Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
J-LAMAT REVIEWER
INTRODUCTION
I.
The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government
and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to
individual remedies for the violations of his rights.
II.
IV.
V.
I.
Concept
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A.
Definition of administrative agency - An administrative agency
is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and
implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation
commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any
department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority, board or bureau x x x ."
B.
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C.
Administrative function, defined - Administrative functions are
those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules
and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence
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Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia
M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service
Commission and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the
Office of the Personnel Relations, both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
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that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the
government employees that they are mandated to serve.
N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are
not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to
particular positions or ranks. Thus a person may be appointed to the position
of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or
to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the
instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV,
without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with
respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of
the Commission.
E.
Reasons for creation of administrative agencies Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987
Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets,
the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes
on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.
Reyes vs Caneba
Ruling: "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must
allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
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3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not
extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general
principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in
the Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and
the general spirit of the Constitution, and except those express provisions of
the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their
contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the
Constitution relating to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions,
and, consequently, the right to trial by jury has not been extended here by the
mere act of the cession of the territory.
4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the
Constitution relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the
Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession, for trials by jury, and
consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling the defendants
in this case to such trial; that the Court of First Instance committed no error in
overruling their application for a trial by jury
The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled An Act temporarily to provide for
the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands,
and for other purposes, in section 5 extends to the Philippine Islands nearly
all of the provisions of the Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. But there
was excepted from it the provisions of the Constitution relating to jury trials
contained in section 2, Article 111, and in the sixth amendment.
The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body
expressly recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to
pass laws, and has the power to pass the libel law under which the defendants
where convicted.
II.
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Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified prewar toll collector, classified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, but
was laid off due to the destruction of the bridge caused by flood. When the
bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the
respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his
duties, but he was refused reinstatement.
Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the position
of toll collector.
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Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or
less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of
the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the
incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for
cause.
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Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former
PCC into what is now the PUP.
Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution not in its corporate life.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization
and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about the abolition of an educational
institution and the creation of a new one only an express declaration to that
effect by the lawmaking authority will.
Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to
the PUP as the new name of the institution.
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and
to create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a
school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
C.
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221 SCRA 145
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws
graduate and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register
of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to
Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner
was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was
for two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect
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III.
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,
pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article
VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the
marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security
over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:
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Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scopes of
presidential power and its limits.
Executive power
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does
not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it
touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-inchief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the
power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the
power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the
President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the
breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and
what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius."
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
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It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty
of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such
does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential
functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing
action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles,
among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it
does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article
it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-inchief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the
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Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in short, the
Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of
the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
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officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance
which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby
violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor.
Neither may he veto, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council
within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be.
He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.
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Power of supervision
Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143
(Angel Pascual)
Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion
Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad
Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other
than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary
indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner
appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was
served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with the
provincial board. On the same day, the provincial, governor issued
Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter,
the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the
petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the
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administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of
suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without
legal effect.
Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and,
offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under
his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and
does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article
VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an
official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation
would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of
the Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The power to oversee that the officials concerned performs their duty and if
they later fail or neglect to fulfill them, to take such action or steps as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
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Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-PresidentAllan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of
several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers
of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to
be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of
Region V of the Department of Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied
by respondent Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an
election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming that the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to
entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations
as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the
exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the President
through the Secretary of Local Government.
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corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official
exercising the power of supervision and review over him.
Purpose of doctrine
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C.
Blending of powers though each department has their own duties
and functions, they nevertheless exercise the same in concert that they
can work with other departments and conduct checks and balances
regarding the actions of each.
II.
Doctrine of non-delegation of powers
delegated cannot be delegated.
A.
General rule
US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327
Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
B.
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Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing and its farreaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this
important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the
industry.
American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-26803 Oct. 14, 1975
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus with
preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who have pending interference and
cancellation proceedings, questions the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised
Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as
amended which authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official of said office to hear inter partes proceedings. Moreover, the rule also
provided that judgment on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared
by the Director and signed by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment
made by the Director on the Rule vesting hearing officers authority to hear
their cases was illegal and void because under the law, it is the Director who
should personally hear the cases of petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions.
Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative
agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such
regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry
out its purpose and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to
delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by
implication it has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law
and RA 165 and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the designation
of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the power and authority
entrusted to the Director suggests that the aforementioned laws should be
construed so as to give aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary
for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of
said laws. Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by him since that the
parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process of law nor the
requirements of fair hearing require the actual taking of testimony before the
same officer who will make the decision.
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III.
B.
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Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government
agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers
to render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed
for the payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer,
there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or
the Government Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the
circular is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public
funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the government. This is in line
with the Commission on Audits constitutional mandate to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
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E.
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Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the
respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof.
AMA Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational
Institution without the required authorization that must be secured first before
the DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure
of the said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two
governmental agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC
Davao to enjoin DECS from implementing the said closure pending the
approval of the request to operate of the said school. The said request was
denied by the DECS for not complying the requirements prescribed by the
Department. The said case was dismissed, undaunted the private respondent
appeal before the CA which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
private respondent then filed a petition before the RTC of Makati with the same
cause of action now using the organization of the parents of their students. The
said court presided by the respondent Judge issued the preliminary injunction
sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. The private respondent
contended that the same should be permitted to operate because DECS is only
performing a ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS on the other
hand contended that it exercises a discretionary power in pursuant to the
provisions of law with respect to educational institutions.
Issues : Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial or
discretionary function.
Ruling : The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power
with respect to the issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution.
The Court further distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A
purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.
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F.
Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory duties and
powers
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1.
2.
Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued by
Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay and
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former the
amount of 51M by way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus
interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of
the total amount collectible as informers reward.
Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.
Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with
the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes
has after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no
tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now
Minister of Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such
decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official
duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A contrary
view, whereby any stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp and control
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Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school
(navy based) which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case
against the military officials concerned because of discrimination. The military
invoked the non-suability of the state.
Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.
Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is
questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office
by virtue of their official capacity.
2.
Estoppel inapplicable
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3.
Presumption of regularity
Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority
and established a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11
but reduced to 7. Thereafter, respondent chairman of the coconut authority
initiated a special coconut end-user companies which included the petitioner.
The chairman directed to collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply
the same to settlement of short levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to
release the subsidy provided they post a bond equal to the amount of the
disputed claim. Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that the COA
Chairman and Auditor had no jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the
subsidy case endorsed to the court.
Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and
decision had became moot.
Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed;
and it is 'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with
powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement
of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or
promotion of which requires a technical or special training, 'aside from a good
knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields,
containing in the nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying our
Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact
of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in
support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently
insubstantial.
Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.
IV.
Investigatory Powers
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Engineering that contract be awarded to F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. being the
lowest complying bidder.
PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the Ombudsman a
letter-complaint protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS to favor
suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation there on.
Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power, functions and
duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS was diverted to set aside
the recommendation of MWSS to award contract.
Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that respondent
Ombudsman acted beyond the jurisdiction notwithstanding that Section 20 of
the Ombudsman Act, which enumerated the administrative act, or omission
that may not be the subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts
the same by his office.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
PLDPPMAs complaint and to correspondingly issue its challenged orders
directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to se aside the recommendation of
the PBAC-CTSE.
Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory power and
public assistance duties that can be found in the first and second part of
Sec.13, Art. XI of the Constitution. While the broad authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which xxx appears illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede
however, that the constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to confer
upon it veto or provisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion is
lawfully vested.
While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, other than those specifically excepted under the
Constitution and Republic Acts No. 6770, which appears illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient, is broad, the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did
not intend to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of
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Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct
of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted.
Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code
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Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in
Infanta, Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS inquired from the Civil
Service Commission as to the status of the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs.
Remolona who got a rating of 81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the
National Board for Teachers. After an investigation, Remolonas name is not in
the list of passing and failing examinees. Remolona admitted that he was
responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no
knowledge and that he did it because he wanted them to be together.
A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona and
Atty. Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and
dishonesty. CSS found Estelito Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery
Remolona was absolved from legibility. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition
and therefore a review by the SC.
Issue : Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite of the fact
that the offense committed was not done in the performance of his official duty.
Ruling : If the government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of
oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.
Rule making power - the power to issue rules and regulations.
A.
Nature of power, definition Administrative agencies are endowed
with powers legislative in nature or quasi-legislative, and in practical
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effect, with the power to make law. However, the essential legislative
functions may not be delegated to administrative agencies and in this
sense, it is said that administrative agencies have no legislative power
and are precluded from legislating in the strict sense.
People vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing
electro fishing in fresh water.
Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84 penalizing
electro fishing.
Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare
what act constitute a criminal offense. Electro fishing is now punishable by
virtue of PD 704. Thus, an administrative regulation must be in harmony with
law; it must not amend an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for violation
of an administrative order it must clearly appear that the order falls within the
scope of the authority conferred by law.
1.
Ordinance
President
-
power
of
the
President/Delegation
to
the
The president has the power to issue rules and regulations (executive
orders, proclamations, etc.)
Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution
Section 23. 2. - In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
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impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin. Code
Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which
the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only
concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in
memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of
all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government,
for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
shall be issued as general or special orders.
Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328
(Aileen Angue)
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Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting and
banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging that the same is null
and void.
Issue : Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was valid.
Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed
thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard
or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without
requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the
performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.
EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies
functions.
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rights and opportunities. Such delegated power the rules and regulations
promulgated should be confined to and limited by the power conferred by the
legislative act.
The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to makes rules and
regulations is specified and defined to the making of rules and regulations for
the classification, marking and packing of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good
quality and the handling of it under sanitary conditions.
2.
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Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply
deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue of
its cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so
far as the manner of appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes
allowed to be filed with SC, are brought to CA.
3.
Delegation to LGUs
Sections 5 and 9, Article X, Constitution
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral
representation as may be prescribed by law.
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the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which
created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage
free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from
the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the
President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate
energy projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the
Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the
imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the
subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED.
No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running not. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegates who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
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Issues:
(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the Public Service
Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 454 constitute a complete
and total abdication of the Legislatures functions and thus unconstitutional
and void.
(2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority.
Held:
(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional. Section 8 of Art. XIII
of the Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be for a longer period
than fifty years and when it was ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that the Public Service
Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate. That
it shall be valid only for a period of time it has been declared that the period
shall not be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that has been delegated to the
commission is the admin function\, including the use of discretion, to carry
out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion
of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and towards the approval of the
practice by the courts.
(2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon
the police power, applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in
operation.
Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works and the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in
Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time.
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The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with
the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws
relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner
contended that such act is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in
connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.
Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation
of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.
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C.
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D.
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Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of
the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which
created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage
free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from
the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the
President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate
energy projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the
Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the
imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the
subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED.
No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call
therefore should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that
conforms to the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking
down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost
losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the
tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More
worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is
the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. When
confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to
strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that
grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The
Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's
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political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the
economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them
for they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with the
esoteric of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so
long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people
especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's
economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.
1.
Completeness test the law must be complete in all its items
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing they will have to do is enforce
it
(Eastern
Shipping vs. POEA)
What cannot be delegated are those which are purely legislative in
nature. He cannot determine what the law shall be.
US vs Ang Tang Ho L-4288 20 Nov 1952
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law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the
latter prevails. Petition is dismissed.
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
(Angel Pascual)
Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936,
before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of
Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of
the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June
1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera
presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to
Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937,
alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative
of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the
provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in
their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec.
1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the
private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera
promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda
racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in
GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937,
counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation
and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative
motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937.
This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted
on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937,
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but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng
because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33
(34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance
of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and
forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10
August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the
movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14
August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila
moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to
the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel
for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions.
The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August
1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion
for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to
have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the
People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an
end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila
which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in
the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him,
exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability
of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court
imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before
the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General
and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import
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than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of
its own laws.
2.
Sufficient standard test to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority by defining legislative policy and indicating
circumstances under which it is pursued.
Serve to canalize the banks of the river from overflowing.
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Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title. The title is not required to be an index of the content
of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are
pertinent to that subject. The Reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is pertinent to the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied
in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. With
respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to
be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in the law.
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council with power to pass upon the program of activities and yearly budget of
member corporations. Petition is dismissed.
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industry. The Solicitor General contended that the said law is a proper
delegation of legislative power to the President of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of power.
Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation of power.
The court further ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion
in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, the
court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
3.
Exceptions to the requirement of sufficient legislative
standards
1.
power which is not directly or exclusively a legislative
one and has no relation whatsoever to personal or property
rights;
2.
power to regulate a mere matter of privilege
E.
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Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license
pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P.
Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own
Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates
of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with
the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum.
Issue: WON Memorandum/ordinance of MMA is valid.
Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all lawenforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and
confiscating driver's licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged
enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or
not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply
delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan
Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to
prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver's licenses as well for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.
An ordinance to be valid:
Must not be in contravention of the constitution
Must not be oppressive
Must not be discriminatory
Must not regulate or prohibit trade
Must not be against a statute
F.
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1.
2.
G.
Supplementary/detailed legislation
1.
2.
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the
decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural
Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their
rights over their mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or
encroachment between two mining claims.
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Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private
respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim
over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict
between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the
law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates
compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims,
such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree.
Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.
Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and
(2) should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they
committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring
petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction. Petitioners
had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the
Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims
[Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 4631.
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural
Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to
issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rulemaking
power.
Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis
for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by
the Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers.
Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does
it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a
procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does
not amend or extend the provisions of the statute
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computation of the 13th month pay. If they were not excluded it is hard to find
any 'earnings and other remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation
of the 13-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle
and with no purpose.
GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79
(Angel Pascual)
Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of
the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en
bane, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body
Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority
vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a
case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner
Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does
not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man
body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in
every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to
the jurisdiction of the NTC.
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Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of manila of
serious misconduct and dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local
government, its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCC.
Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In the 1992
election he run again and this time his victory not without unchallenged.
A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second time
petitioner Grego a registered voted file a petition with comelec for
disqualification and suspension of his proclamation. Basco was proclaimed and
assume office; petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking to annul a hasty and
illegal proclamation.
Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that
the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the
Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case. Basco was NOT
subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from
office on or after January 1, 1992.
"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations
relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.'
Conte vs COA 264 SCRA 19
China Banking Corp vs HDMF 307 SCRA 44
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3.
Requirement of reasonableness
a.
Bears a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to
be accomplished;
b.
Supported by good reasons;
c.
Free from constitutional infirmities or charge of
arbitrariness
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend any review
class, briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any
handouts, review material or any tip from school or any review center during
the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the
examination day.
Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.
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Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of administrative law
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued,
then they must be held invalid.
The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to carrying into effect what is
provided in the legislative enactment.
H. Interpretative legislation
1.
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c.
Interpretation handed down in an adversary
proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer
exercising quasi-judicial power.
2.
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Trial Court of Pasig City, contesting therein the results of the election in all
forty-seven (47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch
68.
On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was
shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the protestant therein, which
payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6.
Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to
comply with this requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent denied
the motion to dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing
or docket fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not
jurisdictional.
Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the
payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and counterprotest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at the outset
will not operate to deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law
and acquired pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the
instant petition is hereby denied.
When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the court that finally determine what
the law means.
Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425
United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of
commissioner in dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the absence of
express provision in Social Security act, vesting in the commission the power to
condone penalties. Petitioners contention that they had under the impression
that international organization, they were not cover under SSC. They paid their
premiums and ask for condonation, which was denied by commissioner.
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ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under
SSC to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premiums.
RULING: No error in the commissioners action. The provision on the SSC
precisely enumerates the power of the commission, nowhere from the said
powers may it shown that the commissioner is granted expressly or by
implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the act.
3.
Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules and
such interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be
erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such interpretation is entitled to
recognition and respect from the courts, as no one is better qualified to
interpret the intent of the regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus, its
interpretation that the rule it issued is not retroactive, not being unreasonable,
should be followed.
I. Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts
Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557
J. Penal rules and regulations
1.
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Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province of
Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous diseases known as rinderpest. The conviction was
grounded on illegal and voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting
and ordering the carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the
quarantines against the same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein
defendant interposed a defense that the acts complained of did not constitute a
crime.
Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime.
Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar
do not fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said
finding does not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of a violation
of an article of the revised penal code.
2.
K. Rate-fixing power
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
(Aileen Angue)
Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set
aside an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
NTC, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged
by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by 15% with the
reservation to make further reduction later, for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a
denial or procedural, as well as substantial due process of law. The said
provisional reduction is allegedly under the contemplation of E.O. 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers; and E.O.
196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC.
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Publication requirement
Section 2, Civil Code
Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following their completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless
otherwise provided.
Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
Chapter 2
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a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior
to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
The publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of its contents.
2.
VI.
Adjudicatory Powers
a.
Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law.
Quasi-judicial body an organ of government other than a court and other
than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making power.
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Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)
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Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy
as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect
to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
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Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature as such are devoled upon the admin agency by the organic law of
existence.
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Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority
to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3)
provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and
receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the
sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification.
Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and
regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be
divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the
criminal investigation stage is the factfinding inquiring which is usually
conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and
interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find
sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation.
The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It
is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient
evidence to bring a person to trial.
It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at
the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law
enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted
if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation
of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as
an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of
this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate
action.
Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80
(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas
and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of
the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of
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Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of his father
constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was afterwards
interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war, but again
reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention
is, is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that they made
application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet with the opposition of
Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted the two Sarenas the
right, in preference to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero Bangad.
Sideco then took the proceedings to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of
Sideco and confirming the decision of the administrative authorities, with the
costs against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness of
the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.
Issue: WON
Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of
waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be
submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications through the
Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary thereon is final
"unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty days after
the date of the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of such
appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See. 4.)
A more extensive method is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral
system, which makes it the duty of the Director of Public Works to make a
technical examination of streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the
performance of this work, the Director of Public Works or any official especially
authorized by him, may examine witnesses under oath, and can issue for this
purpose subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates
signed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications are then granted
each appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director
of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the
property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of the
date of the publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)
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Ocampo vs US 234 US 91
d.
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Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is
not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving
them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious
days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned
in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for
the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a
rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the
source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel
should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should
be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up
and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked.
These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the
examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations
should not be curtailed.
e.
Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-judicial
power
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268
(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development
Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren
Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded
the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the
petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for
specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that
the competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending
that it had jurisdiction over the matter.
Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.
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Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real
estate trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the
National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its
decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the
agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is
justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and
competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.
f.
Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found
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enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and
the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC
moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban
under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive
realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the
ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the
legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering
with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . .
the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered
(Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932,
941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion,
has become well nigh indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the
match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of
mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the
Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
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VII.
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because she could not get a share of the proceeds of the life insurance policy of
her dead husband whose beneficiary was Caamic.
Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.
Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section
1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking
of his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to
be in a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued
in connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court
nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by
direction of this Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz.,
administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way connected with or
related to some of his administrative duties because he knew from the
beginning that it was for a confrontation with the complainant as solicited by
Generosa. Sandagan for the latter to get a share in the death benefits of
Edgardo Sandagan which was received by the complainant. Generosa had not
filed any action in respondent's court for her claim; neither is there any case in
respondent's court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted
was for respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and
absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to his
official functions and duties, accommodating the request and using his official
functions and office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.
In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the
questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his
full rights of redress.
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Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with
several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes
without the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution.
After appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished for
contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing
a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to
try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection
with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot
be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution
(Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the
power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in
nature.
". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did
not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the
power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently,
in the, administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident
and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the
exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid.
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investigation, filed the corresponding informations against her and the same
are now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.
Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the
penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in
ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding
the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence,
the decision of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon
petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial
Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those
constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among other
things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act
that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing
Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law, or
procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound solely by
the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other
means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of wellinformed persons which results must be made a part of the record". All-this
means that an accused may be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses
face to face" and may be convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and
not beyond reasonable doubt.
This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be
contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial
Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the
requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending
the law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our
Government.
CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524
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X.
I. Jurisdiction
A.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an
appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability
should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said
petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code
and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he
concluded that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot
extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not
section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among
those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the
accused with the offended party.
Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that
the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should
extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape
and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or
attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability
for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for
a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse against
chastity is not denominated rape, it is only for the lack of the intention to lie,
both crimes being identical in every other respect, though of different degrees
of gravity. We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is
included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773 and,
consequently, the marriage of the accused with the offended party in the
present case has extinguished his criminal liability.
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B.
Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing quasijudicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of
five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election
Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-PresidentAllan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales.
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of
several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Respondent
Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC
in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region
V of the Department of Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied
by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner
seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain
an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to
entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations
as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules
and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies,
functions, plans, programs and projects;"
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II.
Procedure to be followed
Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
A.
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received
the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other
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agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative
policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative
purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
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Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its
powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer
agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside
the decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the
certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and
CUALOPING.
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory
and adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may
pass upon applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and
hearing), certificates of registration of corporations, partnerships and
associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor
unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and
impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as
well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be
warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly
replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in
the names of the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative
jurisdiction. The stockholders who have been deprived of their certificates of
stock or the persons to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been
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E.
F.
G.
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H.
Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2.
Clear and convincing evidence
Blacks Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3.
Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4.
Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I.
Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1.
Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2.
Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3.
Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4.
Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5.
Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
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6.
A.
Substantive and procedural due process, defined
DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, affecting ones person or property. It is designed to
secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to
formality. For substance must prevail over form.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
By procedural due process is meant a law which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial
The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
and property without due process of law, which clause optimizes the
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desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence
of a competent court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial
of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed authority to try petitioner. The
writ of certiorari and prohibition should have been granted and the lower
court, to repeat, ought not to have dismissed his petition summarily. The
significance of such an insistence on a faithful compliance with the regular
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supporting evidence. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of
the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety
of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these
rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and
evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved
(De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan
vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as
examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial
authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows
the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate
the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27),
or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing
evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's
performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably,
investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
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issue. However, when the Court of First Instance of Manila issued on July 22,
1961 an order of execution against University Publishing Company, Inc., a new
problem cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff of
the City of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the contract with
plaintiff on behalf and as President of University Publishing Company, Inc.
They then discovered that no such entity exists. A verification made at the
Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. On July 31, 1961,
said Commission issued a certification "that the records of this Commission do
not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a
corporation or partnership."2 This triggered a verified petition in the court
below on August 10, 1961 for the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the
Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the judgment against the assets
and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the case.
All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the
University Publishing Company, Inc. Instead of informing the lower court that it
had in its possession copies of its certificate of registration, its article of
incorporation, its by-laws and all other papers material to its disputed
corporate existence, University Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain
silent. On August 11, 1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel
Aruego, Mamaril and Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid)
merely countered plaintiff's petition for execution as against Aruego with an
unsworn manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this
case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.
Issue: WON Aruego is a party to this case
Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as
representative of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract
sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the benefits resulting from it, so
much so that partial payment of the consideration were made by him; that he
violated its terms, thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the
litigation he was the real defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice,
responsibility under the judgment falls on him.
"By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. . . .' (4
Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581); or, as this Court has said, 'Due process of law'
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1. The right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case
and submit evidence
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
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support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing , or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of
Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know Lin: various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
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In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into
the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with
certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R.
No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)
Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers solely on
the basis of an ocular inspection.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on
the basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full evidence to determine
the cause or motive of such a lay off
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Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo merely
acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of
the respondent company was incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot
be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when
conducted at the request of the interested.
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only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which
govern society.' (cited in Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 168 by Neptali
Gonzales, 1975 ed.)
"Administrative due process requires that there be an impartial tribunal
constituted to determine the right involved; that due notice and opportunity to
be heard be given; that the procedure at the hearing be consistent with the
essentials of a fair trial; and that the proceedings be conducted in such a way
that there will be opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable
rules of low and procedure were observed.' (42 Arm Jur. p. 451, cited by Neptali
Gonzales, p. 183, Philippine Constitutional Law). "
Privileges that had long been enjoyed transforms and becomes in the character of
ones property.
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)
Facts: This special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision of the
NAPOLCOM: The fact that the Jai alai bookies were operating in the house
being occupied by herein respondent-appellant, the apprehension of his wife
and brother in two (2) successive raids effected by law enforcement authority
and his intercession for the dismissal of the case filed in consequence thereof,
are tangible proofs that he was, indeed, an accessory - if not a principal - in
said gambling operation.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written charges and
informed of the nature of such charges; that no hearing had actually been held
by the summary dismissal board: and that at any rate he was not heard.
Issue: WON the contention of petitioner is with merit
Held: YES. We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and
that not even the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his
guilt is - in the opinion of his superiors - strong can compensate for the
procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases
such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the
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ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or, through
blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.
BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; OBSERVANCE THEREOF REQUIRED
IN SUMMARY DISMISSAL.- Petitioner's case was decided under P.D. No. 971,
as amended by P.D. No. 1707. While Sec. 8-A of the Decree authorizes
summary dismissals "without the necessity of a formal investigation" of
members of the INP "when the charge is serious and the evidence is strong,"
the Decree and the implementing rules nonetheless give the respondent the
right to be furnished a copy of the complaint and to file an answer within three
(3) days. The filing of charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity to
respondent to answer the charges constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. In summary dismissal proceedings it is mandatory that charges be
specified in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the
complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence against the
respondent can be brought to his knowledge. The formal investigation, which is
dispensed with, refers to the presentation of witnesses by their direct
examination and not to the requirement that the respondent be notified of the
charges and given the chance to defend himself.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD;
BASIS OF DECISION, NOT PROPER.- What the summary dismissal board
appears to have done in this case was simply to receive the report on two raids
allegedly conducted on petitioner's house in the course of which what were
believed were gambling paraphernalia were allegedly found and two witnesses
allegedly admitted they were collectors of petitioner and his brother Lolito Go.
But the report is not in the record of this case which the NAPOLCOM
transmitted to the Court. Nor does the decision of the summary dismissal
board disclose on what the supposed report was based. This is in violation of
the rule that in administrative proceedings "the decision must be rendered
testimonies of the two witnesses were not taken down. This is evident from the
decision of the board which refers to the result of an -investigation.- The facts
found by the board were not the result of any investigation conducted by it but
by some other group.
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D.
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"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be
submitted to the Director of Mines for decision:
"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from
the date of its receipt.
Issue: WON Petitioners-appellant were deprived of due process when Gozon
reviewed his own decision
Held: Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning
fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as
Director of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
E.
Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due
process
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into
the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with
certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.
Essential elements of due process:
a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial
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hearing is required, RCA must be considered to have waived its right thereto,
its counsel having addressed a letter to the Radio Control Board saying that
"little would be gained by arguing the matter both before yourselves and before
the Public Service Commission."
Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
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F.
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2.
Where there is tentativeness of administrative action; where
the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice
and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person
affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of
a delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a temporary
appointee;
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3.
Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the
right to exercise them had not been claimed.
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G.
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Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order
of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not furnished the former a
"copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others.
Respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving
copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding
informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the
reduction of its rates. That petitioner had not even been served a copy of the
auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based, that such order
had been issued without notice and hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner
had been denied due process.
Issue: WON the twin notice of hearing is required in rate fixing?
Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order
complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that,
having been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly
violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void.
Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public service
commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional
provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing,
prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of
such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand,
legislative and rule-making in character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS, ON DUE PROCESS), or are, on the other hand,
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial (IN ALL INSTANCES, DUE
PROCESS IS REQUIRED), affecting the rights and property of private or
specific persons.
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be
heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a
public service commission.
H.
The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party cures
the defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude the party from
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claiming denial of due process assumes that the other requirements of due
process have been complied with. However such opportunity is nothing and he
is still denied due process, where the decision against him has nothing to
support itself, one of the cardinal requirements of due process being that the
decision or ruling of an administrative body must be supported by substantial
evidence.
i.
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There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a noncriminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that,
without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings
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period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19,
1994.
ISSUE: WON the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by
counsel during an administrative inquiry?
RULING: While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing
laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself and no duty rests in such a body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel,28 In an administrative proceeding
such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued)
has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of hearings attended by
Lumigued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted he
represent himself.
The hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a
criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when,
after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a
criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents
in its report and recommendation.
IV.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should first seek
relief in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even
though the matter is properly presented to the court, which is within its
jurisdiction. The court will not determine a controversy:
1. Where the question demands administrative determination requiring
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal
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the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. 26 Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
B.
Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES applies where
a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency; judicial
intervention is withheld until the administrative process has run its course.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its views
Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
C.
Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
(Aileen Rose Angue)
FACT: This is petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal by the trial court of
Petitioner Vicente Villaflor complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit
Lumber Co., Inc.
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reform except those failing under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with law, hence, this case.
Issue: WON the CAs decision is correct.
Ruling: There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is
exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back
rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue
which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, respondent
appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over
this case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the
part of private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in
Quismundo v. Court o Appeals,the resolution by the DAR is to the best
advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian
disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are
summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other
issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying
reconsideration is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28 September 1989 are
REINSTATED.
Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine
corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its
plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state
policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation,
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Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a
set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood
and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International
Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia,
which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from
Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that
"there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match
industry at reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of
Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and
the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC
moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban
under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive
realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the
ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the
legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering
with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . .
the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered
(Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932,
941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
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Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its
motion was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the
just compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of
just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided
from the decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other hand, respondents argue
that actions for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the appropriate
courts within 15 days from receipt of the decision of the DAR adjudicator,
otherwise such decision becomes final and executory, pursuant to 51 of R.A.
No. 6657.
Issue: Which contention is meritorious?
Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657 provides: The DAR
is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .The Special
Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.
D.
Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine does not
apply. It does not apply in any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
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V.
As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the
remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.
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Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was appointed
Principal of the Lambunao High School established in the municipality of
Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High School was later converted into a Regional
Vocational High School under the name of Iloilo Vocational High School.
Gonzales then received a letter from the Secretary of Education appointing him
as Head of the Related Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public School. He
also received a copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools addressed to
respondent Alfredo Pineda, at the time Principal of the Samar Trade School,
appointing him as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School. When Pineda came
to assume the office of Principal of the latter school, Gonzales refused to yield
the same to him, and sent a written protest against Pineda's appointment as
well as against his own appointment as Head of the Related Subjects
Department, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and
Trades, who forwarded it without undue delay to the Director of Public Schools
by a second indorsement. Without waiting for any action on his protest-in fact
even before said protest could be forwarded and submitted to the Director of
Public Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to restrain the
Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from giving effect to
the appointment of Alfredo Pineda as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School,
and to recover damages. After due trial, the lower court rendered the appealed
judgment. Appellants claimed that the lower court erred in not holding that the
present action was instituted prematurely.
Issue: WON the appellee initiated the appropriate administrative proceeding.
Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated appropriate
administrative procedures to obtain relief from the orders that he considered
prejudicial to his rights by means of his first, addressed to the Superintendent
of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter
to the Director of Public Schools, but even before this date appellee instituted
the present action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior
officers any opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before seeking
judicial intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate remedies before
resorting to the courts to seek relief appears to be of stronger application to the
present case where, according to the record, appellant Pineda and the superior
officers of appellee did not appear to have exerted any undue pressure upon
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him to compel him to yield and give up the position in question. The decision
appealed from is reserved, with the result that the present action is dismissed.
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It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-
compliance with the rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause
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Issue: WON the case will prosper and WON there is compliance with the DEAR.
Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple reason that, as
the record shows, the land in question is already the subject matter of
expropriation proceeding instituted by Basilan City pursuant to a resolution
approved by the City Council, which proceeding is now pending in the Court of
First Instance of Basilan. Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him. Petitioner should have first brought
the matter to the Director of Public Works who, under the law, exercise
supervision and control over city engineers of chartered cities (see
Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not satisfied with the Director's
decision he should have appealed to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
The principle is fundamental that a party aggrieved by a decision of an
administrative official should. before coming to court, apply for review of such
decision by higher administrative authority. This principle rests on the
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P340,000 with foreign suppliers which orders were accepted before July 31,
1949; (2) that in November 1950 it requested the respondent to allow
importation of the textiles against its quota for 1949 pursuant to circular No.
12 and (3) but that respondent with grave abuse of authority and discretion
has denied the request and instead ordered that said orders of Ang Tuan Kai &
Co., be charged against the firm's 1951 quota and exchange allocations in
pursuant to the order issued previously by the same board. Hence this case.
Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case before the
court.
Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the Import
Control Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain and adequate
remedy by an appeal to the President. Certiorari or mandamus against
administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative
officers can grant relief. Thus, the petition is denied.
D.
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suit for replevin because the buck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of
this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they
were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was
unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized
in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by
petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Ruling: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for
lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice
for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as
to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Thus, while the administration grapples with
the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies." To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the
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suspension, after he has been duly indicted and tried before a committee
created by the Board for the purpose. An appeal to the Civil Service
Commission would thereby be an act of supererogation, requiring the
presentation of practically the same witnesses and documents produced in the
investigation conducted at the instance of the Monetary Board. Moreover,
Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Law provides that "except as otherwise
provided by law," the Commissioner of Civil Service shall have "final authority
to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officials
and employees in the competetive or classified service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officials and
employees; * * *." Considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central
Bank provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to the
investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the Governor,
coupled with the fact that Petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the noncompetetive or unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to
the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and
voluntary. "The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative
remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as
said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public
office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the
courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As
emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 621, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 82
Phil., 828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683, public interest requires that the right to a public
office should be determined as speedily as practicable."
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Relations Commission, Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid salaries. The
case was docketed therein as NLRC Case No. LR6151. Answering, the herein
petitioners denied that Rodito Nasayao was employed in the company as plant
manager with a fixed monthly salary of P3,000.00. They claimed that the
undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a joint venture, a sort of
partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good
working condition and, in return, he would get the contracts from end-users for
the installation of marble products, in which the company would not interfere.
In addition, private respondent Nasayao was to receive an amount equivalent to
25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would realize, should
there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no profits during
said period, private respondent was not entitled to any amount. The case was
submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected the herein
respondent Jose T. Collado as voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the
proceedings, however, the herein petitioners challenged the arbitrator's capacity
to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to desist from
farther hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. In due time,
or on 29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor of the complainant,
ordering the herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao the amount of P9,000.00,
within 10 days from notice. Upon receipt of the decision, the herein petitioners
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission on grounds that the
labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to hear and decide the
case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist therefrom: and that
the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. On 18 March 1976, Rodito
Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of
the voluntary arbitrator is final, appealable, and immediately executory;3 and,
on 23 March 1976, he filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Acting on the motions, the respondent Commission, in a resolution dated 7
May 1976, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision appealed from
is final, unappealable and immediately executory, and ordered the herein
petitioners to comply with the decision of the voluntary arbitrator within 10
days from receipt of the resolution.5
The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As prayed for, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining herein respondents
from enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned decision and resolution.
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Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that the
petitioner failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies is
tenable.
Ruling: The contention is without merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies cannot be invoked in this case, as contended. In the
recent case of John Clement Consultants, Inc. versus National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court said: "As is well known, no law provides for an appeal
from decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission; hence, there can
be no review and reversal on appeal by higher authority of its factual or legal
conclusions. When, however, it decides a case without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, the party thereby adversely
affected may obtain a review and nullification of that decision by this Court
through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Since, in this case, it appears that
the Commission has indeed acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of a belated appeal sought to be taken from a
decision of Labor Arbiter and thereafter reversing it, the writ of certiorari will
issue to undo those acts, and do justice to the aggrieved party."
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Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of
the aforesaid contract.3 He sought opinions from both the Commission on
Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the in
strument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps
be taken towards its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even
granted the Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the
cancellation. rescission of the above cited contract and make representations
with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the possession,
management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal
Government of Muntinlupa." Consequently, upon representations made by
Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988
Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution,
Bunye, together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Capital Command
of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the public
market and announced to the general public and the stallholders thereat that
the Municipality was taking over the management and operation of the facility,
and that the stallholders should thenceforth pay their market fees to the
Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to follow the
doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies.
Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled
that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.69 This doctrine of
qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most
needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the
President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant
case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive.
Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
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Facts: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention
of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer
Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in
Tobaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office
filed an investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be
petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the
necessary action, petitioner reiterated her application sometime in 1979-1985
alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her
landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the Ming of the said application
and, that the latter had distributed his landholding to his children. A
reinvestigation was conducted this time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October
31, 1985 filed his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's
CLT. Said report was elevated to the MAR. In an endorsement dated November
25, 1985, Regional Director Salvador Pejo manifested his concurrence with the
report of Atty. Evasco holding that the properties of the petitioner consist of
4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 27167,
27168 and 27344 and hence not covered by the Operation Land Transfer
Program. Juanito L. Lorena, the Officer-in-Charge of MAR likewise concurred
therewith. However, in the order dated February 13, 1986, then Minister
Conrado Estrella denied petitioner's application for retention. On April 17,
1986, petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The
case was entitled Hilda Ralla Almine vs. MAR and docketed as AC-G.R. SP No.
08550. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. However, it was
denied in an order dated May 28, 1986. A motion for reconsideration thereof
was likewise denied. After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision dated June 29, 19871 dismissing the appeal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to whether a
landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land holdings, if
administratively decided by the Minister of Agrarian Reform, are appealable
and could be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the
Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.2 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated October 22,
1987.
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Issue: Whether or not the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Ruling: It is contended in this connection, that the appellee failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies by not asking the Board of Regents to reconsider
the challenged resolution before bringing the matter to court. An
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daughters of the couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their
parents were married in 1933, the oppositors nonetheless pointed out that
their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man. Later,
they said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom she
begot eleven children. According to these oppositors, it was their father himself
who had described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had not heard
from the petitioner since 1942.
Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being considered
conjugal and therefore equally owned by the spouses.
The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed for,
but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to act
on the matter. Its reason was that there was no observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction to order an amendment of a
certificate of title without previous exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Held: Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in
a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that
it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a
motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed
waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable to private lands, as also settled in a number of decisions rendered by
this Court. Once registered, the homestead granted to Sergio Serfino ceased to
have the character of public land and so was removed from the operation of the
said doctrine. But notwithstanding the above principles, the petition will still
have to be dismissed because the change sought is not authorized under
Section 112 of Act 496, as interpreted by this Court.
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Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD Computer
Services and Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment of certain benefits.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision sustaining the petitioners' position. The
labor arbiter, then, upon motion of the petitioners, issued a writ of execution to
enforce said decision. The following day, the sheriff served a notice of
garnishment to the Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount of
P15,031.85 was garnished. This amount has already been turned over to the
petitioners.
A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the respondents'
office premises. ACD Group Inc., an American firm based in California, U.S.A.,
through its Chairman, Dulay filed a third-party claim in the NLRC case on the
ground that it is the real owner of the computers levied upon and scheduled for
auction. This third-party claim was denied.
ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition for relief
from judgment in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with prayer for the issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The NLRC then
issued the questioned resolutions incidental to Injunction Case. The petitioners
filed before the NLRC a motion to dismiss and/or answer to the petition on the
ground that a petition for relief is not a remedy granted under the Labor Code
and NLRC Rules.
Without waiting for the NLRC's resolution on their motion to dismiss, the
petitioners filed the present petition. This petition seeks to annul the three
NLRC resolutions, to prohibit the NLRC from taking further proceedings in
Injunction Case and to direct the NLRC to dismiss said injunction case and to
order the full execution of the decision.
The Solicitor General recommends that the petition be dismissed for being
premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. He
further stressed the jurisdiction of the NLRC and its exercise of sound
discretion.
Issue: WON the Soc Gens position is tenable.
Ruling: The Court gave due course to this petition on a finding, among others,
that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an inflexible rule. In
fact, it yields to many accepted exceptions. As we have noted in a number of
cases, exhaustion is not necessary where inter alia there is estoppel on the part
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of the party invoking the doctrine; where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; where there is unreasonable
delay or official action that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant: where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided anyway by the courts of justice.
At least two of these exceptions are present in the instant case on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. There had been no action on the challenge to the
petition for relief from judgment for almost a year. This is considerably long
considering that the labor arbiter's decision had already become final and in
fact has been partially executed. The main case had been filed as early as June
20, 1986.
Moreover, this case involving the propriety of a remedy and the suspension of
an execution would only be further delayed if we remand it to the NLRC, only to
have any decision raised again before this Court.
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case to the Court of Appeals, Manila. The Court of Appeals modified the
decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner,
being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the
highest court of the land.
Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full civil and political rights. With
this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the
government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School
Principal I.
Issue: WON petitioner Sabello should be reappointed to his position.
Ruling: The question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his
former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under
the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of
what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving
justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
cannot be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged
grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering
this a suit against the officials of this government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a nonlawyer, who claims
that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, the Court set aside the
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct
to the merits of the petition.
The petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized representative is hereby
directed to appoint petitioner to the position of Elementary School Principal I or
its equivalent
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Facts: Montes was charged with negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge
No. 6 under him bad sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not
pump out while under his care). the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated
him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board
of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory
negligence in not pumping, the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be
considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to
reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Montes then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review
the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss,
on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies
before he instituted the action.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 598, which provides: The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the
power and authority to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before
it on appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or
modified by the President of the Philippines.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in applying Sec 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
598 in the instant case.
Ruling: There is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision has been
rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the President, and
that the tendency of courts has been not to subject the decision of the
President to judicial review. It is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor
General may be appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board of
Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse may be
had to the courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President,
his action should be final and not reviewable by the courts because such a
course of action would be derogatory to the high office of the President. The
judgment appealed from is thus affirmed.
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