Professional Documents
Culture Documents
First Published Fri Aug 20, 2010: Language and Testimony in Classical Indian Philosophy
First Published Fri Aug 20, 2010: Language and Testimony in Classical Indian Philosophy
Speculations about the nature and function of language in India can be traced to its earliest period.
These speculations are multi-faceted in that one detects many different strands of thought regarding
language. Some of these speculations are about what one may call the principle of language, but others
are about specific languages or specific uses of these languages. One sees speculations regarding the
creation of language as well as the role of language in the creation of the universe. Language appears
in relation to gods as well as humans, and occupies the entire width of a spectrum from being a
divinity herself to being a means used by gods to create and control the world, and ultimately to being
a means in the hands of the human beings to achieve their own religious as well as mundane purposes.
Gradually, a whole range of questions are raised about all these various aspects of language in the
evolving religious and philosophical traditions in India, traditions which shared some common
conceptions, but thrived in full-blooded disagreements on major issues. Such disagreements relate to
the ontological nature of language, its communicative role, the nature of meaning, and more
specifically the nature of word-meaning and sentence-meaning. On the other hand, certain
manifestations of language, whether in the form of specific languages like Sanskrit or particular
scriptural texts like the Vedas, became topics of contestation between various philosophical and
religious traditions. Finally, one must mention the epistemic role and value of language, its ability or
inability to provide veridical knowledge about the world. In what follows, I intend to provide a brief
account of these diverse developments in ancient, classical and medieval India. (For an approximate
chronology of Indian philosophers, see the supplement.)
1. Pre-systematic conceptions of language in Vedic texts 2.
Conception of Language among Sanskrit grammarians
3. General philosophical approaches to the status of Vedic scriptures
4. Language and Meaning
6. Different views regarding sentence-
meaning 7. Some important conceptions
8. Why the differences?
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries
Here, the clause introduced by just as refers to the older more widely prevalent view seen in the
Mahbhya. With the word so, Bharthari is proposing an analogical extension of the procedure of
abstraction (apoddhra) to the level of a sentence.
Without mentioning Patajali or Ktyyana by name, Bharthari seems to critique their
view that the meaning of a sentence, consisting of the interrelations between the meanings of
individual words, is essentially not derived from the constituent words themselves, but from
the whole sentence as a collection of words. The constituent words convey their meaning first,
but their interrelations are not communicated by the words
themselves, but by the whole sentence as a unit. This view of Ktyyana and Patajali is criticized by
Bharthari (Vkyapadya II.1516, 4142). It is clear that Bharthari's ideas do not agree with the
views expressed by Ktyyana and Patajali, and that the views of these two earlier grammarians are
much closer, though not identical, with the views later maintained by the Nyya-Vaieikas and
Mmsakas. For Bharthari, the sentence as a single partless unit conveys its entire unitary meaning
in a flash, and this unitary meaning as well as the unitary sentence are subsequently analyzed by
grammarians into their assumed or imagined constituents.
Finally, we should note that Bharthari's views on the unitary character of a sentence and its
meaning were found to be generally unacceptable by the schools of Mms and Nyya-Vaieika, as
well as by the later grammarian-philosophers like Kauabhaa and Ngeabhaa. Their discussion of
the comprehension of sentence-meaning is not couched in terms of Bharthari's instantaneous flash of
intuition (pratibh), but in terms of the conditions of kk (mutual expectancy), yogyat
(compatibility), and satti (contiguity of words). In this sense, the later grammarian-philosophers
are somewhat closer to the spirit of Ktyyana and Patajali.
1. When a verbal cognition results from the primary signification function (akti / abhidhvtti /
mukhyavtti) of a word, the object or content of that verbal cognition is called primary
meaning (akyrtha / vcyrtha / abhidheya).
2. When a verbal cognition results from the secondary signification function (lakavtti /
guavtti) of a word, the object or content of that verbal cognition is called secondary
meaning (lakyrtha).
3. When a verbal cognition results from the suggestive signification function (vyajanvtti) of a
word, the object or content of that verbal cognition is called suggested meaning (vyagyrtha /
dhvanitrtha).
4. When a verbal cognition results from the intentional signification function (ttparyavtti) of a
word, the object or content of that verbal cognition is called intended meaning (ttparyrtha).
Not all the different schools of Indian philosophy accept all of these different kinds of
signification functions for words, and they hold substantially different views on the nature of
words, meanings, and the relations between words and meanings. However, the above terminology
holds true, in general, for most of the medieval schools. Let us note some of the important
differences. Mms claims that the sole primary meaning of the word bull is the generic
property or the class property (jti) such as bull-ness, while the individual object which possesses
this generic property, i.e., a particular bull, is only secondarily and subsequently understood from
the word bull. The school called Kevalavyaktivda argues that a particular individual bull is the
sole primary meaning of the word bull, while the generic property bull-ness is merely a
secondary meaning. Nyya argues that the primary meaning of a word is an
individual object qualified by a generic property (jti-viia-vyakti), both being perceived
simultaneously.
Sanskrit grammarians distinguish between various different kinds of meanings (artha). The term
artha stands for an external object (vastumtra), as well as for the object that is intended to be
signified by a word (abhidheya). The latter, i.e., meaning in a linguistic sense, could be meaning in a
technical context (strya), such as the meaning of an affix or a stem, or it may be meaning as
understood by people in actual communication (laukika). Then there is a further difference. Meaning
may be something directly intended to be signified by an expression (abhidheya), or it could be
something which is inevitably signified (nntaryaka) when something else is really the intended
meaning. Everything that is understood from a word on the basis of some kind of signification
function (vtti) is covered by the term artha. Different systems of Indian philosophy differ from each
other on whether a given cognition is derived from a word on the basis of a signification function
(vtti), through inference (anumna), or presumption (arthpatti). If a particular item of information is
deemed to have been derived through inference or presumption, it is not included in the notion of
word-meaning.
The scope of the term artha is actually not limited in Sanskrit texts to what is usually understood
as the domain of semantics in the western literature. It covers elements such as gender ( liga) and
number (sakhy). It also covers the semantic-syntactic roles (kraka) such as agent-ness (karttva)
and object-ness (karmatva). Tenses such as the present, past, and future, and the moods such as the
imperative and optative are also traditionally included in the arthas signified by a verb root, or an
affix. Another aspect of the concept of artha is revealed in the theory of dyotyrtha (co-signified)
meaning. According to this theory, to put it in simple terms, particles such as ca (and) do not have
any lexical or primary meaning. They are said to help other words used in construction with them to
signify some special aspects of their meaning. For instance, in the phrase John and Tom, the
meaning of grouping is said to be not directly signified by the word and. The theory of dyotyrtha
argues that grouping is a specific meaning of the two words John and Tom, but that these two
words are unable to signify this meaning if used by themselves. The word and used along with these
two words is said to work as a catalyst that enables them to signify this special meaning. The problem
of use and mention of words is also handled by Sanskrit grammarians by treating the phonological
form of the word itself to be a part of the meaning it signifies. This is a unique way of handling this
problem.
Bibliography
Bharthari (400/1977). Vkyapadya. Critical text, Wilhelm, R. (ed.). (Series: Abhandlungen fr die
Kunde des Morgenlandes, XLII, 4). Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Bhatt, G. P. (1962). Epistemology of the Bha School of Prva Mms. Varanasi: Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series Office.
Biardeau, M. (1967). Thorie de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole dans le Brahmanisme
Classique. Paris: Mouton and Co.
Bilimoria, P. (1988). abdaprama: Word and Knowledge. (Series: Studies in Classical India, No. 10).
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Bronkhorst, J. (1966). Indian semantics: I, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 86, 304311.
Bronkhorst, J. (1969). Sanskrit Philosophy of Language. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Current Trends in
Linguistics, Vol. 5: Linguistics in South Asia, (pp. 499531). The Hague: Mouton and Co., Publishers.
Bronkhorst, J. (1979a). Oriental ideas on the origin of language. Journal of the American Oriental
Society, 99, 114.
Bronkhorst, J. (1979b). The role of meanings in Pini's grammar. Indian Linguistics, 40, 146157.
Bronkhorst, J. (1981). Nirukta and Adhyy: Their Shared Presuppositions. Indo-Iranian Journal, 23,
114.
Bronkhorst, J. (1988). Universals: Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Bronkhorst, J. (1991). Studies on Bharthari, 3, Bharthari on Sphoa and Universals. Asiatische Studien,
45, 518.
Bronkhorst, J. (1992). Pini's view of meaning and its Western counterpart. In M. Stamenov (Ed.),
Current Advances in Semantic Theory, pp. 455464. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Bronkhorst, J. (2004). La grammaire et les dbuts de la philosophie indienne. Asiatische Studien, 58,
791865.
Buitenan, J. A. B. van (1988). Studies in Indian Literature and Philosophy, (Collected articles edited by
Ludo Rocher), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Cardona, G. (1976). Pini: A Survey of Research. The Hague, Paris: Mouton.
Cardona, G. (1988). Pini, His Works and its Traditions, Vol. I., Background and Introduction, Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass.
Chatterjee, K. N. (1980). Word and its MeaningA New Perspective. Varanasi: Chaukhambha
Orientalia.
Chatterjee, S. C. (1965). The Nyya Theory of Knowledge. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.
Coward, H. G. (1980). Sphoa Theory of Language. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Coward, H. G. & Raja, K. K. (Eds.). (1990). The Philosophy of the Grammarians. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Datta, D. M. (1972). The Six Ways of Knowing. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.
Deshpande, M. (1978). Sentence-cognition in Nyya epistemology. Indo-Iranian Journal, 20, 195216
Deshpande, M. (1979). Sociolinguistic Attitudes in India: An Historical Reconstruction. Ann Arbor:
Karoma Publishers, Inc.
Deshpande, M. (1987). Pinian syntax and the changing notion of sentence. Annals of the Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, LXVIII, 5598.
Deshpande, M. (1990). Changing conceptions of the Veda. Adyar Library Bulletin, 54, 141.
Deshpande, M. (1992a). The Meaning of Nouns: Semantic Theory in Classical and Medieval India.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Deshpande, M. (1992b). Bharthari. In M. Dascal, D. Gerhardus, & K. Lorenz (Eds.), Handbcher zur
Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft 7.1: Sprachphilosophie (pp. 269278). Berlin: De Gruyter.
Deshpande, M. (1993). Sanskrit & Prakrit Sociolinguistic Issues. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Deshpande, M. (1994). Brahmanism versus Buddhism: a perspective of language attitudes. In N. N.
Bhattacharyya (Ed.), Jainism and Prakrit in ancient and medieval India: essays for Prof. Jagdish
Chandra Jain (pp. 89111). New Delhi: Manohar.
Deshpande, M. (1997). Building blocks or useful fictions: changing view of morphology in ancient
Indian thought. In Dick van der Meij (Ed.), India and beyond: aspects of literature, meaning, ritual and
thought; essays in honour of Frits Staal (pp. 71127). Leiden & Amsterdam: International Institute for
Asian Studies.
Devasthali, G. V. (1959). Mms: The Vkya-stra of Ancient India. Mumbai: Booksellers'
Publishing Company.
D'sa, F. X. (1980). abdaprmyam in abara and Kumrila: Towards a Study of the Mms
Experience of Language. (Series: Publications of the de Nobili Research Library). Vienna: Institut fr
Indologie der Universitt Wien.
Gchter, O. (1983). Hermeneutics and Language in Prvamms. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Ganeri, J. (1999). Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian
Philosophy. (Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs). New York: Oxford University Press.
Ganeri, J. (2001). Philosophy in Classical India. London: Routledge.
Ganeri, J. (2006). Artha: Meaning. (Series: Foundations of Philosophy in India). Delhi & New York:
Oxford University Press.
Ganguli, H. K. (1963). Philosophy of Logical Construction. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
Gune, J. A. (1978). The Meaning of Tenses and Moods. Pune: Deccan College.
Houben, J. E. M. (1993). Who were the Padavdins?. Asiatische Studien, XLVII(1), 155169.
Houben, J. E. M. (1995). Bharthari's perspectivism (2): Bharthari on the primary unit of language. In
K. D. Dutz (Ed.), History and Rationality (pp. 2962). Mnster: Nodus Publications.
Houben, J. E. M. (2000). Language and thought in the Sanskrit tradition. In S. Auroux (Ed.), History of
the Language Sciences (pp. 146157). Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton.
Houben, J. E. M. (2002). Semantics in the history of South Asian thought. In M. Deshpande & P. Hook
(Eds.), Indian Linguistic Studies: Festschrift in honor of George Cardona (pp. 202222). Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
Houben, J. E. M. (2007). gveda 1.164.2324 and Bharthari's philosophy of language. In K.
Preisendanz (Ed.), Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural
Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass (pp. 711719). Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences
Press.
Iyer, K. A. S. (1966). Vkyapadya of Bharthari, with the Vtti, and the Paddhati of Vabhadeva,
Ka I. (Series: Deccan College Monograph Series, No 32). Pune: Deccan College.
Joshi, S. D. (1967). The Sphoaniraya of Kauabhaa, edited with Introduction, Translation, and
Critical and Exegetical Notes. (Series: Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class
C, No. 2). Pune: University of Pune.
Matilal, B. K. (1971). Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. The
Hague/Paris: Mouton.
Matilal, B. K. (1985). Logic, Language and Reality: an introduction to Indian philosophical studies.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Matilal, B. K. (1998). The Character of Logic in India (J. Ganeri & H. Tiwari, Eds.). Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Matilal, B. K. (2002). Mind, Language, and World (J. Ganeri, Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Padoux, A. (1990). Vc: The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu Tantras (translated from French by
J. Gontier). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Pandeya, R. C. (1963). The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Patajali (Second Century bce/18801885/19621972). Mahbhya, in 3 volumes (F. Kielhorn, Ed.,
18801885; K. V. Abhyankar, Ed., 3rd revised edition, 19621972). Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute.
Prasad, J. (1956). History of Indian Epistemology. Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal.
Raja, K. (1963). Indian Theories of Meaning. (Series: The Adyar Library Series 91). Madras: Adyar
Library and Research Centre.
Rao, V. S. (1969). The Philosophy of a Sentence and its Parts. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
gveda-Sahit, with Syaa's commentary, in five volumes. (19331951, N. S. Sonatakke and C. G.
Kashikar, Eds.). Pune: Vaidika Saodhana Maaa.
Sastri, G. N. (1959). The Philosophy of Word and Meaning. Calcutta: Sanskrit College.
Scharf, P. M. (1996). The denotation of generic terms in ancient Indian philosophy: grammar, Nyya,
and Mms. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 86(3), i-x,1336.
Scharfe, H. (1961). Die Logik im Mahbhya. Berlin: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin, Institut fr Orientforschung.
Staal, J. F. (1960). Correlations between language and logic in Indian thought. Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies. 23, 109122.
Thieme, P. (19823). Meaning and form of the grammar of Pini. Studien zur Indologie und
Iranistik, 8/9, 2328.