Maria Cristina Bellis vs Edward Bellis

20 SCRA 358 Civil Law Application of Laws Nationality Principle

Succession Nationality of the Decedent Legitimes
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States.
By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward
Bellis et al), by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children. He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the
Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills,
one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine
properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything.
The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine
the successional rights of the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina
et al, are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the
national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes
Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt.
Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the
couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita
Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to
renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents
in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it
was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for
divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the
Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married
Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a
complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such
grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford
divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with
her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by
Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not
entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to
validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of
legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by
way of damages and attorneys' fees.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding
upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between
 CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the
Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and
on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an Amended
Complaint with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment
by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and
employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which
is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as
a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for
overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily,
the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved
Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential
pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for
committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of
AIBC and the accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion to Strike
Out of the Records filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their
answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for
extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for
failure to file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing
AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the
order.
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At
the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date
within which to submit their respective position papers. On February 24,
1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988,
AIBC and BRII filed a Consolidated Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered
his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only
324 complainants. Claimants submitted their Appeal Memorandum For
Partial Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR
and/or appeal in addition to the Notice of Appeal filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA.
The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the
claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the
claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the
complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir
of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise
known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of
Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-
appellants are as follows:
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-rive
per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off
fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be
deemed to being from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in
the morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any
official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of
his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service
with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not
less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days
after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect
of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration
may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party prior
notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid
workers and fifteen days notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other
party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the
worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of
the first three years of service and of one months wages for each year of
service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service
completed within a year.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON
the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-
mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is
applicable WON complainants claim for the benefits provided therein have
prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
(Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are
more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved
the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all
doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and
BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became
applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the
employment contract which provides that the compensation of the
employee may be adjusted downward so that the total computation plus
the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation therein
agree, another part of the same provision categorically states that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country
regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted
against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there
is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment
contract and the employees merely take it or leave it. The presumption is
that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the
employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their
bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed.
In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate the
relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into
the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of
performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign
law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute
shall be deemed incorporated into their contract as a set of terms. By such
reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become
a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not
operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such
party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties own choice of
the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with
the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the
complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after
the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum
(local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the
sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending
on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the
applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New
York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed
under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New
York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was
procedural as it was not specifically intended to be substantive, hence, the
prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The
Court observed: . . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a
foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose
was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country
concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think
that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is
the most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test here it appears to us that the
libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us
that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed
against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The
Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives. The American
court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the
Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the
Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to
the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive
law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a
borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute
directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the
forum even though the local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the
laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is
barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to
labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of
the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as
provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3)
Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the
written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the
claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants
worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia
under different terms and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or
general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is
only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile
their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the
claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question
of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain,
many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed
elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and
not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. A claimant has no
concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the
fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have
entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims.
The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class
suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.
 Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs Court of Appeals decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
342 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof
of Foreign Law Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption
where the foreign law is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under
In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the
must be piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in
Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly
President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.
accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River.
Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while
being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other
vessels. One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC).
The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able
to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It
averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of
Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These
two laws provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the
negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent
when he failed to check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing
while traversing the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the
said Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before
the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or
by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign
service officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert
witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
SPOUSES ZALAMEA VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,
Liana purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The
tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while
that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented
confirmed reservations.
On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on
the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before
them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42
names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board
the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two
others were not able to fly. Those holding full-fare tickets were given first
priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding
the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while
his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her
daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked.
Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two
tickets from American Airlines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines,
petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air
carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of
petitioners . CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or
bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a
common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is
specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent
TransWorld Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and
Examplary damages.
RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never
been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has
custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather,
its customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal
Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official
publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent
courts finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same
is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex
loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline
ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad
faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In
Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed
bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that
when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular
flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has
every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he
does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of
carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of
having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would
show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being
refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an
award of moral damages.
For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty
a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which
must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment.
Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have
confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have
incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to
properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would
be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with
another airline.
Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the
alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED
present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly
apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a
hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that
petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA,
thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented
confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA
to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling
respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts
to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the
rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious
disregard of petitioners rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral
damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar
fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary
damages, as well.

In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly

held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets
he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being
refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be
awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles.