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No, I will not convict D as charged for Homicide based on Article 4(1). The proximate cause
doctrine does not apply. Tetanus infection has an incubation period of only 14 days; the facts show
that the victim survived 22 days. This means that the tetanus infection is the proximate cause of
the death, not the stabbing. The criminal liability of the accused is only liable for Slight Physical
Injuries with Treachery.
No, I will not convict X for qualified theft. Under Article 308 in relation to 310, qualified
theft is committed when a person takes the property of another with intent to gain. Here, what was
taken was a check which was worthless. In qualified theft, the element of intent to gain requires
that the stolen thing be OF VALUE.
X is liable for an impossible crime under Art. 42. It would have amounted to theft, but there was
no way the theft could be consummated because of the inherent impossibility brought about by
extraneous circumstances beyond the control of the offender. (Jacinto v. People)
Yes, I will uphold the conviction of murder for Y but downgrade liability for the crime against X.
14 October 2014
C. The mere act of holding a weapon does not constitute unlawful aggression yet. It might be a
provocation but not UA. UA must place the person invoking it in threatened, actual, imminent
danger.
THERE IS NO TREACHERY. According to People v. Vicente Bilbar. When the meeting between the
victim and the accused was casual, and the stabbing was sudden and in the spur of the moment ,
there can be no treachery even if the victim was rendered defenseless. IT WAS DONE IMPULSIVELY.
The first element is wanting. He did not deliberately choose that mode of attack.
Note: the elements of treachery are:
14 October 2014
Yes, Speed is liable as principal by direct participation. He is the one who actually raped A. X, on
the other hand, is NOT liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. Xs acts were not
indispensable to the commission of the crime of rape. Those can be performed by any person not
necessarily X.
What then is the criminal liability? R.A. 7610, Child Abuse. X is liable because the act of X is that of
a pimp procuring a child prostitute. Hence, X is convicted for this crime of child abuse and not as a
principal by indispensable cooperation.
Basis: People v. Dina Dulay
14 October 2014
A) ALL OF THEM are liable as principals, EXCEPT Perpenianshe is liable as an accomplice. There
was no showing that she was part of the kidnapping. Her only participation was talking
to the others and going to the resort. She is an accomplice because she already saw that Chan
was there, and yet she did not report the matter to the police. Therefore, she concurs with the
criminal design of the principal.
B) She acted with discernment. The fact that she lied about her age, address, and other things,
means there was discernment. She KNEW they were committing a crime and yet she did not inform
the police officers. Her minority at the time of the commission of the crime has the effect of a
privileged mitigating circumstance.
C) The Supreme Court made a new decision here. Civil indemnity for heinous crimes used to be
P75,000. Starting from this case, whenever the crime committed is heinous, the liabilities are as
follows:
Civil Indemnity P100,000
Moral Damages P100,000 without need of proof except the fact of the commission of the
crime
Exemplary Damages P100,000
14 October 2014
I will affirm the conviction. The offender performed a single act of stepping on the accelerator of his
vehicle and turning to the right, running over the victims. Since the basis of this is the single act of
stepping on the accelerator, a compound crime exists.
Basis: People v. Punzalan
14 October 2014
His death extinguished everything. Because of PAOs MR, the SC decision had not become
final and executory. Therefore, because he died before the finality of the judgment, both civil and
criminal liabilities are extinguished.
The case will prosper; the crime has not prescribed. According to Act 3326, in case of BP22
or other special penal laws where imprisonment does not exceed 1 year, the prescriptive period is 4
years. This is counted from the time the drawer received the notice of dishonor. Here, he received
the notice of dishonor in 1995, the case was filed on December 16 1997, then RTC on February 3,
2000. The December 16, 1997 filing with the prosecutor halted the prescriptive period.
Basis: People v. Maria Teresa Pangilinan (2013)
Reclusion Perpetua (RP). Since the penalty prescribed by law is RP, under Article 63, it shall be
imposed REGARDLESS of any mitigating circumstance where the penalty imposable is a single
indivisible penalty. There is also no benefit of parole because under R.A. 9346, if the penalty is RP,
IT IS WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF PAROLE.
14 October 2014
The Court is wrong. The three-fold rule cannot be used by the Court. The three-fold rule refers to
SERVICE of sentence and is directed to the Director of Prisons, not by the judges. The latter, of
course, are mandated to impose the penalty mandated by law. Judge should convict for each count
of rape, Reclusion Perpetua for each and P50,000 for each. There are as many civil liabilities as she
has been violated.
14 October 2014
Yes he is. Malversation under 217. There was negligence on the part of the PDEA agent,
considering the bulk and cost of dangerous drugs, he should have asked for escort. By reason of
his negligence, the drugs (then already in custodia legis) were stolen. (Torres v. People).
QUALIFIED RAPE.
People v. Bansing (2013)
14 October 2014
14 October 2014
Special Complex Crime of Rape with Homicide. The criminal intent was to rape the victim but in the
course thereof, homicide was committed.
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ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. The criminal design was to get the winnings of the victim, and in the
course thereof they killed two victims and tried to kill the third and the latter just dove into the canal.
Even that third attempt is already absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, because they were
committed on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery.
People v. Caba
14 October 2014
) I will affirm the conviction. It is not necessary that the corpus delicti be produced, Zapanta was
entrusted to be project manager and tasked to have custody of the materials. Instead, he delivers the
materials to another place. In said act of taking, there was grave abuse of confidence on the part of the
project manager.
B) Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime.
C) In theft, what constitutes corpus delicti is the fact that the offender TOOK the personal property of
another. For as long as there is a single witness that can testify as to the single act of taking, there exists
taking. Here, even if the actual steel beams were not produced, the testimony of the delivery men that
Zapanta asked them to unload is sufficient to produce the crime.
People v. Zapanta 2013
14 October 2014
A) W is NOT liable for Estafa by Postdating a Check. While all the elements for this crime are present.
However, the Court found that the prosecution was unable to prove that it was indeed Wagas that
transacted. It is necessary that the issuance of the check was in concomitance with the deprivation. There
was absolutely no evidence that this was the case. Victim himself confirmed that the transaction was only
by telephone and has not even seen Wagas. SINCE THE IDENTITY OF THE DRAWER OF THE CHECK WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, then SC acquitted Wagas.
B) YES, he should be civilly liable. The fact that he is the signatory to the said check, means he is civilly
liable the moment the check bounced.
Perfect example of ability to recover civil even if acquitted of criminal act.
People v. Wagas (2013)
14 October 2014
The accused is NOT liable for Estafa by Postdating a Check. Again, it is necessary that it be in
concomitance with the deprivation.
He is NOT liable for BP22 either, he is not drawer of the check. It is impossible for him to know that the
checks were not funded.
Likewise, no civil liability to the value of the check because he was not the drawer of the checks.
People v. Ilagan (2007)
On liability, SC SAID NO. Although the crime charged is estafa, based on the evidence, the crime is
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT.
Absolutory causes apply only to those crimes listed (Theft, Swindling, Malicious Mischief). The moment
those crimes are complexed with other crimes, the absolutory cause is no longer available. Now, since
son-in-law commited the complex crime of estafa then the absolutory cause he is invoking no longer
applies to him.
See: 2011 MCQ and 2013 Essay
14 October 2014
SC: Two Counts of QUALIFIED RAPE. The forcible abduction is absorbed by the qualified
rape insofar as the second circumstance is concerned. So the first one is QUALIFIED RAPE, because
of the relationship by affinity. The second incident, it is not forcible abduction with rape because
the obvious intent was to rape the victim, since that is the clear intent, forcible abduction is
already absorbed in the crime of rape since it is merely incidental.
Forcible abduction is the taking away of the woman with lewd design. Carnal knowledge is
not an element of forcible abduction.
Consented abduction is the taking away of a virgin over 12 but under 18, this is with
consent! Carnal knowledge is not an element.
So when you commit rape in those two just mentioned, separate rape. COMPLEX CRIME OF
CONSENTED ABDUCTION WITH RAPE. Consented abduction was a necessary means to commit the
crime of rape. (Like the bf-gf who ran away, but girl did not want to have sex but guy forced her
anyway)
31. SC held the accused liable for physical injuries, NOT LIABLE for RA7610. In the opening statement of
the case, not all crimes involving children amount violations of RA7610. There must be intent to debase,
demean the intrinsic worth of the child as a human being. Here, the father slapped the young boy, absent
any such intent. He was angered brought about by the young boys act of throwing stones at his
daughters. Since it happened at the spur of the moment, it cannot be said that there was intent to debase
the child. Hence, only slight physical injuries with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
(Bongalon v. People 2013)
14 October 2014
14 October 2014
Illegal Possession a person can only be held liable for this if NO OTHER CRIME was
committed. Here, having been held liable for comelec gun ban violation, he can no longer be convicted of
Illegal Possession.
SC said: Yes he is liable for both crimes. But by virtue of PD1866 as amended by RA8294, the
conviction for illegal possession of firearm must be set aside.
Remember R.A. 10591 (Comprehensive Firearms) Section 29:
Whenever the use of a loose firearm is inherent in the commission of the crime, such use of the firearm
shall be an aggravating circumstance whether it is a violation of the RPC or SPL.
If however, it is not inherent in the commission of the crime, the offender shall be charged separately: The
crime he committed + violation of R.A. 10591.
Escalante v. People (2013)
14 October 2014