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PALS Bar Ops Pilipinas Must Read Cases CRIMINAL 2015
PALS Bar Ops Pilipinas Must Read Cases CRIMINAL 2015
BOOK I
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and
potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having
actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the
other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that
of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in
order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction
(Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded
upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are
detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality
is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . .
That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral
disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid.,
P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view
in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the
accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the
"actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's
four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt
of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner
should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the
aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could
be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On
the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently
immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these
crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.
Proximate Cause
3. People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is
found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical
injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is
the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Impossible Crimes
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime
ofqualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be
denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.
Stages of Execution
6. People of the Philippines v. Malisce, G.R. No. 190912. January 12, 2015
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The
essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: a) The offender commences the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts; b) He does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony; c) The offender's act be not stopped by his
own spontaneous desistance.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder.
Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally
liable for attempted murder.
Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
10. Ramie Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 149988, August 14, 2009
Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not fatal and absent a
showing that such wounds would have certainly caused his death were it not for timely
medical assistance, we declare the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted
homicide.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was
established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door
when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush),
and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts
are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of
attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct
participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of
purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals
by direct participation.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing the door
facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The
sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of
appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend
themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this
qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already
killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because
while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to
rob the pawnshop.
It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot
be prepared and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of
the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the
defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated. Thus, petitioners acts
in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the
consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Continuing Crime
18. People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft
and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal
impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The
taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two
roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of
theft.
20. Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994
The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and
those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They
were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of
commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated
ondifferent occasions, and caused injury to different parties.
In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical
injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person who creates in anothers mind an
immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for
whatever the other person may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from
a window of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she suffered
serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which required medical attention
and surgery for more than ninety days. This being the case, the court a quo correctly
convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime of rape with serious physical
injuries.
An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this case, other than the
self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no evidence sufficiently clear and convincing
that the victim indeed attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime Maquiling
and Francisco Austerowho admittedly were among those whom Danny and Bingky had
an encounter with on the night of August 19, 2001, never said in their testimonies that
Romeo attacked Danny and a bladed weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical
that Romeo was not with them during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not
refuted by the defense. Even Bingky who claimed to be a friend of Romeowas not able to
identify the latter as one of those present at the time. Candid enough, Bingky declared
that it was only a certain Ago and Jaime who confronted Danny. Resultantly, Danny
failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, the most indispensable
element of self-defense. Where no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack
with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack
that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong
(like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a
motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening
attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of Joseph
because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an egg. According
to the trial court, the fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively belied the allegation of
Ronald that he was prompted to retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first hacked and hit
him on his neck. The trial court further pointed out that if Joseph indeed hacked Ronald
on the neck, "it is surprising that the latter did not suffer any injury when according to
them (Ronald, Rolando and Flora Credo), Joseph was running fast and made a hard thrust
on Ronald, hitting the latters neck."
- State of Necessity
32. Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared
should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful
inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about
by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
-Fulfillment of Duty
33. Cabanlig v. Sandiganabayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005
Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than the bamboo
lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The policeman in People
v. Delima was held to have been justified in shooting to death the escaping fugitive
because the policeman was merely performing his duty.
In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when
Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape.
The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was
absolutely necessary to prevent his escape.[22] But Valino was not only an escaping
detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the
duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing
Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of
the policemen in grave danger.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom --
and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have
pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her
life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from
BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered
person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount
to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending danger (based on the
conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of
deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of
BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances.
Exempting Circumstances
- Insanity
37. People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the
act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if
the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and
perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his
or her acts.
- Minority
38. Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years
of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with
discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony
either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality
of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is
the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The
prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of
physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission
of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and
shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim
behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not
be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who
shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the
prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being
arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him
into custody.
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had
been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of
Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However,
accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: Sec. 51.
Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.
A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
- Accident
42. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because
the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-
defense in the realm of criminal law.
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies
a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of
action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on
necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of
the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right
begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact,
injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the
accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and
civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption
in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The
accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a
crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the
person to whom it happens.
Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The
essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: 1. A person is performing a
lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4.
Without fault or intention of causing it. By no stretch of imagination could playing with
or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this
ground alone, appellants defense of accident must be struck down because he was
performing an unlawful act during the incident.
Mitigating Circumstances
-Praeter Intentionem
44. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by
the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting
upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating
suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son,
Noemar, is thus clear.
