LEGISLATIVE DEBATES:

Montejo v. COMELEC (242 SCRA 415)

Facts:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative
of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no.
2736, redistricting certain municipalities in
Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of
Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5
districts. The 3rd district is composed of:
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi,
Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte,
was made its subprovince by virtue of
Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on
1959. Said section spelled out the
municipalities comprising the subprovince:
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all
the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took
effect and the subprovince of Biliran became
a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran
into a regular province was approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As
a consequence of the conversion, eight
municipalities of the 3rd district composed
the new province of Biliran. A further
consequence was to reduce the 3rd district
to five municipalities (underlined above) with
a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990
census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the
distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in the province of Leyte,
respondent COMELEC held consultation
meetings with the incumbent representatives
of the province and other interested parties
and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated
the assailed resolution where, among others,
it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the 2nd district and the municipality of
Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd
district of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the
COMELEC of the legislative power of

redistricting and reapportionment is valid or

not.
Held:
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled
and set aside.
The deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional
Commission
shows
that
COMELEC was denied the major power of
legislative
apportionment
as
it
itself
exercised the power. Regarding the first
elections after the enactment of the 1987
constitution, it is the Commission who did
the reapportionment of the legislative
districts and for the subsequent elections,
the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the
ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution
as the source of its power of redistricting
which is traditionally regarded as part of the
power to make laws. Said ordinance states
that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is
hereby
empowered
to
make
minor
adjustments to the reapportionment herein
made.
Section 3: Any province that may hereafter
be createdThe number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created or where the
city, whose population has so increases, is
geographically
located
shall
be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be
made within one hundred and twenty days
before the election.
Minor adjustments does not involve change
in the allocations per district. Examples
include error in the correct name of a
particular
municipality
or
when
a
municipality in between which is still in the
territory of one assigned district is forgotten.
And consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, section 3 of the
Ordinance did not also give the respondent
COMELEC
any
authority
to
transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to
another district. The power granted by
section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the
number of members (not municipalities.)
China Bank v. Ortega (49 SCRA 335)

Held:
No, the lower court did not order an
examination of or inquiry into deposit of B &
B Forest Development Corporation, as
contemplated in the law. It merely required
Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or
not the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for the purposes of
the garnishment issued by it, so that the
bank would hold the same intact and not
allow any withdrawal until further order. It is
sufficiently clear that theprohibition against
examination of or inquiry into bank deposit
under RA 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a
judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in
such a case, and the existence of the deposit
is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental
to the execution process. It is hard to
conceive that it was ever within the intention
of Congress to enable debtors to evade
payment of their just debts, even if ordered
by the Court, through the expedient of
converting their assets into cash and
depositing the same in a bank.

CHANGES IN PHRASEOLOGY:
Umali v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203974,
April 22, 2014)
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Assocciation, Inc.
v. Ramos (G.R. No. 127882, January 27,
2004)
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus
challenges the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of
1995),
its
implementing
rules
and
regulations and the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March
30, 1995 by the government with Western
Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987
Constitution in that it is a service contract
and is antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources,
because they allowed foreign control over
the exploitation of our natural resources, to
the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the
phrase
Agreements
involving
Either
Technical or Financial Assistance contained

in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the

Constitution.
HELD:
The
Supreme
Court
upheld
the
constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law,
its implementing rules and regulations
insofar as they relate to financial and
technical agreements as well as the subject
Financial
and
Technical
Assistance
Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day
management by the contractor, provided
that the State retains the power to direct
overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or
modify plans and actions of the contractor.
The idea of full control is similar to that
which is exercised by the board of directors
of a private corporation, the performance of
managerial, operational, financial, marketing
and other functions may be delegated to
subordinate officers or given to contractual
entities, but the board retains full residual
control of the business.
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola
(G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009)
FACTS:
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its
President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and VicePresident for Finance and Marketing,
Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint
Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent
Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Correspondingly,
petitioner filed a criminal information for
violation of BP 22 against respondent with
the MTC.
On September 20, 2006, respondent with her
husband, instituted a civil complaint with the
RTC against petitioner for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the
parties, as well as for damages. Notably, the
checks, subject of the criminal cases before
the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend
proceedings on July 2007 claiming that the
civil case posed a prejudicial question as
against the criminal cases. Petitioner
opposed
the
suspension
of
criminal

proceedings on the grounds that: (1) there is

no prejudicial question in this case as the
rescission of the contract upon which the
bouncing checks were issued is a separate
and distinct issue from the issue of whether
private respondent violated BP 22; and (2)
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that one of the elements of a
prejudicial question is that the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action;
thus, this element is missing in this case, the
criminal case having preceded the civil case.
MTC granted the motion to Suspend
Proceedings. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was also denied by the
MTC. On Aug. 26, 2008, petitioner then filed
an appeal to the RTC but assailed the
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in not
perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the inferior court, when the latter
ruled to suspend the criminal proceedings on
the basis of prejudicial question.
RULING:
This petition must be granted.
Under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and
now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in
order for a civil case to create a prejudicial
question and, thus, suspend a criminal case,
it must first be established that the civil case
was filed previous to the filing of the criminal
case.
Respondent also cited Article 36 of the Civil
Code which provides: Art. 36. Pre-judicial
questions which must be decided before
any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be

governed by rules of court which the

Supreme Court shall promulgate and which
shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code.
Respondent argued that the phrase "before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed" must be interpreted to mean
that a prejudicial question exists when the
civil action is filed either before the
institution of the criminal action or during the
pendency of the criminal action. Thus,
leading to the conclusion that there exist a
conflict between the Rules of Court and the
Civil Code.
The Court disagrees with respondent's
argument. It is a basic precept in statutory
construction that a change in phraseology by
amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of
the provision from that it originally had. In
the instant case, the phrase, previously
instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature
of the civil action involved in a prejudicial
question in relation to the criminal action.
This interpretation is further buttressed by
the insertion of subsequent directly before
the term criminal action. There is no other
logical explanation for the amendments
except to qualify the relationship of the civil
and criminal actions, that the civil action
must precede the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory
construction that a statute should be
construed not only to be consistent with
itself but also to harmonize with other laws
on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system.
This principle is consistent with the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leges legibus est
optimus interpretandi modus or every
statute
must
be
so
construed
and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code
and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
are susceptible of an interpretation that
would harmonize both provisions of law. The
phrase previously instituted civil action in
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is
not susceptible of alternative interpretations.
The clause before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36
of the Civil Code may, however, be

interpreted to mean that the motion to

suspend the criminal action may be filed
during the preliminary investigation with the
public prosecutor or court conducting the
investigation, or during the trial with the
court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36
of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of
Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for
the situations when the motion to suspend
the criminal action during the preliminary
investigation or during the trial may be filed.
Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of
a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court
conducting
the
preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution
rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory
construction, it is this interpretation of Art.
36 of the Civil Code that should govern in
order to give effect to all the relevant
provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances
present in the instant case indicate that the
filing of the civil action and the subsequent
move to suspend the criminal proceedings by
reason of the presence of a prejudicial
question were a mere afterthought and
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
Petition was granted and decision of RTC and
MTC was reversed and set aside. MTC is
ordered to continue with the criminal
proceedings. No costs.

USAGE:
Manila Jockey Club v. Games
Amusement Board (107 Phil 151)

and

Facts:
The authorized racing days specifically
designated and distributed in Section 4 of RA
309 the basic law on horse racing in the

Philippines amended by RA 983 are as

follows: (1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for 12
Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White
Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand Derby Race of
PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and
entities - 29 Sundays.
However,
RA
1502
increased
the
sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO
from 6 to 12 Sundays, but without specifying
the days on which they are to be run. To
accommodate these additional races, GAB
resolved to reduce the number of Sundays
assigned to private individuals and entities
by six.
Appellants protested that the said increase
should be taken from the 12 Saturdays
reserved to the President, for charitable relief
OR should be assigned to any day of the
week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal
Holiday.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner has a
vested right to the unreserved Sundays.
(2)
Whether
or
not
the
additional
sweepstakes races must be inserted in club
races as debated in the House of
Representatives in the voting of HB
5732/RA1502.
Held:
(1) No, the appellant has no vested right to
the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24
Saturdays (except holidays) because their
holding on races for these days are merely
permissive, subject to the licensing and
determination by the GAB. When, therefore,
RA 1502 was enacted increasing by 6 the
sweepstakes draw and races but without
specifying the days for holding them, the
GAB had no alternative except to make room
for the additional races, as it did, form
among the only available racing days
unreserved by any law - the Sundays on
which the private individuals and entities
have been permitted to hold their races,
subject to licensing and determination by
GAB.
(2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No.
1502, as it was finally enacted, which would
indicate that such an understanding on the
part of these two members of the Lower
House of Congress were received the
sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for

the law is absolutely devoid of any such

indication.
In the interpretation of a legal document,
especially
a
statute,
unlike
in
the
interpretation
of
an
ordinary
written
document, it is not enough to obtain
information to the intention or meaning of
the author or authors, but also to see
whether the intention or meaning has been
expressed in such a way as to give it legal
effect and validity. In short, the purpose of
the inquiry, is not only to know what the
author meant by the language he used, but
also to see that the language used
sufficiently expresses that meaning.
The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in
authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of
regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the
intention of Congress were to authorize
additional sweepstakes draws only which
could, admittedly, be inserted in the club
races, the law would not have included
regular races; and since regular sweepstakes
races were specifically authorized, and it
would be confusing, inconvenient, if not
impossible to mix these sweepstakes races
with the regular club races all on the same
day (and it has never been done before), the
conclusion seems inevitable that the
additional sweepstakes draws and races
were intended to be held on a whole day,
separate and apart from the club races.

CONTEMPORANEOUS ACT OF
LEGISLATURE:

David v. COMELEC (271 SCRA 90) C

EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION:
Asturias
Sugar
Commissioner of
617)

Central,
Inc.
v.
Customs (29 SCRA

Chartered Bank Employees Association

v. Ople (138 SCRA 273)
FACTS:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank
Employees Association instituted a complaint
with the Department of Labor against private
respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment
of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well
as for premium and overtime differentials for
worked legal holidays from November 1,

1974. Both the arbitrator and the National

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in
favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the
Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the
NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's claim for
lack of merit basing its decision on the
provisions of Book III of the Integrated Rules
and Policy Instruction No. 9. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Secretary of
Labor acted contrary to law and abused his
discretion in denying the claim of petitioners
HELD:
While it is true that the respondent Minister
has the authority in the performance of his
duty to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement, construe and clarify the Labor
Code, such power is limited by provisions of
the statute sought to be implemented,
construed or clarified. An administrative
interpretation which diminishes the benefits
of labor more than what the statute delimits
or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Any
slight doubts must be resolved in favor of the
workers. This is in keeping with the
constitutional mandate of promoting social
justice and affording protection to labor.
Nestle Phil., Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 86738,
November 13, 1991)
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A. are
the two major stockholders of Neslte .Nestle
increased its authorized capital stock and
was approved by SEC.
Thereafter, some unissued stocks were sold
to San Miguel and Nestle. Nestle filed a
complaint with the SEC, seeking to exempt
the firm from the registration requirement of
Section4 of the Revised Securities Act and
from payment of the fee referred to in
Section 6(c).
The provision states that a corporation may
be exempted from the requirement of
registration if its issues additional capital
stock
among
its
own
stockholders
exclusively. Nestle argued that issuance of
additional capital stock means issuance of
increased authorized capital stock. SEC held
that for purposes of granting a general or
particular exemption from the registration

requirements, a request for exemption and a

fee equivalent to 0.1% of issued value or
securities or stocks are required.
ISSUE:
Whether or
exemption.

not

Nestle

is

entitled

to

RULING:
Nestle is not exempted from the fee provided
for in Section 6 (c) of the Revised Securities
Act. Section 6(a) (4) permits greater
opportunity for the SEC to implement the
statutory
objective
of
protecting
the
investing public by requiring proposed
issuers of capital stock to inform such public
of the true financial conditions and prospects
of the corporation. When capital stock is
issued in the course of and in compliance
with the requirements of increasing its
authorized capital stock under Section 38 of

the Corporation Code, the SEC as a matter of

course examines the financial condition of
the corporation. Under the ruling issued by
the SEC, an issuance of previously authorized
but still unissued capital stock may, in a
particular instance, be held to bean exempt
transaction by the SEC under Section 6(b) so
long as the SEC finds that the requirements
of registration under the Revised Securities
Act are "not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of the investors" by
reason, inter alia, of the small amount of
stock that is proposed to be issued or
because the potential buyers are very limited
in number and are in a position to protect
themselves.
"The construction of a statute by the
executive officers of the government is
entitled to great respect and should be
accorded great weight by the courts."