Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization V. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is superior to
property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free assembly and
rights of petition
FACTS:
On March 2, 1969, Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid
exercise of their constitutional right of freedom expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers
in the first, second and third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively). On
March 3, 1969, Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon
where PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. That Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to report for work the following
morning shall be dismissed for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT
NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company: REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION. On MARCH 4, 1969 The Company filed for violation of the
CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation since they gave prior notice. Moreover,
it was not a mass demonstration for strike against the company. Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador of the CIR found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers
directly responsible for ULP losing their status as employees. On September 29, 1969
PBMEO motion for reconsideration but was dismissed since 2 days late.
Issue:
W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
agreement, is an inhibition of the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition.
YES.
Ratio:
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person. The
Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles. The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people. The rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of
public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded
these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies
for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring
public officers and employees. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and property rights
can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. A constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence
of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. The Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be
fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate
him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like
rubbing salt on bruised tissues. Injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence
of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights. There was a lack of human
understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union
for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And
to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police,
not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
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unchristian as it is unconstitutional. The most that could happen to them was to lose a
day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One
day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they
were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring
about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to
recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right
to petition for redress. The dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is
enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by
encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and
economic well-being." The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known
as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section
4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
Violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. There is no time
limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the
delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It
is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race
for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually
loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with
which to pay for competent legal services. Enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an accepted
principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require."
LESSON / DOCTRINE:
Human Rights, Civil Rights, Political Rights
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR. ET AL (SIMON)
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL (CHR)
G.R. No. 100150
January 5, 1994
Ponente: Vitug
FACTS
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners)in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to,
and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North
EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3)days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to
give way to the "People's Park".
On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letterto be addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls,
sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.
On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July
1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the
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petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again
directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the order for the demolition of the sari-sari stores, stalls and carinderia
constitute as a violation of human rights
RULING
No. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".
There is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-saristores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which
is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the
North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored.
It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking
at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this
instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment
of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.
RATIONALE
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are
the same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of
the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law),
political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form
political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment
and social services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of
his humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but
can only be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government.
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of
placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause
of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect
and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without
dentures but with maimed legs to boot.
On the Adjudicatory Functions of the CHR:
WON CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed for by
respondents.
WON the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents complaint.
Held:
No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate.
No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights.
Rationale:
Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to investigate,
on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights.
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In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres Narvasa
observed that:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's
Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can
fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" intended by the Constitution.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have

CHRs investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights.

The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include
the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract,
etc. Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the
rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its
attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4)
cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious."
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished
are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected

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Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
Adjudicatory Power of CHR
Facts:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the
alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an
order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-
to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively
charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and
temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said
teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension
for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with
RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of
law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent
teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed
with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders.
Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were
denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to
reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political
rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved. NO
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in
the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Investigate vs. Adjudicate
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an
official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course,
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is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is
the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: .
. . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide
or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also,
within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial
evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having
accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education
had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are
matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration
addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may
be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means:
"To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means
to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the
Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not
the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in
those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to
their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where
the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may
properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