- Sufficient Provocation
46. Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009
Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to
avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when
petitioners lucky punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused
police officer shot and killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words,
the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on
the part of the offended party immediately preceding the shooting. The Court had the
same attitude in Navarro v. Court of Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who
killed a man after the latter challenged him to a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason
why the same mitigating circumstance should not be considered in favor of petitioner.
- Passion/Obfuscation
47. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003
The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion
and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or
motive. In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a
grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation
also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of
two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the
killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
48. People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159. March 18, 2015
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation,
the accused must be able to prove the following elements: 1. that there be an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which
produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate
mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are
based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.
From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the
same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate
mitigating circumstances.
-Voluntary Surrender
50. People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001
The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt,
or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and capture
would require. Going to the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of
appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities
Aggravating Circumstances
52. People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the
simple reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. "Night-
time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the
offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the
crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture." In the case at
bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to
perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.
"The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be
appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance." Here, treachery qualified
the offense to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered
as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the
victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood. In fact, the accused mistook
the victim for a man.
- Recidivism
53. People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000
On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the trial court properly appreciated the
same though not alleged in the information. Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code
defines a recidivist as "one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this
Code." To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to
attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. Nonetheless,
the trial court may still give such aggravating circumstance credence if the accused does
not object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.
-Reiteracion
54. People v. Cajara, G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000
The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10,
of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated murder in
1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of
firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to
imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon
by the President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under
Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished
for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by
law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter
penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and
the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.Where the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.
- Treachery
55. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the
victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated
since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on
the lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply
leaving the place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when
the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of
the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in
the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended
stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind
him. Thus, the trial courts finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery
when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.
Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person
illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death, treachery exists.
In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the exact manner of the
killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately after hearing a gunshot, he could not,
and in fact did not, testify as to how the attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant
was standing behind some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself sufficiently
establish that the method of execution gave the latter no opportunity for self-defense. Nor
was the attack deliberately and consciously adopted by the former without danger to
himself.
- Ignominy
59. People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990
Alternative Circumstances
60. People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010
Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must
likewise prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission
of the crime, as would blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear
and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication on the night of December 8, 2001
and that the amount of liquor he had taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental
faculties. Not one of accused-appellants drinking buddies testified that they, in fact,
consumed eight bottles of gin prior to the rape incident.
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed. In People v. Sanchez, et al., the
Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime
scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the
principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-
conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was
rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. The same finding must be applied to the
case at bar.
Accomplice
63. People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the
rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between
Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to
Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink
beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the
knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should
not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a
principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation
by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was
both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already
had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated
the act even without Idas consent.
Accessories
64. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as
an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty
applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55,
and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60
thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is
rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such
robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because
of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of
the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and
theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612.
However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes aprincipal in
the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand,
and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses.
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or
object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known
that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for
himself or for another. evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration
and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been
carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make
good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the
Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado
who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.
IV. PENALTIES
66. People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007
It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail themselves of parole if
their appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply for executive clemency and ask for the
commutation of their reclusion perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons convicted
of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment. In several cases, we have
considered the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply to
persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty.
Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer
form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of
appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from
two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court
of Appeals, but instead,prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-
standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and
other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our
reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe
that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence,
as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" isprision mayor.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of
the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares,
102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty
and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the
"imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve
more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty
years.
As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term
fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in
this limited sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the
case of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is
taken from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within the prescribed
penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is taken from prisin mayor which
is the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed
by the dissent.
In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the
prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years
of reclusin temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere
within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated
general rule.
- Subsidiary Imprisonment
71. Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004
This Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001 that
there is no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine.
This should finally dispel the petitioners' importunate claim that the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment in this case is improper.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving
the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral
record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses
whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum
terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the
law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions of the
Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted.
In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code and the
special laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the application and
non-application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition
(Art. 139) or espionage (Art. 117).
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same.
(People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused
cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based
upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which
may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No.
00452-CR, January 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental,
and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all
criminal offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws,
with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the
legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed
mandatory.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. "It must be
emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
- Probation Law
76. Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal,
their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is
what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
Petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for
probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not
file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in
the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he
attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction.
Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a
penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime,
which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted
homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced
penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the
chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose
of the probation law.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty
which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not
specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This
omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat
probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.
80. Bala v Judge Jimenez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29, 1990
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so
that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period
of one year is of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed
earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty
of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment
because an order placing the defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence," but is in effect
12
a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. It is not a final judgment but an
"interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final
judgment if the conditions are violated."
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1,
Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a
particular act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an
answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen the period
fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The waiver
or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law.
Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday,
the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has
automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on
the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents
the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from
the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the
absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
84. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling
the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia
v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to
other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan
pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that, is applicable
to ordinances and their prescription period.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of
the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first
paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for
which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under
3
Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses
of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
xxxx
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him. x x x.
BOOK II
- Piracy
90. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in
Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of
piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere
other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of
seizing their boat.
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers,
the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before
the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him, he
and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September
29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store
of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson
Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his residence certificate and
barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to
his residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center
of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked
him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction
of the detachment headquarters.
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of
arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father,
Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of
accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-
appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay clearance of
Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence, which has no
probative value. In summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accused-
appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the arrest without a
warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an essential
precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or actually have been committed
first.
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and his
relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such detention
order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the
unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of
liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful
detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment
by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.
- Expulsion
94. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778
The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them
over to other parties and deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of
freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. There is no law
expressly authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new domicile against their will
and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compel any person to change his residence.
If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and
mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not,
by and of itself, suffice.
Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it
was committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing,
robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation,
the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and
the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex
crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. The
individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion, as it
would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.
- Sedition
98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686
The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common offenses of murder etc.
as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Where the acts of violence were
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of
sedition.
-Inciting to Sedition
99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons
("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to
produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to
the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen may criticize
his government and government officials and submit his criticism to the "free trade of
ideas" but such criticism should be specific and constructive, specifying particular
objectionable actuations of the government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.
When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any information for
illegal possession of firearms should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm
would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d etat and conversely, when the other offense
involved is not one of those enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The constitutional bar against
double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from one another,
with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.
R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. The use
of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance: Provided, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm
is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed
in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that
imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty
for the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of
which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d etat, such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted
coup d etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the
violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
- Direct Assault
101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453
The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a
public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is not
actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the
existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling
motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a mutual
agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place would be
unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all
sense of loyalty and fair play.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from
the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be
said to have escaped therefrom.
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity in the SALN involves merely a description of such
relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the
other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity
of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on
succession. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners
assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and
thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to
disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore
qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship
have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the position but pertains rather to
prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.
Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives
in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an
untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal
mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their
mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes
for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, it was held that one is
guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if
he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment
and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s
in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification
considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong
would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article
168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the
falsification and malversation are separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer,
as the custodian of the money forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected
payments to his co-accused for construction materials supposedly delivered to the
province for various projects when in fact no such materials were delivered, and to
camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused used six vouchers which had
genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were
intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not complex but separate crimes of
falsification and malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting
one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a
private individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioners (1)
counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to
appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear
that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so
participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general,
documents or instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions." Promissory notes facilitate credit
transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money
for convenience in business transactions. A cashiers check necessarily facilitates
bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear
thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.
-Usurpation
109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecutions
theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to
transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the
official functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested
with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest
products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also
exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport
were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the
DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as
municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The
records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false
pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to
obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court.
111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657
The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or
good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a
regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing
that the property is under appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision,
referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it
is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut
in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as
well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
As this Court held in People v. Berdadero,[27] the foregoing provision, as well as the
Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of
the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to
conducting a buy-bust operation x x x. [T]his silence cannot be interpreted as a legislative
intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.[28] In the case at bar, even if we assume for the
sake of argument that Narciso Sabadlab and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y
Narciso alias Bong Pango could have been different persons, the established fact remains
that it was accused-appellant who was caught in flagrante delicto by the buy-bust team.
Following the aforementioned jurisprudence, even the lack of participation of PDEA
would not make accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence obtained pursuant
thereto inadmissible. Neither is prior surveillance a necessity for the validity of the buy-
bust operation.
It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized from
an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest
does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court
explained that "marking" of the seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation"
may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is
done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that
what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to
work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to
Malaysia and had to use her sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first
recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia
previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita
had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can
exist even with the victims consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to
become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under
RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed
through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform
penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for
malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves
the mode of commission of the offense.
This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or
property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or
property and that he could not account for them, or did not have them in his possession
and could not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public
officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which
he has not been able to satisfactorily explain.
In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by the prosecution,
petitioners retaliation against the BIR for not promoting him clearly does not constitute a
satisfactory or reasonable explanation for his failure to account for the missing amount.
-Technical Malversation
124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991
In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own
personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter's personal
use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his
administration not for his or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for
which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the
crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than
private person to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term party is a technical word having a precise meaning in
legal parlance as distinguished from person which, in general usage, refers to a human
being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a
private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public
officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail
and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to
Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with
murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019,
Adalim was a private party.
Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic terms and
conditions in the submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired the PBAC, recommended
the approval of APIs proposal just forty-five (45) days after the last publication of the
invitation for comparative proposals, and subsequently requested the SB to pass a
resolution authorizing him to enter into a MOA with API as the lone bidder for the
project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the construction, terms and conditions
of the parties obligations, were laid down at the time API was already awarded the
project. Even the MOA provisions remain vague as to the parameters of the project,
which the Sandiganbayan found as placing API at an arbitrary position where it can do as
it pleases without being accountable to the municipality in any way whatsoever. True
enough, when API failed to execute the construction works and abandoned the project,
the municipality found itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance
security that API likewise failed to submit.
In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing the duties
primarily vested in him by law, resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The
good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will only be appreciated if they, with
trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom the duty is primarily
lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established.
The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done
without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the palm
leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to private
complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private
property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste
disposal site.
As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the
Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public
officers and private persons: x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g)
of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as
defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the
announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of
certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices
act or which may lead thereto.
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of
overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit teams
conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the
following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle
actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished
by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team
purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5)
documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City. These documents
were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused
relative to Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of
the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers
of Paraaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners
and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the
Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the
barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the
allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in
1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were
disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been
made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public
official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
-Anti-Plunder Act
133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special
law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance
against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse
of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a
person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after
the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor
declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar
the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death Certificate was also
presented in evidence.
Murder
138. People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2)
the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither
constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
Homicide
141. Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent to take his
victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.
Anti-Hazing Law
143. Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple
obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of
initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally
criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the
law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on
the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio
pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against
the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there
being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the
contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law
prohibiting hazing.
Unintentional Abortion
144. People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion
because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then
strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been
sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate
strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an
abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not
necessarily to cause an abortion.
Mutilation
145. Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation
under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a
castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts
alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e.,
[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive
organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre,
however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the
crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to
the intentions of the framers of our penal code.
Rape
147. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration
of the female organ because although the offender has commenced the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was performed.
This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that
force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, as alleged in the
Information. Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape cases
is relative; it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows
the offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the appellant employed that amount
of force sufficient to consummate rape. In fact, the medical findings confirmed AAAs
non-virgin state.
Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal
Code, and was properly sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the
circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged
in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not
qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with
homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.
160. People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011
Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was
not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show
that Glodil sustained any injury, cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for
kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or
treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even
more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above,
leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the
freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of
liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of
the abductor. It remains undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that
he did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so happened that
the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran
away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read
the signboards of the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to
his place of residence.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty,
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment
of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever
length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of
confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.
In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go
with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be
allowed to go home, he refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was
inside the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people outside could
not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant tied the hands of Jomarie, the
formers intention to deprive Jomarie of her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her
tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was then and there
deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a
situation. It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more or
less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go home.
162. People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This
is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A.
No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was
raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not
have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by
forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was
only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct
and separate count of rape.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody
of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or
only for a couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time,
physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a
minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that the second
element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.
Grave Threats
164. Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be
accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling incident which transpired earlier
between petitioner and Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person which constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
165. Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation
to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the
person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material
violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the
mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the
facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged
that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged
that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the
part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition
of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated
by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the
guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to
mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere
padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was
intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim,
31
which is the primary element of kidnapping. Appellant's apparent intention was to take
Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not
show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an
actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup."
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same
code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended
party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to
do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the
exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he
took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for
preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the
other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with
intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then,
conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing
himself the owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and
to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The
motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the
present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the
law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus
furandi was lacking.
Unjust Vexation
168. Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof
taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was
nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party
be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private
complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the
overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao
from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the
business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21, 1997.
170. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995
Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
16
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants.
However, these circumstances were not specifically alleged in the information as required
under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch
as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have attended the
commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on
them.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that
the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide. When homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be
held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the same. If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide
after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with
homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as
principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who
joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no
longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.
