, based on which it monitors
the implementation progress of National
Defence Strategic Objectives.
2. N
an
at i
I n
on
al
line with
D
ef
standard pracen
tice, the said instice
tutional documents are
being in incorporated and
outlined in a Circular of the
Ministry of Defence on National
Defence Planning.
d
Se
cu
r it
yP
2.2 NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY
()

.
,
,
,
().
The National Defence Policy (NDP)

constitutes part of the National Strategy
and specifies the way of employment of
the national defence forces and the management of the broader defence affairs.
It is drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the legislation in force by the
competent Directorate of the Ministry of
Defence, while the Governmental Council
for Foreign Affairs and National Defence
(KYSEA) is responsible for its approval and
release.

,

. ,
, ,
:
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
cy
2.2
ol i
Given that the above documents

cover a wide range of institutional procedures, which do not concern the general
public, it is the White Paper that was chosen
to present elements of the two key documents that work as guidance for developing
strategy and the employment of the force
assets of the Armed Forces.
The NDP takes into consideration a

number of parameters in connection with
current and emerging threats, risks against
the country and the international and regional security challenges. Based on the
assessment of the above parameters, it sets
the national defence objectives and provides guidance, upon due consideration, on
relevant factors, such as:
try.
The geo-strategic value of the coun International relations.

National interests.
National power factors.
Technological developments.
The current and assessed threats.
The risks and the security environment in general.
37
201 4
38

()
2011.
The current National Defence Policy was

approved by the Governmental Council for
Foreign Affairs and National Defence (KYSEA) in March 2011.

,
.
The NDP specifies the national strategic doctrine of the country, advocating deterrence and defence and is based on the
strategic, operational and tactical flexibility
of the Armed Forces, as well as their rapid
reaction capability.

:
.
.
.
.
The basic principles that govern the

NDP are the following:

, ,

, ,
' , .

,
, .
2.
,

,
.
2.3

(),
Respect of existing borders.

Compliance with International Law.
Protection of human rights.
Full compliance with the UN Charter
and decisions.
Fundamental Objectives of the National Defence Policy
Safeguarding national integrity,
sovereignty, independence and force and
therefore, defending the land, sea and air
national territory and, therefore, national
security.
Contributing to the integrity of the
sovereignty, independence and security
of the Republic of Cyprus, in the context of
the strategic cooperation between the two
countries in the common geographical area
of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Apart from the above objectives, the
country mainly aims at ensuring peace and
stability in South-eastern Europe, Eastern
Mediterranean and other regions of specific
interest.
2.3 NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
General
The National Military Strategy (NMS)
stems from the National Defence Policy. It
constitutes an institutional document that
outlines the mission and main operational
tasks of the Armed Forces, as well as the
employment of the countrys military force
towards the end of fulfilling the mission assigned to the Armed Forces. The NMS aims
at implementing the guidelines set by the
political leadership, as being specified in the
yP
cy
It is drafted by the Hellenic National

Defence General Staff (HNDGS), upon recommendations of the General Staffs of the
Services and is approved by the Minister of
National Defence upon advice of the Council
of the Joint Chiefs of the General Staffs.
ol i

, ,
.

, . ,

,
,

.
r it
cu
,
.
Se
:
.

.

,
.
(),
()

().
2. N
at i
NDP,
on
al
by deterD
ef
mining the misen
sion of the Armed
ce
Forces and the method
of preparation, planning,
development and employment
of the countrys Military Power, in
order to achieve the objectives of the
NDP.
an
,

.
,
, , , ,
.
The basic elements included in the

NMS are the following:
Analysis of the environment.
Mission and desired level of national defence objectives for the Armed
Forces.
Provision of strategic guidance to
the Armed Forces as regards to methods of
their preparation, deployment and employment.
The NMS has been revised currently,
it is in the final stage of its approval and is
expected to be released.
Elements of National Military
Strategy
The NMS is based on the identification of a sequence of domestic and external risks that threaten Greece, its territory,
its population and its security interests.
It allows for the evaluation of all different
39
201 4
40

:

.

.

.

.

,
,
,
.
2.
,
:

.

,
.
,
,

.
aspects of these threats and the organisation of our response to them at national
level. In other words, it aims at the mobilisation of the entire Armed Forces, as well
as of all the other forces of the Nation, the
country, and the Security Services, in combination with the resources of the decentralised, local and regional authorities and
of the main bodies that are of vital importance for the country.
The NMS identifies and categorises
the following:
Threats against National Security.
Opportunities to serve national
interests.
Factors of the domestic environment that affect the shaping of domestic
security.
Strong points and vulnerabilities
of the Hellenic side that should be taken
into consideration during the preparation
of the Armed Forces, with a view to employing the countrys military force more efficiently.
The NMS clearly states the mission
of the Armed Forces, which is the safeguarding of the countrys territorial integrity,
national independence, national sovereignty, and sovereignty rights and responsibilities
of the country, as stipulated in international
agreements or through the conduct of operations required by the situation for assisting
and dealing with any form of threat against
national interests.
Moreover, through the determination of the mission and the required level of
objectives, the NMS also specifies:
The desired defence objectives
per type of military threat and the resulting Minimum Military Requirements for the
Armed Forces.
The requirements for the preparation, support, infrastructure and training of
the Armed Forces for the implementation of
the objectives set out in the NDP.
Finally, the determination of the level
of national defence objectives for the Armed
Forces provides the Strategic Objectives
for the Armed Forces and the analysis for
their implementation of the main tasks of
r it
yP
ol i
cy

,
,
(),
.
cu

,

. ,

, , .
Se
2.4
2. N
at i
the
on
al
Armed
D
ef
Forces. The
en
Strategic Objectives,
ce
specified by the NMS,
are the following:
Safeguarding and
promotion of Peace and Stability
in the Broader Area of Geo-political
Interest.
Deterrence of Challenges and/
or Armed Aggression.
Prevision-Management and Resolution of Crises.
Countering a generalised aggression, Conduct of the Operations and Victorious Conclusion.
an

.
/
.
-
.

.
2.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARMED

FORCES
In the Armed Forces, the financial crisis
was seen as an opportunity to seek intelligent and efficient solutions for the accomplishment of the non-negotiable final
objective, which is the provision of a secure
environment for Greek citizens.
The result of the said trend is reflected
on the revision of institutional documents
and mainly on the Force Structure, which
specifies the personnel and assets for the
accomplishment of the mission of the
Armed Forces. The Force Structure took into
consideration all developments and shaped
balances in the broader area of geo-political
interest and aims at the adaptation of the
Armed Forces to recent and future requirements, focusing on jointness, professionalism and interoperability.
:

,
.
41
201 4
42

.

(),

.

,

,
:

, ,
.
The Armed Forces prepared a LongTerm Defence Equipment Procurement

Programme, adapted to the financial, but
mainly to the operational requirements,
with a view to covering urgent operational
requirements and incited by tensions in our
broader area and the existing asymmetric
and conventional threats that contribute to
the shaping of a situation of continuous instability in South-eastern Europe.
With a view to assisting in stabilising
such an unstable environment, Greece:
Participates in international peace
support operations and respective security support operations, upon relevant decisions of the UN Security Council.
Supports the transformation of
NATO into a collective defence and security
organisation.
Promotes the development of a Joint

Defence and Security Policy, the formation
of a European Rapid Response Force and, in
particular, promotes Maritime Security.
Upon due assessment of the above

threats in the broader area of the Southeastern Mediterranean, the HMoND
-through the Long-Term Defence Equipment Procurement Programme- aims at
improving the Armed Forces aeronautical
capabilities, mainly focusing on the following operational sectors:

(
HELIOS) .
2.

,
. ,
:
, ,

.
Enhancement of Hellenic Navy capabilities in terms of ships with strike capabilities, area air defence capabilities,
maritime cooperation aircraft and modern
submarines.
Increase of Hellenic Air Force capabilities in terms of upgrading the existing aircraft and acquiring state-of-the-art aircraft.
Increase of military forces rapid
movement capabilities in terms of rapid
transportation assets.
Increase of capabilities in modern
fields of activity of the Armed Forces, such
as in space (i.e. participation in the HELIOS
programme) and cyberspace.
Greece plays an important role in the
regional and international security system,
aspiring to become a leader of stability in
Capable Armed Forces that

constitute a force of stability and deterrence in the area, even in these periods of financial recession.
cu
r it
yP
cy
Extremely important installations

and facilities that provide a unique advantage in view of a possible deployment of
air and naval forces of allied forces in the
broader area of Eastern Mediterranean and
Middle East. This is of vital importance for
the deployment and support of multinational efforts, in particular in the sector of
humanitarian intervention. The case of Libya proves that we have created a thorough
and versatile support force structure, in line
with the respective operational and training
requirements of NATO.
ol i
, ,
.

,
, , .
Se

,

,
. ,
,
.
2.5
2. N
at i
t h e
on
al
broader
D
ef
area of the
en
South-eastern Euce
rope. In order to accomplish such a difficult task,
Greece possesses:
an

.
, .
,

.
2.5 NEW FORCE AND COMMAND

STRUCTURE - JOINTNESS
Recent developments in the geo-political and geo-strategic environment of the
area of South-eastern Europe and Southeastern Mediterranean, as well as the international developments in the field of
military art and science, made the revision
of the Force Structure necessary at a level
that should correspond to the countrys
actual defence requirements, the decisions
of the country and the expectations of the
Greek people. At the same time, the new
Force Structure reflects, as far as we are concerned, the capability and readiness of European and allied institutions of operating
as a key to stability and as a factor of reliable
force in the broader area.
In particular, recent unrests -as described
herein above- and the subsequent volatility
and instability in the arc from Northern Africa stretching across the Black Sea, as well
as the emergence of the Jihadists, even not
directly threatening the integrity of Greece,
constitute an imminent threat for its national
security, mainly through the increased flows
of illegal immigrants.
43
201 4
44
,

,
, ,
,

. ,
.
, .
, ,

.

,
- . :
2.
, ,
.

,
.
At the same time, the discovery of

energy deposits in the undersea area of
the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean,
within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the
country, according to international law, as
well as the planned transit of hydrocarbon
pipelines through its territory towards Europe, results to additional requirements
for the Armed Forces as regards the protection and safeguarding of national interests against any aggression. In particular,
under the existing financial circumstances,
the protection of the estimated national
resources in the Eastern Mediterranean is
of top priority in the scale of national interests.
Upon due consideration of the foregoing, a new Force Structure for the Armed
Forces was adopted. It aims at determining the Armed Forces apparatus for the ensuing fifteen years, capable of implementing the decisions of the state authorities,
the expectations of the Greek people and
the threats and challenges against national security.
Emphasis has been placed on saving
resources in terms of personnel and operational expenses of the Armed Forces,
resulting from the relevant reduction in size
and the reform of structures, as well as the
redistribution of the funds allocated for the
implementation of armament programmes
or sub-programmes.
The general directives that govern the
new approach are summarised as follows:
Better exploitation of the capabilities
of the manpower, with targeted actions and
options, for their proper assignment to units
and
agencies.
2. N
at i
on
al
an
fe
Reduction
nc
of the operational
e
cost, by adopting a combination of innovative and traditional solutions, implementing
jointness that achieves synergies
and economies of scale.
d
Se
cu
r it
yP
Focusing on the main threat.

Exploitation of the existing infrastructure of the country for rapid force
movement.
Exploitation of the existing transportation assets (land, sea, air) for the rapid
deployment of forces at the locations specified in the plans.
(, , )
.
Maintaining and further increasing

combat capability and effectiveness of the
Armed Forces, despite the cutback in their
budget, through:
,
, :
Targeted improvements in key

sectors, such as command and control, improvement of the intelligence collection
system, surveillance of our national territory
and increase of the capability of dealing
with new types of threats and effectively
managing crises.
,
, ,

.

, , ,
, ,
.
, .
cy
ol i
Re-evaluation of the armament

requirements with priority to the full exploitation of existing resources and the increase of the availability of main weapon
systems.
Integrating jointness, by improving joint training, promoting standardisation and interoperability, to achieve the
necessary levels of uniformity, compatibility, inter-changeability and joint operational
cooperation.
Adopting changes to the organisation and operational functioning of
forces, with the purpose of improving their
operational work.
Transformation of the Armed Forces
into a modern, efficient, cost-effective and
agile instrument in the hands of the state
leadership to constitute a guarantee for the
defence of the country and a means of assistance for the Greek people, through its
social contribution.
45
201 4
46
, , , ,
,
.

, , , , , , ,
. , ,
, ,

.
,
,
,
.
2.6
2.
-
, ,
,
,

The Armed Forces that will result after

the full implementation of the Force Structure shall be more powerful, effective,
coherent, flexible and modern, rapidly developing, sustainable wherever deployed,
and able to respond to their mission in the
best possible way. Furthermore, they shall
be more cost-effective, without putting
any disproportional burden on the national effort for recovery and exit from the
financial crisis.
At the same time, they shall constitute
an ambassador of Greece in any part of
the world, whenever required to provide
assistance to the safeguarding of peace
and security under the auspices of International Organisations, in which Greece
participates.
2.6 OPERATIONAL TRAINING
General Information
All actions-innovations involving
the multi-dimensional section of training
of the Armed Forces and, hence, any activity performed in this view, constitute the
grounds for acquiring knowledge, skills
and capabilities, with a view to fulfilling
the individual mission of each member of
the personnel and of the Armed Forces in
general.
The organisation and planning of the
main training activities aim at:
Projecting a high level of force,
operational readiness and deterrence capability of the Armed Forces throughout
the Hellenic territory, in the frame of any
2. N
an
at i
type
on
al
of modD
ef
ern operation,
en
day and night, unce
der any weather and
climate conditions.
Consolidating jointness and the vertical command
structure of the Armed Forces.
Exploiting the full spectrum
of our weapon system capabilities.
Se
cu
ol i
cy

,
. ,

yP
r it

:
,

, , ,
.

.

.
Operational Training
Operational is the training provided
for the development, maintenance and
improvement of operational readiness of
the personnel and the units of the Armed
Forces. Thus, the peculiar operational environment of Greece requires coordinated
action by all the Services of the Armed
Forces. In this respect, the planning and
conduct of a sufficient number of realistic
joint exercises is necessary. Exercises constitute the culmination point of the entire
training and a realistic way, in which readiness and combat effectiveness of units and
formations can be evaluated.
In general, national joint exercises
aim at training the HNDGS, General Staffs,
Major Commands and Formations in planning and performing joint operations,
which cover the entire spectrum of missions, in an environment that simulates a
period of tension-crisis and conflict. Both
the general and the individual specific objectives of each exercise reflect the existing
and future operational requirements and
priorities. Therefore, national joint exercises are being categorised as follows:
47
201 4
48
.

. , .
2.
Command Post Exercises / CPX,

which mainly aim at training Commands
and HQ Staffs. These are being further distinguished into:
Computer Assisted Exercises /
CAX, where computers simulate the operational environment and provide solutions
for situations formed.
Crisis Management Exercises /
CMX, during which the competent staff officers of the military and civilian sectors are
being trained on the national procedures
for managing several crises.
Live Exercises / LIVEX, which aim
at training mainly participating forces on
the conduct of joint operations and are distinguished into:
Field Training Exercises / FTX,
during which all troops and participating
HQs are being deployed in the field.
, ,
() , ,
, - . ,
, .
:
/
(Command Post Exercises/
CPX)
.
:

/ (Computer Assisted Exercises/CAX),

.
(Crisis Management Exercises/CMX),

.
(/ Live Exercises/
LIVEX),

,
Command Field Exercises /

CFX, during which only selected Units are
fully deployed in the field.
Except for national joint exercises,
Greece also participates in international
exercises conducted abroad, hosted in its
Se
cu
r it
yP
ol i
cy
, ,
. , /
,
.
2. N
at i
terrion
al
tory or
D
ef
organised by
en
Greece. Our particice
pation in international
exercises is part of either
military cooperation with other
countries or the preparation of
units and/or formations assigned to
international organisations with a view
to fulfilling Greeces obligations towards
them, or finally, the exploitation of opportunities for combined training in the frame
of separate joint or one Service exercises.
an
(Field Training Exercises/FTX),

.

(Command Field Exercises/CFX),
,
.
-
.
, , ,
,
, ,
.

,

/ ,

, .
Units-Reserve Training
The revised training programmes
give particular emphasis on night activities
during the training of units / independent
sub-units. Night operations require full understanding of the night as a natural phenomenon, the tactical rules that govern
them, the technologically advanced devices
and the technical capabilities of the equipment, so that the best possible effect would
be achieved in the battlefield in the dark.

.
, .
49
201 4
50
,
,
(
.).
The Hellenic Armed Forces have incorporated a pool of personnel -the reserve
forces- into their organisational structure, in
order to strengthen their manpower in periods of tension / crises or war.
. , , .
, ,
,
,

.
The reserve forces include conscripts

having fulfilled their military service, as well
as retired officers. Age limits apply for both
categories. Upon the lapse of the said limits,
they are written off the reserve force. The
selected ones remain in the roster of the
same Unit until they reach the age limit or
until the occurrence of any other factor (i.e.
migration, etc.).
,
,
,
.
2.7
2.
, ,
. ,

,
,
,
,
.

-
.
In order to monitor the proper implementation of the mobilisation plans,

exercises are being conducted regularly. A
percentage of reservists participate from
time to time in scheduled joint and/or single service exercises. Call-ups, reception,
onward movement of mobilised personnel,
their intensive training and immediate incorporation constitute a chain of actions of
vital importance for the successful exploitation of the reserve force.
Each Service of the Armed Forces
directs and monitors its own reserve manpower, plans and prepares its own mobilisation sector, based on its own operational
assessments, monitoring at the same time
the work of the other mobilisation bodies.
2.7 JOINTNESS
The term Jointness signifies the capability of collective functioning of the Services of the Armed Forces, which essentially
contains the components of interoperability and standardisation. More specifically, it
is the art of combining the capabilities and
functions of the forces of the different Services, in order to achieve the best outcome
from combat synergies, the planning or
the training, an achievement that is greater
than the sum of actions of the Services if
they acted individually.
The acquisition of the necessary operational capabilities requires rational management of the available resources, taking
into consideration the factor of jointness,
thus maximising the effectiveness and
achieving the best possible cost - benefit
,
.
cy
, , ,
.
,
Subsequently, the Force Structure

ensured the full implementation of jointness, in order to obtain the maximum synergies and economies of scale, taking into
consideration the standards of the Armed
Forces of NATO and EU member states.
ol i
, ,

, :
yP

,

.
r it
cu
Se

(/)
:
.
an

,

,
.
2. N
at i
r a on
al
tio. As a
D
ef
consequence,
en
a legal framework
ce
implementing jointness
was prepared, determining the suitable organisational
structure and the respective
command relationships.
Jointness is a fundamental element for

the operational functioning of the HNDGS
and is included in the personal vision of
the Chief of the Hellenic National Defence
General Staff (C/HNDGS) with the following
wording: Domination of the joint force in the
modern operational environment through
the decisive superiority against any potential
threat.
The implementation of this vision, focused on jointness, is going to be achieved
through:
The development of fundamental
operational concepts.
Their transformation into joint operational capabilities.
The conversion of the joint operational capabilities into military action options, available to the political leadership
in order to deal with risks or threats against
national security.
Based on the experience of jointness,
from its implementation until nowadays, we
can summarise the following benefits:
Promotion of the Joint Operational
Planning, obtaining to the maximum extent
51
201 4
52
, , ,
.
, ,
, ,

.

,

,
.
, /
,
,

/.

.
2.
[ - (.. 401 ),
() ]
,

.

possible the unity of effort for the harmonisation and coordination of the three Services. To support the developed operational
plans, planning and organisation of training
were directed to a joint framework, focused
on operations in all the possible theatres,
improving the capabilities of immediate response.
he National Military Strategy, the
Force Structure and the National Defence
Planning were revised, in the context of the
aforementioned Jointness, and a National
Defence Industrial Strategy was drawn.
Promotion of a more effective system for the exploitation of the funds made
available for Defence, through the rationalisation of the credits provided to the
Services by exercising central control and
on the basis of the absolute prioritisation of
them by the HNDGS, in the frame of the new
Command and Force Structure.
Establishment of a Vertical Command
Structure, in accordance with which the C/
HNDGS exercises the full command of all
Services of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of
the Army, Navy and Air Force General Staffs
are integrated in the chain of operational
command and command the respective
Services, according to the instructions and
orders of the C/HNDGS. In this way, a more
cost effective form of command was established, while the immediate response capabilities and the participation conditions of
the Forces in joint operations were improved.
Expansion of the implementation of
jointness to include infrastructure and provision of services [operation of military hospital clinics with medical personnel - medical
attendants from all three Services (e.g. Heart
r it
yP
ol i
cy

( , , ,
).
The improvement of jointness,

combined with the establishment of
the appropriate structures is of priority
for the enhancement of the operational
readiness and combat effectiveness of the
Armed Forces. Interoperability and standardisation are more necessary than ever,
both among the Services of the Armed
Forces and with the Security Services. It
is a force multiplier in the development of
capabilities and it ensures the effective use
of available resources, contributing at the
same time to operational and maintenance
cost savings for the units. The objective of
the HMoND is:
cu
, ,

.
Se
, .
2. N
at i
Suron
al
gery ClinD
ef
ic in 401 Army
en
General Hospital of
ce
Athens), establishment
of a Military Legal Advisors
Corps, etc.].
an
,
. . :
The promotion of common use of

the existing infrastructures.
The implementation of a common
procurement system in the areas of defence
and security, an activity that is supported by
the existing legal framework.
The establishment of a mechanism
for the thorough examination, in the contracting phase, of provisions for common
specifications, concerning materiel and assets aiming at the enhancement of interoperability of the Armed Forces and the Security Services.
2.8
2014
.
().

, .
The thorough examination of cooperation activities in the field of training (e.g.

Intelligence Schools, conduct of joint exercises, execution of joint fires, training in the
field of maintenance and support of means,
etc.).
2.8 NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING
In September 2014, the Minister of National Defence approved the new circular
order on National Defence Planning.
The approved circular order is expected
to become a determining factor in dealing
with modern threats, in compliance with
the adopted methodology approaches.
53
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54
EC 81/2009
.3978/2011
,

.3883/10
( 72-76) .

.

,

.
, ,
,
.

-
,
.
2.

, , .
EU Directive EC/2009/81 that was integrated in the Hellenic legislation by Law

3978 / 2011, concerning the Service contracts (Projects, Services and Procurements) in
the fields of defence and security combined
with Law 3883 / 2010 (Articles 72-76) have
been the two basic pillars for the new circular order of the National Defence Planning.
According to the new circular order, the
procurement system as a whole in the sector
of Defence is under the constant control / supervision of the Parliament. Moreover, procedures pertaining to the preparation and
approval of the institutional texts are determined, governing defence planning, as well
as these pertaining to the Long Term and the
Three-Year Term Rolling Programme for the
Procurement of Defence Materiel.
The procedures of National Defence
Planning focus on the generation of effective Armed Forces, equipped when necessary with the means required to perform
their mission, through transparent procedures, which would guarantee the acquisition of the best materiel, at the best prices,
and would ensure the most efficient investment of the sacrifices of the Greek people.
Although the percentage of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) invested in defence remains one of the highest among the
NATO and EU member states, it represents
the minimum investment that the country
is able to make in order to maintain and secure its strategic priorities and its national
interests.
Despite the fact that our country is still
affected by the economic and fiscal crisis, it
2. N
at i
has
on
al
m a n D
ef
aged to mainen
tain a high level of
ce
operational capabilities
required to counter any possible threat, in the context of
the procedures of the National Defence Planning.
an
() .

4.
d
Se
cu
r it
yP
ol i
cy
The Domestic Defence Technological and Industrial Base decisively contributes to the National Defence Planning, able
to provide the necessary supply security in
critical capabilities. An analysis of the Base is
contained in Chapter 4.
Defence Planning in the context
of the EU

.
,
, -
.

(Capabilities Development Plan-CDP).

(EU Rapid Response Force).

. () -

Our country participates in the defence planning procedure of the EU by

contributing forces. Our contribution, as it
is officially acknowledged by the Military
Committee, is among the largest contributions in military forces of the EU member
states. Through this contribution and the
participation of national representatives in
the meetings of the EU Military Committee,
we participate in the revision of the EU Capabilities Development Plan.
Our country has offered three military airports and two military ports to be
used in the planning of the EU Rapid Response Force. It has also offered medical
teams, as well as military helicopters and
fire fighting airplanes to the EU for the planning of relief operations for natural disasters. It also participates in the procedures
of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in
the context of the development of military
55
201 4
56

.

(Pooling and
Sharing), :
- Helicopters raining Programme

,
, , , .
2.

MARSUR - Network development

.
- Multinational Modular Medical Units
,

- ,
capabilities, participating in the meetings

of the National Capabilities Directors of the
Organisations member states, as well as
with national representatives in the Working Groups having the objective of the
research and development programmes,
in order to meet the shortfalls of the EU in
military capabilities.
In the context of the EDA as well as
of the initiative Pooling and Sharing of
Capabilities, Greece participates in the following programmes:
Helicopters Training Programme

The purpose of this programme is
to enhance the operational capabilities of
helicopter crews for EU crisis management
operations in the modern multinational operational environment, through joint training and exercises, joint development of tactics, techniques and procedures and sharing
of the total cost.
MARSUR - Network development
Its scope is the development of
the necessary interface software and the
provision of the assets and technical infrastructure for the exchange of information
on suspicious ships at European level.
Multinational Modular Medical
Units
This programme aims at the development of multinational medical support capabilities, as well as of a multinational
Se
cu
r it
yP
ol i
cy
2.9
2. N
at i
f ield
on
al
hospital
D
ef
through
the
en
contribution
of
ce
medical
capabilities
and means by the member
states, for crisis management
operations in the EU.
European Air Transport
Fleet
The EDA is searching for solutions concerning the medium- and longterm enhancement of the transport capacity of the European Union. This search resulted in a proposal for the establishment of a
European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), as well
as for the conduct of respective exercises.
Air-to-Air Refuelling
The aim of this working group
is to meet acknowledged shortfalls of the
EU in air-to-air refuelling capabilities.
Military Cooperation in the EU in
the Development and Exploitation of Cyber
Ranges
The working group of the EDA is
a body of experts in cyber defence matters,
aiming at contributing to the development
and implementation of the cyber security
strategy and the cyber defence doctrine.
The duties of the working group also include the identification, analysis of requirements and proposals for the development
of cyber defence projects in the context
of Pooling and Sharing activities and Research and Development.
Remotely Piloted Air System
The aim of this initiative of the EDA
is to coordinate and support opportunities
for multinational military cooperation of the
member states that already use or plan to develop innovative unmanned air systems and
integrate them in operational use.
an

European Air Transport Fleet
EA

.
(European Air
Transport Fleet-EATF), .
- Air-toAir refuelling
.

- Military Cooperation on Cyber Ranges in the EU
H .
,

(Pooling and Sharing)
(Research and Technology).

- MALE RPAS (Remoted Piloted Air System)

,
-

.
2.9 FUTURE PLANNING

In the predetermined context of the
new National Military Planning and the
changes in the Force and Command Structure, the Services of the Armed Forces have
the vision and are working in the direction
of implementing their future organisational
form. The vision of the HMoND is related
57
201 4
58
.
, ,
, .

, , ,

.

2013-2027.
2.
,
,

.

.
to the establishment of a technologically

advanced, strong, flexible army, with high
operational readiness that is a reliable deterrence and rapid response force. This vision is also related to the adaptation of the
army to the modern security requirements,
being able to carry out the international
commitments of the country, but mainly an
army with personnel characterised by high
morale, professionalism and devotion to the
fulfilment of their mission. This vision and
the improvements required thereof led to
the adoption of a new Force Structure that
is in progress for the period 2013-2027.
Due to the budget cuts and the conducted reorganisation, it is expected
that a lot of changes will affect the Force
Structure, causing small reductions in
manpower and the rationalisation of a
number of scheduled defence supplies
procurement programmes or modernisation programmes. The effort is to combine
the feasible with the desirable and at the
same time to decrease the level of acceptable risk and enhance the deterrence and
operational capabilities.
The Hellenic Army is in a continuous
process to adapt its structures to those of
NATO, in order to respond to the whole
range of missions of the Alliance and of
international organisations in which the
country participates. The changes in its
structure aim at the reinforcement of the
military capabilities, in order to meet our
national priorities, in the context of NATO.
The evolving reorganisation of the Hellenic
Army responds both qualitatively and quantitatively to the objectives of the Hellenic
National Defence and the countrys international commitments.
r it
yP
cy
Finally the Hellenic Air Force, in the

aforementioned context, plans the procurement of a new fighter aircraft (in addition to
the upgrading of the existing fleet) that will
be able to cover the immediate operational
needs of the country in the broader area of
the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore,
the procurement of advanced technology
aircraft is considered and planned, in order
to meet the future needs of the country.
In addition to the above, the Hellenic Air
Force works actively on the planning of the
procurement of a new advanced training
aircraft, as well as of Research and Rescue
/ Combat Search and Rescue helicopters
(SAR/CSAR), in order to meet the respective
needs under any conditions (in peacetime
and during operations) in its entire area of
responsibility.
ol i

,
. , ,
.
cu
2.10
Se
, ,
(
) /
. . .
/
- / (SAR/CSAR),
( )
.

,

.
2. N
at i
The
on
al
Hellenic
D
ef
Navy, in order
en
to maintain its dece
terrence capability in the
future, will put forward the
acquisition of new, multipurpose frigates, and the enhancing
of the maritime surveillance capability in sea areas of interest.
an

.
, ,

.
2.10 CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis is an incident or situation that
threatens our country and more specifically its territorial integrity, national independence, and national interests, as well as
the welfare of its citizens. A crisis may expand rapidly requiring political, diplomatic,
.
- ,
,

59
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60
().
:

.

.

.
.
- .
.
.

:
().
().
().

().
economic and military action, in order to

successfully deal with it and meet the national objectives.
Crisis management is a priority of the National Defence Policy. It is a very sensitive political-military procedure and it is practically
met through the organisation and operation
of a Crisis Management System (CMS).
The CMS aims at:
Securing the political and military
readiness.
Preventing and containing a crisis.
Providing guidelines to the Military
Commanders.
Sufficiency in dealing with SecurityDefence challenges.
Successfully dealing with any crisis.
Victory in case of armed conflict.
The main entities involved in crisis management are the following:
The Governmental Council for Foreign Affairs and National Defence.
The Minister of National Defence.

. . 2292/95 ( 3) :
The Council of the Joint Chiefs of

General Staffs.
2.
,
`,
.

,
,
The Defence Council.
The Chief of HNDGS or Commanderin-Chief.
2. N
at i
an
na
These enlD
tities are asef
en
sisted by the comce
petent staff groups of
all the bodies involved,
which contribute with their
proposals to the right decision
making. The Governmental Council
for Foreign Affairs and National Defence is the most important entity for
crisis management according to Law 2292
/ 1995 (Article 3) and it decides for:
Se
cu
r it

, ,
.

.
The declaration and lifting of measures and alert stages for partial or general
mobilisation of the country.
2.11
The country, having recent experience

in crisis management, has promoted the appropriate reforms in order to organise an efficient CMS that monitors and immediately
responds to various incidents, focused on
the main threat encountered. This CMS is
being tested and improved during the various exercises mentioned in this chapter.
() ,

,
. ,
,
, - .

.
cy
The organisation of the Crisis Management System (CMS), providing directives

to the HMoND, the competent cooperating
Ministries and other bodies involved.
ol i
PREPARE & RESPOND
yP
CRISIS
The implementation and lifting of

the Rules of Engagement of the Armed
Forces.
The assignment of responsibilities
for the immediate confrontation of emergencies or incidents, according to its discretion and in relation to the above.
2.11 CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

Civil Emergency Planning is understood
as the planning and programming of the
organisation, preparation and mobilisation
of non-military forces for the sustainment in
war or the confrontation of emergencies in
peace and for their contribution to National
Defence, carried out through the Civil Mobilisation and Civil Defence. Non-military
forces are state authorities and agencies,
the Security Services, legal entities of public
and private law, the public and private organisations and enterprises and, in general,
all the unarmed manpower and the resources of the country.
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62
Civil Mobilisation is the transition of

the state authorities of the country from
peacetime to wartime or to an emergency
situation in order to cope with emergencies
in peacetime. Civil Defence is the organisation, direction and mobilisation of the nonmilitary forces of Greece for its protection
against any kind of enemy aggression or the
management of any kind of disaster, especially in the civil sector.
() ,

.

,
.
() ,

.
:
, ,

.
2.
,

, , .
Civil Emergency Planning is implemented by all the Ministries and their subordinate services, following a decision taken
by the Governmental Council for Foreign
Affairs and National Defence (KYSEA). The
HMoND is the highest coordinating body
that is competent for the provision of additional guidance and the coordination of
the activities of the national authorities in
compliance with the decisions of the KYSEA.
The most important responsibilities of Civil
Emergency Planning for the HMoND are related to the:
Coordination and supervision in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Order
and Protection of the Citizen, of Civil Defence matters, related to the protection and
sustainment of the civilian population in
wartime.
Coordination and organisation, in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Order
and Protection of the Citizen, of the training
of the personnel of public services, organisations and enterprises.
Designation of the necessary Organisations and Enterprises for the sustainment
2. N
at i
of
on
al
the People or of the
National Defence.
ef
en
ce
Provision of the
necessary specialised personnel in wartime for the operation of any kind of services - organisations - enterprises, of the public
sector or not, which are necessary for
the sustainment of the Nation or for Civil
Defence.
an

- - ,
,
.
Se
cu
r it
yP
ol i
cy
Civil-military cooperation with the

respective bodies of other national authorities in matters of civil mobilisation and civil
defence.
Cooperation with other countries,
international organisations and other national bodies in the above fields.
Provision of the credits required for

the economic support of plans of the Civil
Defence - Civil Emergency Planning.
,
.

- .
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64
3.

3. T h
e Co
nt r i
b ut
io n
of
Gr
ee
ce
to
In
te
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
ce a
nd
Se c
u r it
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66
3.1

3.1 SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS

IN NATO AND EU DEFENCE AND
SECURITY
NATO
,

, .
Greece, a traditional and active

member of the Alliance, contributes to all
activities of the Organisation with personnel, assets, and capabilities.
(2012)

,

2010,
. , , ,
, 2020.
Chicago Defence Package.
- -

(Smart Defence)
(Connected Forces
Initiative-CFI)
.
(NATO Defence Planning Policy-NDPP),
.
During the Chicago Summit (2012), a

series of measures were decided in order to
ensure that the Alliance will have all the necessary capabilities to implement the Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 in Lisbon; i.e.
coherent deployable, interoperable, and
sustainable forces, properly exercised and
equipped, capable of meeting NATOs level
of ambition by 2020. These measures are
known as the Chicago Defence Package. It
has been decided that these measures will
be implemented mainly through Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative
(CFI); the first one is related to the development of capabilities, while the latter is aiming at the optimum use thereof. The aforementioned initiatives have become part of
the NATO Defence Planning Policy (NDPP)
process, in conjunction with the long-term
transformation of the Alliance.
3.

(Smart Defence) ,

, . ,
The Smart Defence initiative encourages the Allies to cooperate for developing,
acquiring, and maintaining the required
military capabilities, in order to deal with
the current security issues, according to the
NATO Strategic Concept. The intended result is setting priorities, better coordination
of efforts, pooling and sharing capabilities.
The three pillars of the initiative (prioritisation / targeted specialisation / multinational
3. T h
e Co
nt r i
bu
te
t io n
c o of
operaGr
ee
tion) aim at
ce
to
the development of
In
capabilities, which each
member state would otherwise not be able to acquire
individually, thus achieving economics of scale and better interoperability. In addition, they also intend at
strengthening the cooperation with the
European Union (EU), as well as partners
for complementarity, as well as to avoid
overlaps between similar programmes.
NATO and the EU (particularly the European Defence Agency) work together in order
to avoid overlaps and, consequently, the
wasting of resources. Except for the above,
Smart Defence requires cooperation with
industry.
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
nd
Se c
u r it
(Connected
Forces Initiative - CFI), :
/ .
.
.
ce a
.
( - - )

- , .

.
,
,

.

.
As regards the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), its pillars are the following:
Broader / improved education
and training.
Enhancement of exercises.
Optimum use of technology.
This initiative aims at the correlation
of the reinforcement of the NATO Response
Force (NRF), the improvement of Special
Operations Forces, the connection of national exercises with the respective NATO
exercises, and the involvement of Partners
and the EU in each of the above pillars and
connected elements.
During the Wales Summit (2014),
the Alliance was called to take important
decisions regarding its future. The new

(NATO
Response Force-NRF),
,

(Partners) E
.
67
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68

(2014) , .

ISAF , (engagement)
(preparedness).

,

.

(, 2014) (Readiness Action
Plan), ( ) ,

( ). .
3.

, 2014
, capabilities development - Partnerships.

,
2013-2014 16
(shortfalls)
:
era after the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan marks the shift of NATO from an
engagement status to a preparedness
status. At the same time, the Alliance had
to deal with security issues due to the
Ukraine crisis, as well as due to the rise
of Islamic extremism in the countries of
Northern Africa and the Middle East; thus
making the maintenance of coherence between the Allies a priority.
In the context of the efforts to improve the Alliances response capability to
modern security challenges, the Heads of
State and Government adopted during the
latest Wales Summit (September 2014) the
Readiness Action Plan, which provides for
the provision of continuous (but not permanent) air, land, and maritime presence, as
well as military activity mainly in the eastern part of NATO (mainly exercises). It also
provides for an enhancement of the responsiveness of forces and the creation of a new
NATO Response Force.
Given the new reality and considering the impact of the international economic crisis on the Member States defence
budgets, the Alliance is called after 2014 to
show adaptability, based on capabilities development and partnerships.
Within the framework of the completion of the cycle of the Alliances defence
planning 2013-2014, particular emphasis
was given on 16 priority areas; out of these,
shortfalls were identified in the following
areas:
Air Command and Control.
Joint Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (JISR).
Precision Guided Munitions
3. T h
at i
on
al
De
fe n
ce a
nd
Se c
u r it

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - Resolute
Support Mission (RSM)

ISAF ,
,

.
07 13
(CONOPS)
ISAF Resolute Support
Mission (RSM) - ,
bu
rn
(Partnerships), (Interoperability) ,
. , , , ,
.
nt r i
t io n
(cre of
ation of
Gr
ee
a pool of Precice
to
sion Guided MuniIn
tions).
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).
Medical Personnel.
Air-to-Air Refuelling.
te
(Air Command and Control).

, (Joint Intelligence Surveillance &
Reconnaissance - JISR).

(Precision Guided Munitions)
(
).
(Ballistic
Missile Defence - BMD).
(Medical personnel).
(Air to
Air Refuelling).
(Maritime Surveillance).
e Co
Maritime Surveillance.
As regards partnerships, a critical
element is the enhancement of interoperability through dialogue, consultation,
and cooperation between the Alliance and
Partners. To this end, NATO has already developed programmes and mechanisms to
enhance interoperability among partners,
which aim at anticipation, effectiveness, coherence, and encouragement of partners to
participate to them.
The Contribution of Greece to
NATO Operations
Operation International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)-Resolute Support
Mission (RSM)
Greece has participated from the
beginning of operation ISAF in Afghanistan,
in order to provide assistance and maintain
security in the greater area of the capital,
Kabul, in an effort to create suitable conditions, which would allow for the transfer of
power from the countrys provisional government to a widely acceptable, multi-ethnic, and fully representative government.
On 07 June 2013, CONOPS for the
transition of the ISAF mission to the Resolute
Support Mission (RSM) was approved by the
69
201 4
70
3.

(OPLAN).

ISAF, ,
SAF ,
C-130
(Maintenance Advisor Team C-130-MAT).

(transition).
(),

.

Kosovo
ForceKFOR (Deterrent Presence & Air Policing For Albania)

Joint Guardian,
(), 11 1999,

KFOR.
, ,
,
KFOR
.
KFOR/Joint Enterprise 2 [ (Deterrent Presence)].
[
(Minimum Presence)], ,

.
KFOR/ Deterrent
P r e s e n c e ,
Ministers of Defence of the Alliance, with additional political guidance for drafting an Operations Plan (OPLAN).
Scheduled participation of Greece
in operation ISAF includes Staff Officers assigned to ISAF HQs and personnel as C-130
Maintenance Advisor Team (MAT).
The planning of the future development of our national participation in the
operation is in line with the transition policy
adopted. After the withdrawal of the Hellenic Composite Battalion in Afghanistan
(TESAF), there is no direct particular interest
beyond our limited participation as a nation.
Operation Kosovo Force (KFOR)
(Deterrent Presence and Air Policing For
Albania)
Within the framework of the implementation of Operation "Joint Guardian",
the Governmental Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA) decided on 11
June 1999 for the countrys participation in
Operation KFOR. Initially, the Hellenic Force
was a brigade-level force; its mission was
to perform reconnaissance and engineers
projects, set up control and communications points, provide security and escort
to convoys and, finally, provide support to
KFOR personnel and the local population.
Currently, Operation KFOR / Joint
Enterprise is in Phase 2 (Deterrent Presence).
The final phase of the operation (Minimum
Presence) has not been clearly scheduled
yet, since this would depend directly on the
developments in the area and the stability
criteria at military and political level, which
3. T h
e Co
nt r i
bu
te
t io n
have
of
not been
Gr
ee
met to this day.
ce
to
Hellenic
In
participation in Operation KFOR / Deterrent Presence for 2014 consists in the
participation of a large number
of personnel in Kosovo and in the
support forces in Thessalonica, as well
as sorties of Hellenic Air Force C-130 and
C-27J aircraft for NATO channel flight
services.
Operation Air Policing For Albania
provides assistance to the control-surveillance of Albania's airspace due to this countrys lack of technical capabilities and assets.
National participation, in rotation with Italy,
includes two aircraft at 15 minute readiness
state, two Search and Rescue air assets and
Host Nation Support infrastructure.
NATO Operation Active Endeavour
After the events of 11 September
2001, NATO proceeded for the first time in
its history to the activation of Article V of
the Alliances Founding Treaty, thus characterising the terrorist attacks as an act of
war against a member state of the Alliance.
Its aim is to provide support for operations
in the context of the global anti-terrorist
campaign by NATO Standing Naval Forces,
given the mission to carry out patrols in the
Mediterranean.
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
ce a
nd
Se c
u r it
2014
/ C-130 C-27J
, NATO
(NATO CHANNEL FLIGHT).
Air Policing For
Albania - .
, (rotation) ,
(2) 15 ,
(2) .
NATO Active
Endeavour
11 2001,
V ,
- .
,
.

ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR
() ,
(/, /, /, /,
).
The country has participated from

the beginning of Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) with Hellenic Navy, Hellenic Air
Force assets and infrastructures (frigates,
gunboats, submarines, transport aircraft,
Crete naval base).
71
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72

2014
,

,

, 60 ,
. 1 2009, ,
,
:
,
, , .
,
() (/)
.

()

(),
,
-

.
3.

, ( 13). , :
,

.

European Defence and Security Hellenic Presidency of the Council

of the European Union 1st
Semester 2014
During the past decade, one of the
landmarks in the history of the European
Union was the ratification of the Treaty
of Lisbon by all EU member states, which
marked a new chapter in its almost 60year history. The entry into force of the said
Treaty on 01 December 2009 was followed
by a series of institutional and procedural
changes, the most important whereof were
the following:
The European Council, which consists of the Heads of State and Government, becomes an institutional body,
while the Union itself obtains legal personality.
The establishment of a new service,
the European External Action Service and
the introduction of the new function of
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) became the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), thus further
broadening the scope of expectations, as
well as challenges, through the promotion
of mutual political solidarity of member
states forward and towards the intended
objective of Common Defence.
The European Council launched for
the first time since the entry into force of
the Treaty of Lisbon a thematic discussion
on defence (December 2013). In particular,
3. T h

, :
e Co
nt r i
bu
te
t io n
priof
ority was
Gr
ee
given to the folce
to
lowing three axes:
In
Increase of the
effectiveness,
projection,
and impact of the CSDP.
Enhancement of the development of capabilities.
Reinforcement of the European defence industry.
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
ce a
nd
Se c
u r it

,
.
, , , ,
.

24 2014 .
-

. ,
,
, ,
A significant number of supporting

actions in the area of defence took place
during the Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union, such as:
Maritime Security
The focus on matters of maritime
security is particularly important to Greece,
given its long sea tradition and its maritime
character. Building on the successful efforts
of both the Cypriot, as well as the Irish Presidency, efforts were made to adopt the European Union Maritime Security Strategy,
aimed at both achieving better governance
at sea, according to the values of the EU and
international law, as well as broadening the
scope of application of the strategy to all
aspects of maritime security. The Strategy
text was adopted by the General Affairs
Council on 24 June 2014 and was welcomed
by the Council of the European Union of the
same month.
Cyberspace - Cyber security

The rapid developments in the
area of information technology have led to
the creation of cyberspace, while at the same
time the cyber warfare threat emerged.
Critical infrastructures, such as banks and
73
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74
3.

. ,
.

. , ,
.
.

.
, , ,
,

. :

.
.
(, ).
,

financial services, energy, transportation,

telecommunications, as well as national
defence, are heavily dependent on the use
of information technology. In the emerging
scenario of cyber warfare, the protection
of critical information infrastructures is an
increasingly great challenge. Cyber security is an important matter of international
interest. Cooperation between academia,
the public and private sectors, as well as
between governments, is a necessary condition for effective deterrence against the
cyber threat at global level. This operation
requires the implementation of interoperable technologies and procedures.
Sustainability in Defence
Sustainability in the area of Defence and the Armed Forces is a matter
which, among others, promotes energy security and environmental maintaining. Special
high- and medium-level initiatives have been
designed and implemented by the HMoND,
in order to contribute to a comprehensive
and in-depth analysis of all views, which described the term sustainability in Defence
and the Armed Forces. These include:
Climate change and its consequences.
Life cycle assessment.
Interaction of all fundamental
pillars of sustainable development (environment, society, and economy).
Management of natural disasters, environmental protection, as well as
energy effectiveness and efficiency.
Capability Development
Capability development is a necessary element for the strengthening of
3. T h
nt r i
bu
t io n
t h e
of
CSDP. In
Gr
ee
this
context,
ce
to
events were held
In
on subjects related to
the development and use
of main defence capabilities,
such as the use of Remote Piloted
Air Systems (RPAS). Matters such as
interoperability, their use policy, regulatory and legal aspects are important
in RPAS operations and have been extensively examined. The integration of RPAS
to the European Flight Safety System was
another matter of discussion, since flight
safety, as well as national safety requirements, are particularly important.
Emphasis was also given to space
situational awareness, space-related legal
matters, as well as the use of space units and
products both by military and civilian users,
within the framework of the CSDP.
Integration of Small and MediumSized Enterprises to the Chain of Supply of
the Armed and Security Forces.
Providing a boost for the small
and medium-sized enterprises of member states, active in the sector of defence
and security, is particularly important for
Greece. It is particularly important to ensure that they have fair and unimpeded access to the defence market, as well as their
integration in the production chain in the
fields of defence and security, in order for
Greece and EU in general to maintain and
enhance the strategic autonomy in the Defence sector.
EU Battlegroups
Our country participates in EU
Battlegroups according to its capabilities
and considering the particular conditions of
each formation. The Battlegroups in which
Greece participates are the following:
EUABG (European Union Amphibious Battlegroup, former SIAF).
Our level of participation in the
European Union Amphibious Battlegroup
(EUABG) consists of one Marines Company
and one Landing Ship, built on the SpanishItalian Amphibious Force.
te
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
nd
Se c
u r it
ce a

. ,
,
(Remoted Piloted Air Systems).
, , (RPAS)
.
(RPAS) ,
,
, .
, , ,

,
, .

-, ,
.
, ,
,
.
()
(EU
Battlegroups),
.
e Co
75
201 4
76

:
EUABG
(European Union Amphibious Battlegroup, SIAF)

(EUABG) (/) -
(SIAF/SILF).
HELBROC
O HELBROC (HEL-las B-ulgaria RO-mania
C-yprus), 21 2005,
,
, .
17 2011
.
HELBROC
( / 71
/ ).
3.

-
()
EE EUNAVFOR
ATALANTA
. , ATALANTA,

.

2008 2009.

(/)
HELBROC Battlegroup
HELBROC Battlegroup (out of
the acronym: HEL-las, B-ulgaria, RO-mania,
C-yprus) was established upon the signing
of a relevant agreement on 21 November
2005 by the Ministers of Defence of Greece,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus. Ukraine
joined on 17 June 2011.
The country contributes the
greatest part of the troops comprising the
HELBROC Battlegroup (one Airmobile Battalion of the 71st Airmobile Brigade and
other elements).
Hellenic Participation in Common

Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) Military Operations Missions
EU Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA
Greece has actively supported
from the beginning and will continue to
support international counter-piracy efforts. In this context, the Hellenic Navy
participates in Operation ATALANTA,
considering the restrictions and capabilities imposed by the current
difficult financial conditions.
Our country was the first to
assume tactical command of
the operation from December 2008 to April 2009. Our
presence was continuous
with one frigate and its organic helicopter and Hellenic
Navy Staff Officers in its Operational and
Force HQ staffs.
EU Operation EUFOR ALTHEA
Hellenic participation in the operation, due to the national fiscal restrictions, that imposed the full withdrawal
3. T h
e Co
nt r i
bu
te
t io n
from
of
the exGr
ee
ecutive
part
ce
to
of the operation
In
consists in the sufficient
support of the non-executive part thereof the participation of instructors in mobile training teams.
EU Operation in the Central
African Republic (CAR)
Our country made available to the
operation the Operational Headquarters
(OHQ); at the same time, it was decided that
no Hellenic personnel would be deployed.
EU Operation EUTM MALI
Greece participates in operation
EUTM MALI with instructors, i.e. the INTEL
Training Team, who are Hellenic Army personnel.
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
u r it
(),
,
Se c

,
,
( ),

.
nd
ce a
(/)
.
EE EUFOR
ALTHEA

, ,
,

.
EE ()

/Operational
Headquarters (OHQ),
.
EE EUTM MALI
EUTM MALI , INTEL Training Team,
.
The Contribution of Greece to

International Organisations
Greece participates in international
efforts to promote peace, combat terrorism,
deal with maritime security-related challenges (such as piracy), as well as the creation of a secure and peaceful environment
in countries that have suffered from wars.
Participation in missions within the
framework of the UN and OSCE, further
to NATO and the EU, is of priority for the
HMoND, considering the economic crisis that
the country is going through, as well as the
restrictions posed by the fiscal adjustment
of the country. The Hellenic Armed Forces
personnel, with its high professionalism
77
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78
,

.
,
.
UNIFIL
UNIFIL ,

(12 .),
.
2006,

UNIFIL / .
,
, :
3.

() - NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational
Training Center (NMIOTC)

and its fair and equal treatment of the ethnicities living in the areas, where they have
been called to operate, have proven in practice that their main objective is peace and
peace-making in each of the areas.
UN Operation UNIFIL
Operation UNIFIL is carried out by
an international Maritime Task Force within
the mandate of the UN, patrolling and controlling the sea and airspace outside the territorial waters of Lebanon (12 nm), in order
to prevent the illegal trafficking of arms and
similar materiel to Lebanon.
Since October 2006, the Hellenic
Navy has continuously participated in Operation UNIFIL with one Fast Patrol Boat or
Gunboat and Staff Officers in the operations HQs.
Additionally, Greece contributes
with support and training structures in various areas, such as the following:
NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC)
NMIOTC in Souda, Crete, plays a
special role for our country; its mission is the
combined training of NATO units in order to
enhance their ability to perform surface,
air, and underwater surveillance missions,
as well as special operations in support of
the respective Maritime Interdiction tasks.
The NMIOTC, according to NATO decisions,
improves the specialisation of naval units,
within the framework of Maritime Interdiction Operations (), promotes skills, interoperability, and cooperation between naval
units, and provides support to the SACT
for the development of MIO doctrines, directives, and manuals, as well as research,
experimentation, prototype creation and
3. T h
nt r i
bu
t io n
simof
ulation
Gr
ee
activities, withce
to
in the framework of
In
MIO in general.
Multinational
Peace Support Operations
Training Centre (MPSOTC)
An important support for
the personnel assigned to missions in
the context of the above organisations is
the training received before their deployment in the MPSOTC in Kilkis. The MPSOTC
provides high-level theoretical and practical
training on all peace support operations-related topics for military personnel, as well as
accelerated training for multinational Units,
prior to their deployment for certain peace
support operations.
te
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
ce a
nd
Se c
u r it
(),
, ,
, , , .
,
, , (Maritime Interdiction
perations-), ,
SACT
, , , ,

(MIO).

() - Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center (MPSOTC)

,
,
() .
, ,

.
() NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI)
,
,
, , .

,
, , .
e Co
NATO Missile Firing Installation

(NAMFI)
NAMFI in Chania, Crete, is used
on a permanent basis by Germany, the
Netherlands, Greece, and Belgium. The
NATO Missile Firing Installation can be
used by every NATO member state, as well
as third party countries, technological institutes, corporations, and organisations,
upon request.
Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre (AMSCC)
The mission of AMSCC in Athens
is to search for suitable assets in the sector
of strategic sealift at competitive prices and
to monitor these assets on behalf of countries / international organisations that have
79
201 4
80

( / Athens Multinational
Sealift Coordination Centre - AMSCC)
( / Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre - AMSCC) , ,
/ .

(208
).

.

. , ,
, , .
3.
3.2
-

,
,
,
concluded cooperation
agreements with the
AMSCC. This mission is carried out
mainly through
the Centres pool
of ships (208 merchant ships of various types, suitable
for humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief operations). The AMSCC has concluded cooperation agreements with ten European countries and two international organisations.
In the recent years, the AMSCC has assisted
its members within the framework of NATO
or European Union crisis management operations. In order to deal with the current
and future requirements in the sector of
strategic sealift, the AMSCC intends to acquire planning and coordination capabilities not only for sea, but also for land, air,
and combined lift.
3.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION - RELATIONSHIP
BUILDING STRATEGY WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES
International Relations and
Cooperation
Greece, being fully integrated in
the modern international system, firmly
supports the primary role of the United
Nations for global peace and security,
the peaceful resolution of disputes based
on the principles of international law and
through the contribution of competent
international bodies. In addition, Greece,
as a member of NATO, the EU, OSCE, and a
number of regional initiatives, undertakes,
in the context of its National Defence Policy objectives, combined efforts in the area
of military diplomacy and foreign policy,
in order to support our national interests
and upgrade the security environment in
the Eastern Mediterranean and other areas
of strategic interest.
Greeces area of strategic interest
includes the Eastern Mediterranean, the
3. T h
al
De
fe n
ce a
nd
Se c
u r it

,
/
:

on
at i
, ,
/, ,
, - , .
bu
rn
, ,
,
,
. ()
, .
,
, , ,
.
nt r i
t io n
Balof
k a n s ,
Gr
ee
Transcaucasia,
ce
to
and other areas,
In
depending on the international developments
and the degree to which these
affect national interests. The
main goal of the National Military
Strategy is to promote friendly, good
neighbourly and constructive cooperation relations in the above area. Through
these, Greece intends to consolidate trust
and promote stability, security, and development in the broader area of interest,
supporting the respect of the international legal order, as mentioned in the Charter
of the United Nations.
te
.
, , ,
, ,

,
,

.
e Co
More specifically, as regards the Balkan countries and considering the criterion
of neighbourhood / closeness, under the
condition that good neighbourly relations
and international law are respected, Greece
firmly supports the Euro-Atlantic orientation of Western Balkan countries and the
increase of their integration into the EuroAtlantic structures, for those already members thereof.
Multilateral Cooperation
Concerted efforts in the area of dynamic military diplomacy developed by
our country have resulted in the following
actions:
The annual South-Eastern Europe
Defence Ministerial (SEDM), which aims at
the continuous support of stability and security in the above area.
81
201 4
82
South Eastern Defence Ministerial - SEDM,

.

/, 2007
. , ,

.

, /,
, , .
3.

,
,
, . , ,

, .
, ,

, ,

, , .
()

(),
The Balkan Countries Chiefs of

Defence Conference, which has being taking place since 2007 on an annual basis, at
the initiative of Greece. Through its decisions, the Conference aims mainly at the
promotion of cooperation among the
Armed Forces of the area, with particular
emphasis on joint training and exercises in
order to upgrade the military capabilities of
Balkan countries.
Official visits and bilateral / trilateral contacts at Chief of Defence-level
within the framework of military diplomacy,
which take place regularly upon mutual invitations.
Bilateral Cooperation
Greece is a European country that
wishes to be part of the mainstream of developments within the Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, it is a country with
close traditional bonds with the Arab world;
with a developing strategic relationship
with the State of Israel; and is aware of the
sentiments and conditions in the Mediterranean, having its own national interests and
priorities.
In this context, the Hellenic National
Defence General Staff (HNDGS) monitors
international developments of national interest within the countrys current foreign
and defence policy and takes appropriate
action to conclude new Interstate military
agreements, as well as to revise, amend
and/or terminate existing ones, in cooperation with the competent authorities of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the HMoND and
3. T h
at i
on
al
De
fe n
nd
Se c
u r it
ce a
,
()
(South Eastern Europe BrigadeSEEBRIG), ()
HELBROC BG
Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC-GR)
. ,
, /
:
-
.

, .
.

-.
bu
rn
,
,
.
,
,
.
nt r i
t io n
t h e
of
General
Gr
ee
Staffs.
ce
to
Through the
In
bilateral military cooperation and the annual military
cooperation programmes, our
country aims at forging a strong
and multifaceted grid of bonds with
the Armed Forces of the countries of
interest. Ultimate objectives are:
The improvement of the level of
security.
The enhancement of cooperation.
The increase of the degree of
trust.
The creation of a basis for the development of additional forms of interstate
cooperation.
The result of these actions in the
area of international relations is the signing of bilateral Agreements, Protocols, and
Memoranda of Military Cooperation with
a multitude of countries, further to the
Agreements signed within the framework
of NATO and the European Union. The aim
of these agreements is to create a climate
of peace, security, and cooperation in the
zone of geo-political interest of Greece.
At military level, the policy followed
by Greece to encourage the integration of
new countries to Battlegroups, such as the
South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG),
HELBROC BG or the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC-GR), contributes to the increase of their level of multinationality and
to the strengthening of the countrys position. In addition, further to the operational /
tactical level, the BGs in question, also contribute to the following:
Support of the Euro-Atlantic orientation or the increase of integration into
the Euro-Atlantic institutions for participating countries.
Exchange of valuable experience
at all levels.
Emergence of the dominant geostrategic role of Greece in the area of the
Balkans.
Promotion of bilateral military relations with Member Countries.
te

() . :
.
.
.

.
e Co
83
201 4
84
3.

,

() ,
(), -
12, 18, 24
.
/ :
(, )
.

()
().

.
.

.
.

.

Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDCGR)
.

.
, .

Bilateral military cooperation at

HNDGS-level takes place through the annual Military Cooperation Programmes
with an average of twenty countries; as well
as through Rounds of Talks that take place
at bilateral level with NATO and EU member states on a 12-month, 28-month, and
24-month basis. The above bilateral military
cooperation includes many activities in the
following main areas:
Personnel training in Schools
of the three Services (Army, Navy, and Air
Force) and joint training of elite military
forces.
Personnel training in the NATO
Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) and the Multinational
Peace Support Operations Training Centre
(MPSOTC).
Hellenic personnel training in

special training centres of the partner countries.
Organisation of Greek language
courses.
Invitation of foreign personnel as
observers in Hellenic national or joint exercises.
Participation in national joint
exercises.
Joint naval and air exercises.
Connection of Balkan countries
forces with the NATO Rapid Deployable
Corps (NRDC-GR) HQ and their contribution to its manning with personnel or with
observers.
Exchange of visits at Chief of General Staff level.
Mutual visits of staff teams for
exchanging views on matters of mutual
3. T h
nt r i
b ut
io n
of
Gr
ec
Coop et
oI
eration in the area of
n
security through the exchange of information.
Medicare system.
Cooperation on matters
of air defence (implementation of Air
Policing) and planning on matters of
Search and Rescue and Air Situation Data
Exchange.
Regional cooperation and initiatives, such as the Balkan Countries Chiefs of
Defence Conference and the Adriatic-Ionian
Initiative (ADRION).
Boarding of foreign personnel on
Hellenic Navy ships participating in Operation ATALANTA and other multinational exercises, under the auspices of the UN, NATO,
and the EU.
Scholarships for the training of
Armed Forces personnel from countries
of interest in Hellenic Higher Military Education Institutions, Higher NCO Military
Schools, Advanced Training Colleges at
Tactical - Operational - Strategic level (Command and General Staff College, Supreme
Joint War College, National Defence College) and Specialisation Courses of the
three Services.
rn
at i
on
al
De
fe n
ce a
nd
Se c
u r it

[ () ()]
i n terest.
te
.
[ (Air Policing)]
(Search and
Rescue)
(Air Situation Data Exchange).

- Adriatic-Ionian Initiative - ADRION.

ATALANTA , ,
.
() -
(), - - [ () -
() - ()]
.
e Co
Bilateral Military Cooperation

with the US and Other Countries
(outside the Military Cooperation
Programmes and Rounds of Talks)
,
Mutual Defence cooperation Agreement - MDCA
,
1990.

(), . , -

().
Cooperation with the US is based on

the Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) signed between the two
countries, ratified by the Hellenic Parliament in August 1990. The HNDGS is kept
informed by the Hellenic Representative to
the Naval Support Activity, Souda Bay, as
regards the activities related to the facilities
in question. In addition, it participates with
a permanent representative in the Joint USGreece Committee for Defence Cooperation in the Air Support Activity, Souda Bay.

, ,
Cooperation with countries that have

not signed a Military Cooperation Agreement is based on individual Agreements,
85
201 4
86
(Memorandum of Understanding) ...,

,
(.. ,
..).
ad hoc ,
.
3.3
( - )
,
, . , ,

,
, , .
3.
, ,
,
. , ,
,
.

,
.

3.3 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

(DEVELOPMENTS - PLANNING)
General Information
Protocols, Memoranda of Understanding,

etc. of either HMoND or Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorities (e.g. Cultural Agreements, Scholarship Protocols, etc.). Ad hoc
cooperation is also possible, upon decision
of the Leadership.
It is widely known that Greece is facing immediate threats and great dangers
and, consequently, must develop all those
defence, diplomatic, and economic factors and implement the necessary policies,
which will allow maintaining of peace, stability, and prosperity for the Greek people
and the Nation for the years to come.
In this respect, in the sector of defence diplomacy, Greece exercises a policy
of principles and mutual trust; a policy that
gives great importance to the strengthening of bilateral defence cooperation with EU
and NATO member states that play a special role in matters of defence and security.
Of particular importance is also the smooth
course and development of bilateral defence
cooperation with the Russian Federation, the
Arab world, the State of Israel, the Balkans,
and other countries in SE Europe and the
Mediterranean that constitute our country's
historical and geographical environment.
Defence Diplomacy comprises all international relations and activities developed
by the HMoND in the context of Greeces participation in international security organisations, as well as at bilateral level. It constitutes
the projection of the National Strategy at international level and consists in a set of activities implemented by the HMoND and the
Armed Forces in order to:
Increase the national feeling of
security and safeguard the countrys sovereign rights.
Create the necessary conditions
to maintain peace, security, and cooperation in Greece's broader area of strategic
interest.
Develop communication links
with the Defence Policy makers of other
3. T h
io n
of
countries
Gr
and cooperee
ce
ate with these for
to
the proper and conIn
stant exchange of information regarding the regional
and broader international environment.
Upgrade our country's role
and influence in the International Security Organisations in which it participates
and, in particular, in the broader area of
Eastern Mediterranean.
at i
on
al
De
fe n
nd
Se c
u r it
In order to achieve the above objectives, Greece proceeds to actions, which

are implemented through its participation
in International Defence Organisations and
other international fora, the assignment
of Defence Attachs in Hellenic Embassies
or permanent representations of Greece
abroad, the participation in Peace Support
Operations, bilateral cooperation and visits
or exchanges between military echelons
and commands, the visit of naval units in
foreign ports to show the flag, high value
added joint training with Allied and Partner forces; and the provision of cultural and
humanitarian assistance, within the framework of Peace Support Operations.
ce a

,
(, ,
.., ). ,
,

.
b ut
rn

fora, , , ,
, .
nt r i
te

.

,

.

.

.
e Co
Of the most important factors taken

into consideration during the planning
of the defence policy of a country are the
rights and obligations deriving from its
participation in international organisations
(UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE). The HMoND, with
the constant presence of its representatives
in these organisations, fulfilling their obligations and exploiting the rights provided in
the context of their operating principles, reinforces Greece's role as a factor of stability
and peace in the constantly changing geopolitical environment of SE Europe.
87
201 4
88
4.
&
4. E
con
om
y-
Te
c
hn
og
ol
y
an
d
De
fen
ce
89
201 4
90
4.1
4.1 DEFENCE EXPENDITURE ARMAMENTS
(), ,
, -
,
,
. ,

,
.
The Armed Forces, considering the

current political-military situation in the
area of their geo-strategic interest, the operational environment in which they are
called to operate, the deterrent-defensive
doctrine of Greece and their mission, as
well as the current global financial circumstances, proceeded to a substantial revision of their Command and Force Structure.
Furthermore, this aimed at satisfying their
requirements, in terms of defence materiel
procurements, as well as weapon systems,
scoping to compress the cost and to maximise the utilisation of available funds.
-

- , , .
2%

.

-
2% .
4.

&
.
The said Command Structure stipulates

the coverage of functional-defensive first
priorities requirements, aiming at maintaining the high operational level of the countrys defensive-deterrence power in the
present and the future, to counter all possible future developments, as they are mentioned in previous chapters of this Paper.
Keeping defence expenditures at 2% of
the GDP constitutes a priority for the political and military leadership of the HMoND.
Our country, despite the current global
financial circumstances and the decrease
of defence expenditure at global level, has
managed to be one of the few NATO member states that have kept the defence expenditure at 2% of the GDP.
Our Countrys defence procurement
system is based on long-term planning,
which is complemented with the drafting
of a Long-term Procurements Programme
for the Delivery of Defence Materiel and is
4. E
og
ol
con
i m om
plementyed through a
Te
ch
Three-year Rolling
n
Programme for the Delivery and Payments of Defence Materiel.
y
an
This Three-year Rolling Programme for the Delivery and Payments

of Defence Materiel is updated yearly to
be harmonised with the countrys annual
budget and, on the other hand, to reflect the
true requirements of the Armed Forces.
De
ce

.

7, .
fen

,

.
Complete transparency in the process

of defence expenditure is a major priority
for the leadership of the HMoND. To this
end, the legal framework which governs
the conduct of defence expenditures and
which fully complies with European law, is
fully exploited and continuously improved
as explained in detail in Chapter 7.
4.2
. ,

.

,
.
.
,
.
4.2 DOMESTIC DEFENCE INDUSTRY

The Hellenic defence industry constitutes a major factor for the procurements
of the Armed Forces. Despite the extended
crisis and recession of the past years, Greece
continues to develop substantial activities
and to engage in the production of a wide
range of defence materials and systems.
A domestic defence industry is every
industry engaged in defence material production activities in Greece, irrespective of
its proprietary status. A lot of these industries also produce commercial materials.
Apart from three industries, the main shareholder of which is the Hellenic State, the rest
are private.
91
201 4
92
80 ,
6000
, /:
.
.
( - ).
( - - /
).
- - .
- -.
- /
/ .
- - - , / /
- -
.
[(C4I) - Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence] .
, .
( ),
,
..
4.

/
,
, .
&
The domestic defence industry comprises approximately 80 mainly small and

medium-sized companies, which employ
around 6000 persons and have production
capabilities, related to the manufacturing /
development of:
Small arms and weapon systems.
Ammunition.
Sea vessels (construction - repair).
Aviation materiel (manufacturing of
structural parts - spare parts - engine maintenance/repair).
Vehicles - Chassis - Trailers.
Optics - Optoelectronics.
Electronic systems and module parts
/ components for communication.
Mechanical - cast - pressed articles,
metal constructions and other engineering
components / parts / spare parts - components - mechanisms for use in the area of
defence.
Configuration of information systems for defence uses [(C4I) - Command,
Control, Communication, Computers and
Intelligence] and of defence software.
Electrical equipment, including submarine batteries.
Military uniforms (including CBRN
uniforms), camouflage nets, bulletproof
vests, etc.
The domestic defence industry in case
of crisis or war is able to provide / support
the countrys Armed Forces, with the materials that it produces and maintains, working exclusively for defence. That is why,
securing the viability and increase of Hellenic defence industries competitiveness,
by enhancing their share in the market, is a
major objective of the HMoND.
, , .
fen
ce
De
,
,
,

- , , , ,
.
, :
an
,

,
, ,
,
,
.
, ,
, .
og
ol
2009/81/,

,
,
,

.
4. E
con
Folom
lowing
ythe Directive
Te
ch
2009/ 81/EC, by
n
which protectionism of
defence procurements was
lifted, the Hellenic defence industry is called today to be active
in a more demanding and competitive environment, in which the main
role will be played by the main weapon
systems manufacturers from the big EU
countries.
Hence, the domestic industry is called

to invest in the creation of capabilities,
competitive products and
services, in order to become
more extroverted, aiming at
international clients and cooperation.
Furthermore, the course
now set in the EU for the future of the European market
of defence materiel will create new opportunities for the
development of synergies,
cooperation and co-productions within the national, trans-European
and international frame of commerce and
business, which the Hellenic defence industry will have to exploit, with the help of the
HMoND.
The HMoND, due to the particularities
which the country has to deal with and
which are related to its geo-political position and the existence of a certain main
threat, takes all the necessary measures
to maintain a domestic defensive and
technological - industrial base, in order to
secure a safe procurement source for the
Armed Forces in case of crisis or war in critical materials and services, for which there
are domestic capabilities. Some indicative
measures are:
The Management of Defence Industry Copyrights.
The Presentation of Innovative Technologies in the Area of Defence.
The Enhancement of the Domestic
Defence Technological and Industrial Base
93
201 4
94
- .
.

() .

.
.
346 .
: ,
,

.

.
,

. :
.
4.
.
&
at a governmental - diplomatic level.

Standardisation in the Armed Forces.
The participation of Domestic Defence Technological and Industrial Base
bodies in programmes of the European
Defence Agency and International Co-productions.
The Expansion of Activities of Domestic Defence Technological and Industrial Base Bodies to Security and Dual Use
Products.
Utilisation of the Available EU Financial Resources.
Greece supports EUs efforts to develop

a competitive European Defence Technological Industrial Base, while at the same
time reserving the right to protect its essential security interests according to article
346 of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union). According to the
said article: any Member State may take such
measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security
which are connected with the production of
or trade in arms, munitions and war material;
such measures shall not adversely affect the
conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended
for specifically military purposes. To this end,
a respective legal framework has been established in internal law.
Hence, the HMoND has determined
the crucial operational fields, which are
considered necessary for the countrys
security and on which domestic industrial
capabilities will have to be developed.
4. E
These
fields are the
following:
con
om
y-
hn
an
De
Integrated surveillance systems;
Communications.
Cyber defence.
og
ol
Military intelligence.
Te
c
fen
ce
Follow-on support and ammunition for weapon systems and assets of the
Armed Forces.
Technologies of unmanned systems.
4.3

(), ,

.

,
(European Defence
Technological Industrial Base - EDTIB)
.

():

(Specic Industrial Capabilities)
,
,

Technologies related to the enhancement of capability of Rapid Reaction Forces.

4.3 NEW NATIONAL DEFENCE
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY
The necessity of writing the National
Defence Industrial Strategy, apart from the
current legislative imperative, also arose
from the requirement for an integrated
strategic framework on the viable development of a sensitive industrial sector of the
economy of Greece.
The necessity mentioned above became
even more imperative due to the countrys
particular financial environment, but also
due to the developments in the EU, which
aim at the integration of the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB),
where Greece must play an active role.
The objective of the National Defence
Industrial Base is to determine the context
and the measures with which the HMoND,
through a stable environment of development for the Domestic Defence Technological and Industrial Base:
Will preserve and develop the specific industrial capabilities and cutting edge
technology in sensitive sectors for the security of the country, in order to achieve a
high grade of supply security for the Armed
Forces, always according to the stipulations of the current National and European
Legislation, but also through the Domestic
Defence Technological and Industrial Bases
participation in national but also in international programmes of research cooperation,
95
201 4
96
,
.

,

.
.

.
- ,

EDTIB.
.
- , - ,
,
, ,
.
4.
,
,

. , ,
346 ( ).

&

development and production of defence

materiel.
Will encourage and support the expansion of its activities, in the areas of security and dual use materials.
Will support the exports of the domestic defence industry.
Will enhance the competitiveness of
the Hellenic defence industrial base, focusing on certain cutting edge technologies
with the production of innovative products.
Will promote the creation of joint
ventures - cooperations, so as to increase
the domestic participation in the creation of
EDTIB.
Will contribute to the economic
growth and prosperity of the Greek people.
The establishment and maintaining of
a domestic technological industrial base,
by taking appropriate measures - actions,
including measures on research and development, in particular the strategic sectors
of defence and security, is of the highest
priority for the HMoND, as it constitutes a
basic factor for securing the mission of
the Armed Forces.
In a period when the sector of defence
industry continuously evolves, the geopolitical balances and threats change, the
shaping of a strategy for the Domestic Defence Technological and Industrial Base
constitutes an imperative necessity for the
HMoND. In this context, strategy places special emphasis on our countrys right to protect its essential security interests based on
article 346 of the TFEU.
4. E
og
ol
con
The
om
pursuit of
ya strategy for
Te
ch
harmonious coopn
eration of the countrys
Armed Forces with the bodies of the defence industry and
the requirement for a long-term
planning, aiming to improve industrial capabilities, are expected to create
favourable conditions for the fulfilment
of our countrys future defence requirements.
an
d
De
, ,
, ,

.
AUSA 2014 12 15
.
-
.
Enterprise Greece,
.
,
,

ce

,

,

.
fen
,

.
The aim of the New Strategy is the upgrade of the countrys technological level,
the decrease of losses in important financial
resources mainly due to the assignment of
projects to industries outside Hellenic territory, the estimated enhancement of national economy and the exploitation of the
scientific and technical personnel of the
sensitive sector of the defence industry for
our country, within the framework of the
current legislation.
To support this New, under approval
by KYSEA, Strategy, the political leadership
of the HMoND has launched the first step,
which is the participation of the Hellenic
Defence Industry through an integrated
national stand in major international exhibitions. This policy was implemented for
the first time in the annual meeting and
exposition AUSA 2014 which took place
from 12 to 15 October in Washington, DC.
Hellenic participation, under the supervision of the Greek - American Chamber of
Commerce comprised four companies. The
political leadership of the HMoND, in cooperation with the Ministry of Development
and Competiveness and in particular with
Enterprise Greece, secured the funding of
the integrated national stand.
At the same time, in the context of the
implementation of the strategic planning,
the preparation of national stands in all the
major defence materiel exhibitions is at a
mature stage (always with co-funding by
Enterprise Greece, which provides full support in terms of know-how). Among others,
the greatest possible participation of Greek
97
201 4
98
( Enterprise Greece,
).

IDEX
( ), LAAD ( ), IDEF (), IDET
(), DSEI () International
Paris AirShow ().

:

()
-
, ,
( )
,
.
companies in the following exhibitions will

be sought: IDEX (Abu Dhabi), LAAD (Rio de
Janeiro), IDEF (Istanbul), IDET (Brno), DSEI
(London) and International Paris Air Show.
Furthermore, the HMoND, in the context of its New Strategy and aiming at supporting the Domestic Defence Technological Base within the EU is pursuing:
The mediation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) so that the European
Committee will issue directives to the country bodies of the member states, implementing strategic planning and manage
regionally the European Structural Funds,
so that they (country bodies) include Defence Industries in the funding of dual use
programmes, through the strategy of smart
specialisation.
The funding of small and mediumsized enterprises through European funds
(Structural Funds, HORIZON 2020, etc.),
which will satisfy the Common Security and
Defence Policy after 2020.

( , HORIZON 2020 ),
2020.
4.

,
,

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&
The preparation of a Common Defence Industrial Policy by the EU, which will
promote a greater distribution of supply
chain, apart from the big defence industries
of Europe and giving, at the same time, a
motive to the big industries for subcontracting work to small enterprises.
The evolution of European Defence
Technological and Industrial Base to a common one for the entire EU and at the same
time distributed to the member states, without direct or indirect exclusions and with the
objective of contributing both to the security of all member states and to the European
financial convergence as well. In that way,
4. E
con
t h e
om
enhanceyment of the deTe
ch
fence industrial base
n
can be secured in areas
closer to locations, where
EU operations or missions are
more possible to be conducted, in
the context of the Common Security
and Defence Policy.
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4.4 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
fen

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4.4
Defence research and development for

defence technology in the HMoND aims at
enhancing the operational capabilities of
the Armed Forces in technological fields,
which the Ministry deems useful and critical
to develop, by investing in them.
For the HMoND, the utilisation of the
product of research and development of
cutting edge technologies, through the
maintenance and development of a domestic technological-industrial base, in particular strategic sectors of defence and security
of the Armed Forces, with complete exploitation of the capabilities of the national research network (national research centres,
National Agency of Defence Research and
Development) and of the defence industry,
as well as with the targeted utilisation of
externally funded research programmes, is
a priority.
To that end, the HMoND supports all initiatives taken by the bodies of the Domestic Defence Technological and Industrial
Base for international cooperation in programmes of Research and Development
[R&D (EDA, Intergovernmental, Clusters,
etc.)]. Hence, in the context of the Force
Structure and the targets of the National
Defence Industrial Strategy, the HMoND
has provided for the creation of a Programme for the Development of Defence
Research and Development for the next 15
year period.
In that way, we aim at the best possible utilisation of available resources, since
R&D will be targeted and will function cumulatively for the covering of operational
requirements but also for the development
99
100
201 4
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of industrial capabilities and cutting edge

technologies.
The focus on R&D suggestions for the
coverage of operational requirements, including the requirement for the Armed
Forces procurement security, is considered
high priority. Bearing that in mind, the R&D
suggestions focus on applied research and
experimental application and even on the
development of prototype systems.
The HMoND, through the National
Defence Industrial Strategy, has clearly
determined the fields of convergence for
research activities (state and private) and
industrial investment plans of the private
sector, such as the following:
Technologies of resistant networks,
data analysis, safe transport, communication, information and image, cyber defence,
cyber attacks.
Technologies for the control and precise guidance of ballistic systems.
Technologies supporting Electronic
Warfare (EW), threat detection and location.
Survivability technologies for personnel and materiel (e.g. CBRN technologies).
Technologies for automated information and knowledge.
Technologies for energy sources and
supply.
Technologies for surveillance, reconnaissance, location and linking of anti-aircraft systems.
Satellite applications (e.g. Geospatial
services, etc.).
In light of the development of the above
crucial technologies for the HMoND, the
Domestic Defence Technological and Industrial Base will have to turn to and invest
in R&D, in order to become a manufacturer
of complete innovative products of its own
technology.
Research and innovation will play a
crucial role in the creation of next generation technologies, which will support the
capabilities of our countrys Armed Forces
as well as those of Europes member states.
Innovation constitutes the core of defence
4. E
con
techom
n o l o g y.
yHence, DomesTe
ch
tic Defence Industry
n
in cooperation with the
academic world are able to
enhance innovation in the area
of defence and to face the major
challenges, which we are currently
experiencing, but also those we shall
face in the future.
og
ol
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,
.
WH ITE PAP E R 201 4 101
102
201 4
5.
5.
Hu
an
R
es
ou
rc
es
104
201 4
5.1
5.1 VISION
The human capital of the Armed

Forces is the most essential element of the
HMoND assets and the most fundamental factor for ensuring the implementation
of the National Defence Policy and the
achievement of its objectives.

, ..
.
Since the catalytic role that it plays in

the fields of efficiency and effectiveness of
the Armed Forces is recognised, policies
that reinforce the anthropocentric character of the Armed Forces are adopted and
implemented, being a compelling indication of the importance and value attributed
to the human factor.

- ,
,
,
, .
The rapid development of technology -mainly in the fields of electronic and

weapon systems- the changes in the geostrategic environment, the expansion of the
spectrum of missions and our obligations
to international organisations produce new
challenges to which the civilian and military
personnel will be called to respond.
, , , , ,

,

,
, .
5.2
5.

, , , , , , ,
, ,
.
The vision that determines the selection of policies and measures put into practice for Human Resources is the creation of
modern, effective, efficient, vigorous and
qualitatively superior Armed Forces, with
high morale and a feeling of security, both
among military personnel and in general, as
well as the cultivation of an esprit de corps,
action and synergy among the Armed Forces, the State and Society.
5.2 STRATEGIC PLANNING
The formulation of our strategy is
based on the fundamental principles of
law and defends, in all aspects, principles
such
5.
as meriHu
tocracy, egalim
tarianism, equality,
an
transparency, efficiency,
effectiveness, prevention,
protection, security, knowledge and integrity.

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The fields of policy on which our

strategy is structured and focusing are
the following:
The development of quality efficiency policies
The development of systems for the

employment and organisation of personnel, as well as the implementation of total
quality systems, are priority areas in this
field. The objective for the Armed Forces
is to become a model for the entire Hellenic public administration in matters of
their pertinence, operating according to
the latest technological and legislative
developments, and based on best practises found in internationally recognised
organisations.
A basic instrument for this entire
effort is the Common Assessment Framework. The Common Assessment Framework
is a simple, low-budget and practical selfassessment instrument for the performance of public sector organisations, which
decisively contributes to the import of total
quality administration techniques to public
administration, with the ultimate purpose
of improving the administrative structures
and increasing efficiency.
Personnel Preventive Mental
Hygiene
The protection and promotion of
the personnels mental hygiene is ensured
by a series of preventive policies and measures.
Our priority in this field is the prevention of drug addiction in the Armed
Forces and the active participation and
contribution of the HMoND, by coordinated and complementary actions with other
State authorities active in this field, to a
comprehensive approach and dealing with
drug abuse.
106
201 4
, ,
, ,
,

.

.

,

,

,
,
,
,
.

5.
-
,
,
, , ,
.
Investment in the most important

asset of the HMoND, human resources, the
continuous effort to respond to their existing and emerging problems, the constant
search for best practices, the training of
personnel and the optimisation of their
working and living conditions, are a sound
indication of the importance and added
value attributed by our policy to human
resources.
Personnel Health and Safety
Undoubtedly, the matters related
to the health and safety of Armed Forces
personnel are at the top of the priorities
set by the political and military leadership
of the HMoND. Towards this direction, and
with the aim to prevent and avoid accidents, early deterioration of the health and
occupational accidents, and to eliminate
any danger, caused by the type of duties
and obligations all personnel in the Armed
Forces is called to carry out, we implement
all necessary procedures, so as to protect
the personnels health and safety, taking
the necessary precautions, and at the same
time creating a satisfactory environment in
places of work, living and training.
Personnel Training
All actions - innovations, related to

the multi-dimensional sector of training in
the Armed Forces and thereby all activities
which take place to this end, form the basis for the acquisition of knowledge, skills
and capabilities, for the accomplishment of
all personnels duties, as well as the Armed
Forces mission in general.
ou
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es
Training
5.
Hu
is the leadm
ing vector for the
an
achievement and improvement of the Units
operational readiness. Moreover, the modern and rapidly
changing demands of the 21st century operational environment impose
the introduction of a flexible training
system which, even though it will remain
unaltered in principle, it will have the possibility to be transformed, readjusted and
updated, depending on the demands in
question, without creating confusion and at
the least possible cost.
Training is an important factor for the
proper use of civilian and military personnel
in the Armed Forces, within a constantly
changing and developing environment,
where life-long training is considered a necessary condition, so that the personnel can
successfully respond to their operational
and staff duties.
Interoperability in training is a high
priority in the Armed Forces. The Supreme
Joint War College is already in place, providing joint training at operational and strategic level, as well as education in basic geopolitics to senior officers of all three Services
of the Armed Forces and to foreign officers,
aiming at:
The promotion of their abilities in
decision-making, crisis management and
in the planning, managing and conduct of
joint operations.
Their preparation for staffing
national and allied joint headquarters, at
home or abroad, and being assigned to
other national - allied international posts.
21 ,
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.
108
201 4
,

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20142015 (...) . ...

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Plymouth,

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5.
,
,
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.. , 2014-2015.
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,

The generation of capable commanders and staff officers for joint staffs.
At the same time the Supreme Joint
War College, as well as the Hellenic National
Defence College, have concluded programme agreements, bringing into effect
cooperation with universities for the organisation of Masters Courses, as well as with
recognised domestic or foreign Defence Research Institutes for conducting seminars,
one and two day events, and other similar
activities.
Namely, the department of International European and Regional Studies
of the Panteion University of Social and
Political Sciences, in cooperation with the
Hellenic National Defence College, organises and runs since the academic year 20142015 a Masters Course called Strategic
Security Studies. The aim of this Masters
in Strategic Security Studies is to provide
Armed Forces and Security Services Officers, attending the Hellenic National Defence College, with the necessary knowledge and skills (evaluation, analysis and
synthesis), so as to manage matters of national and international security, according
to the needs of the HMoND and Hellenic
National Defence General Staff.
At the same time, and despite the
current fiscal circumstances, the Hellenic
National Defence College, always characterised by extroversion, runs for the fifth
consecutive year a Masters Course with the
University of Plymouth, which proposed the
signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding for the development of a second
Masters Course in another field.
Sub 5.
sequentHu
ly, the compem
tent Ministries apan
proved the cooperation
between the Supreme Joint
War College and the University
of Macedonia for the organisation of an inter-departmental Masters Course in International Relations and Security, effective as of the
academic year 2014-2015. The aim of this
programme is the promotion of knowledge and the development of research in
the field of International Relations, International Security and International Organisations. Moreover, the programme will contribute to the generation of Supreme Joint
War College graduates with high-level academic specialisation, capable of promoting the upgrading and constant improvement of services provided and the overall
functioning of defence and security, and of
contributing to the enhancement of the organisation, effectiveness and efficiency in
the fields of operational planning, national
security policy making and joint strategy
planning.
es
ou
rc
es
() ()
,

,

, .

.

(pplied Operational
Research and Analysis)
(Systems
Engineering).
The Commands of the Hellenic Higher Military Education Institutions, as well as

the Higher NCO Military Schools, guided
and assisted by the respective General
Staffs, redefine their training programme,
aiming at constantly upgrading the military training and academic education they
offer to their students within a continually
changing operational environment, so that
new personnel will successfully respond
to new challenges. Moreover, for the first

,

-
.
110
201 4
time, two Masters Courses are organised
by the Department of Military Sciences of
the Hellenic Military Academy (Evelpidon),
in cooperation with the Department of
Production and Management Engineers of
the Technical University of Crete. These are
Masters Courses on Applied Operational
Research and Analysis, and Systems Engineering.
5.
,
, , , ,
:

/

.

.

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).

...... , .
Constant training of military and

civilian personnel and attendance at Bachelor, Masters or PhD level is promoted and
encouraged by the leadership of the Armed
Forces so that the personnels Cognitive
Assets will, on one hand, be exploited and,
on the other, improved to the maximum
and at an optimum level, as currently demanded by international political-military
standards and developments.
Additionally, in order for the national military service time to be productive and creative for conscripts, it has been
provided that the young man, after completing his service, will be provided with
a certificate of knowledge, which is nowadays indispensable, through actions such
as:
Establishment of the Certificate of
Work Experience, depending on the training and/or working background of conscripts, as well as on the subject on which
they worked during their service.
Training of conscripts in 7 vocational training centres of the Armed Forces,
certified by the National Organisation for
the Certification of Qualifications and Vocational Guidance.
Implementation of the Career
Orientation programme for conscripts,
d e 5.
pending
Hu
on their edum
cational level (high
an
school and senior high
school graduates and students or graduates of Higher
Educational Institutes and Technological Educational Institutes).
Organisation of training seminars in Athens and Larissa for discharged
conscripts, in cooperation with the Organisation of Agricultural Vocational Education
Training and Employment Dimitra on the
Primary Sector.
es
ou
rc
es

.
, ,
- , :
.
- .
, , , , .

.
-
,

.

.
Personnel Welfare
The personnels unhindered commitment and dedication to their mission
is accomplished by policies and measures
that improve their personal and family
welfare.
To this end, measures are implemented in order to harmonise and assist the
personnels professional and family life, facilitate their everyday life, and resolve their
personal - family, as well as their professional issues, such as:
Couples serving in the same location.
Social standards for Assignments
- Transfers.
Special care for single parents,
divorced parents, disabled person caretakers, large and extended families, and for the
families of Service members deceased on
active duty.
112
201 4
, , ,

.

.
Possibility of military personnel

to seek recourse to the Joint Committee for
Social Problems.
Pregnancy - maternity leave to
female military personnel and extension
thereof in case of having a child beyond the
third one, as well as possibility for the male
spouse to take childcare leave in certain
cases as well.
Study leaves to personnel attending colleges and universities.
Constantly taking measures regarding board and housing, transportation
of personnel, hospital and outpatient care
for personnel and their families, as well as
other kinds of facilities.
Assistance to children of military
and civilian personnel as far as their vocational guidance is concerned.

.

.

.

.
.
5.
Possibility for boarding in Military

Clubs for active duty military personnel, as
well as their family members. This right also
applies to children of personnel studying in
universities away from their place of permanent residence.
Expansion of beneficiaries to
whom services by Military Pharmacies are
provided.
Renewal of contracts for free
transportation of conscripts of all three
Services of the Armed Forces with local Public Transportation, on an annual basis.
Promotion of establishing means
to cover the transportation need of the
5.
Hu
an
es

.

.
rc

. .
ou
es
Equality in the Armed

Forces
personnel
and students
in Military Academies and Schools.
Equality and use of peoples

diversity is a major objective for our
policy planning. Areas that are particularly emphasised are related to the elimination of stereotypes, and equal treatment
and participation.
To achieve this, legislative and institutional initiatives are taken for the enhancement of womens presence in the
Armed Forces, while at the same time improving working conditions, as well as their
career in the administrative hierarchy. It is
noted that the number of women serving
in the Armed Forces has been constantly rising over the past years.
201 4
114
6 .
6. S oc
ia l C
onti
b ut
ion
of
t he
Ar
ed
Fo
rce
sDe
ve
lop
me
nt o
f In
ives
itiat
201 4
116
6.1

6.1 SOCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE

ARMED FORCES
()
, ,
,
.
The Armed Forces, apart from their operational mission, demonstrate their social
character almost on a daily basis, verifying
the sense of the Greek people that they do
not constitute a restricted and delimited
sector, but rather an integral part of the
broader society.

, , ,

.

:
-
6 .
,
, , ,

:
.
.
.
.
, ,
.
.
The Armed Forces, employing their

personnel and resources, without impact
on their operational work, demonstrate a
significant action in several sectors of the
countrys social life, with the purpose of
further strengthening the grid of relationships among the Society and the Armed
Forces.
The actions of the programme of social
contribution of the Armed Forces in the social - financial and cultural development of
the Modern Greek society are being incorporated into the following:
Health - Welfare.
Cooperating with Civil Protection
forces in terms of personnel, equipment
and means in emergency planning for relief
in natural disasters of the affected population as a result of:
Forest fires.
Earthquakes.
Floods.
Snowfall.
Serious road, railway, sea or air
accidents.
CBRN incidents.
Conducting search and rescue operations both in the mainland and at sea.
Allocating personnel from the Hellenic Air Force for staffing the Search and
Rescue Coordination Centre.
Conducting air evacuation missions
to the benefit of the National Emergency
Aid Centre.
The contribution of the Armed Forces to the Modern Greek society is recognised by the Greek people, while the political and military leadership of the HMoND
6. S oc
ia l C
onti
bu
Fo
tion
gives
of
priority
t he
to the mainteAr
m
nance of a high level
ed
of readiness and the
continuous updating of the
Armed Forces personnel about
international developments on
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
and Civil Emergency Planning (CEP).
For this reason, the Armed Forces personnel participate in:
rce
sDe
ve
nt o
f In
The Crisis Management for Disaster Response / Centre of Excellence (CMDR/

COE) under establishment in Bulgaria, with
the purpose of increasing the level of interoperability, specialisation, enhancement of
capabilities of the member states of the Alliance in crisis management, while dealing
with disasters with the use of civil-military
means.
EU research programmes, with
the purpose of enriching knowledge and
experience and enhancing the already existing capabilities.
Crisis
Management for Disaster Response/Center
Of
Excellence
(CMDR/COE) ,

, ,

-
.
, -
.
ives
itiat

,

.
Respective NATO and EU working

groups, by attending International conferences, with the purpose of establishing and
promoting national policies and actions respectively.
me

,

[Civil-ilitary Cooperation - (CIMIC)]

[Civil Emergency Planning - (CEP)].
o ,
:
lop
201 4
118
6.2
-
6.2 ARMED FORCES AND

INFRASTRUCTURE - ENVIRONMENT DEVELOPMENT OF INITIATIVES

- .
The protection of the environment and

the information - awareness of the manpower that serves in the Armed Forces constitute primary objectives of the political
and military leadership of the HMoND.

,
. , ().
6 .

2013, ,

, -

2013
,

,
,

.
The Armed Forces, despite the difficult financial situation, still give top priority to undertaking actions and initiatives
for the protection of the countrys natural
resources and the prevention of environmental pollution. In this respect, the proper
energy management and the exploitation
of Renewable Energy Resources has been
included in these parameters.
The HMoND has published in October
2013 the Green Paper, which outlines in
detail the Ministrys actions with regard to
the Environment, the Environmental Education - Awareness for the Armed Forces
personnel, Energy and the Climate Change,
which also includes the Actions for Development relating to the above sectors, as
well as the respective Actions on the Armed
Forces Social Contribution.
In particular, the Armed Forces develop
targeted actions that aim at:
Protecting the environment (land,
sea and air), as well as the respective biodiversity.
Exploiting efficiently the energy and
natural resources, including water.
Introducing Renewable Energy Resources in the Armed Forces energy balance
6. S oc
, :
ed
Rationally managing waste,

focusing on the prevention of its production and on the selection at source.
f In
The above fields of action are included

in the form of priorities in the recently approved revised Environmental Policy of
the HMoND.
Furthermore, development - research
actions are being developed with a view to
exploiting in the best possible way the EU
funding instruments, so that projects of sustainable development be planned and executed, upgrading the existing infrastructure
of the Armed Forces, aiming at the same
time at the environmental awareness of the
Ministrys personnel.
The HMoND adopts the moto Mission
Accomplishment - Environmental Protection - Unity with Society.
- -
.
ives
itiat
Substituting hazardous chemical

substances with milder alternative ones, as
well as restricting their use to the best extent possible.
nt o

- ,
,

, .
Reducing the
impact of climate change
on the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces.
me
Ar
lop
, , .
t he
ve

,

.
of
De
ion
s-
b ut
rce

, .
onti
at a
satisfactory level.
Fo
,
(, ),
.
ia l C
201 4
120
6.3

6.3 ARMED FORCES AGENCIES WITH

A COMPREHENSIVE SOCIAL
CONTRIBUTION
,
- - . :
The Armed Forces also comprises agencies that -along with their purely military
mission- present a comprehensive contribution to the social and developmental
policy of the country. These services are the
following:
Hellenic Military Geographical

Service
6 .
The Service, through a wide range of

theoretical approaches and practical applications, has now entered dynamically into
the field of digital technology, by preparing
and producing digital maps, orthophoto
maps and other digital products. In this way,
it contributes positively and reliably to the
general contribution of the Armed Forces
to the countrys scientific and technological
developments, thus providing services and
products that are valuable for our national
defence planning and necessary for the formulation and the progress of the countrys
developmental policy, which are appropriate for users (Armed Forces, several agencies of ministries and organisations of the
public sector, scientific institutions, etc) and
adequate for the promotion of each citizens interests.
Hellenic Navy Hydrographical

Service

,
, ,
.

-
.
,
The Service is involved in the thorough collection of data and information

about the Hellenic sea area and their exploitation, aiming mainly at constantly and
qualitatively informing the navigators and
covering the operational requirements of

,

, ,
. ,
, ,

, (,
,
) .
6. S oc
,

.
ia l C
onti
bu
Fo
tion
t h e
of
Hellenic
t he
Navy. It gives
Ar
m
expert opinions and
ed
participates as a technical advisor in the committees for the determination
of the borders of the seashore coastline and works on the seashore.
It is active in the fields of hydrography,
cartography, oceanography, navigation safety and naval studies, implementing state-of-the-art methods and regularly
keeping up with the technological developments in the fields of its competence.
rce
s-
De
ve
lop
The Service is responsible for the

operation and maintenance of lighthouses, beacons, buoys, indication signals and
floating markers, as well as the publication
of relevant notices, in order to provide support to navigators. It performs maintenance
and supply throughout the entire national
lighthouse network and installation of new
lighthouses, wherever required.
Hellenic National Meteorological
Service
The main mission of the Service is
to provide meteorological support to the
national defence and the society, in general. Among the Service's main tasks are
the weather forecasts of any nature, specific
weather forecasts for air and sea, navigation
and farmers, as well as the meteorological
conditions of atmospheric pollution in the
region of Attica.
ives
itiat

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, ,
.
f In
nt o

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, ,

.

.
me
Hellenic Navy Service of

Lighthouses
201 4
122
7.
7. L
e
g is
l at
ive
or
-P
l ia
ar
m
en
tar
yC
on
l
t ro
201 4
124
7.1
7.1 LEGISLATIVE WORK
General Information

,
.
,

.

- .

, :
, .

.
.

.
The organisation and functioning of

the HMoND is defined by laws voted by the
Hellenic Parliament, Regulatory Decrees and
Ministerial Decisions. To the extent of their
competence, the General Staffs appoint
committees, which consider the issues and
submit relevant proposals to the political
leadership for the amendment of the existent legislation. The aforementioned proposals are coordinated by the Recruiting and
Military Legal Advisors Directorate of the
Hellenic National Defence General Staff.
The Legislative work of the HMoND
covers wide aspects of its competence regarding, mostly, matters of:
Structure, Operation and Command of the Armed Forces.
Rationalisation of the Public Administration and restriction of expenses.
National Defence Planning.
Military personnel welfare.
Military recruitment legislation.
.
-
7.

, -
, , ,
, .
Laws - Presidential Decrees

Upon initiative of the HMoND, over
the last years, innovative statutes concerning the Armed Forces have been passed,
towards the direction of their modernisation, their effective operation, the optimal
exploitation of the allocated material and
human resources, always according to the
provisions of the European legislation, as
well as to the conditions imposed by the
current financial circumstances.
Military Personnel Welfare
The priority for the HMoND is the
welfare of the military personnel, so that
7. L
e
l ia
ar
i sl
cruat i
ve
cial matW
ters regarding
or
k
beneficial measures
-P
in favour of certain categories of the personnel of
the Armed Forces, who face
serious social problems, can be
settled successfully and in a anthropocentric manner, through a series
of statutes. In some cases, care is also
taken for the legislation to be harmonised
with the provisions regarding the broader
public sector or the European legislation.
Towards this direction, the HMoND tabled
and keeps promoting relevant bills, which
regard care taken for:
en
tar
yC

.

( - - ).
:
- - .
(
,
).
, (
).
:

l
t ro
on
, , ,
, ,
,

.
, , ,
:
War disabled.
Relatives of Armed Forces personnel deceased on active duty.
Military personnel of the Armed
Forces who face emergency situations (serious illness of family members - childcare specific working conditions, etc.).
All personnel categories as regards
the following matters:
Accommodation - Transfers Vacations for Personnel and their families.
Education (post-graduate study
courses in Greece, abroad, etc.).
Medicare, regardless of sex and
profession (expansion of its field of application and increase of the number of persons
entitled).
Recruiting Legislation
By harmonising the constitutional
provision on the compulsory military service of all Greek men with the latest developments and trends, mostly in the field of
education, a significant number of statutes
of the Ministry regard matters of recruiting
legislation for Greek men:
Modernisation of the recruiting
legislation.
Recruiting benefits are provided
for and standardised.
Issues pertaining to special categories of conscripts (conscientious objectors, specific categories of expatriates etc.).
201 4
126

,
. :

.

.
Matters regarding the registration, the monitoring of recruiting, conscripts call up, medical examinations and
enlistment in the Armed Forces are regulated properly for conscripts to be served
in the best possible way and to be effectively registered in the context of operation of the new Recruiting Services.

(
,
).
, , , ,
.
7.2
7.2 PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL TRANSPARENCY POLICY

General Information

,
,

,
.

7.
, ,

, :
The HMoND following the provisions

of the national legislation on matters of
parliamentary control, as well as the practices applied worldwide on the rule of law
and transparency in governance follows
an open door policy for all parliamentary
parties and their representatives.
Parliamentary Control Office of
the Minister of National Defence
A special parliamentary control office is operating at the HMoND and it is
competent, based on the necessary information that it receives from the General
Staffs, for providing with replies on the following matters:
Questions
Petitions
ments
Applications to Submit Docu Current Questions.

:
.
Salaries, pensions and insurance

of the Personnel of the Armed Forces.
Provision of services to the society.
.
,
.
.

,
.
,
,

, ,
. , :
2009/81/
. , ,

.
,

l
t ro
Defence and foreign policy.
on
Organisation and operation

of the Armed Forces.
yC
Recruiting issues.
tar
,
.
and
en
Armaments
contracts.
l ia
ar
7. L
e
i sl
The
at i
ve
parliaW
mentary conor
k
trol regards mostly
-P
the following matters:
tions.
Chain of command and promo-
Logistics support, assignments

and appointments.
Defence industries.
Measures on Transparency
The political leadership of the
HMoND has taken special care to ensure
transparency in the sensitive area of the
Armed Forces by promoting a series of
important laws and measures towards this
direction.
More specifically, in the field of the
Armed Forces Procurements, as it has already been mentioned, laws have been
voted, which specify the legislation on procurements. In this way, on the one hand, it
becomes possible for the Parliament and
the Court of Audit to conduct their audits
and, on the other hand, the Hellenic legislation complies with the European legislation.
Thus, through the legislative initiatives of
the HMoND:
Directive 2009/81/EC on contracts
in the fields of Defence and Security has
been integrated into national legislation. In
this manner, the national legislation is modernised, simplified and systematised, aiming at the introduction of new guarantees
for transparency under the control of the
Parliament and of the Court of Audit.
Strict and detailed guarantees
for transparency have been introduced,
integrating the Code of Conduct which
201 4
128
7.

. :

,
,

, , ( , ,
, )
'

.
,
,

. , ,
. ,

3 .
regulates all sorts of contacts of the military

and civilian personnel of the HMoND with
representatives of economic bodies participating in bidding and negotiation procedures for the conclusion of contracts, into
the existing legislation. Among others it is
provided for that:
The documents of every contract will compulsorily include a specific
clause of integrity, upon which the financial entities participating in the conclusion
and execution procedures of a contract in
the field of Defence, commit themselves
that through all stages preceding the allocation of the contract, they did not act
unduly, illegally or improperly (that they
did not possess internal information; that
they did not perform any illegal payments
for facilitations or services; that they did
not offer any material favour, gift or return;
etc.) and that they will continue to abstain
from such practices during the stage of the
execution of the contract, as well as after
its expiration.
The aforementioned financial
entities are prohibited from possessing and
employing any mediator or agent during
the procedure of conclusion and execution
of the contract. Contacts of military and civilian personnel of the HMoND are allowed
only by way of legal representatives of companies, while also an authorisation by the
Chief or the General Director is required
with a compulsory publication of a release
about the meeting held, on the internet.
Furthermore, the companies participating
in the procedure of contract conclusion
with the HMoND are prohibited from employing its military or civilian personnel for
at least 3 years after the personnels retirement or discharge.
Towards the same direction of ensuring transparency in the sector of the Armed
Forces, the political leadership adopted a
series of measures regarding the following
matters:
Performing the necessary audits
throughout all stages of execution and
payment of the Armed Forces expenses by
both the competent financial institutions
of the HMoND (by performing regular and
tar
yC
Issuance of the proper legislation

- regulatory acts based on the findings of
the Workgroup against Corruption, which
was created in the HMoND and is coordinated by a superior Member of the Military
Justice Corps. This group has been tasked,
following an agreement with the National
Coordinator against Corruption, with studying, evaluating and analysing corruption
cases in the HMoND; with detecting all potential risks - corruption issues; and with
submitting proposals about measures,
which may prevent or reveal corruption
cases as well.
/
,
(
).
Training / certification of the

personnel, who staff the auditing authorities on subjects of modern auditing methods, and organisation of one-day training
seminars specialised in corruption and
methods of prevention, while the creation
of a Joint Audit Inspector Corps (Evolution
of the Hellenic Army Audit Corps) is already
under consideration.
7.3

7.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS ON

DISARMAMENT AND ARMAMENTS
CONTROL

,
,

.
Greece has set the respect of the International Law, the protection of human
rights and the full compliance with the decisions of the Charter of the United Nations as
fundamental principles of its National Defence and Security Policy.
, ,
l
t ro
Additionally, to consolidate transparency, it has been planned to apply the

following measures against corruption
cases:
on
-

,
.
,
, , , -
.
Compulsorily
publishing all primary requests, decisions / approvals and contracts of the
HMoND online.
en
,
,

:

, /

.
7. L
e
i sl
nonat i
ve
routine /
W
random finanor
k
cial inspections and
-P
audits) and by the Court
of Audit;
l ia
ar

(
/ ),
.
We observe these principles with consistency throughout the aspects of our

diplomatic and defence policy, since we
believe that the field of international law is
201 4
130

.
,
:

.

.
.

:
(1) NPT (

).
(2) BTWC ( , ,
).
(3) ( , , ,
).
7.
(4) CCW (

,
).
2014
a privileged field for defending our national

interests and solving our bilateral disputes.
In this aspect, Greece actively participates in all initiatives of the UN and the
OSCE, in order to enforce the provisions of
International Law regarding:
Control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Control of the proliferation of conventional weapons and more specifically
mines and small arms.
Reinforcement of the armaments
control framework.
In this context, our country is a signatory
and participates actively in the meetings for
the following UN International Conventions:
(1) NPT and Treaties (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, respectively).
(2) BTWC Convention (on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction).
(3) Ottawa Treaty (Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction).
(4) CCW Convention (On Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which may be deemed
to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects). As of September
2014, Greece is a full party in all
five Protocols of the Convention, since it ratified Protocol
V on the Explosive Remnants of War by Law 4288
/ 2014.
In addition, in 2013
Greece along with 121
other countries, signed
the UN Arms Trade Treaty,
and the procedures for its
ratification by the Hellenic Parliament have already begun.
In the field of Conventional Armaments
Control and Confidence Building Measures,
,
4288/2014 V .
Greece
has signed:
g is
l at
ive
or
All treaties on
the control of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).
m
en
The Open Skies Treaty.
-P
l ia
ar
tar
yC
, 2013 121 (Arms Trade Treaty)

.
7. L
e
on
l
t ro
:

(CFE).

(Open Skies).
(Vienna
Document),

() .
,

, ,
, , ,
.
The Vienna Document, which constitutes the unique European system for
the application of Confidence and Security
Building Measures in the military sector under the auspices of the OECD.
In view of the current developments
around the Black Sea and Eastern Europe,
Greece considers maintaining a legally
binding, reviewed, viable, universally applicable control status on Conventional Armaments, also adapted to the requirements of
the modern geo-political environment, as
a particularly important parameter for the
reinforcement of regional stability, confidence and security.
201 4
132
8.
8. I m
por t
a nt
Qu
es t
io n
sA
r is
in
fo
ra
Fu
tu
re
St r
at e
gy
Re v
iew
201 4
134
The following critical questions are

raised emphatically and will be subject to
common consideration during the future
strategy review:
8.1 -
-
8.1 SECURITY THREATS - THREAT FORMS

- INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
21
,
() .
, .
The fact that in the 21st century Greece

still faces a conventional threat caused by
an ally and a potential EU partner neighbouring country is a paradox. This threat
requires the Hellenic Armed Forces to maintain an adequate size and superior capabilities in order to deter the manifestation of
any aggressiveness.
, . , ,

.
- - ,

.
8.
( ),
:
Apart from the conventional threat,

however, new forms of threats have
emerged; real threats, whose consequences are often mentioned by the international press, affect great parts of the
population and are confronted on a daily
basis. Some of them are not -at least in the
beginning- of military nature, but their effects and dealing with their disastrous consequences are also related to the capabilities of the Armed Forces.
The main threats which undermine the
security of the country (as well as international security) were analysed in Chapter 1
and are summed up as follows:
International Terrorism
Cyber warfare
Illegal immigration
Organised Crime
()
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction
Modern Forms of Piracy

Environmental - Health - Energy
Threats
8. I m
.
re
St r
Re v
The consequences may be described,

in brief, as decreased manning of units with
adverse effects on the training, maintenance
and level of readiness of the Armed Forces,
as well as on the size of the available pool for
recruitment of their future personnel.
At this critical time and in view of the
aforementioned, there is a need to find an
answer to the following question: What
would be the desirable composition - level
of the Armed Forces personnel taking into
account also the population / demographic
situation in the country (active - reserve personnel, military - civilian personnel, career
personnel - conscripts, and general duty highly specialised personnel)? At the same
time, the question is enriched and becomes
more complex with the introduction of the
financial parameter, in the form of reduced
defence budgets, and with the requirement
to preserve the current personnel ceiling, by
creating, at the same time, incentives to attract the most skilful personnel to staff them.
An equally important question is the one
regarding the duration of military service.
The future strategy review will have to examine anew the matters of how much time is required to provide satisfactory military training to young conscripts, what the desirable
level of manning for the Armed Forces units
is and how this dynamic part of the society
will return to the production process and the
job market as soon as possible.
iew
The demographic issue of Greece has

particularly severe consequences for its defence and, in particular, for the recruitment
of personnel for the Armed Forces.
gy
8.2 DEMOGRAPHIC ISSUE - IMPACT ON

THE ARMED FORCES
at e
.
,

.
tu
,
: -
-
( - , - , - ,
- ); ,

,
,
.
Fu
, .
Qu
st i
These
on
sA
threats have
r is
been fully includin
ed in the provisions
g
of our national defence
planning and they are evaluated in a coherent manner by
all the bodies, which compose the
national security system in Greece.
ra

() .
a nt
fo
8.2
por t
201 4
136
8.3

,
,
.
2007,
, 2013-27. ,
, .

. , ,

.
8.

,
.
8.4

.
,

8.3 RETAINING THE SAME LEVEL OF

DEFENCE BUDGETS
From the beginning of the financial
crisis, the Armed Forces were the first to
contribute to the national effort for the
budgetary rationalisation by reducing their
budgets. The budget cut is noteworthy
compared to the respective figures of 2007
and it became possible through both the
rationalisation of their operation and their
transformation, as this was provided for in
the Force Structure 2013-2027. At the same
time, particular attention and top priority
was given to the full utilisation of the capabilities of existing weapon systems instead
of procuring new ones.
The predictable recovery of the Greek
economy and the return to positive growth
rates are not an occasion for the Armed
Forces to return to old practices. The crisis was seen as an opportunity for them to
adapt to a more economical, effective and
modernised operation prototype, without
however any compromises regarding the
security provided to the society or the size
of their contribution to it.
The important question which the future strategy review will have to answer,
among others, is related to the possibility of
a further reduction in the required state investments in the field of Defence, by keeping at least the same sense of security experienced by citizens.
8.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TECHNOLOGY AND THE DESIRABLE
EXTENT OF ITS APPLICATION
The development of technology provides the Armed Forces with capabilities
unimaginable in the recent past. Technology is a significant force multiplier, while
a reduced requirement for personnel to
achieve the same results is also one of the
side benefits.
A negative feature is the development
of technology as it takes place mostly
abroad. So, it becomes obvious that adopting new technologies creates conditions of
dependence for Greece. At the same time,
the cost to obtain this technology is usually
8. I m
tu
re
St r
at e
gy
Re v
In order to achieve self-sufficiency and

independence from foreign countries, the
Armed Forces will determine the important fields which they will seek to develop
at home or domestically developed force
multiplier cutting edge technologies. Thus,
they will become the lever to develop the
domestic defence industry and to attract
the high-level and highly skilled Greek personnel, who will respond to the aforementioned challenge.
8.5 THE GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
IN THE BROADER REGION OF OUR
COUNTRY
The past years into the 21st century have
brought about significant changes worldwide. Many of them took place in the close
and broader surroundings of our country.
The Second Gulf War, the Arab Spring
and the instability it caused in a number of
countries where it burst out, the developments around Greeces Northern frontiers,
the new initiatives taken for the solution of
the Cyprus issue, the crisis in Ukraine, the
discovery of undersea hydrocarbon deposits
and the arising additional value attributed
to the declaration of Exclusive Economic
Zones and to the definition of the borders of
the Continental Shelf, the planning and construction of new hydrocarbon pipelines, all
the above compose an environment which
is characterised by high potentials for the
development of new cooperation, but also
bears high risks of a conflict. In this environment, Greece evaluates its position and reviews its strategic alliances, where necessary,
iew

21 .
. 2
,
, ,
, ,

,
,

.
Fu
8.5

ra
, ,
- . ,

, .
a nt
Qu
high,
es t
io n
while it
sA
is always up to
r is
the foreign governin
g
ment to approve the
full release of funds and its
export. Therefore, the recommendable extent to which it will
be adopted and the fields in which
this will be sought are still to be determined and this depends largely on
the level at which the Domestic Defence
Technology Industrial Base has developed
cutting edge technologies, as sought for
by the National Defence Industry Strategy.
fo

. . ,

,

.
,
,
,

, .
por t
201 4
138
,
,
, .

, ,
, . :
.

.

.
.
.

.

, .
8.
, , ,
,
, , ,
.
,
.
, ,
in the international and regional security

environment.
The Armed Forces, acting within this
environment and towards the direction of
implementing the Hellenic Foreign Policy,
to the extent of their competences, plan
and implement their Defence Policy. Their
objectives are:
To enhance the level of security in
the region.
To promote a favourable environment for cooperation and confidence.
To achieve a high level of cooperation with the respective Forces of other
countries.
To achieve a high operational level of
the Armed Forces.
To send deterrence messages to all
aspiring threats.
To show the Greek flag and promote
Hellenic positions abroad.
To create a favourable environment
and a favourable predisposition for other
more competent state agencies to promote
the Hellenic positions and objectives.
As a result, the Armed Forces have created a grid of agreements with a great number
of countries, NATO allies, EU partners, as
well as countries not included in the aforementioned organisations, within which
they cooperate, conduct common training
courses, exchange views, estimates, and
know-how and provide training. The selection of the countries is always based on the
promotion of national interests, the forging
of good neighbourly relations and the upgrading of security and cooperation levels.
The above described volatility of the
environment makes it necessary to monitor
the developments permanently and thoroughly, as well as to be ready to promptly
amend the policy, so that it will always respond to the new developments which will
arise in the best possible manner.
However, it also lies within the competences of the Armed Forces to contribute
to the shaping of these developments in
a favourable manner for our national interests.
8. I m
.
gy
Re v
Greece as an EU member state seeks to

further integrate European policies and participates in the European efforts for the protection and securing of EUs external borders.
Greece, accepting that the borders within the EU are no longer impenetrable border
lines, but bridges of communication and
cooperation, promotes and supports actively the Common European Maritime Policy, as well as the reform of the procedures
for the European Migration policy, as well as
of the internal security policy.
Adopting these common defence policies will not automatically solve the problems
confronted today. It will provide, however, a
strong diplomatic support to the efforts for
their as quick as possible solution based on
the principles of the International Law.
The question that is raised, however, in a
Europe which is faced with the threats of terrorism, crime, trafficking and illegal immigration as real threats, is to what extent the national borders of the EU member states can
become European borders in a substantial
manner. More specifically, would it be possible for the EU to make its priority the assumption of part of or full responsibility, within the
framework of the CSDP, for the protection
and defence of the member states borders?
iew
8.6 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION - BORDER

SECURITY
at e
, ,
,
, , , ,
- ,
, . , ,
, ,
, -;
St r
,
.

, , .
re
, ,

,
, ,

, , .
tu
,

.
Fu
8.6
ra
a nt
Qu
It
es t
io n
becomes
sA
clear that
r is
assessing the efin
fectiveness of the
g
aforementioned extroversion of the Armed Forces and
readjustment of their objectives
and their scope of cooperation, according to the then formed and to the
future geo-strategic environment, will
be subjects of the future strategy review.
fo

,
.
por t
140
201 4
AB
ABBREVIATIONS
BR
EV
Adriatic-Ionian Initiative
EDA
AMSCC
Athens Multinational Sealift

Coordination Centre
European
Defence Agency
EDTIB
BG
Battlegroup
BTWC
Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention
European Defence
Technological &
Industrial Base
ERDF
C/HNDGS
Chief of Hellenic National

Defence General Staff
European Regional
Development Fund
ESDP
C4I
Command, Control,
Communication, Computers
and Intelligence
European Security and Defence

Policy
ESF
European Social Fund
EU
European Union
CAR
Central African Republic
EUABG
CAX
Computer Assisted Exercises
European Union Amphibious

Battlegroup
CDP
Capabilities Development Plan
FTX
Field Training Exercise
CEP
Civil Emergency Planning
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
CFE
Conventional Forces in Europe
HAFGS
Hellenic Air Force General Staff
CFI
Connected Forces Initiative
HAGS
Hellenic Army General Staff
CFX
Command Field Exercises
HELBROC
CIMIC
Civil - Military cooperation
HEL-las B-ulgaria RO-mania

C-yprus
CMDR/COE
Crisis Management for Disaster

Response / Center Of Excellence
HMoND
Hellenic Ministry of National

Defence
CMS
Crisis Management System
HNDGS
Hellenic National Defence

General Staff
CMX
Crisis Management Exercise
HNGS
Hellenic Navy General Staff
COSME
Competitiveness of Enterprises
and Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises
ISAF
International Security
Assistance Force
CPX
Command Post Exercise
JISR
Joint Intelligence Surveillance &

Reconnaissance
CSAR
Combat Search and Rescue
KFOR
Kosovo Force
CSDP
Common Security and Defence

Policy
KYSEA
EATF
European Air Transport Fleet
Governmental Council for

Foreign Affairs and National
Defence
TI
A
ADRION
NS
142
201 4
MEE
AB
ABBREVIATIONS
Live Exercises
Mutual Defence Cooperation
Agreement
MIO
Maritime Interdiction perations
MPSOTC
Multinational Peace Support

Operations Training Center
NAMFI
NATO Missile Firing Installation
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation
NDP
National Defence Policy
NDPP
NATO Defence Planning Policy
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
NMIOTC
NATO Maritime Interdiction

Operational Training Center
NMS
National Military Strategy
NRDC
Rapid Deployable Corps
NRF
NATO Response Force
NTBT
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
OHQ
Operational Headquarters
OSCE
Organisation for Security and

Cooperation in Europe
R&D
Research & Development
Remoted
Piloted Air
System
RSM
Resolute Support
Mission
SACT
Supreme Allied Commander

Transformation
SAR
Search and Rescue
SDC
Shah Deniz Consortium
SEDM
South Eastern Defence

Ministerial
SEEBRIG
South Eastern Europe Brigade
TFEU
Treaty on the Functioning of

the European Union
UN
United Nations
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
NS
Maritime Surveillance
MDCA
RPAS
MARSUR
EV
TI
A
LIVEX
BR
( 2014)

().

1500
2015
THIS PUBLICATION (WHITE PAPER 2014) WAS SET TYPED
AND PRINTED BY THE HELLENIC ARMY'S PRINTING OFFICE
(HARPO). IT WAS PUBLISHED BY THE HMoND DIRECTORATE
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY IN 1500 COPIES,
IN JANUARY OF 2015
Copy Editing - Coordination - Planning:

HMoND/GDNDPIR /DNDP
Typesetting - Printing - Binding:
HELLENIC ARMYS PRINTING OFFICE
Texts:
HMoND - NDGS - HAGS - HNGS - HAF
ISBN: 978 - 960 - 86291 - 5 - 8

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HELLENIC REPUBLIC

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

ISBN: 978 - 960 - 86291 - 5 - 8

Coordination - Copy Editing: HMoND Directorate of National Defence Policy

ISBN: 978 - 960 - 86291 - 5 - 8

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

cooperation, alliances and

Despite the economic crisis, our

All the above are crucial, not only for those

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

What is the reason for

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

The publication of the

Defence, security and the

In order to efficiently ensure all the above,

The need to maintain the defence capacities

The predictable recovery of the Hellenic

As it becomes clear, threat assessment, in our

We have to manage the challenges of the

I invite you to study the White Paper on

General Michael KOSTARAKOS

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

1.1 Shaping of the Geo-Political

5.1 Vision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

CHAPTER 3 - THE CONTRIBUTION OF GREECE TO

2.1 Institutional Framework of National

CHAPTER 2 - NATIONAL DEFENCE AND

CHAPTER 1 - GREECE WITHIN THE CURRENT

CHAPTER 6 - SOCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

1.1 SHAPING OF THE GEO-POLITICAL

Changes in the role of leading

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

In order to respond to the existing

period of readiness and preparedness of

At the same time, the EU is obtaining

On its part, the United Nations

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

Research and Development (R&D) investments, is expected to be maintained in the

The first category includes Russia

The second category includes a series of countries of the developing world,

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

1.2 THE GEO-STRATEGIC LOCATION OF

The special importance attributed to

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

At international level, Greece, a country

1.3 THE REGIONAL SECURITY

The area of South-eastern Europe,

Eastern Mediterranean - Middle

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

Therefore, the developments in the

Furthermore, the bloody and almost

Our country, with its geographic and

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

which are potential asymmetric threats and

1.4 NEW THREATS TO OUR NATIONAL

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

ability to adjust and exploit all the means of

Migration and Organised Crime

WH ITE PAP E R 201 4

Southern Europe have to bear most of the

As far as Greece is concerned, its

Modern Forms of Piracy