DSV Bibby Topaz Case Study &

Discussion of Lessons Learned

 Scope of Work
Water depth 91m, Weather;
Wind NW
Wind gusting up to 30 35 kts
Sig wave height 4.0m
Vessel set up west of template
2 x DGPS, 2 x HiPap, 1 x taut
wire online
3 Generators online, 5 out of 6
thrusters running & selected
onto DP
MOC conducted to enter
template via side
Venting annulus gas prior to
barrier testing
DSV Bibby Topaz Build 2008

5&6 4 3 2 1

Propulsion
2 x Main Propulsion , 2 x Retractable Azimuth, 2 x Tunnel
Thrusters
Time Line; 20.13
Dive 047, starboard
bell locked off
Bell located upstream
of template structure
Divers umbilical
length into template
27m from bell
Time Line; 20.49 to 22.09
Diver 1 & 2 located
inside drilling
template structure
carrying out barrier
testing activities
ROV monitoring
 Time Line; 22.09
Alarm for RBUS
activated
DP amber alert activated
Master & Dive Control
informed
Dive Supervisor
instructed divers to leave
structure and locate to
bell stage
Attempts made to
reselect thrusters into DP
Vessel Tracking
Vessel Tracking

Vessel heading and approximate

position between 22.09.30 and
22.13.00 (30 sec intervals)
 Time Line; 22.11
DP Red alert activated
Vessel drifting easterly,
all references & thrusters
unavailable to DP
4th generator started,
thruster 4 running Easterly Direction

Diver 1 & 2 locating onto

top of template
 Time Line; 22.11 22.12
Diver 2 umbilical
snagged on transponder
bucket located on side of
structure
Bellman pulling in diver 1 Easterly Direction
slack
 Time Line 22.12
Bellman providing slack Easterly Direction

to diver 1
Bellman attempting to
provide slack to diver 2
Diver 1 pulled off
template, returning to bell
Loss of comms to diver 2
Momentary loss of
comms to bell
 Time Line 22.13 to 22.15
Diver 2 umbilical severed
Diver 1 made way back to bell stage
OPM relocated from Dive Control to Bridge
Mode switch to manual thruster control
Port Taut Wire stowed (wire parted)
Downline and tugger parted
 Time Line 22.17
Vessel position 240m NE of Drilling Template
Vessel being manually driven using fwd and aft azimuths
Chief Officer on thrusters 2 & 3, Master on main propulsion thrusters 5 & 6
Diver 2 locator beacon identified at template
240m
 Time Line; 22.30 22.34
ROV back at Drilling Template
Diver 2 located on top of template
150m
DP controllers power recycled
Vessel back on full auto DP
 Time Line 22.38
Diver 1 left stage,
relocated onto
template
Recovery of Diver 2
commenced
 Time Line 22.40
Vessel back at Drilling
Template
Recovery of Diver 2
 Time Line 22.46
Investigation
Diver 2 recovered to
bell, unconscious &
breathing
23.13 Bell sealed and
left bottom
23.38 Bell locked on
24.00 commenced
transit to port
DP Control System Investigation
Determine the fault which caused sudden loss of all analogue and
digital RBUS input / output signals with subsequent loss of DP
control; resulting in vessel drift off
Testing on the system to try to recreate sequence of events &
method for provoking RBUS jamming developed
Test procedure developed for demonstrating fault mechanism
DP Control System Investigation
Components in DPC-3 cabinet exposed to earth faults changed out
as precaution & sent back to Kongsberg Maritime (KM), Norway for
factory inspection
KM supplied equip inspected & modified according to grounding
philosophy
KM disassembled hardware module by module to fully substantiate
root cause of the failure
DP system proving trials conducted
Vessel assurance approved, returned operational (8th Oct)
KM investigation concluded end November
KM Technical Bulletin issued DP-02/2012
Causal Factors
The investigation determined RBUS jammed as a result of a rare
sequence of events involving the combined effects of faults in one or
more RBUS I/O modules in the DPC-3 cabinet (one of 3 cabinets /
central processing units containing DP control system hardware).
Faults found included;
Loose / intermittent connections of fuse in DPC-3 cabinet
Grounding; current was measured in the bound from the RCU units
to ground.
Inner shield on field cables not connected to instrument earth.
DPC 3 cabinet not earthed to ship hull structure.
Preventative Actions
A permanent solution has been made available as a RBUS I/O
Modules (RMP20X) Firmware Update kit.
The kit consists of a CD and an installation & verification procedure
The watchdog functionality self-test function allowing unit to
recognise jamming fault (and provide diagnostic coverage for other
CPU faults).
Provides module isolation should any of these faults occur & is
capable of removing the unit from the network in case of similar
malfunction, ensuring that the inbuilt network redundancy can be
utilised
HSE Safety Notice
HSE issued Safety Notice - OSD 1-2013
Target suppliers of DP systems, operators of offshore installations,
marine type approval bodies, classification societies, verification
bodies and marine consultancies
Notice will focus on Duty Holders Safety Case and the verification
of performance and communication architecture of DP systems
Requirements that if the DP functions are dependent on a dual BUS
network the Offshore Installation Duty Holder should ensure that
appropriate measures are in place to prevent a single fault causing
failure of the dual BUS network.
If not in place manufacturer / suppliers provide adequate
information regarding vulnerability to single point failure
Lessons Learned / Summary TOR
A number of engagement sessions conducted with client base,
industry associations (IMCA, OGP DIWG, MSF)
The objective being to;
Present the incident and the investigation findings
Importantly to identify, from the lessons learned, where
potential improvements could be made to diving and marine
operations and to mitigate the likelihood and consequence of a
similar incident was to occur in the future.
IMCA Safety Notice 02/13 issued 29th Jan
Diving & Marine Safety Enhancement Project
Discussed with and endorsed by the HSE
Design of the bell staging to assist the recovery of unconscious
diver
The design of rescue equipment and method of recovery of
unconscious diver back to the bell
The design and provision of diver transponder / locator beacons
The design and provision of thermal protective undersuits
The specification of diver bailout bottles
The assessment and technology of diver re-breather units
Provision of addition life support equipment on the seabed for the
dive team
ROV interface to aid and assist diver recovery
Diving & Marine Safety Enhancement Project
Review of existing dive management system procedures and risk
assessment criteria
DP control system (software and hardware) inspection and
verification regime
DP field entry trials and set up to enable time for driving the vessel
in manual mode
Enhancement of the understanding and familiarity of manual
systems and operation
Bridge Team Management and the management of major
emergencies / command and control
Fully integrated approach to FMEA / FMECA and the schedule and
criteria for FMEA / FMECA review
Competency scheme performance criteria, training, drills and
exercises