Carlos Gonzlez

B1695585

Public Policy of Compensation to Affected Communities by the

Construction of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam
In this paper I would like to discuss the most famous case in Guatemala
regarding compensation by the government to the people affected by the
construction of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam. A brief summary of the
background and political situation of the time is included. Also I would like to
discuss why the settlement of this case took so long (hasnt finished yet) and
the mistakes that the government made in my opinion.
Background
In 1975 Guatemala was facing problems related to energy. This was the main
motivator for the government to propose a really ambitious project involving
the construction of a hydroelectric dam, with the financial support of
institutions such as
BID (Inter-American Development Bank), BIRF
(International Bank of Reconstruction and Development) and World Bank (CEH,
1999). The proposed location for the project was
the Ro Negro (Black River), which flows through
the departments of Huhuetenango and Quich
to finally reach the departments of Alta Verapaz
and Baja Verapaz (see map by COVIAL fig.1).
In this area, it is said that the Maya Ach
community (about 75,000 indigenous) live for
many centuries. It was estimated that 463
families from this region (150 from the shore of
the Ro Negro) were officially recognized as
victims by the construction of the dam
(Colajacomo, 1999). Many of these people were
living from agriculture, among many other
activities, because the land close to the shore of the river was fertile. The dam
caused a huge flood that destroyed the communities close to it and their
means for surviving.
Fig. 1 Ro Negro
The government tried to start a program of relocation where the local
indigenous were going to be given land to continue living and for agriculture,
but many of them opposed because of a lack of trust towards the government.
Some of them accepted the negotiations and moved but when they saw the
negotiated land was not as they were promised, they came back to protest and
claim to what in their eyes was their right.
It is important to mention here that in Guatemala, there was a serious civil war
from 1960 to 1996 (CEH, 1999). This is relevant to this case because the
opposition from the locals to the hydroelectric dam and some confusing
incidents leaded the military government to associate the community with the

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B1695585
insurgent guerrilla. Also some people have argued that the government used
the insurgent argument to assassinate anyone who opposed to the
construction of the dam (Colajacomo, 1999). It was not until 1992 that the
survivors and affected people started asking for compensation to the
government.
Compensation by the government
Like it was mentioned before, the government created a relocation program for
the affected locals. This program included housing, land for cultivation and
compensation for the losses of crops. Unfortunately, this land didnt fulfill the
indigenous expectations because the land was not suitable for agriculture, and
the houses were poorly made and other services were not working well.
After many failed attempts of negotiating and many years of ignoring the case,
recently Guatemalan government passed the law: Policy for compensating
affected communities by the construction of Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam, whose
human rights were violated.
In this official document, a summary of all the quantified losses are as follows
(DCA, 2014):

3,865 flooded blocks (2,000 hectares of farming space)

23 small towns missing
471 houses destroyed
10 public buildings destroyed
45 archeological sites affected
Natural resources loss

This compensation policy involves many principles regarding human rights,

historical clarification, reparation and rehabilitation, and reconciliation.
The main actions taken by the government to compensate the victims can be
summarized in the next points (DCA, 2014):

Housing:
o Construction of 194 houses in Pacux community.
o Reparation of 254 houses in El Naranjo-Chcuxtn
Land:
o Acquisition of 6 blocks of land per family for Pacux and El Naranjo
community.
o Acquisition of land for common use (communitarian). For Pacux
50 acres and for El Naranjo 66 acres.
Road:
o Paving of roads in Pacux and El Naranjo to benefit 900 families
approximately.
Basic sanitation:
o Construction of water, sewage, and drainage systems for the
affected communities.

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B1695585

Improvement of healthcare system:

o Construction of health posts.
Other projects:
o Includes other projects such as roads, bridges, schools, water
distribution systems, and other housing and land acquisition
projects in other communities.
Paradigmatic change:
o The government will implement models that allow public
participation in all the stages in hydroelectric projects, including
distribution of profits and benefits.
o The government will promote laws for all the involved
stakeholders, to obey the before mentioned statements.
o Modify and adapt the existent laws and institutions to this new
model.
Knowledge and exposure of Chixoy case:
o The Chixoy case must be registered in educational material and
publications, in order to be used for similar cases regarding
hydroelectric dams.
Dignifying victims:
o Public apology by the government, as well as a presentation of the
compensation report.
Truth and justice:
o Research about the events regarding the Chixoy case, and
creation of a documentary about it.
Human rights:
o Free circulation in the sacred areas where there is still an access.
Rehabilitation measures:
o Reforestation.
o Improve the management of the Chixoy basins.
o Restoration of cultivation land, equal to the one flooded.
o Promoting agriculture with crops that can adapt to the region.
o Water supply to avoid communities consuming contaminated
water.
o Recovery of species.
o Environmental education program.
o Develop tourism industry in the affected communities.
Restitution measures:
o Retrieve archeological objects lost during the Chixoy project.
o Restoration/construction of lost infrastructure.

The whole compensation will require approximately $157 million over the
period 2014-2029 (15 years). For the purpose, the government also established
a plan to follow the achievement of the goals and results, and will be checking
it frequently.

Carlos Gonzlez
B1695585
Analysis and conclusions
The analysis of the Chixoy case is really complex because the context of the
country by the time it was built was really delicate, mainly because of the
political instability. So lets start by stating here that in Guatemala, indeed is
necessary to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment before any kind of
project. The Ministry of Environment has divided activities into three main
classifications (C, B, A):

o
o
o
o

Low impact or C1
Low to moderate impact B1
Moderate to high impact B2
High impact A1

In order to carry out the EIA, the contractor must find an authorized institution
or person that must evaluate the project. By the time the Chixoy project was
proposed, it is claimed by the government that EIA was done, and that they
established a plan for relocation and compensation.
The problem itself was not carrying out the EIA, but that the government took it
as merely another requisite and not as a serious solution or preventive
measure for the loss that was going to cause. In other words, they did it
because they had to, not because they wanted to find a solution for the
communities. Starting from here, it is easy to understand why the relocation
programs were a failure later. The government was not able to identify the
communities needs and their lifestyles. If they had done so, they would have
understood that the communities were relying almost entirely in the land
cultivation, and would have provided proper land for the purpose. Instead, the
government provided land were cultivation was not possible.
The second mistake of the government, was not listening to peoples voices,
when they tried to argue or comment about the dam construction. In this
context, Guatemala hasnt made much advancements regarding public
participation. It was not until recently that in some regions, before starting an
environmental critical project, the government calls for a wide consultation in
the region where the project is going to be carried out. By that time, the
government silenced people against the project by murdering them under the
guerrilla threat argument. Regarding public participation, Guatemala still has
a long way to go, but some improvements have been made so far. Like it was
mentioned before, in some projects government is calling for consultations and
also as part of the compensation policy, a compromise was subscribed to use
the negative experiences knowledge of the Chixoy case in future cases.

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The government didnt take responsibility for anything. After the project was
finished, many people were forced to move and couldnt find a place to live,
many others were murdered, and the government was not able to take any
immediate actions to rectify what they knew they had done wrong. The only
way the government started to feel pressure was when international
organizations (such as OEA) and NGOs got involved and exposed them. It was
until then that the discussions for this compensation policy started.
This case was really important from the learning perspective, because that is
not the only hydroelectric project that has been approved in Guatemala since
then (but it is the biggest). In fact, Guatemalas energy matrix depends to a
large degree in hydroelectric energy. That is why the Chixoy case must be
taken as reference for future projects of similar scale.
From now on in Guatemala, more cases involving big projects are likely to
appear: development is unavoidable. Sometimes projects like Chixoy will be
necessary for a developing country like Guatemala that is looking for
advancements and energy security.
For the purpose, some recommendations would be as follows:
o

The creation of EIA law specifically for large scale projects, or projects
with high environmental impact. Mainly with a focus on preserving the
protected areas and the indigenous groups. The existent laws right now
are insufficient to tackle this kind of projects. Since the EIA process for
big projects is vague, the improvement of this matter will reduce
significantly the lack of information or preventive actions like in the
Chixoy case.

The creation of a law or policy that promotes public participation. Tools

such as consultation, voting systems, roundtables, information access,
among others, should be prioritized. In some cases consultations are
being carried out for environmental critical projects but there is no
specific law or institution for the purpose. So because of this reason,
budget and means are sometimes vague and in consequence, public
participation is usually ineffective.

Involve NGOs in the process of these projects. This topic is closely

related to public participation, but extends the scope to international
NGOs and other organizations that usually support the local communities
and the environment. In the Chixoy case, the international organizations
and NGOs had a huge influence on the government and pressured it
exposing the case to an international level.

Evaluate other sources of energy. According to reports of the Ministry of

Energy and Mining, Guatemala has some potential for energy sources

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that hasnt exploited yet. For example, when it comes to solar energy,
wind energy, geothermal energy, among others, Guatemala hasnt make
enough studies for the feasibility of these kind of projects that in some
cases could lead to lower environmental impact.
To conclude, my personal belief is that prevention measures (such as effective
EIA) are much more important than compensation policies because in many
cases, there is no amount of money that can compensate certain losses. During
the Chixoy Hydroelectric construction, many archeological sites, biodiversity
(local species), and even human lives were lost. Many customs and sacred
lands from the Maya Ach were forgotten and human rights were violated. Many
of the victims already passed away and they wont even receive the financial
compensation (their families might get it instead), or receive any benefit from
the restoration to communities. So to prevent future cases like this, measures
like the ones suggested before must be taken, and use the information
acquired from this case as the base for future energy projects, and in general,
any project that involves people and biodiversity. This would be the real
compensation: preventing future cases from now on.

References

CEH. (1999). Guatemala, memoria del silencio. Guatemala: UNOPS.

CEH. (1999). Massacre and elimination of Ro Negro community. CEH
illustrative cases, 426.
Colajacomo, J. (1999). La represa Chixoy: El genocidio de los Ach. Asuntos
Indgenas, 15.
DCA. (2014). Policy for compensating affected communities by the construction
of Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam, whose human rights were violated.
Guatemala: Diario de Centroamrica.

http://copredeh.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/05-ACUERDO-GUBERNATIVO-3782014.pdf
http://www.marn.gob.gt/Multimedios/2582.pdf
http://www.rio-negro.info/che/represa.html
http://www.rio-negro.info/che/doc/CEH-RioNegro.pdf

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http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0489_AI_34_1999_Guatemala.pdf
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/guatemala/docs/publications/UNDP_gt_Prevy
Recu_MemoriadelSilencio.pdf