International Journal of Systematic Theology Volume 17

doi:10.1111/ijst.12118

Number 4

October 2015

Herman Bavinck and the Problem of New

Wine in Old Wineskins
BRUCE PASS*

Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a flowering in Bavinck studies and a new
focus on the synthetic character of Bavincks theology. Bavincks epistemology
represents a prime example of this synthetic character, as Bavinck recasts the
principia of Reformed Orthodoxy in a trinitarian framework, which in turn is
used to address a residual problem of post-Enlightenment philosophy. While
ingenious, certain inconsistencies emerge on account of the sheer complexity
of Bavincks principia. This article explores two inconsistencies that have been
identified in the secondary literature and the extent to which these
inconsistencies threaten the coherence of Bavincks epistemology as a whole.

Until recently, the writings of Herman Bavinck (18541921) were largely unknown
among Anglophones. This relative obscurity is reflected in the fact that until 2001
only six doctoral dissertations on Bavincks theology had been written in the English
language.1 In recent years, however, all this has changed. The English-speaking
world has witnessed a flowering in Bavinck studies, which can largely to be
attributed to the efforts of the Dutch Reformed Translation Society. Many of
Bavincks works are now readily available, including his principal theological work,

* 85 Roland Ave., Wahroonga, New South Wales 2076, Australia.

1

Anthony Hoekema, Herman Bavincks Doctrine of the Covenant (ThD diss., Princeton
Theological Seminary, 1953); Bastian Kruithof, The Relation of Christianity and
Culture in the Teaching of Herman Bavinck (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1955);
Eugene Heideman, The Relation of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959); John Bolt, The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural
Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck (PhD diss., University of St Michaels College,
Toronto, 1982); Syd Hielema, Herman Bavincks Eschatological Understanding of
Redemption (ThD diss., Wycliffe College, Toronto School of Theology, 1998); Ronald
Gleason, The Centrality of the unio mystica in the Theology of Herman Bavinck (PhD
diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, 2001). See John Bolt, Herman
Bavinck speaks English, in Eric Bristley, Guide to the Writings of Herman Bavinck
(Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008), p. 36.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

433

the four-volume Reformed Dogmatics.2 One of the notable developments in this

recent flowering has been a reconsideration of the prevailing general reading
of Bavincks theology, the so-called two Bavincks hypothesis. This portrayal of
Bavinck as a conflicted, if not incoherent,3 figure draws attention to what are
perceived to be irreconcilable tensions in Bavincks thought and orientation toward
the world. Accordingly, the orthodox and confessional Bavinck is viewed as being at
odds with his more philosophically inclined alter-ego, who, particularly in later life,
was increasingly attracted to the impulses of modernity.4 This prevailing general
reading has been brought into question by recent scholarship, which has drawn
attention to the essentially synthetic character of Bavincks theology.5 In particular,
John Bolts gracious acknowledgement of his mistranslation of the oft-cited remark
of Gerrit Berkouwer regarding the presence of onweersprekelijke motieven in
Bavincks writings has lent impetus to a new general reading that discerns the
presence of but one Bavinck.6 On this reading, the tensions created by Bavincks
onweersprekelijke motieven function as agents of unity in his synthesis, much like

2
3

4
5

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols., ed. J. Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Baker
Academic: Grand Rapids, 20038) (hereafter RD).
I am not convinced that Bavinck has left us with an entirely coherent portrait of
Christians basic relationship to this world. David Van Drunen, The Kingship of Christ
is Twofold: Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the Thought of Herman Bavinck,
Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010), p. 162.
See John Bolt, Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam: Herman Bavincks
Reception and Influence in North America, Calvin Theological Journal 38 (2003),
pp. 2647.
Henk Van Den Belt summarizes Bavincks approach to theology in the statement that
Bavinck approached theological issues in a synthetic rather than antithetic manner, see
Henk Van Den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology (Leiden: Brill,
2008), p. 250. George Harinck concurs: Bavinck searched throughout his life for a
certain synthesis between modernity and religion, George Harinck, Something that
must remain, if the truth is to be sweet and precious to us: The Reformed Spirituality of
Herman Bavinck, Calvin Theological Journal 38 (2003), p. 249; see also George
Harinck, The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion:
A Case Study of Herman Bavincks Engagement with Modern Culture, Scottish Bulletin
of Evangelical Theology 29 (2011), pp. 6077. Similarly, James Eglinton describes
Bavincks approach to theology as catholic in spirit and synthetic in nature, James
Eglinton, Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavincks Organic
Motif (London: T. & T. Clark, 2012), p. 171.
See John Bolt, Herman Bavinck on Natural Law and Two Kingdoms: Some Further
Reflections, The Bavinck Review 4 (2013), p. 77. John Bolt publicly retracted his
translation of this phrase as irreconcilable themes in response to Nelson Kloostermans
paper on Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the Thought of Herman Bavinck
presented at the conference A Pearl and a Leaven: Herman Bavinck for the Twenty-First
Century at Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on 19 September
2008. Kloosterman points out that the phrase onweersprekelijke motieven would be more
reliably translated as undeniable themes. For the original citation, see Gerrit
Berkouwer, Zoeken en Vinden: Herinneringen en Ervaringen (Kampen: Kok, 1989),
p. 55.

2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

434

Bruce Pass

the cables of a suspension bridge.7 The recent direction of Bavinck studies therefore,
represents nothing short of a paradigm shift. Further work remains to be done,
however, with respect to the coherence of Bavincks synthesis, and in this regard,
Bavincks epistemology warrants particular attention. Bavincks epistemology is
foundational for his theology and forms the bridge with which Bavinck seeks to span
the gulf between Reformed Orthodoxy and modernity. It is this bridge, which, if
secure, enables theology to fulfil what Bavinck regards as its marvellous calling of
preventing science and religion, the church and the academy, and the believing
community and the world from falling dualistically apart.8 Several studies have noted
both the importance, as well as problematic nature, of this bridge,9 although most
without exploring it in any detail.10 This article seeks to supply some of the missing
detail by examining two inconsistencies that have been identified in the secondary
literature, both of which concern Bavincks innovative adaptation of the principia of
Reformed Orthodoxy. After exploring the basic structure and function of the
principia, it will be argued that these inconsistencies do not expose any fundamental
problem of coherence in Bavincks epistemology, but rather highlight the limitations,
if not inadequacy, of the classically Aristotelian categories of Reformed Orthodoxy
for the ambitious scope of Bavincks unitary theory of knowledge.
7

Recent contributions to the secondary literature have pursued this line of enquiry, paying
particular attention to the direction of Bavincks conversation with modernity. Building
on certain observations drawn in Brian Mattson, Reformed to our Destiny: Eschatology
and the Image of God in Herman Bavincks Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill, 2012),
James Eglinton has argued that even though organism is a prevalent category within
German Idealism, the Bavinckian conception of organism is rooted in patristic and
Reformed trinitarian thought. Thus, the frequently recurring organic motif is not an
example of conflict between the neo-Hegelian Bavinck and his conservative counterpart,
but an example of how the one Bavinck brings his orthodox heritage into conversation
with modernity. See Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, pp. 524, 602. Similarly, I have
argued that, while self-consciousness is a prevalent category in idealist philosophy,
Bavinck trims self-consciousness of much of its Cartesian baggage and rehabilitates the
concept to its Augustinian roots. The frequently recurring motif of self-consciousness
therefore, does not represent an example of conflict between the post-Enlightenment
Bavinck and his pre-Enlightenment alter ego, but another example of where the one
Bavinck brings the Christian tradition into conversation with modernity. See Bruce Pass,
Herman Bavinck and the cogito, Reformed Theological Review 74 (2015), pp. 1533.
It is by no means entirely proven, however, that the direction of this conversation does
not, at least in certain instances, run from modernity to Orthodoxy. Analyses such as that
of Adam Eitel warrant serious consideration and further examination. According to Eitel,
Bavinck appropriates various tropes from Hegels speculative trinitarianism in service of
his view of history. See Adam Eitel, Trinity and History: Bavinck, Hegel, and 19th
Century Doctrines of God, in John Bolt, ed., Five Studies in the Thought of Herman
Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011),
pp. 10128.
8 RD I, p. 606.
9 Cornelius Van Der Koii, The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit, especially in
H. Bavinck, Journal of Reformed Theology 2 (2008), pp. 10910.
10 Van Den Belt, Authority, pp. 262 n.146 and 281.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

435

Bavincks principia: new wine in old wineskins

Herman Bavincks four-volume Reformed Dogmatics commences with an extensive
Prolegomena in which he sets out principia of both theological and general
epistemology. As such, Bavincks epistemology represents a remarkable example of
the synthetic character of his theology as a whole. Bavinck adopts the Aristotelian
framework he inherits from Reformed Orthodoxy, yet modifies this framework in
such a way that it can accommodate a more distinctly trinitarian description of
knowledge, as well as address one of the central problems of post-Enlightenment
philosophy. In order to achieve this synthesis, however, many of the older Reformed
Orthodox terms acquire new points of reference. In this regard the principia resemble
a pouring of new wine into old wineskins.
Bavinck retains the wineskins of Reformed Orthodoxy in his adoption of the
classical distinction between a foundation of being, the principium essendi, and a
foundation of knowing, the principium cognoscendi. Within the principium
cognoscendi, however, Bavinck draws a further distinction between an external
foundation of knowing, a principium cognoscendi externum, and an internal
foundation of knowing, a principium cognoscendi internum.11 This further
distinction between an internal and an external foundation of knowing is rare in
Reformed Orthodoxy.12 For this reason alone Bavincks innovation warrants
attention, but on closer inspection it soon becomes apparent that it plays a prominent
structural role in rendering Bavincks principia serviceable to both theological and
general epistemology. Several observations may be made with regard to the way
Bavinck achieves this.
The additional distinction between an external and an internal foundation of
knowing gives Bavincks principia a ternary rather than binary structure. This
ternary structure affords Bavinck the possibility of formulating a distinctively
trinitarian theological epistemology in which God the Father is the principium
essendi, God the Son is the principium cognoscendi externum, and God the Holy
Spirit is the principium cognoscendi internum. Bavinck writes: these three principia,
distinct yet essentially one, are rooted in the Trinitarian being of God. It is the Father
who, through the Son as Logos, imparts himself to his creatures in the Spirit.13 As
well as furnishing Bavinck with a structure capable of articulating a trinitarian
economy of knowledge, the expansion of the binary structure to a ternary structure
also affords Bavinck a means of addressing one of the residual problems of postEnlightenment philosophy, namely, the subjectobject dichotomy. By identifying the

11 RD I, pp. 21013.
12 Van Den Belt, Authority, p. 238. Notably, Van Den Belt argues that Richard Muller is
mistaken in his identification of a principium internum in the works of Alsted and
Maccovius, see Van Den Belt, Authority, pp. 1446. See also Richard Muller, PostReformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy,
ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), vol. I, p. 442 n. 147.
13 RD I, p. 214.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

436

Bruce Pass

second person of the Trinity with the principium cognoscendi externum and the third
person of the Trinity with the principium cognoscendi internum, Bavinck grounds
the correspondence between knowing subject and known object within the unity of
the Divine essence. This unity of the real and ideal forms the bridge by which
Bavinck will seek to span both the epistemological divide between noumenon and
phenomenon and the theological divide between grace and nature, insofar as it will
ground the correspondence requisite to creaturely knowledge, both of the creation
and the Creator.
In rendering his principia serviceable to both theological and general
epistemology in this way, Bavinck paves the way for a threefold application of the
principia to distinct species of knowledge: the knowledge of the world, the natural
knowledge of God and the redemptive knowledge of God. Concerning the first
species, the knowledge of the world, the cosmos functions as principium
cognoscendi externum and reason functions as principium cognoscendi internum.14
Concerning the second species, the natural knowledge of God, the cosmos still
functions as principium cognoscendi externum and human reason still functions as
principium cognoscendi internum, but importantly, reason only functions in this
capacity according to a religious disposition, which views the creation in relation to
God.15 Concerning the third species, the redemptive knowledge of God, the
principium cognoscendi externum is Scripture, to which the illumination of the Holy
Spirit corresponds as principium cognoscendi internum.16
Thus, the principia are structured in such a way that they relate the particular
way in which we come to know the Creator to the general way in which we acquire
knowledge of his creation. As such, Bavincks principia represent an ambitious
proposal for a unitary theory of knowledge. Any structure of this level of complexity
will face challenges of consistency, and Bavincks principia are no exception. In
particular, two inconsistencies have been brought to light in the secondary literature,
both of which present the reader an opportune litmus test for the fundamental
coherence of Bavincks epistemology.

Principium cognoscendi internum as verbum principale

The first inconsistency concerns Bavincks description of the internal principle of
knowledge as theologys primary principle. Henk Van Den Belt in his fine analysis
of the authority of Scripture in Reformed theology exposes this inconsistency when
he notes the tension Bavinck creates by maintaining that Scripture, theologys
principium cognoscendi externum, is theologys principium unicum, while
simultaneously describing theologys principium cognoscendi internum as
14
15

RD I, p. 233.
RD I, p. 341. This religious disposition corresponds to the Calvinist notion of the seed
of religion, see RD I, pp. 31920.
16 RD I, p. 213.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

437

theologys verbum principale.17 This prompts the question as to how the internal
principle can be primary, if in fact the external principle is theologys sole
foundation. A little historical background will elucidate both the nature of this
problem and the grounds on which Bavinck would strenuously deny any charge of
inconsistency.
Van Den Belt notes that Bavinck is likely to have derived his further
externuminternum distinction within the principium cognoscendi from the
distinction between verbum externum and verbum internum in the writings of Johan
Alsted (15881638).18 Bavinck cites Alsted frequently throughout the first volume of
Reformed Dogmatics, but Van Den Belt demonstrates that on closer inspection
Bavinck does not use Alsteds terms in exactly the same way. Whereas Alsted
uses the externuminternum distinction to account for the relationship between
inspiration and inscripturation, Bavinck uses this distinction to account for the
relationship between revelation and illumination. Van Den Belt shows that, like
Alsted, Bavinck affirms that the verbum internum is theologys verbum principale,19
yet on account of its new point of reference in Bavincks system, Bavinck invests
the verbum internum with an entirely new significance. When Alsted describes the
verbum internum as verbum principale, he is essentially affirming the chronological
priority of inspiration over inscripturation, but when Bavinck describes the verbum
internum as verbum principale, he is affirming the priority of theologys internal
principle over its objective source. This is one of several points at which the new
wine threatens to burst the old wineskins. Van Den Belt rightly asks how Bavinck can
legitimately maintain that Scripture, the principium cognoscendi externum, is
theologys principium unicum, if the principium cognoscendi internum is theologys
verbum principale. The answer to this question lies in the fact that while Bavinck
does view the illumination of the Holy Spirit as a foundation of theology, he adopts
a very restricted definition of the term principium for his internal principle.

A restricted definition of principium

Bavinck carefully qualifies the sense in which he regards his internal principle of
knowledge as a foundation. In contrast with the principium cognoscendi externum,
Bavincks internal principle is not a principium in the sense of source or first
17

Van Den Belt, Authority, p. 247. The statements to which Van Den Belt refers are
Scripture is the sole foundation ( principium unicum) of church and theology, and the
internal word (verbum internum) is the principal word (verbum principale), see RD I,
pp. 86 and 213.
18 Van Den Belt, Authority, pp. 2457. Bavinck cites Alsted frequently throughout the first
volume of his Dogmatics, see RD I, pp. 87, 88 n. 44, 102 n. 66, 180, 241 n. 23, 306 n. 22,
415 n. 53, 584 n. 62, 587 n. 71, 608 n. 19, 611 n. 26 and 618 n. 45.
19 RD I, p. 213. Van Den Belt identifies Johannes Alsted, Theologica Didactica 9, and
Praecognitorum Theologicorum I.1245 as Bavincks probable source, see
Van Den Belt, Authority, pp. 2467.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

438

Bruce Pass

principle.20 The internal principle rather functions as the organ by which external
revelation is received.21 Bavinck is apparently sensitive to the charge of subjectivism
and states that such a charge would only be true when the subjective condition by
which alone the object can be known were made the first principle of knowledge.
Confusing these two categories, Bavinck avers, is precisely the error of idealistic
rationalism.22 Bavinck insists that the internal principle is not a first principle, yet
it is a principle, and even the principal principle, but what does that mean, and why
would Bavinck attribute priority to the organ rather than the source of knowledge?
Much has to do with Bavincks desire to do justice to the subjectivity of
knowledge in general and the subjectivity of theological knowledge in particular. For
Bavinck, the Christian faith is sheer religion, subjective religion.23 To this end, God
only reveals himself objectively for the purpose of engendering a subjective
knowledge of himself in his creatures. A subjective knowledge of God, therefore,
constitutes the final cause of theology. Bavinck writes: The aim of theology, after
all, can be no other than that the rational creature know God, and knowing him,
glorify God.24 Bavincks doctrine of revelation is, therefore, both profoundly
teleological and eschatological. This teleological and eschatological view of
revelation holds particular relevance for the two particular reasons Bavinck offers for
prioritizing theologys internal principle over its external source.
20

21
22
23
24

The English translation in certain respects muddies the waters at this point. The English
translation sometimes supplies the qualifier first to clarify the particular sense in which
Bavinck uses the term principium in the Dutch original. In Gereformeerde Dogmatiek
Bavinck simply uses the term principium without further qualification. See Dan eerst
krijgt zij recht, wanneer de subjectieve voorwaarde, waaronder het object alleen gekend
kan wordentot principium der kennis verheven wordt. Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek (Kampen: Kok, 1928) (hereafter GD), Part 1, p. 533. The corresponding
passage in the English translation reads: It would be valid only if the subjective condition
by which alone the object can be known were made the first principle of knowledge.
RD I, p. 564. What is important to remember is that Bavincks understanding of the
meaning of the term principium does not preclude the meaning of source. Bavinck does
state that he prefers the term principium to fons, but this is because fons suggests a
mechanical relation between Scripture and theology, whereas principium is more
amenable to an organic relation, see RD I, p. 89. What Bavinck understands under the
term mechanical, however, may not be entirely accurate. The editorial footnote to this
passage states that this censure of a mechanical relation between Scripture and theology
is a criticism of Charles Hodges empirical-inductive method. Paul Helm has recently
argued that Bavinck has mistakenly derived his assessment of Hodge from Robert
McCheyne Edgar, Christianity and the Experimental Method, Presbyterian and
Reformed Review 6/22 (1895), pp. 20123, and that Bavincks method is in fact a lot
closer to Hodges than he realizes. See Paul Helm, Faith, Form, and Fashion
(Cambridge: James Clarke, 2014), pp. 1859.
RD I, pp. 506, 564.
RD I, pp. 5645.
RD I, p. 571.
RD I, p. 213. Similarly, in the knowledge of the truth lies the end of its revelation.
Herman Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation: The Stone Lectures for 190809,
Princeton Theological Seminary (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909), p. 82.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

439

Firstly, and somewhat remarkably, Bavinck regards the Holy Spirit, rather than
Holy Scripture, as theologys formal cause. Bavinck states that the external principle
is merely instrumental, incidental and provisional,25 whereas the internal principle is
the formal and primary principle.26 In saying this, Bavinck is not describing
Scripture as formless matter, but is clarifying the sense in which he sees the Holy
Spirit functioning as the receptive organ of revelation. Bavinck writes: God can only
be known by God. Only the Holy Spirit can prolong what has been revealed
externally and objectively in the knowing subject. For the creature to come to a
knowledge of its Creator, the Holy Spirit must function as the form of divine
consciousness in the consciousness of the knowing subject. As the external principle
functions only as the provisional instrument of this consciousness, it can only be
accorded penultimate significance. Ultimate significance must be reserved for the
enduring formal cause of a subjective knowledge of God. Secondly, Bavinck regards
the Holy Spirit as theologys efficient cause. This is the specific reason Bavinck
accords primacy to theologys internal principle over its external source.
Bavinck writes: The verbum internum is the verbum principale for it is this which
introduces the knowledge of God into human beings.27 Because the Holy Spirit
actuates the knowing subjects apprehension of God, he enjoys priority over Holy
Scripture as the principium principale of theology.
Taking these two reasons together, one can see that Bavinck prioritizes
theologys internal principle over its external source because he views the Holy Spirit
as the perfecting cause of revelation.28 As theologys formal and efficient cause, the
Holy Spirit realizes theologys final cause, namely, the subjective knowledge of God.
Bavinck can, therefore, maintain without contradiction the priority of the internal
principle while affirming that Holy Scripture is theologys only source on account of
the restricted definition of principium which circumscribes his internal principle.
Bavinck secures the possibility of this restricted definition in his redistribution of the
fourfold causality across the expanded ternary structure of the principia. By

25

RD I, p. 213. It is worth noting that Bavinck can go so far as to include the incarnation
in his description of objective revelation as instrumental, incidental and provisional.
Bavinck writes: the purpose of revelation is not Christ; Christ is the centre and the
means; the purpose is that God will again dwell in his creatures and reveal his glory in the
cosmos. RD I, p. 380. Thus, the incarnation does not hold ultimate significance in
Bavincks doctrine of revelation. What is ultimate is the final tabernacling of God, not
merely among his people in the incarnate Son, but in his people by the Holy Spirit:
the revelation of God was completed in Christ . . . but this revelation in Christ and in
his Word is a means, not an end. The end is the creation of a new humanity, which
will fully unfold the image of God. Therefore the whole revelation must be
transmitted from Christ to the church, from Scripture to the [believers]
consciousness. God seeks a dwelling place in humanity. (RD I, p. 588)

26
27
28

RD I, p. 506.
RD I, p. 213.
See RD II, p. 319.

2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

440

Bruce Pass

expanding the principia in this way, Bavinck makes room for an internal foundation
which is not a material source. One might well quibble over the propriety of
Bavincks insistence that the internal principle is not a source, even though formal
and efficient causality are attributed to the internal principle, but conceptually the
sense in which the internal principle does not function as a material source is clear,
as are Bavincks reasons for prioritizing theologys internal principle over its
external source.
From the exploration of this first inconsistency it is important to note that the
specific reason Bavinck himself articulates for prioritizing the internal principle is
efficient causality. The internal principle, therefore, functions as an extension of the
principium essendi. God the Father is the causa efficiens principalis,29 but the Holy
Spirit functions as a secondary agent of theologys principium essendi. This
observation will be drawn into sharper focus in the exploration of the second
inconsistency to follow and is closely connected to the underlying reason that the
traditional Aristotelian categories of the Reformed Orthodox principia struggle to
contain their new wine.

The Logos as both principium cognoscendi and principium essendi

A second inconsistency has been identified by K. Scott Oliphint concerning the
conflicting roles Bavinck ascribes to the Logos in his principia in connection with his
account of participation. In his exploration of the relationship between Bavincks
general and theological epistemology Oliphint draws attention to the way that
Bavinck identifies the Logos as principium cognoscendi, yet by attributing efficient
causality to the Logos in his account of participation simultaneously ascribes to the
Logos a role that properly speaking belongs to the principium essendi.30 According
to Oliphint, this inconsistency poses a serious threat to the coherence of Bavincks
system. By attributing efficient causality to the Logos, Bavinck vitiates any role the
Logos may have otherwise enjoyed as a genuine principle of knowing. Oliphint
summarizes this threat when he concludes:
The confusion in Bavinck may be this: it seems in the majority of cases, Bavinck
attributes to the Logos, not specifically the prncipium cognoscendi, but the
prncipium essendi . . . if what we say about the Logos is that he is the originator
of the intellect, and of reason, . . . all we have said thus far is that God, or the
Logos, is the prncipium essendi of knowledge. He is the one who is the cause
of the knowledge that we have . . . But this is not a sufficient epistemological

29
30

RD I, p. 212 n. 13.
K. Scott Oliphint, Bavincks Realism, the Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,
Westminster Theological Journal 72 (2010), pp. 35990.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

441

principle. What we need for an epistemological principle is not simply a causal

principle (though that is necessary), but rather a principle of knowledge.31
Oliphints basic claim of inconsistency is well warranted. While Bavinck identifies
the Logos as the principium cognoscendi externum, he also attributes efficient
causality to the Logos on several occasions. Oliphints conclusion, however, that
Bavinck does not offer a sufficient epistemological principle, is disputable. So too is
the precise nature of the inconsistency that Oliphints observations uncover, but
before we begin our investigation a few brief remarks regarding Bavincks realist
general epistemology are warranted.
Bavincks realism may be described as naive insofar as he regards the
correspondence between universals and particulars as a common notion or selfevident truth.32 While Bavinck is content to appeal to the self-evident character of
correspondence, he also offers a theological description of correspondence in which
the Logos plays a prominent role. Bavinck writes:
But the conviction can, therefore, rest only in the belief that it is the same Logos
who created both the reality outside of us and the laws of thought within us and
who produced an organic connection and correspondence between the two. . . .
But insofar as things also exist logically, have come forth from thought, and are
based in thought (John 1:3; Col. 1:15), they are also apprehensible and
conceivable by the human mind.33
It is the Logos therefore, who grounds the correspondence between the knowing
subject and the known object, having produced an organic connection between
knowing subject and known object in the act of creation. Bavinck implies in this
statement that there is an analogous relationship between divine and human
knowing. Bavinck accounts for this analogous relationship by way of the Thomistic
doctrine of participation.34 Bavinck writes:

31
32

Oliphint, Bavincks Realism, pp. 3889.

Geerhardus Vos was the first to note a resemblance between Bavincks realism and
Scottish Common Sense realism in his review of the first volume of Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek, see Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation: The Shorter Writings of
Geerhardus Vos (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1980), p. 484.
33 RD I, p. 231.
34 David Sytsma advances the argument that Bavinck is likely to have acquired the
Thomistic elements of his epistemology from Reformed Orthodox sources rather than
nineteenth-century Neo-Thomism, see David Sytsma, Herman Bavincks Thomistic
Epistemology: The Argument and Sources of His Principia of Science, in John Bolt, ed.,
Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology
(Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2011), p. 47. This claim warrants further scrutiny given that
Bavinck cites at key points of his argument Die Erkentniss-theorie des heiligen Thomas
von Aquina (Mainz: F. Kirchheim, 1861) by the Jesuit theologian and philosopher Matteo
Liberatore (181092), as well as Philosophie der Vorzeit (Mnster: Theissing, 1863) by
Joseph Kleutgen (181183). Both Liberatore and Kleutgen were significant figures in
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

442

Bruce Pass
God is the light of reason in which, by which, and through which, all things that
shine so as to be intelligible, shine . . . To be (esse), to live (vivere), and to
understand (intelligere) is the prerogative of God in respect of his being (per
essentiam), ours in respect of participation ( per participationem).35

Participation is a concept that accounts both for the way in which our knowledge
resembles divine knowing and the way in which God is the cause of all our
knowing.36 The allusion to Augustines De Trinitate in the quotation above, nested as
it is within Bavincks appeal to the concept of participation, is wholly appropriate, as
the Thomistic concept of participation represents a development of Augustinian
epistemology.37 What is distinctive in Aquinas doctrine of participation is his
description of two analogous relationships between divine and human rationality.
The first of these, the analogy of proper proportionality, restricts the sense in which
human knowing might be said to resemble divine knowing in terms of essence. The
second, the analogy of intrinsic attribution, accounts for that resemblance in terms of
the causal dependence of human knowing upon divine knowing.38 All this stands in
the background of Bavincks passing remark that to understand is the prerogative of
God in respect of his being, and ours in respect of participation, but as will be
shown, the primary function of this appeal to participation is to explain how the
potential for correspondence produced by the Logos in creation is actualized. In
other words, participation accounts for how that which is apprehensible and
conceivable is in fact apprehended and conceived by the knowing subject.
The inconsistency Oliphint detects essentially concerns the fact that the Logos is
ascribed one function in the principia and another in Bavincks account of
participation. In the principia Bavinck describes the Logos as the principium
cognoscendi externum, yet in his appeal to participation Bavinck attributes efficient
causality to the Logos, a property which properly speaking belongs to the principium
essendi. This is evident in statements such as the Logos who shines in the world
must also let his light shine in our consciousness,39 or it is he [the Logos] who
causes this light [the light of reason] to arise in us and constantly maintains it.40
Oliphint observes that in so doing Bavinck attributes to the Logos, not specifically
the prncipium cognoscendi, but the prncipium essendi.41 While Oliphint quite
rightly points out that Bavinck disregards the essendicognoscendi distinction, he

35
36
37
38
39
40
41

nineteenth-century Neo-Thomism. Regrettably, Sytsma does not offer any analysis of

Bavincks engagement with these sources.
RD I, p. 232.
See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1a 79 4.5 (Blackfriars: London, 1975),
vol. 11, p. 158.
See Peter Hnermann, Logos, in Walter Kasper et al., eds., Lexikon fr Theologie und
Kirche (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1993), vol. 6, pp. 10301.
See Cornelio Fabro, Participation, in Faculty of the Catholic University of America,
eds., New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), vol. 10, pp. 90510.
RD I, p. 233.
RD I, p. 232.
Oliphint, Bavincks Realism, p. 388.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

443

misidentifies the precise way in which Bavinck does this. What Oliphint overlooks is
the way that Bavinck assumes the operation of the Holy Spirit in his description of
the illumination of the Logos. This is an example of Bavinckian shorthand which can
be attested in several places in Reformed Dogmatics and it points to the conceptual
reduplication of the trinitarian structure of the principia for each species of
knowledge in Bavincks epistemology.

The relationship between the Logos and the Holy Spirit

Throughout Reformed Dogmatics the Holy Spirit is never far from whatever is said
about the Logos. As Bavinck himself states, where the Logos is, there the Spirit is
also.42 This is true even with respect to Bavincks appeal to participation. Only a few
paragraphs later Bavinck writes: in the final analysis, it is God alone who from his
divine consciousness and by way of his creatures conveys the knowledge of truth to
our mind the Father who by the Son and in the Spirit reveals himself to us.43 The
question that ought to be asked in connection with the problem Oliphint identifies is
what relationship does Bavinck envisage between the Logos and the Holy Spirit with
respect to Bavincks account of participation. The answer may be found in a later
passage of the Prolegomena, in which he revisits the question of correspondence.
Bavinck writes:
All life and all knowledge is based on a kind of agreement between subject and
object . . .
It is the one selfsame Logos who made all things in and outside of human
beings. He is before all things, and they still continue jointly to exist through
him . . . In addition, Scripture makes known to us the Spirit of God as the source
and agent of all life in humanity and the world . . . this operation of the Spirit
assumes a higher form in the intellectual, ethical, and religious life of people. It
then takes the form of reason, conscience, and the sense of divinity, which are
not inactive abilities but capacities that, as a result of stimuli from related
phenomena in the outside world, leap into action.
. . . [The truth] rests within itself, in the Logos, in which all things have their
existence . . . the truth turns those who know it into witnesses . . . entering into
our spirits [truth] brings its own witness along with it; it engenders that witness
in us by itself. Construed religiously, it is the Logos himself who through our
spirit bears witness to the Logos in the world. It is the one selfsame Spirit who
objectively displays the truth to us and subjectively elevates it into certainty in

42 RD II, p. 421.
43 RD I, p. 233.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

444

Bruce Pass
our spirit. It is his witness given in our consciousness to the thoughts God
embodied in creatures around us. This witness of the Holy Spirit to the truth is
especially clear in religion. God has not left us without a witness. He reveals his
power and deity in creation and by his Spirit bears witness to their reality in our
mind (nous). All cognition of truth is essentially a witness that the human spirit
bears to it and at bottom a witness of the Spirit of God to the Word by whom all
things are made.
This witness of the human spirit to truth is the presupposition and
foundation, as well as an analogy, of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Calvin
and others already pointed out this similarity.44

Bavinck introduces this further treatment of the problem of correspondence by first

reiterating his fundamental axiom that all knowledge is based on an agreement
between subject and object. Bavinck affirms the Logos as the ontological ground of
this agreement, but then makes a point of saying that correspondence does not obtain
automatically. In addition, Bavinck says, the Scriptures speak of the work of the
Holy Spirit, who brings this capacity for correspondence to leap into action. All
cognition, according to Bavinck, is effected by the Spirit who first brings the
knowing subject to bear witness to the external reality and then subjectively elevates
that witness to certainty.45 The crux of the matter rests in the statement that it is the
Logos himself who through our spirit bears witness to the Logos in the world. It is
the one selfsame Spirit who objectively displays the truth to us and subjectively
elevates it into certainty in our spirit. There is an important shift of language here
which must be noted, as it informs how we should understand both what Bavinck
says regarding the efficient causality of the Logos and participation. What
Bavinck says about the Logos stands in epexegetical relation to the Holy Spirits role

44
45

RD I, pp. 5867.
In this passage Bavinck notes an analogous relationship between the testimony of the
Spirit in the redemptive knowledge of God and what could be described as a testimony
of the Spirit relevant to general epistemology. Cornelius Van Til notes that although
Bavinck left this observation relatively undeveloped, Bavincks successor at the Vrije
Universiteit, Valentine Hepp (18791950), developed the concept of a general testimony
of the Holy Spirit more extensively in his Het Testimonium Spiritus Sancti (Kampen:
J. H. Kok 1914), see Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace 3, Westminster Theological
Journal 9 (1946), p. 47. It is also to be noted that Bavinck elaborates further on this
actuating power of the Holy Spirit in his discussion of the imago Dei in the second
volume of Reformed Dogmatics. Bavinck affirms that even in the state of integrity human
knowing required the actuating power of the Spirit:
just as the Son was already the mediator of union before the fall, so also the Holy
Spirit was even then already the craftsman of all knowledge, righteousness and
holiness in humanity . . . man in the state of integrity only possessed the virtues of
knowledge and righteousness by and in the Holy Spirit. (RD II, p. 558)
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

445

of displaying the truth and elevating it into certainty in the knowing subject.46 For
Bavinck, the Logos bears witness by the operations of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, this
is not the first time that Bavinck has put things this way. In an earlier discussion of
the natural knowledge of God Bavinck identifies the illumination of the Logos with
the Holy Spirit in exactly the same way. Bavinck writes: Also among pagans, says
Scripture, there is a revelation of God, an illumination by the Logos, a working of
Gods Spirit.47 For Bavinck therefore, the Logos illumines by the personal agency of
the Spirit.
This enfolding of the operations of the Holy Spirit in Bavincks description of
the Logos illumination does not point to any confusion of categories, but rather to
a purposeful consideration of the relationship between the doctrine of God and the
doctrine of the knowledge of God, as evidenced in several comments Bavinck makes
concerning the epistemological significance of the filioque in the second volume of
Reformed Dogmatics. Bavinck maintains that where the Spirit is viewed as
proceeding only from the Father and not from the Father and the Son, the door is left
ajar for mysticism. Unless one upholds the double procession of the Spirit, the Son
and Spirit open their own way to the Father more or less independently of each
other.48 These statements elucidate why Bavinck would speak of an illumination of
the Logos, when in fact it is the Holy Spirit who actuates the correspondence
between knowing subject and known object. Bavinck is reluctant to speak of any
subjective elevation of the truth on the part of the third person of the Holy Trinity
apart from the second person of the Trinity, but he can assume the operations of the
Spirit under his description of the illumination of the Logos because the Holy Spirit
proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son. The relationship Bavinck
envisages between the Logos and Holy Spirit in his doctrine of the knowledge of God
therefore is a corollary of the double procession of the Holy Spirit in Bavincks
doctrine of God.

Bending the principia

At this point what becomes clear is that Bavinck does bend the strict demarcation
of the classical Aristotelian structure of the principia by extending efficient causality
to the principium cognoscendi. Bavinck does not, however, extend efficient causality
to the principium cognoscendi externum (the Logos), but rather to the principium
cognoscendi internum (the Holy Spirit). In Bavincks general epistemology the
46

47
48

These statements concerning the Holy Spirits displaying and elevating ought also to
be read in connection with Bavincks earlier discussion of the intellectus agens, the
capacity of the intellect which isolates from sense perceptions that which is universal, and
the intellectus possibilis, the capacity which assimilates the universals abstracted from
sense perception. See RD I, p. 230. These specific Latin technical terms are absent in the
English translation, but are present in the Dutch original, see GD I, p. 203.
RD I, p. 318.
RD II, pp. 31718.

2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

446

Bruce Pass

Logos functions as an instrumental, or secondary, efficient cause. The Logos himself

does not illumine; the Logos illumines by the personal agency of the Holy Spirit.
Importantly, this reduplicates the relationship between Scripture and the Holy Spirit
in Bavincks theological epistemology. In Bavincks account of the redemptive
knowledge of God Holy Scripture functions as the instrumental efficient cause,49 and
the Holy Spirit functions as the efficient cause, albeit as a secondary agent of God the
Father, who is the principium essendi of the redemptive knowledge of God. In both
Bavincks general and theological epistemology, therefore, the Logos and Scripture
illumine, but they do so by the personal agency of the Spirit. Bavinck bends the
essendicognoscendi distinction, but it is unlikely that he does this unwittingly. As
we have seen, a very specific concern of Bavincks realism is to show not only how
correspondence obtains potentially, but also how correspondence obtains actually.50
How much of a threat, then, does this bending pose to the coherence of Bavincks
epistemology?
Some bending, it might be thought, is entirely necessary if the Logos is to be
taken as a foundation of knowing, for the simple reason that God is one in all his
works. In this regard it is important to note that Bavinck was not the first Reformed
theologian to transgress the essendicognoscendi distinction. Already in Reformed
Orthodoxy the Logos was occasionally attributed with both material and efficient
causality.51 The real threat to the coherence of Bavincks epistemology, therefore, lies
not so much in the fact that he bends the essendicognoscendi distinction, but in
that the way in which he does it precipitates a manifest ambiguity with regard to the
referent of the internal principle. Henk Van Den Belt notes this anomaly in his
analysis when he points out that Bavinck identifies multiple referents for the
principium cognoscendi internum.52 Apart from the Holy Spirit, faith and believing
reason also are identified as the principium cognoscendi internum of theology.53

49 Causa efficiens instrumentalis, see RD I, p. 213 n. 14.

50 At this point it also needs to be pointed out that the actuating role of the Holy Spirit
answers directly a further question Oliphint poses in his article, as to whether Bavincks
realism assuming as it does that it is God-given, also assumes that the meaning of things
is objectively accessible to every rational mind by virtue of our human potentiality. See
Oliphint, Bavincks Realism, p. 376 n. 55. These concerns echo those of Eugene
Heideman, The Relation of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen:
Van Gorcum, 1959), pp. 1378. Bavinck extends efficient causality to the principium
cognoscendi internum precisely to show that this is not the case. It is the Holy Spirit,
according to Bavinck, who brings the human capacity for intellection to leap into
action. The meaning of things is objectively accessible, given the correspondence that
exists potentially between knowing subject and the external world on account of the
Logos, yet it is only subjectively obtainable by the actuating power of the Holy Spirit.
51 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, I, p. 442.
52 Van Den Belt, Authority, p. 265.
53 Bavinck, RD I, pp. 21314, 565 and 616. In the last two passages cited believing reason
is a rendering of the Latin technical term ratio christiana, see GD I p. 517. Believing
reason is also identified as theologys principium cognoscendi internum in the English
translation at an earlier point in the Prolegomena, see RD I, p. 88, but here in the Dutch
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

447

These three referents can be reduced to two, namely, the Holy Spirit and the knowing
subject, as, for Bavinck, faith is a disposition of reason.54 The ambiguity, therefore,
consists in the fact that Bavinck identifies both a divine and a human referent for his
internal principle. The cause of this double identification can be traced back to the
double function that the additional distinction within the principium cognoscendi is
required to perform. The additional distinction between an external and an internal
principle of knowing does not just make room for a trinitarian economy of
knowledge; it also affords a resolution of the subjectobject dichotomy. Ultimately,
this is why Bavinck encounters difficulty in identifying the referent of his internal
principle with any consistency. Bavinck identifies the internal principle alternately as
the Holy Spirit, or faith (or believing reason), according to which function of the
internal principle is in view. When the efficient and formal cause of the human
subjects knowledge of God is in view, Bavinck identifies the Holy Spirit as
theologys principium cognoscendi internum, but when the correspondence between
what God has revealed and the knowing subjects apprehension of that revelation is
in view, Bavinck identifies faith (or believing reason), as theologys principium
cognoscendi internum. While this polyvalence would appear to pose a greater threat
to the coherence of Bavincks epistemology, it is, ironically, entirely consistent with
the correlation of participation with the principia. Participation involves more than
one subject. Bavincks internal principle, therefore, must encompass both divine and
creaturely subjectivity, if it is to account for the knowing subjects participation in
divine self-knowledge. Therefore, while it would seem that the specific way in which
Bavinck bends the essendicognoscendi distinction precipitates a problematic
ambiguity in connection with the referent of the internal principle, it is in fact a
necessary consequence of his desire to offer an explicitly trinitarian account of
participation.
One might conclude that while Oliphint notes that Bavinck seeks to establish a
realism that is grounded and founded in the Triune God,55 he does not pursue the
implications of this observation far enough. Oliphints analysis rightly draws
attention to the fact that Bavinck bends the essendicognoscendi distinction, yet he
misidentifies precisely where this bending occurs. Bavinck extends efficient
causality not to the principium cognoscendi externum, but to the principium
cognoscendi internum. While this further level of complexity does not explain away
the basic inconsistency Oliphint detects, it does demonstrate that his conclusion does
not obtain. Oliphint acknowledges the material sufficiency of the Logos as an
epistemological principle,56 and also affirms that God is the efficient cause of all

original Bavinck does not use the term ratio christiana. Beliving reason here is the
English rendering of geloovige rede, see GD I, p. 64.
54 See RD I, p. 616.
55 Oliphint, Bavincks Realism, p. 364.
56 That [sufficient epistemological] principle, we should now be able to see, is the Logos,
and the knowledge of God that he provides by virtue of his exhaustive activity in the
world that he has made. Oliphint, Bavincks Realism, p. 389.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

448

Bruce Pass

human knowing.57 It would seem, therefore, that Oliphint would allow that God
simpliciter could function as both principium essendi and principium cognoscendi,
but not the same person of the Trinity, as his argument concerning the formal
inadequacy of Bavincks epistemological principle consists in the specific
observation that Bavinck attributes to the Logos the role of principium cognoscendi
in the principia and the role of principium essendi in his account of participation. As
we have seen, this is not entirely accurate. The Logos in Bavincks epistemology
illumines by the personal agency of the Holy Spirit. This being the case, it would
seem that even according to Oliphints own criteria, Bavinck does in fact offer a
formally sufficient epistemological principle. In Bavincks theory of knowledge the
Logos functions as an instrumental efficient cause, who illumines by the personal
agency of the Holy Spirit.58

Conclusion
The results of the exploration of the two inconsistencies above would suggest that the
Aristotelian wineskins of Reformed Orthodoxy cannot contain Bavincks new wine
without a little leakage, and it would appear that the vulnerable seam is to be located
in Bavincks innovation of an internal principle. Specifically, in both examples the
appearance of inconsistency can be traced to Bavincks extension of efficient
causality from the principium essendi to the principium cognoscendi internum. In the
first example this is what leads Bavinck to prioritize the internal principle over its
external source, and in the second it is at the root of Bavincks transgression of the
essendicognoscendi distinction. That explanations can readily be found and that
the reasons Bavinck offers for speaking in the way he does are consonant with
his epistemology as a whole would suggest that these moments of apparent
inconsistency pose less of a threat to the fundamental coherence of Bavincks
epistemology than they expose the limitations, if not the inadequacy, of the classical
Aristotelian categories for all that Bavinck demands of them. These limitations come
into particularly sharp focus when one observes the way that Bavincks correlation
of the doctrine of participation with the principia precipitates a patent ambiguity
with respect to the referent of his internal principle. Even the most charitable reader
must concede that Bavinck simply demands more of the principia than they could
reasonably expected to deliver. That Bavinck also pursued his synthesis of
Orthodoxy and modernity in a context free of the strictures of Aristotelian wineskins

57
58

This [Gods causal efficiency in human knowing] . . . is true enough. God controls
whatsoever comes to pass, and thus is the one who ordains all things. Oliphint,
Bavincks Realism, pp. 3889.
Oliphint is not, however, concerned simply with the formal sufficiency of Bavincks
epistemological principle. Much of the article is dedicated to demonstrating its material
insufficiency, in that Oliphint considers Bavincks construal of the Logos principle to be
somewhat alien to the biblical witness, see Oliphint, Bavincks Realism, pp. 37588.
2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An Analysis of Herman Bavincks Principia

449

would suggest, however, that he was not entirely unaware of these limitations.
Among the various onweersprekelijke motieven of Bavincks epistemology,
the category of self-consciousness is pervasive, and in later works, such as The
Philosophy of Revelation and the essay The Unconscious, Bavinck developed
the sense in which self-consciousness could be said to function as an epistemological
foundation.59 The relationship between Bavincks principia and the motif of selfconsciousness, therefore, warrants further research, as does the intriguing question as
to whether in self-consciousness Bavinck may have recognized a stronger cable with
which he could secure his bridge between Orthodoxy and modernity.

59

Herman Bavinck, The Unconscious, in John Bold, ed., Harry Boonstra and Gerrit
Sheeres, trans., Essays on Religion, Science and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2008), pp. 17599.

2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd