Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Agenda 1:
Balancing Fund for Long-Term Sustainable Development
Agenda 2:
Peoples participation for accountable and transparent
public services and access into public services
Caucusing
Caucusing is an important and logistically difficult component of the United
Nations simulation. These informal meetings between voting blocs, as well as
between States with positions that are diametrically opposed, often produce
compromises acceptable to all parties. However, delegates are required to
address issues within a weeks time which, in many cases, the international
community has failed resolve after years of debate and negotiation. As a
result, the bulk of informal negotiation and the construction of working papers
will occur within, or in the close proximity of, the committee chambers. In
consideration for the other Conference participants, delegates are asked to
respect the formal proceedings occurring both within and between all
committees participating at the Conference. Finally, given the importance of
decorum within committee chambers, all caucusing should occur outside of
the committee chambers while committee is in session.
Decorum
Decorum is a de facto rule throughout the week of the simulation. In both
large and small committees, the ability to conduct normal business while in
formal session is an arduous task when decorum is not maintained. Delegates
will be asked for their assistance in this endeavour.
The WBG belongs to the United Nations (UN), its structure however is quite
distinct from the other official UN bodies. Similar to corporations the five WBG
organizations are completely owned by its member nations that hold a certain
share in the respective organization. According to their share the different
countries have different voting power, with the Unites States of America (USA)
being the largest shareholder with currently 16.4% (worldbank, 2013). The USA
also nominates the WGB president. Over the last years the WBGs loan politics
have been criticized for liberalizing markets too rapidly and applying conditions
too uniformly neglecting the recipients individual specifics (globalpolicy,
2013). Furthermore the weighted voting system has been the target of
criticism (Ebrahim & Herz, 2013), which will be further elaborated on in the
description of Topic B. The WBG offers a large international platform
comprising stakeholders, expertise and finances to help tackle global
challenges in development aid. The topics of our committee are current and
controversial focusing on implementation and optimization of approaches in
the WBG.
Ending extreme poverty within a generation and promoting shared prosperity must be
achieved in such a way as to be sustainable over time and across generations. This requires
promoting environmental, social, and fiscal sustainability. We need to secure the long-term
future of our planet and its resources so future generations do not find themselves in a
wasteland. We also must aim for sustained social inclusion and limit the size of economic
debt inherited by future generations.
The World Bank Groups work in sustainable development can be found prominently in, for
example, its urban development projects, including support for energy efficiency
improvements in buildings, public transit, and carefully planned development based on lowcarbon growth and social inclusion, including public services.
The Banks Inclusive Green Growth report provided an analytical framework and priority
steps for helping clients design public policies and encourage the investments needed to
strengthen sustainable development and improve standards of living in rapidly developing
countries. Much that is useful can be done now: clean air and water and solid waste
management are basic needs, and many urban planning and environmental policies
enhance productivity and poverty alleviation. Ultimately, sustainable growth hinges on good
growth policy, which aims to get prices right and fix markets, address coordination failures
and knowledge externalities, and assign property rights.
In rural areas, the Bank emphasizes resource-efficient, climate-smart agriculture practices
and a landscape approach that recognizes the interdependence of forests, water supplies,
and food security. The Bank Group is committed to the goals of the Sustainable Energy for
All initiative: achieving universal access to energy, doubling the rate of improvement in
energy efficiency, and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global mix by 2030.
In response to the Turn Down the Heat reports, which spell out the dangers of climate
change, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim has called for a plan equal to the scale of the
climate problem.
Ensuring the success of sustainable development requires indicators to monitor
performance. The Bank Group is working with partners to develop greenhouse gas
accounting standards and tools, measures for green growth, and national accounting
indicators for comprehensive wealth that can help determine if growth is sustainable in the
long run. Helping countries develop natural capital accounting practices also underpins the
transition to greener growth that sustains environmental assetswater, land, air,
ecosystems, and the services they providefor future generations.
There is no single model for sustainable development. Strategies will vary across countries,
reflecting local contexts. But all countries, rich and poor, have opportunities to make their
growth greener and more inclusive without slowing it.
Current Scenario
Domestic resource mobilization: The ability to mobilize domestic revenues reduces aid
dependency and can raise country creditworthiness. Low-income countries still struggle to
increase domestic revenue mobilization in the face of high levels of capital flight and limited
The role of the World Bank Group and regional development banks: The World Bank Group
and its regional counterparts can add value through a combination of technical expertise,
prudent risk management policies, application of clear standards to project design,
execution, and corporate governance, a long-term perspective, and cross-country
experience. Multilateral development banks (MDB) can bring financing partners into specific
deals, for example, in the form of syndications or through co-financing arrangements.
Generally, the MDBs stamp of approval and role as an honest broker in disputes can help
to reassure investors and contribute to a projects viability, which in turn reduces the cost of
engagement, including to private investors. MDBs can also contribute to extending
maturities of private flows to finance productive investments.
to
Achieve
Low-income countries differ from their high-income counterparts in their formal tax
structures and tax collection capacity. LIC tax bases tend to be quite narrow, reflecting the
smaller share of the formal sector in employment and business activity. Large informal
economies and agricultural sectors are rarely taxed. LICs have the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio,
although there has been some improvement over the last two decades. For this group, the
average ratio of taxes to GDP increased from 10 percent in 1998 to 13.6 percent in 2009.
The share of taxes as a percentage of GDP is almost 6 percentage points higher and rising
for MICs. High-income countries have the highest tax-to-GDP ratio, collecting two to three
times more taxes as a share of GDP than LICs.
planning.24 Tax and royalty-based regimes negotiated with mining companies, are
frequently perceived as unfair to the home country. Raising taxes and royalty rates is not
always easy, especially given that developing countries need to take into account
investment promotion objectives and often have limited capacity to negotiate the licensing
of extraction rights.
Natural resource-rich developing countries could improve their capacity to negotiate fair
contracts in extractive industries. To help developing countries retain more of their natural
resource rents, governments could pursue initiatives like the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) that promote greater transparency in revenue flows and
contract disclosure. Governments will require support to: (i) build capacity for qualified
negotiation of the licensing of extraction rights, whether in-country or outsourced; (ii)
establish well-equipped large taxpayer offices, or separate tax units for the extractive
industries, offering conditions that are competitive in recruiting and retaining highly
specialized staff; (iii) deepen cooperation and information sharing with tax administrations
of resource-rich developing countries, in order to confront aggressive tax planning by
multinationals in the extractives sector; and (iv) ensure that relevant ministries have the
specialist capacity and laboratory equipment to undertake physical verification of ore
grades, quantity, and price.
Subsidy Reform
Subsidy reform is one of the main areas in which public resources can be redirected to
more effective uses. It is not only important for mobilizing domestic resources but also for
getting incentives right. While it is important to remove harmful subsidies, increasing
subsidies for activities with positive externalities might be the proper course of action. An
extensive body of research has demonstrated that food and fuel subsidies are often poorly
targeted and end up disproportionately benefiting the wealthy and middle class. The IEA has
noted, for example, that only an estimated eight percent of the fossil fuel subsidies
throughout the developingworld in 2010 went to the poorest 20 percent of the
population.26 Earlier analysis noted that the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution
received on average no more that 1520 percent of the total value of these subsidies.
A first step requires removing harmful subsidies, thereby freeing public resources that can
then be directed towards investments with higher social returns. Energy subsidies
particularly fossil fuel subsidies are costly, and these costs are quantifiable and can be
measured. According to the IMF, pre-tax subsidies for petroleum products, electricity,
natural gas, and coal reached US$480 billion in 2011 (0.7 percent of global GDP or 2 percent
of total government revenues). Total subsidies amounted to US$1.9 trillion (2.5 percent of
global GDP or 8 percent of total government revenues). Despite their negative
environmental impacts, in many countries subsidies artificially increase the incentives for
using fossil fuels. The main beneficiaries often have political power and lobbying capacity to
oppose reforms. Furthermore, the removal of subsidies needs to be complemented by
safety nets, new pricing solutions or compensatory transfer to avoid adverse impacts on the
poor.
In this context, improving aid effectiveness plays an important role in attracting new
sources of development finance. Global aid effectiveness principles and objectives have
been defined in the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and the
Busan Outcome Document (2011), all sharing a focus on improving country ownership,
transparency, and results. Reflecting the growing share of non-ODA actors, the international
aid effectiveness architecture has evolved from a focus on donor harmonization and
alignment to a broader approach of inclusive development partnerships. The Global
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) created at the 4th High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (2011) brings together multi- and bilateral donors,
emerging economies that are both recipients and providers of development cooperation,
recipient countries (including fragile and conflict affected states), the private sector, CSOs,
and parliamentarians.
Since 2005, several analyses of aid effectiveness at the global and institutional levels have
been conducted. At the global level, the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 20052010
assessed progress on 13 indicators against their 5-year target. While only one indicator met
its target at the global level (strengthen capacity by coordinated support), country
ownership (evidenced by the number of countries with sound national development
strategies and results-oriented monitoring frameworks) increased substantially. The survey
identified the need for further progress in using country systems, harmonizing donor
procedures, reducing aid fragmentation, and improving aid predictability. Building on the
Paris Declaration indicators, the GPEDC is developing a Monitoring Framework of the Global
Partnership for development effectiveness, including updated targets for 2015 on selected
indicators of the Paris Declaration survey and additional indicators for private sector and
civil society participation, gender equality, and transparency.
Significant progress has been achieved in aid transparency and accountability, notably
since the creation of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) in Accra in 2008.
Based on an open data standard, IATI aims to increase the transparency and accountability
of aid by publishing aid data from aid providers, aid users, and civil society on a timely basis.
To date, 116 organizations have published their aid information to the IATI registry.50
Ongoing work aims to strengthen links between IATI and partner countries aid information
management systems, publish detailed geographical information on aid projects (geomapping), and develop a common, open transparency standard51 in line with Busan
commitments.
comparison, official inflows, net of debt repayment, only accounted for 1 percent of
international capital inflows in 2012. Net FDI inflows to developing countries are projected
to rebound by 17 percent to US$697 billion in 2013 and reach close to US$800 billion in
201453 as global economic growth is anticipated to accelerate modestly.
Over the past decade, many developing economies have demonstrated an increasing
ability to access international capital markets. International long term debt flows to
developing countriesbonds and syndicated bank-lending with at least five years of
maturity increased four-fold from 2000 to 2012. However, the global financial crisis led to
a sharp contraction in long-term international debt flows, with a protracted retrenchment in
global banking lending, particularly affecting MICs (by 2009, private capital flows to MICs
were at about half their 2007 level). As a group, LICs have seen an increase in private capital
flows, with flows reaching their highest level, nearly 4.5 percent of aggregate GDP, in 2011,
despite a 17 percent cut in FDI inflows and a sharp contraction in bank lending, as financial
market volatility spread globally.
Sources of Funding
Emerging Sources
Given the scarcity of bank lending for infrastructure, the development of non-bank financing
for infrastructure is now emerging as the new imperative. International financial markets
present a largely untapped pool of capital to finance infrastructure; and institutional
investors have the potential to provide an additional source of long term finance.
sector, reducing transaction costs and facilitating risk management. LCBMs in these
countries have shown resilience in the midst of capital volatility and international market
instability and have been among the best performing asset classes over the last few years
(Figure 5.2). The viability of LCBMs for long-term investment depends critically on policy
credibility and commitment, including through the establishment of the right
macroeconomic, institutional, and regulatory preconditions.
yield, and the attraction of valuation methods for unlisted assets. Despite this, it is
estimated that less than 1 percent of institutional investors portfolios are allocated to
infrastructure investments.
Some of the explanations for this situation include: weaknesses in the enabling environment
and lack of bankable projects; the capacity of institutional investors, which often lack the
experience to analyse infrastructure investments; and a lack of suitable investment vehicles
structured to provide institutional investors with the risk-return profile they require.
Infrastructure investment in developing markets poses an additional set of challenges
from sovereign risk to regulatory issues. Moreover, the global economic downturn is likely
to have had a lasting impact on the fund management industry and the long-term asset
allocation strategies of institutional investors by encouraging more cautious investment
strategies and a greater focus on portfolio risk management in the coming years .
Diasporas
Global diaspora resources represent another key source of funding for development. There
are an estimated 215 million migrants in the world, and in 2012, they sent about US$529
billion in officially recorded remittances to their countries of origin. Of this, developing
countries received over US$401 billion in remittances, and the figure is projected to grow to
US$515 billion by 2015. Actual remittances are much higher, as many resources are
transferred through informal channels. These resource flows are more than three times
ODA, acting as a lifeline to the poor and boosting growth and development.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/environment
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTSD
NETWORK/EXTUNITFESSD/0,,contentMDK:20639137~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168
435~theSitePK:1633788,00.html
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sustainabledevelopment/overview#3
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/05/09/inclusive-green-growthpolicies-real-world-challenges
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTSD
NETWORK/EXTUNITFESSD/0,,contentMDK:22766521~menuPK:5990985~pagePK:641
68445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1633788,00.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_development
Who should be the ones funding the majority of the sustainable developments
post 2015?
Where and in which form the funding should take place?
How would The World Bank define sustainable development in accordance to
the various geographical and political conditions of a nation?
What should be the appropriate measures to ensure the security of the funds for
sustainable development only?
What would be the various domestic and international resources at stake?
What extent of a role would private bodies and NGOs play in funding for the
sustainable development of a nation?
dissatisfaction with the provision of public services, a large but often non-responsive
bureaucracy, and the need to cut public expenditure (Government of UK, 1999).
Policy intervention
CCs were first introduced in India in 1994 when consumer rights activists drafted a charter
for health service providers at a meeting of the Central Consumer Protection Council in
Delhi. In 1996, Prime Minister Gujral introduced the CC program on a national level. In 1997,
a CC program was initiated on the state level as part of the Action Plan for Effective and
Responsive Government. The Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances
(DARPG) was responsible for the implementation of the CC program. According to a
Handbook authored by DARPG, These charters were to include first, standards of services
as well as time limits that the public could reasonably expect for service delivery, avenues of
grievance redress, and a provision for independent scrutiny through the involvement of
citizens and consumer groups.
Following the UK model, the components that had to be included in a CC are the following:
1) Vision and mission statements; 2) Details of business transacted by the organization; 3)
Details of clients; 4) Details of services provided to each client group; 5) Details of grievance
redress mechanisms and how to access them; 6) Expectations from clients. Since 1997,
more than 850 CCs have been drafted by various agencies around the country. A special
web portal (http://goicharters.nic.in) has been created, listing out the names of 131 central
and 729 state government organizations that have adopted CCs, and providing information
and documents on CCs from across the country.
Quality of information. The study showed that none of the analyzed CCs contains
the full information required by DARPG. The CCs generally include a mission
statement and an outline of the primary function of the relevant agency or
department, but many charters do not specify the procedures citizens have to follow
to apply for a service. Further, almost 50% of the charters do not indicate the basic
Low awareness. One possible explanation for such poor performance can be the low
awareness of CC. Government agencies only rarely consulted lower-level officials or
citizens before drafting a charter and did not aim to assess the feasibility of its
implementation in various locations. Almost 75% of citizens who took part in the PAC
survey were unaware of the CCs policy. Only 7% of the surveyed citizens indicated
that they had seen and read a charter (but the vast majority of these citizens had
never been asked to provide feedback on the CC). Furthermore, the study revealed
that many officials were only vaguely aware of the concept of a CC and the majority
of them have never been trained in CC drafting or implementation. (Paul 2008).
While the general picture seems to be quite grim and the implementation of the CC policy
appears to be a failure, two factors stand out: publicity and the role of civil society.
Publicity.The PAC study indicated that the public display of a CC in the agencys
office did have a positive impact on service delivery. Citizens who were interviewed
in agencies that displayed a charter were more satisfied with the overall
performance of the agency and the behavior of its public officials, compared to
citizens interviewed in offices that did not display CCs. However, despite these
promising results, the causal link between the display of a CC and the quality of
services is not necessarily direct. It is possible that agencies that are better prepared
to deliver a service and confident about their performance, are also more likely to
display their CCs to the public.
Capable civil society. The effects of CCs were strikingly different when CSOs
informed and educated citizens about the contents and functions of these CCs. One
illustrative example comes from Tamil Nadu. The Catalyst Trust, an NGO working in
the field of good governance and citizenship led a network of other CSOs to raise
awareness of CCs among local citizens. The CSOs established 167 Citizen Centers
across Tamil Nadu, aiming to provide guidance and facilitate the monitoring of public
service providers in the region. As part of this, they compiled, displayed, and
distributed to local communities the charters of all the agencies and departments of
Tamil Nadu. This led to high levels of awareness of CCs in Tamil Nadu (64% of the
interviewed citizens were aware of CCs and 29% read them) (PAC 2007, p. 24, 34).
The survey, however, does not provide data on citizens satisfaction with service
provision in the state.
PETS in Uganda
After the findings of the PETS survey became known, the Ugandan government conducted a high
level public information campaign. Additionally, the Ministries of Local Government and Finance
started to publish data on the monthly transfers of the capitation grants in national and local
language newspapers (this transparency provision was incorporated in the Local Government Act of
1997). In 1997, the Ministry of Education went a step further by requiring district headquarters and
schools to publicly post notices informing local communities when they receive funds from central
government (Hubbard 2007).
In 2002, a follow up PETS by the World Bank showed that there had been a dramatic improvement in
getting the capitation grant out to the schools. More than 80% of the funds transferred to the
schools from central government had now been received by the schools (Reinikka and Svensson
2003). Based on a statistical analysis of the variance among the sample schools, the researchers
concluded that the leakage reduced significantly more in schools that were closer to the nearest
newspaper vendor. Hence, they suggested that the general decrease of leakage in the system from
74% to less than 20% can be attributed to the information dissemination policy of the Ugandan
government (Reinikka and Svensson 2003).
Following these results, the PETS method garnered worldwide acclaim as a highly effective anticorruption mechanism. However, subsequent implementations of PETS in other countries did not
PETS IN TANZANIA
Tanzania was one of the first countries after Uganda to apply the PETS methodology. Its first PETS
was conducted in 1999 and tracked a certain type of expenditures in the education and health
sector. The survey revealed that only 43% of the education funds were transferred to schools, and
only 12% of health funds made it to their intended destination (PWC 1999). A second Tanzanian
PETS was conducted in 2001 and largely confirmed the findings of the first survey-- less than 50% of
the allocated funds reached service delivery units (Sundet 2008). Although the results of both PETS
were shared with the Tanzanian government and discussed by policymakers, international donors
and civil society, the government was not willing to commit to the measures that were implemented
in Uganda (Sundet 2008).
A third PETS, conducted in 2004, was more ambitious than the first ones. It tracked the flow of the
Primary Education Development Project (PEDP) funds from the national level, through district
offices, and down to primary schools. The survey was based on a randomly selected sample of 210
schools and 21 districts (Sundet 2008). PEDP provided substantial funding for the building of
classrooms and prior governmental analyses indicated a minimal leakage in its disbursement. When
the PEDP PETS indicated significant leakages of 40%, the Tanzanian government questioned its
methodology and declined to recognize the results (Sundet 2008, REPOA 2004).
PETS in Malawi
A new system of free primary education, introduced by Malawi in 1994, did not translate into
improved education outcomes (IBP 2008). Corruption and leakages were often blamed for these
poor results, as the control of the Malawian government over funds allocation at the district level is
limited. In response, a coalition of over 60 civil society groups, the Civil Society Coalition for Quality
Basic Education (CSCQBE), decided to adopt the PETS methodology to monitor the expenditure of
these funds at district and school levels. The Coalition has conducted three PETSin 2002, 2005, and
2007. As part of the process, CSCQBE administered a series of standardized questionnaires to
teachers and education officials around the country, aiming to obtain information on students
(enrollment, test results, drop-out rates, etc.), teachers (qualifications, absenteeism, etc.), textbook
availability, condition of school facilities, and more (IBP 2008).
Background
Aiming to address the deepening economic recession, the new Obama Administration introduced in
February 2009 a stimulus bill titled the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act). The
stated purposes of the act were to preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery,
assist those mot impacted by the recession, provide investments needed to increase economic
efficiency by spurring technological advances in science and health, and to stabilize State and local
budgets
Policy intervention
According to Section 1512 of the Recovery Act, recipients of any Recovery funds are required to
submit quarterly reports on the progress of the funded project to a newly established, independent
Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (Recovery Board). The reporting requirement
applied to any entity receiving recovery funds, including state governments. To fulfill the
transparency requirements of the Recovery Act, the Recovery Board disclosed all information
collected from recipient reports on a designated web-based platform Recovery.gov.
The transparency provisions of the Recovery Act aimed to achieve several objectives. First, the
online efforts associated with the Recovery Act were supposed to actively engage the public in the
oversight of the disbursed funds. According to this logic, millions of Citizen Inspectors General
who live in the neighbourhoods where Recovery dollars are being spent [would] join in the oversight
effort and hold the government accountable for every dollar spent by participating on the
Recovery.gov website and reporting instances of fraud, waste, and abuse (Recovery Accountability
and Transparency Board 2009, Orzag 2009). In order to pursue this goal, the format and content of
data on Recovery.gov prioritized geospatial mapping and data visualizations that invited people to
plug in their zip code and locate projects in their immediate area (Rojas 2012). To enable more
sophisticated and professional users to use the data, the Recovery Acts website also allowed
downloading machine-readable spread-sheets of data and summaries of expenditures in static (PDF)
document formats.
status, and the amount of jobs created as a result of it. Further, states and many state agencies
voluntarily followed suit and created their own data portals. Journalists and CSOs also created
multiple online platforms facilitating public access to Recovery spending data.
As the Recovery Act transparency policy matured over three years of implementation, it sustained
an exceptional level of spending disclosure compliance and triggered an array of voluntary
transparency efforts. Nearly every recipient of federal funds reported their expenditures on a
quarterly basis starting in September 2009, as required (Rojas 2012). Indeed, recipients compliance
with spending disclosure was very high. In the quarter ending December 2011, 171,304 recipients
filed reports with the Recovery Board and 413 recipients failed to do so, mostly first-time offenders.
Only nine recipients failed to report to the Recovery Board over three or more reporting cycles
(Rojas 2012). Further, the quality of the reported data has been consistently improving since the
launch of the policy. Rates of fraud, waste, and abuse of Recovery Act funds appears to be relatively
low, with just 298 criminal convictions and $7.2 million in lost funds out of over $200 billion in
federal contracts, grants and loans received by the statesa 0.004% rate over two years (Rojas
2012).
The objective of providing public officials with tools to track the flow of federal funds to the
individual project level was also accomplished. State officials were principal users of Recovery Act
data as it allowed them to manage and track federal spending in near real time (Rojas 2012). Rojas
argues that state officials had strong incentives to track the rate of expenditures: Funds were
meant to be deployed quickly and effectively, and came with a use it or lose it conditionality. If the
data revealed potential barriers in certain pipelines of funds, managers could adjust and redeploy
funding for more rapid and impactful outcomes.
Policy Intervention
The primary objective of the D-Brain System was to enable an accurate analysis of the fiscal data and
information, providing policymakers with real time support for policy formulation. The system also
aimed to improve the credibility of the national budget by introducing double-entry book-keeping
and accrual accounting that include assets, debt, and cost information as well. It also tried to
integrate and connect fiscal information systems in line ministries, local governments, and public
enterprises. D-Brain was meant to enhance efficiency, transparency, and public participation in the
national fiscal management. It introduced the following features (Kuriyan et al. 2011):
Comprehensive transparency policy. The main advantage of the D-Brain platform is that
fiscal information is now easily available for both public officials and the general public. This
information can then be used for monitoring progress on nationwide projects and making
improvements to them as the project unfolds. Also this provides the public detailed
information on what the governments expenditure are on different major nationwide
projects. (Kuriyan et al. (2011), p. 38).
Budget efficiency. Similarly to Recovery.gov, D-Brain appears to be particularly useful for
public officials. As Kuriyan et al. (2011) explain The dBrain acts as the middleman for the
central government, local government and public agency to exchange information about the
respective processes of fiscal activity and provide them the basis for strategic planning. (p.
38) The system makes treasury operations more efficient and help agencies to collect
payments easier and faster. (p. 38). The system seems to be beneficial for the political
system in generalit made it considerably easier for public representatives to review the
budget process and receive information on a variety of budget allocations. It also made it
the budget analysis conducted by the Korean Budget Authority more effective (Kuriyan et al.
2011, Chambers 2012).
Corruption. According to surveys conducted by the Korea Institute of Public administration,
the percentage of citizens who believed bribes were common when dealing with public
officials declined from 69 percent in 2000 to 57 percent in 2008. Further, the percentage of
citizens who reported that they paid a bribe to public officials during the last year fell from
25 percent in 2000 to 5 percent in 2008 (Jang 2008).
Citizen participation. Despite the high ICT capacity of Korea, and similarly to the situation
with Recovery.gov, it seems that citizen participation is the weakest part of the D-Brain
project. As noted by Kuriyan (2011), although the public participation rate has increased, it
has shown that they have the tendency to remain as a passive user only making electronic
payments and transfers.
Civil society participation. There are no documented accounts of how civil society used the
D-Brain system to hold government accountable for its activities or budget decisions. While
the literature that analyzes budgetary transparency in Korea does refer to several
accomplishments of CSOs that used governmental information to expose cases of
corruption, this information did not originate from the D-Brain system (Ramkunar 2008, You
& Lee 2011).
from DepEd officials or local divisions. ANSA-EAP then relied on its connections with DepEd officials
to draw their attention to the identified problems and request their solution.
The online aspects of CMS were more challenging. ANSA-EAP created a web-based platform that
consolidates all the available government data on the public education system in the Philippines in
one source. Overall, the data received from DepEd covered more than 44,000 public schools in the
Philippines. However, as DepEd did not possess GPS coordinates for all of these schools, the
interactive map for the first phase of the project covered 8,684 schoolsthe ones for which GPS
coordinates were known. The platform was supposed to include key indicators and measures of
performance, and present official DepEd information alongside with data validated by CMS in an
easily accessible and user-friendly way. Further, the CMS platform aimed to facilitate community
engagement around education issues, encouraging users to post feedback about different schools
and respond to emerging issues. However, during the first year of CMS operation, the website was
not fully functional. Infomediaries relied on Facebook to post news and photos from their
monitoring activities, and the general potential of ICT was not fulfilled.
E-Procurement in Russia
Background
Transparency International classified Russia as the 143rd most-corrupt country out of the 182
countries surveyed in 2011 (Transparency International 2011). This was a slight improvement from
Russias 154th ranking the previous year. State procurement is one of the largest segments of the
Russian economy, and it is also highly prone to corruption. Estimates by Transparency International
place Russias annual losses to bribery at $300 billion, much of it related to corruption in large
transactions such as state tenders (Krylova 2011). The major industries where corruption prevails are
construction of building and roads, medicine (procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical
equipment) and scientific research services (Sirotkina 2011).
Websites. Initially three levels of official web portals were created: federal, regional,
municipal. These portals provided access to a variety of bidding documents and procedures.
In 2011, a single Russian-wide portal http://www.zakupki.gov.ru/was launched. The
creation of a single information source was supposed to reduce manipulations with tenders
and consolidate all the procurement data on one centralized platform. The information
available on the website includes all governmental tenders, contracts, and purchase
catalogues. It allows potential bidders to participate in government tenders and also enables
interested individuals to monitor the different stages of the procurement process.
Elimination of pre-qualification. The pre-qualification stage allows public officials to
determine the competence of a bidder to take part in the advertised tender. While this
practice is widespread in procurement systems around the world, in Russia it was a source of
corruption, as public officials were at times biased and could use their discretion to prevent
potential bidders from participating in tenders (Sirotkina 2011; Yakovlev, Yakobson &
Yudkevich 2009). Eliminating the pre-qualification stage the drafters of the law aimed to
avoid this situation, enabling more bidders to take part in the procurement process and
attempting to make it more competitive.
Introduction of auction procedures. Before the implementation of the law, the Russian
procurement system revolved around tenders. The introduction of auctions was supposed to
improve the process, as auctions allow a relatively easy comparison between the price
offered by a bidder and the market price of the relevant service.
In light of the failure of the official procurement reforms, transparency interventions by civil society
became particularly important. Alexey Navalny, a lawyer, anti-corruption activist, and a popular
blogger announced in December 2010 the launch of RosPil (http://rospil.info/)a central anticorruption initiatives in Russia (the name RosPil means a Russian sawin Russian slang, taking a
kickback is called to saw off a piece of the contract). RosPil takes advantage of the public
procurement law discussed above. It encourages citizens to monitor the tenders and contracts
posted on the official procurement website and report information on suspicious tenders and other
violations. The reports are then forwarded to a team of public interest lawyers who work with
Navalny and examine the details of the reported tenders. If needed, the lawyers turn to experts in
the field or solicit public help on the specific details of each case (for instance, Navalny asks the
readers of his blog to send him expert advice on a specific construction technique or the market
prices of a particular service). In cases where tenders appear to be illegal, RosPil lawyers take
advantage of the available legal mechanisms to file complaints and require the cancelation or
amendment of the tenders.
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