Accademia Editoriale

Archaic Truth
Author(s): Thomas Cole
Source: Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, New Series, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1983), pp. 7-28
Published by: Fabrizio Serra Editore
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20538760
Accessed: 14-01-2016 23:10 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Fabrizio Serra Editore and Accademia Editoriale are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Archaic Truth

Thomas Cole

The study of early Greek notions of truth is still dominated,

fifty years later, by Heidegger's influential restatement1 of the view2
that to a-lethes
is, originally and essentially, to me lanthanon?i.e.,
the or "unforgotten".
"unhidden" If Heidegger and his followers
are correct, al?theia must be a quality inherent in objects perceived
or information received: a certain self-evidence, clarity or
abiding
memorableness3. Against this view (though also, by implication,
against those who reject altogether the correctness or relevance of
the derivation from the root lath-)4 Bruno Snell has recently suggest
5
ed that the l?th? excluded by a-letheia is something found in per
1 In Sein und Zeit
(= Jahrbuch der Philosophie und ph?nomenologischen
Forschung 8, 1927) 33 and 220-223. Cf., also, Piatons Lehre von der Wahrheit,
Bern 1947, 26-33 and 'Al?theia (Herakliit, Fragment 16)', in Vortr?ge und
Aufs?tze3 3, T?bingen 1967, 54-61.
2 First stated
by J. Classen, Beobachtungen ?ber den homerischen Sprach
gebrauch, Frankfurt 1867, 195.
3
See, most briefly, the articles in the etymological dictionaries of Frisk
(s.v. 'al?th?s') and Chantraine (s.v. 'lanthan?'), and, most exhaustively, J.-P. Le

vet, Le vrai et le faux dans la pens?e grecque archdique, Paris 1976.

4
E.g., A.W. H. Adkins, 'Troth, Kosmos and Arete in Homer', Class.

Quart. 66, 1972, 6-7. Cf., also, Friedl?nder's suggestion {Plato1 1, eng. transi.
New York
1958, 221?modified and largely abandoned in Plato1 1, Berlin
1964, 234-236) that the word may not even be Indo-European.
5 In
AAH0EIA, Festschrift f?r Ernst Siegmann (= Wurzb?rger Jahr
b?cher f?r die Altertumswissenschaft 1, 1975), 1-18. See, especially, 14 "fckr?ic
ist das im Ged?chtnis l?ckenlos Festgehaltene (das in seiner F?lle hergez?hlt
werden kann)", and 11, "...in einem bestimmten Wissens-Kontinuum nichts
der Lethe anheimfallen lassen". Snell seems indebted to T. Krischer's study,
'ETYM02 und AAH0EZ', Philologus 109, 1965, 161-174 for his notion of
al?theia as the larger whole from all of whose parts the process or idea

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8 Th. Cole

sons rather than things: forgetfulness rather than hiddenness or being

forgotten. A-lethes is that which is retained in the memory without

any of the gaps to which such le the would give rise.
In this
"subjective" reformulation of the established, "objec
tive" interpretation, al?theia becomes the result of the way an original

apprehension remains in the perceiving subject's memory, not an

aspect of objects or information as originally apprehended. But per

ception or continues to be of major, if no longer cen
apprehension
tral, importance. The discussion which follows accepts Snell's sub

jective interpretation in the main

argues but for further reformula
tion, this time in terms of the processes of communication rather
than perception: al?theia is that which is involved in, or results from,
a transmission of information that excludes l?th?, whether in the
form of forgetfulness, failure to notice, or ignoring6. The semantic

development thus posited, by which a word that originally meant

something like "conscientious reporting" became a synonym for truth

(etymon or eteon in the earliest attested Greek) has a close parallel
in the transformation of Latin accuratus ("careful", usually of speech
or writing) into English "accurate". The Greek counterpart to this

development is more complex and harder to trace: al?theia absorbs

some of the original meaning of two other more specialized terms

(n?mert?s, atrek?s) and transmits some of its own to a third (akrib?s)

before finally becoming, in the mid-fifth century, the most general
and important word for truth. Moreover, the initial and terminal
stages of its history are much better documented than the interven
ing ones. But the development in all its phases an attempt
is worth
at reconstruction, even if the consequences for the history of Greek

thought are less spectacular here than where the Heideggerian etym
ology serves as a point of departure.

Snell's subjective reformulation, whether as originally presented

associated with the lath- root is excluded. For Krischer this idea is that of
"unnoticed" rather (than "unhidden" or so that an aleth?s
being "forgetful",
logos is "...der Bericht der die Dinge darstellt... ohne das dabei etwas unbe
merkt bleibt" (op. cit. 167; cf. 165: "...so aussagen das nichts [dem Angere
deten] entgeht)".
6 As in the
corresponding verbs lanthan? and l?thomai, the distinction
between unintentional forgetting or failure to notice and intentional ignoring
is not strictly observed. The meaning posited is broad enough to include both.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 9

by him or in the revised version to be offered here, removes the most

crucial problem posed by its objective alternative. Hiddenness (or
failure to be remembered) and its opposite are conditions which
should attach to things as well as to the content of statements. Yet
it is almost exclusively to the latter that al?th?s refers in its first two
and a half centuries of attestation. A Greek may, from the very be
ginning, speak the truth (or "true things"), but it is not until much
later that he is able to hear it (Aesch. Ag. 680), or see it (Pind. N.
7,25), or be truly good (Simonides 542,1 Page), or believe in true
gods (Herodotus 2,174,2). And it is later still that al?theia comes
to refer to the external reality of which discourse and art are imita
tions. Other lanthanein derivatives?lathra, lathraios (and alastos,
if it belongs to this group)?are applied freely, at all periods of their
use, to persons, things and situations; why not al?th?s as well7 ? The

question becomes fairly easy to answer if al?theia is taken to be, in

origin, a kind of "unforgettingness", a specifically human quality and
one which is most crucially and consistently important in the realm
of human discourse 8.
That the word should be applied to the verbal manifestations
of this quality rather than the people who exhibit it,whether verbally
or is unexpected, but certainly not unparalleled. One
non-verbally,
may compare the related adjective n?mert?s (below, pp. 13-15), also
used regularly of discourse, even though the verb from which it is
derived is rarely so used and always takes a personal subject. Nor

7 contention
Usage thus tells strongly against the relevance of W. Luther's

('Wahrheit, Licht und Erkenntniss in der griechischen Philosophie bis De

mokrit', Archiv f?r Begriffsgeschichte 10, 1966) that the Homeric world is one
which knows "keinen Unterschied zwischen Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" (31),
and in which "die Dinge und die sie bezeichnenden W?rter noch in einem
untrennbaren stehen" (37). This may be true in general,
Wirkungszusammenhang
and for etymos (text, p. 13), but not for al?th?s. Cf. Snell (above, n. 5) 11,
n. 4, and 17.
8 This
link to the meaning found in the noun l?th? or the medio-passive
lethomai seems to be regular in lath- derivatives with a long vowel in the root
syllable. Cf. epil?thos, epil?smon, l?thargia, Uthedanos, l?thiponos. L?thanemos
h?ra dit Simonides 508, 4 Page may be the season which eludes the wind, but
it is more logically taken as the one which allows men to forget about the
wind (cf. lathik?d?s)?which leaves lesimbrotos (H. Herrn. 339) as the only
secure instance of such a derivative with the "objective" meaning found in the
active lanthan?.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 10 Th. Cole

are personal, non-verbal applications of al?th?s absent.

completely
One such appears in the earliest clear gloss on the word, Hes. Theog.
233-236 9:

Nrjpea 8* ?ipsuS?a xai akrft?a yelvocto IIovto?

irpscr?iiTaTOV ira?Swv a?x?p xa\?ou<n y?povua
o?vExa virpEpTife te xai ??tcio?, o?S? ds[xicri:?wv
Mj&ETai, ?\Xa Sixaia xai ijma 8iQV?a o?Sev

and another is to be found at Iliad 12,433 (below, p. 14).

Also in favor of Snell's subjective interpretation are the contexts
in which a number of Homeric instances of al?th?s appear. Com
pleteness, non-omission of any relevant particular, whether through
forgetting or ignoring, is certainly what is expected of Phoenix when
he is posted as an observer so that he can keep track (memne?ito)
of the course of the race and report al?thei?n concerning it (II.
23,361); and it is also what Tdemachus requests from Nestor in in

quiring of Agamemnon's fate (Od. 3,247, 254) and gives to Penelope

(17,108) in his detailed account of the trip to Sparta and Pylos (cf.,
also, 22,420 [Eurycleia's enumeration of the guilty serving maids]).
But against these five passages one can set others which are more
difficult to square with Snell's definition ?and suggest the need for the
further reformulation mentioned earlier. Al?theia, for example, seems
to be a property of all the substantially true stories Odysseus tells?
from the exceedingly full versions of the career of Neoptolemus and
the trip from Calypso's island found at 11,506-537 and 7,241-297,
to the nine lines (16,226-234) that inform Telemachus of the how
and why of his arrival in Ithaca, to the five-line statement (21,212
216) of how he plans to reward Eumaeus and Philoitios. There are,
moreover, contexts where it is not freedom from omissions but just
the opposite?freedom from irrelevant or misleading inclusions?that
the word seems to designate. Such inclusions, in the form of encour
aging but ill-founded leads on the whereabouts of Odysseus, are prob

ably what Eumaeus has in mind when he says that travelers are

unwilling al?thea myth?sasthai in the tales they tell Penelope (14,124

9 For later
glosses which seem to establish a similar link between al?theia
and unforgetfulness, see Pind. 0. 10, 3-4 and Plato, Phaedr. 248b (in conjunc
<A-AH0EIA
tion with Rep. 10,621a?cf. H. D. Rankin, in Plato ', Glotta 41,
1963, 51-54).

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 11

125). The pseudea {ibid.) which result are not simply untruths but,
as Eumaeus himself indicates three lines later
(128), elaborate fab
rications: no one
confronted, as the travelers are, with the prospect
of being rewarded for any good news he brings can resist the temp
tation epos paratektainesthai. Priam may be on his guard against
similar elaborations?<as well as tactful omissions?when he asks
Hermes (disguised as a servant of Achilles) for pasan al?thei?n (II.
24,407) on the fate of Hector's body.
Di?neke?s, which is used twice in contexts suggesting it is a near
synonym of the non-epic al?the?s 10, seems to have the same double
reference. Applied (Od. 7,241) to the narrative (cf. above) described
as al?thei?n in 1,291, it contains the idea of starting from the begin
ning and proceeding, point by point, to the end. But the word refers
to something quite different at 4,836-837: not ia "straight-tbrough''

telling without omissions but a "straight-out" telling without evasion

or inconsequentiality dream refuses either to say di?neke?s
(Penelope's
n
whether Odysseus is alive or dead or?the alternative?to indulge
in windy talk \_anemolia hazein]). Here the contrast seems very much
that drawn by Eumaeus (cf. above) between straightforward, cir
cumstantial al?thea and pseudea (fuller, presumably, and more de
tailed) based on guess-work and invention.
In even briefer compass, the serving maids' conviction that Odys
seus "meant just what he said" (cp?v yap \xiv akrftia jxu?hfaacrfrai:
18,342) in threatening to report Melantho's insuk to Telemachus is
simply the other side of the coin to Telemachus' justification of his
refusal to help the supposed beggar at 17,15 ("I am given to saying
just what I mean": fj yocp ?[xol cp?V ocXiQ&?apAJ??)o,a<rdai). Odysseus
and Telemachus are both saying what is strictly on their mind?no
more than what one intends to do in the former instance (as also in
the promise to Eumaeus and Philoitios at 21,212-216 [above, p. 10]),

10 to
Perhaps excluded for purely metrical reasons. Synizesis (? X rj fr ? <;
is required if the word is to fit into a hexameter at all, and the resulting
shape (^_) is largely confined to line end?a position which truth formulae
usually reserve for a verb of saying,
11The same
meaning at Od. 12,56-57 (Circe's refusal to say di?neke?s
which path to follow between Scylla and Charybdis). Cf., on the word in
general, Levet (above, n. 3), 192-194.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 12 Th. Cole

no less than what one feels in the latter. Context determines whether
emphasis is on the no more, the no less, or equally on both.
The existence of
contrasting these
usages could perhaps be ex
plained as the result of a natural extension of the meaning posited by
Snell. An original "the whole story?no d?lections" becomes also "the
whole story?no additions" so that al?theia is alternatively the whole
truth or nothing but the truth. But the "extended" meaning can,
I think, be derived more simply and plausibly from the same source
as the "original" that the excluded
one?by assuming forgetting by
al?theia involves primarily the process of transmission?not the
mental apprehension on which the transmission is based. The
reference will then be, not
simply to non-omission of pieces in
of
formation through forgetting or failure to take notice or ignoring,
but also to not forgetting from one minute to the next what was
said a few minutes before, and not said or unsaid,
letting anything,
slip by without being mindful of its consequences and implications
(cf. the later use of the verb lanthanein, with or without a reflexive
and followed by a participle, to indicate doing [or saying] something
without realizing it). It would beappropriate to describe a com
munication which arises under such conditions as a-l?th?s, whether the
the adjective derives directly from l?thomai (like, for example,
aphrad?s from phrazomai) or indirectly, via an almost unattested
l?thos (Theoor. 23, 24; cf. ak?d?s from k?domai via k?dos), and to
think of the communication as containing, or being itself an instance
of, al?theia. What is involved is strict (or strict and scrupulous)
rendering or as exclusive of bluster, invention
reporting?something
or irrelevance as it is of omission or understatement. It is not, as
the interpretations of Snell and Heidegger imply, the compelling
clarity of a perception or the percipient's total command in recalling
it that come to be combined in a (to us) confusing way with the idea
of truth. It is, rather, truth and method, the what and how of a

given communication that are so combined.

The positive evidence (18 instances of aleth?s or ai?thei? in Iliad
and Odyssey) on which this modification of Snell's view is based
stands, as will be seen, in substantial accord with the much larger
body of evidence obtained by considering and comparing those Ho
meric passages in which al?th?s jai?thei? is not used, but some' other

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 13

truth word instead (over 100

instances)12. The commonest of such
words (eteos, etymos, et?tymos) derive from the root et- and seem
to have much the same range of meanings which al?th?s was to

acquire in the fourth century. They can be applied to a communica

tion which is 13,or will prove to be 14, in conformity with the facts,
or to what is in fact the case 15,by contrast with uninformed report,
wishful thinking, or as yet unconfirmed hypothesis. In compound
proper names (Eteooles, Eteocretes) and in the phrase nostos et?tymos
at Od. 3, 241, the meaning seems to be "real" or "genuine".
Less common than these, but more common than al?th?s, are
two words, n?mert?s and atrek?s, which are parallel to it in form
and seem, like it, to have a more
specialized meaning. All three
show the same privative prefix (derived from the Indo-European

syllabic nasal), with n?mert?s referring to that which does not miss
its mark (hamartano)16 and atrek?s to that which does not deviate
or distort (cf., for the root trek-, Latin torqueo and, for the metaphor,
the phrase o?x ocv Eywys/aXXa -rcap?J; eltoi[xi ^apaxXiSov o?8' ?rca
Tifau at Od. 4,348 and 17,139). Though the isolated (ap)hamar
toep?s (II. 3,215; 13,824) is the only corresponding non-privative
form attested as a contrary for any one of these words 17, their original
privative force is still strong enough to prevent their being used with
a negative18. The primary reference of all three is to the transmission

12 In what fallows I am much indebted the clear collection and classifica

tion of all Homeric examples given by Levet (above, n. 3).
13Cf. II.
10,534; 14,125; 20,255; 23,440; Od. 4,140; 19,203 and, by a
natural extension from speech to speaker, II. 22,438 (et?tymos angelos).
14Cf.
II. 1,558 (of a promise), 2,300 (prophecy), Od. 16,320 (portent),
and 19,567 (etyma krainousin ["bring true things to pass"], said of dreams
which say things that come true).
15
Usually in the phrase el ete?v (ye)... Cf., also, II. 13,111; 18,128; Od.
23,26 and 4,157.
16What is not missed is presumably the truth (etymon), though there is
often the added idea of speaking unerringly what one's interlocutor wants to
know (cf. Snell [above, n. 5] 13-14) and occasionally that of not coming up
with the wrong thing to say: cf. the adjective (ap)hamartoepes at II. 3,215 and
13,824, and the phrase ou8' ifpapxavE p?dwv (Od. 11,511).
17On the other
(rare) occasions when a contrary appears it is pseud?s
(Od. 2,19-20 = 337-338 [contrasted with n?mert?s] and 14,124-125 [text, p. 10]).
18On the two occasions where al?th?s
appears alongside ouk or oud*
the negative forms a single idea with the verb: ouk ethelousin at Od. 14,124
(text, p. 10) and o?S' ? Y ?XTjft?oceins, rc?XLv S' o ye XA?eto ^?frov at 13,254.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 14 Th. Cole

of information through discourse, whether the transmission be un

erring, undeviating and undistorting, or strict and (i.e.,
scrupulous
"unneglectful")19; and since these qualities attach as much to the

speaker in the process of framing his discourse as to the transmitted

speech, they all suggest forms of truthfulness as well as truth: sure

trathfulness, straight truthfulness, strict truthfulness. More accurate

ly, perhaps, one could say that the idea of truth or truthfulness is not
contained in the words themselves but, in the normal course of things,

implied by the context in which they appear. Unerring speech is

normally true speech, but n?mert?s may be used, as etymos is not,
of a plan that will not miss being realized (Od. 1,86; 5,30)20 or of
a person who is infallible (in the phrase y?pwv akioc, vrpEpTife at Od.
4,349, 384, 401, 542; 17,140). The same holds true for atrek?s in
most contexts, though on one occasion (Zeus' instructions to the
dream in II. 2,10) the information to be transmitted is false; and it
is strict, unneglectful accounting, not truthful teffitag, that charac
terizes the yuv?) xepvffri? akr$fr\ci of II. 12,433 as she raises the
balance aloft to make sure that the wool on one side equals the

weight on the other21.

sure, the straight,
The and the strict and scrupulous are not
so far apart as to exclude the existence of statements that are all

three, and many of the Homeric speeches termed n?mert?s, atrek?s

and al?th?s seem, when considered in isolation, to fall into this

category?hence to provide little basis for empirical verification of

the meanings just suggested. But their number is radically reduced

In the latter passage oud}... eipe is a way of lazeto.

negative saying palin
Odysseus did not speak out, but instead held back, the ale the a my thon he
might have told.
19The
preference for adverbial atreke?s as against adjectival and substantival
al?th?sIal?thei? and adverbial-adjectival n?merte?s/n?mert?s may reflect noth
more than the constraint of hexameter Atrekeia and atrek?s
ing composition.
require, to be metrical, a different scansion of the initial syllable (atrekeia,
atrek?s) from that given currency in the normal ?trekeos, whereas n?merteia
has a pattern (_^) largely confined, like that of al?the?s (above, n. 10) to
line end.
20
Cf., also, H. Apoll. 132, 252, 292.
21The variant al?tis
(still favored by, e.g., Levet [above, n. 3] 91-93 and
Mette [Lexikon der fr?h-griechischen Epos, s.v.]) requires the unlikely as
that a woman could also be a worker
sumption wandering beggar piece earning
a wage (chern?tis).

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 15

when one considers certain types of context where one word or the
other is consistently favored or excluded throughout Iliad and
Odyssey. True statements about the future, for example, unless they
refer to a speaker's intentions (Od. 18,342 and 21,212-216 [above,
p. 11])22 or what will occur because it occurs habitually (Od. 4,383,
399) ^ are either n?mert?s (Od. 5,300; 11,96, 137, 148; 12,112)
or designated by an et- word?never atrek?s or al?th?s. Here the

difficulty of forgetting or letting slip by unnoticed something which

has not yet occurred practically excludes al?th?s; and atrek?s suggests,
if it does not demand, non-deviation from a model that is already in
existence. On the other hand, the clear parallel between the spatial
distance separating a marksman from his target and the temporal
distance between delivery and fulfillment of a prophecy makes n?
mert?s an obvious choice for such contexts.
When reference is not to the future, n?mert?s is regularly dis
from atrek?s by the greater urgency or importance of the
tinguished
information to be communicated24, atrek?s from al?th?s by the greater

accessibility of the information and its greater ease of transmission.

Atrek?s assumes as a matter of course that the speaker is in full
command of what is to be communicated. It is thus the only word
found in connection with verbatim transmission of an order (II. 2,10
[above, p. 14]); and in the standard formula alX9 &ye pm t?Se zii?
xa? ?cTpEx?w? xoctocXe^ov it does little more than contribute a certain

epic elevation to hundrum inquiries of the tl? izb?ev tic, ?vSpwv

variety25. This very routiness, however, may create special overtones

22
Cf., also, H. Herrn. 459 (atreke?s).
23The two
speeches of Eidathea introduced by atreke?s katalex? in these
lines contain advice and prediction, but they are largely concerned with where
Proteus is regularly to be found and what he does when someone attempts to
use force him.
against
24News of Odysseus, for example (Od. 3,19 [below, p. 18]; 17,561;
19,269; 23,35), or Zeus' orders to Calypso (5,98), or what the suitors want
'to know about Telemachus' departure and intentions (4,642). See, for other
passages, text, p. 19 (II. 6,376 and Od. 15,263-264) and below, n. 26 (?/.
14,470).
25 For the routineness of the information
sought or supplied atreke?s,
cf. Od. 1,169, 179, 206, 214 (name and parentage), 24,256 (master's name),
11,140 and 16,137 (immediate practical instructions), 24,287 ("How long
since...?") II. 24,655 ("How long until...?") and 380 ("Where are you going
and what are you doing?"). The communication is more important and com

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 16 Th. Cole

in passages where a discreditable piece of information is

possibly
involved (four times in the exchanges between Odysseus and Dolon,
II. 10,384, 405, 413, 427), once at II. 15,53 [Zeus to Hera] and
once, perhaps, at Od. 24,123 [Amphimedon's ghost to Agamemnon's]).
If a transmission is not atrek?s it can only be because of deliberate
distortion?not the temporary lapses or partial ignorance that might
result in a failure to be al?th?s or n?mert?s. And so to insist on
atrekeia in a situation where there is some reason to believe that
accurate transmission will not occur can be equivalent to demanding,
or offering, undeviating disclosure?even at the cost of self-incrimi
nation 26.
Al?theia, by contrast with atrekeia, presupposes a certain deter
mination, concentration or effort at recall on the part of the speaker,
and so a degree of commitment and concern, whether to produce a

given effect on others or to maintain a standard for oneself (cf. the

recurring phrases [xvifaacrdE ... aXxfjc;, \zka<7[izda/'kzka<T\xi\)ov ... ccX
xt)<;, ?Xxffe-\affby\xoii where a similar concern, or lack thereof,
is linked to the absence, or presence, of l?th?). The gods are regularly
above (or below) such concern, secure as they are of their own effec
tiveness and unavailability in all dealings with men. And so the
pronouncements they make
during the course
dealings, of those
whether directly or through seers, are never al?th?s 27. (Cf. the two
phrases quoted earlier [p. 14]: y?ptov ftXioc vTnn?pTT)<;and yuvtq xzpvfiiic,

plicated, but neither urgent nor difficult to make, at Od. 4,486; 11,457; 15,353
(news of someone other than Odysseus); 1,224; 16,113 (the political situation
at Ithaca) and 8,572; 11,170 and 370; 14,192 and 15,383 (past experiences
of the informant).
26 If this
suggestion is correct, atreke?s might have been expected in a
similar demand for a demaging admission at II. 14,470. Polydamas must there
answer yes ?to Ajax's "Tell me n?mert?s: wasn't the man I killed
question,
worth as much as the man you killed?"?and so acknowledge that he has
been powerless to prevent Ajax from getting his revenge. But Ajax wishes to
be as well as force an admission. He knows the answer to his
insulting question
perfectly well, but sarcastically uses a word (n?mert?s) which suggests urgent
need for information of the sort only a seer such as Polydamas can supply.
27 n.
Gf. Snell (above, 5) 15: "Bei Homer ...wurde akrft?c, nie auf ?ber
menschliche Wahrheit angewandt". The generalization does not, of course,
apply to what gods say when disguised as mortals (H. Dem. 121) or when
talking to each other (ibid. 433 [Persephone's full, circumstantial account of
the painful details of her abduction] and, probably, Hes. Theog. 233-236
[text, p. 10] where Nereus' themistes are presumably given to gods, not men).

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 17

with their contrasting images of divine infallibility and human

ocXtqotq?,
accountability).
Though the characteristic semantic field of al?th?s is best seen
the contrast with atrek?s, the two words are alike in that
through
they may not be used in the course of one character's corroboration
or impugning of what another just said. It is possible
has to know
on the basis of one's own that a particular
information statement is

etymos, or even that it is unerringly so (cf. the use of n?mert?s ect

II. 3,204, Od. 17,549, 556); but to be in a position to judge the
atrekeia or al?theia of anything more elaborate than a brief statement
of present intention such as that found at Od. 18,342 (above, p. 11)
implies prior possession of all the information
being conveyed. And
this will normally exclude needing or desiring to hear the speech at
all. Even narrower restrictions apply when the or
plausibility prob
of a speech is at issue. Odysseus is adept at telling pseudea
ability
which are etymoisin homoia (19,203)?i.e., recognizably the sort of
so (presumably)
thing actually occurs and
that readily believed. But
there are no recurring characteristics to permit such recognition in
the case of those statements which, at different places and times and
in the mouth of various to be unerring, or undeviat
speakers, happen
ing, or strict and scrupulous. Eumaeus says (above, p. 10) that
informants are unwilling to speak al?thea, but this is
Penelope's
less an immediate reaction to the reports themselves than an explana
tion of why they always turn out to be false. And their falsity is
of which Eumaeus is convinced on other
grounds?whether
something
because ever comes of them, or because they insist on the
nothing
imminence of the one thing?Odysseus' return?which he is certain
will never occur (cf. 14,363-368).
The various restrictions to which the use of the three words
under discussion is subject may be set forth in summary form as
follows:
n?mert?s
TruthWord atrek?s
al?th?s
? or
Time reference only past present
? ?
Speaker human
?
Nature of information important or urgent less important or rou-
conveyed tine
? Transmission non-problematic (in- difficult
formation ac
readily
cessible to speaker)
? not immediately verifiable
Verifiability

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 18 Th. Cole

The restrictions are maintained with sufficient consistency to

justify closer scrutiny of those passages which seem to violate them.

In most instances there are reasons for believing that the violation is

only apparent; in a few, formal considerations seem to have taken

precedence over semantic ones; I find none where the restrictions are

totally disregarded.
To the first category belong several groups of passages where
the demands of an immediate context seem to have been overriden

by those of a larger one. Telemachus' request, made first to Nestor

(3,96-97) and then to Menelaus (4,326-327) not to over or

gloss
embellish out of a desire to spare his feelings:

[XTjS?t? p.' aiSopisvoc [xeikivcrzo [xtq8' ?Xsatpwv,

?Xk9 su |xol xax?Xs^ov ottooc i]VTiQcra<;otzwtzti?,

leads oneto expect al?th?s in the line with which the entire speech
concludes: t&v vGv jxoi [xviQcrai, xai [xol vrpspxec ?vicrra? (3,101 = 4,
331. Cf. Priam's request at II. 24,407 [above, p. 11]). But the speech
itself, repeated verbatim in the later book, belongs to a larger pattern
of inquiry that begins with the injunction of Athena-Mentor (3,19)
to seek out sure information
(n?mertea) from Nestor. The line
above recalls this injunction on its appearance in 3; and in 4
quoted
it recalls a similar injunction from Nestor, who cannot supply n?mertea
himself but urges Telemachus to seek them from Menelaus (3,327).
The pattern is only completed when Menelaus reports what he has
heard from the yepoov aXio? vrpepTifc = 384 = 401 =
(4,349 542).
Here the larger context dictates to the immediate one, just as it does
on three other occasions in the book. Eidothea, though doubtless

capable of n?mertea, is only allowed to speak atreke?s at 383 and 399,

lest her revelations to Menelaus compete in importance with the

subsequent ones of Proteus. At 314, on the other hand, Menelaus

is presenting as wanting to learn n?merte?s the reason for Telemachus'
presence in Sparta. Atreke?s is the expected form in such a request,
but the line is a deliberate anticipation of what appears 17 lines
later (331) at the close of Telemachus' reply: one of the pattern
determined requests for n?mertea already mentioned. Thirteen books
later (17,122) Telemachus will call the contents of this same reply
al?thei?, because there they are part of the larger al?thei? (17,108;
cf. above, p. 10) of his entire narrative to Penelope. More simply,

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 19

Odysseus' promise to speak n?mert?s to Penelope at 17,561 is at

least partially determined by Penelope's original offer (17,549, related
verbatim by Eumaeus at 556) to reward the man who can tell her
n?mert?s about the fate of her husband. There n?mert?s was one
of the normal means
of designating the sort of truth that is subject
to corroboration a hearer (above, p. 17)28.
by
On three other occasions variation between truth words involves
subtle in meaning
distinctions or nuance. Theoclymenus' request
(15,263) for n?mertea about Telemachus' identity is only appropriate,

given his mantic profession and present situation?it is essential to

know for sure whether Telemachus has any ties to Theoclymenus'
pursuers or the man whose murder they are seeking to avenge.
Telemachus' reply is the stereotyped -roiy?cp eyw toi %?ive, jx?X' ocxpE
x?co??yopzxxxu (266), and by bringing the exchange back to a more
routine it already conveys
level a measure of reassurance.

Urgency is also behind Hector's request (II. 6,376) for sure

information on Andromache's whereabouts?whether with his sisters,
his-sisters-in-law, or in the temple of Athena. He must return to the
battle soon and only has time to look for her in one place. In re

phrasing his question as "Exxop, euei [xocV ?vcoya? ?Vr)&?a [xu?hfaaa'dai

(382) before they reply, the servant women, like Telemachus, offer
a kind of correction?in the event that the original list was meant
to be exhaustive. They would be speaking n?merte?s if they simply
replied, as they do at first, that Andromache is at none of the places
enumerated; it is only a demand for a full, strict account (al?theia)
which requires them to add that, in point of fact, she has gone to the
city wall (386). To Hector's "Say to me with unerring truthful
ness..." "Hector, in strict truthfulness we can
they reply (coyly?)

28Al?theaat Od. 13,254 (above, n. 18) may be similarly determined by

the tendency (text, p. 10) for all of Odysseus' true accounts to be called al?th?s.
It is not simply the truth, but an account such as he earlier told Akinous that
he refrains from giving to Athena.
29Cf. Snell a somewhat
(above, n. 5) 11 n. 8, who draws similar contrast
" "
between Hector's request for Zutreffende and the serving women's modest
claim to know only "was ihr 'bewusst ist". But one would expect such a reply
to contain less rather than more than what was "We don't know
asked?e.g.,
about the you mentioned, but when we last saw her she was to
places going
ward the wall...".

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
20 Th. Cole

Morecomplex is Theoclymenus' ?Tp?x?co<; yap toi ixavTEUffo^xai

o?S' ?7nxEUo,w at 0?/. 17,154, where the seer's insistence on the

certainty of what he has to say about Odysseus' whereabouts might

lead one to expect n?mert?s. But the speech must be heard as a

sequel to Telemachus' conscientious

and complete (al?th?s [above,
p. 10]) report of the
trip to Pylos and Sparta. Theoclymenus rejects
all that has been heard about Odysseus during that trip as uncertain
and imprecise: Telemachus (or Menelaus) o? ca?a o?Ssv (153).
on the other hand, is going to give an undeviating
Theoclymenus,
report of what his mantic powers tell him. What he says is, by

implication, n?mert?s; but to call it that would make Telemachus

or Menelaus mistaken(hamartoep?s or pseud?s [see above, p. 13, with
n. 17]) by contrast.
And this is further than Theoclymenus wants
to go. Of the three available truth words (al?th?s is not used for
mantic utterances [above, p. 15]), he tactfully chooses the one which
refers to straight transmission rather than 'infallibility or true state
ment. Since the transmission involves information not available to
Telemachus and Menelaus, a claim to atrekeia in making it need
not involve invidious comparisons.
Formal considerations are probably decisive in two passages

involving the single most common truth formula ?W ayt y,oi TaSs
dn? xai ocTpEx?oo? xoct?cXe^ov. This phrase always precedes any re
quests for information with which it is connected. It may not, there
fore, follow another verb in the imperative; and when it introduces
a series of requests that are interrupted by a second generalizing order,
the latter involves another formula: xai jioi tout' ay?pEuo-ov ?t/)tu
[xov, ocpp' ?? ?l8& (Od. 1,174 = 24,258). The questions which follow
the second formula are, however, no different in character from those
which precede. Either, then, et?tymon is here a purely formal vari
ant on atreke?s or else?since speaking atreke?s almost always in
volves (above, p. 13) but not vice-versa?a more
speaking et?tymon
idea is referred back to and continued a more gen
specific being by
eral one, as often occurs when the simple form of a verb takes up
and refers to something first designated by one of its compounds 30.
The former suggestion seems somewhat more likely, given the fact
that, even when the et?tymon formula appears separately from the

30 See R.
Renehan, Greek Textual Criticism. A Reader, Cambridge Mass.
1969, 77-85 and Studies in Greek Texts (= Hypomn?mata 43, 1976) 11-27.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 21

other (Od. 4,645; 13,232; 14,186; 24,403), it follows closely, in

every instance but the last (an indication of "lateness"?), another
request in the imperative.
For traces of semantically formally dictated
rather than excep
tions to the Homeric system described, one must go to Hesiod and
the Hymns; and even there the divergences are slight and infrequent.
The clearest are at H. Herrn. 561 (ai?thei? of the responses of an

oracle) and 564 (atreke?s used to describe, not an oracular response,

but the effort to elicit one)31. The generalization of meaning found
in the earlier passage may also be present in Hesiod's references

(Erga 768 and 818) to those who celebrate the last day of the month
"on the basis of a true observing of distinctions" (al?thei?n kr mon
tes) and designate the 27th of the month "by its true name" (al?thea
kikl?iskontes). On the other hand, it is just as possible?unless these
two lines are evidence for the lateness of the whole "Days" section
of the poem?that Hesiod is not thinking of truth but, in Homeric

fashion, of a strict keeping track?one which reckons consistently

from the beginning of each calendar month, celebrating month end
when 30 days have rather than upon completion of a lunar
elapsed
cycle, and calling the 27th the "third ninth day" (triseinas [814])
rather than?counting from the other direction?"fourth from last"
(tetras phthinontos)32. If so, the divergence from earlier usage is

purely syntactic (ai?thei? and al?th?s construed with kikl?isk? or

krino rather than a verb
saying). of
Al?theia is also
ambiguous in the famous claim of the Muses
to to as well as pseudea ...
(Theog. 28) know how speak al?thea ety
moisin homoia. The word may be a simple variant on etyma, and
its use in connection with divine discourse?and discourse pertain
to essomena (32) as well as present or
ing, at least by implication,
past?is certainly un-Homeric. On the other hand, the whole pass
age is often taken as referring specifically to the sort of poetry that
is to follow in the Theogony, in which case al?th?s may retain enough
of its Homeric meaning to contrast Hesiod's circumstantial catalogue

31 see H.
For what may be a similar transfer of reference, Dem. 294, where

n?mert?s ant o does not mean "they spoke unerringly" but rather, "they
mythes
did not fail to say [what they had been commanded to say]"
32 own occa
For the different systems of reckoning involved, and Hesiod's
sional inconsistency in using them, see West ad loc.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
22 Th. Cole

of cosmic dynasties and genealogies with the basically realistic (ety

moisin homoia) but stylistically ornamented33 and extensively fic
tionalized narrative of heroic epic. Hesiod's Muses have learned to
do strict reporting as well as inspired celebration of past achieve
ment; and it is the content of their repertory, not the meaning of
al?th?s, that has changed. However one interprets this passage, the

promise at the opening of the Erga to speak et?tyma (10) falls well
within the Homeric range of meanings: what follows is largely ex
hortation and so concerned with the future. N?mert?s would have
been a possible alternative, but perhaps an excessively arrogant one.
It qualifies divine speech more often than human (hence, no doubt,
its position as the favored truth term in the Hymns)34.
Little can be learned from the isolated references to al?theia
which appear in other pre-fifth-century texts
35, and it is only with

Aeschylus (the most conservative?or Homeric?of later writers in

his truth terminology) that one encounters once more a body of
evidence large enough to suggest how and whether the original sys
tem of meaning has changed. Here the functions of atrek?s and
n?mert?s (found only at Vers.
246) have been completely taken over

by al?th?s; and the latter now stands in somewhat the same relation

33The absence from the of the "smooth,

Theogony leisurely espansiveness"
of the Homeric manner is noted by M. L. West (Hesiod, Theogony, Oxford

1966, 73-74).
34 41
per cent of all occurrences (see Le vet [above, n. 3] 33). For other
instances of essentially Homeric use of truth words in Hesiod and the Hymns,
see the passages cited above notes 20, 22 and 27 and?most strikingly per
haps?Hermes' speech ?n his own defense before Zeus (H. Herrn. 368-386).
The strict circumstantiality of the whole account is announced at the start (368:
al?thei?n katalexo), as well as the speaker's infallibility (n?mert?s te gar eimi
[369]), but the crucial denial ("I didn't drive home Apollo's cows and never
even ventured beyond my own threshold") is followed immediately by the in
sistent atreke?s (380) that makes any accompanying untruth the result of delib
erate falsification (text, p. 16).
35
E.g., FVS 22B 112 (Heraclitus) and FGrHist 1 F 1 b (Hecataeus), where
the promise to write &<; \xoi ?XTjd?a Sox?a slvou rather than the ri
reproduce
diculous current among the Greeks could indicate an un-Homeric unwill
logoi
to make inferences about the al?theia of someone else's (cf. text,
ingness logoi
p. 17, with Krischer [above, n. 5] 173; and contrast FVS 21B 35 [Xenopha
nes]: eoikota tois etymoisin). But Hecataeus may be doing nothing more than
Eumaeus did (text, pp. 10 and 17) when he concluded that Penelope's informants
were unwilling al?thea mythe sas thai.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Archaic Truth 23

ship to et(?t)ymos as did the entire triad of words in Homer. It

thus continues to
refer, except in the adverbial al?th?s36, not to
what is merely true, but to what is truthful as well (cf. above, p. 14)
?or, in statements about the future, to what the course of events
will prove to have been truthfully said (Sept. 710, Ag. 1241, 1567)37
or cursed 885-886,
(Sept. 946). The main innovation is that all
forms of truthfulness, not just the three for which
specific there were
Homeric words, are now **; and that et(?t)ymos
covered is confined

(except at Prom. V. 293 and 595)39 to statements that are true without

being truthful. Messenger speeches can be al?th?s (Pers.

necessarily
513, Ag. 622, 680, Choeph. 844), but only when they come from
someone assumed to be in a position to control the accuracy of what
si said. The haxis of Ag. 477 that has a chance of being et?tymos
is simply the second-hand gossip that arises on the basis of as yet
unconfirmed reports; and at Pers. 131 Darius' tout' et?tymon} refers
to his own anxious inference from what the messenger has just said:
it may be true, but it cannot be truthful. The cloud of dust which
in and of itself tells of the approaching army at Sept. 82 is an etymos
are conceivably
angelo s 40; but the beacon signals of the Agamemnon
... al?theis (490-491), if true, they reflect the truth
par aliagas because,

36Used
to mean "really", "in fact" at Bum. 796, Suppl. 585 and 86
(panal?th?s) and Simonides 542,1 (text, p. 9). The usage may have originated
through shortening of a parenthetical &<; a)o)frw<; eitue?v or the like: "to speak
truthfully", "to tell the truth", hence "really", "actually". Cf. the interrogative
8Xr\fe? ("Really?") of Attic drama and adverbial atrekes at II. 5,208, Od. 16,245
and 167, where it seems to mean like "I exaggerate not"
Theognis simething
(said of a numerical figure [amphoter?, dekas, ondeisl that is likely to seem
too or too low; compare the use of w? etco? eixe?v [ouSe?c/tcocc] to mean
high
"almost", "practically", when such exaggeration is involved).
37 . .. ?XaMa a natural ex
Ag. 1547-1549 (alvov cppEv&v -tcovtqo-ei,) contains
tension of ?this meaning. Vhrenes are sincere (al?theis) when are in harmony
they
with what is said, as words are al?theis when are?knowingly?in
just they
harmony with -the facts. Cf. Pind. O. 2,92 (al?thei noo?).
38This
generalized meaning may already be present in Alcaeus 366/Z43
Lobel and Page (olvo? & (pikz -nm xal ?XadEa)?if the later writers (Schol. Plat.
Symp. 217e, Theocr. 29,1-2) to whom we owe our knowledge of the passage
were right in taking the meaning to be in vino veritas.
39Akribos oisth' at From. V. 328 is an additional
divergence from the truth
terminology of the other plays (see text, p. 25).
40Contrast the same
phrase at Iliad 22,438 and H. Dem. 46, where no
such limitation of meaning is involved.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
24 Th. Cole

fulness of the original sender and a faithful series of transmissions.

Helen's name was bestowed et?tymos (Ag. 682), without foreknow

ledge (unless the namer was a god) of its aptness; whereas that of

Epaphos (Suppl. 312) was given al?th?s?presumably by his mother,

in conscious reference to the touch of impregnation and release which

produced him. Even more conservative, or Homeric, is the syntax

of Aeschylean al?theia?always depending on a verb of saying, or
modifying or referring back to a word for speech, speaker or speech
...
act41. (Contrast, for et[?t]ymos, Ag. 1296 [et?tymos oisthd], Eum.
496 [etyma pathea] and Choeph. 948 [et?tymos Dios kord]).
It is only in Pindar and subsequent writers that the Homeric
system disappears completely. Al?th?s now indicates all kinds of
truth, with et- words confined to specific forms (e.g., adverbial ety
mos [Pindar and Bacchylides] or eteon
[Aristophanes]) speci and
fic meanings ("genuine"), or used sporadically and unpredicably for
reasons that are often unclear. The use of al?theia as the object of
verbs of perception (Pind. N. 7,25 [idemen]) or inquiry (Soph. Track.
91 [pythesthai]), or in contexts where it may be more than simply
a quality found in discourse (Pind. O. 7,68-69: teXe?tocoev S? X?ycov
xopucpod ?v akaftz?a TCTOiom, I. 2,10: p^ix' aka?tz?ac, (k-z??) ?cyx^toc
?ouvov) suggests that the word is coming to be associated with the

objective as well as the subjective half of the logos-ergon dichotomy.

One curious consequence of this generalization in meaning is
the (non-Aeschylean) use of atrekeia by itself, or of atrek?s as a modi
fier of al?theia, in situations where Homer would probably have had
a single al?th?s/al?thei?. Thus Pindar can suggest (N. 5,16-17) that

punctiliousness in telling exactly what happened (alathe? atrek?s) is

not always the more profitable (kerdi?n) policy (tactful silence is
often soph?taton), just as Athena (Od. 13,291) was able to congratu
late Odysseus for being kerdaleos beyond all his competitors because
of his skill in deceit (he had just been restrained by his polykerdea
noon [254] from speaking al?thea about his identity)42. At Pind.
O. 10,13 it is the privileged position of the goddess Punctiliousness
41Al?theis
opseis at Sept. 710 may be "true visions", but they can just
as well be "apparitions which speak truthfully".
42
The eta alatheia read or restored some scholars at I. 2,10
phrase by
(text) and N. 7,25 would be a parallel instance of al?theia with a modifier in
a context where Homer would have used the modifying word, or some
probably
cognate, by itself.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 25

(Atrekeia) at Locris which makes it especially important that Pindar

make amends the lapse of memory
for that late delivery of a prom
ised ode
might imply. Even more striking is the prominence of
atrek?s/atrekeia in Herodotus, where it seems to suggest both the
precision of Homeric atrekeia and the scrupulousness of Homeric
al?theia. The result is a frequency (40 per cent of all truth words)
higher than in any other author. This popularity proved to be short
lived, but only, one suspects, because the gap filled by atrek?s in
its expanded sense came to be taken care of in another way. In Attic
and all later prose the previously sporadic akrib?s (FVS 22B 101a
[Heraclitus], Aesch. Prom. V. 328 and the Hippocratic corpus)43 takes
over the function of Homeric atrek?s and al?th?s, a pair of words
whose sound as well as meaning it echoes 44.
In surveying the development sketched out in the preceding
pages one continues to be struck (cf. above, p. 8) by the absence,
well into the fifth century, of any extensive trace of al?theia in a
or primarily objective sense. And this raises the
purely naturally
question of whether and how far that particular usage was determined
by philosophical considerations?in
particular by tendency of the
Greek thinkers, beginning with Parmenides, to assume that the truly
real must display the same qualities as the content of strict and care
ful (al?th?s) discourse, and that such discourse is a better indication
of the nature of reality than observed facts and events. It is worth

noting that the earliest passage in which the extension of meaning

has clearly taken place is Parmenides' famous account (FVS 28B 7-8)
of journeying along a path which is simultaneously that of reality,
investigation and truth 45.The Pindaric examples quoted above (p. 24)

43 in early texts (Prom. V. 102, 488 and the

Compare the similar distribution
Hippocratic corpus) of what may well have been an unsuccessful of
competitor
akrib?s: skethros ("exact", "careful"). If derived from schein (see Frisk s.v.),
the word is semantically parallel to al?th?s: that which holds fast in the one
instance, that which does not let in (the other.
slip by
44The
similarity of sound may well have been sufficient to suggest to
Greek speakers an etymological link, though the real origin of the word remains
obscure.
45
Cf. Snell (above, n. 5), who seems to favor an affirmative answer to the

question (17) "...hat erst Parmenides den Wahrheitsbegriff geschaffen, der Sein
und Denken in eins setzte, indem er das ete?v und das ?Vnft?? in einen Begriff
verschr?nkte".

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
26 Th. Cole

are, by contrast, much more ambiguous, nor can the possibility of

Eleatic influence be excluded. In particular, the parallel between
P. 3,103:

s? S? v?w tic ?X?L . . .?Xai?z?ac, ?S?V...

and FVS 28B 2,1-4:

el 8' ay' ?yobv ?p?w, x?pi?om S? cb [xOdov ?xoucra?
oarap o S o i [xoOvai Si?^/jat?c ?10*1 v o f? o*a 1
?) [x?v otccoc; ?0*TLVte xa? ob? oux ?cm \ii] ??vai,
Iladou? ecti x?taudo? ('A X, tq3*e t rj y?p ?7rr)S??)

may well be more than

coincidental, given the completely unpre
cedented character of the way both passages speak of al?theia as a

pathway to be traveled in, or by, the mind46.

Such larger problems of interpretation, however, in so far as

they involve the period after 450 B. C, lie beyond the scope of the
present investigation. For the earlier period one is hampered by the
absence of any sizeable body of post-Homeric, pre-Aeschylean evid
ence, but one or two further suggestions may be in order. That

et(?t)ymosIetymos should give way to a more expressive, emphatic,

specific alternative is in accord with a general principle of linguistic
history47 and need cause no surprise when it occurs in Greek. Most

strikingly, perhaps, one can compare the history of what may well
be a cognate of etymos, English "sooth". The word has the same

preponderant position in Anglo-Saxon as does the root et- in Homer,

but in modern like etymos in later Greek, it is confined to
English,
isolated survivals. (Compare the oddly similar ways in which the
words continue to appear in two compounds a particular
designating
form of archaic discourse ["soothsaying"] and learned efforts to rec
over the content of archaic discourse in general [etymologia]). When
sooth gave way to truth it was displaced by a word which had orig

46With
akr\Mx? y?p ?it-nSet one may also compare I. 2,10 (?tju/ ?\aMa<;
aYX^^oc ?aivov). It is perhaps worth noting that all the Pindaric passages which
(allow an objective sense to al?theia (cf., in addition to those cited in the text,
O. 8,1 and 10,54) are from works which postdate the poet's Sicilian visit.
47 '
Cf. H. Frisk, 'Wahrheit' und 'Luge' in den indogermanischen Sprachen',
Kleine Schriften (= Studia Gothoburgensia 21, 1966) 17-18.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Archaic Truth 27

inally referred, like al?th?s, to a specifically human quality (reliabil

ity, loyalty: cf. German treu and Middle English "troth") often re
vealed in, but not confined to, discourse, and one which only later
came to designate the correctness of a statement (13th century) or

reality of a thing (14th-15th centuries)48.

That Englishmen should look for truth to someone who is loyal
and Greeks to someone keeps his mind
who on what he is about
should cause no surprise either. But something more specific than
ethnic stereotypes suggests itself as an explanation for the success
of al?theia over its two equally emphatic, equally expressive rivals.
In anage of intellectual inquiry and ferment, it might well have

designated a quality easier to come by than the dead certainty of

n?merteia and useful in a wider variety of situations than the exact
transmission of atrekeia. It was also a quality for the discovery of
whose presence rational criteria such as coherence and consistency
could be devised, criteria which would be especially important dur

ing a period when oral communication was beginning, in certain con

texts at any rate, to be challenged by written as the principal vehicle
for the transmission of truth. Unlike akriheia (cf. Arist. Rhet. 3,12,2
1413b8-9), al?theia never came to be felt as a characteristic excell
ence of written discourse, but it had been associated, from the be

ginning, with qualities of care, precision, order and coherence that

are more readily available and more easily verified in written than
in oral discourse; and as truth came increasingly to be measured in
terms of such qualities it would have been easy to identify the thing
measured with the measure: etymon with al?th?s m. Al?theia is, by
origin ?at any rate, sober, methodical, rational truth?first the pos
session of men alone, though later Muses (Hes. Theog. 28), oracles
(H. Herrn. 561), and eventually even gods (Soph. Phil. 993; Eur.
Hel. 1150) learn to speak it, diluting and partially transforming its
character in the process. Its linguistic success can be explained?

48 s.v.
See ?the entries in the OED, 'torue' and 'truth'.
49The first
prose writer in whom this identification is complete is Thucy
dides; and dt may be more than mere coincidence that he is also the first writer
to combine investigation of al?theia with a style and manner of presentation
that makes use of ?a certain range of inherent in written
complete possibilities
rather than oral discourse. See, for the latter, B. Gentili and G. Cerri, Le teorie
del discorso storico nel greco e la romana arcaica, Roma
pensiero storiografia
1975, 22-26.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
28 Th. Cole

approximately but, I think, truly?as yet another aspect of the gen

eral passage in Greek thought from oral, mythical and poetic to logi
cal and rational. To emphasize this connection is not necessarily to

downgrade the importance, during the period with which we have

been concerned, of more direct forms of cognition: revelation, the
non-verbal flash of awareness, the compelling "unhiddenness" of

things. It is merely to insist that, however important such phenom

ena may have been for the archaic Greek, they were not what he
had in mind when he spoke of al?theia 50.

Yale University

50
The}' loom large, for example, in D. Bremer's Licht und Dunkel in der
fr?h griechischen Dichtung, Interpretationen zur Vorgeschichte der Lichtmeta
physik (= Archiv f?r Be s
griff geschickte Suppl. 1, Bonn 1976); and the amount
of evidence assembled there is impressive, whether or not one accepts, as Bremer
does (p. 161, n. 144) the equation of al?th?s with "unhidden". Cf., also,
R. A. Prier, 'Sema and the Symbolic Nature of Pre-Socratic Thought', Quad.
Urb. 29, 1978, 91-101.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:10:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions