PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW EH401; Atty. Joseph Randi Torregosa family home takes place.
family home takes place. There is no need for the performance of a positive act other than the actual, as
FINAL EXAMINATION NOTES by KaRaBa
Spectra Archives Property
THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION
Your Family Members are those whom the law considers as your family. Art. 150 enumerates the persons
who are considered as members of the same family.
Take Note: The Family Relation contemplated in Art. 150 does not include in-laws, as distinguished from the
relationship among persons considered as beneficiaries of the family home because in the latter, an in-law is
included, while the former contemplates exclusively of blood relation.
Take Note: When the suit is between members of the same family under Art. 150, the law requires as
condition president before the filing that there should be earnest efforts to a compromise but such proved
futile so that the suit against family members may continue.
Q: What is the effect of non-compliance of Art. 151?
A: As an initiating party, you are required by law, if the suit is between members of the same family, to allege
in your initiatory pleading that earnest efforts towards compromise have been exerted but that effort failed,
or the parties failed to arrive at their amicable settlement. Failure to comply with this requirement would
render the petition dismissible upon motion of the other party for non-compliance of the condition president
in Art. 151.
Take Note: The requirement of earnest efforts towards a compromise does not apply when one of the
parties to the suit does not fall under the relation in Art. 150.
Ex. If you are suing your own brother, and your husband is a party to that suit, or if you are suing against the
wife of your brother, such suit does not require the condition president contemplated in Art. 151. Insofar as
the family is concerned, they are strangers to the suit. That case does not fall within the definition of Art. 151
in relation to Art. 150.
Take Note: The requirement of earnest efforts towards a compromise applies only to CIVIL CASES. This does
not apply in criminal cases because in criminal cases, settlement is not allowed.
THE FAMILY HOME
Q: What is the Family Home?
A: The Family Home refers to the family dwelling as well as the land on which it is situated where the family
resides.
Take Note: The law expressly requires that only the properties belonging to the absolute community of
property, conjugal partnership of gains, exclusive property of either spouse, or property belonging to an
unmarried head of the family may be constituted as a family home
While there are beneficiaries of the family home, other than the spouses or the unmarried head of the
family, only the properties of the properties belonging to the spouses or the unmarried head of the family
may be constituted
There are many beneficiaries, but not all properties of the said beneficiaries may constitute a family home,
only the properties of the spouses or the unmarried head of the family.
Q: How is the Family Home constituted?
A: Effective August 3, 1988, or when the Family Code took effect, constitution of the family home takes place
by mere act of occupation. The moment the house and lot is occupied as a family residence, constitution of a
opposed to constructive, occupation. It requires the physical presence of the constituting parties.
Before the effectivity of the Family Code, the law specifically requires two (2) ways to constitute a family
home, either judicially or extra-judicially. Judicial Constitution is to go to court in a summary proceeding and
as the court would issue a Judicial Declaration of Family Home. Extra-judicial Constitution, on the other hand,
by executing an affidavit declaring the house and lot as a family home and by recording the latter in the
appropriate registry of property, where the family home is located.
Q: What happens to the house and lot occupied as a family residence before August 3, 1988, but no judicial
or extra-judicial constitution was effected?
A: Those family dwellings occupied before the effectivity of the Family Code, but was either judicially or
extra-judicially constituted, are deemed constituted as of the time the Family Code took effect.
This is emphasized for purposes of determining whether a particular claim would fall under the exceptions to
the exemption from forced sale, attachment or execution under Art. 155, particularly in debts incurred prior
to the constitution of the constitution of the Family Home. Meaning, debts incurred prior to the constitution
of the family home are not covered by the rule exempting the family home from forced sale, execution or
attachment.
Q: If the obligation was incurred before August 3, 1988 e.g. 1985, and the house and lot or the family
dwelling was occupied in 1980, without judicial or extrajudicial constitution. A suit was filed in 1990 under
the Family Code. Is the Family Home exempted, or is the obligation incurred considered as a debt incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home?
A: The family dwelling may be sold, executed or attached because the obligation is incurred prior to the
constitution, which took place only on August 3, 1988, upon the effectivity of the Family Code.
This is the rule that applies to dwellings existing prior to August 3, 1988 and were not judicially or extra-
judicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the procedure in the Civil Code.
Q: May the family home be sold, alienated or encumbered by the owner?
A: While the family home is protected from creditors, there is no provision against selling, alienating or
encumbering by the owner. Even if the house and lot is constituted as a family home, there is no stopping
the owner of the property from selling the family home. However, if there are beneficiaries residing in the
family home, the consent of majority of the beneficiaries who are of age is required.
Q: What happens if either or both spouses or the unmarried head of the family dies?
A: Ordinarily, when the owner of the property dies, settlement of the estate follows to liquidate the assets
and to divide the remaining property by and among the heirs. By the death of the person, ownership is
transferred by operation of law by his/her surviving heirs. The heirs automatically, ipso facto, become the
owners of the property left by the decedent. However, if that property is a family home, no settlement or
partition can be done 10 years from death or even for a longer period if there is a minor beneficiary who
continues to reside in the said family home. Even if the heirs become the owners, they are prohibited from
dividing or partitioning the family home. The purpose of this is for the family home to remain intact,
therefore exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment.
There are two (2) ways to divide or partition, extra-judicial or judicial. Extrajudicial partition is effected by the
heirs agreeing among themselves how to divide the family home. What is required is merely the mutual
agreement between and among the heirs. If the heirs cannot mutually agree among themselves, Judicial
Partition may be ensued.
Q: What is the rule insofar as prohibition of partitioning the family home?
A: If the partition is to be made extrajudicially, no partition can be done within 10 years from death or for a
longer period for as long as there is a minor beneficiary residing in the family home. No exceptions. It the
partition is to be had judicially, no judicial partition can be made within 10 years from death or for a longer
period if there is a minor beneficiary, except if the court finds compelling reasons for such partition.
In other words, if it is JUDICIAL PARTITION, partition can be had even during or within the 10 years or even if
there is a minor beneficiary who continues to reside in the family home, as ordered by the court if there are
compelling reasons.
Whether done judicially or extrajudicially, the law requires that it cannot be done within 10 years from death
or for a longer period so long as there is a minor beneficiary residing in the family home, without prejudice to
the exception in judicial partition.
Take Note:
Q: What then is the minor beneficiary contemplated under Art. 159?
A: The law specifically defines that the minor beneficiary must be one who is dependent on the head of the
family for LEGAL SUPPORT. The law appropriates the technical meaning of the term LEGAL SUPPORT. Under
the given circumstances the relationship between that minor beneficiary and the head of the family must be
such that the head of the family is LEGALLY OBLIGED for support for the minor beneficiary.
In other words, the head of the family and the minor child who continues to reside must be related in such a
way that it falls under the specifications under Art. 195, which enumerates the persons who are obliged to
support each other:
(a) Spouses;
(b) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(c) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(d) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
and
(e) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood
Take Note: The law prescribes an order of preference or priority upon whom the obligation to give support
devolves. In other words, while these persons aforementioned are obliged to support each other, when that
obligation to give support falls upon the shoulders of two or more of them, the law prescribes a certain order
of priority or preference. Who should support first? It is only if the first on the line is unable or is incapable to
give support that the next in line is obliged to give support.
Illustration:
Suppose a minor child staying with his father and his/her grandfather. Under Art. 195, both the childs father
and grandfather are obliged to give support. This is a situation where the obligation to give support falls on
two persons. Under Art. 199, the law prescribes an order of preference so that the child may not go directly
or ask for support directly from his grandfather because the liability to give support is devolved upon the
father, which is first in line in accordance with Art. 199.
This is illustrated in the case of Patricio vs. Dario:
PATRICIO vs. DARIO, GR. No. 170829, Nov. 20, 2006
DIGEST PARTITION OF FAMILY HOME; BENEFICIARIES MUST BE DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY
FACTS:
Marcelino Dario, Sr. died intestate and left a parcel of land which included a residential house. He was survived by his wife, herein petitioner
Perla Patricio, and their sons, namely, Marcelino Marc Dario and herein private respondent Marcelino Dario III. The three heirs extrajudicially
settled the estate of the late Marcelino Dario, Sr.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership.
However, private respondent refused. This prompted petitioner and Marcelino Marc to file an action for partition before the RTC of QC.
Subsequently, the RTC ordered the partition of the subject property. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence, he
appealed before the CA which denied the same. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the CA partially reconsidered their decision where they
dismissed the complaint for partition by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death
of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON Marcelino Dario IV is considered a minor beneficiary under Article 154.
RULING:
SC granted the petition, remanded the case to the RTC for partition, and ruled that as a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum
of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the
constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved
only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor
beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3)
they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, Marcelino Dario IV complies with the relationship requirement in Art. 154. As to the second requisite, there must be actual
residency which the grandson of the decedent satisfies. However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandparents, but from his father. He cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents, unless of course if his parents are
incapable of supporting him. Thus, despite residing in the family home and being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Sr., he cannot be considered as a
beneficiary contemplated under Art. 154 due to non-fulfullment of the third requisite.
It is also a requirement before the property may be constituted as a family home that it should not exceed the
maximum value of the property fixed by law at the time of its constitution. For rural areas 200,000 is the
maximum, for urban areas, 300,000. Urban areas refer to chartered cities or with income equal to that of a
chartered city. Other areas are rural.
Take Note: The value specified under the law is the value at the time it is occupied as a family home or at the time
of its constitution. If the value of the property complies with the maximum value fixed by law at the time of its
constitution, but increases overtime, that property remains to be a family home because what is important is the
value of the property at the time of its constitution.
Q: What are the benefits if the property is constituted as a family home?
A: Under the Family Code, the family home is exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. These
processes are coercive processes where the property may be placed under the custody of the court so that it be
sold in a public auction and the proceeds of which are to be used to satisfy an obligation. If your property is
constituted as a family home, it cannot be subjected to these coercive processes. Art. 155 however, enumerates
the obligations which are not protected by this exemption.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
Take Note: If the obligation is one of those mentioned in Art. 155, the ordinary procedure there is that once the
judgment becomes final and executory, issuance of a writ of execution follows and the said writ may be now
implemented by levy and execution. That family home may be sold on execution and the proceeds will be applied
to the claim. Even If the claim is more than the maximum value fixed under Art. 157, the entire proceeds will go to
the creditor because these are claims which are not covered by the exemption.
Q.1: What is the remedy of the creditor when the obligation is not one of those mentioned in Art. 155 or in other
words, if the obligation is exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment?
A.1: The only instance by which that kind of creditor other than Art. 155 may levy on execution the family home is
when that creditor has reasonable ground to believe that that family home is worth more than the maximum
amount fixed by law during its constitution or even if the family home complied with the maximum amount,
the creditor has reasonable ground to believe that overtime, the value of the property has increased as a
result of the improvements introduced thereof, the creditor may go after the family home to satisfy the
claim.
Q.2: What should the creditor do?
A.2: The creditor is allowed by law to file a motion to the court which rendered the judgment upholding his
claim for an issuance of an order allowing the sale of the house and lot. In that motion, the creditor should
convince the court that the house and lot is worth more than the maximum amount during constitution or it
has increased its value after constitution. If the court is convinced, the latter may issue an order directing the
sale of the house and lot.
In that sale or execution which is a public auction the proceeds of the sale depending on the extent of the
proceeds will now be divided in accordance to the following illustration.
Illustration:
A house and lot is actually worth 1 million, either at the time of constitution or overtime, after the sale or
execution the proceeds acquired were 1 million. The rule is no bid below the maximum amount provided for
in Art. 155 is allowed by law. Suppose the claim is also 1 million.
Q: May the creditor collect the entire 1 million, because that is the extent of his claim?
A: No. Even if the family dwelling is worth more than the maximum value fixed by law, that portion
equivalent to the latter is still protected by law. In the illustration, that creditor cannot claim the entire 1
million because the law requires that the first 200,000 or 300,000, as the case may be, cannot be touched by
the creditor. It is reserved for the owner or beneficiaries in order to secure another family home. The
remaining amount is the portion that may be touched by the creditor.
Suppose the proceeds is 1 million and the claim is only 500,000. First again, the 300,000 or 200,000 would be
delivered to the owner, the creditor gets the full satisfaction of his claim of 500,000 and the excess of which
would be returned to the owner.
Suppose there are creditors falling under 155 and those not falling under 155.
Q: Whose claim should first be satisfied?
A: If the proceeds of the house and lot is more than the total claim of both creditors, there is no problem.
However, if the proceeds is not more than both claims, the rule is that creditors falling under 155 should first
be satisfied. If the total proceeds is 1 million and the claim of the creditor falling under 155 is also 1 million,
the other creditor can no longer claim. But if the total claim of the creditor falling under 155 is only 300,000,
then the other creditor may satisfy for his claim without prejudice to the untouchable amount fixed by law.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Paternity or Maternity is the relationship between the parent and the child from the viewpoint of the
parents. Filiation, on the other hand is the relationship between the child and the parent from the viewpoint
of the child.
There are two kinds of Filiation:
1. Natural Filiation
a. Legitimate
b. Illegitimate
2. Legal Filiation
a. Adoption
Q: Who are legitimate children and who are illegitimate children?
A: Legitimate children are the following:
a. Children conceived or born inside a valid marriage;
b. Children conceived or born before a judgment of declaration of nullity or psychological incapacity
becomes final; and
c. Artificially inseminated children
Illegitimate children are the following:
a. Children conceived and born without marriage;
b. Children conceived and born inside a void marriage except psychological incapacity and Art. 53; and
c. Children conceived and born during the existence of a valid marriage but fathered by a man other than
the husband.
Take Note: Under (c) of illegitimate children as mentioned above, it is the relationship of the child between the
mother that is illegitimate; the child has no relation whatsoever to the impugning husband.
Our policy is to favor legitimacy, thats why there is a presumption in law that a child conceived or born in a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate. This is the ruling in the case of Cabatania vs. CA, GR No.124814, 21
October 2004. This case involves a wife who was separated in fact from her legitimate husband. During their
separation de facto (physical separation; no decree of legal separation), she cohabited with another man, a sugar
planter. This woman served as a helper of this sugar planter. As a result of their illicit relationship, a child was
born. The legal husband of the wife filed an action to impugn the childs legitimacy and to compel the sugar
planter to acknowledge the child and to give him legal support. The employer denied vehemently that he fathered
the child. The issue was whether or not the child is the illegitimate child of the sugar planter. SC said, the child was
born while the mother is still legally married to the legitimate husband and there was no evidence showing that
(during this period when the child was conceived) physical coitus was impossible. The SC invoked the presumption
that a child born during the existence of a valid married should be deemed legitimate and that the child was the
legitimate child of the legal husband of the wife.
Take Note: Because of the presumption of legitimacy, if you are the child, you dont need to prove that you are
legitimate. The presumption is already in your favor. It is the burden of those who allege to prove that you are
illegitimate, Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (the burden of proof lies on he who asserts, not he who
denies). But while the child has no burden to prove his legitimacy, it is still his burden to prove that his parents are
legally married because that presumption of legitimacy arises from the fact of a legal valid marriage. While you
need not prove your being legitimate, it is always your burden to prove the legal marriage of your parents,
otherwise, no presumption can run.
This is illustrated in the case of Angeles vs. Maglaya , G.R. no. 153798, Sept 2, 2005 where someone who claimed
to be the legitimate daughter of the chief, filed an action to settle the estate of the diseased and prayed that she
be the administrator of the said estate. She claims that being the legitimate daughter of the diseased, she is
qualified under the law to act as administrator. This was opposed by the wife of the deceased where the latter
claimed that the petitioner who claims to be the legitimate daughter is not legitimate and the former prayed that
she be the one appointed as administrator. The issue was whether or not the child is really the legitimate daughter
of the deceased. During the proceeding, the RTC dismissed the case because the child failed to prove her being the
legitimate daughter of the deceased. However, in the SC, the daughter argued that the presumption is legitimacy
and it is not her burden to prove that she is legitimate. SC said while it is true that the presumption is in favor of
legitimacy, still being the one who claims to be legitimate, she is duty-bound to prove the basic fact from where
the presumption arises, that being a valid marriage between her parents which she failed to prove. In other words,
the one who claimed to be the legitimate daughter failed to prove that her parents were legally married. The
presumption of legitimacy arises only if a valid marriage between the parents is established.
This presumption of legitimacy is a rebuttable presumption. Meaning, it may be overcome by contradictory
evidence.
Q: How do you overcome the presumption of legitimacy, if you are the husband who wants to impugn the
legitimacy of the child?
A: Art. 166 enumerates the grounds to impugn the legitimacy or filiation of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except
in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent
was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)
Take Note: Under 166, the action to impugn can only be instituted by the husband. This is a personal right of
the husband, no other party can institute an action impugning the legitimacy of the child except in certain
special instances where the heirs of the husband may be allowed to institute the action.
Q: What are these instances?
A: The instances when the heirs may be allowed to institute an action to impugn legitimacy are the ff:
1. When the husband dies before the prescriptive period to file an action expires;
2. If the husband dies after the filing of the action, without him desisting from such. This
contemplates a situation where the husband dies during the pendency of the case, in this case,
the heirs may continue;
3. When the husband dies before the child was born.
It is only during these instances where the heirs are allowed to file an action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child because an action for impunity is the personal right of the husband.
Take Note: Even the mother or the paramour of the mother cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child. The
mother cannot disclaim that the child is not the child of her husband or cannot claim that the child is
fathered by her paramour. The law prohibits the mother from impugning the legitimacy of her own child.
This is illustrated in the case of Concepcion vs. CA, GR No.123450, 31 August 2005. The case involves a
couple, Gerardo and Theresa. During their marriage, a child was born. Subsequently, Gerardo discovered that
prior to his marriage with Theresa, the latter being already married to a certain Mario. Gerardo filed an
action in court to nullify their marriage with Theresa on the ground of Bigamy. The court granted the action
but Theresa took it against Jose Gerardo. Because of Gerardos action nullifying the marriage, their child, Jose
Gerardo has been bastardized. Theresa filed an action in court to deny Gerardo the right to visit Jose Gerardo
and to prohibit the latter from using the surname of Gerardo (Concepcion). In the RTC, both Gerardo and
Theresa admitted that the child was really the child of Gerardo. However, when the case reached SC, the SC
surprisingly ruled that actually Jose Gerardo is the legitimate son of Mario. Invoking the principle that a child
born inside a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. And since Theresa remains to be married to Mario,
even if Jose Gerardo was born during her cohabitation with Gerardo, Jose Gerardo is presumed to be the
legitimate child of Mario. It was argued that even Theresa herself admitted that the child was of Gerardo. But
SC said that even the mother or the paramour cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child. By admitting that
the child was Gerardos, Theresa was, in effect, impugning the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo, which is not
allowed under the law. Even if Gerardo himself admitted that it was his child, he was not the LEGAL husband
of Theresa, therefore, he cannot also claim or impugn legitimacy since the right belongs only to Mario and
Mario himself never impugned.
Although in the aforecited case, the SC said that the presumption for having disputed that no sexual intercourse
could have ensued between Theresa and Mario, there was no proof that sexual intercourse was impossible during
that period. It was established that Mario and Theresa just lived within the same city.
Neither can the child impugn his own legitimacy. This is illustrated in the case of Liyao vs. Liyao, GR No.138961, 7
March 2002. The latter case involves a child who was born during the illicit cohabitation between his mother and
her paramour, the mother separated in fact from her legitimate husband. The child filed an action to compel the
paramour to recognize his illegitimate filiation. Again, the SC ruled that the child is the legitimate child of the legal
husband of the mother, the latter still being married to the former. The action of the child compelling the
paramour to recognize him was in effect an action impugning his own legitimacy.
Q: What is the prescriptive period to impugn the legitimacy of the child?
A: 1 year, 2 years, 3 years. 1 year if the husband resides in the municipality where the child was born, 2 years if the
husband resides in a place other than the place where the child was born but within the same country, 3 years if
the husband is abroad.
Q: When do you reckon the prescriptive period?
A: The answer is in Art. 170:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth
or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it
was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of
the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
Q: How do you interpret the reckoning?
A: The first paragraph says that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the knowledge of birth. This
contemplates of a situation where the birth is not concealed from the husband. In this case prescriptive period
starts to run when the husband knew of the birth or at the time the baby was delivered. On the other hand, if the
birth was concealed or was not known, it should be from the time of discovery or knowledge of birth or of the fact
of registration.
Q: Discovery of birth or from registration?
A: This can be interpreted in two ways. Knowledge of birth or knowledge of registration? These are two different
things. No registration, but the husband came to know of the birth in other ways (e.g. somebody told him that his
wife gave birth), thats knowledge of birth. Registration, on the other hand, is when he came to know of the fact of
the registration of the birth of the baby in the civil register. But it can be also interpreted in such a manner that
even though he came to know of the registration more than 3 years, the fact that the baby was registered,
prescriptive period runs from the registration of the birth whether the husband came to know of it or not. This
serves as the logical interpretation because a recording in the registry would constitute a constructive notice to
the whole world that a baby was indeed born.
Q: Whats the effect?
A: In the first interpretation where insofar as registration is concerned, knowledge of registration is required, even
if the child is registered today but the husband knew of the registration 10 years from now, prescription starts to
run from the time the husband knew of the registration. This will defeat the purpose of the law. It is worth noting
that unlike any other prescriptive period, an action to impugn legitimacy has very short prescriptive periods. Why?
Because the law favors legitimacy, therefore, the intention to have very short periods is to wipe out, as early as
possible, any uncertainty in the status of the child because before the period of prescription expires, the status of
the child is always in danger of being impugned. If we are to interpret the prescription as to the time of knowledge
of registration, that is contrary to the very intent of the law. Second, Art. 170 in the second paragraph states that
whichever is earlier. If it was knowledge of birth and knowledge of registration, it would not make sense
because when the husband knew of the registration, it is no different from saying that the husband knew of
the birth.
For purposes of the bar, however, we should follow the interpretation of Sta. Maria that the reckoning point
of the prescriptive period, if the birth was concealed, should be from the knowledge of registration.
Take Note: the prescriptive period, whether 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years, should first be reckoned from the
knowledge of the husband, or knowledge of the heirs if the instances would allow the latter to impugn.
Take Note: If the action does not fall under Art. 166, even if it is the husband filing, it will not prosper.
