ALBENSON vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid
and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason Account Closed.
Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson
made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but the latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was
his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent
had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to
inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or
enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on
accusing Baltao of BP 22. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be
intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently".

Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:
SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

1. there is a legal right or duty
2. exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:

1. there is an act which is legal
2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him.
It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence
of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result
of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company

100 Phil 168 Civil Law Torts and Damages Obligations arising from human relations

FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54
plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI
had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal
meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee
that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file
suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay
them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the
working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such
was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning
its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness
of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell
USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was
granted.

Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell
USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other
creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint
of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the
Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the
insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction
against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in
the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The
C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the
law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Thus, at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law,
should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the
liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.

Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag

FACTS: Artemio bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio and Felisa, part of a 400-square meter
lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses.. In October, 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander
demanding payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by
Purisima; failing which, civil and criminal charges will be brought against him. This demand letter was followed by
another demand letter. According to Artemio, the demand letter caused him damages prompting him to file a
complaint for damages against Purisima and Atty. Alexander. In their defense, Atty. Alexander alleged that he merely
acted in behalf of his client Purisima, who contested the ownership of the lot by Artemio. Purisima alleged that the
lot was pat of an 800-sq. meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into two parts. The
400-square meter lot was conveyed to the spouses Gomez by virtue of a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement
that it will be held in trust by the Gomezes in behalf of their (Eulogio and Purisima) children. Artemio is only renting
the property which he occupies. She only learned of the deed of sale by the Gomez spouses to Artemio when the
latter filed the case for damages against her and Atty. Alexander.

ISSUE: Whether or not Artemio and Atty. Alexander and Purisima liable for damages, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
HELD: In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another. In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty.
Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was
ground for Nalas actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that
respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed
on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent
filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. Nala was acting well within her rights when
she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce
her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does
no injury. Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-
weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental
in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married
an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children.
She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal
separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award for damages because
they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter
Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This
theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to
support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence
involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject
to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared
policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means
do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled
to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at
the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to
Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article
2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in
civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code
of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason
why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even
if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".
Pe vs. Pe

FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque
who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was
given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to
win Lolitas affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy
due to their illicit affair.

HELD:

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than
that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her
to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed
free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita
used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents,
defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection
and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new
Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Wassmer vs. Velez

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to
postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from
again.

Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement was
rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary
damages, P2,500 as attorneys fees.
 Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby rendered
judgment hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding
and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in
accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.

When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages may
not be awarded when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-18630 Dec. 17, 1966

Facts:

From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of
legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated
such feelings. With Tanjancos promise of marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge
sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting
pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. In
her state of unemployment Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not
fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child
she was bearing, and pay her for support and damages.

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action. Santos appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided the case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21
of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction.

Issue:

WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry her.

Held:

No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations
with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived she would not have again yielded to his
embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would
have cut all relationship upon finding that the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held
liable for a breach of promise to marry.

In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the
Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum,
Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age,
and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than being
deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the idea of
seduction.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check,
diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means
are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because
it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a
"lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.