Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the
DAR in the latter part of 2003. The first was filed by the Supervisory Group
of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in
the alternative, its revocation. The second petition, praying for the
revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands
in
the
hacienda,
was
filed
by
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The
DAR then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues
relating to the SDP of HLI. After investigation and evaluation, the STF
found that HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657despite
the implementation of the SDP. On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued
the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of
Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands be forthwith placed
under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of
the CARP.
From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion
notwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light
of what it considers as the DARs hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under
CARP even before PARC could rule or even read the motion
for reconsideration. PARC would eventually deny HLIs motion for
reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006
II. Issues
(1) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright
land transfer, unconstitutional?
(2) Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and
placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory acquisition and
distribution scheme?
(3) Did the PARC gravely abuse its discretion when it included LIPCOs and
RCBCs respective properties that once formed part of Hacienda Luisita
under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of
Coverage?
III. Ruling
(1)NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. The Court
actually refused to pass upon the constitutional question because it
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and because the
resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the
issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no
longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, it took FARM
some eighteen (18) years from November21, 1989 before it
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite
too late already. The FARM members slept on their rights and even
accepted benefits from the SDP without even a complaint on the
alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were
derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a
constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a
long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and
activities which resulted from the application of an alleged
unconstitutional legal provision. Furthermore, the lis mota is
whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the
fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain
constitutional and statutory provisions. Any of these key issues may
be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec.31 of
RA 6657.
By virtue of Sec. 5 of RA 9700, the stock distribution scheme under
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing
law; thus the question of unconstitutionality should be a moot issue.
(2)NO, the PARC did not gravely abuse its discretion in revoking
the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs
compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme. The
revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and
timelines of HLIs stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the
minimum individual allocation of each original farm workerbeneficiaries (FWBs) of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of
the use of man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2)
the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to
what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.
As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days
in a fiscal year before he or shebecomes entitled to HLI shares. If it
falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share
at yearend. The number of HLI shares distributed varies depending
on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one
year. Worse, HLI hired farm workers in addition to the original 6,296
FWBs, such that, as indicated in the Compliance dated August 2,
2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farm
workers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these farm
workers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares
out of the118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of
the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum
individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was
diluted as a result of the use of mandays and the hiring of
additional farm workers.
Par. 3 of the SDOA expressly provides for a 30-year timeframe for
HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec.
11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the
implementation of the approved stock distribution plan within three
(3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval
of the plan by PARC. Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are
given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost of the land thus
awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the
government.
DAO 10, having the force and effect of law, must be duly complied
with; therefore, PARC is correct in revoking the SDP.
(3)YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda
Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase should be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC, adduced from
their foregoing actions, are purchasers in good faith for value, so
entitled to the benefits arising from such status.
First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300)
hectares of industrial land, there was no notice of any supposed
defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other
person has a right to or interest in such property. The same is true
with respect to RCBC. To be sure, intervene or RCBC and LIPCO knew
that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by
means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was
annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they
acquired. However, they are of the honest belief that the subject
lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and
for which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of
PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and hence, can be legally and validly
acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows
conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered
by CARP land acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its
award when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized and
the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes. And second, both LIPCO
and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value.
Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary
for the amount of PhP 750 million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated
July
30,
1998.
On
the
other
hand,
in
a
Deed of
Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed po
rtions of Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en
pago to pay for a loan of PhP 431,695,732.10.
Both RCBC and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing
that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita are industrial/commercial
lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and
consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed
LIPCOs and RCBCs property which once formed part of Hacienda
Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme.