Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Administrative Law Case Digest
Administrative Law Case Digest
COMELEC
88 SCRA 251
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of
the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and
Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A
Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had
conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in
the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the
KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.
qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened
on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm
of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not
allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having
been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December,
petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming
that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to
accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December,
defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited
from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by
PD No. 1818, which provides: Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project of the government to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official
from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project
Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a
state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national
government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the
prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like
the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it
would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
GOCCs. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institutionrefers to
any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent
that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body
nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the
procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to
shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the
anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly
issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been
denied.
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively
suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for
region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On
December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager
also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was
also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was
redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it
to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two
days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857
but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA.
With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was
created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA
were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council.
Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel. On
December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the
DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control
and administrative supervision, Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program
coordination. With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency
from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an
agency under a Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law
impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of
Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to
subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA AAB-1-049-89.
The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is
REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any person, association or corporation
adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the
Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an
appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or
ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu have the personality to resort to
the Court of Tax Appeals on his valuation on the taxes of Consuelo and Jesusa Samson.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the petitioner has
no personality to bring before the CTA. Supreme Court stressed out that The rulings of the
Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu 1
that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty
taxes from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but
the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court of Tax Appeals
was not created to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies.
Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals did not grant it blanket authority to
decide any and all tax disputes. Defining such special court's jurisdiction, the Act necessarily
limited its authority to those matters enumerated therein.
P870,093.12. Claiming that it paid the aforementioned income tax by mistake, a written claim
for refund was filed with the BIR on 15 April 1987. However, before the said claim for refund
could be acted upon by public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitionerappellant filed a petition for review with the CTA docketed as CTA Case No. 4149, to judicially
pursue its claim for refund and to stop the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the
then Section 243 of the NIRC. On 21 February 1995, CTA rendered its decision denying SEALANDs claim for refund of the income tax it paid in 1984. On March 30, 1995, petitioner
appealed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals. After due
proceedings, on October 26, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has committed grave abused of discretion.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court sees no reason to
reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals. The Supreme Court will not set aside lightly the conclusion reached by the Court of
Tax Appeals which, by the very nature of its function, is dedicated exclusively to the
consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject,
unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err or gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition
for review
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals
477 SCRA 49
FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Company herein referred to as the petitioner is a domestic
banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. In the
early part of 1992, the Cavite Development Bank [CDB], also a domestic banking corporation,
was merged with Petitioner with the latter as its surviving entity [under] the merger. Petitioner
being the surviving entity, [it] acquired all [the] assets of CDB During the period from 1990 to
1991, CDB sold some acquired assets in the course of which it allegedly withheld the creditable
tax from the sales proceeds which amounted to P755,715.00. In said years, CDB filed income
tax returns which reflected that CDB incurred negative taxable income or losses for both years.
Since there was no tax against which to credit or offset the taxes withheld by CDB, the result
was that CDB, according to petitioner, had excess creditable withholding tax. Thus, petitioner,
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being the surviving entity of the merger, filed this Petition for Review after its administrative
claim for refund was not acted upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals are not
based on Facts and the Law.
HELD: The petition is denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The Court
stressed out that The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise
on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court,
especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is normally the final
arbiter of questions of fact. The findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal unless a
party can show that these are not supported by evidence, or when the judgment is premised on
a misapprehension of facts, or when the lower courts failed to notice certain relevant facts which
if considered would justify a different conclusion
livelihood or with a view to profit. It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium
corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the
Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels
of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under
its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it
did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The
protest was rejected by the City Treasurer, insisting that the collection of dues from the unit
owners was effected primarily to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with
the end in view of getting full appreciative living values for the individual condominium
occupants and to command better marketable prices for those occupants who would in the
future sell their respective units. Thus, she concluded since the chances of getting higher
prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that
condominiums with poor managed common areas, the corporation activity is a profit venture
making. The CA reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay
business taxes to the City of Makati.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium
corporations.
HELD: No. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the
Makati Revenue Code (Revenue Code), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072.
The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue
Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses
which are covered by business taxes. At no point has the City Treasurer informed the
Corporation, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is
the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax
on petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?
HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative
remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on
considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give
the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA
upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law.
HELD: A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has
been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or
merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most
importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion"
within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby
have them covered by RA 7654. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it
legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of
notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. The Court is convinced
that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative
issuance.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board"
is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as
to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in
the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction
and control of the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing
barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main
import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of
which consists of several barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently
legislative in character not administrative.
HELD: Respondent's non-observance of the DARAB Rules on notice and hearing and his grant
to Madarieta of her motion for execution pending appeal in effect deprived complainant of the
land he tills and the source of his income. Complainant woke up one day not knowing that the
emancipated land which he thought was already reallocated to him was lost by order of
respondent. He was not given the chance to defend his claim over the property. This is
tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law, a constitutional guarantee
available to every individual. The actual review of the subject issuance of the respondent should
be undertaken in the proper judicial proceedings and not by this Court at this time via an
administrative action. Nevertheless, respondent's culpability under the Code of Professional
Responsibility is indubitable. As a lawyer, the IBP determined, and we subscribe to such
determination, that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states: Canon 1A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes. While the duty to uphold the Constitution and
obey the laws is an obligation imposed upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities
well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should
moreover make himself an exemplar of others to emulate. A member of the bar who assumes
public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on 21 June 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from
Canon 6 of the said Code. Lawyers in government service are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus they should be more sensitive in the performance of
their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public. Respondent, as a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB, was reposed with a higher
gravamen of responsibility than a lawyer in private practice. The recommended penalty of two
months suspension is too light under the circumstances, and a penalty of six (6) months'
suspension more appropriate. As held in recent cases, the penalty for a judge found to be guilty
of gross ignorance of the law is six (6) months.
HELD: Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to
investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to
the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to
enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly
authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same.
The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government but as
held in Margarejo vs. Escoses until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City
Prosecutors stays
after a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The
lifting of the ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on the
prescribed contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no longer contaminate the
local livestock.
SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957
Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the
provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn
the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to
regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that
the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the
President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended
by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur
recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO
80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for
injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of
Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void.
The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned
from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.
Issues: Whether or not the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80. Whether or not
the said Executive Orders were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly
delegated to the President.
Held: Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl
fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
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functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the
President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations,
decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66
and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by
authority of law. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress
intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such
restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When
the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued
EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San
Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said
coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A
6646, the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to
implement, employed the word may, it is, therefore improper and highly irregular for the
COMELEC to have used instead the word shall in its rules.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing,
are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking
of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically punished. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. Thus, the lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
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ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid? (2) Whether or not the removal or
confiscation of the plate number of any vehicle found to be illegally parked is sanctioned by LOI
43?
HELD: On the first issue, the highest tribunal resolves that, letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid.
However, applicable only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the streets due to some
involuntary reasons and not against those who intentionally breaks traffic laws. Resolving the
second issue, the Court holds that the applicable law to justify the removing and confiscating the
plate number of any vehicle intentionally parked by the owner in an area not designated as
parking sides is Presidential decree 1605. The court found out that the provisions of the two
statutes do not clash each other, LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on public
roads because of involuntary cause while PD 1605 deals with motor vehicles that have
deliberately parked in a place which is not designated as parking area.
Accordingly, the petition was DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, branch 8,
Manila was affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on February
9 1990 was lifted.
through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, likewise dismissed the appeal in an
undated decision.
Issue: Whether or not the Department of Labor exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it
issued their interpretative bulletin.
Held: No. The second requisite for a valid administrative regulation was not complied with,
which says that it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature. The
Supreme Court stated that, LOI No. 174 mandates the grant of P50 a month emergency
allowance for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more" and P30
for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P100,000 to P1 million." While the determinative
factor for the amount of emergency allowance is simply the capitalization of the employer
concerned. The problem lies in the fact that the same provision of LOI No. 174 categorizes an
enterprise capitalized at P1 million as under both the P50 and the P30 brackets of emergency
allowance. This grey area, however, was clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin on LOI No. 174
issued by the Department of Labor. Sec. 5 states that an employer has to pay the fifty-peso
allowance "where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case
of other undertakings, exceeds P1 million" or thirty pesos "where the authorized capital stock of
the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000
but not more than P1 million." Clearly then, the petitioner falls under the bracket of employers
required to give a thirty-peso monthly emergency allowance under LOI No. 174 in view of the
undisputed fact that it is a "domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws" with an authorized capital stock of one million pesos. While said administrative
interpretation of LOI No. 174 is at best merely advisory for it is only the courts which have the
power to determine what LOI No. 174 really means, said Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin
was adopted in P.D. No. 525 Sec. 7 of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that
P.D. No. 525 prescribes. Having been based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the
President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the principle that an administrative agency like the
Department of Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement.
Income Tax Return, which is generally done on April 15 following the close of the calendar year.
Respondent Commissioner also states that since the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return of the
petitioner for the taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed on April 15, 1986, the latter had
only until April 15, 1988 to seek relief from the court. Further, respondent Commissioner
stresses that when the petitioner filed the case before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the
same was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioners cause of
action. A motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was
likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the BIR exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it issued Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 7-85.
Held: No. Supreme Court stated that the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 is clearly
inconsistent with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Further, the Supreme
Court said that A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer
with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a
wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could
not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same. A valid administrative
regulation must comply with the following requisites: (1) its promulgation must be authorized by
the legislature; (2) it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (3) it must
be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, and (4) it must be reasonable. In
the case at bar, the BIR have not complied with the second requisite as it was ultra vires with
the NIRC.
the Philippines and section 3 and 4 chapter 2 of the administrative code of 1987. Lack of
publication is an essential requisite for the validity of the law. (Tanada v. Tuvera)
Accordingly, the prohibition was granted. The issuances were all suspended pending the
compliance of publications as required by law.
24
25
filing of a petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post
proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality.
27
LWUA has quasi-judicial power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts,
which it may review to establish compliance with the provisions of PD 198.
28
nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided by the law itself when it
provided for the promulgation and enforcement of a National Grid Code, and a Distribution
Code. In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the
President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the
event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary becomes the means or tool
by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress.
Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or
modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the Secretary the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact. If it is exists, the Secretary, by legislative mandate, must submit such
information to the President who must impose the 12% VAT rate. There is no undue delegation
of legislation power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
31
under the provision of Sec. 59, of the 1987 Administrative Code, the recommending authority is
also prohibited from recommending the appointment to non-teaching position of his relatives
within the prohibited degree. IV. OPPRESSION: Rubenecia is also guilty of Oppression. He did
not give on time the money benefits due to Ms. Leah Rebadulla and Mr. Rolando Tafalla, both
Secondary Teachers of CNHS, specifically their salary differentials for July to December 1987,
their salaries for the month of May and half of June 1988, their proportional vacation salaries for
the semester of 1987-1988, and the salary of Mr. Tafalla, for the month of June, 1987.
Rubenecia did not even attempt to present countervailing evidence. Without being specifically
denied, they are deemed admitted by Rubenecia. V. INSUBORDINATION: He is not liable for
Insubordination arising from his alleged refusal to obey the 'Detail Order' by filing a sick leave
and vacation leave successively. The records show that the two applications for leave filed by
Rubenecia were duly approved by proper official, hence it cannot be considered an act of
Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia when he incurred absences based on an approved
application for leave of absence. Rubenecia is therefore found guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism,
Oppression and Violations of Civil Service Rules and Regulations. WHEREFORE, foregoing
premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to find Ruble Rubenecia guilty of
Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and Violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Accordingly, he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service."
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and
assume jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner; and (2) Whether or not
petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with rendition of CSC Resolution No.
94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service.
HELD: (1) Yes it has authority to issue the said resolution and YES it has jurisdiction over the
administrative case.
RUBENECIA: Since MSPB was a creation of law, it could only be abolished by law and not by
CSC.
The questioned resolution in sum does the following:
1. Decision in administrative cases appealable to the Commission pursuant to Section 47 of the
present Civil Service Law may now be appealed directly to the Commission itself and not to the
MSPB.
2. Administrative cases already pending on appeal before the MSPB or previously brought
directly to the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93-2387, were required to be
elevated to the Commission for final resolution. The functions of the MSPB relating to the
determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in other words, re-allocated to the
Commission itself. WHY RELOCATE: to "streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn
required the "simplification of systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of [an] unnecessary
bureaucratic layer." The previous procedure made it difficult for cases to be finally resolved
within a reasonable period of time. The change, theretofore, was moved by the quite legitimate
objective of simplifying the course that administrative disciplinary cases, like those involving
petitioner Rubenecia, must take. We consider that petitioner Rubenecia had no vested right to a
two-step administrative appeal procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to an office of
the Commission, the MSPB, and thereafter a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission
itself (i.e., the Chairman and the two (2) Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission), a
procedure which most frequently consumed a prolonged period of time. It did not abolish the
Merit System Protection Board, and if it did, he is not an employee of MSPB to be a real-party-in
interest. He cannot argue that he was not notified that his case was elevated to CSC because
(a) CSC Resolution 93-2387 did not require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in
administrative cases pending before the MSPB; (b) CSC Resolution 93-2387 was published in
the Manila Standard so it would be deemed substantially complied; and (c) it was Rubenecia
himself who insisted on pleading before the Commissioner (he filed MTD before commissioner
and not before MSPB). History of the Merit System Protection Board: PD 1409 created in the
CSC the Merit Systems Board and gave it power to hear and decide administrative cases. If the
Board orders the removal of the public officer, it would be subject to automatic review of the
CSC. All other decisions of the Board are subject to appeal to the CSC. 1987 Admin Code recreated the Merit System Board as Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) which was intended
to be an office of the Commission like any other 13 offices in the CSC. MSPB was made a part
of the internal structure and organization of the CSC and thus a proper subject of organizational
change which CSC is authorized to undertake under SECTION 17 of the CIVIL SERVICE LAW.
(2)YES. Due Process = Notice + Opportunity to be heard. NOTICE: Formal charge which
33
contained the essence of the complaint and the documents in support thereof that had been
furnished to Rubenecia + testimony of the principal witnesses against him given during the
preliminary hearing. ON THE NONFURNISH OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: he was given
the opportunity to obtain those documents but he did not avail of it + he sent a formal letteranswer to CSC Chair controverting the charges against him and submitted voluminous
documents in support of his claim of innocence. MR CURED WHATEVER PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS DEFECT: MR gave him opportunity to be heard. ON FINDINGS OF THE CSC: The
settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the finding of fact of an administrative agency must be
respected, so long as such findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate
court, like this Court, to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency
of evidence. In the present case, in any event, after examination of the record of this case, we
conclude that the decision of the Civil Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the
administrative charges prepared against him is supported by substantial evidence.
car plan benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1, 1989. Thus, it was legal and
proper for them to continue enjoying said benefits within the five year period from date of
purchase of the vehicle allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of COA is not valid.
HELD: The repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of "all corporate charters that exempt agencies
from the coverage of the System" was clear and expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes
for which the law was enacted, that is, the standardization of salaries of all employees in
government owned and/or controlled corporations to achieve "equal pay for substantially equal
work". Henceforth, PITC should now be considered as covered by laws prescribing a
compensation and position classification system in the government including RA 6758. This is
without prejudice, however, as discussed above, to the non-diminution of pay of incumbents as
of July 1, 1989 as provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law. Wherefore, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED, the assailed Decisions of the Commission of Audit are set aside. RA 6758 which is
a law of general application cannot repeal provisions of the Revised Charter of PITC and its a
mandatory laws expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage being special laws. Our rules
on statutory construction provide that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by
a subsequent general law by mere implication; that a statute, general in character as to its terms
and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the
legislative purpose to do so is manifested; that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is
intended, the proper step is to so express it.
35
36
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Commission on Audit ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
39
40
41
42
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary
238 SCRA 63
Facts: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation
whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in
Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of the executive
branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and
collection of taxes and other imposts. It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax
(VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of
the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production
or distribution. The petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of
Health and not the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is the competent government agency to
determine the proper classification of food products. It cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of
the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it is
produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible. The respondents,
on the contrary, argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the
implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect. Likewise,
petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt,
traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil
millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers. Thus, the present
petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 4791 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the
sale of copra by members of petitioner organization.
Issues:
1. Is copra an agricultural food product for purposes of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), thus exempting the petitioner from payment of the Value Added Tax
(VAT)?
2. Whether or not the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should be accorded
respect in interpreting the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
3. Is RMC No. 47-91 violative of the equal protection clause?
4. Are oil millers exempt from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)?
Held:
1. In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not
considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of Section 103(b) of the
NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for
human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners
considered it so is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the
contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws. Under Section
103(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their
original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of
the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a
trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under Section 103(b) the sale of
agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or
43
distribution regardless of who the seller is. The reclassification had the effect of denying to the
petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food
product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In interpreting Section 103(a) and (b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict
construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is
entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in the exercise of his power under Section 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings
on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."
3. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is a material or substantial difference
between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and
dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The
Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a
reasonable basis for classifying them differently.
4. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to Section 102 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under Section 104
of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and
dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is
VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax
on the sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by
the producer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
44
45
US vs. Panlilio
28 Phil. 300
Facts: The accused is charged for violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the
accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine,
to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An
amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify the section of Act No. 1760 alleged
to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial. The
defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the
Director of Agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico,
Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that
said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral
designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by
further order of the Director of Agriculture. It further appears from the testimony of the
witnesses. for the prosecution that the defendant fully understood that, according to the orders
of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to
remove them, from the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this,
the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven from place
to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same manner as if they
had not been quarantined.
Issues: Whether or not violation of Administrative orders issued by the department of
agriculture constitute a criminal offense.
Held: Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for
not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court,
for each offense." 'A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by
paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provisions of the Act.
The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of
law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a
penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and
penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
46
47
Peralta vs. CA
462 SCRA 382
Facts: Petitioner Israel G. Peralta (PERALTA) is the Director/Officer-in-Charge of the PPA,
Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City. On the other hand, private respondent Nida Olegario
(OLEGARIO) holds a permanent position of Budget Officer I in the same office. On March 23,
1995, PERALTA issued an Order, directing OLEGARIO and a co-employee Visitacion U. Enilo,
to cease and desist from performing their duties and functions effective April 1, 1995 and to go
on leave with or without pay, as the case may be, on the ground of insufficiency in the release
of allotment under the plantilla of the office. On March 24, 1995, OLEGARIO sought the opinion
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Cotabato City, anent the legality of the aforesaid Order.
In a letter dated March 27, 1995, the CSC informed PERALTA that OLEGARIO, being a
government employee holding a permanent appointment, cannot be removed or separated from
the service without valid cause. In the same letter, the CSC declared that the assailed Order is
illegal because going on leave is a matter of personal choice and decision of the employee
concerned. The CSC further held that the alleged insufficiency of cash allotment for salaries is
not among the valid grounds provided by law for removing/separating employees from the
service. It also advised PERALTA to cease and desist from enforcing the void Order.
Issue: Whether or not, the authority to issue opinions and rulings by CSC regarding personnel
management for both national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction is binding
to the said government agencies.
Held: It is clear from the provisions of Section 13 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 16(15), Chapter
3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 that the Regional Offices of the CSC are
empowered to enforce Civil Service laws, rules, policies and standards on personnel
management or personnel actions of national and local government agencies within their
jurisdiction, and to enforce the same laws, rules, policies and standards with respect to the
conduct of public officers and employees. From this power necessarily flows the authority to
issue opinions and rulings regarding personnel management in both national and local
government agencies. Moreover, these opinions and rulings perforce bind the aforementioned
government agencies, otherwise, the authority given by law to these Regional Offices would
become useless and said Regional Offices can be rendered impotent by government agencies
which can simply choose to ignore their opinions and rulings on the convenient ground that they
are not binding. In the present case, the provision of law being enforced by the Regional Office
of the CSC is Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 which both provide
that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for
cause as provided by law and after due process. Hence, the ruling of the CSC Regional Office
that the memorandum of Peralta, dated March 23, 1995, directing private respondent Nida
Olegario to cease and desist from performing her duties and functions and advising her to go on
leave with or without pay is contrary to existing Civil Service law and rules, is binding upon
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is denied.
48
49
50
51
Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated the President to recover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime.
Quasi-Judicial Function
As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasijudicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other. However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgmentof regional trial courts and quasi-judicial
bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or
challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court,
the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively
by this Court.
FACTS: Petitioner Lastimosa has urged the wisdom of this court to decide on the validity of the
of the preventive suspension order issued by the Honorable Ombudsman and his Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas against her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for allegedly failing to
act on the Ombudsman order to file Attempted rape charges against the Mayor of Santa Fe
Rogelio Ilustrisimo in Cebu based on complaint filed by Jessica Villacarlos-Dayon, a public
health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral
acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct. The complaint was assigned to a graft
investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facie evidence and accordingly
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the
Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed
that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court.
The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Gloria G. Lastimosa. However, the petitioner refused the order of the Ombudsman to file
attempted rape because based on her preliminary investigation it is only an act of
lasciviousness that the Mayor of Santa Fe will be charged accordingly. The Ombudsman by the
continuous acts of defiant by the petitioner issued preventive suspension order for grave
misconduct and to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and
failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to ask assistance or to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo.
HELD: The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a
public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty; it is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a
public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute. In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors
for assistance. Sect. 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel
of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided
shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
FACTS: Jose Jalandoon filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a petition to make
his claim of twenty percent (20%) of share stocks of IBC.
However, the SEC refused to render decision because its jurisdiction to decide the case was
now transferred to RTC by virtue of R.A. 8799. The herein petitioner filed an appeal to the CA
which has acquired a favorable decision enjoining the SEC to render decision of the petitioners
claimed. The SEC and IBC eventually have filed a petition for judicial review or a review on
certiorari on the case at bar by this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC has the jurisdiction to decide on the issue of the share of 20%
stocks claimed by the petitioner to the IBC
HELD: NO. the supreme court ruled that as of August 9, 2000 which is the effectivity of RA
8799, the case was not considered pending because the SEC had not decided whether the
Republic who by virtue of the sequestration of the PCGG of the IBC will now be the new party
to be impleaded as party of interest.
In other words, the case will fall within the circumstances described in RA 8799 and thus, a
controversy considered as intra-corporate issues shall now lodge at the RTC pursuant to the
mandate under RA 8799.
56
Facts: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed three (3) separate complaints with Board of Power and
Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense
of selling electricity without permit and franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their
electricity consumption in excess in the MERALCO rates. In her answer, Syquia questioned the
jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of the electric power but
merely passes to the apartments tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in
accordance with their lease contracts.
Issue: Whether or not the Board Power and Waterworks has Jurisdiction over the said case.
Held: Respondent Board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by the respondents against petitioner.
Respondent Board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioners contractual relations with
respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor
in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents complaints against being
charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a
question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provision of
the Civil Code and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the
regular courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against the
petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising cost of electricity consumed for the
common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of fifteen thousand (15,000.00) a
year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside
as null and void.
Facts: Private respondent CCM Gas Corporation is a customer of petitioner Manila Electric
Company. On May 23, 1984, it was billed P272, 684.81 for electric consumption for the period of
April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984. The account was due on May 29, 1984, but CCM Gas withheld
payment until its question concerning the purchased power adjustment was answered. It
demanded to know how the item for purchased power adjustment in the amount of P213,
696.00 had been arrived at. As no information was forthcoming, CCM Gas brought this case in
the Regional Trial Court. On October 14, 1985, MERALCO filed, by leave of court, an amended
answer in which it raised, as special and affirmative defenses, the lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court. The trial court dismissed the case and lifted the injunction it had issued on the ground that
the court lacked jurisdiction. As basis for its holding that the matter was cognizable by the Board
of Energy, it cited allegations in the complaint that the purchased power adjustment was
arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing and therefore the
same was not only unconstitutional but also oppressive and excessive.
Issue: Whether or not Board of Energy has jurisdiction to question of determining the
breakdown and itemization of the purchased power adjustment billed by an Electric power
company.
Held: CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the
power rates to be charged by electric companies but the regular courts power to adjudicate
cases involving violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. CCM Gas did
not question the fact that the law (P.D 1206) vest upon the BOE Supervision, control and
jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates, it also did not question the fact that the purchased
power adjustment was decided by the Board of Energy and it did not, before the Trial Court,
question the purchased power adjustment formulated by the BOE. Trial Court concluded that
CCM Gas was not questioning before it the purchased power adjustment in question but simply
to demand a breakdown and itemization on which MERALCO based the purchased power
adjustment amount of P213, 696.00 which it was trying to collect from CCM Gas, it is clear that
the question of determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter that in any way
pertains to BOEs supervision, control and jurisdiction. The question CCM Gas rose before the
trial court is a matter foreign to the functions of BOE because it falls within the field of judicial
determination and adjudication. Thus, it is the trial court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has
jurisdiction to entertain civil action such as the case at bar and, after trial, render final judgment
therein.
informing them of the deaths of close relatives which allegedly caused them inconveniences,
mental anguish and additional expenses. After hearing, the Board of Communications in both
cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and
imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine pursuant to Section 21 of
Commonwealth Act 146. Petitioner contest that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to
entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual
obligation arising from negligence and injury caused by quasi delict which accordingly, it should
be ventilated in the proper courts and not in the Board of Communications.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages
allegedly suffered by private respondent for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner
RCPI.
Held: The Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of
Communication being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such
jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by
statute. The functions of Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and
it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it
by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of
Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in
the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission.
Cable and Radio Corporation in New York which in turn transmitted to Empresa Nacional de
Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. However, the latter mislaid the message resulting to its nondelivery. Private Respondent sent to the Public Service Commissioner, Enrique Medina an
unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. Petitioner questioned the PSCs jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the
message to the addressee. PSC finds petitioner responsible for the inadequate and
unsatisfactory service complained which orders them to pay a fine amounting to P200,000.00
and likewise required to refund to the remitter of the undelivered message.
Issue: Whether or not Public Service Commission has jurisdiction.
Held: The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with
respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international
commitments made or adhered to by the Philippines under Section 5 of RA 4630. Jurisdiction
and powers of administrative agencies limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied
from those granted in the legislation creating such body. Too basic in the administrative law to
need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body, and any order without or
beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
Petition is granted. Order was set aside.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd.
412 SCRA 101
Facts: On July 12, 2000, WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement,[4] sold to herein petitioner
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company its shares of stock in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. for
$10,000,000.00. Petitioner requested the approval by the Department of Environment and
60
Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary of the transfer to and acquisition by it of WMCPs FTAA on
account of its (petitioners) purchase of WMCs shares of stock in WMCP. The Tampakan
Companies notified the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR of
the exercise of their preemptive right to buy WMCs equity in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc., seeking
at the same time the MGB Directors formal expression of support for the stock transfer
transaction. Petitioner wrote, by letter the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said
agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of its acquisition of the disputed shares.
WMCP and WMC, respondents herein, by letters to the MGB, proffered their side. Several other
letters or position papers were filed by the parties with the MGB or the DENR. Petitioner filed
before the Makati RTC a complaint against herein respondents WMC, WMCP, and the three
corporations comprising the Tampakan Companies, for specific performance, annulment of
contracts, contractual interference and injunction. Defendants-herein respondents filed before
the Makati RTC a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction and
that petitioner is guilty of forum Shopping and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: Whether or not MGB has jurisdiction.
Held: The questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and
between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock
from one entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or
interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the
questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the DENR, is inextricably
linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law.
Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that petitioner seeks from both the MGB and the RTC.
Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman
Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank),
which, after emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its
ownership over the property and subdivided the land into two parcels, namely: the first, covered
by TCT No. T-162663; and the second, covered by TCT No. T-162664, which is the property
subject of the instant dispute (Cuison property). Sometime in 1989, the government acquired
the Cuison property for distribution to the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Among the beneficiaries were herein private respondents who are members
of the Sto. Nio Farmers Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
(ARBA) and Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents
were individually issued with certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs). After compulsory
acquisition proceedings, the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL-850 issued in the names of the
aforesaid organizations. Claiming that the disputed property had already been classified as
urban/urbanizing and therefore beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint
docketed as DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 on September 23, 1993 with the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator. Named respondents were the Regional Director for Region XI of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer, the Register of Deeds of Davao City, SNFC, ARBA and NAMAR-FADCKMP. Respondent officials therein and SNFC stood by their assertion that the Cuison property
was agricultural as per certification issued on June 30, 1990 by the Regional Officer of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In addition, they questioned the city zoning
ordinance classifying the Cuison property as urban/urbanizing for being without the approval of
the HLURB. Evidence presented by the Bank consisted of a certification issued by the HLURB
on October 13, 1993 correcting its prior classification that the Cuison property was agricultural
and a written official classification from the Davao City Zoning Administrator stating that
Resolution No. 984, Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 categorized the Cuison property as
urban/urbanizing.
Issue: whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction on the said case.
Held: The petition for certiorari is granted. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory
Board (DARAB) has the jurisdiction over the case. The Cuison property was not agricultural
land and, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARP.
proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner
union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be
issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting
under their command and on their behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and
refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free
ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga
City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the
determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court. The record
discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry
of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct
certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid
employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in
Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm
before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living
allowances. 4 Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against
private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local
union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and "employment of oppressive
alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the
minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes
and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private
respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and
members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners,
blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and
suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for
the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained
of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that
therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss,
which was denied. Hence this petition is for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge has the authority in trying and hearing the said case.
Held: The writ of certiorari is granted. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction
for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters and not vested in regular courts.
contract price for the work was pegged at P1,489,146,473.72 with the peso component thereof
amounting to P1,041,884,766.99 and the US$ component valued at $60,657,992.37 at the
exchange rate of P7.3735 to the dollar or P447,361,706.73. On November 6, 1978, the parties
signed Amendment No. 1of the contract whereby NIA agreed to increase the foreign currency
allocation for equipment financing from US$28,000,000.00 for the first and second years of the
contract to US$38,000,000.00, to be made available in full during the first year of the contract to
enable the contractor to purchase the needed equipment and spare parts, as approved by NIA,
for the construction of the project. On April 9, 1980, the parties entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) whereby they agreed that Hydro may directly avail of the foreign currency
component of the contract for the sole purpose of purchasing necessary spare parts and
equipment for the project. This was made in order for the contractor to avoid further delays in
the procurement of the said spare parts and equipment. Work on the project progressed steadily
until Hydro substantially completed the project in 1982 and the final acceptance was made by
NIA on February 14, 1984. During the period of the execution of the contract, the foreign
exchange value of the peso against the US dollar declined and steadily deteriorated. Whenever
Hydros availment of the foreign currency component exceeded the amount of the foreign
currency payable to Hydro for a particular period, NIA charged interest in dollars based on the
prevailing exchange rate instead of the fixed exchange rate of P7.3735 to the dollar. Yet when
Hydro received payments from NIA in Philippine Pesos, NIA made deductions from Hydros
foreign currency component at the fixed exchange rate of P7.3735 to US$1.00 instead of the
prevailing exchange rate. Upon completion of the project, a final reconciliation of the total
entitlement of Hydro to the foreign currency component of the contract was made. The result of
this final reconciliation showed that the total entitlement of Hydro to the foreign currency
component of the contract exceeded the amount of US dollars required by Hydro to repay the
advances made by NIA for its account in the importation of new equipment, spare parts and
tools. Hydro then requested a full and final payment due to the underpayment of the foreign
exchange portion caused by price escalations and extra work orders. In 1983, NIA and Hydro
prepared a joint computation denominated as the MPI-C-2 Dollar Rate Differential on Foreign
Component of Escalation. Based on said joint computation, Hydro was still entitled to a foreign
exchange differential of US$1,353,771.79 equivalent to P10,898,391.17. NIA filed its Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim raising laches, estoppel and lack of jurisdiction by CIAC as its
special defenses. NIA also submitted its six (6) nominees to the panel of arbitrators. After
appointment of the arbitrators, both parties agreed on the Terms of Reference as well as the
issues submitted for arbitration.
Issue: whether or not Construction Industry Arbitration Commission has jurisdiction on the said
case.
Held: The petition is GRANTED. It would be preposterous for NIA to have the power of granting
claims without the authority to verify the computations of such claims.
Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Assoc. of the Phil.
465 SCRA 532
Facts: The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a
definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission.
After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA, the DTI
Secretary then promulgated a Decision wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the
conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors
65
application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the
Tariff Commissions negative findings. Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary
by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to
set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that the Court
of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment
independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under
the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff
Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent
inferences and erroneous methodology. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision
penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion, partially granted
Philcemcors petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of the
Tariff Commission, it also held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of
the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the
ambit of the Secretarys discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant
the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions
recommendation. On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the
Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a
petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the
Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of
general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the Court
of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary
when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the
appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding
Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination that,
contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious
injury as a result of the import surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure
on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the
amount ofP20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.
Issue: Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction in the said case.
Held: The petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors
petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA,
and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of
conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI
Secretary.
On December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before Electoral Commission a motion of protest against
Angara and praying among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected member of the
National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On December 9, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution stating that the last day for filing protest is on Dec. 9. Angara
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the SC
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules of Proceedings adopted by the Electoral Commission in
election contest of which it was the sole judge is validly prescribed by such commission?
HELD: Yes, it is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power must be deemed by necessary application to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission. The Supreme Court emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as
the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral
Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an examination for
the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent,
in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals
who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has
been questioned formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before
the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence
of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also
embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore,
the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
jurisdiction. Guiang, Liceralde and De Jesus formed a corporation known as the P.B. De Jesus
& Co., Inc. Agusmin interposed and appealed from the decision of the Secretary stating that it
was appealing said decision to the Office of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right for procedural due process has been violated by the Executive
Secretary?
HELD: No, in deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly
enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable, little, if any,
useful purpose could be gained in further discussing these issues because Letter of Instruction
No. 172, which ordered the cancelation of the timber issued to Agusmin, in effect, reversed and
set aside the said decision of the Executive Secretary before the same become final and
enforceable. In the words of the CA, the said decisions did not acquire and finality.
Administrative rules of procedure would be construed liberally in order to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses. There is no denial of due process if the decision was rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.
witnesses testify under oath and that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right
against self-incrimination
ISSUE: Whether or not the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and ask for
their punishment in case of refusal
HELD: NO. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and
superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or
bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined
as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, filed a motion for intervention. Lower court ruled in favor
of Pascual.
ISSUE: Whether in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, the Board can compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent.
HELD: No. The lower court's decision follows the principle in Cabal v. Kapunan, about an
adminstrative case, that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer
incriminatory questions but also to take the witness stand. While the matter there referred to an
administrative case, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The present case is not
dissimilar. The self-incrimination clause is applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result
in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.The Board is mistaken that the
clause is limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to
a penal liability. That is just one aspect of the right. The constitutional guarantee protects as well
the right to silence. In Chavex v. CA, defendant has a right to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand.
Setting instead the application for heaving, Judge Jaime Delos Angeles afterwards reserved his
resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. Private
and judge then was served a copy of a subpoena issued by respondent Inciong requiring them
to appear at the NLRC to explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use old
society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the commission.
Issue: WON a labor official's power to hold a person for contempt for refusal to comply with its
order can be extended to trial court judges.
Held: No. Courts exist precisely to assure that there is compliance with the law, which is the
essence of judicial power. Courts like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits
of its jurisdiction, thus said judge reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal
questions raised after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for.
The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the
court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers
conferred on it. Citing the judge for contempt is an affront to reason as well as a disregard of
well-settled rules.
supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army; (3) the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal; and (4) the
exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations is granted.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus, the failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. That of having something to support its decision;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. Judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;
and
7. Should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
Digested by:
Lacastesantos, Regin Eral F.
LLB II-A
Montemayor vs. Bundalian
405 SCRA 264
FACTS: Private respondent (Luis Bundalian) accused petitioner (Edillo Montemayor), of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, that results
to his dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highway. Petitioner
explained that in view of the unstable condition of the government service in 1991, his wife
inquired from her family in the US about their emigration. After the investigation, the PCAGC
concluded that a petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion
to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. That it recommended petitioners dismissal from
service.
73
ISSUE: Whether or not he was denied of due process in the investigation before the PCAGC
HELD: We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.6In the case at bar, the
PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence
could not be located.7 Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due
process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was
duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence,
attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the
President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in
every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there
was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the
procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.
disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a
case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their
appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice,
animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozons
finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon.
Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be
given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision
and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier decision to be reaffirmed while
Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.
HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had
acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the
officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased
view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.
Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the
office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was
inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was
that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself.
It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service
Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA
Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who
between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be
adopted by the President of the Philippines.
Corona vs. CA
214 SCRA 378
FACTS: On May 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25
creating a Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability. Pursuant to the mandate
of A.O. No. 25, former DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating
the Administrative Action Board (AAB) to ac, decide and recommend to the Secretary
appropriate measures on cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of
corruption in the Department. In line with the said order series of complaints where then filed in
the AAB. Bungubung as one of the respondents filed his answer and questioned the
jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA
who had jurisdiction over the case.
76
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
PPA?
HELD: That the DOTC Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA
personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain extent. The DOTC
Secretarys jurisdiction is circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter and
the Civil Service Law which give him only appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary matters
involving personnel below that of Assistant General Manager. He does not have the power to
initiate proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the
absurd spectacle of the DOTC Secretary acing as complainant-initiator of an administrative
case which later falls upon him to review.
78
Held: Petitioner's claim that she was denied due process is likewise without basis. She was
given the chance to explain and exonerate herself of the charges during the investigation. It was
incumbent upon her to prove her innocence but she failed to do so. Her allegation in her
complaint that she acted only in obedience to her superior's order is an obvious after thought
which should not be given credence. She failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support her
allegation. Nevertheless, the courts agreed with respondent Minister's order of reinstating
petitioner without backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial of
backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions.
inasmuch as no such list was attached to the notice of hearing issued by the hearing officer;
besides, the usual practice in the hearing of cases in the respondent Commission was not to
send such individual notices to affected parties.
Issues: Whether or not there was proper notice of hearing was published?
Held: Respondent applicant contends that the publication of the notice of hearing in 2
newspapers of general circulation in the province of Zambales is notification not only to the
interested parties, but to the whole world in general. This is inaccurate. The order required, in
addition to publication, individual notice to the operators affected by the application and whose
names appeared in the list attached to the order. The requirement, therefore, is not in the
alternative, but conjunctive. It cannot be disputed that this requirement of the Public Service
Commission itself in connection with an application for a certificate of public convenience, is
within the power of the Commission to impose. The inadequate notification to the interested
parties in this case, which resulted in the oppositors' failure to be present during the hearing,
deprived them of their day in court. The decision rendered in disregard of said right,
consequently, is null and void.
Cruz and Zosimo Sacdalan and the award of service incentive leave pay to all complainants.
Instead of the award of separation pay, the petitioner was ordered to reinstate the complainants
with full backwages until actually reinstated.
Issues: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter violated due process in rendering the decision?
Held: Labor arbiter who scheduled a complaint for hearing and heard the same before the
answer was filed violates due process. We note that the respondent commission adopted the
labor arbiter's findings verbatim and merely added three short paragraphs in its decision which
modified the awards with one sentence justifications for each change. The court agreed with
the petitioner that the conclusions of the arbiter are "patently erroneous and devoid of logical
and justifiable consideration." The arbiter called the petitioner's defense that it never dismissed
the complainants from employment a mere "theory", inspite of the fact that this defense
constituted the crucial issue of the case before him.
81
Held: On this point, we note that the Labor Arbiter and the CA are in accord that at the time of
the filing of the complaint, respondents had no cause of action to file the case for illegal
dismissal. According to the CA and the Labor Arbiter, the lay-off of the respondents was merely
temporary, pending construction of the new building at Pearanda Street. But while the closure
of the hotel operations in April of 1997 may have been temporary, we hold that the evidence on
record belie any claim of petitioners that the lay-off of respondents on that same date was
merely temporary. On the contrary, we find substantial evidence that petitioners intended the
termination to be permanent.
Held: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against
him-he is only entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence
presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. There is no law or rule
which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation
report.
evidence is all that is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and
substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
office. Adding the word "courtesy" did not change the essence of resignation. That courtesy
resignations were utilized in government reorganization did not give private respondent the right
to use it as well in its own reorganization and rehabilitation plan. There is no guarantee that all
employers will not use it to rid themselves arbitrarily of employees they do not like, in the guise
of "streamlining" its organization. On the other hand, employees would be unduly exposed to
outright termination of employment which is anathema to the constitutional mandate of security
of tenure. The record fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of
petitioner. There are no proofs of malfeasance or misfeasance committed by petitioner which
jeopardized private respondent's interest. The latter's allegations that petitioner was "purged"
because he sabotaged the bank and that he "contributed, directly or indirectly" to its
downfall are mere subjective conclusions unsubstantiated by hard facts. To clothe with legality
petitioner's dismissal for his failure to submit his letter of courtesy resignation is to add a ground
for termination of employment to the provisions of the Labor Code.
defective, did not refer to any of the private respondents. No evidence was presented to show
that petitioners engaged the services of private respondents. As regards the matter of evidence,
it is clear that the Labor Arbiter relied solely on the bare allegations of the parties in their
position papers in rendering his now assailed decision.
substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or
formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum of proof
required in criminal proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The Ombudsman, in ordering the withdrawal of the criminal complaints
against respondent was simply saying that there is no evidence sufficient to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt which is a condition sine qua non for conviction. Ergo, the dismissal of
the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action against respondent.
89
90
91
92
93
94
petition, or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without need of prior hearing but it shall call
a hearing within 30 days thereafter for determination of its final decision.
96
HELD: Since the decision of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executor y the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well
established in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
97
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and respondent Minister Amado Inciong acted with grave
abuse of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the dismissal of
the unfair labor practice complaint.
HELD: Since the judgment has become final and executory the subsequent filing of another
unfair labor practices charged against Atlantic for the same violations committed during its
existence, is barred by res judicata, the bringing of the same action in the name of the individual
members of the union will not take out the case from ambit of the principle of res judicata.
98
100
101
Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Assoc. Inc.
461 SCRA 517
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa city, Branch 205 dismissing civil action no. 02-237 on the ground of litis pendentia
any forum shopping. The petitioner Sherwill development corporation is the registered owner of
two farce of land in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Lot 88 is covered by transfer of certificate of title no.
131918 consisting of 8,774 square meters while lot 86, with an area of 16,766 square meters, is
covered by TCT no. 131919 both lots form part of the Muntinlupa estate, while the title thereon
were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on September 24, 1913. On October 16, 2002,
the petitioner filed a complaint for Quieting of title against respondent Sitio Sto. Nio Residents
Association Inc. (SSNRAI), Nilda Devilleres and the lands management Bureau (LMB)
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the fraud had been committed in securing such title.
2. Whether or not the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping insofar as SP
Civil No. 02-237 is concerned are applicable
HELD: The director of lands original certificate of title over the same authority of the director of
lands to investigate conflicts over public and is derived from section 91 of the Public land act. In
fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duties to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in
securing patents and the corresponding title. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as
indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation by the
director of lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigations to
determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the government. As a rule then, courts have no
jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB. The court ruled
that the petitioner action was barred by the pendency of the proceedings before the LMB for litis
pendentia to lie; the following requisites must be satisfied 1.) Identity of parties or representation
in both cases; 2.) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; 3.) The relief must be founded
on the same facts and the same basis and identity of the two preceding particulars should be
such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration. To determine
whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present or whether final judgment in one case will amount to res
102
judicata in pendentia barred the filing of SP Civil Action No. 02-237, the RTC correctly dismissed
the same on the additional ground of forum sopping.
103
104
105
DEVELOPMENT
HAS
HELD: It was ruled that the cause of action by IEI is not merely the rescission of the Agreement
but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. That the decision of the
rescission of the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating
contract to IECs favor and directed to the BED to give due course are matters properly falling
within the domain of the BED, and not with the civil court.
106
or
HELD: Yes, it has. GTEB as an administrative agency has in its favor the presumption that it
has regularly performed its official duties, including those which are quasi-judicial in nature, so
much so in the exercise of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Thus, the power and jurisdiction
to adjudicate on the questions of AIFCs entitlement to the export allocations (be it export quotas
or export authorization), which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export
allocations, belongs solely to GTEB, and not to the regular courts.
107
System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Govt. of Caloocan City
408 SCRA 406
FACTS: Petitioner System Plus Computer College was established in 1997. It is a non-profit
and non-stock educational institution, it enjoys tax exemption on its buildings from the local
government but it does not cover the parcels of land which petitioner is renting in the amount of
P5, 000.00 monthly from Consolidated Assembly, Inc. and Pair Management. Petitioner
requested to extend the tax exemption on the said parcels of land invoking Article VI, Sec. 28(3)
of the 1987 Constitution and other provisions in Local Government Code. The request was
denied by the respondent on the ground that the subject parcels of land were owned by
Consolidated Agency and Pair Management and that it is not used exclusively for educational
purposes. On February, 1999 the petitioner entered into separate agreements from Contract of
lease to donations. But still respondent again denied the application for tax exemption.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with the RTC.
ISSUE: (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY AVAIL THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IN REGULAR COURTS. (2) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER VIOLATED
THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
HELD: The court ruled that before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that
petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. The
petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly
seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law
without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law
provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the
case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein.
Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner
should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
109
110
111
112
114
HELD: Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed
to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain
a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject
to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v.
Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30,
1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.]
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question.
Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is warranted.
116
117
119
120
121
122
123
124
emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII, that "No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law." and which recognizes no exception. The absolute rule thus propounded is repeated almost
verbatim in Section 132 of the Central Bank Charter (Rep. Act 265) that provides in equally
absolute terms that "No officer or employee of the Central Bank subject to the Civil Service
law or regulations shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." It is
well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act No. 2260) divides positions into
three categories: competitive or classified; non-competitive or unclassified service; and exempt
service, the last being expressly excluded from the scope of the Civil Service Act (sec. 3, R. A.
2260). In view of section 3 and 5 of the same law, providing that "SEC. 3 Positions Embraced
is the Civil Service. The Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, . . ." "SEC. 5. The non-competitive service. The non-competitive or unclassified
service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive
or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature." (R.A. 2260) it is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the
Civil Service law and regulations as a member of the non-competitive or unclassified service,
and that his removal or suspension must be for cause recognized by law (Unabia vs. Mayor, 53
Off. Gaz., 132; Arcel vs. Osmea, L-14956, Feb. 27, 1961; Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L19748, Sept. 13, 1962). The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as
private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of
office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no
removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special
skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the
highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and
erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that
while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security
of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist
or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. The entire
objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit,
would be thus negated. Of course a position may be declared both highly technical and
confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may require. But the position of plaintiffappellant Corpus is not of this category. The decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289,
relied upon by the appellant Bank, is not applicable, since said case involved the office of city
engineer, that the court expressly found to be "neither primarily confidential, policy determining
nor highly technical" .
126
127
Demaisip vs. CA
106 Phil. 237
FACTS: The first applicant for a fishpond permit covering Lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of
Dumangas Cadastre, Iloilo, was the late Geronimo Destacamento who filed his application on
April 1, 1927. On Dec. 31, 1930, the Fishpond Permit No. F-624-B granted to the late Geronimo
Destacamento expired, because he failed to make any improvements on the lots and to pay the
required rentals. Before his death on December 19, 1928, Geronimo Destacamento without the
knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in
question in favor of Serafin Villanueva, an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the
permit granted him. In a letter dated December 19, 1928, the District Forester of Iloilo,
notwithstanding the existence of the aforesaid deed of sale, requested Serafin Villanueva to
apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots. In spite of the request, Villanueva neglected and
failed to file his application for a fishpond permit, such that no permit was ever granted to him
before or after the expiration of the permit of the late Geronimo Destacamento. It appears that
on October 15, 1935 the herein complainant Gaudencio G. Demaisip filed with the Fish and
Game Administration a fishpond permit application which was given No. 2285 for the same lots
Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of Dumangas Cadastre, containing an area of 13.9859 hectares of
public mangrove forest land located in Sitios Buang and Balabag, barrio Buang, Dumangas,
Iloilo. By March 6, 1936, the Demaisip had complied with all the pre- requisites necessary for
the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting of a
surety bond in the sum of P350. On March 19, 1936, when the fishpond permit in favor of
Gaudencio Demaisip was ready to be issued, Serafin Villanueva executed a deed of sale
covering the lots in question in favor of the herein defendant Luis E. Buenaflor; shortly thereafter
or in the same month, the latter started to occupy the land, and introduced improvements
thereon consisting of a big dam 27 meters long, 4 meters high, across the Balabag River, worth
P1,600. According to the result of an investigation conducted by a representative of the Fish and
Game Administration, the dam deprives other fishponds leased from the government of fresh or
flowing water and was illegally constructed because it violated a rule of that Office prohibiting
the introduction of any improvements on the land applied for before the issuance of a permit. It
was only on May 21, 1936, or 7 months after Demaisip had filed an application, that Luis
Buenaflor also filed his application for the area in question with the Iloilo branch of the Fish and
Game Administration, the Director of Fish and Game Administration was called upon to decide
who of the conflicting claimants Luis Buenaflor or Gaudencio G. Demaisip had a better
right to be regarded as the lessee of the land in question pursuant to Section 63 of Act No.
4003.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable.
HELD: The plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of
Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should be
denied and that of defendant Buenaflor be given due course upon compliance with certain
requirements, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the
theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The
presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President
unless the same is disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action
should not be entertained because he has failed to exhaust first all the administrative remedies
available to him.
Facts: In the case herein, petitioner began his service in the armed forces of the Philippines on
January 15, 1924 upon his enlistment in the Philippine Constabulary. When the Pacific war
broke out in 1941, he held the rank of sergeant in the Philippine Constabulary. When the order
for surrender to the enemy was issued by the high command of the USAFFE, he refused to
surrender and, instead, he joined the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, a guerrilla
organization in Mindanao. This guerrilla outfit was recognized on February 13, 1943 by the
Headquarters, Philippine Ryukyus Command of the United States Armed Forces, which
recognition was later revised to take effect as of September 16, 1942. While in the service of
the aforementioned guerrilla outfit, petitioner Bartulata was promoted to the rank of third
lieutenant effective November 1, 1942, and to second lieutenant effective April 1, 1943. His
name, rank (2nd Lt.) and serial number (0-24220 PA) appeared in the Roster of Reserve
Officers in the Headquarters, Mindanao Zone Military Police Command, Philippine Army, per
General Order No. 358, dated June 28, 1946, Army Headquarters APO 75. After the war,
petitioner still carrying the rank of 2nd Lieutenant, continued to render service under the postwar
Philippine Army. He was assigned as Junior Officer of the 62nd Military Police Command (PA).
As second lieutenant he was paid his salaries and allowances and was allowed to wear his
uniform as such officer. His services ended when he was honorably discharged, effective
January 31, 1947, as a second lieutenant. On September 1, 1956, petitioner Bartulata filed an
application for retirement pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 340, as amended.
Since he had rendered more than 25 years of continuous military service, his application was
approved and officially announced in paragraph 13, Special Order No. 126 of General
Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, dated December 19, 1957, retiring him with the
rank of Staff Sergeant effective January 31, 1947, the date when he was separated from the
service. Contending that he should be retired as second lieutenant instead of staff sergeant,
petitioner Bartulata, on several occasions, requested re-adjustment of his retirement rank, but
said requests were denied by General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and by
the Secretary of National Defense, upon the ground that his name does not appear in the
approved reconstructed roster of his guerrilla outfit, and as such it is "conclusive that his service
was not recognized or that the recognition of his guerrilla status was revoked. Thereupon,
Bartulata sought relief from the lower court, but the latter, on the basis of the stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties and the other documents admitted by them, dismissed his petition as
stated in the beginning of this opinion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not he should be retired with the rank of staff sergeant as contended by
respondents, or with the rank of second lieutenant as claimed by petitioner?
Whether the petitioner must, exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him
before coming to court?
Held: this Court, speaking of the probative weight of the revised roster, said that the entries in
the Army's roster of recognized guerrillas, assuming them to be the official acts of duly
authorized public officers, are merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In other
words, this roster or list is not to be considered the sole and exclusive evidence of the
government's recognition of guerrilla services. As there is nothing in the law making
inadmissible other proof of such recognition, where they are material and relevant. Further, this
Court said that the recognized roster (drawn up primarily for backpay purposes) must yield to
the initial roster (which in that case showed that Aragon was already serving six months before
the Leyte landing of the liberation troops). In the case now before this Court, respondents'
theory must be rejected. This Court holds that the Philippine Government had recognized not
only herein petitioner's wartime and post-liberation services in the Army, but also his rank as 2nd
lieutenant. The recognition was made when his name was included in the initial roster of the
108th Infantry, 10th Military District; when he was given backpay for services rendered as
second lieutenant from April 1, 1943 to May 15, 1945; when he was paid his salaries and
allowances as second lieutenant; when he was allowed to wear the uniform as such officer; and
when he was honorably discharged with the rank of second lieutenant on January 31, 1947.
Even the approval of petitioner's retirement application indicated a clear showing of the
recognition of petitioner's guerrilla and post liberation services. It will be noted that in Special
Orders No. 126, which officially announced the approval of his retirement, it is stated that he
had completed 23 years and 15 days of service. And it will also be noted that in the stipulation of
facts, respondents admit that petitioner had rendered more than 23 years of continuous military
service. These 23 years and 15 days of service cover the period from January 15, 1924 (date of
original enlistment) up to January 30, 1947 inclusive, as the records do not show that he had
130
rendered further military service. If the petitioner, as contended by the respondents, had not
served under the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, nor was he a member thereof or that his
guerrilla status was revoked, his wartime services, dating as early as October 1, 1942 and
ending May 15, 1945, could not have been included in the computation of his military service.
The inclusion of the period from October 1, 1942 to May 15, 1945 in petitioner's military service
record simply means his guerrilla services with the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, the only
guerrilla outfit he was known and shown to have served in, was duly recognized by the
authorities of the Philippine Army. The fact that his name may not be included in the roster of
recognized guerrillas of the Philippines that is kept by the authorities of the United States
Government should not matter. What should matter are the records of the Philippine
Government regarding his military activities, including his services in the guerrilla during the last
World War II. We hold that on the basis of the evidence, amply and adequately showing the
Philippine government's due recognition of petitioner's guerrilla services, it is but fair and legal,
that he be accorded all the rights, the benefits and the privileges that are due him as a
recognized guerrilla to be retired with the rank of second lieutenant, which was his rank when
the afore-quoted Executive Order No. 121, confirming it, was promulgated, and which was the
rank that he was holding when honorably discharged from the Army. Respondents, however,
would contend that the present action should be dismissed because petitioner "has not
exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him before coming to court. Respondents
would want petitioner to appeal his case to the Office of the President before availing of court
processes. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the doctrine requiring the
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. The present proceedings having been
brought against the Secretary of National Defense, respondents' contention is clearly untenable.
131
Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a certain tract of
forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land consists of 6,240 hectares and located
within the former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland. Petitioner
submitted his application in due form along with nine other applicants. Thereafter, President
Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation
establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids received
for the issuance of timber license be rejected. The Secretary of Agriculture and National
Resources sustained the recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that it
would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain
conditions. Finally, the area was awarded to petitioner. Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge
Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry.
Ravago appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which later on, declared
the license issued to petitioner by Director of Forestry as null and void. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies
Held: YES. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts
of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner to take that appeal is failure on his part
to exhaust his administrative remedies. From the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources complained of, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by
appealing to the Chief Executive. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again,
it being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party
must exhaust the administrative remedies available.
Facts: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a
contract with petitioner for the latters management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public
Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner
terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio
Bunye, Mayor Carlos successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the
agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
and the patently inequitable rental, directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the
Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract. Petitioner filed with the RTC of
Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the
KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. The
matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint
charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market.
On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the
latters heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to
serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the
same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners
claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not
bear its seal and is a mere Xerox copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that
respondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be
declared null and void.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid
2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available
Held: (1) NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be
deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of
Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to
vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which
grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has
only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for
their just and reasonable execution. (2) NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does
not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This
doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed.
There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts
could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also
yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant
case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of
petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
Mariano Friasto to work on the property while Fr. Flores appointed the Friases, plus some
others, as farmhands. However, in Fr. Flores lease contract, there was a stipulation that he was
prohibited from installing a leasehold tenant thereon. No such prohibition existed in Hensons
contract. When Fr. Flores lease period expired, Valencia ordered his farmhands to vacate the
lot. The farmhands refused to do so, and actually even secured CLTs over the land in their
names. Catalino Mantac, one of the farmhands, subsequently entered into a leasehold contract
undertaking to have a profit sharing agreement with Valencia. After 12 years, DAR investigated
the matter and found that the right of the farmhands to the land ceased upon termination of the
lease contracts except to as regards to Mantac, with whom Valencia entered into a tenancy
agreement. As such, it was recommended that the CLTs given to the other farmhands be
cancelled. However, the regional office disregards the investigation report and ruled that the
farmhands had a right to continue on the land until otherwise ordered by the court. On appeal to
the office of the president, then Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona upheld the ruling of the
DAR, with the modification that is acquired by Valencia as homestead be excluded from the
coverage of PD 27. Valencia then appealed to the CA contending that the Exec. Sec. erred in
recognizing the farmhands as tenants, and disallowing him and his 7 compulsory heirs from
exercising their right of retention under R.A 6657. However, the CA dismissed the case.
Issue: Whether or not a contract of civil law lease prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a
tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement.
Held: YES. Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a
tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. A
different interpretation would be most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who
entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on the he can no
longer gain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.
On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the civil code, the lessee cannot
assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In
the case before us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary, the lessee is expressly
prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant
thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership.
Doctrine: The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of landowner, except as many be
provided by law. Inherent in the right of landholders to install tenant is their authority to do so;
otherwise, without such authority civil law lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on the
landholding tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character. Deforciants
cannot install lawful tenants who are entitled to security of tenure. A contract of civil law lease
can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease
agreement. Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and
the tenant;(2) The subject is agricultural land;(3) There is consent;(4) The purpose is agricultural
production;(5) There is personal cultivation; and (6) There is sharing of the harvests between
the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the
case an agrarian dispute. Claims that one is a tenant do no not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant
to security of tenure. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is
intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy
laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.
The act of subletting to third persons extinguishes the agricultural leasehold relations, as this
constitutes an abandonment of the landholding due to the absence of personal cultivation.
Obiter: Social justice is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper
in his hovel. It is never justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or
reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and
the rich alike according to the mandate of law. Interpretare et concordare legeslegibus est
134
optimus interpret and imodus. Interpreting and harmonizing the laws with laws is the best
method of interpretation.
competition would only result if petitioners application were to be favorably acted upon. On 29
October 1999, the LTFRB rendered its decision granting petitioners application and directing the
issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Public Convenience. Respondents motion for
reconsideration was denied in the boards resolution of 27 January 2000. Respondents then
appealed to the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC). On 05 June 2000, the DOTC Secretary reversed the decision of the LTFRB. This time,
it was petitioners turn to move for reconsideration of the DOTC Secretarys resolution. The
motion, however, was denied by the DOTC Secretary in his order of 30 August 2000.
Respondents thereupon moved for the immediate implementation by the LTFRB of the decision
of the DOTC Secretary. On 03 October 2000, the LTFRB granted respondents motion and
directed petitioner to cease and desist from operating its buses along the contested route. On
07 October 2000, petitioner filed a letter-appeal to the Office of the President seeking to set
aside the resolution and order, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000, respectively, of the
DOTC Secretary. Petitioner then likewise filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, docketed C.A.-G.R. SP No. 61159, questioning the same resolution and order of the
DOTC Secretary subject of the letter-appeal addressed to the Office of the President. Upon
advice of its new counsel, however, petitioner filed a notice of withdrawal of its petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 61159) pending with the appellate court. The appellate court did not
act upon the notice of withdrawal of the petition (C.A. G.R. SP No. 61159) but, instead,
dismissed, in its resolution of 09 November 2000, the petition for failure of compliance with
Section 1, Rule 42, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on non-forum shopping. On 20 October
2000, the Office of the President issued a memorandum directing that the execution of the
resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000,
respectively, be meanwhile stayed. On 15 January 2001, respondents filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 62619, assailing the Memorandum Order of the Office of the President.
Respondents argued that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to issue the assailed
order in the absence of any law providing for an appeal from the DOTC to the Office of the
President, adding that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping in addressing a letter-appeal to
the Office of the President. On 18 June 2001, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petition
for certiorari basically on the ground that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping. It ordered the
dismissal of the appeal filed by petitioner before the Office of the President and reinstated
the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary enjoining petitioner from operating its buses
along the contested route.
Issue: whether or not appellate court has decided a question in a way not in accord with
applicable jurisprudence
Held: In order to deter the evils of forum shopping, Circular 28-91, dated 08 February 1994,
issued by the Supreme Court requires that every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals must be accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping. Administrative
Circular 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, expands the certification requirement to include
cases filed in court and quasi-judicial agencies below the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 0494 to become Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly, to curb the
malpractice of forum shopping, the rule ordains that a violation thereof would constitute
contempt of court and be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice
to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. Undeniably, there
is identity of cause of action and reliefs sought between the petitioners letter-appeal filed with
the Office of the President and the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals (C.A.
G.R. SP No. 61159). The DOTC resolution and order, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000,
respectively, were sought to be set aside in both appeals filed by petitioner. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President to review any
determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an
administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should
be priorly exhausted before the courts judicial power is invoked. The appellate court correctly
ruled that the action of a department head bears only the implied approval of the President, and
the latter is not precluded from exercising the power to review the decision of the former
pursuant to the Presidents power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
136
The Office of the President validly acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing therewith of
the appeal by herein petitioner, and said jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent recourse by
the petitioner of the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction which has
attached in the first instance continues until the final resolution of the case. Incongruently, the
appellate court, while recognizing to be valid the exercise of jurisdiction by the Office of the
President, ordered the dismissal of the appeal pending with the said office based on forum
shopping. The decision of the appellate court ordering the dismissal of the appeal taken to the
Office of the President is clearly flawed. It is the latter, not the appellate court, which could
dismiss the case pending before that office. It also behooves courts of justice, if only for reasons
of comity and convenience, to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress is completed so as to give the administrative office every opportunity to correct its error
and to properly dispose of the case. In fact, the appellate courts order to dismiss the appeal
pending with the Office of the President could well constitute an undue intrusion into a valid
exercise of jurisdiction by the President over acts of subordinates within that office.
over the PNP thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
NPC and the PNP were placed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by
virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a
corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department."
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of
the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
National Development Company and DOLE Philippines Inc. vs. Wilfredo Hervilla
GR No. L-65718, June 30, 1987
FACTS: The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and damages filed
on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a
total area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-ininterest of his brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former],
filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent
Application for the said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant,
filed with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted agricultural
138
plants. On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of
Candido de Pedro. Counsel of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for the
investigation of the said lots, to which a report was rendered and an order was issued as to the
adjustment of the said title numbers. The trial court dismissed the action for recovery, to which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court decision and declared that
the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void.. A
motion for reconsideration was filed and subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the
purpose of submitting original certificate of titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-ininterest by the Bureau of Lands while the case was pending. The two motions were denied.
Thus this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the court in a deciding a case involving recovery of possession declare
null and void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency of such case?
HELD: In the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director
of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of
rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public
lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the
determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question
(in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at
bar, the petitioners possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of
Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the
courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot and
academic by the decision of the Director of Lands. Defendants' possession of the lands
disputed, for purposes of the free patents, has been confirmed in the administrative case. The
administrative branch of the government has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed into
finality. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of possession is lost. Moreover, records do not show that
private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the Philippines. In short,
Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court
review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer
interfere with such decision. The decision of the Appellate court is reversed and set aside.
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Boquerns "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were
duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease
application was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post. During
the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's
mining claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, dated April 17, 1978, which give
preferential rights to Buqueron in his claim except the areas covered by the adverse claim to
which Atlas Consolidated has preferential rights. Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural
Resources who rendered a decision on November 10, 1978 reversing the decision of the
Director of Mines. Subsequently this matter was appealed to the Executive Secretary, which
reversed the decision of the Minister and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines. Thus
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not findings on facts based on substantial evidence by an administrative
official can be disturbed or overturned during appeals?
HELD: This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative
official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for
instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial
evidence, but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law
or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure
which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave
abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the
case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines
which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the
prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional
evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in
this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. This petition
is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Office of the President, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the
subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto
R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are
now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer
beneficiaries.6 Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas,
who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the
landholdings.
On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the
recommendation. DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed
the Order of the Regional Director. Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Private Agricultural lots donated to the Department of Education is
subject to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and can be distributed to farmerbeneficiaries identified by the administrative agency?
HELD: Yes, agricultural lots previously held as alienable and disposable subsequently donated
to the DECS which is not exclusively for educational purposes but was leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation is not exempted from the coverage of the CARP but is subject to
distribution for farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR, the administrative agency authorized
to do so. the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under
CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by
the Department of Labor and Employment in issuing a order awarding the private respondent
salary and allowance differentials?
HELD: No, it is Well established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases do not
go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Deputy Minister and the
Regional Director based their determinations but are limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion For Certiorari to lie, there must be capricious arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of
both civil and common law traditions. The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent and it
must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically (Purefoods Corp. v.
NLRC, 171 SCRA 415 [1989]; Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr., 131 SCRA 151 [1984]), which is not
obtaining in the present case. The petition is dismissed and appealed order is affirmed.
interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the
interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great
respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is
in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees
were validly located, surveyed and registered."
administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with
by the courts.
are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported
by substantial evidence.
was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the
court.
Issue: Whether or not the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts.
Held: Yes. Factual findings of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by
substantial evidence. It is a settled rule of administrative law, but whether there is substantial
evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this
case. The school official based his determination of the petitioner's age on the pre-war records
in the preparation of which the petitioner does not appear to have taken a part. On the other
hand, the petitioner post-war records which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his
birth.
146
ironed out, respondent alleged that the union officers and members abandoned their work and
waited for the payment of their respective retrenchment benefits. Twenty-six of them, including
the President, Treasurer and three Directors accepted, upon execution of quitclaim and release
waivers, the grant under the supervised payment conducted by the National Conciliation and
Mediation and Mediation Board. However, private respondents interpreted this act as an
abandonment of work and thus were constructively dismissed. The Union filed before the SubRegional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City, a complaint against private respondents for unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal, with claims for damages and attorneys fees. Labor Arbiter
Nicodemus G. Palangan upheld the validity of petitioners dismissal. On appeal, this was
affirmed in toto by the NLRC. Their motion having been denied, petitioners filed the instant
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of NLRC, being a quasi-judicial agency, are
supported by substantial evidence.
HELD: According to the Supreme Court, It should be stressed, to the point of being repetitive,
that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are generally accorded, not
only respect but, at times, finality if such are supported by substantial evidence. In the case at
bar, the Court is compelled to deviate from this well-established rule on the ground that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC misappreciated the facts, thereby impairing petitioners right to
security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Petitioners argue that
they never abandoned their jobs; instead, they were prevented by security guards from entering
the workplace. This assertion was completely rejected by Labor Arbiter Palangan when he
stated that security guards are not appropriate officials to make a decision for the management
of respondent and the petitioners allegation was refuted by the joint affidavit of the security
concerned. He also denied petitioners imputation of partiality when he gave more credence to
said joint affidavit than the sworn complaint of the individual employees. There is, however,
nothing on record which would justify the Labor Arbiters conclusions. He glossed over the fact
that the security guards were under the control of private respondents who alone could have
authorized their actions. The security guards may not be the appropriate officials but, certainly,
they acted as agents of the respondents. For a retrenchment to be valid, three requisites must
concur, as provided for under Article 283 of the Labor Code, namely: (1) The retrenchment is
necessary to prevent loses and the same is proven; (2) Written notice to the employees and to
the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date thereof; and (3) Payment of separation
pay equivalent to one month or at least month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In this case, the respondent quasi-judicial agency failed to establish substantial evidence
due to the following: (1) Private respondent failed to prove the existence of a just and valid
cause for dismissing petitioners;(2) Conciliator Tamboboy took the statement at its face value
and never required Yap to substantiate his claim; (3) What it shows is that private respondents
led its employees to believe that the company was suffering losses when this allegation has not
at all been substantiated; and (4) Evidently, there was bad faith on the part of private
respondents which should not be countenanced as being prejudicial and oppressive to labor. In
view of the foregoing finding that retrenchment was unnecessary to prevent alleged business
losses which were never adequately proved by private respondents, the Court no longer finds
any need to discuss whether the remaining requisites outlined under Article 238 are present.
Hence, the petition was granted. The challenged decision of respondent NLRC and that
of Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan are set aside.
148
Relations Commission, whereby, the NLRC opted to treat his motion as an appeal. In its
decision, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no
negligence on his part. Respondents moved for reconsideration of the decision, but said motion
was denied by the Commission. This led the respondents to file a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and the appellate court decided in favor of the employer.
Hence, Ariel Tres Reyes file a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, setting
aside the decision of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of NLRC as a quasi-judicial body coincide with those
of the Labor Arbiter and supported by substantial evidence.
HELD: The findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory in this case, so the
Supreme Court delved into the records and examined for itself the questioned findings. Even
though factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide
with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect
and even finality by the Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court, the record shows that
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter primarily involved the submission of position papers by
the parties. No trial-type hearing was conducted at all by the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the finding of
the Court of Appeals that the latter was in a better position to evaluate the evidence as he had
the better position to evaluate the evidence as he had the better opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the parties at the hearing has no leg to stand on. Moreover, based on the police
traffic accident investigation report, we are convinced that the accident was the fault of the tenwheeler trucks driver. On seeing the signal light change to red, this driver stepped on his brake,
not just once but three times, but his truck could not stop. Since the truck was on the wrong
lane, petitioners van, which was in its proper lane with the green light smashed into the out-ofcontrol truck. This episode led to petitioners dismissal which, in our view, is unjustified.
Furthermore the court said that, in sustaining the Labor Arbiters finding the petitioner was
grossly negligent, the appellate court stressed that the cited episode was the second vehicular
accident involving the petitioner, and as such it may clearly reflect against his attitudinal
character as a driver. We note, however, that the Commission found that in the first vehicular
accident involving petitioner he was the victim of the reckless and negligent act of a fellow
driver. We agree with the NLRC that an imputation of habitual negligence cannot be drawn
against petitioner, since the earlier accident was not of his own making.
1960, the collector of Customs of Iloilo, after hearing, rendered judgment denying the claim for
refund. Because of this judgment the petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who
upheld the decision of the Collector. Eventually, a petition for review was filed with the Court of
Tax Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs as an administrative body is allowed to resolve
questions of law in the exercise of it quasi-judicial function as an incident to its power of
regulation.
HELD: According to the Supreme Court Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office
charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the
construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight. In applying the doctrine or
principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to several
factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give
the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves.
These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently
are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature
must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of
the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences, or improvements in
the statute; x x x. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
memorandum supporting Rogelio De Jesus stand. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan issued the
questioned resolution denying the motion to quash. Rogelio de Jesus motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and try election
offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office the Commission on Elections
and the Court of First Instance [now the regional trial court] or the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan?
HELD: Only the Commission on Elections is exclusively vested with the power to investigate,
prosecute and try election cases committed by a public officer in relation to his office. The grant
to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to ensure the free, orderly and honest
conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people
and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To
divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.
Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan and dismissed
the Criminal Case against Rogelio De Jesus. The COMELEC was directed to forthwith conduct
an investigation, and if the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against Rogelio De
Jesus before the proper court of first instance.
presiding judge of Branch I of the City Court of Butuan, was also assigned to preside over
Branch II of said court, since the judge of said sala had retired from service. The informations
filed by petitioners in Branch II likewise remained dormant because of Hon. Judge Napoleon D.
Villanuevas firm refusal to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest for want of affidavits of the
witnesses. Petitioners urgent motion disclosed that no warrants had been issued in 113
informations. Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva received the Supreme Court Resolution
requiring him to comment on the petition. However, interpreting the same as a denial of a
petition itself, Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva issued an Omnibus Order directing
petitioners to submit immediately the supporting affidavits and other evidence in Criminal Cases
Nos. 12209-12222. Having failed to secure a reconsideration of said Omnibus Order, petitioners
finally submitted the required affidavits and documents in order to avoid further delay in the
prosecution of these cases. This move on the part of the petitioners would have rendered the
instant petition moot and academic. But while Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva gave due
course to some of said cases either by issuing the warrants of arrest or taking some other
appropriate action, he refused to issue warrants in five (5) Criminal Cases, and instead ordered
the records thereof remanded to the City Fiscal. Petitioners therefore filed a motion with the
Supreme Court to restrain Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva from enforcing the orders subject
of the main petition and compel him to accept, and take cognizance of, all the informations in his
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge is compelled to issue warrants of based on fiscals
certification of the existence of probable cause as provided by P.D. 911.
HELD: According to the Supreme Court, There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon
the fiscals certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest. But does such certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We
answer this query in the negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. As provided by
the provisions of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of the
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. He alleges that the PCGG may not
conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without
violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG
has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation. Likewise, on July 6, 1990, Maria Clara
Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Motion to Admit
Petition to Intervene wherein they ask that the PCGG desist from further proceeding with the
preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, and 84 charging the
intervenors and other respondents, including petitioner, with violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in connection with the, coconut levy funds. The
intervenors question the authority of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the said
cases. They maintain that even assuming that the PCGG has such authority; the same cannot
be delegated to a prosecutor or his assistants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the
power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the
Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse
of coconut levy funds.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 1 and
Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the power to
investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and
associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the
PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the
PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, it is also noted that
under Section 15(11) of Republic Act No. 6770, among the powers vested on the Ombudsman
is to investigate and to initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or
unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
involved therein. The Court agrees with the contention of the public respondent PCGG that this
provision is a tacit recognition that the authority of the PCGG to conduct preliminary
investigation of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed before February 25, 1986
is maintained.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
GR No. 82544 June 27, 1994
FACTS: Petitioners were arrested on 27 February 1988 by agents of the CID by virtue of
Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner. Petitioners were suspected alien
pedophiles. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in
the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. On 7
March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code. On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.
On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied
considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. On 4 April 1988
petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a
self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed
under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the
Board of Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain
conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion
was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners detention is valid notwithstanding that there is no provision in
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners
pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative
investigation.
HELD: Yes. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance
with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part: The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien Section 37(a) is not
constitutionally proscribed. The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions,
which are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature.
Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. Moreover,
The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings. There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. What is essential is that there
should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair
hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the
charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code explicitly provides: Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign
power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands
or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which
such action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the
charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation
of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. The denial by
respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order
because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by
the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that
the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. As
deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional
guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
155
1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued
by it to be approved by the President before they become effective.
2. No. On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by
the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will
not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is
not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the
number of existing processing plants." Accordingly, it was ordered: Sec. 1. The Philippine
Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the
number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival
of the remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing
processing plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants
for the above purpose. In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March
24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new
coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby,
forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous
one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of
production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in
case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. Instead of determining
the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit,
the PCA now relies entirely on competition with all its wastefulness and inefficiency to do
the weeding out, in its naive belief in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat
of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition,
underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign
trade performance of the coconut industry.
PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby
declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine
Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.
157
Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line
between the PET and the Supreme Court.
Section 4, Paragraph 7 of Article 7 of the Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
Section 12, of Article 8 provides:
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.
159
HELD: The Court ruled that, in resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the
merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts. In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order
of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own
determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He
failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC
judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should
have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw
160
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ
Secretary.
162
163
tax assessed; in which case, the corresponding interests and penalties shall be condoned.
PNOC's tax liability could not be considered a delinquent account since (1) it was not selfassessed, because the BIR conducted an investigation and assessment of PNOC and PNB
after obtaining information regarding the non-withholding of tax from private respondent
Savellano; and (2) the demand letter, issued against it on 08 August 1986, could not have been
a deficiency assessment that became final and executory by 31 December 1985. Given that
PNOC's tax liability did not constitute a delinquent account or a disputed assessment as of 31
December 1985, then it could not be compromised under E.O. No. 44.
2. No. It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered with by the courts; but when the exercise of such functions by the administrative
officer is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the
courts to set matters right, with the Supreme Court having the last say on the matter. The
discretionary power of the BIR Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior
over the power of judicial review by the courts. In this case, the BIR Commissioner's authority to
compromise, whether under E.O. No. 44 or Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, can
only be exercised under certain circumstances specifically identified in said statutes. The BIR
Commissioner would have to exercise his discretion within the parameters set by the law, and in
case he abuses his discretion, the CTA may correct such abuse if the matter is appealed to
them.
3. No. The new BIR Commissioner, Commissioner Ong, had acted well within his
powers when he set aside the compromise agreement, dated 22 June 1987, after finding that
the said compromise agreement was without legal basis. It had been declared in Hilado v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, et al. that an administrative officer, such as the BIR
Commissioner, may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in
office. The construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors
if, thereafter, the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should be given.
165
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A
Case List for Administrative Law
Prepared by: Leo Angelo Lacar
Chapter 1 General Considerations
1. Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
2. Maceda vs. ERB, GR Nos. 95203-05, Dec. 18, 1990; 192 SCRA 363
Chapter 2 Administrative Agencies
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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APPENDIX B
Case Assignment for Administrative Law Cases
Prepared by Leo Angelo N. Lacar
Aballe:
Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
Beja, Sr. vs. CA, 207 SCRA 689
Ursal vs. CTA, 101 Phil. 209
Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. CA, 357 SCRA 441
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. CA, 477 SCRA 49
Abilla:
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 678
ACWSU Broadcasting Networks vs. NTC, 397 SCRA 574
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
TOMMI vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597
Roman Cruz vs. People, GR No. 110436, June 27, 1994
Albrecht:
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258
Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236
Tadlip vs. Borres, 474 SCRA 441
COMELEC vs. Espaol, 417 SCRA 554
Alzate:
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. CIR, 302 SCRA 241
Luzon Polymers Corporation vs. Clave, 209 SCRA 711
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418
Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. ERC, 432 SCRA 157
Antanani:
Rubenecia vs. CSC, 244 SCRA 640
Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177
Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, 427 SCRA 46
Balbuna vs. Sec. of Education, 110 Phil. 150
Arbison:
PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA, 469 SCRA 397
De Jesus vs. COA, 294 SCRA 152
Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary,
238 SCRA 63
Asistido:
People vs. Santos, 62 Phil. 300
US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 300
Peralta vs. CA, 462 SCRA 382
Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441
Bucoy:
Tio vs. VRB, 151 SCRA 208
Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329
People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640
Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732
Cabreros:
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