Property Case Digests (Atty.
Vivencio Abano)
Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Adriano Maneclang in this case filed a complaint for quieting of title
over a certain fishpond located within the 4 parcels of land
belonging to them situated in Pangasinan but the trial court
dismissed it by saying that the body of water is a creek constituting
a tributary to Agno River therefore public in nature and not
subject to private appropriation.
o They appealed it to the IAC which affirmed the
aforementioned decision. Hence, this review on certiorari.
However, after having been asked to comment to the case thereon,
they manifested their lack of interest and the parties to the case (the
complainant and the awardee in the public bidding Maza) decided to
amicably settle the case saying that judgment be rendered and that the
court recognize the ownership of the petitioners over the land
the body of water found within their titled properties.
o They say that there would be no benefit since the NIA already
constructed a dike and no water now gets in and out of the
land.
Issue:
Whether or not the fishpond is public in nature.
Ratio:
Yes. A creek is defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea.
o It is a property belonging to the public domain and is
not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription.
o The mere construction of the dikes by NIA nor its conversion
to a fishpond altered or changed the nature of the creek as
property of the public domain.
The compromise agreement is null and void and of no legal effect
because it is contrary to law and public policy.
Villarico v. Sarmiento
Facts:
Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy
Aquino Avenue highway by a strip of land belonging to the
government.
Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the said
government land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson
Corp.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villarico
acquired a portion of the same area owned by the
government.
o He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents
(Vivencio) on the government land closed his right of way to
the Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of his
lot.
Issue:
Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA.
Ratio:
No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way
to the lot belongs to the state or property of public dominion.
o It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined to
privileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public.
Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is
for the use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property
for public dominion.
o Public dominion property is outside the commerce of
man and hence, it cannot be:
Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter
of contracts
Acquired by prescription against the state
Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution
Be burdened by any voluntary easement
It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor
of the petitioner and petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself and
he cannot claim any right of possession over it.
Abrogar v. People
Facts:
Abrogar here is being accused with theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that he effectively stole
the business from PLDT while using its facilities.
o He filed a motion to quash the information since according to
him it does not contain material allegations charging the
petitioner with theft of personal property since long distance
calls and the business of providing telecommunication are not
personal properties under theft.
Issue:
Whether or not "stealing the business from PLDT while using its
facilities" constitutes taking of personal property within the meaning
of Art. 308 of the RPC.
Ratio:
PERSONAL PROPERTY is defined as anything susceptible of
appropriation and not included in the chapter in real property in the
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
Civil Code. This court has consistently ruled in the past that any
personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft.
o Any property which is not included in the enumeration in the
chapter on real property and capable of appropriation can be
the subject of theft under the RPC.
TO appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing and it
may be committed through the use of the offender's own hands, as well
as any mechanical device such as access device.
o Accused here was charged with using ISR or the unauthorized
routing and completing of international long distance calls
using lines to make the calls.
o This is punishable as subtraction under a Revised Ordinance
of Manila.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is
likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under the
RPC.
o It is not included as real property in the Civil Code but in
previous cases, it has been held as personal property.
Petitioners acts constitutes theft of respondent's business
and service by means of unlawful use of the latter's facilities.
o Hence, the amendment information describes the offense
inaccurately by making it seem that what he took were the
long distance calls rather than the business.
o It cannot be said that PLDT is the owner of the "calls" because
they merely encode the voices and decode them.
o It is the use of the communication facilities without the
consent that constitutes the crime of theft.
Tayag v. Lacson
Facts:
Respondents (the Lacsons) herein were registered owners of 3 parcels
of land in Pampanga which were tenanted agricultural lands
administered by a certain Renato Espinosa.
o The farmers and tillers executed in favor of petitioner herein
(Tayag) Deeds of Assignment wherein they assigned their
respective rights as tenants and tillers of the landholdings
possessed and tilled by them for a consideration. In the said
Deed of Assignment, the said amount was to be payable
"when the legal impediments to the sale of the
property to Tayag no longer existed". Also in the said
deed, Tayag was granted the exclusive right to buy the
property if and when the Lacsons, with concurrence of the
farmers, agreed to sell the property.
Tayag set a meeting with the tenants to work out the implementation
of the said deed but the tenants instead wrote to Tayag and said that
they decided to sell their rights to the property to the Lacsons
instead.
o Tayag instituted a civil action against the tenants because he
has already been making partial payments to the subject
property, as well as an action against the Lacsons because he
alleges that they induced the tenants to breach the agreement
between them.
In answer to the complaint against them, the successors in interest of
Lacson (since he died already during the pendency of the case) stated
that they never induced the tenants to violate the contract with Tayag
and that the tillers had no right to enter into the transaction
without their knowledge and consent. They also allege that the
contract between Tayag and the tenants are contrary to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
o On the other hand, the tenants, as answer also to the
complaint filed against them stated that they were merely
deceived into believing that the alleged partial
payments were loans. They say that they never knew that
what they signed with Tayag was a Deed of Assignment.
Tayag herein prayed for injunctive relief against the tenants to
prevent them from selling their rights and interests in the land to
Lacson, and upon knowledge of this, Lacson motioned to dismiss such
prayer.
o The court ruled in favor of Tayag saying that the injunctive
relief is entitled to him because of his material allegations in
the civil case. Hence, Lacson petitioned for certiorari to the
CA.
o The CA ruled in favor of Lacson and said that he cannot be
enjoined since they were not privies to the deeds of
assignment executed herein.
Issues:
Whether or not the issuance of the RTC of the preliminary injunction
is warranted.
Whether or not Lacson and the tenants can be enjoined from selling to
each other the rights and interest of the subject property.
Whether or not the deeds of assignment executed by the tenants were
contrary to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Ratio:
The respondents here contend that the CA cannot permanently enjoin
the parties to institute a simple civil action again since the only
question posted to them when they filed a petition for certiorari is
"whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion for reconsideration of
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
the respondents for the denial/dismissal of the petitioner's
plea for a writ of preliminary injunction"
o In the decision of the RTC before it was appealed to the CA,
they ruled that the petitioner was entitled to injunctive relief,
however, this court rules that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the petitioner
such injunctive relief.
o Preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event
calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things
until the merits of the case can be heard. It rests on the sound
discretion of the court. It is a limitation upon the freedom of
action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly
or precipitately. It should rest on the existence of a cause
of action. If the right is doubtful, injunction is not proper.
o In this case, petitioner failed to prove the existence of the
essential requisites for him to be entitled to such injunctive
relief. The respondents cannot be enjoined to dispose their
property.
The rightful owner of the property in question is the respondent
(Lacson) and he cannot be enjoined by the trial court from disposing
his property without any other limitations than those established by
law in accordance with the Civil Code.
o The right to dispose, sell, encumber, transfer and
even destroy the property is in the hands of the
owner. It also includes the right to recover the possession
of the property from any other person whom the owner has
not transmitted by appropriate action.
o However, it is not absolute, it is limited by the law, such as
the agrarian reform laws.
The respondents in this case were not parties to the deeds of
assignment and there is no evidence that they agreed, expressly or
impliedly to the deeds or to the terms set forth therein. He even
testified in the RTC that he had no knowledge of such deeds.
The action of Tayag against the tenants also have no legal basis since
the terms of the deed of assignment itself states that the sale will only
happen if the legal impediments to the sale no longer exists.
o In this case the legal impediments were that the Lacsons, have
not yet decided to sell the property, and the lack of approval
from the Department of Agrarian Reform (since the parcel of
land was subject to the CARP)
o Contrary to what the petitioner avers, this is no option
contract since the grantors were merely the tenants and
not the registered owners of the property.
On the issue of the CARP, the tenants, by assigning their rights to
the petitioner herein, would become disqualified from becoming
beneficiaries of the land hence, they would become landless again for a
measly sum. This scheme of the petitioner is subversive, and in
violation of public policy and the agrarian laws.
Panganiban v. Oamil
Facts:
2 properties are the subject of this case, the first one is the "21st
portion" and the second one, we refer to as "the Canda St. portion."
Petitioners in this case and their father (Partenio) are the co-owners of
such property. 1/2 to the father, as his conjugal share, and 1/6 of
the remaining half to the petitioners as surviving heirs.
Oamil was the buyer in this case and she filed an action for specific
performance in the trial court praying that the father be ordered to
execute a deed of sale of the parcel of land which is covered by their
agreement. However, there is a confusion as to what the subject of the
agreement was (whether it was the 21st portion or the Canda portion)
o In its decision the RTC ordered that the deed of absolute sale
be executed, however they did not state which portion of
the property should be deeded.
Acting on this decision, the petitioners averred to the CA that their
properties were still being subject of a partition proceeding and that
their case is still pending with the Court of Appeals. Hence, the RTC
cannot yet decide on which property was the subject of the sale
between Oamil and Paternio.
o When the partition proceeding was decided, the Canda portion
was awarded as the conjugal share of Paternio.
o However, the CA still rendered a decision to the contrary and
stated that the subject property in the sale consists of
the 21st portion thereby disregarding the decision in
the parition proceeding.
o Respondents here moved for reconsideration but it was denied
for being dispensable parties to the case despite their claims of
co-ownership.
They appealed to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are indispensable parties to the civil
case for the reason that they are co-owners of the subject property.
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the subject property of the
sale was the 21st portion and not the Canda portion despite the
decision in the partition proceeding.
Ratio:
They can intervene in this case since they are indispensable
parties to the case. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons and during its
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
existence, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the
community property until the partition thereof.
o All that a co-owner has is an ideal or abstract or proportionate
share in the entire land or thing.
o Before partition, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of
his undivided interest in the common property.
In the event of a division, assignees of one or more of the co-owners
may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and
object to its being effected without their concurrence. But
they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless
there has been fraud, or in case it was made, notwithstanding a formal
opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the
debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
o The decision in the partition case determines what Paternio,
and the respondent (as his successor in interest) is entitled to
in the civil case.
o As the successor in interest, they cannot acquire any
superior right in the property than what Partenio is
entitled to or could transfer or alienate after
partition.
In the contract of sale, what the vendee obtains by
virtue of such sale are the same rights as the vendor
had as co-owner and the vendee merely steps into the
shoes of the vendor as co-owner.
The decision of the courts in the partition proceeding is the
law of the case and is conclusive on the issue of which
specific portion of the property became the subject matter of
the sale between Partenio and Oamil.
o The effect of the transfer is limited to the portion which may
be awarded to him upon the partition of the property, it
cannot exceed the portion of Partenio.
The principle of conclusiveness should be observed by the
courts.
o In order that it can be conclusive, it must be of the same
parties, and that the issue must be identical.
Bongalon v. CA
Facts:
Rosalia is the owner of a lot and sometime in the year 1943, her 3
children, Trinidad, Conchita and Teodora executed a deed of sale
conveying to Cirila a part of the lot.
o On the same day, Cirila, Trinidad and Conchita and Teodora
executed another deed of sale conveying to Pedro Bongalon
a part of the lot for a consideration.
However, acting alone, Cirila executed another deed of absolute sale
conveying the said lot to Amparo which was subsequently declared in
her name for tax purposes and paid real estate taxes therefor.
Meanwhile, in an extrajudicial settlement instituted by Pedro, he
declared that Cirila is the only heir of Rosalia and therefore, he is the
only heir of Cirila making the subject property's TCT here issued in his
own name. He thereafter filed a case for Quieting of title and Recovery
of portion of the property and damages against Amparo alleging that
he is the registered owner of such property.
o In support of his claim during the trial he presented the deeds
of absolute sale executed to him and the extrajudicial
settlement declaration that Cirila was the owner of the entire
lot which she later sold to Amparo (double sale).
The trial court ruled that Pedro was the rightful owner of the property
and ordered Amparo to vacate the land in question.
o Respondent appealed to the CA and reversed the RTC decision
saying that, the basis of the complaint of Pedro is that he
inherited the said property as evidenced by the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate but such extrajudicial settlement is
tainted with fraud and misrepresentation since there
are 7 more children.
Issues:
What is the basis and extent of Pedro's interest in the subject
property?
Whether or not the sale to Amparo casts a cloud on Pedro's title.
Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid.
Ratio:
When Rosalia died, she passed on the piece of property to her
surviving spouse and their five children. Such heirs inherited the lot in
co-ownership at 1/6 undivided share each. After their father died, their
shares increased to 1/5 each. Since they were co-owners of the
property, the extent of Pedro's share in the property is only up
to the undivided shares of Cirila, Trinidad, Teodora and
Conchita (the sellers). He did not acquire ownership of the entire lot
since the other co-owners did not take part in the sale.
o Each co-owner has dull ownership of his part and may alienate
it but the alienation affects only the portion which pertains to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The deed of sale to Amparo casts a cloud on Pedro's title.
(Cloud means any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but in truth it is
invalid).
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
o The sale to Amparo is invalid because at the time of the
execution, Cirila had no interest to sell the lot because she
already sold her interest to Pedro.
Pedro falsely stated that Cirila was the only heir of Rosalia
and in turn, he was the sole heir of Cirila. This is not a minor
defect and renders the Extrajudicial settlement void. But this
cancellation does not deprive him of the right to maintain action for
quieting title. He has interest over the lot insofar as it as sold to him by
the co-owners.
Resuena v. CA
Facts:
Juanito is the co-owner of parcels of land in Cebu. He owns 6/8 of Lot
1 and late Spouses Bascon owns 2/8 thereof. The other lot, Lot 2 is
owned in common y Juanito and the heirs of Nicolas but the
proportion of their undivided shares was not determined.
Resuena herein, allegedly with the permission of Spouses Bacson
resided in the upper portion of Lot 1 and Rosario resided in a portion
of Lot 2 with the permission also of Nicolas.
Juanito developed the lots in question into a resort and he demanded
that Resuena and Rosario vacate their homes. .
o The MTC ruled in favor of Resuena and Rosario saying that
since it was not yet partitioned, he had no right to evict
them.
o On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and said
that any of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment because in a sense a co-owner is the owner and
possessor of the whole and that the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all co-owners.
o The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
Whether or not Juanito, as co-owner has the right to eject Resuena
and Rosario.
Whether or not the verbal agreement (that the seashore portion will be
Juanito's share and the upper portion, theirs) between them (other co-
owners) was already an executed contract.
Ratio:
Respondent has the right to eject petitioners. According to the
Civil Code, any one of the co-owners may bring an action to eject.
It is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent
to evict petitioners. He may bring actions to exercise and protect the
rights of all co-owners. But an adverse decision cannot prejudice the
rights of co-owners.
The verbal agreement between them hardly establishes a
definitive partition. Despite such agreement, their co-ownership
remain inchoate and undivided. Since they are not successors in
interest, Juanito is not estopped.
Balcodero v. CA
Facts:
Bosing and Oday are spouses with three children but sometime in
1946, he left the conjugal home and started to live with Josefa Rivera
with whom he begot one child names Josephine (petitioner in this
case).
During their cohabitation, Bosing purchased a parcel of land and
indicated that his civil status as married to Josefa (the common law
wife).
o He even married said common law wife while his marriage
with Oday was still subsisting.
o 3 years later, the legal wife and Josephine executed an
extrajudicial partition on the lot bought which they allege was
their conjugal property. A TCT was issued in favor of
Josephine.
The common law wife here alleges that it was a conjugal property
between her and Bosing.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for reconveyance of the property has
prescribed.
Whether or not the action for reconveyance is based on implied or
constructive trust.
Whether or not the property belongs to the petitioners
Ratio:
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal property
of Bosing and Oday since all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership. The provisions under Article 147
or 148 shall apply as the case may be.
A constructive trust was deemed to have been created by
operation of law at the time of Bosing's demise. As stated by
Article 1456, if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is by force of law considered to be a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
The period or prescription starts to run from the
establishment of an implied trust. The applicable prescriptive
period here, since it arises from law, is 10 years. It is counted from the
time the transaction affecting the property is registered with the
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
corresponding issuance of a new certificate of title. IN this case, only 6
years and 4 months have elapsed.
The legal wife herein is not disqualified to the estate since there was no
legal separation case instituted by the deceased despite her alleged
marriage to another man.
Imperial v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
The subject properties in this case are Lot 1091 and Lot 1052 co-owned
by Adela and Melanio Imperial.
o Adela executed a document which waived her rights over
the lots mentioned but in turn, Melanio also executed a
document which declared that the document executed
by Adela was a simulated one in order to expedite the
registration of the lots in his name.
o Nevertheless, by virtue of the document of waiver which Adela
executed, Melanio was able to obtain the lots herein in his
name. Thereafter, he executed another document which
acknowledged the half share of his sister in both lots and
further stated that his sister was entitled to the proceeds of the
sale of the subdivision in the said lots.
Later, it was found out that Melanio was able to sell Lot 1052 and the
proceeds of said sale were not given to Adela. Hence, her daughter
filed this case which prayed for the reconveyance of the entire
Lot 1091 since the proceeds from the sale of Lot 1052 were
not given to her mother (as the co-owner thereof).
o In defense of the claim of Rosa (successor of Adela), Melanio
contended that Adela already sold the said property to him
while she was still alive as evidence by 3 receipts purportedly
for payment for the said property.
Issue:
Whether or not Lot 1091 should be reconveyed to Adela.
Ratio:
In this case, the SC found out that contrary to what Melanio avers,
there was no deed of sale executed by Adela in favor of
Melanio ceding lot 1091. 3 receipts were presented as evidence and
the last one bears the date "May 7, 1980" which is impossible since the
Adela already died on May 4.
o Also, in examining the receipts presented, the court came up
with the conclusion that the amounts mentioned therein are
paid by petitioner to Adela without the intention that it was
part of the purchase price of Lot 1091. It was only the latter's
share in the proceeds of the sales of subdivision lots which
were part of 1091.
oIf a sale was intended by the siblings, it is unusual that he did
not ask for the execution of a Deed of Sale which ceded to him
the share of Adela in the lot.
The lot now belongs to the estate of the late Adela Imperial
Solleza represented by her heirs in this case.
Tumlos v. Fernandez
Facts:
An action for ejectment was filed against the petitioners herein
(Tumlos). In this action the spouses (Fernandez) allege that they are
absolute owners of a building wherein the petitioners are
residing. However, Guillerma Tumlos herein alleges that he spouses
have no cause of action since she is a co-owner of the property
as evidenced by a contract to sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with
Mario Fernandez.
o she further states that she and Mario had an amorous
relationship and that they acquired the property in question
as their love nest.
o They acquired the property during their cohabitation.
RTC ruled that she was a co-owner thereof and could not be ejected
from it.
The CA ruled that the claim of co-ownership must fail since the
provision governing them is Article 148 which requires that there be
proof of actual contribution in the purchase of the subject
property.
o They found her contention to be unjustified.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is a co-owner of the property
Whether or not they cannot be ejected on the ground that they have
the substantive right of support
Ratio:
She is not the co-owner of the property. The governing provision
is Article 148 because their alleged cohabitation amounted to
concubinage. Since it was clear that Mario was incapacitated to marry
Guillerma because he had a wife, the governing provision is Article
148.
o She failed to present any evidence that she made an actual
contribution to the purchase of the subject property and
anchors her claim merely on her cohabitation.
o In this article, administration does not amount to
contribution.
Petitioner argues that since Mario is liable for support, this prevails
over the rights to eject her in the building. But the court stated that
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
this is an ejectment suit and is summary in character and
must deal solely with the issue of possession of the property
in dispute.
o Besides, the support claim cannot hold since the law requires
that there be extrajudicial demand and none was made here.
Munoz v. Ramirez
Facts:
Spouses Ramirez here are owners of a residential house which they
mortgaged with the GISIS to secure a loan. The title to the said
property however, was transferred to Munoz herein by virtue of a sale
in order to pay for the loan they contracted with GISIS with Erlinda
acting as attorney in fact.
A downpayment was given but the petitioner refused to give the
remaining balance because one of the spouses unsigned an affidavit.
o Since they failed to pay the rentals and failed to repurchase the
property, he filed an ejectment suit against the spouses.
It was later found out that the land where the house in question was
built was paraphernal property of Erlinda because it was acquired by a
gratuitous title from her parents.
o The Special power of Attorney allegedly executed by Eliseo was
also found out to be a forgery hence, Erlinda had no power to
sell the land without the consent of the husband (if the
property is conjugal).
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not the property (house) is conjugal
Whether or not the contract between petitioner and the spouses is an
equitable mortgage
Ratio:
All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved. But in this case, since the
residential lot was inherited, it was the exclusive property of the
spouse. To find out whether the house is conjugal or
paraphernal, we have to look at the improvements made on the
separate property of the spouses.
o When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of
the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the
conjugal.
o Otherwise, it is paraphernal.
o In this case, the improvements were less than the value of the
property, hence paraphernal.
o The written consent of Eliseo is not necessary hence, whatever
contract entered into is valid.
It is an equitable mortgage because the vendor remained in
possession as the lessee, the purchaser retained for himself
a part of the purchase price, the vendor bound himself to pay
for the taxes, and because the real intention was to secure
the payment of a debt. These instances, according to the civil code
gives rise to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage.
Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio De Jesus
Facts:
Gregorio De Jesus (respondent) filed a complaint for the recovery of
ownership and possession with damages over the subject property in
this case. In his complaint, he stated that he acquired said property
and when he caused a verification survey of it, he discovered that
the northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon
by a building of PNB (petitioner).
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner said that when he
acquired the lot from Mayor Ignacio, the encroachment was
already in existence and they even tried to remedy the said
encroachment by an offer to sell the area. Unfortunately, this sale did
not materialize by reason that the lot was mortgaged.
The trial court decided the case in favor of the respondent declaring
him to be the rightful owner and ordered the petitioner to surrender
the possession of the property to respondent and to cause the removal
of any improvement thereon.
The CA sustained this decision of the trial court but deleted the award
of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not PNB was a builder in bad faith over the encroached
property.
Whether or not the provisions on Article 448 of the Civil Code should
be applied to this case.
Ratio:
PNB would fall short from its claim of good faith in this case
since he was quite aware and was, in fact advised, prior to its
acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part
of the building sold to it stood on the land not covered by the
land conveyed to it. Good faith should be understood to be an
intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition and it encompasses among other things, an honest belief,
the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek
an unconscionable advantage. Good faith implies honesty if intention
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
and freedom from knowledge of the circumstances which out to put
the holder upon inquiry.
o One is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
The provisions of Art 448 of the Civil Code does not apply to
this case. It refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by
two or more parties, one of whom has built some works and not to a
case where the OWNER OF THE LAND IS THE BUILDER
who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or
otherwise for, elsewise stated, "where the true owner
himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of
good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant."
Sula Nayon Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino Foundation
Facts:
Nayong Pilipino Foundation (respondent) leased a portion of their
complex to Sulo (petitioner) for the construction and operation of a
hotel building to be known as the Philippine Village Hotel. The
contract of lease was renewable for a period of another 25 years and
when the lessee notified the lessors of the intention to renew the
contract, they agreed.
Petitioners, however, defaulted in the payment of their rentals. Thus,
respondents demanded them to pay in arrears and vacate the
premises.
o A complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted in the MeTC
and a decision was rendered in favor of the respondents
stating that Article 448 does not apply to the instant case as
contended by the petitioners. They, instead, applied Article
1678 of the Civil Code which grants them the right to
reimburse of the value of the improvement.
o On appeal, the RTC modified the ruling and stated that
petitioners in this case were builders in good faith and thus
have a right to indemnity, applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code.
o The CA reversed this decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the MeTC have jurisdiction over the case since there
was no demand to satisfy the requirement of extrajudicial demand in
ejectment cases.
Whether or not the rules on accession, as found in Article 448 and 546
of the Civil Code apply to the instant case.
Ratio:
There was a demand letter in this case and it was adequate to
satisfy the requirement of "extrajudicial demand." It was sent
by respondent through registered mail requesting them to pay rentals
arrears or else it will be constrained to file the appropriate legal action.
Contrary to what they aver, this demand is already adequate since the
word "vacate" need not be employed in all notices. There can be no
other interpretation of the notice given to them. This was a notice
or demand to vacate.
Article 448 does not apply to the instant case. It is only
intended to apply to a case where one builds or sows on land in which
he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the
only interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as
a tenant.
o The petitioners here had no adverse claim or title to the land.
They even recognize that the respondents are the owners of
the land. Their claim that they should be considered as
builders in good faith who have the right to the possession of
the property until reimbursed cannot be countenanced.
o The mere introduction of valuable improvements on the land
does not give the right of retention to the petitioners
and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a
builder in good faith. They may not "improve" the lessor
out of its property.
The rights of the lessees herein are governed by Article 1678 of the
Code which stated that the lessor has the option of paying one half of
the value of the improvements which the lessee made in good faith,
which are suitable for the use for which the lease is intended. The
lessee may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to
reimburse.
o The laws are incorporated in each and every contract hence, if
there is no special agreement between the parties as to how to
proceed in cases of default or breach of contract, the
aforementioned provision should apply despite the fact that
the hotel amounts to 2 billion pesos and what will be
reimbursed to them only amounts to a little more than 26
million.
Cynthia Cruz Khemani v. The Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad
Facts:
Cynthia Khemani here is the registered owner of Lot 107 which was
purchased from Jose Pena. However, heirs of Anastacio Trinidad
herein are claiming ownership and allege that their predecessors in
interest have openly, publicly, peacefully and adversely possessed said
subject land in the concept of an owner since 1950.
Before all of these controversies arose, it must be noted that
the land in dispute has already been decided upon in a
previous case which involved Jose Pena. Lot No. 107
constituted a part of Lot 355 before. Such land (Lot 355 inclusive
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
of Lot No. 107) was sold to Jose Pena. Pena requested the BoL (Bureau
of Lands) to adjust the area of the lot awarded to him but the BoL
denied such request since it stated that it belonged to the government.
o The Office of the President however decided and held that the
entire area of Lot 355 belonged to Pena and not to the
government.
o Mendoza (another third party) filed a special action for
certiorati claiming that he was denied due process when the
Office of the President decided to award the lot to Pena. He
asserted ownership over them on the strength of a
Miscellaneous Sales Application.
o This case was elevated to the Supreme Court which was
decided upon in favor of Pena.
At present, despite the decision over Lot 107 in the past were
proclaimed, the heirs of Trinidad are now claiming
ownership over said lot and state that the have been
possessing it since 1950.
o They further claim that they applied for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over the land which was approved by the BoL.
The heirs of Pena motioned to dismiss the case alleging that the
predecessors in interest were mere "informal settlers" who had been
allowed by Mendoza (the former adverse claimant to the land) to
occupy it and that since there was already a decision in the previous
case, that this was res judicata.
In their answer, respondents claim that they are not barred since they
were not parties to the case and there is no identity of causes of action.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
They filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which held that certiorari
is not the proper remedy and that there is no re judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper
remedy in assailing the order of the RTC in denying the motion to
dismiss.
Whether or not there is res judicata
Ratio:
The filing of petition for certiorari is proper. It has been settled
that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order
which neither terminates nor disposes a case. As such, the general
rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a certiorari case.
o But there are exceptions to this general rule. It is allowed when
the ground is improper venue, lack of jurisdiction or
res judicata as in the case at bar.
There is no res judicata in this case since there is no identity
of parties and causes of action. Res Judicata literally means a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing settled by judgment. It
is said that there is res judicata when the ff. requisites concur:
o Former judgment is final
o It is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties
o It is a judgment or an order on the merits
o There is between the first and the second actions identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.
The cause of action in the first case was the alleged grave abuse of
discretion of the Office of the President in awarding the lands to Pena
and in the second, the basis is on their adverse possession of the land
in the concept of an owner for over 40 years and the alleged fraudulent
issuance of a patent and certificate of title to Pena.
o The parties in the two cases have their own rights and interests
in relation to the subject matter in litigation.
According to PD1529, a person deprived of his land through
actual fraud may institute an action to reopen or review a
decree of registration within one year from entry of such
decree. In this case, the patent was issued in favor of Pena on Sept
20, 1993 and the filing for review of decree was instituted on January
27, 1994 or well within the prescribed one year period.
o Also, under the petitioners name in the title, a Notice of Lis
Pendens, it cannot be said that petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value as well aware of respondents claim over
the property.
o Even if they filed it after 2 year, they may still file an action
based on an implied trust which prescribes in ten years from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.
Under the circumstances, it would be more in keeping with the
standard of fairness to have a full blown trial where the evidentiary
matters are thrashed out.
Frondarina v. Malazarte
Facts:
The property in question in this case is Lot 5 which was acquired by
Flordelina Santos from Iluminado Amar and was thereafter acquired
by Cirila Gongora. Cirila Gongora, sister of Frondarina, filed a
Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands.
o Said disputed land was declared in Gongora's name for
purposes of tax declaration and she also paid the real estate
taxes on said property for years.
o Frondarina obtained the disputed lot from her sister thereafter
as evidenced by a Waiver of Rights to the parcel of land.
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
Frondarina declared the lot in her name for taxation purposes and
paid the real estate taxes on such property for years. She also had the
lot surveyed and fenced it with 4 strands of barbed wire and
tended 2 mango and 1 coconut tree on the lot.
Malazartes here came into the picture and out of no where alleged that
they bought the said lot from Romeo Valencia and that they
have been residing on the lot since 1988. On the sad date, they
immediately started construction of their house on the lot without a
building permit because their application to build was not
granted due to the complaint filed by Frondarina.
o To support their claim, they presented their caretaker, Lorenza
Andrada to testify in their favor.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the Frondarinas who have sufficiently
established their cause of action against the Malazartes.
But this was overturned by the RTC who stated that the Malazartes
were in actual and physical possession of the lot through their
predecessor in interest Romeo Valencia.
o The RTC anchored their decision on the fact that the
Frondarinas were not in actual and physical possession of the
land as such was only possesses by their caretaker
o Allegedly, this caretaker was threatened by the Malazartes but
the trial court deemed this as mere hearsay evidence since the
caretaker was not really presented to testify as witness.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Who are the owners of the lot?
If the aforestated question rules that the Frondarinas are the owners,
do the Malazartes have the right to indemnity as builders in good
faith?
Ratio:
The court gives credence to the claim of the Frondarinas that
they and their predecessors in interest had been in peaceful,
physical possession of the said lot since 1971. Although the fact
is that none of the parties have actually been in possession of the land
(since it was possesses by their caretakers), the actuations of the
Frondarinas are more in accordance with the usual course of human
conduct and common experience. The claim of the Malazartes that
they occupied said lot for 15 years deserves scant consideration since
his job took up most of his time.
Romeo Valencia also testified that he checked with the BoL and was
told that the lot has not been declared in the name of any person.
However, this statement of his is not true as there was a tax
declaration in Cirila's name. The latter also applied for a
Miscellaneous Sales Application before. Seeing as there is
already a falsity and misrepresentation in the testimony of Valencia,
the court rules that his testimony does not constitute evidence of the
truth of the said allegations.
o The testimonies of Frondarina were more consistent with one
who has been deprived of possession by force. They sought
help from officials and reported incidents. Such is more in
accordance with a person who has been illegally and unfairly
deprived of possession.
The lack of testimony of the caretaker (who was not presented as
witness) was not fatal to the cause of the Frondarinas as ample and
circumstantial evidence was presented.
The tax declarations also, as well as the payments for taxes for the
disputed lots are much earlier than those allegedly made by the
Malazartes.
o Although tax declarations are not conclusive evidence, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.
The Malazartes are not builders in good faith. Considering that
they were informed by the petitioners that the disputed lot was owned
by them and had the right of possession over said lot, still, they
persisted on building their house on it. Respondents therefore are not
builders in good faith and shall lose their house without any right to
reimbursement.
