Model of a philosophical essay

Are we free?
We are asked to address the question Are we free?, but freedom is an equivocal
concept since we may use it at least in two different ways. On the one hand we may
understand freedom as absence of coercion, like when we use expressions such as I have my
passport, Im free to travel to a different country or Ive been released from prison, Im
finally free. On the other hand we use a different concept of freedom when we use
expressions such as Im free to choose whether I want to drink this glass of water or not or
I could have acted differently, I had free choice. Were going to call the first kind of
freedom just freedom and the second kind free will.
It seems that freedom presupposes free will, therefore in order to be able to answer the
question of whether we have freedom, weve better address the question of whether we have
free will before, so in this essay we will understand the question Are we free? as Is our
will free?. But again, this issue needs further explanation. To most people it appears to be
obvious that they have the power to decide what to do provided nothing external coerces
them, that is, for them freedom is all thats needed. Nevertheless we can ask ourselves about
the origin of that will to decide what to do, and this is precisely the problem of free will: Is it
up to us not what to do but what to want? Do we have not just the power to act freely in
accordance with our will, but the power to freely have the will we want? Does what I wish
depend on me?
In the following paragraphs well address this problem through the analysis of the
different options concerning the origin of our will, of our desires, and therefore indirectly the
origin of our actions. Firstly we will consider the notion of fate, just as a means towards
clarifying the concept of free will through opposition to that notion. Secondly we will
consider whether free will is compatible with a determinist account of the nature of human
beings, and try to prove that it isnt. Thirdly we will contemplate the other possibility,
indeterminism, as an option compatible with free will, and again try to prove that it isnt.
From the incompatibility of free will with both determinism and indeterminism, and the idea
that necessarily one of them has to be the case, we will infer as a conclusion that theres no
case for free will.
Lets consider the myth of Acrisius, king of Argos, in order to fully understand what
free will means by comparing it with its traditionally sworn enemy: fate. Acrisius was warned
by the Oracle of Delphi that one day he would be killed by his grandson, so he imprisoned his
only and yet childless daughter Danae. Despite this precaution, Zeus, turned into golden rain,
impregnated her. Both mother and son (Perseus) were thrown to the sea in a closed chest.
Both survived and a grown up Perseus, after great deeds like killing Medusa, participated in
some athletic games throwing the discus. Acrisius was attending those same games, ignorant
that his daughter and grandson were alive. When throwing the discus Perseus slipped, and
accidentally killed Acrisius with the discus, thereby fulfilling the prophecy.

It is obvious that Perseus did not kill Acrisius freely (in fact, it was an accident),
everything seems set up already by some supernatural forces (the Greek gods). Could we
make sense of this picture without resorting to the supernatural? It seems that the Oracle
knew in advance the whole series of events which would lead to the death of Acrisius, it
made a perfect prediction. A modern oracle would be science: Edmond Halley predicted the
solar eclipse of May 3 of 1715 to within four minutes accuracy. Knowing the laws of nature
and all the relevant events of the past, knowing all the relevant variables, a future event is
predictable, or so says determinism, the modern version of fate which challenges free will.
The question is then: Are our actions predictable (even though were unable to consider all
the variables and therefore unable to actually predict them)? Are our actions events of the sort
that science would be able to predict or not? The possible answers to that question are just
two: a) yes, our actions are predictable; b) no, our actions are unpredictable. Lets consider
first possibility a).
Many human actions are predictable: if two lovers finally see each other after many
months apart, we expect that theyll hug and kiss each other as soon as they meet. We have
nevertheless the impression that, though predictable, that event is not necessarily going to
happen, it could not happen. According to determinism this is just an illusion. If we could
really have all the information (all the physical circumstances but also access to any single
belief and desire of the subjects), we could determine the motivation of each agent. Of
course, sometimes different intentions are at stake, but knowing everything we may know
which intention is heavier and will cause the motive to act and the consequent action. Human
beings actions wouldnt be substantially different from natural events, just more complex. If
this is so, any single action is necessarily caused by antecedent events, but antecedent series
of events are not under our control, therefore our actions are not fully under our control. If we
are just deterministic mechanism, theres no way our will could be free, our will is the result
of previous events which are not up to us. Lets try then option b).
The result of throwing a dice (an ideal dice) is unpredictable. Of course we can make
statistics and calculate a result, but that result would be merely probable whereas Halleys
eclipse was certain. I may have had a series of, say, one hundred sixes in a row with my dice,
I could still have another one. Are human beings like dice? Are our actions undetermined?
Lets suppose they are, would something like this be possible? Randomness is not free
will, dice are no freer than planets.
Both possibilities a) and b) considered, it seems that, whether our actions be
determined or undetermined, described by molecular or by quantum physics, it seems that
free will doesnt exist. If really free will is truly necessary for freedom, and freedom is a
requisite for moral responsibility, holding human agents morally responsible for their actions
would be equivalent to punishing a ball for falling because of the law of gravity or an
electron for being in the position P2 instead of P27. Or maybe free will isnt required for moral
responsibility but this hypothesis would require another essay.
In the previous paragraphs it has been shown that the concept of a free will, that is,
self-determined, is not coherent either with determinism or indeterminism, but either the
causation of our desires, principles and actions is determined or undetermined. Therefore,
free will is just an illusion since: either our will is determined by previous events and the laws

of nature (and neither of them are up to us) or our will fails to be determined by our own
values and desires (and it will be the product of an arbitrary process). Are we free?
Apparently not, if freedom requires free will.