Contstruction Interstate Rivalry

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The Construction of a Latin American

Interstate Culture of Rivalry
a
Cameron G. Thies
a
Department of Political Science , University of Iowa , Iowa City,
Iowa, USA
Published online: 18 Nov 2008.
To cite this article: Cameron G. Thies (2008) The Construction of a Latin American Interstate Culture
of Rivalry, International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations,
34:3, 231-257, DOI: 10.1080/03050620802469872
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International Interactions, 34:231257, 2008
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620802469872
The Construction of a Latin American

1547-7444 Interactions,
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International Interactions Vol. 34, No. 3, October 2008: pp. 145
Interstate Culture of Rivalry
CAMERON G. THIES
C. G. American
Latin Thies Culture of Rivalry
Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

Downloaded by [University College London] at 04:35 09 September 2014
This paper merges constructivist theoretical insights into the rival

role identity, rival role relationships, and the resulting culture of
anarchy that characterizes the interstate system with recent empirical
measures of rivalry. This project is carried out through an exami-
nation of the Latin American regional subsystem, which has
already received some attention from analysts concerned with
interstate culture, largely because of the relative lack of interstate
conflict in the region. The dyadic relationships of 17 Latin American
states and the culture they produce are examined between 1948
and 1992. The paper employs simultaneous equation modeling to
capture aspects of the co-constitution of these agents and struc-
tures, consistent with constructivist theory. The results indicate
that the Lockean culture of anarchy and the adoption of a dyadic
rival role relationship are affected by a variety of factors emphasized
by realists, liberals, and constructivists in the Latin American
context.
KEYWORDS Latin America, regional culture, rivalry, zone of

negative peace, culture of anarchy
In the past decade two separate literatures have grown up surrounding the
concept of interstate rivalry, one emphasizing dyadic interaction and the
other focused on the structure of the interstate system. The first has empiri-
cally identified rivalries based upon the number and timing of Militarized
Interstate Disputes (MIDs) (e.g., Diehl and Goertz, 2000) or by the mutual
I would like to thank Paul Hensel, Paul Diehl, three anonymous reviewers, and the editors for their
helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Address correspondence to Cameron G. Thies, Associate Professor, University of Iowa,
Department of Political Science, 341 Schaeffer Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA. E-mail:
cameron-thies@uiowa.edu
231
232 C. G. Thies
identification of decision-makers in a dyad (e.g., Thompson, 2001). A sec-

ond literature, based on constructivist international relations theory has also
developed the concept of a rival role identity, and theorized about the
effects that it could have if adopted by greater numbers of states (Wendt,
1999). A central theoretical puzzle motivating this paper is whether the
concepts of rivalry developed in the two literatures are complementary. If
so, could their merger lead to integration of the study of the structure of
interstate politics that usually occurs at a high level of abstract theorizing
and the study of dyadic interaction or foreign policy that occurs at a more
applied level? This paper suggests that these literatures can be integrated to
achieve this goal.
At the level of empiricism, can quantitative measures be used to test
constructivist propositions about the culture of the interstate system? Quan-

titative tests of constructivist theory are rare, but if constructivism is to be
considered one of the dominant theoretical approaches in the discipline,
then it should be amenable to tests from a variety of methodologies. Further,
in the specific application to Latin America, does this approach help to
explain the negative or violent peace that is thought to characterize the
interstate political culture of the region?1 The integration of constructivist
theory with empirical measures of rivalry demonstrates that a Lockean
culture of anarchy, or a culture based on the rival role identity, is affected
by a variety of factors emphasized by realists, liberals, and constructivists in
the Latin American context. Many of these factors affect the dyadic relation-
ships as well, but with different effects, as the widespread adoption of the
rival role identity preserves the negative peace characteristic of the interstate
culture, while the specific rival role relationships formed by states contain
the majority of the conflict in the region. The rival role identity thus serves
as a crucial mechanism linking the culture and the dyad as constructivists
would expect. The empirical results demonstrate that interstate culture can
be assessed through the use of quantitative measures and techniques.
CULTURE AND THE RIVALRY CONCEPT: MERGING THEORY

AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Constructivist international relations theory brought new life to the concept

of political culture, taking it to an even higher level of political order
than typically considered by those who debate its merits in other subfields.
Alexander Wendts (1999) Social Theory of International Politics has been
instrumental in this regard by theorizing about different cultures of anarchy
that arise from the adoption of particular role identities. This approach pro-
vides fertile ground for theorizing about the relationship between interstate
politics and foreign policy, as roles provide a crucial link between structures
and agents.
Latin American Culture of Rivalry 233
Wendts (1999, p. 1) approach to constructivism is grounded in two

basic propositions: (1) that the structures of human association are deter-
mined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that
the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these
shared ideas rather than given by nature. In this perspective, the structure of
the interstate system is formed from the distribution of ideas, rather than the
distribution of material capabilities (c.f., Waltz, 1979). The distribution of
ideas that comprise interstate structure is simply another way of describing
socially shared knowledge, or the interstate culture. A key component of that
culture is the shared knowledge of the identities of the actors (i.e., states) in
the system, as those identities ultimately help to explain actor behavior.
Wendt (1999, p. 327) argues that role identities are learned and rein-
forced in interaction with significant others through a process of cultural

selection or socialization. In the social act, a state either selects a role identity
from the available distribution of roles that comprise the structure of the sys-
tem, or it may have one chosen for it by significant others. The state then
attempts to enact this role identity with significant others in a role relationship.
For example, if a state is treated by a significant other as an enemy, then the
state internalizes that belief in its own role identity. The effects of this inter-
action are magnified when a tipping point is reached whereby all members
of a system are automatically assumed to be enemies. According to Wendt,
this process produces the Hobbesian culture of anarchy. Similar logic trans-
lates the rival role identity into a Lockean culture and a friend role identity
into a Kantian culture.
Wendts (1999, p. 279) judgment is that the modern interstate system
dating from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is dominated by a Lockean
culture of anarchy. Wendts (1999, pp. 283285) characterization of the cul-
ture of the Westphalian interstate system as Lockean in nature is based on
the four tendencies he argues are generated by such a culture. First, inter-
state conflict is an accepted, yet constrained part of the culture. Since rivals
recognize each others sovereignty as an institutional feature of the system,
they do not attempt to conquer or destroy each other as enemies would.
Rivals also recognize a right to property given that sovereignty rests on a
territorial foundation. As such, Wendt (1999, pp. 211213, 280) recognizes
that many disputes between rivals will concern territorial revisionism. Sec-
ond, the limited nature of conflict results in a low death rate for states in the
system. Third, states will tend to balance power as a result of the mutual
recognition of sovereignty, rather than as an effect of anarchy (c.f., Waltz,
1979). Finally, neutrality is a recognized status in a Lockean culture of anar-
chy, as the live and let live culture generated by the dominance of the
rival role identity means that there is no need for states to compete militarily
if their significant relationships do not warrant it.
Wendt (1999, pp. 285290) further describes the three degrees to which
sovereignty norms may be internalized in the modern interstate system,
234 C. G. Thies
corresponding to three pathways through which a Lockean culture of anar-

chy can be achieved: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. The first degree
is the realist path to a Lockean culture of anarchy based on coercion. This
path suggests that states respect sovereignty norms because they are forced
to by other states that are more powerful. The second degree is the liberal
path to a Lockean culture of anarchy based on self-interest. This path
suggests that states respect sovereignty norms because they feel it is in their
interest in order to achieve other goals like increased trade. The third
degree is the constructivist path to a Lockean culture of anarchy based on
legitimacy. This path suggests that states respect sovereignty norms because
they are seen as legitimate, constitutive components of the interstate
culture. Since Wendts constructivism is an analytical approach rather than
a theory of international politics, he and others argue that it can incorporate

theoretical expectations from realism and liberalism, as well as sociological
theories that focus on identity (Wendt, 1999; Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Adler
and Barnett, 1998). Constructivism subsumes their explanatory variables as
particular paths to culture, or degrees of internalization of sovereignty
norms. Wendt expects elements of all three pathways to be present in the
Lockean culture of anarchy.
Wendts work, unlike previous theories of international politics, explicitly
recognizes the links between agents and structures that are necessary to
produce and maintain the international system and its particular culture of
anarchy. In fact, his work stands apart from other scholars who have sug-
gested that it is impossible to provide a single approach that unifies both
the unit and structural levels of analysis (Waltz, 1979). Wendt (1999,
pp. 147156) argues that interaction is an important level of analysis
between the unit and structural levels. Interaction is a highly structured
process that links the micro- and macro-structural features of the system.
Wendts discussion of these linkages is an advance over existing theory,
yet the transmission of agent behavior into structural or cultural outcomes is
unexamined and assumed to be fairly straightforward. A friend role relation-
ship is probably peaceful at the dyadic level and if enough states adopt the
friend role identity, then the culture produced at the macro-structural level is
probably pacific too. The same would be true of the enemy role identity and
relationshipextremely hostile and conflictual at the dyadic and structural/
cultural levels. But what about the rival role relationship? Rivals demonstrate
a curious mix of quasi-amity and enmity, with periods of hostility and open
conflict, as well as periods of relative peace. The link between the rival dyad
and the culture is not as simple as in the friend and enemy scenarios. The
argument of this paper is that the rival role identity becomes the link
between the micro-structure (rival role relationships) and the macro-structure
(Lockean culture of anarchy). It serves as a mechanism that maintains
the negative peace characteristic of the Lockean culture by containing the
majority of conflict in the region within specific rival role relationships.2
Athough Wendt provides an intriguing theoretical account of international

politics, he does not provide any empirical evidence for his propositions
about the rival role identity and the Lockean culture that it might form. The
addition of an empirical dimension to my extension of Wendts theoretical
approach enables us to more fully understand the linkages between
micro-structure, or rival role relationships, and macro-structure, or the Lockean
culture of anarchy. We can accomplish this by drawing on the work of schol-
ars operating within the traditional materialist and individualist ontology
(as opposed to Wendts ideational structuralism). These scholars have
explored rivalry at a more empirically grounded level, and a few have even
begun to acknowledge that rivalry may constitute a form of identity.
This scholarship began with an approach to rivalry based on the COW
project. Diehl and Goertz (2000, p. 4) conceptualize enduring rivalry as

a relationship between two states in which both use, with some regularity,
military threats and force as well as one in which both sides formulate
foreign policy in military terms. Operationally, an enduring rivalry is a dyad
that experiences at least 6 MIDs within at least 20 years. Thompson (2001,
p. 560) avoids a strict dispute threshold requirement by suggesting that stra-
tegic rivalries occur when states view each other as (a) competitors, (b) the
source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming
militarized, and (c) enemies. Operationally, the initiation and termination
of the strategic rivalry are gauged by the perceptions of the decision makers
in both states, with no minimum or maximum duration of time specified in
advance. Thompson relies on the foreign policy histories of each state for
insight into these threat perceptions.
Although Thompsons conceptualization requires that rival states view
each other as enemies, this does not imply the enemy role identity that
Wendt would argue constitutes the basis of a Hobbesian culture of anarchy.
Thompson (2001, p. 561) indicates that the most important criterion for
identifying rivalries is their non-anonymity. One of Thompsons consistent
criticisms of Diehl and Goertz is that their operational definition leaves open
the possibility that any random state dyad across the globe may be consid-
ered a rivalry, leading to some questionable classifications. Adding the
enemy condition is to ensure that rivals are more than simply theoretical
competitors, and instead require mutual identification as a source of threat
(Keunne, 1989, p. 555; Thompson, 2001, p. 561; Thies, 2001a, pp. 697698).
Using the language of enemy also connotes a certain level of historical
hostility that separates these dyads from friends. Although Thompson
(2001, p. 561) states that actors categorize other actors in their environ-
ments. Some are friends, others are enemies, rivals are really a middle
category, something that fellow realists may not recognize explicitly in their
conceptual construction.
Wendt (1999, p. 261) anticipates this conceptual confusion by explaining
that enmity and rivalry are similar in that
236 C. G. Thies
both imply that the Other does not fully recognize the Self and therefore
may act in a revisionist fashion toward it, but the object of recognition
and revisionism is different. An enemy does not recognize the right of
the Self to exist as a free subject at all, and therefore seeks to revise
the latters life or liberty (call this deep revisionism). A rival, in
contrast, is thought to recognize the Selfs right to life and liberty, and
therefore seeks to revise only its behavior or property (shallow revi-
sionism). Both impute to the Other aggressive intent, but the enemys
intentions are unlimited in nature, the rivals are limited.
In the Hobbesian culture of anarchy created by the dominance of the

enemy identity, we would find the presence of unrelenting and unlimited
warfare and a high death rate for weak or otherwise unfit states. We do not
observe this in the modern interstate system. Thus, despite the language
Thompson uses to classify rivals, I believe that he and Wendt are essentially
describing the same phenomenon. Of the two empirical approaches to
rivalry, Thompsons comes closest to Wendts rival role identity. Thompson
explicitly recognizes the intersubjective nature of the rivalry relationship by
requiring evidence that the principal decision makers in each country
viewed each other as rivals in order to classify them as such.
The emergence of a conceptualization of rivalry that is roughly similar
across constructivist international relations theory and historically-minded
empirical work, in addition to the operational definition found in the latter,
allows us to empirically test some propositions derived from constructivism.
Quantitative tests of constructivism are rather rare in the literature (e.g., Eyre
and Suchman, 1996). This may be due to a perceived incompatibility
between the intersubjective ontology characteristic of constructivism and
the positivist epistemology that dominates the discipline (Kratochwil and
Ruggie, 1986, pp. 764766), though not all constructivists see the combina-
tion as problematic (Wendt, 1999; Hopf, 2002).
Latin America provides the context for the analysis for a variety of
reasons. One of the most striking features about Latin America is the rela-
tively low level of interstate violence in the region compared to the rest of
the developing world. Jervis (2002, p. 9) draws specific attention to South
America as a potential security community on par with the peace that has
developed among the leading powers of the world. Kacowicz (1998) classi-
fies South America, or what he refers to as the Southern Cone countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador), as
a zone of negative peace from 18831996. In addition to the states listed
above, this study also includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela to complete the
larger Latin American region, which is relatively homogenous, compared to
other regions of the world due to its common Iberic colonial heritage.
I examine the dyadic interactions of these states with each other, and in
terms of the relationship they have with the United States between 1948 and
1992, encompassing the Cold War period between the U.S. and its global
rival, the U.S.S.R. The case and time selection that controls for colonial
heritage, language, ethnicity, religion, and the effects of the international
distribution of power would seem to provide the answer for why conflict is
rare in this part of the worldthere is nothing to fight about.
Yet, the reality of the Latin American situation is more complicated.
Morris and Millan (1983, p. 2) identified more than 30 conflicts in the region
during the 1980s concerned with ideology, hegemony, territory, resources,
and migration. Child (1984, p. 25) identified twenty interstate conflicts in the
1980s, most of which concerned territory, borders, resources, or migration.
Huth (1996) lists 18 territorial conflicts between 1950 and 1990 in the
region, many of which have resource and ethnic dimensions. In one

list, Mares (2000: 36) identifies 16 contemporary interstate disputes concern-
ing borders, territory, resources, and maritime issues, while Mares (2001,
pp. 4546) later lists 11 major active, 3 minor active, and 4 latent disputes in
contemporary Latin America. Thompsons (2001) classification of strategic
rivalry finds 26 rivalries between Latin American states, with 6 to 9 ongoing
in each year of the present study.
How can Latin America be considered a zone of negative peace, yet still
be characterized by ongoing territorial disputes and rivalry? I suggest that the
rival role identity has come to dominate the structure or culture of Latin
American interstate politics. Precisely because so many states adopt the rival
role identity we observe a negative peace marked by intermittent interstate
violence localized in specific rival role relationships that is generally not
allowed to spiral out of control into open warfare. Latin America, in Wendts
words, exists in a Lockean culture of anarchy, or zone of negative peace in
Kacowiczs understanding. Mares (2001) phrase violent peace captures the
same notion as well. That Latin America exists in Wendts Lockean culture of
anarchy characterized by a negative or violent peace can be demonstrated
with reference to the existing qualitative literature on interstate culture in the
region.
Kacowicz (1998) provides the most comprehensive qualitative assess-
ment of the zone of negative peace argument in the Latin American context.
He proposes four realist hypotheses for the maintenance of negative peace,
or what Wendt refers to as the realist path to a Lockean culture of anarchy.
The presence of a regional hegemon, a regional balance of power, an exter-
nal threat to the region, and geographical isolation, irrelevance (lack of
intra-regional interaction) and impotence to wage wars are potential realist
explanations of the zone of negative peace.
Kacowiczs (1998, pp. 193194) qualitative study finds that the pres-
ence of the U.S. as a regional hegemon was important in keeping the nega-
tive peace. Most of the existing qualitative literature on the region has
focused on the importance of the regional hegemon. Ebel, Taras, and
238 C. G. Thies
Cochrane (1991, pp. 4951) suggest that Latin American states want a
strong, but not overly intrusive patron who will protect them from the uncer-
tainties of international life. Yet, they caution that excessive intervention by
the patron will prompt a turn away from a clientelistic attachment to the
patron back to nationalism. The United States was firmly institutionalized in
the role of regional hegemon by the end of World War II, as indicated by
the Rio Treaty of 1947 and in the Charter of the Organization of American
States in 1948.3
The presence of a regional hegemon is thought to have had several
important effects on interstate relations in Latin America. First, Latin America
has a relative absence of interstate conflict, especially given the number of
long-standing, often emotionally charged disputes that exist in the region
(Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane, 1991, p. 57). The integrative force of the regional
hegemon has resulted in conflict within a loose association of states, (Waltz,
1971). Waltz suggests that countries in this situation have three potential
responses: 1) integrate their activities to increase their mutual well-being, 2)
battle over their differences, or 3) watch each other with wariness and suspi-
cion and not battle it out but, rather, resolve their dispute through diplomatic
means. The ultimate choice rests on their level of interdependence with each
otherthe more dependent they are for trade, investment, technology and
the like, the more likely they are to battle. Ebel, Taras and Cochrane (1991,
p. 59) suggest that their U.S. patron, which has provided markets, capital, and
technology, has reduced conflict between the Latin American states.
Second, since the U.S. was the major military supplier during much of
the mid to late twentieth century, it helped to avoid interstate conflict by
maintaining a rough military balance between contending states. These
states often had the capabilities to pull off internal coups, but could not
muster the strength to annex territory or engage in full-scale interstate war.
Third, the institutionalized mechanisms of U.S. regional leadership, such as
the OAS, were effective in many instances in bringing about an end to any
hostilities that did erupt. As a result, Kurth (1986) labeled the U.S. the
Colossus of the North which constructed a hegemonic international
system in Latin America. This system has four features: a military alliance
(Rio Treaty), Latin American economic dependence on the U.S., ideological
commonality with the U.S., and (in)direct intervention by the U.S. I suggest
that this system is based on Waltzs third response to conflict within a loose
association of states: watch each other with wariness and suspicion and
do not battle it out, instead resolve disputes diplomaticallyhowever long
it may take, which results in rivalry. This observation has not gone unno-
ticed among Latin American scholars as many have noted the numerous
rivalries in the region, although they have largely left them unexamined.4
On the contrary, Mares (2001) recent study, although largely confined to
the domestic determinants of the decision to use force, strongly challenges
the notion that the presence of the U.S. as a regional hegemon has had any
impact on the conflict propensity of the Latin American system. Mares inter-
pretation suggests U.S. hegemony was not determinative of outcomes in the
region, whether the argument is that conflict was more likely when the U.S.
fails to police the region, or that U.S. policy actually encouraged conflict
because of opposition to Latin American nationalism or communism during
the Cold War. As Mares (2001, p. 82) states force is used when the U.S.
wants it, and also when the U.S. opposes its use. Thus, the U.S. is not
intent on providing a collective good of regional peace, but instead is intent
on pursuing its own interests.
Kacowiczs second realist factor, the regional balance of power, was
important only between 1970 and 1980 in the period under study, as the mil-
itary regimes that dominated the Southern Cone states adopted military strate-
gies and alliances based on geopolitics (Child, 1985). As Kacowicz relates, the
major territorial disputes of the region resulted in the formation of two blocs:
Chile and Ecuador against Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, with Brazil taking on
the role of the balancer. Such a system had the potential to escalate any one
of the territorial disputes into a regional conflict, but did not. Kacowicz (1998,
p. 94) concludes that the balance of power either preserved the regional neg-
ative peace or failed to disturb it. Kacowiczs third realist factor, extra-regional
threat, was of little significance. Although, as indicated by Ebel, Taras and
Cochrane, at times the U.S. itself was considered a threat, especially during
the Central American interventions of the 1980s. The threat of U.S. interven-
tion thus had a pacifying effect on the willingness of Latin Americans to
resolve their disputes with force. Finally, geographical isolation, irrelevance,
and the lack of institutional capacity have rendered most states impotent to
fight wars, thus preserving the negative peace of Latin America.
Kacowicz (1998) also derives three hypotheses from liberal theory,
which represent Wendts liberal path to a Lockean culture of anarchy. The
presence of liberal democratic regimes, high levels of economic develop-
ment and prosperity, and high levels of economic interdependence and
integration are expected to preserve a negative peace. Kacowiczs (1998,
pp. 194196) qualitative analysis suggests that democracy has been impor-
tant in maintaining the negative peace in Latin America after the last round
of democratizations in the 1980s. However, he notes that regime type and
the incidence of pacific relations between states is uncertain for most of
Latin Americas history. Authoritarian states have been able to maintain the
negative peace, and at times new or unstable democracies have initiated
conflict in the region. He further suggests that future efforts at consolidating
democracy may move Latin America in the direction of a stable peace, or
even a pluralistic security community.
Kacowicz also reiterates the liberal argument that countries that have
attained a high level of economic development and prosperity have a
vested interested in maintaining peaceful relations with their neighbors and
trading partners. While not all states of the region have achieved high levels
240 C. G. Thies
of economic development, it certainly has been a predominant goal for all

of them. Movement toward higher levels of economic development should
support the Lockean culture of anarchy. While the extent of economic
interdependence has been rather limited in the Latin American context,
Kacowicz believes that efforts underway to promote increased interdepen-
dence should work to promote the negative peace. Kacowicz argues that
efforts to promote economic integration have been favorable toward nega-
tive peace with the advent of MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact. Grugel and
Medeiros (1999, p. 54) and Cason (2000, p. 25) report that decisionmakers
in Argentina and Brazil believed that further economic integration through
MERCOSUR would assist in ending their traditional conflicts as well as
their geopolitical rivalry. Pion-Berlin (2000) also suggests that increased
economic integration will lead to closer military cooperation and greater

regional security, though optimism about the pacifying effects of increased
interdependence are met with skepticism from Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane
(1991), who believe these factors might actually lead to increased conflict.
Finally, Kacowicz (1998, p. 39) proposes a neo-Grotian hypothesis and
a missing link hypothesis that Wendt (1999, p. 3) would place on the con-
structivist path to a Lockean culture of anarchy. The neo-Grotian hypothesis
is that a normative consensus about conflict management and resolution,
facilitated by a common cultural framework will help maintain the negative
peace of the region. Kacowiczs qualitative analysis finds that a common
diplomatic culture and normative consensus has reduced border disputes
in South America as states adopted the norm of uti possidetis with regard
to inherited colonial borders. Other aspects of this consensus include the
principle of convivencia, or peaceful international coexistence, noninterven-
tion and mutual respect for state sovereignty, and peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, including use of arbitration and mediation (Atkins, 1989, pp. 202236;
Holsti, 1996, pp. 169170; Simmons, 1999; Kacowicz, 2005).
Kacowiczs (1998, p. 47) missing link hypothesis, that satisfaction
with the territorial status quo is important to maintaining negative peace is
also confirmed in his qualitative analysis. He terms this an active satisfaction
in South America as opposed to a passive satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This
finding is at odds with current scholarship on Latin America (e.g., Huth,
1996; Mares, 2000, 2001; Thies, 2001b), which find a number of territorial
issues still in active contention. However, as a result of Thompsons data on
rivalry, we can examine whether territorial revisionism is consequential for
Latin American interstate relations.
DATA AND METHOD
Wendts discussion of the Lockean culture of anarchy and Kacowiczs

explanations for the zone of negative peace in Latin America are mutually
supportive accounts of the factors that sustain the interstate culture of the
region. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to empirically testing the
hypotheses derived from this literature. These hypotheses are tested in
the Latin American region consisting of all interstate dyads between 1948
and 1992.
This study has two endogenous dependent variables, which is crucial
to a constructivist understanding of the relationship between agents and
structures. The first endogenous dependent variable of interest is the Lockean
culture of anarchy, which is operationalized as the number of rival role
relationships present in the system in any given year using Thompsons
measure of strategic rivalry. This is consistent with Wendts characterization
of interstate structure, or culture, as the number of existing role relation-
ships, and with previous treatments of culture (e.g., Thies, 2004; McPhee,
1963).5 The second endogenous dependent variable is the existence of a
rival role relationship within a state dyad as indicated by Thompsons measure
of strategic rivalry. Examining the factors that affect this dependent variable
allows a connection to the existing literature on interstate rivalry. By including
dependent variables that represent the regional culture and dyadic relation-
ships, we can explore the relationship between these two realms of social
structure as mediated by the adoption of the rival role identity. This system
of simultaneous equations is modeled using three-stage least squares (e.g.,
Green, 2003).
There are a variety of independent variables identified in the literature
review that affect the formation of rival role relationships, as well as a cul-
ture based on the rival role identity. Some of the independent variables are
measures of regional characteristics, while others are measures of the char-
acteristics of dyadic relationships. Since the dependent variable representing
the Lockean culture of anarchy is also measured at the regional level, one
might object to crossing levels of analysis by incorporating dyadic independent
variables. Yet, the crossing of levels of analysis is a key feature of construc-
tivist theorizing about international politics, since it is the dyadic interaction
that produces the culture, which then constrains future dyadic interaction.
The methodological problem posed by crossing levels of analysis is also at
the heart of the agent-structure problemhow and where does one begin
to look at the mutual constitution of agents and structures (Wendt, 1999).
This analysis is designed to examine the production of a regional culture
based on previous regional and dyadic interactions.
Lockean Culture of Anarchy Equation

The model of the Lockean culture of anarchy contains realist, liberal, and
constructivist variables described by Kacowicz and others. The variables
that represent the realist path to the Lockean culture of anarchy include the
variation in performance of the U.S. hegemonic role. This variable is coded
242 C. G. Thies
1 for the years 19481962 and 0 thereafter. This coding scheme is suggested
by a reading of the literature that demonstrates strong performance as a
regional hegemon from the Truman through the Kennedy presidencies, and
a weakening in this role thereafter.6 U.S. capabilities is calculated as the log
of the ratio of U.S. capability to the sum of the Latin American regions
capability using the COW Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC).
This ratio measures the variation in the amount of material power that the
U.S. has in comparison to all of the Latin American states comprising the
region. The higher the ratio, the more dominant the U.S. is vis--vis Latin
America. Related to the understanding of the regional hegemon role is a
dichotomous variable coded 1 for years in which U.S. intervention occurred
in at least one of the states in a dyad and 0 otherwise.7 As Ebel, Taras, and
Cochrane, and Kacowicz note, the U.S. at times may have failed in the
regional hegemon role by itself becoming a threat to Latin American states
through excessive interventions. This possibility is further captured by a
measure of U.S. cumulative intervention, which counts the number of U.S.
interventions in the region per year. As a final measure of hegemonic influ-
ence, I examine the dyadic economic interdependence between the U.S.
and Latin American dyads using data from Kesh et al. (2004). For each Latin
American state, the total amount of trade with the U.S. is divided by its GDP
to produce an interdependence score. The lower score between the two
states in the dyad is used to represent the overall effect of the dyads U.S.
economic dependence.
The regional balance of power is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for the
years 19701980 and 0 otherwise, according to Kacowiczs observation that
a regional balance of power was in effect during that time. Common threats
emanating from third parties are rare in Latin America, but the aforemen-
tioned variables representing U.S. interventions may capture some level of
perceived threat from the hegemon. Other common threats may best be
represented by general shocks to the international system, which have reper-
cussions in regional subsystems like Latin America. The paper uses Goertz
and Diehls (1995, p. 41) measure of system shock, which equals 1 when a
world war, major change in territorial distribution, or major shift in power
occurs in the international system. The events have a 10-year impact window.
The log of the distance from capitol to capitol is used to represent
geographic isolation and the diminishing ability to project force over dis-
tance (Gochman, 1991). It is also an indicator of irrelevance, or the lack of
interaction. The paper uses Goertz and Diehls (1995, p. 41) measure of
domestic shock, which equals 1 when a civil war or period of regime insta-
bility occurs in one or both states in a dyad. The civil war coding is from the
COW project, while regime instability is measured as a change of 3 or more
in the Polity score in any of the prior 3 years. Domestic shocks are also
allowed to have a 10-year impact window. Domestic shocks may render
states impotent or incapacitated to carry out interstate conflict.
The variables representing the liberal path to the Lockean culture of

anarchy include the regional polity average, which is assessed using the
regional average of the polity score for the dyad from the Polity IV data
(Jaggers and Gurr, 1996). The level of regional economic development is
measured by the average GDP per capita per year for the Latin American
states with data from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten,
2002). A variable indicating whether both states in a dyad are members of a
regional trade agreement is also included.8 These liberal variables should be
positively related to the Lockean culture of anarchy.
The variables representing the constructivist path to the Lockean
culture of anarchy include a measure of the satisfaction with the status quo.
Satisfaction with the status quo is proxied by the use of Signorino and
Ritters Sc coefficient (1999), which gauges the satisfaction of Latin American

states with the regional status quo by examining the similarity of each states
alliance portfolio to the regional hegemon. A measure of joint satisfaction is
created for each dyad following Lemke and Reed (2001, p. 463). Finally, the
paper examines the use of negotiation, arbitration, and mediation to resolve
territorial disputes. This dichotomous variable, labeled negotiated territorial
issues, is based on the list of such activities reported in Table 2 of Simmons
(1999, p. 5). According to Kacowicz, if the states of the region have adopted
a normative consensus and common diplomatic framework to resolve
their territorial disputes, then the negative peace of the region should be
supported.
The model of the Lockean culture of anarchy is identified by the
exclusion condition (e.g., Greene, 2003). There are four variables that are
unique to this equation, including U.S. capabilities, U.S. cumulative inter-
vention, regional polity average, and regional economic development.
Serial correlation is a potential problem in this equation. It is addressed by
the use of robust standard errors, which are adjusted for clustering on
dyads.
Rival Role Relationship Equation

The model of the rival role relationship considers many of the same vari-
ables representing the realist path to the Lockean culture of anarchy. These
include the U.S. hegemonic role, U.S. intervention, U.S. economic depen-
dence, regional balance of power, system shocks, distance, and domestic
shocks. While these variables are thought to promote the Lockean culture of
anarchy, they should simultaneously reduce the likelihood of a rival role
relationship. One additional dyadic level variable reflecting realist concerns
is also included in this model. The log of the dyadic capability ratio, which
is measured as the natural log of the higher CINC score to the lower CINC
score of the states in the dyad. A greater imbalance in dyadic capabilities
should result in a lower likelihood of a rivalry.
244 C. G. Thies
Variables representing the liberal path to the Lockean culture of anar-

chy include the aforementioned regional trade agreement measure, but also
measures more specific to the dyad. These include the dyadic polity score
based on the Polity IV data. The lower polity score for the two states is used
to represent the dyadic regime type based on the logic that the norms of the
least democratic state will dominate the dyad. This variable ranges between
10 (most autocratic) and +10 (most democratic), with an average score
of 3.05 among the dyads in our sample. Dyadic economic development is
measured by the GDP per capita of the two states from the Penn World
Tables. Again, the lower value of the two states is used to represent the
joint level of economic development, and all of the behaviors and attributes
associated with it. Finally, dyadic interdependence is measured using data
from Kesh et al. (2004). For each Latin American state, the total amount of
trade with the other state in the dyad is divided by its own GDP to produce
an interdependence score. The lower interdependence score between the
two states in the dyad is used to represent the overall effect of the dyads
economic interdependence.
The constructivist path to a Lockean culture of anarchy is represented
by the joint satisfaction and negotiated territorial issues variables as found in
the previous model. This model is identified by the exclusion condition.
There are four variables that are unique to the rival role relationship equa-
tion, including the dyadic capability ratio, the dyadic polity score, dyadic
economic development, and dyadic interdependence. I also employ the
technique developed by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) to address the prob-
lem of serial correlation. The rival role relationship equation is estimated
with a counter for the number of years that a state has not been in a rivalry
(peace years) and three cubic splines to account for autocorrelation.
ANALYSIS
The use of the simultaneous equations estimation technique for modeling

the construction of a rival role relationship and the Lockean culture of anar-
chy produces some intriguing results. Table 1 presents the factors affecting
the size of the Lockean culture of anarchy.
The results indicate that the formation of a rival role relationship helps
to bring about the Lockean culture of anarchy as expected. The rival role is
the constitutive element of the Lockean culture of anarchy, so we would
expect that rival role relationships would continue to build this culture. The
U.S. hegemonic role vis--vis Latin America also has a positive effect on the
size of the Lockean culture of anarchy. This is expected by Ebel, Taras, and
Cochrane, and Kacowicz as part of the realist path to the Lockean culture,
in which a strong, but benevolent hegemon protects states from the uncer-
tainties of international life. Yet, higher ratios of U.S. to Latin American
TABLE 1 Factors Affecting the Size of the Lockean Culture of Anarchy in

Latin America
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
Rival Role Relationship .2531*** .0382

US Hegemonic Role .8294*** .0345
US Capabilities .3874*** .0109
US Intervention .1611*** .0220
US Cumulative Intervention .1584*** .0070
US Economic Dependence .0093 .0199
Regional Balance of Power 1.3228*** .0293
System Shock .6009*** .0246
Domestic Shock .0686*** .0116
Distance .0237** .0075
Regional Polity Average .0925*** .0063

Regional Economic Development .0004*** .0000
Regional Trade Agreement .1660*** .0197
Joint Satisfaction 5.8602*** .5237
Negotiated Territorial Issues .1784*** .0379
N = 5791.
R2 = .64.
Note: All significance tests are two tailed; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
capabilities threatened to undermine the regional culture, perhaps reflecting

overlay by a great power that dominates regional interaction (Buzan and
Weaver, 2003). There is obviously some tension between the ideational
component of U.S. regional hegemony reflected in the perception of the
U.S. hegemonic role and the material component reflected in U.S. military
capabilities vis--vis the region. United States interventions in specific dyads
in the region have had a positive effect on the Lockean culture of anarchy,
consistent with the notion that the hegemon is allowed to intervene to
preserve order. Yet, the cumulative effect of those interventions in the
region may have posed a serious threat to the regional culture. Economic
dependence on the U.S. is not significantly related to the Lockean culture of
anarchy, in contrast to the arguments of Ebel, Taras and Cochrane who sug-
gest that the U.S., in its role as the patron, has provided markets and capital
to the region.
The politico-military and economic exercise of U.S. hegemony seems
to have had mixed effects on the negative peace/Lockean culture of anar-
chy in the region. The strong regional hegemon was perceived as tending to
the family of nations in the region, as Ebel, Taras and Cochrane, and
Kacowicz expected. Yet, U.S. activity was also subject to criticism from Latin
American states who perceived the regional hegemon as a threat at times.
These findings challenge Mares (2001) judgment that U.S. hegemonic activ-
ity was inconsequential.
The regional balance of power has had a negative affect on the size of
the Lockean culture of anarchy, in contradiction to Kacowiczs and Ebel,
246 C. G. Thies
Taras, and Cochranes expectations. This is probably due to a number of

factors. First, the regional balance was in existence for a short period of
time. As Wendt (1999, p. 299) explains, allies engaged in balancing behavior
do not expect their relationship to continue indefinitely. An alliance is a
temporary, mutually expedient arrangement within rivalry . . . and so allies
expect to eventually revert to a condition in which war between them is an
option and will plan accordingly. Balancing is clearly one possible effect
of the Lockean culture of anarchy, but it cannot guarantee the maintenance of
that culture given it is a short-term phenomenon that often gives way to
planning for or engaging in war. Second, the short-lived regional balance of
power was simply no substitute for the strong hegemonic performance of
the United States prior to 1962. If this balance of power had encompassed
more issues than a few key territorial disputes, and more geographical
space, it may have contributed toward the negative peace. However, the
alliances were largely contained within the Southern Cone states, and they
appeared to exacerbate the potential for regional conflict as they revolved
around a handful of territorial disputes, thus reducing the size of the Lockean
culture of anarchy. This last observation fits Vasquezs (1993; 1996) Steps to
War model, whereby territorial disputes and repeated confrontations
combined with alliance formation, military buildups, and a lack of rules to
manage conflict lead to war. In Latin America, particularly in the Southern
Cone, the first 4 of these steps are present, however the presence of rules to
resolve conflicts may have been what prevented war among these blocs.
Though no war occurred to destroy the negative peace, the short-lived
balance of power that developed in the Southern Cone encouraged the
kinds of activities that chipped away at its foundations.
System shocks, in the form of world wars, territorial changes, and changes
in the distribution of power at the level of the international system served to
undermine the Lockean culture of anarchy. While Kacowicz does not explicitly
consider these types of threats, it is clear that the international system has a
strong effect on the Latin American regional subsystem. The occurrence of a
domestic shock, such as a civil war or instability in the governing regime, has a
significant positive effect on the size of the Lockean culture of anarchy. Internal
disruptions and the lack of state capacity that this variable represents lead to the
inability to engage in sustained, systematic interstate conflict. Latin America has
seen its fair share of these types of failures in governance, and although they
often have devastating effects on the domestic political economy and society of
the states involved, they do contribute to pacific interstate relations (Centeno,
2002; Thies, 2005). Greater distance between the states in a dyad has a positive
effect on the Lockean culture, consistent with Kacowiczs belief that geographic
isolation is a guarantor of negative peace. On balance, the realist hypotheses
have received mixed support.
Kacowicz is not terribly sanguine about the prospects that the liberal
variables can explain the negative peace, and this analysis supports the
mixed message those variables have for this path to the Lockean culture of
anarchy. The average regional polity score has a significant negative effect
on the Lockean culture of anarchy. Recall that this variable is measured as
the lower of the democracy minus autocracy scores of the two states in the
dyad. Among the cases and timeframe in this analysis, the average regime
type score is 3.05 on a scale that varies from 10 to +10. Clearly, most
states in Latin America were not democracies most of the time. Kacowicz
stated that a community of liberal democracies is required to sustain the
negative peace, but he also recognized that historically, Latin America has
been a community of autocracies existing in a zone of negative peace.
Movement away from the community of autocracies, or toward the forma-
tion of a mixed community of autocracies and new democracies, both of
which can be inferred from rising dyadic regime type scores, appears to
have worked against the Lockean culture of anarchy.
Higher levels of economic development support the Lockean culture of
anarchy. Wealth is often seen as a competing explanation to the democratic
peace hypothesis. In our case, Latin American states made some progress in
developing economically while under various levels of autocratic rule. The
higher average levels of economic development and prosperity were able to
provide the incentive to autocratic governments to preserve the negative
peace that characterizes the Lockean culture of anarchy.
Regional trade agreements have a positive, significant affect on the
negative peace. This suggests that those interested in promoting a continuance
of the negative peace may attempt to tie regional integration to the entire
Western Hemisphere, as some have proposed to do with the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas. The hypotheses concerning the liberal path
receive mixed support in this analysis with economic development supporting
the Lockean culture more than political development.
The constructivist hypotheses are not supported by the data. Joint
satisfaction with the status quo, reflecting an underlying normative con-
sensus in the region, is negatively related to the Lockean culture of anar-
chy. Negotiated territorial issues significantly undermine the culture of
anarchy in Latin America. Neither finding is expected by Kacowicz.
According to Wendt, disputes between rivals will often concern territorial
revisionism, but the violence associated with such conflicts is not allowed
to escalate out of control. The fact that most territorial issues in Latin
American undergo mediation and arbitration is generally thought to
prevent them from significantly detracting from the negative peace. This
does not appear to be the case according to these measures. The distinc-
tive system of international law and diplomacy surrounding territorial con-
flict in Latin America has probably had less of an effect in the post-World
War II era than it did prior to that time. Many of the most successful cases
of arbitration, for example, occurred around the turn of the century
(Simmons, 1999).
248 C. G. Thies
It should be no surprise that many of the factors responsible for variation

in the growth of the Lockean culture of anarchy also affect the decision to
adopt and sustain the rival role relationship at the dyadic level. However,
the effects of the variables are often in different directions for the dyad than
they are for the overall culture, since these dyads contain most of the
regions conflicts. This analysis is included in the paper as a way to demon-
strate the synergy that results from the link between a constructivist
approach to rivalry and the more conventional quantitative approaches to
rivalry. Explicit hypotheses were not formulated for this model, but the
results will be compared to previous findings in the empirical literature. The
results of the analysis are found in Table 2.
The Lockean culture of anarchy is a significant determinant of the forma-
tion of new rival role relationships, as Wendt would expect. Once the rival
role comes to dominate interstate interaction, then a tipping point is reached
whereby a Lockean culture of anarchy is in place. Given our assumption that
the Lockean culture was already in place, we still find evidence of this pro-
cess as the size of that culture pressures more states to adopt the rival role
and form rival role relationships. This is an indication of structure constituting
the agents and their relationships. Taken with the findings from the first
model, we have empirically demonstrated that agents and structures are
mutually constitutive, at least in the weak sense of demonstrating simulta-
neous correlative effects. This is the first quantitative effort to do so.
The U.S. performance in its hegemonic role significantly reduces the
likelihood of the construction of a dyadic rivalry, which is suggestive of the
TABLE 2 Factors Affecting the Construction of a Rival Role Relationship
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
Lockean Culture of Anarchy .3326*** .0116

US Hegemonic Role .2614*** .0124
US Intervention .0287*** .0074
US Economic Dependence .0157* .0069
Regional Balance of Power .3426*** .0145
Dyadic Capability Ratio .0180*** .0032
System Shock .0745*** .0083
Domestic Shock .0095** .0039
Distance .0145*** .0025
Dyadic Polity .0005 .0003
Dyadic Economic Development .0006* .0003
Dyadic Interdependence .1489* .0689
Regional Trade Agreement .0570*** .0069
Joint Satisfaction 2.0667*** .1517
Negotiated Territorial Issues .2455*** .0111
N = 5791.
Pseudo-R2 = .52.
Note: All significance tests are two tailed; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Peace years
and splines not shown.
potential pacifying effects of U.S. hegemony. United States interventions

also significantly reduce the likelihood of the construction of a dyadic
rivalry. Mares (2001) claims of the inconsequential effects of U.S. hegemony
are also contradicted by these dyadic-level findings. On the other hand,
economic dependence between a Latin American dyad and the U.S. signifi-
cantly increases the likelihood of a rivalry in that dyad. This is probably
because most Latin American states have very similar production structures
and are competing with each other for exports to the U.S. This could be
interpreted through the lens of dependency theory to demonstrate that the
structure of economic dependence with the U.S. promotes conflict within
the periphery, which serves to further the interests of the U.S. in maintaining
its economic and political advantage in the region. Thus, of the potential
measures of the influence of the U.S. as hegemon, only the economic depen-
dence variable is significant in spawning particular rival role relationships.
The regional balance of power is not significantly related to increases
in the likelihood of interstate rivalry. The dyadic capability ratio is nega-
tively related to rival role relationships as we would expect. System shocks
increase the likelihood of rivalry, consistent with previous analyses (Goertz
and Diehl, 1995; Lemke and Reed, 2001). Distance between states signifi-
cantly reduces the likelihood they will be involved in a rivalry, consistent
with previous studies of interstate rivalry that focus on the material difficulty
of engaging in conflict over greater geographical space (e.g., Diehl and
Goertz, 2000; Lemke and Reed, 2001; Stinnett and Diehl, 2001; Huth, 1996).
It is also consistent with the constructivist notion that significant levels of
interaction between states are necessary to establish a rival role relationship.
Domestic shocks are significantly related to decreases in the likelihood of
rivalry, suggesting that internal turmoil has often rendered Latin American
states incapable of engaging in interstate conflict (Centeno, 2002). Thus, all
of the realist variables are significantly related to the construction of a rival
role relationship, in ways that are generally consistent with previous work.
Regime type, as represented by the dyadic polity score, is not signifi-
cantly related to the likelihood of being involved in a rival role relationship,
contradicting findings based on other samples of states (e.g., Diehl and
Goertz, 2000; Lemke and Reed, 2001; Stinnett and Diehl, 2001; Huth, 1996).
In Latin America, rivalries are found between jointly democratic, jointly
autocratic, as well as mixed dyads. Higher levels of economic development
are negatively related to the likelihood of being in a rivalry, as we would
expect. Yet, higher economic interdependence between the states in the
dyad is positively and significantly related to the probability they are
involved in a rivalry. This is exactly what Ebel, Taras and Cochrane feared,
and the opposite of what Kacowicz expected. It is consistent with Waltzs
(1971) claim that higher degrees of economic interdependence could derail
attempts by states to integrate their activities to promote the general welfare.
Regional trade agreements have a significant negative effect on the construction
250 C. G. Thies
of a rivalry as expected. This suggests that states with significant disputes over
trade related matters have developed institutional arrangements in the attempt
to mediate their conflicts. Overall, these variables provide mixed support for
the liberal path to the Lockean culture of anarchy.
Joint satisfaction with the status quo promotes the formation of rival role
relationships. The existence of negotiated territorial issues also promotes
rivalry, in contradiction to Kacowicz and previous findings (Bercovitch and
Diehl, 1997; Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Herz and Nogueira, 2002). Territorial
revisionism is expected of rival role relationships according to Wendt (1999,
p. 261). Yet, the level of violence used to revise a rivals property (shallow
revisionism) should not extend to the revision of the rivals life or liberty
(deep revisionism). Given that many of these rivalries do not involve great
loss of life, it may be that territorial conflict (negotiated or otherwise) still

serves symbolic purposes on the home front (Vasquez, 1993; Thies, 2001b).
CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this paper, based on Wendts suggestion that

interstate politics is characterized by a Lockean culture of anarchy, produces
some intriguing results for the Latin American region. Although Wendts
analysis assumes that structure or culture emerges at the dyadic level
through the interaction of states learning their appropriate role identities,
this analysis also suggests that states may be socialized into their roles by a
great power; the U.S. in this case. In fact, elements of the realist, liberal, and
constructivist paths to the Lockean culture of anarchy are all present.
Although the analysis in this paper is framed in terms of an empirical test of
constructivist theory about the rival role identity and the resulting Lockean
culture of anarchy, it should be obvious that factors traditionally associated
with realism and liberalism are important determinants of interstate political
culture. Thus, material capabilities, interests, and identity are not mutually
exclusive approaches to explaining interstate culture (Snyder, 2002).
What does this analysis suggest about Latin American interstate culture in
the post-Cold War era? As Johnson (2001, p. 43) notes, the one thing that has
not changed with the end of the Cold War is the dominance of the United
States in the region, despite the varying performance of its hegemonic role.
It is not clear at this point whether the U.S. will use its influence to maintain
the negative peace of the region, or push toward a more positive peace. The
U.S. may even neglect the region altogether or intervene indiscriminately,
which could destabilize the region and lead to an absence of peace altogether.
While Perry and Primorac (1994) argue that active cooperation
between the U.S. and Latin America is essential in the post-Cold War era,
Desch (1998), Buchanon (1998), and Kryzanek (1996) suggest that instead
the U.S. has lapsed into a period of benign neglect with regard to the
region. In the absence of a strong external threat to U.S. security in the

region, they suggest that U.S. policy will probably be piecemeal and reac-
tive, rather than comprehensive and proactive with regard to many of the
issues mentioned above. Muoz (2001) even goes so far as to suggest that
regardless of U.S. interest or disinterest in Latin America, the states of the
region no longer see the U.S. as the principal reference point with regard to
their interstate relations. He suggests that regional trade activity and
increased interdependence among Latin American states are slowly displacing
the U.S.s dominant position.
Other scholars see the U.S. as maintaining its normal historical stance,
which involves the use of unilateral U.S. intervention in the service of its
own perceived national interest (e.g., Bulmer-Thomas and Dunkerly, 1999;
Mares, 2001, Smith, 2001). However, Schraeder (1992, p. 396) suggests that
U.S. military intervention may be legitimate and useful under certain
circumstances. If this is to be the case, then Schraeder suggests that the U.S.
should work harder to build domestic and international support for inter-
vention that will enhance the perception of the U.S. as a legitimate leader of
the region. The findings of this paper suggest that U.S. intervention appears
to reduce the likelihood of the formation of specific rival role relationships
while simultaneously maintaining the negative peace of the region. The
problem occurs as the total number of U.S. interventions increase in the
region, which breaks down the negative peace. If Schraeders advice
were followed, perhaps the overall number of interventions could be
reduced while maintaining intervention for the legitimate purpose of
preserving regional peace and order. Fonseca (2003) has suggested that this
may be accomplished by reigning in U.S. unilateral impulses to intervene
through the use of multilateral organizations. Yet, it seems unlikely that the
U.S. and Latin American states would ever unanimously agree on what con-
stitutes a legitimate intervention.
George W. Bush made U.S.-Latin American relations an important
feature of his presidential campaign by advocating improved relations with
Mexico and supporting the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. How-
ever, the events of September 11, 2001 seem to have moved Latin America
to the bottom of U.S. foreign policy concerns. The Bush Administration did
not intervene in Argentinas financial crisis in December of 2001. The
Administration subsequently allowed the Andean Trade Preferences Act to
expire in the same month, which had previously provided the Andean
countries with tariff reductions on products that offered alternatives to the
drug trade. The Adminstrations ambivalence with regard to the removal
and reinstatement of President Chavez of Venezuela, including their refusal
to recognize the event as a coup, also poses serious questions about their
interest in Latin American affairs or even sustaining supposed pillars of U.S.
foreign policy such as the support of democracy. The lack of strong Latin
American support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq has also strained relations.
252 C. G. Thies
Bushs recent 2007 visit to the region might be seen as a rear-guard action
to stave off the popularity of Chavezs so-called Bolivarian Revolution in
Latin America. Whether recent U.S. action represents a continued slide into
neglect, benign or otherwise, remains to be seen. However, it is clear that
U.S. policy and action is still highly consequential for the region.
Future research should examine whether the results from the analysis of
the Latin American region are generalizable to other regions around
the world. The factors that produce the Lockean culture of anarchy may be
uniform across the globe, but it is equally plausible that they vary by region.
The U.S. is probably more involved in the construction of Latin American
interstate culture than in any other region of the globe. Other regional hege-
mons may have different effects on their local cultures of anarchy. Buzans
(1991, p. 209) concept of security complexes, seen as subsystems, or

miniature anarchies existing within the structure of the international system
may provide some direction in this regard (e.g., Mares, 2001). It is entirely
possible that while the Latin American region may be best characterized as a
Lockean culture of anarchy based on the peculiarities of its own security com-
plex, other regional systems may approach the Kantian culture of anarchy
(European Union?), or the Hobbesian culture of anarchy (South Asia?). Jervis
(2002) recent exploration of the potential causes of the security community
among the leading powers of the world is a very similar project to the one
proposed here. Jervis (2002, p. 8) also calls for a synthetic interactive expla-
nation of this community that would draw on constructivist, liberal, and realist
explanations, or what Wendt refers to as pathways or degrees of internaliza-
tion of sovereignty norms on the way to the formation of a culture of anarchy.
The paper demonstrates that the merging of constructivist theory, area
expertise, and historically-informed quantitative measures is a fruitful way
to integrate qualitative and quantitative research in the study of international
politics. In particular, constructivism offers many hypotheses that are
amenable to quantitative testing. The factors linking rival role relationships
and the Lockean culture of anarchy could not have been uncovered without
the merging of qualitative international relations theory and quantitative
analysis. Overcoming this type of flawed dichotomy, in Brechers (1999)
words, can open up the possibilities for new and exciting theory building,
testing, and cumulation of knowledge across the discipline.
NOTES
1. Kacowicz (1998, p. 7) defines negative peace as the absence of systematic, large-scale collective
violence between political communities. Mares (2001, p. 6) defines violent peace as a period in which
military force is used in a ritualized, ubiquitous, and largely inconclusive manner to avoid major war.
2. Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998, pp. 67) define mechanisms as bits of theory about entities at
a different level (e.g., individuals) than the main entities being theorized about (e.g., groups), which
serve to make the higher-level theory more supple, more accurate, or more general.
3. See Atkins (1989, pp. 108134), Blachman (1990) and Mares (2001, p. 67) for similar views on
ascendance to the regional hegemonic role. Rosenberg (1987) argues the U.S. assumed a predominant
role in the region during World WarI by exploiting inter-american rivalries to advance its own security
and economic interests.
4. For examples, see Atkins (1990, p. 3), Pastor (1992, p. 24), and Kacowicz (1998, pp. 8488). See
Mares (1996/97, 2001) work for an important exception.
5. Since Wendt does not specify how many relationships are needed to reach the tipping point that
constitutes a particular culture, I assume that the Lockean culture of anarchy already exists (following
Wendts judgment and corroborating judgments on Latin America), and attempt to assess the factors that
affect its size. This also assumes that the same factors affect the creation and maintenance of the culture.
6. Most scholars agree that the U.S. achieved dominance of the region by 1948 with the signing of
the OAS charter, though the duration and end of this period is not as precise. MacFarlane (1987, p. 93)
suggests that by the end of the 1970s, it was simply illegitimate and undesirable in the eyes of many for
Latin American states to accept a paternalistic regional security structure, which allowed states in the
region to contemplate open conflict with other regional actors. Atkins (1990, p. 16), following
Lowenthal (1976), dates the shift to the mid-1960s when the U.S. moved into an important but diminishing
role in the region characterized by a relative low priority given to U.S.-Latin American relationships.
7. This data is from a list compiled by Zoltan Grossman A Century of U.S. Interventions: From
Wounded Knee to Yugoslavia available at the following Website: http://www.lai-aib.org/lai/html
8. This data is from Mercosurs official Website http://www.mac.doc.gov/ola/mercosur/mgi/
tradeag.htm
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On: 09 September 2014, At: 04:35

International Interactions: Empirical and

The Construction of a Latin American

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050620802469872

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The Construction of a Latin American

Interstate Culture of Rivalry

Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

This paper merges constructivist theoretical insights into the rival

KEYWORDS Latin America, regional culture, rivalry, zone of

identification of decision-makers in a dyad (e.g., Thompson, 2001). A sec-

constructivist propositions about the culture of the interstate system? Quan-

CULTURE AND THE RIVALRY CONCEPT: MERGING THEORY

Constructivist international relations theory brought new life to the concept

Wendts (1999, p. 1) approach to constructivism is grounded in two

forced in interaction with significant others through a process of cultural

corresponding to three pathways through which a Lockean culture of anar-

a theory of international politics, he and others argue that it can incorporate

Athough Wendt provides an intriguing theoretical account of international

project. Diehl and Goertz (2000, p. 4) conceptualize enduring rivalry as

In the Hobbesian culture of anarchy created by the dominance of the

region, many of which have resource and ethnic dimensions. In one

of economic development, it certainly has been a predominant goal for all

economic integration will lead to closer military cooperation and greater

DATA AND METHOD

Wendts discussion of the Lockean culture of anarchy and Kacowiczs

Lockean Culture of Anarchy Equation

The variables representing the liberal path to the Lockean culture of

Ritters Sc coefficient (1999), which gauges the satisfaction of Latin American

Rival Role Relationship Equation

Variables representing the liberal path to the Lockean culture of anar-

The use of the simultaneous equations estimation technique for modeling

TABLE 1 Factors Affecting the Size of the Lockean Culture of Anarchy in

Variables Coefficient Standard Error

Rival Role Relationship .2531*** .0382

Regional Polity Average .0925*** .0063

capabilities threatened to undermine the regional culture, perhaps reflecting

Taras, and Cochranes expectations. This is probably due to a number of

It should be no surprise that many of the factors responsible for variation

TABLE 2 Factors Affecting the Construction of a Rival Role Relationship

Variables Coefficient Standard Error

Lockean Culture of Anarchy .3326*** .0116

potential pacifying effects of U.S. hegemony. United States interventions

loss of life, it may be that territorial conflict (negotiated or otherwise) still

The analysis presented in this paper, based on Wendts suggestion that

region. In the absence of a strong external threat to U.S. security in the

(1991, p. 209) concept of security complexes, seen as subsystems, or

Jervis, Robert (2002). Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace. American

Wendt, Alexander (1999). Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge:

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