MONSANTO VS.FACTORAN,JR.

(170 SCRA
190,1989)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which

wasdenied,hencethispetition.

FACTS:

ISSUE:W/Napublicofficerwhohadbeengranted
anabsolutepardonbytheChiefExecutiveisentitled
toreinstatementtoherformerpositionwithoutneed
ofanewappointment.

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Monsanto

andthreeaccusedofthecomplexcrimeofestafathru
falsificationofpublicdocuments.
PetitionerMonsantoappealedherconvictiontothis
Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She
thenfiledamotionforreconsiderationbutwhilesaid
motion was pending, she was extended by then
PresidenMarcosabsolutepardonwhichsheaccepted.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be
restoredtoherformerpostasassistantcitytreasurer
sincethesamewasstillvacant.
PetitionersletterrequestwasreferredtotheMinistry
ofFinanceforresolution.TheFinanceMinistryruled
that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment not
earlierthanthedateshewasextendedtheabsolute
pardon.Italsodirectedthecitytreasurertoseetoit
that the amount of P4,892.50 which the
Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in
favorofthegovernment.

HELD:
NO. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is
deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
conviction by the Sandiganbayan and has assumed
thecharacteroffinality.
Theessenceofpardonistheremissionofguilt.Thus
pardon implies guilt. Pardon does not ipso facto
reinstateaconvictedfelontopublicofficewhichwas
forfeited by reason of the conviction. It should be
noted that public office is intended primarily for
collective protection, safety and benefit of the
common good.Thus, it cannot be compromised to
favorprivateinterests.Apardondoesnotvirtually
acquittheaccusedoftheoffensecharged.
Butthepardonrestoresthepetitionereligibilityfor
appointment tothe saidoffice.Thus,toregainher
formerpost,shemustreapplyandundergotheusual
procedurerequiredforanewappointment.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling,

petitioner wrote the Ministrystressing that thefull
pardon bestowed on her has wiped put the crime
whichimpliesthatherserviceinthegovernmenthas
never been interrupted and therefore the date of
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventivesuspension;thatsheisentitledtobackpay
fortheentireperiodofhersuspension;andthatshe
shouldnotberequiredtopaytheproportionateshare
oftheamountofP4892.50.

FACTS:

TheMinistryofFinancereferredpetitionersletterto
the Office of the President for further review and
action.

She was given an absolute pardon by

PresidentMarcoswhichsheaccepted.

TherespondentDeputyExecutiveSecretaryFactoran
denied the petitioners request and holds that
Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic
reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon
grantedher,butmustsecureanappointmenttoher
former position and that she is liable for the civil
liabilitytoherpreviousconviction.

In a decision by the Sandiganbayan

convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was
accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment and to indemnify the government in
thesumofP4,892.50representingthebalanceofthe
amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.

Petitionerrequestedthatsheberestoredto
herformerpostasassistantcitytreasurersincethe
samewasstillvacant,shealsoaskedforthebackpay
fortheentireperiodofhersuspension.

Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may

bereinstatedtoherpositionwithoutthenecessityofa
newappointment


The Office of the President said that that
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public
officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his
former position and entitlement to payment of his
salaries,benefitsandemolumentsduetohimduring
theperiodofhissuspensionpendentelite.

Infact,insuchasituation,theformerpublic
official mustsecureareappointment beforehecan
reassumehisformerposition.Andapardonshallin
nocaseexempttheculpritfrompaymentofthecivil
indemnityimposeduponhimbythesentence.

Petitioner argued that general rules on

pardoncannotapplytohercasebyreasonofthefact
thatshewasextendedexecutiveclemencywhileher
conviction was still pending appeal in this Court.
Therehavingbeennofinaljudgmentofconviction,
heremploymentthereforeasassistantcitytreasurer
could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited.

Thecourtviewedthatisnotmaterialwhen
the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction,fortheresultwouldstillbethesame

ISSUE:
(1)Effectsofafullandabsolutepardon
(2)WONapublicofficer,whohasbeengrantedan
absolutepardonbytheChiefExecutive,isentitledto
reinstatementtoherformerpositionwithoutneedof
anewappointment.

honesty,integrityandfairdealing.

Apardonlookstothefuture.Itisnotretrospective.It
makesnoamendsforthepast.Itaffordsnorelieffor
whathasbeensufferedbytheoffender.Itdoesnot
imposeuponthegovernmentanyobligationtomake
reparationforwhathasbeensuffered.

(2)
No. To insist on automatic reinstatement
becauseofamistakennotionthatthepardonvirtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grosslyuntenable.Apardon,albeitfullandplenary,
cannotprecludetheappointingpowerfromrefusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character,apoormoralrisk,orwhoisunsuitableby
reasonofthepardonedconviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from
publicofficeformspartofthepunishmentprescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsificationofpublicdocuments.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in

removing her disqualification from holding public
employmentbutitcannotgobeyondthat.Toregain
herformerpostasassistantcitytreasurer,shemust
reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
foranewappointment.
PEOPLEVS.SALLE(250SCRA581,1995)

HELD:

FACTS:

(1)
A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender;andwhenthepardonisfull,itreleasesthe
punishmentandblotsoutofexistencetheguilt,so
thatintheeyeofthelawtheoffenderisasinnocent
asifhehadnevercommittedtheoffense.Ifgranted
beforeconviction,itpreventsanyofthepenaltiesand
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching;ifgrantedafterconviction,itremovesthe
penaltiesanddisabilitiesandrestoreshimtoallhis
civilrights;itmakeshim,asitwere,anewman,and
gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless
expresslygroundedonthepersonsinnocence(which
is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for

Accusedappellants Francisco Salle, Jr. and Rickey

Mengotewerefoundguiltybeyondreasonable,doubt
as coprincipals of the compound crime of murder
and destructive arson. Appellants seasonably filed
theirnoticeofappeal.However,Sallefiledanurgent
motion to withdraw his appeal in view of his
acceptanceofthegrantofconditionalpardonbythe
President. Mengote was also granted a conditional
pardonandwasreleasedfromconfinement,butthe
latterdidnotfileamotiontowithdrawhisappeal.
The court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his
appeal and his case is considered closed and
terminated,insofarasheisconcerned.Mengote,on

theotherhand,hasnotfiledanymotiontowithdraw
hisappeal.

thecaseofMengote,executiveclemencymaynotbe
grantedtoappellant

ISSUE:

The reason is that, the doctrine of separation of

powersofdemandsthatsuchexclusiveauthorityof
the appellate court be fully respected and kept
unimpaired.

W/Nappealofthecasemustbewithdrawnforthe
effectivityofapardon
granted.
HELD:
YES.The"convictionbyfinaljudgment"limitation
under Section 19 of Art.VII of the present
constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether
fullorconditional,toanaccusedduringthepending
ofhisappealfromhisconvictionbythetrialcourt.
Anyapplicationtherefore,ifoneismade,shouldno
beacteduponortheprocesstowardsitsgrantshould
no begun unless the appeal is withdrawn or the
convictionisfinal.Ajudgmentofconvictionbecome
final(a)whennoappealisseasonablyperfected"(b)
whentheaccusecommencestoservethesentence,
(c)whentherighttoappealisexpresslywaivedin
writing,exceptwherethedeathpenaltywasimposed
bythetrialcourt,and(d)thentheaccusedappliesfor
probation,therebywaivinghisrighttoappeal.Thus,
where the judgment of conviction is still pending
appealandhasnotyetthereforeattainedfinalityasin

DOROMALVS.SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R.No.85468,07September1989

Quintin S. Doromal, a public officer and being a

Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on
GoodGovernment,participatedinabusinessthrough
the Doromal International Trading Corporation
(DITC), a family corporation of which he is the
President, and which company participated in the
biddingsconductedbytheDepartmentofEducation,
Culture and Sports(DECS) and the National
Manpower&YouthCouncil(NMYC).

Inconnectionwithhisshareholdingsandpositionas
president anddirectoroftheDoromal International
TradingCorporationwhichsubmittedbidstosupply
P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and air conditioning

equipment to the THE Department of Education,

CultureandSportsandtheNationalManpowerand
YouthCouncil.
Aninformation
wasthenfiledbytheTanodbayanagainstDoromal
forthesaidviolationandapreliminaryinvestigation
wasconducted.

Thepetitionerthenfiledapetitionforcertiorariand
prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the
Tanodbayan to file the info rmation without the
approvaloftheOmbudsman.
ISSUES:
WhetherornottheactofDoromalwouldconstitutea
violationoftheConstitution.
RULE:ArticleVII,Section13(1)oftheConstitution
provides:


The President, VicePresident, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,hold
anyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly,practiceanyotherprofession,participate
inanybusiness,orbefinanciallyinterestedinany
contractwith,orinanyfranchise,orspecialprivilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, orinstrumentality thereof, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheir
subsidiaries.They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interestintheconductoftheiroffice.
ISSUES:
WhetherornottheactofDoromalwouldconstitutea
violationoftheConstitution.
Whetherornotpreliminaryinvestigationisnecessary
evenifbothinformationsinvolvethesamesubject
matter.
Whetherornottheinformationshallbeeffectedas
invalid due to the absence of preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
Yes,astothefirstandsecondissuses.No,astothe
third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme
Court.
RATIO:
(1)Thepresenceofasigneddocumentbearingthe
signatureofDoromalaspartoftheapplicationtobid
showsthathecanrightfullybechargedwithhaving
participated in a business which act is absolutely
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution"because"theDITCremainedafamily
corporationinwhichDoromalhasatleastanindirect
interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "the President, VicePresident, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistantsshallnot...during(their)tenure,...directly
orindirectly...participateinanybusiness.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary
investigationis"asubstantialone."Itsdenialoverhis
oppositionisa"prejudicialerror,inthatitsubjects
the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law" provided by the
Constitution.

Since the first information was annulled, the

preliminaryinvestigationconductedatthattimeshall
alsobeconsideredasvoid.Duetothatfact,anew
preliminaryinvestigationmustbeconducted.
(3)Theabsenceofpreliminaryinvestigationdoesnot
affectthecourt'sjurisdictionoverthecase.Nordo
they impair the validity of the information or
otherwiserenderit defective; but,iftherewereno
preliminaryinvestigationsandthedefendants,before
enteringtheirplea,invitetheattentionofthecourtto
their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
informationshouldconductsuchinvestigation,order
the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation
maybeconducted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall
immediatelyremandCriminalCaseNo.12893tothe
Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation and shall hold in abeyance the
proceedings before it pending the result of such
investigation.

MARCOSVSMANGLAPUS
G.R.No.88211September151989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family
spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to
returntothePhilippines.Thecallisabouttorequest
ofMarcosfamilytoordertherespondentstoissue
travelordertothemandtoenjointhepetitionofthe
President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whetherornot,intheexerciseofthepowersgranted
bytheConstitution,thePresidentmayprohibitthe
MarcosesfromreturningtothePhilippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution:"Theexecutivepowershallbevestedin
the President of the Philippines." The phrase,
however,doesnotdefinewhatismeantbyexecutive
poweralthoughthesamearticletacklesonexercises
ofcertainpowersbythePresidentsuchasappointing
powerduringrecessoftheCongress(S.16),control
ofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,andoffices
(Section17),powertograntreprieves,commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after

conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty

making power (Section 21), borrowing power
(Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22),
informingpower(Section23).

The Constitution may have grant powers to the

President,itcannotbesaidtobelimitedonlytothe
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Whateverpowerinherentinthegovernmentthatis
neitherlegislativenorjudicialhastobeexecutive.