BARREDO vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. L-17863, November 28, 1962)

FACTS:

On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims
with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first
publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the intestate
estate of Charles McDonough.

On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face
value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorneys fees against the said estate.
The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold
rights of McDnough The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all
annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of
the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid
title.

The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule
87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in
the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator argues that the one-month period
for filing late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular 6-month period.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the tardy claim will be allowed.

HELD:

No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A tardy
claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to
present said claim on time.

The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to
begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of
one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation
of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)

However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing
claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit
but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as
excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the
possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability,
and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the
mortgage embodying the instant claim,(as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the
Japanese military authorities.)

The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or
for an insufficient cause.
 BELAMALA vs. POLINAR
(G.R. No. L-24098, November 18, 1967)

FACTS:

On May 24, 1954, a complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed againts Mauricio Polinar, et al, in
the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol. Mauricio Polinar was convicted of the crime of serious
physical injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now
claimant herein, the amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of
P1,000.00 as moral damages. On June 18, 1956, Mauricio appealed and while the appeal of
said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died and that there was no
Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and said decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated on March 27, 1958 wherein said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956.
Mauricio Polinar is survived by his wife, Balbina Bongato and his children and the parties have
reserved to present in Court evidence on facts not agreed to herein by the parties.

ISSUES:

Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
civil liability?

HELD:

The Supreme Court see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view
of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below,
Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Assuming that for lack of express
reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with
the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. Such claim
in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the obligation to indemnify
upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter acquired their decedents obligations
only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of
the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate.

Judgment reversed and set aside. No Cost.

 DE VILLANUEVA vs. PNB
(G.R. No. L-18403, September 30, 1961)

FACTS:

For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual Villanueva, the widow
Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for hearing and Notice thereof
was published on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the Manila Daily Bulletin. At the hearing,
other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under administration opposed the
appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte, suggested and all the parties
agreed. After the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his
duties. The defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank filed in the administration proceedings,
Creditor of Pascual Villanueva, deceased, respectfully presents its claim against the estate of
the said deceased.

The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. The appellant PNB,
on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the claim presented by
the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time within which to
File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the
Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon
cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to present the claiming with the
period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings, for while
said maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not come to know of the
proceedings, the notice has been published in the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited
circulation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the question is already barred.

HELD:

The claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court, within
which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed or about 1 year
and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did not know of such
administration proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan.
It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were
duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full
compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of
the proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees had been belied by uncontested
and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by the administrator of
the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period
within which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but
such extension should be granted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any
justifiable reason to give the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the
same had elapsed.

WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed.

 GERONA vs. DE GUZMAN
(G.R. No. L-19060, May 29, 1964)

FACTS:

Petitioners herein, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida
de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo
de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de
Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children.

That Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945 and on May 6, 1948, respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased. Although they
well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs respondents succeeded fraudulently in
causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said
deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name,
in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each. Such fraud was discovered by the
petitioners only the year before the institution of the case. They demanded from respondents
their share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon.

The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra- judicial
settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in
litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to them their aforementioned share. The trial
court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first
marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife and that petitioners' action
has already prescribed, Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not
subject to the statute of limitations of action.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner contention is tenable.

HELD:

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among
co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases; from the
moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement"

upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefore may be filed within four
(4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the
case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and
new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of
the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
 SIKAT vs. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA
(G.R. No. L-35925, November 10, 1932)

FACTS:

Ricardo Sikat filed a complaint, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P.
Villanueva, against Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate
of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on claims and appraisal in the
intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late
Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial administratrix,
be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from July 15, 1919
until fully paid, and the costs.

In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set
up a special defense of prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the
estate of Mariano P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for
judgment absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount
with interest and costs.

The plaintiff, Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action as judicial administrator of the estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva, however questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Albay
over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and upon appeal the
Supreme Court decided that said Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the said intestate proceedings. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court holding the Court
of First Instance of Albay incompetent to take cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the
estate of Pedro Villanueva, these proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila through the application of Enrique Kare, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate
of Mariano P. Villanueva upon the ground that when Pedro Villanueva died he owed the estate
of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of P10,192.92, with legal interest from June 15, 1919.

After the Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva,
administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas as
commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal, Enrique Kare, as
administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filed his claim with the committee on
September 22, 1925, and that the same claim appears in the present complaint. The said
committee on claims and appraisal, composed of Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas, admitted
the claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filing their report with the
court accordingly.

ISSUES:

Whether at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate to
collect the credit against him has already prescribed.

HELD:

The court decided the question in the affirmative, citing section 49 of the aforecited Act No. 190.
This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190, "means
an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to this definition, the
proceeding here in question is not an action but a special proceeding, which, according to the
same section, is any other remedy provided by law. The very reference in section 49 to actions
brought against debtors before their death clearly means ordinary actions and not special
proceedings.

In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs. Manarang,
this court laid down the following doctrine: The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which
claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased person and the early delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.

It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons entitled to be appointed
administrators or to apply for the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in that
direction, and since no administrator or committee on claims and appraisal has been appointed
to fix the time for filing claims, the right of the plaintiff, as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's
estate, to present the latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate could not prescribe.

The plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, was guilty of laches in not
instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila
until after the lapse of three years after this court had set aside the intestate proceedings begun
in the Court of First Instance of Albay for lack of jurisdiction over the place where the decedent
had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to June 18,1925.

Taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of estates, and the
fact that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro
Villanueva's death, and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's
estate in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it,
which was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction,
the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same proceedings in
the competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until after three years had elapsed,
and applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy, we declare
the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to permit a
creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense.