G.R. No.

167304

August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal
Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at
the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in
the amount ofP71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the
Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995,
or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As
such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to
respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996,
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMBVisayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain
whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on
September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation
of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon
review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable
cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante
of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash
advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND
NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by reason of her office,
for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate
intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said
cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice
of the government in aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the
said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated
November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated
September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent
Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which
at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the
process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who
was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused
holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.

The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of
settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established
during the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante
since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the
OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to
the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against
Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED
IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE
FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the
former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner,
Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the
offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law
was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the
exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of
Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that
the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary
grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies
other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a
position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction
over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a decision 9 of this Court where it was
held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be
fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by,
any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
1avvphi1

In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in
Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section
4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this
Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.

The petition is meritorious.

The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this
Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
at all times accountable to the people.13
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 14
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsodunder Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A.
No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about
December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of
the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where
it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is
contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in
this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No.
8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249
are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under
Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for
the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below
may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads;
officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and
air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law

provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her
office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically
including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials
enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the
Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they are
the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are
committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration,
jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under
Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general
qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the
proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade
'26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No.
1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section
89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under
Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is
not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the
instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under
Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid
section, the general qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a position with
salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the
accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
1avvphi1

Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of
the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the
Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the
offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said
case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition
on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses
involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are
those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said
other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in
relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense
charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official

functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it
was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x
x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner
herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he
committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged
petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter
had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners official
functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing" and that "accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege
speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during
said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense
was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to
extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could
assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand,
and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office
on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the
offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the
said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough
that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees'
office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office,
this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of
the term "offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office" by referring to the principle laid down
in Montilla v. Hilario[90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized
in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an
offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if "the offense cannot
exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x 20
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with

Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, let the case beREMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 170122

October 12, 2009

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171381
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner
Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005
Order,1 as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil
Case No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the
petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171381,
seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No.
0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29
that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan
Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the
Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those
properties. This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth
Division of the anti-graft court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case, docketed
as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55.
Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of the SB. For
convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as Forfeiture I and
Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the
Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5,
2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed
as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The
plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties
identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his
place of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the summons were
duly served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of
attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.

Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of
jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion to
expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed
an opposition in which they manifested that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in
which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution5 of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the
same motion aspro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same
resolution declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution6 denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer,
and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to the
prohibited pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation
of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions of
the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249. 7
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture
case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I
on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th
Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in
order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.
By Order8 of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having been
declared in default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special civil
action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005 that merely
"Noted without action," hence refused to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash by
virtue of petitioners prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division could not have
acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x persons, much less make
them become the true "parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries" in forfeiture I. As
the [SB] has not validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners [and her childrens] x x x
persons, they could not possibly be declared in default, nor can a valid judgment by default
be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging the
[SB] 4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the same can
be raised anytime, even after final judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, any and all proceedings before the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been passed
upon by [the SB 4th Divisions] resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the
grounds relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26,
2005 were entirely different, separate and distinct from the grounds set forth in petitioners
manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005 that was denied by it per its
resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that mandates the

automatic forfeiture of the subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct
of any conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the
plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal
conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the
matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double
jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB]
on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.9 (Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after the
petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of July
13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of
the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed
his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia
acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: "Im receiving the
copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it
being served to the above-named (sic)."
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their
persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative
service of summons. The motion for alternative service would be repeated in another
motion of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration. 10
From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition for
certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated
November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners motion to dismiss
and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB]
ought to have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the
automatic forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth
Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the
plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the
matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double
jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan
on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.11 (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were
consolidated.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of
jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for that matterconsidering
that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her
have been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No.
28107has already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of
the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos.
0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures
I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the Garcias. Or as
petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its
automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with
the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy
entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would
ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to
dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing
ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her pleadings,
let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379,
albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan12 involving
no less than petitioners husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus
depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions
holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil
action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20,
2005 Resolution,13 the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a
criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer or employee [acquires]
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x
and to his other lawful income x x x."14 Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired.15 Thus "if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property
aforesaid shall become property of the State.16 x x x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the
jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family
and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 317 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379
which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,18 interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good
Government to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in
Nature while the Latter Is Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of
action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder
charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is
sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of illgotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it is "sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts

indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth]." On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,
under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor
General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed
from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the
acquisition of the illegal wealth.19
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements
should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a
criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, 20 suggesting that double
jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to
repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded
against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction
or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the
plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of
conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where the
plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the decision by
this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this Courts Second Division may
exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division grant the petition for
forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a conflict.
After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and circumstances separate
and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection
in the facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision
of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the forfeiture of the
subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will apply only to those illgotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption
that the information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of properties. 21
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I and II
with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly,
of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any
public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA
1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other
legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which
were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts
should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be
sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no
irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in
petitioners contention.
1 a vv p h i 1

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements
of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision
or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules,
is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.22
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on
Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged
receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for
both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the
PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or
the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being "so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party."24 Moreover, we indicated therein that
the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at
least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the
facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or
regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made
on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the
first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover,
the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at
petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained,
even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons
was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief. 25 In the instant case, the Republic asserts that
petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service
of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary
appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner
and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rule
means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which
case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper
service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a)
motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for
reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely
for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her
person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction
over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident
substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never
abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their
attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative
defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon
her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the
forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or
equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the instant case. Said
case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court
challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes
other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to
jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to
cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such
defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons
made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And
perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children
are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default
must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the
forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or
alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their
persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and
her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

[G.R. No. 123504. December 14, 2000]

P/INSP. RODOLFO SAMSON, PO3 JAMES BUSTINERA, PO2 PABLO
TOTANES, and PO1 ADRIANO CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Secretary of Justice, Chief
State Prosecutor ZENON DE GUIA, and State Prosecutor
PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE and Prosecuting Attorney
EMMANUEL VELASCO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The instant petition is to restrain the Secretary of Justice from conducting a
reinvestigation of PNP-CICC (Heirs of Datu Gemie Sinsuat vs. P/Sr. Insp. Rodolfo
Samson, et al.,) pursuant to an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
79.
[1]

[2]

[3]

The facts are as follows:

On July 13, 1995, at about 8:05 p.m., at Scout Reyes Street, Barangay Paligsahan,
Quezon City, patrolmen of the Central Police District Command posted at the
intersection of Scout Reyes Street and Mother Ignacia Street flagged a taxicab, with
Datu Gemie Sinsuat as passenger. Instantly, the patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat in
different parts of the body, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds, causing his
death.
[4]

In August 1995, PNP-Criminal Investigation Service and Central Police District

Command district director and the heirs of Gemie Sinsuat filed with the Department of
Justice a complaint for murder against Rodolfo Samson, James Bustinera, Pablo
Totanes, Adriano Cruz, and police officers Ernesto Diaz, Fernando Nituan, Jaime de la
Cueva, Nestor Tiotioen and Edwin Villanueva, for the killing of Datu Gemie Sinsuat, a
son of a politician from Cotabato, on July 13, 1995, at Scout Reyes, Barangay
Pinagkaisahan, Quezon City.
[5]

The case was assigned to Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel Velasco.

Accused Diaz, Nituan and dela Cueva admitted killing Datu Sinsuat but claimed
self-defense since according to them, they killed Sinsuat during a shootout. On the
other hand, accused Samson and Totanes denied any participation in the killing and
alleged that they arrived at the scene of the crime after the shooting in response to a
radio message requesting for assistance.
[6]

Accused Bustinera and Cruz submitted a separate joint counter-affidavit claiming

that they arrived at the scene of the crime after the shootout. They brought the body of
Datu Sinsuat to the Capitol Medical Center upon instructions of Captain Samson.
[7]

After investigation, on October 3, 1995, Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel Y. Velasco

filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, an information for murder against
petitioners and other police officers, except Nestor Tiotioen and Edwin Villanueva, who
turned state witnesses.
[8]

On October 3, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Very Urgent Motion for
Judicial Determination of Existence of Probable Cause (with Prayer to Hold the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest) praying:
[9]

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to personally

determine the existence of probable cause before issuing the warrants for the
arrest of the accused, and to dismiss these cases if it shall determine that no
probable cause exists against the accused.
Movants also pray that a warrant of arrest be held in abeyance until after the
resolution of this case or in case a warrant has already been issued to recall
the same with respect to the movants.
On October 9, 1995, the trial court ruled that there was probable cause for the
arrest, with no bail, of accused Ernesto Diaz, Fernando Nituan and Jaime de la Cueva.

[10]

On October 18, 1995, the trial court ruled that it was premature to discuss the merits
of Exhibits A to F (for the prosecution) for the purpose of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest considering that these exhibits were not presented during the preliminary
investigation of the case and accused were not furnished copies of the same. The trial
court ordered the reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioners. Thus[11]

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds that at the time of the filing of the
information for murder against accused Samson, Totanes, Bustinera and Cruz
based on the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and
Resolution dated September 29, 1995 issued by Prosecutor Emmanuel Y.
Velasco, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against accused P/Sr. Insp. Rodolfo Samson, PO3 Pablo Totanes, PO3
James Bustinera and PO1 Adriano Cruz.
The Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice or his Assistant
Prosecutors is ordered to reinvestigate this case giving accused Samson,
Totanes, Bustinera and Cruz opportunity to controvert Exhibits A to F with submarkings.
SO ORDERED.

[12]

Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the order. However, before
the Department of Justice could conduct a reinvestigation, on February 6, 1996,
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the instant petition to enjoin respondents from
further proceeding with the reinvestigation of the case or from resolving the same.
[13]

The issue is whether or not the Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from
conducting a reinvestigation of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial
court for determination of probable cause.
We dismiss the petition.
Petitioners plea for injunction to restrain the reinvestigation of the criminal case
against them is not legally permissible.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will
[14]

injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation. However, in extreme cases, we have laid the following exceptions:
[15]

(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the

constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there
is a prejudicial question which is subjudice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without
or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or
regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
[16]

Petitioners have not shown that the case at bar falls within any of the recognized
exceptions above set forth. Petitioners only rely on the probability that a reinvestigation
may result in the remand of the case to the court and the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
We find petitioners plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly
without merit. As a rule, we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations
or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender.
[17]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 164538

August 9, 2010

METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on
its own motion, even though complete reparation [has] been made of the damage suffered by the
private offended party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is committed against the State, the private
offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the crime."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision2 dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 and its further
Resolution3 dated July 12, 2004 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 4
Factual Antecedents
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code. In the affidavit5 of petitioners audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was
alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch
uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client
Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the only voting members of
the branchs credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up
to P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paidup capital of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make
withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.006 against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at
petitioners Port Area branch; that, consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioners funds even
before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that Universals withdrawals
against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioners head office; that
the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed";
and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.
In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and
claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts
and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement7 whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount
of P50,990,976.278 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly
amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated checks,

"plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on
December 31, 2001."9
Findings of the Prosecutor
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad
(Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution10 dated July 10, 1997 found petitioners evidence insufficient to
hold respondents liable for estafa. According to Prosecutor Edad:
The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that
the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the
relations between the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of
any criminal liability on the part of respondents.11
Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the case be
dismissed.12
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review.13
Ruling of the Department of Justice
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:
It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only against its
employees and treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the one who benefited from
this transaction and instead, agreed that it should be paid on installment basis.
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which
will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa
was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this
transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with
Universal.
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited
with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive
Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which
they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with]
Universal.14
A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1, 2000 by
then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero.16
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
Citing jurisprudence19 wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it
may prevent the rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information
in court.20 Hence, according to the CA, "[j]ust as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills
purchase transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the
former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions."21 The CA added that "[s]ince the
dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal ground, public respondents may not be compelled by
mandamus to file an information in court."22
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment23 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) where
the latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that

the DOJ erred in dismissing the complaint. It alleged that where novation does not extinguish
criminal liability for estafa neither does restitution negate the offense already committed. 24
Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other
responsible individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper
remedy is to cause their inclusion in the information.25 This notwithstanding, however, the CA
disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED. Consequently, the
resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, this instant petition before the Court.
On November 8, 2004, we required27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion to dismiss, on the
petition within 10 days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Comment28 while respondent Jose C. Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment29 on the petition.
The Secretary of Justice failed to file the required comment on the OSGs Manifestation and Motion
in Lieu of Comment and respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado) did not submit any. For which
reason, we issued a show cause order30 on July 19, 2006. Their persistent non-compliance with our
directives constrained us to resolve that they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a fine
of P1,000.00 on Reynado. Upon submission of the required memorandum by petitioner and
Adraneda, the instant petition was submitted for resolution.
Issues
Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:
1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable
for the offense charged.
Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did
not absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the
settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of
the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding
of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law
on novation. By petitioners claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda,31 the
"negotiations pertain [to] and affect only the civil aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution
for the offense already committed."32
In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes on the
sole responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the pertinent
documents being the head of petitioners Port Area branch. Nonetheless, he contends that because
of the Debt Settlement Agreement, they cannot be held liable for estafa.
The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed before the CA
to give due course to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in dismissing the complaint for
estafa.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the execution of
the Debt Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from holding respondents liable to stand trial for
estafa under Art. 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.33
Our Ruling
We find the petition highly meritorious.
Novation not a mode of extinguishing

criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for estafa not affected by compromise or novation of
contract.
Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability."34
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or
novation of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v. People,36 this Court ruled that in a crime
of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the
accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno 37 and
in People v. Ladera38 that "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of
contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its
own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the
offended party." Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda39 cited by
petitioner, we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and
not his criminal liability.
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered
into after the commission of the crime does not extinguish accuseds liability for estafa. Neither will
the same bar the prosecution of said crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the
complaint for estafa against respondents should not be dismissed just because petitioner entered
into a Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal. Even the OSG arrived at the same conclusion:
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into
between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the
latters liability as a corporate entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually
committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank. x x x40
Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed over in the body
of the assailed Decision of the CA.
Execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the incipience of criminal liability.
Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the disposition
absolving the respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." The civil law principle of
relativity of contracts provides that "contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof."41
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention
of the parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent
provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties
to the agreement, respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the
crime they committed. It may do well for respondents to remember that the criminal action
commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of
confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions as responsible bank officers. It did not
arise from a contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so,
respondents cannot rely on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense
already committed to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any
liability that may arise from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the
agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the
respondents.
Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial review
allowed where it has been clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. 42 The Secretary of Justice,
however, may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial."43 Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where
respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is,
when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 44 Tested against these guidelines,
we find that this case falls under the exception rather than the general rule.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edads Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily
reveals that were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable cause to
indict respondents for the crime charged. From her own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of
petitioners auditor, her preliminary finding is that "Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been
sufficiently established."45 Interestingly, she suddenly changed tack and declared that the agreement
altered the relation of the parties and that novation had set in preventing the incipience of any
criminal liability on respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor
should not have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding further the error,
the DOJ in dismissing petitioners petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the findings of the prosecutor.
Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited
with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive
Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which
they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with]
Universal.46
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of
defense best left to the trial courts deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the
criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence
of probable cause is "not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence
is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof."47 A "finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged." 48 So we held
in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:49
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming the
dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of whether or
not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring
"hard facts and solid evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of
probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, wellfounded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no
evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were
teeming; or it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was
adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene
committed the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised
its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against
respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are
reasonable enough to excite her belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of.

In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas50 we had occasion to rule that the "presence or absence of
the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."51
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of
evidence on hand, we do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative. We have previously ruled that grave
abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Non-inclusion of officers of Universal not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioners appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor gave another
ground failure to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which
will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa
was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this
transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with
Universal.52
1avvphi1

The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against respondents
rests upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal) based on the
latters conspiratorial participation, the non-inclusion of said co-accused in the charge should benefit
the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.
Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be
charged with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the
ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court53 mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced
either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons
who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to
file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The
proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included
in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include
them in the information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the
inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with
respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the
officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged.
Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public prosecutor from
prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were
charged.
Mandamus a proper remedy when resolution of public respondent is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when "any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station."54 The writ of mandamus is not
available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is
a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible
for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his
inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the
rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite
the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information
against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely
abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as
acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latters finding and
proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard

of the concept of probable cause as pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary
of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. 55 The
present case calls for the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner has
clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 58548 promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and
March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice, and its Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying
reconsideration thereon are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered
to file the necessary information for estafa against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 166355

May 30, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LUIS J. MORALES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the petition for review on certiorari, filed by the People of the Philippines (the People), to
assail the Resolution1 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27431,
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Luis J. Morales."
Background Facts
On June 13, 1991, then President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 to
commemorate the 100th anniversary of the declaration of Philippine Independence and thereby
created the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998 (Committee).
In 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128 (EO 128), entitled
"Reconstituting the Committee for the Preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998."
EO 128 renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission" (NCC). The mandate of
the NCC was to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the
Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the
Malolos Congress."2 The late Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as NCC Chairman.
On March 10, 1996, the NCC and the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) 3 organized
the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation or Expocorp whose primary purpose was to operate,
administer, manage and develop the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998 (Expo 98). 4
The Philippine Centennial project was marred by numerous allegations of anomalies, among them,
the lack of public biddings. In 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech
in the Senate denouncing these anomalies. Because of this speech, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee conducted an investigation on the Philippine Centennial project. In 1999, then President
Joseph Estrada created the Ad Hoc and Independent Citizens Committee (AHICC), also for the
purpose of investigating these alleged anomalies. Both the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the
AHICC recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman that a more exhaustive investigation of the
Philippine Centennial project be conducted.
The investigation that followed resulted in the filing in 2001 of an Information 5 by the Ombudsmans
Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau against respondent Luis J. Morales (Morales), the acting

president of Expocorp at the time relevant to the case. This Information served as basis for Criminal
Case No. 27431 that we now consider.
The Information against Morales for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 6 reads:
That on or about September 6, 1997 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in Pasig City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Pres. of Expo Corporation, Pasig City, a government corporation, and as such
was issued one (1) Mercede[s] Benz, Model 1997-C230, bearing Serial No. WDB202023-1F602122, and Engine No. 111974-12-027093 for his official use, and while in the performance of his
official functions, acting thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits to one Rodolfo M. Lejano by selling to him said
Mercede[s] Benz through Newton Motors, Inc. represented by its President Exequiel V. Mariano in
the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,250,000.00), without the requisite
public bidding nor approval of the Board of Directors of Expo Corporation and thereafter failed to
deposit the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned vehicle to the account of Expo Corporation,
to the damage and prejudice of the Corporation and the public interest as well. 7
In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for the dismissal of the case for lack
of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged. He alleged that Expocorp is a private
corporation and that he is not a public employee or official. He also alleged that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over his person or the offense charged as he is a private individual who has not
been charged jointly with other public officials or employees. He added that Expocorp is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation because it was not created by a special law, it did not
have an original charter, and a majority of Expocorps capital stock is owned by private individuals.
He claimed that he did not receive any compensation from the government as defined in Section
2(a) of R.A. No. 3019, and the compensation he received as Expocorps acting president was paid
from Expocorps funds.8
In its comment to Expocorps motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People,
insisted that Expocorp is a government-owned corporation since its articles of incorporation showed
that of its ten listed subscribers, BCDA held stocks valued at P99,999,100.00, while the stocks held
by the rest of the subscribers had a total value of P900.00. The People further argued, based on the
Courts ruling in Salvador H. Laurel v. Aniano A. Desierto,9 that NCC Chairman Laurel was a public
officer; thus, Morales was likewise a public officer since his appointment flowed from the formers
exercise of his authority as chairman of both NCC and Expocorp.
In his reply, Morales averred that upon Expocorps incorporation, BCDA owned essentially all of
Expocorps stocks. Two months after its incorporation, however, the Board of Directors of Expocorp
issued a resolution declaring all its unissued and unsubscribed shares open for subscription. Global
Clark Assets Corporation (Global) subscribed to essentially all of these unissued and unsubscribed
shares; thus, Global became the majority owner with 55.16% of Expocorps stocks, while BCDA was
left as minority stockholder with 44.84% of Expocorps stocks. Morales also asserted that the ruling
in Laurel10 applied exclusively to Chairman Laurel. Morales concluded that since Expocorp is a
private corporation and an entity distinct from NCC, he, as its president, is not a public officer.
The Sandiganbayan Resolution
The Sandiganbayan, after considering the arguments of the parties, ruled that the position of a
president of a government-owned or controlled corporation clearly falls within its jurisdiction.
However, before Morales could be held accountable as Expocorps president, it must first be
established that Expocorp is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
The Sandiganbayan explained in Laurel,11 that the Court only held that Laurel is a public officer
without ruling on whether Expocorp is a private or a government-owned corporation. The Court also
held that NCC performed executive functions, hence, it was a public office; consequently, its
chairman, Laurel, was a public officer. Morales, in the case at bar, is being charged as president of
Expocorp only and not as an NCC official.
In ruling that Expocorp is a private corporation, the Sandiganbayan stated that it was not created by
a special law nor did it have an original charter. It was organized under the Corporation Code and
was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. According to the Sandiganbayan,
Expocorp could not derive its public character from the fact that it was organized by the NCC. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that applying the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,

Expocorp is a private corporation because Global owns 55.16% of its stocks; hence, its officers and
employees are private individuals who are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On this
basis, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the information against Morales.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion the People subsequently filed; 12 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The People submits the following grounds:
(1) Expocorp was organized and created for the sole purpose of performing the executive
functions of the National Centennial Commission and the sovereign functions of the
government, and should be considered as a public office.
(2) Petitioner, as president of Expocorp, should rightfully be considered as a "public officer",
falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandigangayan.13
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The nature of Expocorp
The People submits that Expocorp was an extension of the NCC as provided in Expocorps Articles
of Incorporation, specifically Section 214 which states Expocorps primary purpose. It provides that
Expocorps primary purpose was to establish and operate Expo 98 - an NCC project. The People
stated in its petition, thus The position occupied by respondent as President of Expocorp stemmed from his appointment as
such by NCC Chair and Expocorp Chief Executive Officer Salvador H. Laurel. On the basis of such
appointment, respondent served as the governments representative and Laurels alter ego in
running the affairs of Expocorp. As held in the Laurel vs. Desierto case, "even assuming that
Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive officer (CEO) of Expocorp
arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp
must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair."
Having established that Expocorp, by extension, performed part of the sovereign functions delegated
to the NCC, it follows that respondent, as President of Expocorp, performed tasks that likewise fall
within the contemplation of the governments sovereign functions.15
We do not agree with the People.
Expocorp is a private corporation as found by the Sandiganbayan. It was not created by a special
law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.16 It is also not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although
BCDA, which owned 999,991 shares17 of its shares, was one of Expocorps original incorporators,
the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed Global to buy 1,229,998 of its unused and unsubscribed
shares two months after its incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp
cannot be characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. In Dante V. Liban, et al.
v. Richard J. Gordon,18 we pointedly said:
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case
of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government.
The Sandiganbayans Jurisdiction
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: 19
Sec. 5. The [Batasang Pambansa] shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

R.A. No. 8249,20 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606,21 delineated the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as follows:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the Sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang Panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads;
(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
-controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
1avvphi1

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Underlining supplied.)
Since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, Morales,
as Expocorps president who now stands charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in this
capacity, is beyond the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Sandiganbayans June 15, 2004 Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27431, entitled "People
of the Philippines versus Luis J. Morales," is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 184800

May 5, 2010

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE,

SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P.
GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the
issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order 1 of
April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel,
and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the
Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen)
and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City
Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos,
who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez,
Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente
Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are
trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain
John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans,
Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by
the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI,
due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments
before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI
sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under
their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a
blogspot6 under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-

group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by

anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates
from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13],
maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and
particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on
August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal
aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is
the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC
AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to
air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga
investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do
the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who
joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT
BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL
US NA. x x x9 (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict
the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory
portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public
respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking
the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance
Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in
the said website www.pepcoalition.comand injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is
attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article
are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the
accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the
article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to
the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable
cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice

Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be
charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion
to Quash16the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law
since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective
for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular
place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or
that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed
and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed,
quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any
allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of
the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in
Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that the Information
sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban 21 which
held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was "printed and first
published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which
Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was
deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since
venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction
is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment. 22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the
defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, 24 the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further
purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice
or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory
article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest
jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were
"printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the
Amended Information to be sufficient in form.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting
the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT
PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
With the filing of Gimenezs Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated
the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of
discretion attended the public respondents admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, 29 as a rule, requires that
recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher
court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed
in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts
do not involve factual but purely legal questions. 32
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority,
by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of
law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the
Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in
this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. 33 This
principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically
provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo 35 which laid out
the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate
our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and
first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue
of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited
to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the
second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati
becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA
No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals36 explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel,
following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the
place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the
public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written
or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel
case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio
Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace
court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to
the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional
Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303,
311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish
nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation
becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses
influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended
party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported
by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn
the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It
hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending
website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of
Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to
the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or
capable of being accessed.
1avvphi1

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are
unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing
that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first
publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the
subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet.
There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel
actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file
the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no
need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and
first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to
quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br.
149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and
DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice