People, plaintiff-appellee v.

Mapa defendantappellant
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Francisco
appellant.

P.

Cabigao

for

defendant

and

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Solicitor

General F .R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C .
Hernandez for plaintiff and appellee.
Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in an
information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of
Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code
in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and
as further amended by RA 4 (home-made
revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number,
with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first
having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the corresponding authorities)
Accused admits to possession of firearm on
ground of being a secret agent of Governor
Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November
1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused of the crime and
sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and
one day to two years. As the appeal involves a
question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly
appointed and qualified as such of the governor
is exempt from the requirement of having a
license of firearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for
any person to possess any firearm, detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition (Sec 878 RA 4 of the

RAC) except when such firearms are in

possession of such public officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their
official duties; as those firearms and
ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines,
the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
police,
provincial
governors,
lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails (Sec 879) It is the
first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the
law; Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. The law
cannot be any clearer, there being no provision
made for a secret agent.
Reliance in the decision in People v.
Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no
longer speaks with authority to the extent that
the present decision conflicts with. It may be
note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret
agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment of the accused
as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of
crimes sufficiently put him within the category of
a peace officer equivalent even to a member of
the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879, Thus, in the present case,
therefore, the conviction must stand.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
judgment.

Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga,

Cebu
G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56
FACTS:

Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from

Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961,
as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of
P204,300, have all been met with rebuff.
Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance
No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant
Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as
provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised
Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period
of ten (10) days within which to settle the
account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961,
defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager
of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000
bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiffs
delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was
received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T.
Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said
articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public
auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961,
proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle
the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not
take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30,
1962
ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction
were valid.
HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the
Revised Administrative Code: The remedy by
distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of
the person owing any municipal tax or revenue
to pay the same, at the time required, the
municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any
personal property belonging to such person or
any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient
quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question,
together with any increment thereto incident to
delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.
The clear and explicit language of the law leaves
no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be
deemed to have accepted as conclusive the
findings of the lower court which upheld the
validity of the auction.

LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social

Security Commission
G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969)
Chapter III, Page 206, Footnote No.206
FACTS:
Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know
that they had to pay tax for their operations.
Nevertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they
paid their premium remittances but refused to
pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not
know that they had to pay the aforementioned
premium remittances, claiming that the
assessed
penalties
were
inequitable.
Respondent said that their organization is
embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore
the assessed penalties are imposed on them.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it
has no authority under the Social Security Act to
condone, waive or relinquish the penalty
prescribed by law for late payment of
remittances.
HELD: Respondent has no such authority.
Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the
absence of an express provision in the Social
Security Act vesting Respondent the power to
condone penalties, it has no legal authority to
condone, waive, or relinquish the penalty for late
premium remittances mandatorily imposed
under the SS Act. The reason of the law is to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which shall be suitable to the
needs of the people to provide employees
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old
age, and death. Good faith and bad faith are
irrelevant since the law makes no distinction.
Where the language of the law is clear and the
intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is
no room for interpretation.

Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with
respondent which was approved. The loan was
to be released in installments. The outstanding
obligation of the petitioners with respondent,
including interests, amounted to P13,983.59.
Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in
the amount of P14,000 for his outstanding
obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay
pursuant to RA No. 897 (RA 897). Respondent
advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the
offer on the ground that the loan was not
incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953
when RA 897 was approved.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners obligation is subsisting
at the time of the approval of RA 897.
HELD:
No. The provision expressly provides that the
obligations must be subsisting at the time of the
approval of RA 897. Hence, when such backpay
certificates are offered in payment to a
government-owned corporation of obligation
thereto which was not subsisting at the time of
the enactment of said Act on June 20, 1953,
such corporation may not legally be compelled
to accept the certificates. The Court cannot see
any room for interpretation or construction in the
clear and unambiguous language of the
provision of law.
LATIN MAXIM: 28, 7a, 6c, 1

Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of

Customs
G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971)
Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec.

2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner

was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation
of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec.
2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which
states: There shall be levied collected and paid
on products of the Philippines exported from
the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross
metric ton as a fee for wharfage
ISSUE: W/N the words products of the
Philippines excludes bran and pollard on the
ground that they are from wheat grain, which is
imported into the Philippines.
HELD:
No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear
quite obvious that as long as the goods are
produced in the country, they fall within the
terms of the above section. The law is clear; it
must be obeyed. The Term product of the
Philippines should be taken in its usual
signification to mean any product produced in
the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak)
produced from wheat imported into the country
are products of the Philippines.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma

G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984)
FACTS:
Zambowood Union went on strike because of
the illegal termination of their union leader and
underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the
process, they blocked the roads and prevented
customers and suppliers from entering the
premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court
for damages for obstruction of private property.
Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this
case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts
to decide.

ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that

can pass on a suit for damages filed by an
employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC?
HELD:
Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. In the
Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with
original jurisdiction. However, P.D. 1367
amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first
instance with original jurisdiction to award
damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D.
1691 amended Sec. 217 to return the jurisdiction
to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended
the same section, but without changing original
jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from
employer-employee relations. Thus the law is
clear, respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to
act on the case.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a

KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad

Company
G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
FACTS:
The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which
the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to
overturn the ruling relying on a right that,
according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to
them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA
2023 compels employers to deduct from the
salaries or wages of members of credit unions
the debts of the employees and pay it to said
credit union. The lower court has already
granted there is no such right granting first
priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll
collection.
ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit
unions credit into a first priority credit.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner

relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be

granted first priority in the salary collections.
According to Justice Recto in a subsequent
opinion, it is well established that only specific
legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that
the right sought to be enforced must be certain
and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where
the right is doubtful. Justice Barrera adds:
the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed.
LATIN MAXIM: 7a

Radio Communications of the Philippines v.

National Telecom. Com.
G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987)
FACTS:
Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in
1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio
communications system, recognized by the
Public Service Commission (PSC). Petitioner
then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro,
and Samar. In 1980, the Respondent, which
replaced the PSC, authorized Kayumanggi to
set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too.
Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a
complaint by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to
stop operating, because it didnt have a
certificate of public convenience, which is
necessary under EO 546 for any public service
to operate.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of
candidacy before it can validly operate.
HELD:
Yes, they need such certificates to validly
operate. Petitioner was created under RA 2036,
governed by the Public Service Commission.
Under it, radio companies did not need a
certificate of public convenience to operate.
However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service

Commission and EO 546 created the

Respondent Commission. Under EO 546,
Respondent must issue a certificate of public
convenience for the operation of radio
communications systems. Petitioner did not avail
of it when they should have.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 30, 46a, 49

People v. Quijada
G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996)
FACTS:
Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an
unlicensed firearm. He was convicted of 2
offenses, which were separately filed:
1) Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC
2) Illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1
of P.D. 1866 states that, If homicide or murder
is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
SSUE: 1) W/N the trial courts judgment should
be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid
down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon,
People v. Caling, etc. OR to modify the judgment
and convict the appellant only of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form
pursuant to People v. Barros. 2) W/N the 2nd par
of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession
of firearm and the resultant killing into a single
integrated offense.
HELD: 1) The trial courts judgment is affirmed.
2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not
support a conclusion that intended to treat said
two offenses as a single and integrated offense
of illegal possession with homicide or murder.
It does not use the clause as a result or on the
occasion of to evince an intention to create a
single integrated crime, but rather it uses the
clause with the use of.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c

Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC

G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997)
Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No. 53
FACTS:
Respondents were both employees of Petitioner
and holding position as line leaders, tasked to
supervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6,
l993, all the line leaders did not report for work.
On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not
allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner,
and then required to submit written explanations
as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private
Respondents tendered their explanation letters.
Despite their explanation, they were not allowed
to resume their work and were advised to await
the decision of the management whether or not
the real reason for their absence was intended
to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. But
other line leaders were allowed to resume their
work despite their absence on May 5 and 6,
l993.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow
Private Respondents from resuming their work
constitutes dismissal from the service?
2. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the
award of backwages for only a period not
exceeding three 3 years?
HELD: Under the old doctrine, the backwages
that can be awarded to illegally dismissed
employees was not to exceed a period of three
years. However, a new doctrine allowed the
awarding of full backwages and also prevented
the company from deducting the earnings of the
illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during
the pendency of their case. The Labor Arbiter
was wrong in awarding backwages for a period
of not exceeding three years.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49

Enrile v. Salazar
G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged
with the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed
during a failed coup attempt from November 29
to December 10, 1990. Petitioners contend that
they are being charged for a criminal offense
that does not exist in the statute books because
technically, the crime of rebellion cannot be
complexed with other offenses committed on the
occasion thereof.
ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the
Hernandez doctrine.
HELD: The doctrine in the case People v.
Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof. The charges of murder and
multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the
crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges
against Petitioners in the information should be
understood as that of simple rebellion under the
RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion,
Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled
that the charges of murder could be prosecuted
separately from rebellion, then the principle of
non-retroactivity would be violated.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation

G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)
FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of
deceased
employees
of
Respondent
Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in
while working in underground mining operations.
Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca,
recovered damages under the Workmens
Compensation Act. However, a later report on
the accident showed there was negligence on

the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter,

Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages
for Respondent Corporations reckless and
wanton negligence.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose
between availing of the workers right under the
Workmens Compensation Act or suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages.
HELD:
Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages. However, in
light of the fact that they have already recovered
damages from the Workmens Compensation
Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the
regular courts, the amount received from this Act
shall be deducted to prevent the instance of
double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue
both courses of action simultaneously. In
allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the
Court stated that it did not legislate in this case
but rather, applied and gave effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a

Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate

Appelate Court
G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)
Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99
FACTS:
Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for
a collection of money against Varian Industrial
Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent
attached some of the properties of Varian
Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes
bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond
through Petitioner so the attached properties
were released. Sycwin filed a petition for
execution pending appeal against the properties
of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ

of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian

failed to deliver the previously attached personal
properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that
Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the
value of its bond which was granted.
ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid.
HELD: The counter bond was issued in
accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the
counter bond limited its application to a final and
executory judgment. It appllies to the payment of
any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff.
The only logical conclusion is that an execution
of any judgment including one pending appeal if
returned unsatisfied may be charged against
such counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the
counter bond to life attachment shall be charged
with the payment of any judgment that is
returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final
and executory judgment but also the execution
of a judgment of pending appeal.
LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26, 36a

Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v.

Equitable Banking Corporation
G.R. No. 74917 (January 20, 1988)

FACTS:
Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner
Bank for reimbursement of P45,982.23 as a
consequence of six crossed Managers checks
which turned out to have forged and/or
unauthorized endorsements appearing at the
back of each check. Philippine Clearing House
Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay
the said amount. Petitioner Bank appealed
saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because
the checks involved were non-negotiable
checks.
ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks
which are non-negotiable.

HELD: Yes. As provided in the articles of

incorporation of PCHC, its operation extends to
clearing checks and other clearing items.
Clearly, the term checks refer to checks in
general use in commercial and business
activities, including nonnegotiable checks. No
doubt non-negotiable checks are within the
ambit of PCHCs jurisdiction. There should be no
distinction in the application of a statute where
none is indicated for courts are not authorized to
distinguish where the law makes no distinction.
They should instead administer the law not as
they think it ought to be but as they find it and
without regard to consequences.
LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26

Salenillas v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)
Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47

FACTS: On December 4, 1973, the property of

Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National
Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure
to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by
PNB and was bought at a public auction by
Private Respondent. Petitioner maintains that
they have a right to repurchase the property
under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act.
Respondent states that the sale of the property
disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs
vis--vis the said property. Respondent also
maintains that the period for repurchase as
already prescribed based on Monge et al. vs.
Angeles.
ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioners have the right to
repurchase the property under the said Act.
2. W/N the prescription period had already
prescribed.
Held: The provision makes no distinction
between the legal heirs. The distinction made by
Respondent contravenes the very purpose of
the Act. Petitioners contention would be more in

keeping with the spirit of the law. With regard to

prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto
de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so
the rules under the transaction would be
different. For foreclosure sales, the prescription
period starts on the day after the expiration of
the period of redemption when the deed of
absolute sale was executed.
LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a