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EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
Facts: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and
before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the
premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its
predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the
same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES,
LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the
respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and
other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA
bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of
injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA
again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles,
pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and
expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and
their subordinates.
EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue
injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the
Commission (CHR).
Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary
restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing
and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining
order. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987
Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others
to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection.
Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing
the acts complained of.
Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued
by the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the
TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT.
In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR
is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the
CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme
Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules
of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose.
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A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976
DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent.
TOPIC: RIGHT TO INFORMATION
BRIEF: This is an administrative case against the Municipal Judge of Taal, Batangas who
allegedly refused to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal
docket records of the Municipal Court
FACTS:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of
Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality,
with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine
the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their
contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to
official court records but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to
who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has
the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and furnishing copies
may be refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate interest, out of whim or
fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or promote public scandal.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for
investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor
Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but the motion was denied by
the Investigating Judge. After formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the
inspection of the docket books infringe upon the right of individuals to information.
RULING:
After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, We find that the respondent did not
act arbitrarily in the premises. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent
allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain
conditions and under his control and supervision. it has not been shown that the rules and
conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records
predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern.
Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance. In an earlier case, 1 this Court held that mandamus would lie to
compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the
latter office. Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a
certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that
while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons
desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights,
such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit. Citing with approval People ex rel.
Title Guarantee & T. Co. vs. Railly, 2 this Court said:
The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, 'to his (register of deeds')
discretion as to how much of the conveniences of the office are required to be preserved
for the accomodation of these persons. It is not his duty to permit the office to be
thronged needlessly with persons examining its books of papers, but it is his duty to
regulate, govern, and control his office in such a manner as to permit the statutory
advantages to be enjoyed by other persons not employed by him as largely and extensibly
as that consistently can be done * * *. What the law expects and requires from him is the
exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, by which all persons resorting to the
office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in an orderly manner, shall be
secured their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner in
which the relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by
searches, abstracts, or copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.
Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer,
Idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to
concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access
to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records
contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong
to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having
custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. As to the moral or material
injury which the publication might inflict on other parties, that is the publisher's
responsibility and lookout. The publication is made subject to the consequences of the
law.
8|Page
The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on statutory grounds
merely but on the constitutional right of the press to have access to information as the
essence of press freedom. 3
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to
information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official
records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such
limitations imposed by law. 4 The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to information of
general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if
either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. " 5 However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to
control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and
impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order. 6
David vs.Arroyo
TOPIC: LIBERTY, RIGHTTOFREE EXPRESSION, RIGHT to peaceably assemble,
WARRANTLESS ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
BRIEF: This is a seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency,
and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5),declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist, resulting to violations of constitutional rights
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, the President issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency stating the following as basis:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired
with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme
Right, represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic
Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted
Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain
segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing
governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples
confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme
Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine
State;
9|Page
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation
of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral
effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the
Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired
with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the
democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-
constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican
government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain
segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing
governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples
confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme
Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine
State;
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo
ISSUE:
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge- overbreadth doctrine
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by
their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains
that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Second, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court
to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual
operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth the challenger must
establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine which
holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application.They
also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning
and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis
10 | P a g e
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision-Callingout power:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion"
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action.
But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal
or ultra vires.
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order.
In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility
and business affected with public interest
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
Second provisionTake Care Power:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;"
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII
Petitioners argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo
the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to issuancesof Eos, AOs, proclamations,
memorandum orders, memorandum circular and general or special orders, She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081 which
are of the same category and binding force as statutes
Third provision- Power to Take Over:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency."
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declarea state
of national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection
can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress
to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not
11 | P a g e
the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President
Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her
during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress.
c. As Applied Challenge
The right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless
arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the
Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury,
theseincludewarrantlessarrest,warrantless search and seizure, and"turned away and
dispersed"duringthecelebrationofthe 20th anniversary ofpeoplepower I
PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose
is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It
had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021.
But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct
illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.
G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas
First, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the
basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was
fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated
brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked
car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas PambansaBilang No. 880145 and Inciting
to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was eventually
released for insufficiency of evidence.
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right
against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble (Section 4
of Article III). David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear
and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. Peaceable assembly for
lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.
G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al.
TheCourt likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of
KMU etalunwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units.
This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of
the principle that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on
a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent."
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with
the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such
permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and
present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of
their permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal.
When a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic
government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to
procedure.
G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc.
First, the Daily Tribunes offices were searched without warrant;second, the police
operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at
about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted
in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
12 | P a g e
building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily
Tribune offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong
presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels
in bringing down this government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they
do not follow the standards and the standards are if they would contribute to instability
in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc.
No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner
Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for
the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not
hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for
media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the
steps in the conduct of search and seizure.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights
are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the
Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing
tasks of a democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth
and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our
peoples liberty.
RULING:
Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of
terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media
or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
On the arrest/searches/seizures
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant
to PP 1017 valid?
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,
were NOT valid. [S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies
petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
13 | P a g e
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria
Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-
shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to
sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure.
Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section
8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in
the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched,
in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.
All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW (Facial Challenge: Void-for-vagueness and overbreadth)
Art. 3, Section 1, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Facial Challenge (Void-for-vagueness and overbreadth)
The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council
G.R. No. 178552,
July 16, 2007
Ponente: Morales, C.:
Nature of Case:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,"
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
BRIEF
RA 9372 The Human Security Act of 2007 was challenge by several petitioners including
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No.
178552 on the ground of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrine. Petitions were
dismissed due to lack of merit and locus standi. The court ruled that doctrine is only
applicable to speech. RA 9372 does not regulate speech. What the law seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech. On the other hand, petitioners were not able to prove locus standi
and transcendental importance of issues raised.
FACTS:
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr.,
a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on
July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. Other petitions were filed by different parties
challenging the constitutionality of the law.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council9
composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs
Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also
impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. HermogenesEsperon
and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
Petitioners, in insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes
speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by
the free speech clause.
14 | P a g e

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the
following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any
of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special
penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9372 in unconstitutional on the ground of void-for-vagueness doctrine
and overbreadth.
ACTIONS of the COURT
SC: Petitions dismissed.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE RULING
Facial Challenge: Void-for-vagueness and Overbreadth
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity.
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the
following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any
of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special
penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
Doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case
since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct,
not speech. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes." It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under
which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and,
if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally
disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
15 | P a g e
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a
limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
HELD:
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible
threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that
judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002]
VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 77,
Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA KALAW
LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Brief:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated
January 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed the petition to prohibit Judge
Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, from issuing a writ
of demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the same court
from implementing an alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Facts:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267
and 111266, in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain
portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the
name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October
29, 1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered
both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into
smaller lots. Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including
herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot
707-A-2, Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is now #33 Doa
Regina St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The other portions were registered
in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons.
Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and
Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action,
Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by
virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial
continued for three decades.On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged
defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land
and ordered them:
(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the amount of
P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint;
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(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by
defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own
expense;
(d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with
interest computed from the date of filing of the complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners Report, particularly,
Annexes A and B thereof, at the expense of the defendants. [3]
As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners,
through an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they
were occupying. On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30,
1998, from the trial court stating as follows:
Before the Court for resolution is the Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of
Demolition, filed by plaintiff, through counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order
directing the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures on
the plaintiffs property constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. The
defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion.
Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and
executory, the Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias
writ of execution for the enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the service
of the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject property,
they failed to comply therewith, as per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated February 9, 1998,
issued by the Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to
demolish the structures in order to implement the said decision.
To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from issuing a
writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of
execution, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998. [5] Petitioners
alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they
were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ
of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to
do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers and successors-
in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights
from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order in Civil Case
No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed.[6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
(1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners (NO); and (2)
whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
HOLDING:
1. The petitioners submit that the Medina Case is not controlling since Medina
markedly differs from the present case on the following points:
a. First, the petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot
subject of the dispute after the original action was commenced and became
final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the
lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918.
b. Second, the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of
the petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity,
allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish
Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the
right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is
based on a fully recognized Torrens title.
c. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own
names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her
predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership
of the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel
of land under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing
with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can
rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and
claims as are annotated on the title.[9] It is our view here that the petitioners,
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of
their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who
merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
2. We note that this is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a
general rule, this could not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate
that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they could
have raised but never did during trial and even during proceedings before the
Court of Appeals.[13] Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be resolved
now, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case.
On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.
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A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.[14] As earlier
discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge
of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their
conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City
tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of
private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918
cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not
impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have
rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in
any case thereon.[15]Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded
them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be
reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by
any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution
can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.[16]
In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and
meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot,
which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Hong Kong v. Olalia G.R. No. 153675
TOPIC: Bail on Extradition Cases (To fully understand the case, you MUST read
Puruganan Case)
Facts:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It
took effect on June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private
respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If
convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On
September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the
request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. On
September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. On October 14,
1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On November 9,
1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void. On
November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be
reversed. On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of
the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The
Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001. Meanwhile, as early as November
22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733,
raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
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On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case
No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. On
October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties.
The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of
the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further
desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but
it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
May be a possible extraditee be granted bail? YES, thus abandoning the doctrine of
Purganan.
Ratio:
NB: The issue was discussed in the light of the modern trend in international law placing
primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court
in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in
light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of
his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have likewise
been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of
the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation
for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his
appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court
opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding,
some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions
relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court
ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may
be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated,
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the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining
the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also
be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect
for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption
lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty
of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty,
to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding. 9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the
escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state
from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a)
it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will
best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting
state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending
receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks
of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without
having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in
criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this
major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing
in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean
that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which
the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to
apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
20 | P a g e
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which
he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove
by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that
he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence."

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