Theft
178. Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment
due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with
the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the
remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares.
He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the
construction contract.
Qualified theft
179. Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308
and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the
said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be
done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecutions evidence proved, through
the prosecutions eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioners instruction, several pieces of
wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in
November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager,
repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the authority and
consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.
Anti-Carnapping Law
181. People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of
the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the
benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent
constitutes gain.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the
registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this, the
prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the
Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and
Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their unexplained
possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of
the tricycle.
The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased
was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of
unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the
person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply
required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of
the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of
personal property from another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation,
with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to
the offender.
Estafa
185. Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013
When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under paragraph 1(b) and yet
what was proven was estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what
determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual
recital of facts stated in the information and not the caption of the information. The
information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa
under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental
principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a
single offense has multiple modes of commission.
188. Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013
Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere filing of a formal
charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted
to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify
respondents termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the
accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which allegations remain
uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers
do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees. The other bits of
evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.
BP 22
191. People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received
the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed
received the notice of dishonor of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was
sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that
presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscals office
without any confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through registered mail
was actually received by appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty
of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellants right to procedural due
process. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that
the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving receipt of
notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for conviction
in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
193. Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable
before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party
or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a
dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.
The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the drawer or maker of
the check gives the latter the option to prevent criminal prosecution if he pays the holder
of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the check
has not been paid.
The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90
days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to
make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That
the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of
the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds
in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after
its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss
caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than
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six (6) months, or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days
after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could
still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he
would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the
said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact
but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof.
There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency
of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And
despite petitioners insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent courts
affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
- Other Deceits
198. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005
For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the prosecution must
prove the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other
than those in the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a
result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[40] It is essential that such false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the
private complainant to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in
Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that
purpose with its broad scope and intendment.
-Arson
199. People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes
was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de
rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson,
the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other
hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice,
when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact
the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing,
then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.
- Malicious Mischief
202. Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of
the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The
version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the
CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's version that it
was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara
considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and
dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would
be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational
pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just
giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private
complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief.
204. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November 29, 1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction,
namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12)
and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the
two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be
with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away
of the offended party must be with lewd designs while Qualified Seduction requires that:
(1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the
offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
- Acts of Lasciviousness
205. Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation be irresistible. It
being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the
free exercise of the will of the offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a
windowless room together with her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a
grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint, what more the hapless
victim who was only 15 years old when she was subjected to such atrocity.
Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing
her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while
admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any
showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants
sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said
crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it
is done (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age;
and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.
207. People v Bonaagua , G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011
Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest
penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia
majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an
act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered
as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts
of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could
not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her
private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the
victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what
specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle
that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement
cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.
-Forcible Abduction
208. People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is
with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is
unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken
against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-
appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to
physically resist considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have
been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show
that the taking was against her will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute
the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering
that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the
purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the
taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds.
Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was
effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible
abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan
Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective
became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted
from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes
due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in having
carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly
committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by
reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women
subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse
his amorous advances. Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work
Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or
employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor
from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission
is accepted by the latter. It is committed when the sexual favor is made as a condition in
the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.
In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present,
respondent being the person who recommended complainant to her present position,
complainant has failed to prove the alleged sexual advances by evidence other than her
bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or omissions operate to
cast doubt on her claim.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on
10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with
Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006
or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or
subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity.
Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention
that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia
at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity
of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
215. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before
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the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts
finding that the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends to
induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of
Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his
dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or
somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondents integrity.
Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its
ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity and
reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as
it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our
considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on
private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign
and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient description or
other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that "Miss S"
and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.
Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication
without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the
writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person
who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in the publication of
the offending article is not required.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear
on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the
same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which
the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in
the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his
responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not
liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor
or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management,
conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the
publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or
manager to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that said person cannot
evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is immaterial
whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the publication.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs
of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first
access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first
publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC
sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos
that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone
who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the
private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
- Slander
222. Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006
Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase Fuck You, which is
similar to the expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression was
not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People, where the Court said that: This is a common
enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer,
that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact
that there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioners act of
pointing a dirty finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing
from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner
"to express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his
leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon
complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall bearresto
menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00.
We opt to impose a fine following Mari.
Criminal Negligence
225. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity
to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x
on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as
opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes