Knowlege On Collision Avoidance and Safety of Navigation Among Selected Deck Officers at Maersk Filipinas

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna
COLLEGE OF MARITIME EDUCATION

KNOWLEDGE ON COLLISION AVOIDANCE AND SAFETY OF NAVIGATION
AMONG SELECTED DECK OFFICERS AT MAERSK FILIPINAS
An Undergraduate Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the College of Maritime Education
In Partial Fulfilment of the

Requirements for the Degree
Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation
By:
Dan Rigor B. Mortiz
Angel Nico A. Sarino
John Petterson M. Sotto

March 2016
March 2016


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The researchers wish to acknowledge with profound gratitude the invaluable help
extended help to them by the following in completion of the study:
To God Almighty, for giving them courage to face all difficulties that came along their
way and for giving the researcher strength and wisdom and to finish the entire study, for His
blessing and guidance as well;
To Dr. Ferdinand C. Somido, their school director, for his supervision in giving every
Perpetualite a high quality of education for them to be globally competitive in their chosen field;
To Dr. Pedrito Jose Bermudo, Dean of College of Arts and Sciences for his patience and
guidance in finishing this study and for giving the researchers the thesis topic they use in their
study;
To Prof. Leomar S. Galicia, their thesis adviser and editor, for imparting his researcher
skills, for his never ending guidance all throughout the revisions of the papers, for the inspiration
and encouragement to bring out the best in them from the time they started researching up to the
final oral defense;
To Engr. Araceli C. Corpuz, their statistician, for generously sharing her knowledge and
skills in the field of statistic, for identifying the problems and for determining how to obtain data
and values necessary for solving the problem;
4

To C/E. Billy Boregas, Dean of College of Maritime Education, for giving them
permission to conduct their research; and
To the Deck Officers at Maersk Filipinas who served as their respondents, for their
cooperation in accomplishing this study.
The Researchers
DEDICATION
First and foremost, I would like to gratefully dedicate this study to my family, who has
supported me morally and financially and who really serves as my inspiration from the very
beginning until we finished this study. Thank you for believing that I could accomplish things on
my own.
To Prof. Leomar S. Galicia, our thesis adviser and editor and to Engr. Araceli C. Corpuz,
our statistician who have patiently guided us and helped us all the time, this thesis would not be
possible without them. To the thesis committee, Dr. Dalisay G. Bantatua, Prof. Melissa P. Cabria,
and Engr. Araceli C. Corpuz, thank you for helping us to make this study better. To Dr. Pedrito
Jose Bermudo thank you for your patience and guidance in finishing this study and for giving us
the thesis topic we use in our study. To C/E. Billy Boregas, our Dean, thank you for giving us
permission to conduct this research.
To my thesis mates, Angel Nico A. Sarino and John Petterson M. Sotto I just want to say
that we did it, I know that this thesis truly measured our friendship and our patience; we almost
gave up, but here we are, were done with it.

And most of all a sincere thank you to God as a source of our life, for giving me enough
strength, patience and courage to make this study all throughout.
D. R. B. M.
DEDICATION
To my loving Parents,
I thank them for all their support to me.
I cannot make this possible without them.
I love you Mama and Papa.
To my thesis mates,
Especially to Dan Rigor B. Mortiz,
We cannot make this research without him.
He always reminds us to pursue and finish our thesis in the times of laziness.
This research has totally measured our friendship.
6

To my loving girlfriend Maria Karen,
I thank her for being my inspiration.
She is always there to cheer me up in the times of giving up.
I love you Mahal.
Most of all I sincerely thank God.

I'm blessed and I thank God for every day for everything that happens for me.
A. N. A.
S.
DEDICATION
To our God
Who deserves all the praises and glory.
My thesis mates,
Dan Rigor B. Mortiz and Angel Nico A. Sarino
Wi.thout them this thesis would not be possible
I especially Thank Dan for being patient to me

J. P. M. S
THESIS ABSTRACT
Thesis Title
:
Knowledge on Collision Avoidance and Safety of
Navigation
Among Selected Deck Officers at Maersk Filipinas.
Authors
Dan Rigor B. Mortiz
Angel Nico A. Sarino
John Petterson M. Sotto
Degree
Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation
School

8

Academic Year
2015-2016
Thesis Adviser
Leomar S. Galicia, MAEd
Number of pages
60
A major concern for the navigator during a voyage is collision avoidance. Ship collision
avoidance is an important research domain in maritime science. The collision risk is one of the
major reasons threaten safety at sea. Efficient marine navigation through obstructions is still one
of the many problems faced by the mariner. Many accidents can be traced to human error,
recently increased traffic densities and the average cruise speeds of ships impedes the collision
avoidance decision making process further in the sense that decisions have to be made in reduced
time. It seems logical that the decision making process be computerized and automated as a step
forward to reduce the risk of collision. This study reviews the development of collision avoidance
techniques and path planning for ships, particularly when engaged in close range encounters.
Designed with descriptive correlation of research, this study sought to determine the level
of knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of navigation among selected deck officers at
Maersk Filipinas. Specifically, it answered the following sub-problem: the respondents profile in
terms of age and rank; the respondents perceived level of knowledge on collision avoidance; the
respondents perceived level of knowledge on safety of navigation; significant difference in the
respondents perceived level of knowledge on collision avoidance when grouped according to
their profile variables; significant difference in the respondents perceived level of knowledge on
safety of navigation when grouped according to their profile variables; significant relationship
between the respondents perceived level of knowledge on collision avoidance and their
perceived level of knowledge on safety of navigation.
Based on the data gathered, the following findings were made: As to age, sixteen (16) or
53.3% aged 22-35 years old while fourteen (14) or 46.7% aged 36 and above. On the other hand,
as to rank, twenty-six (16) or 53.3% were under operational level while fourteen (14) or 46.7%
were under management level; an average weighted mean of 3.99 revealed that the respondents
had very high level of knowledge on collision avoidance; an average weighted mean of 3.65
revealed that the respondents had very high level of knowledge on safety of navigation; for the
difference in the level of knowledge on collision avoidance when the respondents are grouped
according to profile variables, both age and rank obtained a p value of 0.359 which was higher
than the 0.05 level of significance. This shows that there is no significant difference in the
respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance when they are grouped according to age
and rank. This means that the respondents have the same level of knowledge on collision
9

avoidance regardless of their age and rank; for the difference in the level of knowledge on safety
of navigation when the respondents are grouped according to age, a p value of 0.025 was
obtained which was lower than the 0.05 level of significance. This shows that there is a
significant difference in the respondents level of knowledge on safety of navigation when they
are grouped according to age. This means that the younger group of respondents are more
knowledgeable on safety of navigation than the older group of respondents. As to rank, a p-value
of 0.014 was obtained which was lower than the 0.05 level of significance. This shows that there
is a significant difference in the respondents level of knowledge on safety of navigation when
they are grouped according to rank. This means that those who are under the management level
have higher level of knowledge on safety of navigation than those who are under the operational
level; for the relationship between the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance
and safety of navigation, a Pearson r value of 0.350 was obtained. A p value of 0.058 which is
higher than the 0.05 level of significance shows that there is no significant relationship between
the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of navigation. This means
that the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance has no bearing on their level of
knowledge
on
safety
of
navigation.
Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were arrived at: majority of
the respondents were sixteen (16) or 53.3% aged 22-35 years old while fourteen (14) or 46.7%
aged 36 and above. On the other hand, as to rank, sixteen (16) or 53.3% were under operational
level while fourteen (14) or 46.7% were under management level; the respondents had very high
level of knowledge on collision avoidance; the respondents had had very high level of knowledge
on safety of navigation; the respondents had the same level of knowledge on collision avoidance
regardless of their age and rank; the younger group of respondents were more knowledgeable on
safety of navigation than the older group of respondents. Meanwhile, those who were under the
management level had higher level of knowledge on safety of navigation than those who were
under the operational level; the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance had no
bearing on their level of knowledge on safety of navigation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
10

Title page
i
Recommendation for Oral Examination

ii
Approval by the Panel of Examiners

iii
Acknowledgement
iv
Dedication
v
Thesis Abstract
viii
Table of Contents
ix
Chapter 1 THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

Introduction
1
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework
3
Operational Framework
4
Operational Model
5
Statement of the Problem
5
11

Statement of the Hypothesis
6
Assumptions of the Study
7
Scope and Delimitation
7
Significance of the Study
7
Definition of Terms
8
Chapter 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES

State of the Art
9
Related Literature
9
Related Studies
14
Synthesis of the State of the Art
31
Gap/s Bridged by the Present Study

32
Chapter 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

12

Research Design
33
Sources of Data
33
Population of the Study
34
Instrumentation and Validation
34
Evaluating and Scoring
35
Data Gathering Procedure
35
Statistical Treatment of Data
36
Chapter 4 PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

37
Chapter 5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Findings
51
Conclusions
53
Recommendations
54
13

References
55
Appendices
Letter of Approval
Questionnaire
Certificate of Statistical Analysis with SPSS Software
Editors Certification
Statisticians Certification
Curriculum Vitae
14

Chapter 1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
Introduction
A major concern for the navigator during a voyage is collision avoidance. Ship collision
avoidance is an important research domain in maritime science. The collision risk is one of the
major reasons threaten safety at sea. Efficient marine navigation through obstructions is still one
of the many problems faced by the mariner. Many accidents can be traced to human error,
recently increased traffic densities and the average cruise speeds of ships impedes the collision
avoidance decision making process further in the sense that decisions have to be made in reduced
time. It seems logical that the decision making process be computerized and automated as a step
forward to reduce the risk of collision. This study reviews the development of collision avoidance
techniques and path planning for ships, particularly when engaged in close range encounters.
The Collision Regulations (COLREGs) is the essential international arrangement which
regulates the rules of the roads at sea. Many discussions on COLREGs have continued since its
first submission related to its application. It seems unlikely to make a radical change on
COLREGs even on its manner of introduction. So it would be better to improve new methods to
ensure the effective use of COLREGs in particular in the field of education and training. The
introduction of a collision avoidance display that focus on real-time presentation of danger areas
1

in true motion enables the navigator to judge collision risk for any acquired target and
simultaneously identify suitable evasive manoeuvres.
Over the decades, scholars and experts have actively researched strategies for collision
avoidance. This is because accidents such as ship collisions or groundings frequently happen,
due to factors relating to the territorial waters navigated in, wave and weather conditions, traffic
density, condition of ship body and navigator experience/skill.
The study of Lazarowska (2012) found out that technological development led to an
increased
marine
trafc,
which
caused
navigation to become more demanding
for deck ofcers. Carrying out navigation represents a complex process, because it requires
continuous analyzing of huge amount of information. Incorrect assessment of current
navigational situation can lead to collision situations often with very tragic consequences.
Therefore, it is necessary to support deck ofcers in anti-collision decision making process. The
Nautical Institute (2007) has investigated the causes of collisions and groundings over the past 10
years, in which human error was the primary cause. The research also indicated that most
incidents take place outside VTS areas, indicating that VTS works effectively, considering that
most close quarter situations take place in VTS areas. For both collisions and groundings, there
are no internationally agreed attributions for causes and many of the investigated incidents were
attributed to multiple causes. It is important to solve these problems because Maritime accidents
are rarely the result of one human error, rather a sequence of human errors by those conducting
2

the vessels. A collision can potentially cost human lives, cause pollution and loss of money.
Collision should theoretically be avoided if every vessel abided by the International Rules for the
Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG), which came into force in 1977.
Ship-ship collisions have the potential to cause serious maritime accidents with human
casualties and environmental damage. Based on analyses of accidents at sea the reasons for
collisions are mostly due to human error: bad lookout both by sight and by radar; insufficient
adjustment of the radar for weather conditions, inappropriate speed of the vessel according to the
navigational situation, lack of bridge team and bridge resource management, superficial
communication between the crew on the bridge and/or with the pilot, excessive reliance on
navigational devices, watch-keeping with an insufficient number of people on the bridge,
misinterpretation of the traffic situation, misinterpretation of information obtained from
navigational aids, ignorance and disregard of the COLREG rules, etc. In addition to these
reasons, there are also accidents due to stress, fatigue and impaired judgment of navigators
(Dekker, et al, 2002).
Considering the foregoing standpoint, the purpose of this research was to determine the
knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of navigation among selected deck officers at
Maersk Filipinas.

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework
This study utilized the theory of Jansson (2005) on Collision Avoidance, stating that
avoiding collisions is a crucial issue in most transportation systems as well as in many other
applications. The task of a collision avoidance system is to track objects of potential collision risk
and determine any action to avoid or mitigate a collision. This thesis presents theory for tracking
and decision making in collision avoidance systems. The main focus is how to make decisions
based on uncertain estimates
and in the presence of multiple obstacles. A general framework for dealing with nonlinear
dynamic systems and arbitrary noise distributions in collision avoidance decision making is
proposed. Some novel decision functions are also suggested. Furthermore, performance
evaluations using simulated and experimental data are presented. Another study was based upon
the theory of Pedersen (2013), which is Dempster-Shafer Theory based on ship-ship collision,
Pedersen said that the use of AIS has provided a major improvement in the information available
on the maritime traffic in an area and has changed the way of developing the modeling of the
probability of collision between ships on a route. The AIS system, mandatory installation in the
terms established by the SOLAS convention, provides data on the position, velocity, type and
length of the vessels navigating in a route. These data allows the trajectories of ships (the position
data of each vessel are sorted chronologically). It is also possible to model traffic, defining routes
resulting from the clustering of the trajectories in areas of high traffic density.
4

Operational Framework
This study was anchored on Janssons (2005) Theory of Collision Avoidance, Jansson
said that avoiding collisions is a crucial issue in most transportation systems as well as in many
other applications. The task of a collision avoidance system is to track objects of potential
collision risk and determine any action to avoid or mitigate a collision. This thesis presents
theory for tracking and decision making in collision avoidance systems. The main focus is how to
make decisions based on uncertain estimates and in the presence of multiple obstacles. A general
framework for dealing with nonlinear dynamic systems and arbitrary noise distributions in
collision avoidance decision making is
proposed. Some novel decision functions are also suggested. The diagram below shows the
relationship between the level of knowledge in collision avoidance and the level of deck officers
knowledge about safety of navigation.
Operational Model
Dependent/Independent Variable
Independent Variable
Respondents
Knowledge on
Collision Avoidance
Respondents
Profile
Age
Rank

Dependent Variable
Respondents
Knowledge on Safety
of Navigation
Figure 1. The operational model of the study showing relationship among variables.
Statement of the Problem

This study sought to determine the perceived level of knowledge on collision avoidance and
safety of navigation among selected deck officers at Maersk Filipinas. Specifically, it answered
the following sub-problems:
1. What is the respondents profile in terms of:
1.1 age; and,
1.2 rank?
2. What is the respondents perceived level of knowledge on collision avoidance?
3. What is the respondents perceived level of knowledge on safety of navigation?
4. Is there a significant difference in the respondents perceived level of knowledge on
collision avoidance when grouped according to their profile variables?
5. Is there a significant difference in the respondents perceived level of knowledge on safety
6

of navigation when grouped according to their profile variables?
6. Is there a significant relationship between the respondents perceived level of knowledge
on collision avoidance and their perceived level of knowledge on safety of navigation?
Statement of the Hypotheses:

The study tested the following null hypothesis:
Ho1: There is no significant difference in the respondents perceived level of knowledge on
collision avoidance when grouped according to their profile variables.
Ho2: There is no significant difference in the respondents perceived level of knowledge on
safety of navigation when grouped according to their profile variables.
Ho3: There is no significant relationship between the respondents perceived level of knowledge
on collision avoidance and their perceived level of knowledge on safety of navigation.
Assumptions of the Study
The study rested on the following assumptions:
1. Collision at sea can be avoided.
2. Safety is paramount in traveling.
3. The respondents answered the questionnaire objectively.
Scope and Delimitation

The scope of the study evolved on the level of knowledge on collision avoidance and
7

safety of navigation of selected deck officers at Maersk Filipinas. The respondents were the thirty
(30) who were applying for their next contract. This study was conducted during the A.Y. 20152016.
Significance of the Study

This study could benefit the following individual or groups:
College of Maritime Education as the institution responsible for the cadets improvement of
knowledge on collision avoidance and to be responsible onboard regarding the safety of
navigation.
Deck Officers this study could help them to filter those who are qualified and will meet the
International Regulations in Preventing Collision at Sea, part of which is the knowledge in
collision avoidance of the applicants;
Future Researchers this study could help them gather more knowledge and information about
preventing collision at sea.
Definition of Terms
For a better understanding of the discussions of this paper, the following terms are defined
both conceptually and operationally.

Knowledge refers to the amount of facts or information about an idea, object, or person which a
person knows possesses. (Webster Dictionary, 2004).
Collision an accidental contact between two or more vehicles or ships which causes damage.
(Duhaimes Law Dictionary).
Avoidance refers to the act or practice of keeping away from something undesirable. (Merriam
Webster, 2009).
Safety refers to the condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury, or loss.
(Merriam Webster, 2009).
Navigation refers to the method of determining position, course, and distance traveled.
(Merriam Webster, 2009).
Deck Officer in the studyrefers to the ships officer who is part of the deck crew, whose
responsibilities include navigation, cargo handling, etc.
Maersk Filipinas is a worldwide conglomerate that operates in some 130 countries with a
workforce of over 89,000 employees. Owning the worlds largest container shipping company,
Maersk is involved in a wide range of activities in the shipping, logistics, and the oil and gas
industries.

Chapter 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This chapter presents the review of the related literature, studies, both local and foreign,
regarding the avoidance of collision and the safety of navigation.
State of the Art
The data gathered focused on the avoidance of collision and safety of navigation. The
researchers gathered the data from book, newspaper, magazines, reference manuals and the
Internet to provide support in the data analysis of this study.
Related Literature
Collision avoidance is a central issue to maritime safety, collisions can result in the loss of
human life and have grave economic and environmental consequences. As identified by Petersen
and Nielsen (2001) the means available for maintaining the required degree of safety is limited
which makes the issue of supporting navigators in avoiding collisions central to maritime safety.
What makes this even more pressing is the fact that the seas are becoming ever more densely
populated with giant vessels.
The tool known as the Advanced Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) is designed to aid the
navigator in his decisions and reduce the danger of collision. It displays the surrounding marine
10

traffic flow within a specified range, augmenting the icons corresponding to other ships
otherwise known as target ships
with alphanumeric data when those targets are selected by the operator. The data gives the
operator an understanding of the target ships
position, bearing, speed, Time to Closest
Point of Approach (TCPA) with own ship and Distance at Closest point of Approach (DCPA)
with own ship. Target ships are also presented with vectors which are arrows protruding from the
bow of the target ship and own ship. The vectors are a graphical representation of the heading of
the target ship while the tip of the vector communicates where the target ship or own ship will be
in a pre-set period of time. A safety envelope can also be determined by setting a minimum safety
DCPA which if violated sounds an aural alarm to alert the navigator. The graphical ARPA display
is therefore able to augment the human perceptual system making it very useful in understanding
the surrounding marine traffic.
There are aspects of the system identified and outlined by Liu and Pedersen (on 2004)
that could be improved. According to the authors the numerical display of anti-collision
information is not very compatible with the capabilities of the human perceptual system, thereby
hindering the process of information extraction. Secondly, the navigator has to judge the potential
collision dangers from the analysis of large amount of numerical information of target ships, and
then make decisions on how to act and take necessary evasive actions. The processing of large
amount of data increases their mental workload and is time-consuming when the navigator is
11

confronted with many targets simultaneously. The authors reference the findings of Cockroft
(1984) that when the workload is high and beyond a navigators processing abilities, it will result
in poor decision making and errors. Thirdly, current ARPA display does not provide sufficient
information in the interface to support navigators problem-solving, or say, knowledge-based
behavior (Rasmussen, on 1986). A standard procedure for collision
risk assessment with utilization of ARPA is firstly to observe true vector display to get an idea of
the true traffic flow, then switch display to relative vector where the vector assumes that the
target ship will hold true to the last data collected about it and finally turn on Trial manoeuvre
mode and trial out the effect of a proposed course and/or speed change. The navigator then
decides an evasive manoeuvre, switches off Trial manoeuvre mode and once again observes the
true vectors of targets before finally taking a manoeuvring action. Having to switch between the
true and trial displays is not optimal but rather disruptive, wasting precious time and separation
between vessels as the navigator decides the best course of action. Further it indicates the
limitations of the representation provided as the navigator lacks enough information to build an
updated mental model that could be used to reason about the situation and possible solutions. Liu
and Pedersen (on 2004) propose a direct perception ARPA display that would address the
aforementioned issues. The authors argue that to improve navigators' collision avoidance
assessment activities, the collision danger areas should be visualized in the display. This
visualization is based on the proposal made by Pedersen et al (2003,2004) in which collision
12

danger areas are displayed as cone-shaped regions (Collision Danger Sector, hereinafter CDS) to
acquired targets. With this type of display the risk of a collision can simply be assessed by
viewing the tip of the own ships velocity vector in relation to the CDS. If the tip is within the
CDS then there is a risk of a collision and any manoeuvre that takes the own ships velocity vector
out of the CDS can be described as a collision avoidance manoeuvre.
Collision avoidance can be said to be a bit like riding a bicycle. After a (frequently)
wobbly start, once people get the hang of it, the ability never leaves them. However, knowledge,
understanding
and the correct application of the Rules do take a little time to accomplish. The Rules are not
intended to be an intellectual challenge. They are a logical protocol designed to keep vessels
apart and to provide a complete and sufficient framework, within which to defend yourself, your
vessel and the lives of others. Here then, are a few tricks of the trade: In collision avoidance,
time is of the essence. Dont waste it; Never assume that any other vessel will comply with the
Rules; Nowhere do the Rules state that a vessel should stand into danger (Price, on 2013).
According to Patraiko (2013) two facts spring to mind. Firstly, some reports claim that as
many as 60% of collisions happen when either one or both ships dont even see each other until it
is too late to avoid colliding (often in fine weather). Secondly, it is fair to say that a collision at
sea can ruin your whole day. Our industry expects our shipboard Navigators to avoid all
collisions, 100% of the time throughout their entire careers often making such critical
13

manoeuvres alone without the support of other officers checking their decisions. This is a big ask.
Professionalism in the task of avoiding collisions is essential. It is critical to stay alert and
focused at all times; and it is crucial to know how to keep a proper lookout by all appropriate
means (Rule 5) and to determine if risk of collision exists (Rule 7). These means consist of
many traditional techniques, not least of which is the use of sight and hearing, but also many
modern tools, such as ARPA and AIS. Ships often sail close to navigational hazards and in
congested waters. These waters are due to grow ever more congested as seaborne trade increase,
and water space diminishes. The former resulting from a recovering economy and
environmental / political pleasure to shift goods by sea rather than road; the latter due to
competition from issues such as offshore energy installations, aquaculture and environmental
restrictions.
According to Dhir (2013) the Navigator has to be aware of the manoeuvering ability of
his or her vessel, and means of lookout available. Size should not really be the deciding factor for
rules. And Richard (2013) putting yourself in the position of the other vessel can in many
instances, avoid risk of collision or even a close quarters situation arising in the first place.
According to Price (2013) it is helpful to think of the Colregs as ship separation rules.
This mindset helps encourage early and positive actions. It is better to make an early adjustment
to course or speed than to spend too much time using VHF, radar features or ECDIS/AIS to make
an assessment. Know how much sea room you have. Dont stand on from long range if you
14

dont have to. Conversely, dont leave it too late. If standing on and the lack of response from the
give way vessel is making you unhappy, do something. The Rules provide all the freedom you
need. Anticipation is the key to success. Potential collision avoidance issues can even be
anticipated during passage planning and the watch-keeping plan adjusted to suit. The chart and
sailing directions can reveal a lot about what to expect. Know your vessels needs in terms of
visibility, sea room, response timings and draft. This gives you the ranges at which various rules
are triggered and defines safe speed.
According to Trevor (2013) we determine risk all the time: when walking down a
crowded street, we tend to be instinctively aware if we are going to walk into somebody or if they
are going to do the same to us. As professional navigators, we should be able to apply this same
inherent sense to our watch-keeping and lookout practices; with experience there will often tend
to be an instinctive awareness of the potential of risk of collision with another vessel. Yet instinct
is far from the only way of determining the risk of collision. So, how should you interpret all
available means? What do you
have at your disposal to determine risk of collision? The primary tool should be the mark one
eyeball, assisted by the compass repeater. On some vessels this may be placed on the centreline
of the wheelhouse, although this is not universal by any means. A regular and careful check of the
compass bearing of any approaching vessel will give the navigator an early and effective
15

indication of the potential risk of collision. Bear in mind there must be an appreciable change in
the bearing before you can be confident that risk of collision does not exist.
Related Studies
One of the most important factors for the safety of navigation is to ensure proper collision
avoidance manoeuveres in a congested traffic area. There are many aids for this purpose; for
example, an ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid), which is mandatory for certain ships and
which is expected to be effective. (Iijima et al., 2009). Chang et al., (on 2003) said that collision
avoidance is an intensive discussion issue for navigation safety. Collision avoidance is believed,
in a sense, to prevent groundings, the striking of fixed obstacles and ships colliding. Over the last
half-century despite improvements in navigational aids such as ARPA and attempts to raise the
standards of training through various STCW conventions, collisions still occur. Many studies and
accident reports indicate that the accidents are caused by either human error or are associated
with human error as a result of inappropriate human responses. Collisions commonly represent
the majority of these accidents. (Acar et.al. on 2011). Ship collision avoidance has become
essential due to the emergence of special vessels like chemical tankers and VLCCs (very large
crude carriers), etc. The information needed for safe navigation is obtained by combining
electrical equipment with real-time visual information. However,
misjudgements and human errors are the major cause of ship collisions according to research
data. The decision support system of Collision avoidance is an advantageous facility to make up
16

for this. Collision risk evaluation is one of the most important problems in collision avoidance
decision supporting system. A review is presented of different approaches to evaluate the
collision risk in maritime transportation. In such a context, the basic concepts and definitions of
collision risk and their evaluation are described. The review focuses on three categories of
numerical models of collision risk calculation: methods based on traffic flow theory, ship domain
and methods based on dCPA and tCPA (Xu and Wang, 2014).
Navigation is a process that depends crucially on the navigators knowledge, experience
and judgment. A collision can potentially cost human lives, cause pollution and loss of money.
Collision should theoretically be avoided if every vessel abided by the International Rules for the
Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG), which came into force in 1977. Study of
collisions, groundings, contacts and near collisions reported to the Marine Accident Investigation
Branch (MAIB) in the timeframe 1994 2003, revealed that the COLREGs were contravened to
varying degrees on all the vessels involved in collisions (MAIB, 2004). The most common
contributory factors in all the collisions were poor lookout and poor use of radar. Technology has
advanced with regard to radar and ARPA, and the number of crew on vessels has decreased in
parallel with increased automation. The Officer of the Watch (OOW) place more and more
reliance on radar and ARPA to maintain lookout and to assess the risk of collision. Also many
newer vessels are not even equipped with a gyro pelorus on the bridge with which to take a visual
bearing. It is therefore disturbing that the OOWs on 73% (of
17

33 collisions (MAIB, 2004)) of the vessels involved in collision potentially contravened
COLREG 7(b) or 7(c) (IMO, 1972) which state: Rule 7(b) proper use shall be made of radar
equipment fitted and operational, including long range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of
collision and radar plotting or equivalent observation of detected objects. Rule 7(c)
Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty radar
information (Takle, 2011).
The captain, or master, of a large ship has total command in the high seas. However, when
a ship enters or leaves a port, orenters a river or channel, the captain turns over navigation to a loc
al pilot. Because of safety and commercial concernsstate and federal maritime law governs the lic
ensing and regulation of pilots(Wenner et al., 2008). Deck officers carry out the most important
tasks of navigation and cargo handling on ships. As the rules of navigation and shipping are
constantly changing, deck officers are required to keep themselves updated with the latest
knowledge to insure the avoidance of collision and safety of navigation (Raunek,
2012).Knowledge disparity among deck officers of the same rank is highly subtle
(Klangboonkrong, 2008). Heath (2003) stated that tacit knowledge is experiential and less
susceptible to codification and sharing. Also regarded as know-how, it is acquired through
experience and often resembles intuition. Seafarers that have more experience has the higher
knowledge in the maritime industry.
18

The collision risk is one of the major reasons threaten safety at sea. The Collision
Regulations (COLREGs) is the essential international arrangement which regulates the rules of
the roads at sea. Being also a legal document, the language of the COLREGs is not so apparent
for the end users (navigators) and this causes some misunderstandings and ambiguity. Many
discussions on COLREGs
have continued since its first submission related to its application. It seems unlikely to make a
radical change on COLREGs even on its manner of introduction. So it would be better to
improve new methods to ensure the effective use of COLREGs in particular in the field of
education and training. It is aimed to review the existing studies on COLREGs and recent
improvements in the maritime education, and investigate applicable and reliable solutions to
reduce the negative impacts experienced during the application of the COLREGs (Demirel,
2015).
The study of Lazarowska (2012) found out that technological development led to an
increased marine trafc, which caused navigation to become more demanding for deck ofcers.
Assertion of safe navigation simultaneously with minimal operational costs constitutes the main
issue in present day marine transport. Carrying out navigation represents a complex process,
because it requires continuous analyzing of huge amount of information. Incorrect assessment of
current navigational situation can lead to collision situations often with very tragic consequences.
Therefore, it is necessary to support deck ofcers in anti-collision decision making process.
19

Currently onboard a ship the function of anti-collision system is accomplished by Automatic
Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA). According to the requirements of Safety of Life at Sea Convention
(SOLAS), enacted by International Maritime Organization (IMO), all ships of 10 000 gross
tonnage and over constructed on and after 1 July 2002 have to be equipped with Automatic Radar
Plotting Aid. ARPA system provides the possibility to track automatically at least 20 targets. The
system also generates dangerous target alarm which indicates that the computed values of Time
to the Closest Point of Approach (TCPA) and Distance of the Closest Point of Approach (DCPA)
exceed the specied safe limits. ARPA system
offers also a collision avoidance support function called trial manoeuvre. By using this function
the deck ofcer has the opportunity to check the effects of own ship planned manoeuvre. It
enables simulation of course change as well as speed change of own Decision support system for
collision avoidance at sea vessel. Therefore there is still a possibility to improve performance of
anti-collision system by implementation of a decision support system automatically determining
the safe trajectory of own ship. Human error causes 75-96 % of marine accidents. Application of
a system eliminating human subjectivism in decision making process will cause the number of
ship accidents to decrease, providing protection of human life and health, transported cargo and
natural environment. Moreover the system will also assure economical transport by taking into
account optimality criterion in the form of the smallest lost of way on overtaking other ships.
20

The Nautical Institute (2007) has investigated the causes of collisions and groundings
over the past 10 years, in which human error was the primary cause. This was conducted from
data obtained from the UK MAIB, Australian Safety Transport Bureau, Swedish Accident
Investigation Board, Transport Accident Investigation Commission (NZ), Transport Safety Board
of Canada, US Coast Guard Marine Board Reports, National Transportation Safety Board (US),
Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (Japan), Isle of Man Ship Registry, Irish Marine Casualty
Investigation Board (IMCIB), and Accident Investigation Board of Finland. Data was also
obtained from The Nautical Institute publications Stranding and their Causes and Collisions and
their Causes, as well as from the Institutes MARS database. Collisions and groundings due to
mechanical and structural failures were not taken into account, nor were incidents where vessels
dragged anchor, collided with quays and jetties or were
under control of tugs. These constituted about 40 per cent of all incidents of collision and
grounding, leaving 60 per cent of incidents accounted for by direct human error. The research
also indicated that most incidents take place outside VTS areas, indicating that VTS works
effectively, considering that most close quarter situations take place in VTS areas. For both
collisions and groundings, there are no internationally agreed attributions for causes and many of
the investigated incidents were attributed to multiple causes. Therefore, for the purpose of this
research, each attribution was recorded. For instance, it is accurate to say that 23 per cent of
incidents were attributed to poor or no lookout and that 13 per cent were attributed to unaware
21

of other vessel but it would not be accurate to group these as 36 per cent, as the summation may
contain the same incident in each category. Of the collisions investigated, 24 per cent were due to
insufficient assessment of the situation, 23 per cent to poor lookout and, significantly, in 13 per
cent of the collisions they were completely unaware of the other vessel until (or just before) they
collided. Other causes were due to confusion of VHF communications, infractions of the Colregs,
fatigue and OOW falling asleep, poor bridge management and pilot/master communications
breakdown.
Another study of Tsou and Hsueh (2010) stated that maritime traffic is becoming more
complex every day. At present, due to technological advances and to new maritime regulations,
there is increasing demand for new nautical marine instruments to be installed into the bridge,
and the breadth of navigational information complicates on-duty officers decisions. Therefore, if
decision support tools can be used to help deal with navigational decision-making, human errors
arising from subjective judgments can be reduced, and sea transport safety improved.
Marine navigation system development will result in the following impacts: for the safe
navigation of the ship First, the ship must be installed of the navigation devices (AIS and
RADAR, etc.) with the predicted collision Inter-base, and by implementing programs and danger
alarms, it will provide early collision between ships that would enable to prevent accidents.
Secondly, due to the dangerous goods in advance, it would be able to prevent accidents in the sea
by providing reminders and risk indicator for utilizing real-time of the ship's position and by
22

orienting the extract information of the dangers from electronic chart based on the international
standard 'S-57'. Third, shipping accidents and loss of life caused by pollution and protecting the
public property will be expected by the general public welfare. Fourth, unlike conventional
marine navigation equipment, it will maximize the user's convenience and smart devices by
diffusion through the use of marine navigator and will enable the industry to target small and
medium-sized ship with increased utilization. This provides real time information to the user of
his own boat and other boat after interface of various support equipments for sailing upon
installation and operation of boat. This large vessels are operating in the electronic chart display
installed (ECDIS: Electronic Chart Display & Information System) for real-time route planning
and route monitoring (Min et al., 2014).
Efficient marine navigation through obstructions is still one of the many problems faced
by the mariner. Many accidents can be traced to human error, recently increased traffic densities
and the average cruise speed of ships impedes the collision avoidance decision making process
further in the sense that decisions have to be made in reduced time. It seems logical that the
decision making process be computerized and automated as a step forward to reduce the risk of
collision. This article reviews
the development of collision avoidance techniques and path planning for ships, particularly when
engaged in close range encounters. In addition, previously published works have been
23

categorized and their shortcomings highlighted in order to identify the state of the art and issues
in close range marine navigation (Tam, 2009).
Ever since the International Regulations for Prevention of Collision at Sea (IRPCS) were
introduced as a control system for collision avoidance, there have been disputes and arguments
about exactly what they mean, and how they should have been applied in particular collision
incidents. The principle of deciding by international agreement which ships should be given the
duty of keeping clear of other ships generally works well but, as traffic volumes increase, so do
situations in which the IRPCS alone do not provide a clear indication of what is expected of the
mariner. Various solutions have been addressed to this problem, ranging from proposed radical
revisions of the whole principle of collision avoidance, through periodic thoughtful adjustments
to the details of the IRPCS, to informal additions and requirements imposed by individual ship
owners on their fleets. The residual problem with any solution (except perhaps the first
mentioned) is that there will always be exceptions where the rules are unclear or ambiguous.
Adding adjustments may reduce these exceptions but, unless all uncertainties can be removed,
the adjustments may create a new and even more complex set of exceptions, which are yet more
difficult to interpret. (Taylor, 2000).
According to Shimizutani, (2002) for safety, the navigator makes decisions to alter a
ships course or change her speed by use of his navigational information. If this information is
24

uncertain, the process of his decisionmaking has an ambiguity, and he becomes unsure. It is
considered that an
uncertainty of information has a strong relation with the results of his decision-making. And so
the quantification is necessary as the measurement of the navigational information. Therefore, an
idea of the mutual information that can measure quantitative information's uncertainty is useful
for one method of the quantification of the navigational information. The differences among
mutual information from the visual sight, Radar, and ARPA have already been proposed.
At present, a ships navigator gather much navigational information from his visual sight
and other modern navigational aids, especially Radar, Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA),
Electric Chart Display System (ECDIS) and ship borne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS).
New navigational systems built in the computer are changing the complicated and conservative
navigators work to the modern and monitoring work. If a navigator does not understand any
contents of information from those new systems, the navigator might take a wrong decisionmaking and action as a result (Shimizutani, 2001).
As a result, mutual information from the visual sight is greater than that from Radar, and
the Radar is a little more than that from the ARPA. Then, under the above circumstance the
navigator's judgment, decision-making, and the action to avoid a collision, the visual sight has
considerable uncertainty when compared with information from Radar and ARPA. Therefore, it is
needed to investigate the navigators cognitive process (cognitive information, judgment,
25

decision-making, and action). At the first step of investigation, in this paper, some basic and
cognitive experiments focused on navigators cognitive process (judgment, decision-making, and
action) to avoid a collision were carried out. On these experiments, the navigational simulator
with distinguished visual system is used,
and the professional deck officers joined for the subjects of this experiment. There are two visible
conditions. One is a good visible condition, and the other is poor visible condition. In the good
visible case, the experimental subject should judge whether a target has the risk of collision from
the visual sight only. In the poor one, he should judge it from information of Radar or ARPA
respectively (Kubota, 2010).
Corbet (2010) stated that radar has been in general use in merchant ships since the end of
the Second World War and during this time the Regulations for the Prevention of Collision at sea
have undergone two amendments at International Safety Conferences, in 1948 and 1960. The
amended regulations were ratified and brought into use in 1954 and 1965 respectively. The 1948
regulations made no reference to the use of radar whatsoeverradar for commercial use was still
in its infancy in 1948 and indeed little was then known about its capabilities and limitations, nor
of the operational difficulties it was going to present even before these 1948 regulations were
finally ratified in 1954.
According to Sato and Ishii (2008) the avoidance of ship collisions is becoming essential
from the viewpoint of maneuvering ships safely in crowded or crossing areas. The information
26

needed for safe navigation is currently obtained by combining radar data with information
obtained visually. However, misjudgments accompanying visual observations comprise a major
cause of ship collisions. For this reason, the authors have been pursuing a study of ship collisionavoidance systems, including the use of radar and infrared imaging. In this study, they have
obtained a method for measuring the course of a target vessel, and for the evaluation of the risk
of a collision by extracting images of a target ship from an infrared image. As a result of this
study, this paper demonstrates and asserts that the
effective and simultaneous use of radar and such images can improve performance in terms of
collision avoidance.
Ship-ship collisions have the potential to cause serious maritime accidents with human
casualties and environmental damage. Collision avoidance is a major operative task for the
Officers of the Watch (OOW). Large volumes of marine traffic data are available from the
shipboard ARPA and AIS systems. However, complicated and congested traffic conditions may
cause workloads and stress that challenge navigational safety. Of paramount importance are
therefore the quality and availability of anti-collision information and how the OOW process,
understand and use this information (Takle, 2011).
The study of Statheros et al., (2008) provide a a spherical understanding about
autonomous ship navigation for collision avoidance (CA) and a theoretical background of the
reviewed work. Additionally, the human cognitive abilities and the collision avoidance
27

regulations (COLREGs) for ship navigation are examined together with water based collision
avoidance algorithms. The requirements for autonomous ship navigation are addressed in
conjunction with the factors influencing ship collision avoidance. Humans are able to appreciate
these factors and also perform ship navigation at a satisfactory level, but their critical decisions
are highly subjective and can lead to error and potentially, to ship collision. The research for
autonomous ship navigation may be grouped into the classical and soft computing based
categories. Classical techniques are based on mathematical models and algorithms while softcomputing techniques are based on Artificial Intelligence (AI). The areas of AI for autonomous
ship collision avoidance are examined in this paper are evolutionary algorithms,
fuzzy logic, expert systems, and neural networks (NN), as well as a combination of them (hybrid
system).
According to Mou et al., (2010) due to high density of vessel traffic, busy waterways are
water areas with high potential for collisions. The application of AIS makes it possible to
investigate accurate and actual behavior of collision-involved ships, and benefits vessel traffic
management and waterways design for these areas. As a case study, the authors focus on a Traffic
Separation Scheme (TSS) off Rotterdam Port in Europe, and using AIS (Automatic Identification
System) data, statistical analysis is made for collision involved ships. In order to identify the
correlation of CPA (Closest Point of Approach), which is a key indicator for collision avoidance,
with ship's size, speed, and course, linear regression models are developed. To assess risks, a
28

dynamic method based on SAMSON (Safety Assessment Model for Shipping and Offshore on
the North Sea)is presented.
The potential human, environmental, and economical consequences of collisions at sea
are grave. Yet the means available for maintaining the desired degree of safety are relatively
limited. The issue of how to support navigators in avoiding collisions is central to maritime
safety, and the subject matter is increasingly pressing as the already giant vessels are still
growing in number and size. Enhanced support for collision avoidance at sea must be rooted in
reality. That is, we must understand the present practices and problems of collision avoidance
before we can hope to propose truly useful safety enhancements. The present paper seeks to
contribute to such an understanding. We base our analysis of collision avoidance at sea on
empirical studies. We go aboard one of the worlds largest container carriers, and follow her
during departure from Felixstowe (UK) and the subsequent approach
to Rotterdam (NL). The objective is to understand collision avoidance as seen from the
perspective of the navigating crew: To understand what information the crew need in order to
perform safe collision avoidance, and to analyze some of the central obstacles to achieving the
desired informationan initial analysis which is intended to provide part of the foundation for a
structured conceptualization of information requirements in collision avoidance at sea. Collision
avoidance involves two or more seagoing vessels that have to cooperate and coordinate their
individual operations to avoid ending up in the same place at the same time. In order to avoid
29

colliding with other vessels the crew need to know certain things about their own vessel, and they
need to know certain things about the foreign vessels involved in the collision avoidance scenario
(Nielsen and Petersen, 2007).
Based on analyses of accidents at sea the reasons for collisions are mostly due to human
error: bad lookout both by sight and by radar; insufficient adjustment of the radar for weather
conditions, inappropriate speed of the vessel according to the navigational situation, lack of
bridge team and bridge resource management, superficial communication between the crew on
the bridge and/or with the pilot, excessive reliance on navigational devices, watch-keeping with
an insufficient number of people on the bridge, misinterpretation of the traffic situation,
misinterpretation of information obtained from navigational aids, ignorance and disregard of the
COLREG rules, etc. In addition to these reasons, there are also accidents due to stress, fatigue
and impaired judgment of navigators (Dekker, 2002, Zhengjiang, 2003; Diestel, 2005, Gale,
2007; Tzannatos, 2010).
Maritime accidents are rarely the result of one human error, rather a sequence of human
errors by those conducting the vessels. They are a result of activities on the bridge, where one
wrong decision
leads to another, etc. (Rudan, 2012). These so called active errors or errors of operators were
already defined by Reason in his model of a human error, which he called the Swiss Cheese
model. According to this model the accident is a sum of errors a system error. He divided errors
30

into active and latent errors, where the latent were considered as human errors indirectly linked to
the accident errors by system designers, organizational managers, agents, etc. (Reason, 1990).
Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) divided the aspect of human error in aviation into six main
areas: cognitive, ergonomic, behavioral, health, psycho-social and organizational. The cognitive
aspect observes the mental functioning of the operator, focusing on his perception/processing of
information, and, consequently, decision making. The ergonomic aspect deals with man-machine
interaction; the behavioral aspect in particular highlights the problem of the behavior of operators
(safety culture). The health aspect considers human error as a consequence of psychological or
physiological symptoms (illness or fatigue). The psychosocial aspect considers mutual relations
between people on vessel - with other departments, etc. The organizational aspect of human error
looks at the impact of the organization (eg., the shipping company) on human errors that lead to
maritime accidents. Similarly, Chauvin (2011) presented the role of the human factor in maritime
accidents, dividing it into three levels: the cognitive factor, the social interpersonal factor and the
latent (organizational/system) factor. Of course we cannot forget to mention that the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO)
deals with the problem of human factors/human error in maritime by implementing laws and
regulations for working conditions, the working environment, as well as the living environment
for seafarers, as this is crucial when discussing safety on vessels. The most important
implemented instruments are; the International Safety Management (ISM) Code,
31

Seafarers Training, the Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code, Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA), Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and other important resolutions like
A.850(20) on the human element vision, principles and goals for the organization, as well
A.890(21) on principles of safe manning (along with the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea - SOLAS chapter V. Reg.14).
Human factor related risks, such as fatigue, safety culture, competency of seafarers or
breaking the sea route rules, stood out as the most prominent risks to maritime safety at the Gulf
of Finland. Human factor related policies were also seen as the most effective to improve
maritime safety in future. Shipping companies own activity in safety matters, in other words self
regulation, was perceived to be most effective way to improve maritime safety. Many human
factor related policies, such manning, competence requirements and employment and working
conditions of seafarers are issues that seem to have major development potential compared to the
current situation according to the results of the questionnaire.
However, when asked about
concrete measures to prevent an oil accident at the Gulf of Finland, the development of VTS
operations and piloting got the highest scores, although there were many references to various
human factor related policies as well. How to interpret this discrepancy? One explanation can be
that although it is widely acknowledged that something should be done to human factor issues it
is difficult to find good policies which would tackle the human error. For instance, many human
factor connected issues such as safety culture, language, authority or communication are all
32

complex issues that are determined by individual and institutional relationships that may or may
not be affected by jurisdiction and other policy instruments (Hetherington et al. 2006; Roe 2009).
The problem is also how to encourage and support shipping companies to operate
responsibly and safely which would probably decrease the role of human error in accidents. On
the other hand, in many studies both VTS and piloting (e.g. Darbra et al. 2007; Great Barrier
Reef Shipping Review Steering Committee 2001; Uluscu et al. 2009, Walker 2000) have been
perceived to be effective measures to decrease the risks of maritime traffic. When thinking
about the characteristics of both piloting and VTS, they practically mean that some outside the
ship contributes to safe navigation either a pilot or a VTS operator. This raises a question that
does not the shipping industry believe in its own abilities to increase the effect of human factor,
but it merely relies on outside expertise, like VTS.
According Griggs (2012) Human error has been identified in an estimated 80% of all
commercial and military maritime accidents. Crew sizes on commercial merchant ships are
characteristically smaller than military vessels. Commercial merchant ships rely on automated
technology in order to reduce crew sizes. Since next generation naval ship designs are leveraging
automated technology in order to reduce manning, an examination of commercial ship accidents
is warranted. Two independent raters coded 518 findings from 48 maritime mishap reports using
the Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
taxonomy. Inter-rater reliability was calculated using Cohens Kappa and a final result of 0.72
33

was determined for HFACS Level I. HFACS analysis identified relationships among the HFACS
levels and collision, allision, and grounding accidents. Logistic regression analysis identified six
patterns stemming from latent conditions and active failures. This was used to develop a
modified hazard analysis to identify how latent conditions aligned in the accident event chain,
and to propose intervention measures. The
research concluded that a maritime version of HFACS should be adopted to improve the
reliability of classifying causal factors. Additionally, by employing human factors post-accident
research the Navy may be able to develop possible intervention strategies for the fleet.
Rothblum (2010) stated that over the last 40 years or so, the shipping industry has focused
on improving ship structure and the reliability of ship systems in order to reduce casualties and
increase efficiency and productivity. Weve seen improvements in hull design, stability systems,
propulsion systems, and navigational equipment. Todays ship systems are technologically
advanced and highly reliable. Yet, the maritime casualty rate is still high. Why? Why is it, with
all these improvements, we have not significantly reduced the risk of accidents? It is because ship
structure and system reliability are a relatively small part of the safety equation. The maritime
system is a people system, and human errors figure prominently in casualty situations. About 7596% of marine casualties are caused, at least in part, by some form of human error. Studies have
shown that human error contributes to: 84-88% of tanker accidents, 79% of towing vessel
groundings, 89-96% of collisions, 75% of allisions, 75% of fires and explosions. Therefore, if we
34

want to make greater strides towards reducing marine casualties, we must begin to focus on the
types of human errors that cause casualties. One way to identify the types of human errors
relevant to the maritime industry is to study marine accidents and determine how they happen.
Chairman Jim Hall of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has said that
accidents can be viewed as very successful events. What Chairman Hall means by successful is
that it is actually pretty difficult to create an accident (thank goodness!). Accidents are not usually
caused by a
single failure or mistake, but by the confluence of a whole series, or chain, of errors. In looking at
how accidents happen, it is usually possible to trace the development of an accident through a
number of discrete events. A Dutch study of 100 marine casualties found that the number of
causes per accident ranged from 7 to 58, with a median of 23. Minor things go wrong or little
mistakes are made which, in and of themselves, may seem innocuous. However, sometimes when
these seemingly minor events converge, the result is a casualty. In the study, human error was
found to contribute to 96 of the 100 accidents. In 93 of the accidents, multiple human errors were
made, usually by two or more people, each of whom made about two errors apiece. But here is
the most important point: every human error that was made was determined to be a necessary
condition for the accident. That means that if just one of those human errors had not occurred, the
chain of events would have been broken, and the accident would not have happened. Therefore, if
we can find ways to prevent some of these human errors, or at least increase the probability that
35

such errors will be noticed and corrected, we can achieve greater marine safety and fewer
casualties (Rothblum, 2010).
Synthesis of the State of the Art

The related literature and studies presented by the researchers were all appropriate to the
matter of investigation and all information in collision avoidance, in which actions could be taken
in case of danger. Many accidents like collision and grounding can be traced to human error. It is
the primary cause of these accidents in the study of Dekker, (2002), Zhengjiang, (2003): Diestel,(
2005): Gale, (2007): Tzannatos, (2010): (Rudan, 2012): (Statheros et al., 2008): (The Nautical
Institute 2007) (Tam,
2009). The reviewed literature and studies seems logical that the decision making process can be
computerized and automated as a step forward to reduce the risk of collision and in the safety of
navigation in the studies of Lazarowska, (2012): Shimizutani, (2002): Sato and Ishii (2008):
Corbet, (2010): Mou et al., (2010): Tsou and Hsueh (2010).
Gap/s Bridged by the Present Study

With regard the above review of related literature and studies, the researchers
determined the following gaps:
36

1. There was no study conducted yet concerning the local of the respondents
which was at the Maersk Filipinas.
2. Even though there were studies conducted along knowledge on collision
avoidance and safety of navigation there was a need of improvement to the structure of the study
considering higher number of respondents.
Considering the above gaps, the study looked into the knowledge on collision
avoidance and safety of navigation among selected deck officers at Maersk Filipinas.
Chapter 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides a discussion of the methods and procedures utilized to achieve
goals of this study. This includes the research design, sources of data, population of the study,
instrumentation and validation, data gathering procedure, and statistical treatment of data study.
Research Design
37

The type of research design that was used in this study was descriptive-correlational
method. Descriptive research endeavours to describe systematically, factually, accurately and
objectively a situation, problem or phenomenon (Bermudo, et.al, 2010). In correlational research,
the researchers try to probe the significance of relationship between two or more factors or
characteristics (Bermudo, et.al, 2010). The researchers employed this method to determine the
level of knowledge on collision avoidance and safety navigation among selected deck officers at
Maersk Filipinas.
Sources of Data
There were two sources of data for this study namely: primary and secondary sources.
The primary sources of data for this study were the respondents who took Bachelor of Science in
Marine Transportation. The secondary sources of data were articles, journal, books, and theses
that were considered related to this study.
Population of the Study

The respondents of this study entitled; knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of
navigation among selected deck officer at Maersk Filipinas were the thirty (30) who were
applying for their next contract, the actual sample of the study was chosen through convenience
38

sampling technique which is the process of picking out respondents in the most convenient and
fastest way to immediately get their reactions (Bermudo, et al, 2010).
According to Gay (1976), a minimum number of thirty (30) respondents is needed for a
descriptive-correlational research.
Instrumentation and Validation
The questionnaire was used as the instrument to generate data of the study. The survey
instrument was designed by the researchers. It was consisted of three parts. Part 1 was about
respondents profile, Part 2 was about respondents knowledge on collision avoidance and Part 3
was about Respondents knowledge on safety of navigation.
The instrument underwent face and content validity. The instrument was validated by
the panel of experts; one in research, one in statistics, and one in the field of Maritime Education
who evaluated and critiqued the tool. Afterwards, all their suggestions and recommendations
were incorporated in the final draft of the questionnaire.
Evaluation and Scoring
39

The respondents knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of navigation were
measured in terms of a four point likert scale with the assigned points, together with their
corresponding numerical ranges and verbal interpretations;
Assigned points
Numerical Ranges
Categorical Responses
Verbal
Interpretations
4
(3.51 - 4.00)
Strongly Agree
Very High
(2.51 3.50)
Agree
High
(1.51 2.50)
Disagree
Low
(1.00 1.50)
Strongly Disagree
Very Low
Data Gathering Procedure

The researchers wrote a request for the Dean of the College of Maritime Education. Upon
approval, the questionnaires were personally administered by the researchers with the guidance
of their thesis adviser. Prior to which, the researchers briefed the respondents about the contents
and purposes of the study. After it, the questionnaires were retrieved, tallied, tabulated, and
subjected to statistical treatment.
40

Statistical Treatment of Data

The researchers used the following statistical tools to analyze the data gathered:
1. Percentage, used to describe the respondents profile.
2. Weighted Mean, used to determine the respondents level of knowledge on (a)
collision avoidance and (b) safety of navigation.
3. t test, used to determine if there is significant difference in the respondents
level of knowledge on (a) collision avoidance, and (b) safety of navigation when they are
grouped according to profile variables.
4. Pearson r, used to determine if there is significant relationship between the
respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of navigation.
41

Chapter 4
PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTEPRETATION OF DATA
This chapter presents the analysis and interpretation of the gathered data in supported to
the study.
1. Respondents Profile
Table 1
Profile of the Respondents
Profile
Frequency
Percentage
22 35 years
16
53.3
36 and above
14
46.7
Management Level
14
46.7
Operational Level
16
53.3
Age
Rank
Total Number of Respondents = 30

42

Table 1 shows the profile of the respondents. As to age, sixteen (16) or 53.3% aged 22-35
years old while fourteen (14) or 46.7% aged 36 and above. On the other hand, as to rank, twentysix (16) or 53.3% were under operational level while fourteen (14) or 46.7% were under
management level.
To sum up, majority of the respondents were 22-35 years old and under operational level.
2. Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision Avoidance
Table 2
Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision Avoidance
43

To avoid collision, I know that I
Weighted
Mean
Interpretati
on
Ran
k
1. have to comply with International Regulations of Preventing

Collisions at Sea.
3.97
Very High
8.5
2. need to reduce speed or stop if more time is needed to assess the

situation
3.97
Very High
8.5
3. have to maintain a safe speed to take proper and effective action

to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance.
4.00
Very High
3.5
4. have to use all available means appropriate to the prevailing

circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists
4.00
Very High
3.5
5. have to call or notify the master for taking over when I am in

doubt
4.00
Very High
3.5
6. have to stroll around the ship during my duty on navigational

watch
4.00
Very High
3.5
7. maintain a proper look-out at all times.
4.00
Very High
3.5
8. have to deem if such risk to exist if the compass bearing of an

approaching vessel does not appreciably change.
4.00
Very High
3.5
9. have to communicate with other vessels if risk of collision exists
3.97
Very High
8.5
10. must take early and substantial action to keep well clear if Im
the give-way
3.97
Very High
8.5
Average Weighted Mean
3.99
Very High
As shown in Table 2, Indicators 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 which state To avoid collision, I know

that I have to maintain a safe speed to take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be
stopped within a distance, To avoid collision, I know that I have to use all available means
appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision
44

exists, To avoid collision, I know that I have to call or notify the master for taking over when I
am in doubt, To avoid collision, I know that I have to stroll around the ship during my duty on
navigational watch, To avoid collision, I know that I maintain a proper look-out at all times,
To avoid collision, I know that I have to deem if such risk to exist if the compass bearing of an
approaching vessel does not appreciably change respectively all obtained a weighted mean of
4.00, ranked 3.5 and verbally interpreted as very high. Meanwhile Indicators 1, 2, 9, 10 which
state To avoid collision, I know that I have to comply with International Regulations of
Preventing Collisions at Sea, To avoid collision, I know that I need to reduce speed or stop if
more time is needed to assess the situation, To avoid collision, I know that I have to
communicate with other vessels if risk of collision exists, To avoid collision, I know that I
must take early and substantial action to keep well clear if Im the give-way respectively all
obtained a weighted mean of 3.97, ranked 8.5 and verbally interpreted as very high.
To sum up, an average weighted mean of 3.99 revealed that the respondents had very high
level of knowledge on collision avoidance.
This findings are contradicted by the studies of Dekker (2002), Zhengjiang (2003) Diestel
(2005), Gale (2007), Tzannatos (2010) they said that based on analyses of accidents at sea the
reasons for collisions are mostly due to human error: bad lookout both by sight and by radar;
insufficient
45

adjustment of the radar for weather conditions, inappropriate speed of the vessel according to the
navigational situation, lack of bridge team and bridge resource management, superficial
communication between the crew on the bridge and/or with the pilot, excessive reliance on
navigational devices, watch-keeping with an insufficient number of people on the bridge,
misinterpretation of the traffic situation, misinterpretation of information obtained from
navigational aids, ignorance and disregard of the COLREG rules, etc. In addition to these
reasons, there are also accidents due to stress, fatigue and impaired judgment of navigators.
46

3. Respondents Level of Knowledge on Safety of Navigation

Table 3
Respondents Level of Knowledge on Safety of Navigation
To have safe navigation, I know that I have to
Weighted
Mean
Interpretati
on
Ran
k
1. identify aids to navigation and point their position on the

paper chart.
2. do all the methods of obtaining ships position.
3.97
Very High
1.5
3.83
Very High
3. calculate the distance, average speed, course made good,

set and drift and estimated time of arrival (ETA).
4. interpret information from bridge equipment to identify
navigational hazards and fix vessel position.
5. determine the state of the tide at specified locations and
findings are applied to the passage plan.
6. do manual plotting to assure avoidance of collision.
3.90
Very High
3.5
3.90
Very High
3.5
3.87
Very High
5.5
3.87
Very High
5.5
7. plot own ships position without using radar.
3.97
Very High
1.5
8. depend on Electronic Chart Display and Information

System (ECDIS) as a primary means on navigation.
9. perform navigation using a sextant.
1.87
Low
10
3.67
Very High
10.steer the vessel using all the parameters of the Automatic

Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA).
Average Weighted Mean
3.70
Very High
3.65
Very High
47

As shown in Table 3, Indicators 1 and 7 which state To have safe navigation, I know that
I have to identify aids to navigation and point their position on the paper chart and To have safe
navigation, I know that I have to plot own ships position without using radar respectively both
got the weighted mean of 3.97, ranked 1.5 and verbally interpreted as very high. Meanwhile,
Indicators 3
and 4 which state To have safe navigation, I know that I have to calculate the distance, average
speed, course made good, set and drift and estimated time of arrival (ETA), To have safe
navigation, I know that I have to interpret information from bridge equipment to identify
navigational hazards and fix vessel position respectively both got the weighted mean of 3.90,
ranked 3.5 and verbally interpreted as very high. Moreover, Indicators 5 and 6 which state To
have safe navigation, I know that I have to determine the state of the tide at specified locations
and findings are applied to the passage plan, To have safe navigation, I know that I have to do
manual plotting to assure avoidance of collision respectively both got the weighted mean 3.87,
ranked 5.5 and verbally interpreted as very high. However, Indicator 2 which state To have
safe navigation, I know that I have to do all the methods of obtaining ships position got the
weighted mean of 3.83, ranked 7 and verbally interpreted as very high. In addition, Indicator
10 which state To have safe navigation, I know that I have to steer the vessel using all the
parameters of the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) got the weighted mean of 3.70, ranked
8 and verbally interpreted as very high. Furthermore, Indicator 9 which state To have safe
48

navigation, I know that I have to perform navigation using a sextant got the weighted mean of
3.67, ranked 9 and verbally interpreted as very high. Finally, Indicator 8 which state depend
on Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) as a primary means on navigation
got the lowest weighted mean of 1.87, ranked 10 and verbally interpreted as Low.
To sum up, an average weighted mean of 3.65 revealed that the respondents had very
high level of knowledge on safety of navigation.
These findings are contradicted by the studies of Hetherington et al. (2006) and Roe
(2009) stating that human factor related risks, such as fatigue, safety culture, competency of
seafarers or breaking the sea route rules, stood out as the most prominent risks to maritime safety
at the Gulf of Finland. Human factor related policies were also seen as the most effective to
improve maritime safety in future. Shipping companies own activity in safety matters, in other
words selfregulation, was perceived to be most effective way to improve maritime safety. Many
human factor related policies, such manning, competence requirements and employment and
working conditions of seafarers are issues that seem to have major development potential
compared to the current situation according to the results of the questionnaire. However, when
asked about concrete measures to prevent an oil accident at the Gulf of Finland, the development
of VTS operations and piloting got the highest scores, although there were many references to
various human factor related policies as well. How to interpret this discrepancy? One explanation
49

can be that although it is widely acknowledged that something should be done to human factor
issues it is difficult to find good policies which would tackle the human error. For instance, many
human factor connected issues such as safety culture, language, authority or communication are
all complex issues that are determined by individual and institutional relationships that may or
may not be affected by jurisdiction and other policy instruments.
4. Difference in the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision Avoidance When They

Are Grouped According to Profile Variables
Table 4
Difference in the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision Avoidance When They Are
Grouped According to Profile Variables
50

Statistical Test
Profile
Mean
(t test)
Age
X1 (22-35) = 3.9750
0.933
p-value
Interpretation
0.359
X2 (36 and above) = 4.0000
Rank
Not
Significant
X1 (Management Level) = 4.000
0.933
X2 (Operational Level) = 3.9750
0.359
Not
Significant
0.05 level of significance

As shown in Table 4, for the difference in the level of knowledge on collision avoidance
when the respondents are grouped according to profile variables, both age and rank obtained a p
51

value of 0.359 which was higher than the 0.05 level of significance. This shows that there is no
significant difference in the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance when they
are grouped
according to age and rank. This means that the respondents have the same level of knowledge on
collision avoidance regardless of their age and rank.
This finding is supported by the study of Raunek (2012) stating that deck officers carry
out the most important tasks of navigation and cargo handling on ships. As the rules of navigation
and shipping are constantly changing, deck officers are required to keep themselves updated with
the latest knowledge to insure the avoidance of collision and safety of navigation.
52

5. Difference in the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Safety of Navigation When They

Are Grouped According to Profile Variables
Table 5
Difference in the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Safety of Navigation
When They Are Grouped According to Profile Variables
Statistical Test
p-value
Profile
Mean
(t test)
Interpretation
Age
X1 (22-35) = 3.7250
2.369
0.025
Significant
2.624
0.014
Significant
X2 (36 and above) = 3.5714
Rank
X1 (Management Level) = 3.5643

X2 (Operational Level) = 3.7312

53

As shown in Table 5, for the difference in the level of knowledge on safety of navigation
when the respondents are grouped according to age, a p value of 0.025 was obtained which was
lower than the 0.05 level of significance. This shows that there is a significant difference in the
respondents level of knowledge on safety of navigation when they are grouped according to age.
This means that the younger group of respondents are more knowledgeable on safety of
navigation than the older group of respondents.As to rank, a p-value of 0.014 was obtained which
was lower than the 0.05 level of
significance. This shows that there is a significant difference in the respondents level of
knowledge on safety of navigation when they are grouped according to rank. This means that
those who are under the management level have higher level of knowledge on safety of
navigation than those who are under the operational level.
These findings are supported by the study of Wenner et al., (2008) stating that the
captain, or master, of a large ship has total command in the high seas. However, when a ship
enters or leaves a port, or enters a river or channel, the captain turns over navigation to a local
pilot. Because of safety and commercial concerns state and federal maritime law governs the
licensing and regulation of pilots.
54

6. Relationship Between the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision Avoidance and

Safety of Navigation
Table 6
Relationship Between the Respondents Level of Knowledge on
Collision Avoidance and Safety of Navigation
Variables
Pearson r
55
p value
Interpretation

Level of Knowledge on Collision 0.350

Avoidance and Safety of Navigation
0.058
Not
Significant

As shown in Table 6, for the relationship between the respondents level of knowledge
on collision avoidance and safety of navigation, a Pearson r value of 0.350 was obtained. A p
value of 0.058 which is higher than the 0.05 level of significance shows that there is no
significant relationship between the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance and
safety of navigation. This means that the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance
has no bearing on their level of knowledge on safety of navigation.
These findings are contradicted by the study of Klangboonkrong (2008) and Heath,
(2003) stating that knowledge disparity among deck officers of the same rank is highly subtle.
Tacit knowledge is experiential and less susceptible to codification and sharing. Also regarded as
know-how, it is acquired through experience and often resembles intuition. Seafarers that have
more experience has the higher knowledge in the maritime industry.
56

Chapter 5
Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation
57

This descriptive-correlational study sought to determine the perceived level of knowledge
on collision avoidance and safety of navigation among selected deck officers at Maersk Filipinas.
Specifically, it will answer the following sub-problems:
1. What is the respondents profile in terms of:
1.1 age; and,
1.2 rank?
2. What is the respondents perceived level of knowledge on collision avoidance?
3. What is the respondents perceived level of knowledge on safety of navigation?
4. Is there a significant difference in the respondents perceived level of knowledge on collision
avoidance when grouped according to their profile variables?
5. Is there a significant difference in the respondents perceived level of knowledge on safety of
navigation when grouped according to their profile variables?
6. Is there a significant relationship between the respondents perceived level of knowledge on
collision avoidance and their perceived level of knowledge on safety of navigation?
Summary of Findings
Based on the data gathered, the
following findings were made:
1. On the Respondents Profile

58

As to age, sixteen (16) or 53.3% aged 22-35 years old while fourteen (14) or 46.7% aged
36 and above. On the other hand, as to rank, sixteen (16) or 53.3% were under operational level
while fourteen (14) or 46.7% were under management level.
2. On the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision Avoidance
An average weighted mean of 3.99 revealed that the respondents had very high level of
knowledge on collision avoidance.
3. On the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Safety of Navigation
An average weighted mean of 3.65 revealed that the respondents had very high level of
knowledge on safety of navigation.
4. On the Difference in the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision Avoidance When
They Are Grouped According to Profile Variables
For the difference in the level of knowledge on collision avoidance when the respondents
are grouped according to profile variables, both age and rank obtained a p value of 0.359 which
was higher than the 0.05 level of significance. This shows that there is no significant difference in
the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance when they are grouped according to
age and rank. This
means that the respondents have the same level of knowledge on collision avoidance regardless
of their age and rank.
59

5. On the Difference in the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Safety of Navigation When
They Are Grouped According to Profile Variables
For the difference in the level of knowledge on safety of navigation when the respondents
are grouped according to age, a p value of 0.025 was obtained which was lower than the 0.05
level of significance. This shows that there is a significant difference in the respondents level of
knowledge on safety of navigation when they are grouped according to age. This means that the
younger group of respondents are more knowledgeable on safety of navigation than the older
group of respondents. As to rank, a p-value of 0.014 was obtained which was lower than the 0.05
level of significance. This shows that there is a significant difference in the respondents level of
knowledge on safety of navigation when they are grouped according to rank. This means that
those who are under the management level have higher level of knowledge on safety of
navigation than those who are under the operational level.
6. On the Relationship Between the Respondents Level of Knowledge on Collision
Avoidance and Safety of Navigation
For the relationship between the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance
and safety of navigation, a Pearson r value of 0.350 was obtained. A p value of 0.058 which is
higher than the 0.05 level of significance shows that there is no significant relationship between
the respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of navigation. This means
that the respondents
60

level of knowledge on collision avoidance has no bearing on their level of knowledge on safety
of navigation.
Conclusions
Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were arrived at:
1. Majority of the respondents were 22-35 years old and under operational level.
2. The respondents had very high level of knowledge on collision avoidance.
3. The respondents had had very high level of knowledge on safety of navigation.
4. The respondents had the same level of knowledge on collision avoidance regardless of their
age and rank.
5. The younger group of respondents were more knowledgeable on safety of navigation than the
older group of respondents. Meanwhile, those who were under the management level had higher
level of knowledge on safety of navigation than those who were under the operational level.
6. The respondents level of knowledge on collision avoidance had no bearing on their level of
knowledge on safety of navigation.
61

Recommendations
Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, the following recommendations are
proposed:
1. Deck officers should continuously attend seminars and trainings that would sustain
their competency and knowledge on collision avoidance and safety of navigation.
2. Deck officers should continuously update their knowledge on operating the
navigational equipments by attending relevant seminar and trainings.
3. Future researchers may duplicate the present investigation considering other variables
not mentioned in the study.
62

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APPENDICES

Knowlege On Collision Avoidance and Safety of Navigation Among Selected Deck Officers at Maersk Filipinas

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University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

COLLEGE OF MARITIME EDUCATION

In Partial Fulfilment of the

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Most of all I sincerely thank God.

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Dan Rigor B. Mortiz

Angel Nico A. Sarino

John Petterson M. Sotto

Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Leomar S. Galicia, MAEd

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Recommendation for Oral Examination

Approval by the Panel of Examiners

Chapter 1 THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Chapter 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES

Gap/s Bridged by the Present Study

Chapter 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Chapter 4 PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Chapter 5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

navigation to become more demanding

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Statement of the Problem

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Statement of the Hypotheses:

Scope and Delimitation

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

Significance of the Study

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

position, bearing, speed, Time to Closest

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna

University of Perpetual Help System Laguna