This is illustrated in the case of Babiera vs. Catotal, GR No.138493, 15 June 2000. This is a case where a
certain couple, without their knowledge, a child delivered by their housemaid was made to believe that it
was the legitimate child of the couple. As it appears, the couple would have 2 legitimate children, their real
legitimate child and the child of the housemaid. When the couple died, the real legitimate child filed a case in
court to nullify the birth certificate of the other child who was made to appear as a legitimate child of his
parents. One of the arguments interposed by the bogus child was that the action is an action to impugn his
legitimacy which can only be filed by the husband and is subject to the rule on prescription. The SC rejected
the argument holding that the rule on actions to impugn legitimacy particularly the grounds and the
prescriptive period apply only in a situation where the child, no doubt is the child of the wife, but it is the
husband who questions that the child is not his own. But in this case, the true legitimate child contended
that the bogus child is not the child either by the wife or the husband. Meaning, the claim of the real
legitimate child is that the child is not the child of both husband and the wife. SC said that this is not the
situation contemplated in Art. 166 which applies only in actions to impugn legitimacy. Therefore,
prescription, proper party, grounds of actions to impugn do not apply, and since this is an action to nullify or
make void a certificate, it does not prescribe nor does it require only the husband as the proper party.
Take Note: Legitimacy of a child may not be attacked collaterally. In other words, if the husband disputes the
legitimacy of the child, the husband should file an action to impugn for that specific purpose so that the
husband, or the heirs, as the case may be, cannot assail the legitimacy of the child in another proceeding.
Much less raise it as a defense in an entirely different suit. So for example, if the husband is sued and
compelled to give support, he cannot interpose as a defense that he cannot give support to the child because
the child is illegitimate.
COMPARE:
Tison vs. CA, GR No.121027, 31 July 1997: Tison involves a property which belonged to a couple. When the
wife died, the husband adjudicated the property led by the wife unto himself claiming that he is the only sole
surviving heir of his wife. After the property was adjudicated, the husband sold the subject property to a
third party. Subsequently, the husband died. The nephew and niece of the wife went to court to file an
action to recover or reconvey the subject property sold to a third party claiming that disposition of a
property by the husband is void because they too had interest in the property left by the wife claiming that
they were left out in the estate of the wife. To prove their claim that they have interest in the subject
property, they had to prove that they were indeed the legitimate children of their father and that their father
was the brother of the wife. It was argued by the nephew and niece that the issue of WON the niece and the
nephew were indeed the legitimate children of their father amounted to an action to impugn their legitimacy
which cannot be done because only the husband can impugn and it can be done only in a direct action for
that purpose and not in an action for reconveyance of property. The third party cannot in effect impugn the
legitimacy of the nephew and niece of the heirs because it amounts to a collateral attack on their legitimacy
since the case was for reconveyance of property.
Fernandez vs. Fernandez, GR No.143256, 28 August 2001: This case involves a couple who, after the death of their
only son, became childless. It was claimed that when the couples child died, they purchased a baby for P20 from
the natural mother. Subsequently, the couple took the child as their own until the child grew up and the couple
died. After the death of the couple, the purported child executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate adjudicating
the property claiming that he is the legitimate child of the deceased. However, the nieces and nephews of the
deceased contested because they knew that the child was not really the legitimate child of the couple. They filed
an action in court to nullify the extrajudicial settlement as well as the deed of absolute sale purported by the child.
One of the issues raised was WON the nieces and nephews can file an action wherein they essentially impugned
the legitimacy of the child and that they did it in an action for nullity of documents which amounts to a collateral
attack. SC rejected the argument contending that the principle that only the husband may impugn the legitimacy
of the child and the legitimacy may not be collaterally attacked apply only in an instance where the child is really
the legitimate child of the wife, but the husband disputes that the child is not his child. In this case, as in Babiera
vs. Catotal, it was alleged that the purported legitimate child is not really the child of both the purported mother
and father. In other words, the case does not involve an action to impugn legitimacy.
Q: What is the rule if the child believes that he/she is the legitimate or illegitimate child of a particular parent, but
the parent refuses to acknowledge his/her legitimate or illegitimate child?
A: The Family Code accords this right to children whose filiation is denied or not recognized by the purported
parent. This right is to file an action to compel recognition either as a legitimate or illegitimate child.
Q: If you are filing an action to compel filiation, what proof do you need to establish your claim of filiation?
A: Art. 172 enumerates the grounds.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Take Note: Whether the document is private or public, it must be signed by the parent concerned, otherwise, it is
not binding. Even a birth certificate which is supposed to be a primary proof is not binding if it is not signed.
When you allege open and continuous possession of a child, thats only a conclusion of fact.
Q: How do you convince the court that you have open and continuous possession of the child?
A: The proof that constitutes such is specific. These overt acts constitute open and continuous possession. This is
illustrated in the case of Jison vs. CA, GR No.124853, 24 February 1998. The illegitimate daughter of a certain
lawyer sued the father to compel him to recognize her as his daughter. She was able to prove various instances
which constituted proof that indeed Fransisco has been consistently and oftenly treated her as her daughter.
Family portraits, Hospital bills that Fransisco paid for her daughter, the fact that he shouldered her education, the
fact that Fransisco paid for her board and lodging, clothing, etc., these are specific circumstances which constitute
proof of open and continuous possession of a child.
Take Note: Under the DNA testing method, when the DNA test yields negative or shows that the purported father
cannot be the real father, it is conclusive proof and cannot be overcome by contrary evidence. However, when the
result is positive or there is a possibility that the purported father can be the real father, the result is not
conclusive but merely disputable and it may be overcome by contrary evidence.
Take Note: In an action to compel recognition, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the same kind of proof is
required except that in an action to compel illegitimate filiation and the ground thereof is based on secondary
evidence, the action may only be filed during the lifetime of the purported parent. Because as a general rule, an
action to compel recognition whether legitimate or illegitimate, may be filed during the lifetime of the child. Matter Domestic Adoption Inter-Country Adoption
So long as the child is alive, the child can always file an action to compel legitimate or illegitimate filiation. Who may adopt? 1. Adopter must be at least 18; 1. Adopter must be at least 27;
This is so because in an action to compel illegitimate recognition with secondary evidence, the framers deem 2. Adopter could be an alien or 2. Adopter could be an alien or
it necessary that the purported parent should be given to rebut the claim of filiation. Filipino; Filipino;
3. If the adopter is Filipino, the 3. If the adopter is Filipino, he
As a general rule, an action to compel recognition may only be instituted by the child. Except in the following adopter could either be should be permanently
instances wherein the heirs may compel: (1) when the child dies during his minority; or (2) when the child residing in the Philippines or residing abroad.
dies in a state of insanity. Paras expressly stated that in both instances, there has to be death. The abroad;
prescriptive period is 5 years from the death. 4. If the adopter is an alien, 4. If the adopter is an alien, he
generally, he should reside in should not be a resident in
LEGITIMATION the Philippines for at least 3 the Philippines.
Legitimation is a process whereby an illegitimate child is accorded the status of a legitimate child. years before filing*

Q: Who may be legitimated?

A: Only those children conceived and born by parents who are capacitated to marry each other or by parents
who are below 18 but otherwise capacitated at the time of conception. Who may be adopted? 1. Adoptee if a child, must be 1. Adoptee must be below 15;
below 18;
If their parents got married but was subsequently nullified, there can be no legitimation. 2. Adoptee could be of age; 2. Adoptee should not be of age;
3. Adoptee could be a Filipino or 3. Adoptee should be Filipino;
Q: How does legitimation take place? alien;
A: Legitimation takes place by the subsequent marriage of the parents. By the mere fact of marriage of the Where to file the petition? 1. At the Family Court in the 1. At the Family Court in the
parents, legitimation takes place. However, that is not enough technically, you need to do a positive act to place where the Adopter place of the Adoptee;
perfect the process (i.e. submit an affidavit of legitimation to the local civil registrar). But under the law, resides;
legitimation takes place merely by marriage of the parents. 2. Can only be filed in the court; 2. May be filed in the Family
Court or directly with the
Legitimation retroacts to the childs birth. Adoption Agency abroad
Q: What happens if the child dies before the marriage of the parents? Will there be legitimation? where the Adopter resides;
A: Death terminates personality. There will be no legitimation. There is no one to be legitimated. However, if
the child is survived by his/her heirs, they will be benefited by the effect of legitimation. In other words, they *3 Exceptions: (1) If the alien was formerly a Filipino and he/she seeks to adopt his/her relatives within the 4 th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity; (2)
If he seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse; and (3) If an alien married to a Filipino seeking to adopt the relatives of his/her spouse
will be treated as children of a legitimate child. within the 4th civil degree

The status of a legitimated child may be assailed or impugned within 5 years from the death of either or both Q: What is the effect of Adoption?
parents. A: The adoption creates parent and child relationship. It creates paternity and filiation.
Q: Who may impugn?
A: Only interested parties whose successional rights may be affected. Take Note: The effect of adoption retroacts to the time of the filing of the petition. On the other hand, adoption
severs all relationship between the adopted child and his/her natural or biological parents. For purposes of
ADOPTION liability, what is material is: At the time the liability is incurred by the child, the one who has actual custody and
Adoption is legal filiation. This is the only mode where filiation is established legally. has parental authority over the child is the one responsible.

Take Note: Filiation by Adoption is a judicial or legal process.
In the Philippines we have 2 existing laws on adoption. RA 8552 is the Domestic Adoption Law and RA 8043 is
the Inter-Country Adoption Law.
Comparisons between Domestic and Inter-Country Adoption provided in the following table:
This is illustrated in the case of Tamago vs. CA. In the latter case, a child was undergoing the process of adoption.
While the petition for adoption was pending, the child shot and killed somebody. In the meantime, the adoption
was eventually granted. The issue in the case was WON the adopting parents may be held liable for the death
caused by the adopted child. This issue came about because the basic rule in adoption is that adoption retroacts to
the time of the filing of the petition, and therefore the adopting parents are deemed to have been the parent at
the time the petition was filed. SC ruled that while it is true that adoption retroacts to the filing of the petition, for
purposes of liability, the one who should be responsible for the damage caused by the adopted child should be the
one who ACTUALLY had custody and exercised parental authority at the time the child caused such damage.

Take Note: The effect of adoption is limited only between the adopter and the adopted child. It does not go
beyond their relationship, so that while the adopted is deemed to be a child of the adopter, the adopted cannot
be considered as the grandchild of the adopters parents and vice versa.
That is why for purposes of succession, only the adopter and the adopted are heirs to each other. When the
adopter dies, the adopted inherits and vice-versa. That is also why the adopter and the adopted do not have
the right of representation.
Q: What is this right of representation?
A: Under the law on succession, suppose we have the lolo, son and the apo. Ordinarily, when the lolo dies,
the son inherits. If the son dies, the apo inherits from his/her own father/mother. The son is supposed to
inherit from the lolo if the lolo dies, but in a situation where the son dies ahead of the lolo, as between the
lolo and the apo, there is no succession because the supposed heir dies ahead of the decedent. By the right
of representation, the apo represents the son and therefore inherits from the lolo what the son would have
inherited from him had the son been alive.
This does not apply if the relationship between the son and the apo is created by virtue of adoption. So if the
son dies ahead of the lolo, the apo cannot receive the supposed legitime of the son by the right of
representation.
Q: What about the relationship between the adopted child and his natural parents?
A: Adoption severs the relationship between the adopted and his natural parents and therefore, parental
authority ceases on the part of the natural parents and ceases to be heirs of each other. So if the adopted
child dies, the natural parents cannot inherit from the adopted child, except when the adopted child
executes a will in favor of his/her natural parents.
When a decree of adoption is issued and the child is already adopted, he is deemed to be a legitimate child
and is deemed to have the same rights and privileges as a legitimate child including the right to use the
surname of the adopter but excluding the aforementioned right of representation.
Take Note: In the case of In Re: In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Honorato
Catindig, petitioner, GR No.1483311, 31 March 2005 where the adopted child is allowed to use the surname
of the natural mother as her middle name.
The adopted child is entitled to inherit from the adopter in the same extent as the natural legitimate child.
SUPPORT
Support comprises everything for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical expenses, education, and
transportation. These are the basic necessities.
Take Note: This is subjective. Support is always in keeping with the resources of the family. There is no fixed
standard of how much, it depends on the resources of the giver and the need of the demander.
Support is legally demandable.
Q: Who are the persons obliged to support each other?
A: Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole
extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)
Take Note: Based on the enumeration, when the relationship between the parent and the child is
illegitimate, support ends with the apo and not beyond.
Q: What is the rule in instances where the obligation to support falls on two or more persons obliged to give
support?
A: The law provides for an order of priority. When the obligation falls upon two or more persons, the first priority
is the spouse. It is only when the spouse is unable or incapacitated when you may go to the next line, and so on
and so forth as illustrated in Art. 195 of the FCP. If there are two or more descendants, you go to the nearest. In
default, incapacity or refusal, you go now to your ascendants, if there are two or more, the nearest, and onwards.
Suppose there are two or more persons under the same line (i.e. two or more children supporting two parents)
obliged to give support, the rule is the liability should be shared by them in proportion to the respective resources.
The children are obliged to give support in proportion to their respective net worth but the court in its discretion
may order one of them to give the full support subject for reimbursement from the others to the extent of their
share.
Q: What is the rule if 1 person is called upon to give support to two or more persons entitled to give support from
him (i.e. the head of the family supporting many children) and the resources are insufficient to cover them?
A: The law provides for an order of priority as illustrated earlier. But in case of the spouse and the minor child
concur, and the resources are not sufficient, the child is preferred over the spouse.
Q: What happens if a stranger, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, gives support to the
one entitled to receive?
A: The rule is the stranger has the right to ask reimbursement from the person obliged to give support unless that
stranger did not intend to be reimbursed.
Q: What about if the person obliged to give support unjustifiably refuses to give support but there is urgent need
on part of the person entitled to give support?
A: A stranger may give support, but that stranger is entitled to reimbursement from the person who refuses.
Take Note: Support is demandable the moment the need arises. So with respect to a child, support is demandable
even if the child is still inside the maternal womb, more so if already born. The need is deemed to arise the
moment the child is conceived. But the law is categorical that while support is demandable the moment the need
arises, payment shall only be done as of the time demand is made, whether judicially or extrajudicially, otherwise,
he may not be compelled to give it. The person obliged to give support may not be compelled to pay for the
expenses accruing before the demand was made.
So if the child was born today, 3 years thereafter, the father refused to give support but no demand was made
either, it was only on the 4th year where the demand was made, the father may not be compelled to give support
accruing from today until 3 years thereafter because during this period, while the need for support arose but
demandable, no demand was made whether judicially or extrajudicially. For evidential purposes, there has to be a
formal written demand.
Once the demand is made, obligation accrues. So from the time the demand was made up to the time payment
was actually made, the person obliged to give support is liable to pay for the support in those years. So if on the
fourth year, demand was made, but it was only in the tenth year when payment was actually made, the person
obliged to give support is liable for support from the time demand was made up to the time payment was made.
But never support accruing before demand was made.
Unjustifiable refusal to give support could send somebody to jail for contempt, or worse, it is a criminal offense,
under the VAWC law.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority covers parental authority over the person, as well as over the property of the person under
parental authority.
Take Note: Parental authority covers custody. Custody emanates from parental authority. One that has
parental authority has the custody of the child.
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the
children are under parental authority. (311a)
Art. 211 does not distinguish whether the child is legitimate or illegitimate. However, we need to distinguish
Art. 211 from Art. 176.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, xxxx
Q: How do you reconcile Art. 176 and Art. 211?
A: According to Sta. Maria, the way to reconcile the two provisions is that 211 applies when the paternity of
the child is certain, meaning there is no dispute that the child is the child of the husband and the father-
husband is living together with the wife-mother and the illegitimate child. On the other hand, 176 applies
when (1) the paternity of the child is disputed; and (2) even if it is not disputed, the husband-father is not
living together with the wife-mother and the child.
But if the child is legitimate, ALWAYS apply 211.
Q: What happens if the husband and the wife separates?
A: All through often, when marital conflict arises, issue on custody also arises. The rule is: The custody of the
children shall be awarded to the spouse designated by the court. In legal separation, nullity or annulment, if
the spouses have children, the decision is always coupled with adjudication as to whom the custody is
awarded. In determining who should be awarded, the court must take into consideration the choice of the
children who are 7 years old and above. In real practice, the court would even ask the child in open court to
pick their choice, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Children below 7 cannot be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons. The bottom-line is the court should determine is the childs best
interest would be served with the parent to whom custody is awarded.
Q: What happens if a minor child causes damage or injury to another? Who should shoulder the liability?
A: The parents are primarily liable for the damage caused by the acts or omissions of children in their
custody. This is the so called vicarious liability.
Q: What is the rule if the parents die or are absent, or incapacitated?
A: In case of default of parents, the law accords with substitute parental authority. These persons are (1)
surviving grandparents; (2) brothers and sisters of age unless unfit or disqualified; (3) any person having
actual custody of the child, of age and unless unfit or disqualified. Even a stranger is given parental authority
by law and therefore, it comes with it the obligation to support. This is an instance where support is
demandable from a stranger. This is an example of the principle that support emanates from parental
authority. One who exercises substitute parental authority assumes all the responsibilities and exercises all
the rights of the parents of the child.
So in case the child causes damage or injury, by his acts or omissions, the person exercising substitute
parental authority is liable as the childs parents.
Q: What happens if a minor child causes damage or injury to another while under the custody, supervision or
instruction of the school or any entity engaged in child care?
A: Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)
Insofar as schools are concerned, these special parental authorities aforementioned are the school administrators
and teachers.
When a minor child causes damage or injury while under the supervision, instruction, or custody of the school, the
school or entity is primarily liable for the damage caused. Primarily liable meaning the liability is devolved upon
them exclusively and may not be transferred because the said liability is expressed by law. The liability of the
parents or the persons exercising substitute parental authority is only subsidiary, meaning, they can be compelled
to pay only if the school or entity are unable to pay or insolvent. Take note, the parents or the persons subsidiary
liable may only be compelled to pay only if the school or entity is insolvent. Mere refusal to pay is not enough to
hold the parents or the persons exercising substitute parental authority subsidiarily liable.
Waivers are actually against public policy. These are inadmissible in court. Although some waivers are crafted in
such a way that it may be acceptable (i.e. the school may not be liable for any injury or loss caused by events
caused beyond their control.) but NEVER an absolute waiver.
Q: When is the child deemed under the custody of the school or entity engaged in child care?
A: The minor child is deemed under the custody, instruction or supervision when the latter is (1) inside the
premises of the school in pursuance of a legitimate student objective; or (2) in the exercise of a legitimate student
right; or (3) in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege. These circumstances presuppose that the child
must be a legitimate student.
Distinguish Art. 218 of the FCP from Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2181 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Under the NCC, if the school is held liable for the damages caused by the child, and the school paid the said
damages, the school has the right to be reimbursed from the one who caused the damage, in that case the parents
of the child. This is no longer true under the FCP, that liability is primary on the part of the school or entity,
although insofar as the latter are concerned, their liability is solidary.
According to Sta. Maria, to reconcile 218 with 2180, he said that 2180 applies to a situation where the student is
no longer a minor. 218 specifically applies to a situation where the student is still a minor below 18.
USE OF SURNAMES
In the Philippines, every person is allowed to use the first name and the surname. In fact, the middle name is
not required. The first name is used to identify an individual and distinguish him from the rest. The surname
is to indicate the particular family to which that individual belongs.
Q: What is the rule on surnames insofar as married women are concerned?
A: The rule insofar as married women are concerned is only directory. Its not compulsory. There is no law
that compels married women to use the surname of their husband. There are 3 ways where a married
woman may use her name: (1) she may choose her usual full maiden name; (2) she may choose her full
maiden name and add the family name of her husband; or (3) she may choose to use her first name and the
surname of her husband; or (4) use the full name of her husband but indicate a prefix that she is the wife of
such (i.e. Mrs. Lawrence Flores).
Q: What if they are separated, annulled or nullified?
A: If she was the guilty party, she should restore her full maiden name, otherwise, she may choose to use the
family name of her former husband. In case of the death of the husband, the widow may continue to use the
surname of her deceased husband. In case of separation, and the married woman is not the guilty party, she
may choose to continue the surname of her husband except when there is a court order or when both of
them remarries.
2. If the new name or nick name has been habitually and consistently used by the petitioner and the latter
is publicly known in the community to be bearing that first name or nick name;
3. If the change is intended to avoid confusion.
These are the only grounds where the change in first name or nick name may be made.
Take Note: The case of Silverio vs. Republic where a person involved sex reassignment procedure filed a petition
to change his name from Rommel to mely on the ground that she has already obtained a change of gender
through surgery. SC dismissed the petition holding that in our jurisdiction, sex reassignment is not a valid mode of
changing ones gender.
Distinguish this from the case of Republic vs. Cagandahan where someone who was endowed naturally with the
best of both worlds, male and female genitals, was allowed by the SC which gender. The SC allowed him to change
his name from Jennifer to Jeff.
Take Note: Before, illegitimate children were not allowed to use the surname of their natural father. But with the
enactment of the so-called, Revilla Law, illegitimate children are now allowed to use the surname of their
natural father when their illegitimate filiation are recognized by their father through records in the LCR or
admissions made in some public written document or private handwritten document.

Q: What is the rule on change of first name or surname?

A: Before, no change in the entry in the Local Civil Registrar can be made without judicial order. This is no Disclaimer: These notes are made solely for review purposes and cannot guarantee a passing grade. However,
longer true today because there is a special law which authorizes the LCR to correct clerical or typographical these have been very helpful to me when I took this subject and I hope this will also help you.
error or to change first name or nick name without prior judicial order.
Sincerely, KRB.
Q: What are the entries covered under the new law, the so-called Gunigundo Law?
A: The changes may be done administratively by the LCR. (1) Correction of clerical or typographical errors;
and (2) change of first names and nick names.

Q: What are clerical or typographical errors?

A: A clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in the
writing, copying, transcribing, or typing of an entry in the LCR which are harmless and innocuous (i.e.
misspelled name, misspelled place of birth, and the like, which is visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding and can be changed or corrected by reference to other existing records, provided that no
change must be made if it involves nationality, status, age, and sex). If the intended change involves
nationality, status, age, and sex, court order is required. The rule applicable is the Rules of Court on
correction of entries.

Q: Does these clerical or typographical errors cover changes involving the surname?
A: According to Atty. Torregosa, Yes it covers the surname because the law explicitly said name, no
distinction, and the change insofar as typographical surname errors are concerned are harmless and
innocuous, visible to the eyes and obvious to the understanding and can be corrected by reference to other
existing records (i.e. Birth records of the parents and brothers or sisters). Unfortunately, after a number of
attempts, Atty. Randi has failed to convince any LCR. They have this fixated notion that when it comes to
surname, no amount of change or correction can be done without a court order. In real practice, if it involves
a change in surname, you have to go to court.

Take Note: While this new law allows change in first name, whether typographical or just a change in such,
that this can only be done if there are grounds present and the rule specifies the grounds thereof:

1. If the petitioner finds the first name or nick name ridiculous or tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;