SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,

HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries
in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried
to intervene for the strikers cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision[1] of the Office of the President (OP),
issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-
industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution[2] on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory.
The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the
extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and
set aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the
Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the Win-Win
Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject
matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as
follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned
by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of
the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371[3] of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of
ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate
of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land
value at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR
Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or activities
concerning the subject land until further orders.[5]
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38
million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just
compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9,
1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the
summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation
of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering
the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated
March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and
the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank to return
the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders.[6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in
the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,[8] dated January 7, 1993, designating
certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where
the subject property is situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29,
1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:

Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who
can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.

Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification
of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition.

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said Ordinance.
Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by Mr.
Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association).

Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a
Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and
Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as
Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is
supposed to have the following components:

1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for Continuing
Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development
Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch, various
corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing
for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices;
processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant;
cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;

3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding,
memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and

4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories
and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The
same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon;
the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive
Director, signing By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the
Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.

In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas
Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO
OBJECTION to the proposed conversion as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems
thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-
San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no
objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question as it will provide more economic
benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and employment
opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up x x x.

On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and
DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their
respective officials in endorsing the project.

Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the
DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65
of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject
land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory
coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the
following grounds:

1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;

2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);

3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;

4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;

5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has
no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No.
124, Series of 1993.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but
the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995).[9]

10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property.[10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed[11] the order of denial to the Office of the
President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be
more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995,
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction,[12]
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential
Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a
memorandum[13] to the President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation that the
DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province for the
conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum[14] to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael
Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that
the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
Resolution[15] ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the
hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested
before the said court that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of the applications of
farmers-claimants and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition.[16]
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing
the DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:

After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by
Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality
of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other
hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none)
does not guarantee such benefits.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is,
indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of
way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject
of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by
the Philippine Packing Corporation.

On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA)
and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable,
suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC,
the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could
not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract
with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR
Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing
any activity or activities covering petitioners land.

On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already contributed
substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in
Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong,
Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just compensation up to this time.

Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements
for the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for
the land is not tenanted as already stated.

Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-
industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local
government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including
the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the
favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject
Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby
SET ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.[17]

17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996,
NQSRMDC and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to
DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that
during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed
against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O.
Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on
August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT
No. T-50264[19] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR
caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it
registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536[20] of the Registry of
Deeds of Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint[21] with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment
and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then
issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997[22] and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on
May 19, 1997,[23] restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting
from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24] was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben
D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision
had already become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997
Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was
challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front
of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October
10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a
motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424,
asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set
aside.[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve
their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task
Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and
recommend possible solutions to the problem.[26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by issuing
the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the

approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.

2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation

canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway provided in the
portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned
government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey
of the area, valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of the
identified farmer-beneficiaries.

3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously

determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment

of just compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the
CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP
coverage.

5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the
Department of Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.

We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997 without
ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.

SO ORDERED.[27]

A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon,
Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997[28] and, on
December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene[29] was filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously
identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property
subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30] by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the
President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by
fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the
Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by
reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.[31] Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997.[32] They
availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[33] They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject
Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek
a reconsideration .[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be
dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with
the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the
motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not,
it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal.[35] On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.[36] This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any
quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,[38] including the Office of the
President,[39] may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review[40] within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution,[41] whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[42]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable
considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently
illegal[43] and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary
Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction[44] when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP
Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial
issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by
an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed
resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x x x x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of
the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed
illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the
petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also
be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari,[46] prohibition[47] and
mandamus.[48] But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-
judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided
by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in
People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,[49] through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in
any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations
omitted)

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This
has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases,
namely:[50] Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs. Arranz,[52] Bercero vs. De Guzman,[53] and
Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.[54] As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition
in the interest of speedy justice[55] and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest
because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the
petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time
and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[56]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of
the case."

As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when
they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial
recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is
a patent nullity,[57] as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a
petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court
of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against
DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts
while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative
processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling.
This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no
jurisdiction (citations omitted).

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid
down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the
identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.'[58]

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The
test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory
examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with
each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR
Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject
property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and
cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was
based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs
title, used documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation
of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two
cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President
dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were
instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by
alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants
contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in
interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of Farmer-
Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in the
dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a
perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those purportedly Found Qualified and
Recommended for Approval. In other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-
beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in question is
a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as
intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 can
still be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines
are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise

provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of
a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision
of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the
second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18
and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which
had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long
become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-
established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99
Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial
acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to
the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-
judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose
is to write finis to disputes once and for all.[61] This is a fundamental principle in our justice system,
without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle
must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates
such principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed
by Justice Thomas A. Street[62] in a 1918 case,[63] is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[64]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated
November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]
Annex AA, Petition; Rollo, pp. 163-167.
[2]
Annex A, Petition; Ibid., pp. 48-63.
[3]
Annex B, Petition; Rollo, pp. 64-65.
[4]
Par. 12, Petition; Ibid., p. 6.
[5]
Annex C, Petition; ibid., pp. 66-67.
[6]
Annex D, Petition; ibid., p. 68.
[7]
Annexes E, F and G, Petition; ibid., pp. 69-71.
[8]
Annex H, Petition; Ibid., p. 72.
[9]
Annex AA, Petition; Ibid., pp. 163-166.
[10]
Annex S, Petition; Ibid., p. 113.
[11]
Annex T, Petition; Ibid., pp. 115-120.
[12]
Annex U, Petition; Ibid., pp. 121-146.
[13]
Annexes V and V-1, Petition; Ibid., pp. 147-150.
[14]
Annex W, Petition; Ibid., pp. 151-153.
[15]
Annex X, Petition; Ibid., pp. 154-156.
[16]
Annex Y, Petition; Ibid., pp. 157-158.
[17]
Ibid., pp. 166-167.
[18]
Par. 37, Petition, rollo, pp. 14-15.
[19]
Annex BB, Petition; Ibid., p. 168.
[20]
Annex CC, Petition; Ibid., pp. 169-176.
[21]
Annex DD, Petition; Ibid., pp. 177-189.
[22]
Annex EE, Petition; Rollo, pp. 190-191.
[23]
Annex GG, Petition; Ibid., pp. 193-194.
[24]
Annex FF, Petition; Ibid., p. 192.
[25]
Par. 17, Respondents Comment, rollo, p. 532.
[26]
Par. 18, ibid., p. 533.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[28]
Par. 3, Petition; Ibid., p. 4.
[29]
Rollo, pp. 195-200.
[30]
Ibid., pp. 280-282.
[31]
Petition, ibid., p. 17.
[32]
Ibid., p. 18.
[33]
Ibid., p. 4.
[34]
Ibid., p. 5.
[35]
Fernando vs. Vasquez, et. al., 31 SCRA 288.
[36]
Ibid; Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court.
[37]
Ibid.
[38]
Except those issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court).
[39]
Section 1, Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court.
[40]
Sections 3 & 5, ibid.
[41]
Section 4, ibid.
[42]
Section 3, ibid.
[43]
Petition, rollo, p. 5.
[44]
Ibid., p. 18.
[45]
Fernando vs. Vasquez, et al., 31 SCRA 288.
[46]
Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court; People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., 172 SCRA 415, 423; Vergara, Sr. vs.
Suelto, et. al., 156 SCRA 753, 766.
[47]
Section 2, ibid.
[48]
Section 3, ibid.
[49]
Supra.
[50]
Cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. One, 1997 edition, p. 721.
[51]
G.R. Nos. 111416-17, Sept. 26, 1994.
[52]
G.R. No. 123352, Feb. 7, 1996.
[53]
G.R. No. 123573, Feb. 28, 1996.
[54]
G.R. No. 125500, Aug. 7, 1996.
[55]
Eugenio vs. Drilon, et. al., G.R. No. 109404, Jan. 22, 1996; 252 SCRA 106,110.
[56]
190 SCRA 31, 38.
[57]
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, L-19850, Jan. 30, 1964; Luzon Surety Co. vs.
Marbella, et al., L-16088, Sept. 30, 1960; Dir. Of Lands vs. Santamaria, 44 Phil. 594, all cited in Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 710.
[58]
First Philippine International Bank, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 252 SCRA 259, 283 (Jan. 24,
1996).
[59]
Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 27.
[60]
174 SCRA 258, 271.
[61]
Legarda, et al. vs. Savellano, et al., 158 SCRA 194, 200.
[62]
One of the first Justices of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
[63]
El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921.
[64]
Ibid., at p. 949.