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Personal Details

Principal Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Professor, Department of Philosophy,


Investigator University of Hyderabad
Paper Coordinator Prof. Bijoy H. Boruah Professor Department of Humanities and
Social Studies, Indian Institute of
Technology, New Delhi
Content Writer Dr. Kavita Chauhan Department of Philosophy, University of
Hyderabad, Hyderabad
Content Reviewer Prof. Pradeep Gokhale Department of Philosophy, Central
University of Buddhist Studies, Sarnath,
Varanasi.
Language Editor Udaya B. L. Freelance editor, Bangaluru

Description of Module

Subject name Philosophy


Paper Name Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics
Module Name/Title Cognition of Art: In Abhinavaguptas Abhinavanbhrti
Module Id 14.27
Prerequisites Rasa Theory
Objectives Understanding of various cannons of Indian literary art
Key words ekaghanat, carva, samvidvirnti, sthybhvas, malas,
mnasapratyaka
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Cognition of Art: In Abhinavaguptas Abhinavanbhrti

We visit a museum, art-gallery, musical concert, theatre and so on, with the hope that these places will
give us solace from the boredom of everyday life. This is because there is something special in the
cognition of art which is not found in ordinary cognition of things around us. What, then, is special in
the cognition of art and how is it different from ordinary cognition? These are the questions that need
to be examined.

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This module explores the cognitive experience of art enumerated by Abhinavagupta (10 Century AD)
in his treatise Abhinavabhrti, which is a profound commentary on Bharatas Ntyastra. Ntyastra
deals mainly with theatrical arts as drama was taken as the basis by the classical aestheticians. Hence,
this paper largely deals with it, though the points made apply generally to all art forms.

There are two aspects of the cognition of art; first, art experience is possible only when the appreciator
experiences an art-object. It is a direct experience. In the context of drama, Abhinavagupta says that
drama exists only during the time of performance. Hence, rasa experience is possible only during the

time of performance, neither before the performance nor after it (samanyabhineyakalapramanatvam).1


Second, the cognition of art cannot be considered as right or wrong cognition. It is beyond truth and
falsity. The uniqueness of the cognition of art is that it leads to pleasurable experience. Also, this
pleasure experience, according to Abhinavagupta, is not ordinary (laukika); rather, it is extraordinary
(alaukika). Keeping in mind the enjoyable aspect of art, we will see how the cognition of art lies in
transcendental or extra-ordinary bliss. Let us first discuss rasa experience according to Abhinavagupta,
before we discuss his views on artistic cognition.

Abhinavagupta maintains that it is rasa that provides the most adequate explanation of aesthetic
pleasure. During the rasa experience, spectators forget everything including themselves. With single-
minded concentration, they immerse themselves solely in rasa, and
Experience the disappearance of material desires. This experience is not ordinary in nature. Abhinavagupta
holds that when the characters are presented in a poem or in a play, they lose their individual identities by
crossing the limits of time and space. A responsive reader or sahrdaya has been endowed with certain
innate vsans or instincts, which are called sthybhvas. With the vivid representation of the vibhvas,
anubhvas and vyabhicribhvas, this vsan or instinct is realised in a universal form which is
accompanied by thrill and joy. Sthybhvas themselves are not enjoyed unless they are roused by the
vibhvas etc. in their universalised form and become the object of experience.

1Abhinavabhrati of Abhinavagupta, ed. Dr. Nagendra, Delhi University, 1973, p. 75


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Just as the taste of a drink prepared with sugar-candy and pepper etc., is different from the taste of those
ingredients separately eaten, so also the relish of ratidi associated with the vibhvas is different from
individual taste.Abhinavagupta maintains that on reading a poem or watching a play, the permanent
mood or sthybhva is evoked by the representation of vibhvas. The ordinary causes like garden,
glances etc., when depicted on stage, transcend the plane of empirical causality. He writes: Rasa, in
this connection, is just that reality (artha) by which the determinants, the consequents and the transitory
feelings after having reached a perfect combination (samyogyoga), relation (sambandha), conspiration
(aikgrya)in the mind of the spectator, make the matter of a gustation consisting of a form of

consciousness free of obstacle and different from the ordinary ones.2

Hence, when vibhvas etc., attain a unity in the minds of the spectator, they create the state of relish
which is extra-worldly in character. Abhinavagupta gives reasons why aesthetic experience is not
ordinary. He says that determinants etc., are not the material causes (kraka-hetus) of the production
(nipatti) of rasa; otherwise, rasa would arise even in the absence of their cognition; effect may
continue in the absence of the cause. Also, if vibhvas etc., are the causes of cognition (japti), they
would have to be included among the means of knowledge (pramna); but this is not possible since
rasa is not an objective thing (siddha), which could function as knowledge-object. The object of
knowledge (prameya like ghaa) exists independent of cognition, which is not true of rasa experience.
Rasa experience is the continuous process of tasting of rasa, unlike the object of cognition. It is aroused
solely by the combination of the determinants etc., which are of extraordinary character, differing from
memory and ordinary means of cognition.

Hence, rasa is not an object of cognition; it consists solely in its relish and not in comprehension.
Abhinanvagupta has stressed over and over that there is not a direct correspondence between krana
and vibhva, or between krya and anubhva, for one refers to the world and other to the art. Ordinary

means of knowledge play no role in rasa.3

Abhinanvagupta states clearly that the nature of aesthetic experience is cognitive in the sense of
constant process of relish, not something which exists beyond contemplation. Aesthetic experience
is different from ordinary knowledge; it is a type of perception which results in a delightful feeling
and consisting of a tasting.

2Gnoli, R, The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi,
1968, p78

3 Masson J.L. and Patwardhan, ntarasa and Abhinavaguptas Philosophy of Aesthetics, Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1985, p.48
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.this perception is apt to become the object of a relish, and, as such, it is neither a form of ordinary
cognition, nor it is erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary perception, nor does it consist of a super-

imposition.4
Aesthetic experience cannot be equated with the right cognition, since right cognition is defined as that
which reveals the attributes possessed by the object. It cannot be wrong cognition as well, since wrong
cognition is that which reveals attributes not possessed by the object: for example, knowledge of silver

in a conch-shell.5 Furthermore, it is not the case that aesthetic experience is indescribable.

riankuka, a predecessor of Abhinavagupta, had already established at great length in his discussions
that aesthetic experience does not come under any doubtful or false cognitive category. According to
him, it is a different kind of cognition. It is neither like the actor himself is happy, nor Rma is happy,
nor is this Rma or not, nor this is similar to Rma.Instead of these four kinds of cognitions, namely
samyak (valid), mithy(error), saaya (doubt) and sdya (similarity), rasa experience is like
observing a horse in a picture (citr-turaga-nyya). It cannot be said of a painted horse that it is not a horse
because it is the picture of a horse, not of a mule; but at the same time it cannot be said that it is a horse
Because it is not a real horse grazing the grass. Therefore, of an aesthetic experience during watching a
play on Rma, it is appropriate to say thatthis is that Rma who was happy.

Thus, aesthetic experience is neither valid, nor erroneous, nor doubtful, nor a matter of similitude. It rather
takes the form: This (actor) is really that (Rma) and also this (actor) is not really that (Rma) The
apprehension that the spectator gets is one unified, coherent experience, and cannot be challenged by the

canons of logic. 6

The process of Contemplation


The cognition of art is unique in the sense of relish which is of the nature of extraordinary bliss. The
pleasure derived from the contemplation of an artwork is known as carva. Abhinavagupta uses the term
carva in the sense of tasting and hence enjoying of rasa. The literal meaning of carva is to chew, and
ordinarily it is used in the sense of chewing of cud by a cow. Similarly a sahdaya contemplates art and
enjoys.

4Gnoli, R, The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi,
1968, p61
5Tarka-Samgraha of Annambhatta, translation of the text by Mahadev Rajaram Bodas, Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute, Poona, 1988, p28.

6Walimbe, Y.S., Abhinavagupta on Indian Aesthetics, Ajanta Publications, 1980, p23.


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Abhinavagupta further elaborates the process of contemplation by calling it mental perception


(mnasapratyaka). Aesthetic experience is a direct experience of the mind, or it is perceived through
the inner mental faculty (mnas sktkrtmik). Such a perception is self- knowing
(svasamvedanasiddha). In order to have aesthetic experience the mind should be calm and concentrated,

just as tasting good food requires mental absorption in the food tasted to the exclusion of all else.7

Further, this state of mind is called ekaghanat (compactness) without which carva is not
possible. Ekaghanat or compactness is a psychological state in which the subject becomes totally one
with the object of contemplation, so that there remains no room for any other desire. If one is not totally
absorbed and finds no rest in the object of contemplation, it is not a state of compactness and hence
cannot lead to the tasting of rasa. When we are relishing an artistic creation, we forget our day-to-day
mundane activities such as our social appointments, personal responsibilities, and family problems etc.
which are done in the dimensions of time and space, whereas in aesthetic experience these dimensions
disappear temporarily, giving rise to undisturbed enjoyment.
Abhinavagupta maintains that aesthetic experience is like the blossoming of a magic flower.
It is an experience of the present moment, which does not extend into past or future, which is why it is
a highly concentrated and intense experience. Hence, during aesthetic experience the mind, which is the
organ of tasting rasa, needs to be free from all obstacles. Such a state of mind is known as
samvidvirnti. According to Abhinavagupta, visrntiis a state of complete absorption in the aesthetic

experience. To him it is a joy that keeps away from all worries and sorrows of the world8. Happiness is
nothing but the complete rest or repose of the mind, whereas, pain is the absence of complete repose.

The basis of samvidvirnti can be traced back to the metaphysics of Kashmir aivism. The
objective world is a manifestation of the Absolute Will. This Will, however, is nothing but the Vimara
or Praka. Vimara is characterised by freedom (svtantrya). Svtantrya is the perfect independence
from anything external to it. It is the freedom to manifest what lies potentially within it or to bring back
to a state of potentiality what has been actually manifested. This freedom is the essential nature of the
Absolute. Praka stands for the pure, changeless witness aspect of the universal consciousness. The
individual does not realise ones true self because of malas. Malas or impurities play a very important
role in the realisation of truth. Mala is just ignorance that doesnt allow knowledge to function. Malas
reside in my. Opposite to my is svtantryaakti. Though ssvtantryaakti and my are one, they

7Abhinavabhrati of Abhinavagupta, ed. Dr. Nagendra, Delhi University, 1973, p466.

Dhvanylokalocana of Abhinavagupta, Motilal Banarsidas, New Delhi, 1973; 1st udyotta, p.56
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are different in the sense that svtantryaakti is the state of energy which can, by will, produce the
power of going down(nimea) and coming up(unmea) again, whereas my is the principal of going
down and not the ability of rising up again. My binds the individuals.

In aiva philosophy, there are three malas (impurities): gross, subtle and subtest. The gross impurity is
called krmamala related to the actions. This impurity makes an individual to realise that Im lucky or
Im unlucky, Im happy or Im unhappy. This impurity of action is the impressions of pleasure and pain.
And, these impressions of pleasure and pain actually remain in the individual consciousness.

The subtle impurity is called myyamala. It is also known as avidy because this impurity creates
differentiation in ones own consciousness. For example, This is mine; that is not mine; he is my friend,
that man is my enemy. Myyamala creates duality that I and others are different. iva, the absolute
reality, appears as many rather than as one.

The third and the subtlest impurity is called avamala. Due to this impurity the individual thinks herself
as incomplete. And hence leads to the desire for completion. The desire to become complete is
avamala, as a result the individual wants to hold everything to fill the gap.

When the individual gets rid of these malas, the individual I becomes completely absorbed in iva.
iva is the realisation of Consciousness or Vimara which is inseparable from Self-lumoninosity
or Praka in its universality and, therefore, of freedom from all limitations not once for a moment
but continuously and without any impediments.
Similarly, apprehension of rasa without obstacles is always pleasurable. It is a state that consists in
the tasting of ones own consciousness; this tasting is endowed with supernatural bliss (laukiklahd).
Abhinavagupta writes:
Therefore, the tasting of rasa (which consists in a camatkra different from any other kind of
ordinary cognition) differs both from memory, inference and any other form of ordinary self-

consciousness.9

The realization of rasa is laukika or transcendental in nature because the causes Vibhva etc., due to
which rasa is manifested are not ordinary in nature. This extraordinary state (laukika) of bliss is
visrnti, a state where no desire is left to fulfil.
When a sensitive appreciator witnesses a good work of art or play on the stage, he/she grasps the
representation in its universal form (sdhrankarana).

9Gnoli, R, The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi,
1968, p81.
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The dramatic representation becomes free from all limitations of time and space. For example, in
Abhijakuntlam, the young deer appears in its universal form, devoid of any particular (viesa)
identity. And at the same time, the factors that cause fear, as in the example the actorDusyanta,who
frightens, having no real form, cannot be a real source of terror. In other words, the spectator is not in
real time and real space and the deer being chased by the hero is also not real. The deer etc., is without
any temporal or spatial determination, and hence the impression of fear is relished in its generalised form.
Sdhrankarana is a process through which the particular emotions are enjoyed in universal form. The
enjoyment of this universal form is known as laukiklhd.

Here, laukika does not mean the experience of a yogin. If aesthetic experience differs from the
ordinary perception, then it is distinct of laukikapratyaa and the perception of a yogin. It is laukika
because the vibhvas etc., are not ordinary cause of producing experience.
Abhinavagupta distinguishes the nature of the relish or apprehension of rasa, on the one hand, from the
ordinary means of knowledge like perception, and on the other hand, from telepathy of a yogi, who is
in the process of spiritual perfection; and of a perfect yogi who remains in an ecstatic state due to non-
dual self.

In the end, it can be concluded that aesthetic cognition consists exclusively in aesthetic relish.
Visvanatha writes:

The Rasa, arising from an exaltation of the quality of sattva or goodness, indivisible, self-
manifested, made up of joy and thought in their identity, free from the contact of a thought else
perceived, akin to the realisation of Brahma, and having for its essence supernormal wonder
(camatkra), is enjoyed by those competent in its inseparableness (as an object of knowledge) from

the knowledge of itself.10

10Shityadarpana of Vivantha, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Pratishthana, Varanasi, 1989, P. 32


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In the above lines Vivantha provides a complete picture of aesthetic cognition. Aesthetic cognition
consists in aesthetic relish. During aesthetic relish, the mind is pervaded by sattva guna. The nature of
sattva guna is peace and bliss, which is why aesthetic experience is always pleasurable. The bliss in the
appreciators mind is a manifestation of that joy which is the innate nature of self that is why it is similar
to mystic experience. Above all, the essence of aesthetic delight is extraordinary wonder that consists of
the expansion of mind. It is a state where the distinction between the art-object and process of aesthetic
relish disappears. Hence, it can be asserted that the enjoyment of rasa is also a kind of cognition, but it
is quite different in its nature from the ordinary cognition that we generally experience.

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