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Torts Reviewer Albano PDF
Torts Reviewer Albano PDF
1. INTENTIONAL TORTS
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused
to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is
liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. (n)
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives money or
property of a third person and misapplies it; and
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third
person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the
custody of the partnership. (n)
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything chargeable to the
partnership under articles 1822 and 1823. (n)
Article 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable
with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. (n)
Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. (n)
#01
PATROCINIA
RAVINA
AND
WILFREDO
RAVINA,
Petitioners,
vs.
MARY
ANN
P.
VILLA
ABRILLE,
for
herself
and
in
behalf
of
INGRID
D'LYN
P.
VILLA
ABRILLE,
INGREMARK
D'WIGHT
VILLA
ABRILLE,
INGRESOLL
DIELS
VILLA
ABRILLE
AND
INGRELYN
DYAN
VILLA
ABRILLE,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
160708,
October
16,
2009
Firmly
established
in
our
civil
law
is
the
doctrine
that:
"Every
person
must,
in
the
exercise
of
his
rights
and
in
the
performance
of
his
duties,
act
with
justice,
give
everyone
his
due,
and
observe
honesty
and
good
faith."
When
a
right
is
exercised
in
a
manner
that
does
not
conform
with
such
norms
and
results
in
damages
to
another,
a
legal
wrong
is
thereby
committed
for
which
the
wrong
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 1 of 16
doer
must
be
held
responsible.
Similarly,
any
person
who
willfully
causes
loss
or
injury
to
another
in
a
manner
that
is
contrary
to
morals,
good
customs
or
public
policy
shall
compensate
the
latter
for
the
damages
caused.
It
is
patent
in
this
case
that
petitioners
alleged
acts
fall
short
of
these
established
civil
law
standards.
#02
CONRADO
BUNAG,
JR.,
petitioner,
vs.
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
First
Division,
and
ZENAIDA
B.
CIRILO,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
101749,
July
10,
1992
It
is
true
that
in
this
jurisdiction,
we
adhere
to
the
time-honored
rule
that
an
action
for
breach
of
promise
to
marry
has
no
standing
in
the
civil
law,
apart
from
the
right
to
recover
money
or
property
advanced
by
the
plaintiff
upon
the
faith
of
such
promise.
Generally,
therefore,
a
breach
of
promise
to
marry
per
se
is
not
actionable,
except
where
the
plaintiff
has
actually
incurred
expenses
for
the
wedding
and
the
necessary
incidents
thereof.
However,
the
award
of
moral
damages
is
allowed
in
cases
specified
in
or
analogous
to
those
provided
in
Article
2219
of
the
Civil
Code.
Correlatively,
under
Article
21
of
said
Code,
in
relation
to
paragraph
10
of
said
Article
2219,
any
person
who
wilfully
causes
loss
or
injury
to
another
in
a
manner
that
is
contrary
to
morals,
good
customs
or
public
policy
shall
compensate
the
latter
for
moral
damages.
Article
21
was
adopted
to
remedy
the
countless
gaps
in
the
statutes
which
leave
so
many
victims
of
moral
wrongs
helpless
even
though
they
have
actually
suffered
material
and
moral
injury,
and
is
intended
to
vouchsafe
adequate
legal
remedy
for
that
untold
number
of
moral
wrongs
which
is
impossible
for
human
foresight
to
specifically
provide
for
in
the
statutes.
Under
the
circumstances
obtaining
in
the
case
at
bar,
the
acts
of
petitioner
in
forcibly
abducting
private
respondent
and
having
carnal
knowledge
with
her
against
her
will,
and
thereafter
promising
to
marry
her
in
order
to
escape
criminal
liability,
only
to
thereafter
renege
on
such
promise
after
cohabiting
with
her
for
twenty-one
days,
irremissibly
constitute
acts
contrary
to
morals
and
good
customs.
These
are
grossly
insensate
and
reprehensible
transgressions
which
indisputably
warrant
and
abundantly
justify
the
award
of
moral
and
exemplary
damages,
pursuant
to
Article
21
in
relation
to
paragraphs
3
and
10,
Article
2219,
and
Article
2229
and
2234
of
Civil
Code.
The Code Commission commenting on this article (19 vis--vis 21), says the following:
But,
it
may
be
asked
would
this
proposed
article
obliterate
the
boundary
line
between
morality
and
law?
The
answer
is
that,
in
the
last
analysis,
every
good
law
draws
its
breath
of
life
from
morals,
from
those
principles
which
are
written
with
words
of
fire
in
the
conscience
of
man.
If
this
premises
is
admitted,
then
the
proposed
rule
is
a
prudent
earnest
of
justice
in
the
face
of
the
impossibility
of
enumerating,
one
by
one,
all
wrongs
which
cause
damages.
When
it
is
reflected
that
while
codes
of
law
and
statutes
have
changed
from
age
to
age,
the
conscience
of
man
has
remained
fixed
to
its
ancient
moorings,
one
can
not
but
feel
that
it
is
safe
and
salutary
to
transmute,
as
far
as
may
be,
moral
norms
into
legal
rules,
thus
imparting
to
every
legal
system
that
enduring
quality
which
ought
to
be
one
of
its
superlative
attributes.
Furthermore,
there
is
no
belief
of
more
baneful
consequence
upon
the
social
order
than
that
a
person
may
with
impunity
cause
damage
to
his
fellow-men
so
long
as
he
does
not
break
any
law
of
the
State,
though
he
may
be
defying
the
most
sacred
postulates
of
morality.
What
is
more,
the
victim
loses
faith
in
the
ability
of
the
government
to
afford
him
protection
or
relief.
#04
ERNESTO
RAMAS
UYPITCHING
and
RAMAS
UYPITCHING
SONS,
INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO
QUIAMCO,
respondent.
G.R.
No.
146322,
December
6,
2006
Article
19,
also
known
as
the
"principle
of
abuse
of
right,"
prescribes
that
a
person
should
not
use
his
right
unjustly
or
contrary
to
honesty
and
good
faith,
otherwise
he
opens
himself
to
liability.
It
seeks
to
preclude
the
use
of,
or
the
tendency
to
use,
a
legal
right
(or
duty)
as
a
means
to
unjust
ends.
There
is
an
abuse
of
right
when
it
is
exercised
solely
to
prejudice
or
injure
another.
The
exercise
of
a
right
must
be
in
accordance
with
the
purpose
for
which
it
was
established
and
must
not
be
excessive
or
unduly
harsh;
there
must
be
no
intention
to
harm
another.
Otherwise,
liability
for
damages
to
the
injured
party
will
attach.
2. NEGLIGENCE
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible
for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage. (1905)
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the
death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
Family Code
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over
said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is
proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
#01
PHOENIX
CONSTRUCTION,
INC.
and
ARMANDO
U.
CARBONEL,
petitioners,
vs.
THE
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
and
LEONARDO
DIONISIO,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
L-65295,
March
10,
1987
We
hold
that
private
respondent
Dionisio's
negligence
was
"only
contributory,"
that
the
"immediate
and
proximate
cause"
of
the
injury
remained
the
truck
driver's
"lack
of
due
care"
and
that
consequently
respondent
Dionisio
may
recover
damages
though
such
damages
are
subject
to
mitigation
by
the
courts
(Article
2179,
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines).
Petitioner
Carbonel's
proven
negligence
creates
a
presumption
of
negligence
on
the
part
of
his
employer
Phoenix
in
supervising
its
employees
properly
and
adequately.
The
respondent
appellate
court
in
effect
found,
correctly
in
our
opinion,
that
Phoenix
was
not
able
to
overcome
this
presumption
of
negligence.
The
circumstance
that
Phoenix
had
allowed
its
truck
driver
to
bring
the
#02
AIR
FRANCE,
petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL
CARRASCOSO
and
the
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
L-21438,
September
28,
1966
The
responsibility
of
an
employer
for
the
tortious
act
of
its
employees
need
not
be
essayed.
It
is
well
settled
in
law.
For
the
willful
malevolent
act
of
petitioner's
manager,
petitioner,
his
employer,
must
answer.
The
contract
of
air
carriage
generates
a
relation
attended
with
a
public
duty.
Neglect
or
malfeasance
of
the
carriers
employees,
naturally,
could
give
ground
for
an
action
for
damages.
Passengers
do
not
contract
merely
for
transportation.
They
have
a
right
to
be
treated
by
the
carrier's
employees
with
kindness,
respect,
courtesy
and
due
consideration.
They
are
entitled
to
be
protected
against
personal
misconduct,
injurious
language,
indignities
and
abuses
from
such
employees.
So
it
is,
that
any
rule
or
discourteous
conduct
on
the
part
of
employees
towards
a
passenger
gives
the
latter
an
action
for
damages
against
the
carrier.
Petitioner's
contract
with
Carrascoso
is
one
attended
with
public
duty.
The
stress
of
Carrascoso's
action
as
we
have
said,
is
placed
upon
his
wrongful
expulsion.
This
is
a
violation
of
public
duty
by
the
petitioner
air
carrier
a
case
of
quasi-delict.
Damages
are
proper.
#03.1
PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES,
INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
NATIVIDAD
and
ENRIQUE
AGANA,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
126297,
February
2,
2010
In
general,
a
hospital
is
not
liable
for
the
negligence
of
an
independent
physicians-consultants
allowed
to
practice
in
its
premises.
There
is,
however,
an
exception
to
this
principle.
The
hospital
may
be
liable
if
the
physician
is
the
"ostensible"
agent
of
the
hospital.
Where
an
employment
relationship
exists,
the
hospital
may
be
held
vicariously
liable
under
Article
2176
in
relation
to
Article
2180
of
the
Civil
Code
or
the
principle
of
respondeat
superior.
Even
when
no
employment
relationship
exists
but
it
is
shown
that
the
hospital
holds
out
to
the
patient
that
the
doctor
is
its
agent,
the
hospital
may
still
be
vicariously
liable
under
Article
2176
in
relation
to
Article
1431
and
Article
1869
of
the
Civil
Code
or
the
principle
of
apparent
authority.
Moreover,
regardless
of
its
relationship
with
the
doctor,
the
hospital
may
be
held
directly
liable
to
the
patient
for
its
own
negligence
or
failure
to
follow
established
standard
of
conduct
to
which
it
should
conform
as
a
corporation.
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 6 of 16
#03.2
MARITER
MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
vs.
ADRIANO
CASUMPANG,
JENNIFER
ADRIANE
and
JOHN
ANDRE,
all
surnamed
CASUMPANG,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
197987,
March
19,
2012
A
surgical
operation
is
the
responsibility
of
the
surgeon
performing
it.
He
must
personally
ascertain
that
the
counts
of
instruments
and
materials
used
before
the
surgery
and
prior
to
sewing
the
patient
up
have
been
correctly
done.
To
provide
an
example
to
the
medical
profession
and
to
stress
the
need
for
constant
vigilance
in
attending
to
a
patients
health,
the
award
of
exemplary
damages
in
this
case
is
in
order.
Loadmasters
and
Glodel,
being
both
common
carriers,
are
mandated
from
the
nature
of
their
business
and
for
reasons
of
public
policy,
to
observe
the
extraordinary
diligence
in
the
vigilance
over
the
goods
transported
by
them
according
to
all
the
circumstances
of
such
case,
as
required
by
Article
1733
of
the
Civil
Code.
In
case
of
loss
of
the
goods,
the
common
carrier
is
presumed
to
have
been
at
fault
or
to
have
acted
negligently.
This
presumption
of
fault
or
negligence,
however,
may
be
rebutted
by
proof
that
the
common
carrier
has
observed
extraordinary
diligence
over
the
goods.
Premises
considered,
the
Court
is
of
the
view
that
both
Loadmasters
and
Glodel
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
R
&
B
Insurance
for
the
loss
of
the
subject
cargo.
Under
Article
2194
of
the
New
Civil
Code,
"the
responsibility
of
two
or
more
persons
who
are
liable
for
a
quasi-delict
is
solidary."
A
liability
for
tort
may
arise
even
under
a
contract,
where
tort
is
that
which
breaches
the
contract.
In
the
present
case,
Phoenix
and
McGee
are
not
suing
for
damages
for
injuries
arising
from
the
breach
of
the
contract
of
service
but
from
the
alleged
negligent
manner
by
which
Mindanao
Terminal
handled
the
cargoes
belonging
to
Del
Monte
Produce.
Despite
the
absence
of
contractual
relationship
between
Del
Monte
Produce
and
Mindanao
Terminal,
the
allegation
of
negligence
on
the
part
of
the
defendant
should
be
sufficient
to
establish
a
cause
of
action
arising
from
quasi-delict.
Whenever
an
employees
negligence
causes
damage
or
injury
to
another,
there
instantly
arises
a
presumption
juris
tantum
that
the
employer
failed
to
exercise
diligentissimi
patris
families
in
the
selection
(culpa
in
eligiendo)
or
supervision
(culpa
in
vigilando)
of
its
employees.
To
avoid
liability
for
a
quasi-delict
committed
by
its
employee,
an
employer
must
overcome
the
presumption
by
presenting
convincing
proof
that
he
exercised
the
care
and
diligence
of
a
good
father
of
a
family
in
the
selection
and
supervision
of
his
employee.
In
this
regard,
Loadmasters
failed.
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 7 of 16
#05
ALFREDO
P.
PACIS
and
CLEOPATRA
D.
PACIS,
Petitioners,
vs.
JEROME
JOVANNE
MORALES,
Respondent.
G.R.
No.
169467,
February
25,
2010
Unlike
the
subsidiary
liability
of
the
employer
under
Article
103
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code,
the
liability
of
the
employer,
or
any
person
for
that
matter,
under
Article
2176
of
the
Civil
Code
is
primary
and
direct,
based
on
a
persons
own
negligence.
Clearly,
respondent
did
not
exercise
the
degree
of
care
and
diligence
required
of
a
good
father
of
a
family,
much
less
the
degree
of
care
required
of
someone
dealing
with
dangerous
weapons,
as
would
exempt
him
from
liability
in
this
case.
#06
FILIPINAS
SYNTHETIC
FIBER
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
WILFREDO
DE
LOS
SANTOS,
BENITO
JOSE
DE
LOS
SANTOS,
MARIA
ELENA
DE
LOS
SANTOS
and
CARMINA
VDA.
DE
LOS
SANTOS,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
152033,
March
16,
2011
In
the
selection
of
prospective
employees,
employers
are
required
to
examine
them
as
to
their
qualifications,
experience
and
service
records.
In
the
supervision
of
employees,
the
employer
must
formulate
standard
operating
procedures,
monitor
their
implementation
and
impose
disciplinary
measures
for
the
breach
thereof.
To
fend
off
vicarious
liability,
employers
must
submit
concrete
proof,
including
documentary
evidence,
that
they
complied
with
everything
that
was
incumbent
on
them.
In
order
that
the
defense
of
due
diligence
in
the
selection
and
supervision
of
employees
may
be
deemed
sufficient
and
plausible,
it
is
not
enough
to
emptily
invoke
the
existence
of
said
company
guidelines
and
policies
on
hiring
and
supervision.
As
the
negligence
of
the
employee
gives
rise
to
the
presumption
of
negligence
on
the
part
of
the
employer,
the
latter
has
the
burden
of
proving
that
it
has
been
diligent
not
only
in
the
selection
of
employees
but
also
in
the
actual
supervision
of
their
work.
The
mere
allegation
of
the
existence
of
hiring
procedures
and
supervisory
policies,
without
anything
more,
is
decidedly
not
sufficient
to
overcome
such
presumption.
#07
DR.
RUBI
LI,
Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES
REYNALDO
and
LINA
SOLIMAN,
as
parents/heirs
of
deceased
Angelica
Soliman,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
165279,
June
7,
2011
The
type
of
lawsuit
which
has
been
called
medical
malpractice
or,
more
appropriately,
medical
negligence,
is
that
type
of
claim
which
a
victim
has
available
to
him
or
her
to
redress
a
wrong
committed
by
a
medical
professional
which
has
caused
bodily
harm.
In
order
to
successfully
pursue
such
a
claim,
a
patient
must
prove
that
a
health
care
provider,
in
most
cases
a
physician,
either
failed
to
do
something
which
a
reasonably
prudent
health
care
provider
would
have
done,
or
that
he
or
she
did
something
that
a
reasonably
prudent
provider
would
not
have
done;
and
that
that
failure
or
action
caused
injury
to
the
patient.
There
are
four
essential
elements
a
plaintiff
must
prove
in
a
malpractice
action
based
upon
the
doctrine
of
informed
consent:
"(1)
the
physician
had
a
duty
to
disclose
material
risks;
(2)
he
failed
to
disclose
or
inadequately
disclosed
those
risks;
(3)
as
a
direct
and
proximate
result
of
the
failure
to
disclose,
the
patient
consented
to
treatment
she
otherwise
would
not
have
consented
to;
and
(4)
plaintiff
was
injured
by
the
proposed
treatment."
The
gravamen
in
an
informed
consent
case
requires
the
plaintiff
to
"point
to
significant
undisclosed
information
relating
to
the
treatment
which
would
have
altered
her
decision
to
undergo
it.
#08
EQUITABLE
PCI
BANK,
Petitioner,
vs.
ARCELITO
B.
TAN,
Respondent.
G.R.
No.
165339,
August
23,
2010
Evidently,
the
bank's
negligence
was
the
result
of
lack
of
due
care
required
of
its
managers
and
employees
in
handling
the
accounts
of
its
clients.
Petitioner
was
negligent
in
the
selection
and
supervision
of
its
employees.
In
Citibank,
N.A.
v.
Cabamongan,
the
Court
ruled:
Banks
handle
daily
transactions
involving
millions
of
pesos.
By
the
very
nature
of
their
works
the
degree
of
responsibility,
care
and
trustworthiness
expected
of
their
employees
and
officials
is
far
greater
than
those
of
ordinary
clerks
and
employees.
Banks
are
expected
to
exercise
the
highest
degree
of
diligence
in
the
selection
and
supervision
of
their
employees.
#09
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK,
Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES
CHEAH
CHEE
CHONG
and
OFELIA
CAMACHO
CHEAH,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
170865,
April
25,
2012
It
bears
stressing
that
"the
diligence
required
of
banks
is
more
than
that
of
a
Roman
pater
familias
or
a
good
father
of
a
family.
The
highest
degree
of
diligence
is
expected."
PNB
miserably
failed
to
do
its
duty
of
exercising
extraordinary
diligence
and
reasonable
business
prudence.
The
disregard
of
its
own
banking
policy
amounts
to
gross
negligence,
which
the
law
defines
as
"negligence
characterized
by
the
want
of
even
slight
care,
acting
or
omitting
to
act
in
a
situation
where
there
is
duty
to
act,
not
inadvertently
but
willfully
and
intentionally
with
a
conscious
indifference
to
consequences
in
so
far
as
other
persons
may
be
affected."
In
any
case,
the
complaint
against
the
spouses
Cheah
could
not
be
dismissed.
As
PNBs
client,
Ofelia
was
the
one
who
dealt
with
PNB
and
negotiated
the
check
such
that
its
value
was
credited
in
her
and
her
husbands
account.
Being
the
ones
in
privity
with
PNB,
the
spouses
Cheah
are
therefore
the
persons
who
should
return
to
PNB
the
money
released
to
them.
All
told,
the
Court
concurs
with
the
findings
of
the
CA
that
PNB
and
the
spouses
Cheah
are
equally
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 9 of 16
negligent
and
should
therefore
equally
suffer
the
loss.
The
two
must
both
bear
the
consequences
of
their
mistakes.
#10
MERCURY
DRUG
CORPORATION
and
ROLANDO
J.
DEL
ROSARIO,
petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES
RICHARD
HUANG
and
CARMEN
HUANG,
and
STEPHEN
HUANG,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
172122,
June
22,
2007
Employers
liability
under
Art.
2180
is
direct
or
immediate
and
also
joint
and
solidary
with
the
employee.
It
is
not
conditioned
on
a
prior
recourse
against
the
negligent
employee,
or
a
prior
showing
of
insolvency
of
such
employee.
To
be
relieved,
petitioner
should
show
that
it
exercised
diligence
of
a
good
father
of
a
family
both
in
the
selection
of
the
employee
and
supervision
of
the
performance
of
the
latters
duties.
Mercury
Drug
failed
to
exercised
due
diligence
on
the
supervision
and
discipline
over
its
employees.
In
fact,
on
the
day
of
the
accident,
Del
Rosario
was
driving
without
a
license.
He
testified
that
he
reported
the
incident
on
his
prior
apprehension
to
his
superior,
but
nothing
was
done
about
it.
He
was
not
suspended
or
reprimanded
and
no
disciplinary
action
was
taken
against
him.
#11
PAULITA
"EDITH"
SERRA,
Petitioner,
vs.
NELFA
T.
MUMAR,
Respondent.
G.R.
No.
193861,
March
14,
2012
Under
Article
2180
of
the
Civil
Code,
employers
are
liable
for
the
damages
caused
by
their
employees
acting
within
the
scope
of
their
assigned
tasks.
Whenever
an
employees
negligence
causes
damage
or
injury
to
another,
there
instantly
arises
a
presumption
that
the
employer
failed
to
exercise
the
due
diligence
of
a
good
father
of
the
family
in
the
selection
or
supervision
of
its
employees.
The
liability
of
the
employer
is
direct
or
immediate.
It
is
not
conditioned
upon
prior
recourse
against
the
negligent
employee
and
a
prior
showing
of
insolvency
of
such
employee.
Moreover,
under
Article
2184
of
the
Civil
Code,
if
the
causative
factor
was
the
drivers
negligence,
the
owner
of
the
vehicle
who
was
present
is
likewise
held
liable
if
he
could
have
prevented
the
mishap
by
the
exercise
of
due
diligence.
#12
FILCAR
TRANSPORT
SERVICES,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE
A.
ESPINAS,
Respondent.
G.R.
No.
174156,
June
20,
2012
Under
Article
2176,
in
relation
with
Article
2180,
of
the
Civil
Code,
an
action
predicated
on
an
employees
act
or
omission
may
be
instituted
against
the
employer
who
is
held
liable
for
the
negligent
act
or
omission
committed
by
his
employee.
Whether
the
driver
of
the
motor
vehicle,
Floresca,
is
an
employee
of
Filcar
is
irrelevant
in
arriving
at
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 10 of 16
the
conclusion
that
Filcar
is
primarily
and
directly
liable
for
the
damages
sustained
by
Espinas.
While
Republic
Act
No.
4136
or
the
Land
Transportation
and
Traffic
Code
does
not
contain
any
provision
on
the
liability
of
registered
owners
in
case
of
motor
vehicle
mishaps,
Article
2176,
in
relation
with
Article
2180,
of
the
Civil
Code
imposes
an
obligation
upon
Filcar,
as
registered
owner,
to
answer
for
the
damages
caused
to
Espinas
car.
This
interpretation
is
consistent
with
the
strong
public
policy
of
maintaining
road
safety,
thereby
reinforcing
the
aim
of
the
State
to
promote
the
responsible
operation
of
motor
vehicles
by
its
citizens.
This
does
not
mean,
however,
that
Filcar
is
left
without
any
recourse
against
the
actual
employer
of
the
driver
and
the
driver
himself.
Under
the
civil
law
principle
of
unjust
enrichment,
the
registered
owner
of
the
motor
vehicle
has
a
right
to
be
indemnified
by
the
actual
employer
of
the
driver
of
the
amount
that
he
may
be
required
to
pay
as
damages
for
the
injury
caused
to
another.
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible
for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage. (1905)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
#01
PURITA
MIRANDA
VESTIL
and
AGUSTIN
VESTIL,
petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT,
DAVID
UY
and
TERESITA
UY,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
74431
November
6,
1989
Article
2183.
The
possessor
of
an
animal
or
whoever
may
make
use
of
the
same
is
responsible
for
the
damage
which
it
may
cause,
although
it
may
escape
or
be
lost.
This
responsibility
shall
cease
only
in
case
the
damages
should
come
from
force
majeure
from
the
fault
of
the
person
who
has
suffered
damage.
Article
2183
of
the
Civil
Code
holds
the
possessor
liable
even
if
the
animal
should
"escape
or
be
lost"
and
so
be
removed
from
his
control.
And
it
does
not
matter
either
that,
as
the
petitioners
also
contend,
the
dog
was
tame
and
was
merely
provoked
by
the
child
into
biting
her.
The
law
does
not
speak
only
of
vicious
animals
but
covers
even
tame
ones
as
long
as
they
cause
injury.
As
for
the
alleged
provocation,
the
petitioners
forget
that
Theness
was
only
three
years
old
at
the
time
she
was
attacked
and
can
hardly
be
faulted
for
whatever
she
might
have
done
to
the
animal.
According
to
Manresa
the
obligation
imposed
by
Article
2183
of
the
Civil
Code
is
not
based
on
the
negligence
or
on
the
presumed
lack
of
vigilance
of
the
possessor
or
user
of
the
animal
causing
the
damage.
It
is
based
on
natural
equity
and
on
the
principle
of
social
interest
that
he
who
possesses
#02
JOSE
DINGCONG,
recurrente-apelante,
vs.
HALIM
KANAAN,
NASRI
KANAAN,
y
MICHAEL
KANAAN,
dedicados
al
comercio
bajo
la
razon
social
de
"American
Bazar,"
recurridos-apelados.
G.R.
No.
L-47033,
April
25,
1941
As
Jose
Dingcong
is
a
joint
tenant
and
manager
of
the
hotel,
with
full
possession
of
the
top
floor,
he
must
then
answer
for
damages
caused
by
things
that
were
thrown
or
fell
from
it
(Article
1910
Civil
Code).
Francisco
Echevarria,
a
guest
of
the
hotel,
was
the
one
who
directly
by
his
neglect,
left
open
the
tap,
let
the
water
pipe
pull
back
on
the
ground
and
seep
into
the
lower
floors,
dripping
onto
the
articles
and
goods
of
the
plaintiffs
and
is
thus
liable.
Dingcong
Jose,
on
the
other
hand,
did
not
practice
the
diligence
of
a
good
father
to
prevent
this
damage,
because
he
knew
the
pipes
were
broken
and
did
not
repair
the
pipes,
Echavarria
could
use
the
tap
if
he
was
provided
some
container
to
catch
the
drip
by
Jose.
#03
MARGARITA
AFIALDA,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BASILIO
HISOLE
and
FRANCISCO
HISOLE,
defendants-appellees.
G.R.
No.
L-2075,
November
29,
1949
The
owner
of
an
animal
is
answerable
only
for
damages
caused
to
a
stranger,
and
that
for
damage
caused
to
the
caretaker
of
the
animal
the
owner
would
be
liable
only
if
he
had
been
negligent
or
at
fault
under
article
1902
of
the
same
code.
In
the
present
case,
the
animal
was
in
custody
and
under
the
control
of
the
caretaker,
who
was
paid
for
his
work
as
such.
Obviously,
it
was
the
caretaker's
business
to
try
to
prevent
the
animal
from
causing
injury
or
damage
to
anyone,
including
himself.
And
being
injured
by
the
animal
under
those
circumstances,
was
one
of
the
risks
of
the
occupation
which
he
had
voluntarily
assumed
and
for
which
he
must
take
the
consequences.
4. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the
death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the
event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or
personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for
compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as
the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious
negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation.
When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall
be equitably reduced.
5. NUISANCE
Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or
Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included
in the foregoing definition.
Article 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a
nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same
manner as the one who created it.
Article 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to
recover damages for its past existence.
Article 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.
Article 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a
public nuisance are availed of.
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 13 of 16
Article 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such
action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.
Article 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
Article 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.
Article 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by
removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing
a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the
nuisance;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance
of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
Article 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary,
by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace
or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial
abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.
Article 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable
for damages:
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article. (29a)
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 14 of 16
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than
seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
from the maternal womb. (30a)
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused
to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is
liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. (n)
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives money or
property of a third person and misapplies it; and
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third
person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the
custody of the partnership. (n)
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
Article 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable
with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. (n)
#01
ANTONIO
GELUZ,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
OSCAR
LAZO,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
L-16439,
July
20,
1961
Since
an
action
for
pecuniary
damages
on
account
of
personal
injury
or
death
pertains
primarily
to
the
one
injured,
it
is
easy
to
see
that
if
no
action
for
such
damages
could
be
instituted
on
behalf
of
the
unborn
child
on
account
of
the
injuries
it
received,
no
such
right
of
action
could
derivatively
accrue
to
its
parents
or
heirs.
In
fact,
even
if
a
cause
of
action
did
accrue
on
behalf
of
the
unborn
child,
the
same
was
extinguished
by
its
pre-natal
death,
since
no
transmission
to
anyone
can
take
place
from
on
that
lacked
juridical
personality
(or
juridical
capacity
as
distinguished
from
capacity
to
act).
It
is
no
answer
to
invoke
the
provisional
personality
of
a
conceived
child
(conceptus
pro
nato
habetur)
under
Article
40
of
the
Civil
Code,
because
that
same
article
expressly
limits
such
provisional
personality
by
imposing
the
condition
that
the
child
should
be
subsequently
born
alive:
"provided
it
be
born
later
with
the
condition
specified
in
the
following
article".
In
the
present
case,
there
is
no
dispute
that
the
child
was
dead
when
separated
from
its
mother's
womb.
This
is
not
to
say
that
the
parents
are
not
entitled
to
collect
any
damages
at
all.
But
such
damages
must
be
those
inflicted
directly
upon
them,
as
distinguished
from
the
injury
or
violation
of
the
rights
of
the
deceased,
his
right
to
life
and
physical
integrity.
But
the
immorality
or
illegality
of
the
act
does
not
justify
an
award
of
damage
that,
under
the
circumstances
on
record,
have
no
factual
or
legal
basis.
Torts and Damages: Case Doctrines
Page 15 of 16
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