Yu v. Pacleb
Facts:
Ruperto Javier here offered to set his lot to Ernesto Yu who accepted
the offer and gave the price for down payment. Javier then delivered
the supposed muniments of title to the petitioners. At the time of turn-
over, a portion of lot was occupied by Ramon Pacleb
(respondent's son) and his wife as tenants.
o Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered the possession of
their portion to the petitioners and later on, petitioners
appointed Ramon as their trustee over the subject lot.
o Petitioners on the other hand, allege that they exercise
ownership rights as well as open, public and peaceful
possession over the property.
Respondent herein was in the United States and upon his return, he
entered the property allegedly by means of force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth thereby ousting the
petitioners and their trustee. He refused to vacate said property
despite numerous demands.
An action for forcible entry was instituted in the MTC and the MTC
ruled in favor of the respondent, Pacleb.
The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto.
The CA also ruled in favor of respondent .
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Pacleb had prior physical possession of the
subject property.
Ratio:
He had physical possession of the property. Possession is
defined by the Civil Code as to actually and physically occupy a thing
with or without right. It always includes the idea of occupation. There
must be occupancy, apprehension or taking and there must
be intent to possess.
In this case, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical
possession to justify a ruling in their favor. Their claim that the lot was
turned over to them was self-serving in the face of this factual
finding. On the other hand, the presentation of tax declarations and
payments established the possession of the respondent Pacleb.
Possessioni n the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession. Respondent's son in this case was named as caretaker.
However, the loss of trust and confidence in Ramon amounted to the
transfer of the administration of the land to his other son, Oscar.
o Ramon and the wife were mere tenants of the home. They
were established as trustees of the petitioners herein but they
had no authority to sign any document as they were
mere tenants. They had no right to sign the waiver of
all rights to the land. In fact, when they signed said
document, the caretaker was no longer Ramon, but was
actually Oscar.
Should a question of possession arise, the ff rules are to be observed:
o The present possessor shall be preferred
o If 2 possessors the one with longer possession preferred
o If the dates are the same the one who presents a title
o If all conditions are equal deposit the thing in a judicial
deposit pending the determination of ownership.
Copuyoc v. de Sola
Facts:
Mario Copuyoc (petitioner) and his spouse are holders of a Contract to
Sell between them as buyers and the Bank of Commerce. They began
constructing a house on the property without the consent of the
respondent.
o On the other hand, respondent herein alleges that he is the
owner of the disputed parcel of land and has been in actual
possession of the property since 1993 when it was sold to her
by a Christin Quesada as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of
Sale.
It should be noted that the title to the property describes a different
property, as the Deed of the respondent in this case, states that the
property is in Tandang Sora, but actually it is in Loyola.
o 2 testimonies were given in court, one stating that it is not the
property described and the other, stating that the properties
were identical (which the SC gave more weight).
Respondent filed a case with the MTC for forcible entry
The MTC decided the case in favor of the petitioners, dismissing the
complaint for forcible entry.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC.
The CA, on certiorari, denied the petition of Copuyoc.
o It stated that the respondent had prior possession of the
property and petitioner encroached on such possession. Even
though respondent did not stay on the property, her regular
visits to the same are deemed to be possession thereof.
Issue:
Who had priority possession over the property subject of this case?
Ratio:
The petitioner (Copuyoc) has priority possession over the
property. In forcible entry cases, the plaintiff is deprived of physical
possession by means of FITSS. It implies that the possession of
the thing has been unlawful from the beginning and that he acquired
such possession by illegal means. What is to be decided here is mere
physical possession or material possession, not juridical possession
nor ownership of the property. It does not even matter that a party's
title to the property is questionable. The party in peaceable and quit
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor
prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
him.
Petitioner's right to possess the property is not derived from
any claim of ostensible ownership over the same but on the
provision in the Contract to Sell allowing him to take
possession of the property pending reconstitution of the title
and full payment of the purchase price. Ownership was still with
the Bank of Commerce. It has been ruled in an ejectment case that it
cannot succeed where it appears that the party had a possession
antedating to that of the plaintiff. To ascertain this, it is proper to look
at the possession of the respondent.
o Execution of a Deed of Sale is merely a prima facie
presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real
property. It may be negated by the failure of the vendee to take
actual possession of the land sold as in the respondent's case.
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
Records show that the respondent never occupied the
property from the time it was allegedly sold to her.
Her regular visits cannot be held to be possession by the
court since, such visits were not coupled by actual exercise of
dominion over the property. She only visited the property for 5
times in a span of 3 years, she did not construct anything
thereon, neither did she know the road number where the
property was located.
Petitioners Copuyoc herein established their actual physical possession
over the property.
o The contention that there is no tax declaration cannot hold
water since the petitioners in this case were not even owners of
the property yet. In this case, possession is the only issue,
not ownership.
Malayan Realty Inc v. Uy Han Yong
Facts:
Malayan Realty here is the owner of an apartment unit leased to Uy
Han over a monthly rental fee. Such rental fee is increased yearly.
o Malayan sent Uy a written notice informing him that the
lease contract would no longer be renewed or
extended upon its expiration and asked him to vacate
and turn over the possession of the property.
o Uy refused to vacate said property prompting Malayan to file
before the MTC a complaint for ejectment.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of Malayan and on appeal, the
RTC extended the lease contract for a period of 5 years.
In the CA, Malayan Realty alleges that there was an error on the part of
the RTC to grant the extension period seeing as Uy did not plead for
this in his appeal. Hence, the CA modified the RTC ruling and reduced
the extension period to a year.
Unsatisfied with this decision, he appealed to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ca erred in shortening the period to a year.
Ratio:
In this case, the lease period was not agreed upon by the parties and
rentals were paid monthly and respondent has been occupying said
property since 1958. The power of the courts to grant a grace
period is potestative or discretionary depending on the
particular circumstance of the case. A longer term may be
granted when equities come into play and may be deemed where it
appears, always with due deference to the parties' freedom to contract.
In this case, the petitioner has already been deprived of his property
for so long as it was shown that he was unable to have full use and
enjoyment of the considerable portion of his property. Such
militates against further deprivation by fixing a period of
extension.
However, the court finds that the increase of rental fees per annum
was just and fair and is a reasonable valuation of the compensation
due petitioner for the use and occupation of the property from the
expiration of the contract of the lease until the turn over by the
respondent.
In conclusion, the respondent was to vacate the premises
immediately without period for extension and was to pay the
increased monthly rental fees to the petitioner.
Nonito Labastida v. CA
Facts:
Private respondents in this case are the owners of a parcel of land and
said land was leased to the petitioners Nonito Labastida for a monthly
rental.
A case was initiated by the private respondent herein praying that the
plaintiffs be ordered to vacate the land.
o They allegedly sent notice to the occupants that the property
was going to be used as a commercial building and instead of
heeding this request, the petitioners repaired the building
erected upon it and putt additional constructions on the lot
and refused to vacate said property.
In their answer, the Labastidas are now stating that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and over the nature of
the subject matter of the action since there is no evidence that the 1
year period has elapsed from the time defendants received
the written notice to vacate, coupled by the fact that clearly,
this was a case of unlawful detainer (which should be filed
with the MTC).
o They claim that there was actually no demand made and that if
ever there was a demand, it was made on Feb 20, 1983. And
since this case was instituted less than 1 year after such
demand, it is clearly an unlawful detainer case.
The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. Such decision was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether or not the petitioners have a right to possession.
Ratio:
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint filed by the
private respondents that the case was actually an unlawful
detainer one. The respondents here allege that they were the
registered owners of the lot subject of the case and thus entitled to
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Property Case Digests (Atty. Vivencio Abano)
possession thereof and that petitioners were mere lessees paying rent.
This therefore, amounts to an allegation that petitioners were
unlawfully withholding the possession of the land. This
refusal of the lessee to leave the premises gives rise to an
action for unlawful detainer.
o The action therefore, is not a recovery of possession.
In case of several demands in an unlawful detainer case, the
period is reckoned from the date of the last demand. The date
of the last demand was on Feb 20, 1983 and this case was instituted on
December 3, 1983. Thus, it is clear that the case should have been
brought to the MTC.
In cases of ejectments based on the expiration of the lease, no notice is
required and any notice given only serves to negate any inference that
the lessor has extended the period of the lease. Such notice is needed
only when the action is due to the lessees failure to pay the rent or do
not comply with the obligations of the lease.
Valdez v. CA
Facts:
Petitioners in this case, Bonifacio and Venida Valdez initiated a case in
the MTC against the respondent Gabriel and Francisca Fabella for
allegedly, without color of title whatsoever, occupied the said lot by
building their house in the said lot. They made repeated demands to
the respondents to vacate the property but they refused to do so.
o In their answer, the respondents contended that the
complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior
physical possession of the property or that they were
the lessors of the former (as the case was an unlawful
detainer)
o Petitioners on the other hand claim that the have ownership of
the land and have been in open, continuous and adverse
possession thereof for more then 30 years.
MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. It was affirmed by the RTC, but
such decision of the RTC was later questioned by the CA on appeal.
o The CA stated that petitioners failed to make a case for
unlawful detainer because they failed to show that
they gave private respondents the right to occupy the
premises or that they had tolerated the respondents
possession of the same which is a requirement in
cases of unlawful detainer. It requires an allegation of
material possession.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case
for unlawful detainer
Whether or not the MTC has original jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio:
The averments of the complaint did not make out a case for
unlawful detainer. The court went on to discuss the differences
among accion interdictal, publiciana and reivindicatoria. The court
stated that to justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
the plaintiff's supposes acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
If it is unlawful from the start, unlawful detainer is not the
proper remedy.
If such tolerance is present from the start of the possession sought to
be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer is proper. It is the nature of the defendant's entry into the
land which determines the cause of action whether it is forcible entry
or unlawful detainer. If the entry is legal but later becomes illegal, the
case is unlawful detainer. It is necessary that the complaint
should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy as the proceedings are summary in nature.
o When the complaint fails to aver the facts constitutive of the
case, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how
and when dispossesison started, the remedy would either be
publiciana or reivindicatoria.
In this case, the petitioners allege that the inherited the property from
their parents and that the possession of the private respondent
was by mere tolerance of their mother and after her death,
by their own tolerance.
o Those possessions merely tolerated become illegal once he is
required to leave. It is essential in cases like this that the
tolerance must have been present right from the start
of the possession.
o But in this case, the possession was illegal from inception and
not merely tolerated by the petitioners as alleged in the
complaint considering that they built a house thereon without
the permission and consent of the petitioners before them,
their mother. Such act is a stealthily act which is forcible entry.
The complaint here do not recite any averment of fact that would
substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties and the failure to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of the unlawful detainer is fatal.
In conclusion, MTC has no jurisdiction over the case and
there is no valid cause for an unlawful detainer.
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