Unduran v. Aberasturi (2015)

G.R. No. 181284. October 20, 2015.
*

LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO
PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA,
JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO,
VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL,
BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN,
and MARK BRAZIL, petitioners, vs. RAMON
ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR.,
DIONISIO A. LOPEZ, MERCEDES L. GASTON, AGNES
H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA S. LOPEZ,
ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO
ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI,
EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S.
LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L.
GASTON, ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION,
NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A.
VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ,
THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO
H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR
L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS,
GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T.
LOPEZ, and as represented by Attorney-in-Fact RAMON
ABERASTURI, respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC.

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Unduran vs. Aberasturi
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Words

and Phrases; Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.Locus standi is defined as a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the real parties-in-
interest rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Such concept of real party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2, Rule
VI of the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That
petitioners are the real parties-in-interest can be gleaned from the
Entry of Appearance with Motion to Refer the Case to the
Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP filed by the NCIP Special
Transition Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The
STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein that the respondents
complaint for recovery of ownership (accion reinvidicatoria)
sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in
Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the
exception of Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-benefi-
ciaries of CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in
the name of the Talaandig Indigenous Peoples, located at
Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation,
petitioners presented a certification that the disputed land is
within the area covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of
Beneficiaries of Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon,
Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon. In contrast,
respondents failed to submit any evidence to dispute petitioners
claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe. Hence,
respondents contention that petitioners have no legal standing to
file the petition, is without merit.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based
on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.In resolving the
pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has
jurisdiction over the respondents amended complaint, foremost in
the Courts mind is the principle in that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or

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116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Regional Trial Courts; Under
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, as amended
(Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to,
possession of, real property or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended
(Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real
property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Indigenous Cultural Communities; National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples; Jurisdiction; The National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs).
The NCIPs jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA
as follows: Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP, through
its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however,
That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued
by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt
to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP. On the matter of NCIPs jurisdiction and
of procedures for enforcement of

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rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the

Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA,
Rule IX, Section 1 states: Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and lands, involving
ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the conflicting claims and
boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties
through the application of customary laws in the area where the
disputed ancestral domain or land is located. All conflicts
related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the
parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be
resolved through customary law shall be heard and
adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings,
Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted
hereafter. All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal
by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the Order or Decision.
Same; Same; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act; A careful review
of Section 66 shows that the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples (ICCs/IPs) only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP.A careful review of Section 66
shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can
be gathered from the qualifying provision that no such dispute
shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted
all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the
NCIP. The qualifying provision requires two conditions before
such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1)
exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and
(2) compliance with condition precedent through the said
certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in
recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly
accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace
building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and
practices within their respective communities, as may be
compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.

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Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 3(f) of the

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) defines customary laws as a
body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and
observed by respective Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs).Section 3(f) of the
IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or
unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and
continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective
ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it
is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that
the above said two conditions can be complied with. If the parties
to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to
have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council
of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the above said two
conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-
ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws as
contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed,
it would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process
for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be
subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; When such claims and
disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the
same Indigenous Cultural Community/Indigenous People
(ICC/IP), i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of
the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).Pursuant to Section
66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When
such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do
not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different
ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall
fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead
of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which
appear to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig
Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power
to hear, try and decide this case. There are, however, exceptional
cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over

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such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not

belong to the same ICC/IP.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) declares Rule
IX, Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act-Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IPRA-IRR), Rule III, Section 5 and Rule
IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) Rules as null and void insofar as they expand the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include
such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims
between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving
their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative
law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must
conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law, the
Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR, Rule III,
Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as
null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where the
parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court held in
Padunan v. DARAB, 396 SCRA 196 (2003), [j]urisdiction over a
subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and
rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated,
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can
confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of
procedure cannot. In the above said exceptional cases where one
of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same
ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly
dispenses with the requirement of certification issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed attempt
to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the
concerned ICC/IP.

VELASCO, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; View
that as correctly pointed out by the ponencia, jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.I
concur with the

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ponencia that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction

over the case. Both original and amended complaints, accion
reivindicatoria and injunction, respectively, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation; thus falling within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. As correctly pointed out by the ponencia, jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court.
Indigenous Cultural Communities; National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples; Jurisdiction; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act;
View that it is my position that the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) has jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) regardless of whether
or not they belong to the same IP/IC Community.I would like to
submit some points for consideration which run counter to the
opinion of my esteemed colleague. It is my position that the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) has
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs)
regardless of whether or not they belong to the same IP/IC
Community. This is pursuant to Section 66 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8371, otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA) as follows: SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the
NCIP.The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose,
a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that all cases and disputes
where one of the parties is a non-Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) are covered by the
jurisdiction of the regular courts regardless of the subject matter
even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs.All
cases and disputes

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where both parties are ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the NCIP. Consequently, all cases and disputes
where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP are covered by the
jurisdiction of the regular courts regardless of the subject matter
even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs.
Moreover, the regular courts have jurisdiction over cases and
disputes as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is vested with quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative powers.It must be pointed out that
the NCIP is an administrative body entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under its special knowledge and training. It is
charged with the implementation of the law, considering its
competence, expertise, experience and informed judgment. As
such, the NCIP is vested with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers. It is the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs
to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs
and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their
rights thereto. It is quasi-judicial because it has jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving the rights of the ICCs/IPs. It is
quasi-legislative because of its rule-making power. Because of its
expertise in the field of ICCs/IPs, it is better equipped than the
trial courts in resolving the claims and disputes involving rights
where the parties are both ICCs/IPs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that anent the issue as to
what customary laws apply in cases where the parties involved in
the claims and disputes do not belong to the same Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) Community,
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) may
apply the customary law common to both ICCs/IPs or that which
can be applied by analogy.Anent the issue as to what customary
laws apply in cases where the parties involved in the claims and
disputes do not belong to the same IP/IC Community, the NCIP
may apply the customary law common to both ICCs/IPs or that
which can be applied by analogy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that a rule or regulation
cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to
imple-

122

ment. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is
null and void.As earlier discussed, Section 66 of R.A. No. 8371
is explicit that the NCIPs jurisdiction is confined only to claims
and disputes where the parties are both ICCs/IPs. Such being the
case, the second paragraph of Rule IX, Section 1 of the IRR of R.A.
No. 8371 should be declared null and void because it is contrary to
the provision of Section 66 of the IPRA. It is well-settled that an
administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict,
the provisions of the enabling law. A rule or regulation cannot
modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to
implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself
is null and void. Since the rule in question is at war with Section
66 of R.A. No. 8371, then it must be excised.

BRION, J., Separate Opinion:

Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Pleadings; View that
the rule on amendments as a matter of right applies to a
codefendant who has yet to file his responsive pleading, even if his
codefendants have already done so.At the time the respondents
amended the complaint, the petitioners had yet to file their
answers to the original complaint, hence, the amendment was
still a matter of right. The rule on amendments as a matter of
right applies to a codefendant who has yet to file his responsive
pleading, even if his codefendants have already done so. Thus,
while Macapayag and Brazil have filed their answers, the
respondents still have the right to amend the complaint with
respect to the rest of the petitioners.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; View
that as the ponencia pointed out, both the original and the
amended complaints do not allege that the respondents were
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs),
or that the dispute involves an ancestral dominion. Hence, on the
face of the respondents complaint, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
has jurisdiction over the injunction case.Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by law and by the material
allegations of the complaint. Under these standards, the
petitioners argument, i.e., that the NCIP has jurisdiction because
the case involves the rights of ICCs/IPs, is without merit. As the
ponencia pointed out, both the original and the amended
complaints do not allege that the respondents were ICCs/IPs, or
that the dispute involves an ancestral dominion. Hence,

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on the face of the respondents complaint, the RTC has

jurisdiction over the injunction case. Neither am I impressed with
the petitioners argument that, where the actual issue is
evidenced by the subsequent pleadings, jurisdiction does not
depend on the complaints literal averments. This Court has
consistently ruled that jurisdiction never depends on the defenses
set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) does not have
jurisdiction over disputes where one of the parties is a non-
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs),
or where the opposing parties are members of different ICC/IP.I
join the ponencia in ruling that the NCIP does not have
jurisdiction over disputes where one of the parties is a non-
ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of different
ICC/IP. My concurrence is based on the following: (i) Section 66
contains a proviso that limits the NCIPs jurisdiction; (ii)
the RTC, not the NCIP, has jurisdiction to adjudicate
violations of ICC/IP rights; (iii) Congress had no intention
to apply customary laws to non-ICCs/IPs.
Indigenous Cultural Communities; Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act; View that each Indigenous Cultural Community/Indigenous
People (ICC/IP) has its own set of customary laws and council of
elders/leaders.Each ICC/IP has its own set of customary laws
and council of elders/leaders. To require members of a particular
ICC/IP to appear before the council of elders/leaders of another
ICC/IP would be to require the former to observe the customary
laws of the latter. This is repugnant to the right of each ICC/IP to
use its own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution
institutions, and peace building processes or mechanisms.
Same; Same; View that Section 72 of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (IPRA) provides that any person who violates the rights
of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) shall be punished in accordance with the customary
laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned....without prejudice to the right of
the ICC/IP concerned to avail of the protection of existing laws...
[i]n which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine,
and damages, upon the discretion of the court.Section 72 of the
IPRA provides that any person who violates the rights of

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ICCs/IPs shall be punished in accordance with the

customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned....without prejudice to
the right of the ICC/IP concerned to avail of the protection of
existing laws...[i]n which case, the penalty shall be
imprisonment and/or fine, and damages, upon the discretion of
the court. Existing laws refer to national laws as opposed to
customary laws; while the court refers to the regular courts as
opposed to administrative bodies like the NCIP. Under Section 72,
ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under national laws and file
an action before the regular courts, in which case, the penalty
shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages. From this
perspective, Section 72 is a special penal law that applies
to ALL persons, including non-ICCs/IPs.
Same; Same; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples;
View that since the regular courts, not the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), have jurisdiction over national
laws, then the NCIPs jurisdiction is limited to punishment under
customary laws.Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have
jurisdiction over national laws, then the NCIPs jurisdiction is
limited to punishment under customary laws. The NCIPs power
to impose penalties under customary laws presents two important
issues: first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs
with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a
member of a particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance
with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.
Same; Same; Same; View that most customary laws are not
written, much less published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) or even the
regular courts have the power to penalize non-Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) with these penalties
under customary laws. A contrary ruling would be constitutionally
infirm for lack of due process.Laws that provide for fines,
forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, must be
published. Most customary laws are not written, much less
published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or even the
regular courts have the power to penalize non-ICCs/IPs with
these penalties under customary laws. A contrary ruling would be
constitutionally infirm for lack of due process. Similarly, an
ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another.
Otherwise, the former would be forced to

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observe a nonbinding customary law. Therefore, while the

NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its
jurisdiction is limited to those committed by and against members
of the same ICC/IP.
Statutes; Publication; View that the publication of all laws of
a public nature or of general applicability is mandatory.I
share Justice Vitugs view. Laws must be published before they
take effect. The publication of all laws of a public nature or of
general applicability is mandatory. Without publication, non-
ICCs/IPs would be deprived of due process of law.
Same; Same; View that under Section 54, the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) may, upon the written
request of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs), review existing claims and after notice and hearing,
cancel Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs) and
Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CALTs) that were
fraudulently acquired by any person or community.Sections
52(h) and 53 require the NCIP-ADO to publish and post
applications for CADTs/CALTs to notify all persons, including
non-ICCs/IPs. Section 62 allows all interested persons, including
non-ICCs/IPs, to file adverse claims over disputes arising from
delineation of ancestral domains. Under Section 54, the NCIP
may, upon the written request of ICCs/IPs, review existing claims
and after notice and hearing, cancel CADTs and CALTs that were
fraudulently acquired by any person or community. In these
cases, the NCIP has jurisdiction even if one of the parties
is a non-ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are
members of different ICCs/IPs.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction; View that under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from
determining a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the

126

administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate

matters of fact. On the other hand, when Congress confers
exclusive jurisdiction to a judicial or quasi-judicial entity over
certain matters by law, its action evinces its intent to exclude
other bodies from exercising the same. Having primary
jurisdiction is not equivalent to having exclusive jurisdiction.
Thus, to avoid confusion, and to prevent future litigants from
claiming that the NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction, the Court
should remind the NCIP and other administrative bodies to
refrain from claiming that they have exclusive jurisdiction when
no such jurisdiction is conferred by law.

PEREZ, J., Concurring Opinion:

Act; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; View that the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP.I concur with the ponencia on the basis of the
principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint, and that the averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. As
clearly delineated in the ponencia, upon a careful review of
Section 66 and based on the qualifying proviso, the NCIP shall
have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP. And, as clearly alleged by the
petitioners in their complaint, the defendants they impleaded are
not indigenous people.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction; View that primary jurisdiction, also known
as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested
by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to
act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.Primary
jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the
power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon
an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its
specific competence. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents
the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal
possessed with special competence. In

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one occasion, we have held that regular courts cannot or

should not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the
question is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered. The
objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court
in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Same; Same; Same; National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act; View that for the reason
that under the provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA), specifically Section 66 thereof, the jurisdiction of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is special and
limited, confined only to cases involving rights of Indigenous
Peoples/Indigenous Cultural Communities (IPs/ICCs), where both
such parties belong to the same ICC/IP, the original and amended
complaint herein properly fall within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts, specifically the Regional Trial Court (RTC).In
all, for the reason that under the provisions of the IPRA,
specifically Section 66 thereof, the jurisdiction of the NCIP is
special and limited, confined only to cases involving rights of
IPs/ICCs, where both such parties belong to the same ICC/IP, the
original and amended complaint herein properly fall within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts, specifically the RTC. Thus, I
concur in the denial of the petition.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Act; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; View that the
jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) is limited to disputes where both parties are members of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IPs)
and come from the same ethnolinguistic group.A careful reading
of Section 66 of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, with particular emphasis
on its

128

proviso will reveal that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited
to disputes where both parties are members of ICC/IPs and come
from the same ethnolinguistic group.
Same; Same; Same; View that per Section 38, the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and
protect the rights and well-being of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition
of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.
Section 38 of the Act created the NCIP to carry out the policies set
forth in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Per Section 38, the
NCIP shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the
ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as
their rights thereto. Section 39 provides for the NCIPs mandate
to protect and promote the interest and well-being of the
ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and
institutions.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; View that the proviso
reads: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought
to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws; Thus, for Section 66 to say that the parties
must exhaust all remedies is to say that both
plaintiff/complainant/claimant/petitioner, on one hand, and
defendant/respondent, on the other, must comply.Attention must
be drawn to the provisos choice of words. To reiterate, the proviso
reads: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought
to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. The proviso uses the
plural term the parties. It also uses the plural their, which is a
possessive pronoun substituting for the noun phrase the parties.
The use of the plural the parties necessarily means that the
requirement of exhaustion of remedies provided under customary
laws is a requirement that is not exclusive to a singular party.
The basic framework of adversarial litigation, as is the case in our
jurisdiction, is one that entails two (2) parties: first, the one
initiating or bringing the action (i.e., the
plaintiff/complainant/claimant/petitioner); and the one against
whom an action is initiated or brought (i.e., the defen-

129
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 129
dant/respondent). Thus, for Section 66 to say that the

parties must exhaust all remedies is to say that both
plaintiff/complainant/
claimant/petitioner, on one hand, and defendant/respondent, on
the other, must comply. In a case brought by A against B, both A
and B must comply with the requirement. Had Section 66
intended that compliance with the requirement by only one party
shall suffice, it should have used the singular a party, similar
language like either party, or permissive language like a/the
party/ies. Had Section 66 intended that the requirement must
be complied with by a specific party, it should have used specific
language like the petitioner.
Act; Parties; View that it is evident that only those belonging to
have or adhere to customary laws. Since Section 66 refers to
parties having customary laws, it follows that the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIPs) jurisdiction, as
defined in Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),
is limited to parties who belong to ICCs/IPs. It excludes those who
do not.It is evident that only those belonging to ICCs/IPs have
or adhere to customary laws. Since Section 66 refers to parties
having customary laws, it follows that the NCIPs jurisdiction, as
defined in Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, is
limited to parties who belong to ICCs/IPs. It excludes those who
do not. To hold otherwise is to summarily compel those who do not
belong to ICCs/IPs to adhere and subject themselves to customary
laws despite their not having traditionally and continually
recognized, accepted[,] and observed these laws. This runs afoul
of fair play and violates their right to due process. Thus, Section
66s qualifiers as specifically worded indicate that cases that
fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP must be limited to those
where both parties belong to ICCs/IPs.
Same; Same; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples;
View that extending the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIPs) jurisdiction to those who do not belong to an
indigenous cultural community or are not indigenous peoples finds
no support elsewhere in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
Extending the NCIPs jurisdiction to those who do not belong to
an indigenous cultural community or are not indigenous peoples
finds no support elsewhere in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.
Section 66 is the

130

sole provision of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act that

spells out the NCIPs jurisdiction in respect of the exercise of its
quasi-judicial power.
Judicial Power; View that in Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756
(1966), judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights.Judicial power, in turn, has been
defined in Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA
236 (1993), as the right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants. In Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756
(1966): Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs
for violations of such rights.
Act; View that the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) does not
extend the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIPs)
jurisdiction to disputes involving those who do not belong to
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs).
The precise wording of Section 66 and the silence of the remainder
of the IPRA on extending the NCIPs jurisdiction bear this out.
The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act does not extend the NCIPs
jurisdiction to disputes involving those who do not belong to
ICCs/IPs. The precise wording of Section 66 and the silence of the
remainder of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on extending the
NCIPs jurisdiction bear this out.
Same; Same; Customary Law; Words and Phrases; View that
customary law is a descriptive label which should acknowledge
that each tribe lived through its own history and endogenously
emerged their own set of norms reflecting their values and
lifeways.Customary norms are as varied as there are tribes
within ethnolinguistic groups. If we are to animate the spirit of
both the Constitution and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, we
should not stereotype all cultures as homogenous or incapable of
dynamic interfaces with each other. Customary law is a
descriptive label which should acknowledge that each tribe lived
through its own history and endogenously emerged their own set
of norms reflecting their values and lifeways. To say that the
customary norms of the Kalinga are

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 131

the same as those of the Subanen betrays the same colonial

mindset that marginalized what our colonizers called as Non-
Christian Tribes in the distant past.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Normita V. Batula for petitioners.
Romeo B. Fortea and Zoilo Antonio G. Velez for
respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated August 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00204-MIN, and the Resolution3
dated July 4, 2007, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor
Macapayag, are members of the Miarayon, Lapok,
Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or
Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since
birth on the land located at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag,
Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their
forefathers.
On the other hand, respondents, represented by
attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the
lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of
agricultural land (Lot No. 7367 Cad 630-D), with an area of
105.7361 hectares, which appears to be located within the
ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 21-50.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim Jr., with Associate
Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Sixto Marella, Jr., concurring; Id.,
at pp. 56-68.
3 Id., at pp. 11-13.

132

On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for

Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction with Damages4 (original complaint for accion
reivindicatoria) against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC). Docketed
as Civil Case No. 04-03-01, the petition was raffled off to
Branch 11.
On March 20, 2004, petitioners Macapayag and Brazil
filed their Answer, alleging that respondents have no cause
of action against them.
On March 23, 2004, the rest of the petitioners filed their
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners alleged that with the
advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), they, together
with the rest of the tribe members, assisted the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in the
processing, validation, and delineation of their Ancestral
Domain claim in May 2003. On July 25, 2003, Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R-10-TAL-0703-0010
was issued by virtue of NCIP En Banc Resolution No. 08-
02003 to the Talaandig tribe over its ancestral domain in
Talakag, Bukidnon, containing an area of 11,105.5657
hectares. On October 30, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo awarded the said CADT to the Talaandig tribe. As
awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has
exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the
subject matter concerns a dispute and controversy over an
ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie
Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional
Hearing Office-National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
_______________
4 CA Rollo, pp. 29-42.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 133

On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend

and Supplement Complaint from Accion Reivindicatoria to
one for Injunction, Damages, and Other Relief, with the
attached Amended and Supplemental Complaint5
(amended complaint for injunction). On July 30, 2004,
petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.
On August 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, alleging that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.
On August 10, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting
the Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, and
declared petitioners Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-
NCIP and Motion to Dismiss moot and academic as a
consequence of the grant of the said motion to amend and
supplement complaint.
On August 17, 2004, petitioners filed a Manifestation
praying for an ocular inspection of the disputed land to
determine the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status of
the area.
On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to
Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint.
On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their
Opposition and Motion for Judgment by Default.
On February 14, 2005, the RTC issued an Order6
resolving all pending incidents before it, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants [herein

petitioners] motion to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP and its
manifestation for an ocular inspection are hereby denied for being
bereft of merit. Further, defendants [petitioners], except
Macapayag and Brazil, are hereby declared in default for their
failure to file their
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 74-80.

6 Id., at pp. 25-28.

134

Answer to the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, let this case, as

against defendants Macapayag and Brazil, be called for pretrial
and ex parte presentation of evidence as against the rest of
defendants [petitioners] on May 2, 2005 at 9:00 oclock in the
morning. Furthermore, the injunctive writ prayed for by the
plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. Accordingly,
defendants [petitioners], their agents and privies, or any other or
all persons acting for and in their behalves, are hereby ordered to
observe, maintain and preserve the status quo subject of the
action and/or the relation between the parties in order to protect
the rights of the plaintiffs while the case is pending in court and
to cease and desist from performing any acts that in one way or
another contravene the tenor of this order, while awaiting final
determination of the instant suit or until further orders of this
court. Furthermore, to answer for whatever damage that
defendants [petitioners] may sustain by reason of this injunction
order if the court should finally decide that plaintiffs
[respondents] are not entitled to the relief it prayed for, plaintiffs
[respondents] are hereby directed to put up a bond in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) executed
in favor of the party enjoined.
SO ORDERED.7

On April 12, 2005, petitioners filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.
On August 17, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision
affirming the RTCs February 14, 2005 Order, which in
turn denied the referral of the case to the NCIP, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

partly GRANTED. The assailed Order
_______________
7 Id., at p. 28.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 135

dated February 14, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION that the order of default against petitioners,
except Macapayag and Brazil, is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.8

The CA ruled that the RTC correctly granted the
amendment of the complaint and properly refused to refer
the case to the RHO-NCIP. Based on the allegations of both
original complaint [accion reivindicatoria] and amended
complaint [injunction], the CA found that the subject
matter of both complaints is well within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. The CA noted that the only substantial
amendment made was with regard to the nature of the
action which originally was one of accion reivindicatoria
and then changed to one for damages. And except for some
amendments as to petitioners alleged violent acts and the
prayer for declaration of their title to the subject property,
the rest of the amended complaint was basically the same
as the original one, including the reliefs prayed for by
respondents. Anent the writ of preliminary injunction, the
CA held that the RTCs assailed February 14, 2005 Order
is self-explanatory as to why the issuance of the same was
proper considering the circumstances of the case.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of its August 17, 2006 Decision.
Hence, this appeal on certiorari raising the following
issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A
QUO OVER A COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION
INVOLVING AN ANCESTRAL DOMAIN OF THE
TALAANDIGS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT A
QUO ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE
COMPLAINT,
_______________
8 Id., at p. 348.

136

THE SOLE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFER

JURISDICTION ON THE LOWER COURT.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RESOLVING THAT EVIDENCE MUST BE
PRESENTED BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WHEN IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION FOR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE
IT, THE COURT A QUO HAS ADMITTED THAT A
CADT WAS ISSUED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS.9

On the first issue, petitioners contend that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 04-03-0 for Injunction,
Damages and other Relief, because the 105.7361-hectare
land claimed by respondents is undisputedly within the
ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe over which a
CADT has already been issued. Petitioners insist that, even
granting that the case is purely a personal action, the
NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over it as it
concerns a claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs
over their ancestral domain.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the
amendment of the complaint from accion reivindicatoria to
injunction with damages was clearly meant to oust the
NCIP of its jurisdiction over the case and confer it on the
RTC by concealing the real issue in the case, which is the
parties conflicting claims over the 105.7361-hectare land in
Miarayon, Talakag Bukidnon. According to petitioners, the
cause of action in the complaint for accion reivindicatoria is
the claim of ownership and recovery of possession of the
said land which is undisputedly found within the
Talaandig tribes ancestral domain covered by CADT No.
R10-TAL-0703-0010; hence, a claim within the exclusive
and original jurisdiction of the NCIP. Petitioners contend
that respondents amended the complaint to one for
injunction to downplay the real issue which is the dispute
over a land that is within the Talaandig tribes ancestral
domain, and mainly capitalized on the acts complained of,
_______________
9 Id., at p. 433.

137
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 137

such as harassment, threats, acts of terrorism, among

others, supposedly committed against respondents.
On the third issue, petitioners fault the CA in ruling
that whether the complaint is one for Injunction or Accion
Reivindicatoria, the RTC has jurisdiction because nowhere
in respondents original and amended complaints is it
stated that petitioners were members of the ICCs or IPs
and that the disputed property was part of their ancestral
domain. Petitioners take exception to the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, as strict adherence thereto
would open the floodgates to the unscrupulous practice of
litigants divesting the NCIP of jurisdiction by crafting their
complaints in such a way as would confer jurisdiction on
their court of choice. Petitioners contend that the literal
averments of the complaint are not determinative of the
jurisdiction over the subject matter where the actual issues
are evidenced by subsequent pleadings; in certain cases,
the real nature and character of the pleadings and issues
are not merely found in the complaint, but also in the
subsequent pleadings submitted by both parties.
Petitioners stress that although the complaint banners the
subject matter as one for injunction, the pleadings of
respondents show that the subject matter is the conflicting
ownership claims over the land. In fact, petitioners point
out that the records of the case show that various pieces of
evidence have been presented to prove that the dispute
involves conflicting claims over a land covered by a CADT.
For their part, respondents contend that petitioners do
not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file
this petition, since they failed to make prima facie showing
that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they were
authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe. Respondents
insist that based on the allegations in their amended
complaint for injunction and damages, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter which is a purely
personal action and incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Respondents assert that the real issue

138

is whether or not petitioners are guilty of wrongful acts of

violence, terrorism, destruction, intimidation, harassment,
etc., to justify a permanent injunction and hold the latter
liable for damages. Respondents also point out that
petitioners cannot invoke protection under the IPRA 8731,
because the conflict does not involve an ancestral domain
and they (respondents) are not IPs so the condition
precedent before bringing a dispute before the NCIP cannot
be satisfied, i.e., exhaustion of remedies under customary
laws by the parties.
The petition has no merit.
On the procedural issue raised by respondents, the
Court disagrees with their contention that petitioners do
not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file
the petition, for failure to show that they are members of
IPs/ICCs, or that they are authorized to represent the
Talaandig tribe.
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real parties-in-interest rule
found in Section 2,10 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such
concept of real party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2,11
Rule VI of the 2014
_______________
10 SEC. 2. Parties-in-Interest.A real party-in-interest is the party

who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law
or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest.
11 Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, Rule VI, Section 2.
Real Party-in-Interest.Every case must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest who shall sue as plaintiff or
petitioner. The person being sued shall be referred to as defendant or
respondent.
In actions involving general interest, the real party-in-interest shall be
the ICCs/IPs or person/s authorized, through a community resolution, by
majority of the ICCs/IPs in the community to represent them.
A real party-in-interest, as provided in Section 2, Rule 3, of the Revised
Rules of Court, and adapted herein, is the party who

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 139

Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That

petitioners are the real parties-in-interest can be gleaned
from the Entry of Appearance with Motion to Refer the
Case to the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP12 filed by
the NCIP Special Transition Team-Quick Response Unit
(STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein
that the respondents complaint for recovery of ownership
(accion reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered
real property situated in Miarayon, Bukidnon, from
petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of Nestor
Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of
CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the
name of the Talaandig Indigenous Peoples, located at
Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their
allegation, petitioners presented a certification13 that the
disputed land is within the area covered by the same
CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of Talaandig
Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San
Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon.14 In contrast, respondents
failed to submit any evidence to dispute petitioners claim
that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe. Hence,
respondents contention that petitioners have no legal
standing to file the petition, is without merit.
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC
and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents
amended complaint, foremost in the Courts mind is the
principle in that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the com-
_______________
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party

entitled to the avails of the suit.
12 CA Rollo, pp. 65-71.
13 Records, p. 262.
14 CA Rollo, pp. 179-204.

140

plaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the

plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.15
Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to,
possession of, real property or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
On the other hand, the NCIPs jurisdiction is defined
under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP, through its

regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however,
petition with the NCIP.16
_______________
15 Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA
91, 98.
16 Emphasis added.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 141

On the matter of NCIPs jurisdiction and of procedures

for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No.
1, 1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-
IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states:
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.All conflicts related

to the ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as
but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary disputes,
shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application
of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral
domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands
where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the
dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall
be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be
adopted hereafter.
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition
for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the Order or Decision.17

In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIPs quasi-
judicial power to promulgate rules and regulations
governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before
it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated
April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice
and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be brought
before it. Section 5, Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for
the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:
_______________
17 Id.

142

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP through

its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all
cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited
to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional
Hearing Officer (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes, controversies
over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement
of free and prior and informed consent of ICC/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs
involving violations of customary laws or desecration
of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under
Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing
Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession, and
settlement of land disputes, between and among
ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under
customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any
violation of Republic Act No. 8371;
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the
Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral
Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have
been fraudu-

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 143

lently acquired by, and issued to, any person or

community as provided for under Section 54 of
R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed
within one (1) year from the date of
registration.

Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition
with the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, Sections 13
and 14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide:
Section 13. Certification to File Action.Upon the
request of the proper party, members of the indigenous
dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise
issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving
due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in
any form so long as it states in substance the failure of
settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under
customary law or traditional practices.
Section 14. Exceptions.The certification shall not be
required in the following cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or
private corporation, partnership, association or
juridical person or a public officer or employee
and the dispute is in connection with the
performance of his official functions;
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or
does not belong to the same IP/IC Community,
except when he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or
petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and
irreparable damage or injury that may result if not
acted upon immediately; and

144

d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to
issue the necessary certification without justifiable
reasons.18

Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to
the RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their
respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations in
the original and amended complaints to find out which
tribunal may properly exercise jurisdiction over this case.
In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria,
respondents traced the provenance of their title over said
land to one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig
tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957.
They averred that, together with their predecessor-in-
interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes
thereon since 1957 and that they have been in physical,
actual, open, prior, notorious, continuous, public and
adverse possession of said land in the concept of owners for
more than 50 years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They
alleged that said land was declared alienable and
disposable since August 3, 1927 per certification of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They
claimed that by means of fraud, stealth and surreptitious
means, petitioners entered the said land, without
permission and against the consent of the landowners,
caused damages therein and harassed respondents by
indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers. They
added that petitioners continue such harassment by means
of armed men frequenting the campsite and firing M-16
rifles at them during nighttime, causing great fear and
threat.
Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following
reliefs, among others: (1) to cause the preliminary
injunction to be made permanent for the respondents to
enjoy possession of their property, free from threats of
physical harm, harassment and undue obstruction caused
by petitioners; (2) to or-
_______________
18 Id.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 145

der petitioners to respect and not to harass, intimidate and

cause trouble to the prior possession of respondents as the
owners by virtue of right of title; (3) to order petitioners to
pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
appearance fees and costs of suit; and (4) to declare
respondents title as having become a vested right, and as
such entitled to all right and incident of an absolute owner.
In their amended complaint for injunction and damages,
on the other hand, respondents further alleged that
sometime in November 2003, petitioners harassed,
intimidated, threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon
respondents farm workers to drive them away from the
land, without legal or justifiable reason. They added that,
despite having hired private security guards to secure and
protect their property, these violent incidents were followed
by more acts of violence, lawlessness, harassment,
terrorism to drive away respondents from the land which
they claim to lawfully own and possess.
Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following
reliefs: (1) to order petitioners and their representatives, to
stop and refrain from committing acts of violence,
destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness and
terrorism against respondents, and to maintain the
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 105-hectare land
by respondents as an attribute of ownership; (2) to declare
petitioners to have committed acts of violence, harassment,
intimidation, destruction, assault and other forms of
lawlessness against respondents, and to permanently order
petitioners to stop and refrain from committing similar
acts; and (3) to hold petitioners jointly and severally liable
to pay respondents actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and treble costs.
After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both
original and amended complaints, the Court notes that
respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are
members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute
or controversy

146

over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the
allegations in respondents original complaint make up for
an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an
interest in a real property with an assessed value of
P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended
complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court
therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject
matter of the amended complaint based on allegations
therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners contention, the mere
fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their
ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to
wit:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP, through its

regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For
this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the
NCIP.

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall
have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from
the qualifying provision that no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle
the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
petition with the NCIP.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 147

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before
such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1)
exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the
parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent
through the said certification by the Council of
Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of
ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice
systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building
processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and
practices within their respective communities, as may be
compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.19
Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a
body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs
and practices traditionally and continually recognized,
accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this
restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when
both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the
above said two conditions can be complied with. If the
parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are
recognized to have their own separate and distinct
customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will
fail to meet the above said two conditions. The same holds
true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is
neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the
IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be
violative of the principles of fair play and due process for
those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be
subjected to its customary laws and Council of
Elders/Leaders.
Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP
shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims
and disputes arise between or among parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to
different ICC/IPs or

148

where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall

under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice,
instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the
petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not
belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue
involves a dispute over land which appear to be located
within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is
not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to
hear, try and decide this case.
There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP
shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes
even if the parties involved do not belong to the same
ICC/IP, viz.:
1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which
contemplate a situation where a dispute over an ancestral
domain involving parties who do not belong to the same,
but to different ICCs/IPs, to wit:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process.The identification
and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
h) Endorsement to NCIP.Within fifteen (15)
days from publication, and of the inspection process,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report
to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim
that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if
the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall require the submission of
additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral
Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed
patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification: Provided, further, That in case of
rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the
applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned,
containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be
appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore,
That in cases where there are conflicting claims
among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral
domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall cause the contend-

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ing parties to meet and assist them in coming

up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict,
without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to the section below.
xxxx
SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts.In cases
of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims
within the ancestral domains as delineated in the
survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the
NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the
proper parties, the disputes arising from the
delineation of such ancestral domains:
Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or
among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional
boundaries of their respective ancestral
domains, customary process shall be followed.
The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions:
Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or
ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute
or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement and interpretation of
this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the
Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of a copy thereof.20
2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent
claims by parties who are not members of the same ICC/IP,
to wit:
SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims.The
Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request
from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have
been fraudulently acquired by any person or
community. Any claim found to be fraudulently
acquired by, and issued to, any person or
community may be cancelled by the NCIP after
due notice and hearing of all parties
concerned.21
_______________
20 Emphasis added.
21 Id.

150

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the
NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes
and claims between and among members of the same
ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as
the basic administrative law principle that an
administrative rule or regulation must conform, not
contradict the provisions of the enabling law,22 the Court
declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR,23 Rule III,
Section 524 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and
_______________
22 Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 617 Phil. 358, 369; 583 SCRA 168, 205 (2009).
23 Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.All conflicts related to the
ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to
the conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the
concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area
where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the
parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through
customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted
hereafter.
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for
Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
Order or Decision.
24 Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP through its Regional
Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the
implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including
but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing
Officer (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and
informed consent of ICC/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving
violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred
places, or rituals;

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14 of the NCIP Rules25 as null and void insofar as they

expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the
IPRA to
_______________
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A.

8371; and
(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs
that have not been settled under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No.
8371;
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have
been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as
provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided, that such action is
filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
25 Section 13. Certification to File Action.Upon the request of the
proper party, members of the indigenous dispute settlement group or
council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the
NCIP. In giving due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in
any form so long as it states in substance the failure of settlement
notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional
practices.
Section 14. Exceptions.The certification shall not be required in the
following cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation,
partnership, association or juridical person or a public officer or employee
and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official
functions;
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the
same IP/IC Community, except when he voluntarily submits to the
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to
prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable damage or injury that may
result if not acted upon immediately; and
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary
certification without justifiable reasons.

152
include such disputes where the parties do not belong to

the same ICC/IP. As the Court held in Padunan v.
DARAB,26 [j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred
by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield
to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must
exist as a matter of law.27 Only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of
procedure cannot.28 In the above said exceptional cases
where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong
to the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the
NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the requirement of
certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the failed attempt to settle the dispute
according to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court
of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its
Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00204-
MIN, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin,

Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and
Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Carpio and Del Castillo, JJ., On Official Leave.
Velasco, Jr., J., Pls. see Concurring Opinion.
Brion, J., See: Separate Opinion.
Perez, J., With a Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.

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CONCURRING OPINION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I concur with the ponencia that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) has jurisdiction over the case. Both original and
amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria and injunction,
respectively, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus
falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC. As correctly
pointed out by the ponencia, jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action.1 It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court.2
However, I would like to submit some points for
consideration which run counter to the opinion of my
esteemed colleague. It is my position that the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) has jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs)
regardless of whether or not they belong to the same IP/IC
Community. This is pursuant to Section 66 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8371,3 otherwise known as The Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) as follows:
_______________
1 Ponencia, p. 140.
2 Gomez-Castillo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231, 22 June 2010, 621
SCRA 499, 507.
3 An Act To Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes
(1997).

154

SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP, through

its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however,
petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied)

A careful scrutiny of Section 66 of the IPRA would
reveal that it is composed of three parts: (1) the NCIP has
ICCs/IPs; (2) the requirement of exhaustion of all remedies
provided under the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs; and (3)
a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders as a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with NCIP.
The first part lays down the basis of jurisdiction of the
NCIP. It can be gleaned from this part that the law is
silent if the parties should belong to the same IP/IC
Community. What the law only provides is that the NCIP
has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs.
The second part contains the proviso that should be
followed before the NCIP acquires jurisdiction over the
case. Said proviso states: Provided, however, That no such
dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties
have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws.
The third part, on the other hand, refers to the
certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders as a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with NCIP.
This is in relation to the second part requiring the
exhaustion of all remedies.
The second and third parts of the provision should not
be interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction of the NCIP to
claims

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 155

and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they

arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP. The proviso only provides for a condition precedent.
It is merely procedural and does not divest the NCIP of
jurisdiction over parties not belonging to the same IP/IC
Community. As provided in Section 14, Rule IV of the
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure4 of the NCIP
(NCIP Rules), a party which does not belong to the same
IP/IC Community is exempted from the requirement of
certification, to wit:

Section 14. Exceptions.The certification shall not
be required in the following cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private
corporation, partnership, association or juridical
person or a public officer or employee and the dispute
is in connection with the performance of his official
functions;
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuses to
reasons. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is my position that the NCIP has jurisdiction
over the following:
a. claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
arising between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP; and
_______________
4 Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003.

156

b. claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs

arising between or among ICCs/IPs even if one of the
parties does not belong to the same IP/IC Community.

All cases and disputes where both parties are ICCs/IPs
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP.
Consequently, all cases and disputes where one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP are covered by the jurisdiction of
the regular courts regardless of the subject matter even if it
involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs. Moreover,
the regular courts have jurisdiction over cases and disputes
as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.
To limit the jurisdiction of the NCIP to claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs arising between or
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP would be
contrary to the purpose for which the NCIP was created. It
must be pointed out that the NCIP is an administrative
body entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under its special knowledge and training. It is charged with
the implementation of the law, considering its competence,
expertise, experience and informed judgment. As such, the
NCIP is vested with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers. It is the primary government agency responsible
for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans
and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-
being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral
domains as well as their rights thereto.5 It is quasi-judicial
because it has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving the rights of the ICCs/IPs.6 It is quasi-legislative
because of its rule-making power.7 Because of its expertise
in the field of ICCs/IPs, it is better equipped than the trial
courts in resolving the claims and disputes involving rights
where the parties are both ICCs/IPs.
_______________
5 Supra note 3, Section 38.

6 Id., Section 66.
7 Id., Section 44(c).

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 157

Anent the issue as to what customary laws apply in

cases where the parties involved in the claims and disputes
do not belong to the same IP/IC Community, the NCIP may
apply the customary law common to both ICCs/IPs or that
which can be applied by analogy.
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that there is no
need to declare the following provisions as null and void:
i. The first and third paragraphs of Rule IX, Section 1
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 8371 which provide:

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.All
conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands,
involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to
conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be
resolved by the concerned parties through the
application of customary laws in the area where the
disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
xxxx
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal
by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.
ii. Rule III, Section 5 of the NCIP Rules which
provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP
through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the
implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the
Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

158

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of

free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs
involving violations of customary laws or
desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or
rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing
Officer:
customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation
of Republic Act No. 8371.
Commission:
been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to,
any person or community as provided for under
Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such
action is filed within one (1) year from the date
of registration.8

iii. Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules
which provide:
_______________
8 Supra note 4.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 159


request of the proper party, members of the indigenous
dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise
issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving
due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in
any form so long as it states in substance the failure of
settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under
customary law or traditional practices.9
Section 14. Exceptions.The certification shall not be
required in the following cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private
corporation, partnership, association or juridical
person or a public officer or employee and the dispute
is in connection with the performance of his official
functions;
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does
not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except
when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
Council of Elders/Leaders;
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to
reasons.10
The above mentioned rules can be interpreted in

harmony with the provisions of the IPRA law. Said rules do
not expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP but merely
enumerate the claims and disputes falling within its
jurisdiction. Section 14(b) does not automatically dispense
with the certification required by law as the parties may
opt to voluntarily submit to the juris-
_______________
9 Id.
10 Id.

160

diction of the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is akin to a

barangay conciliation proceeding under the Local
Government Code wherein the conciliation process is a
condition precedent that affects the sufficiency of the cause
of action, not the jurisdiction of the court.11
However, the second paragraph of Rule IX, Section 1 of
the IRR of R.A. No. 8371 is not anchored on legal mooring.
Said paragraph reads:
conflicts related to the ancestral domains or
lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or
where the dispute could not be resolved through
customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in
accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.
(Emphasis supplied)
As earlier discussed, Section 66 of R.A. No. 8371 is
explicit that the NCIPs jurisdiction is confined only to
claims and disputes where the parties are both ICCs/IPs.
Such being the case, the second paragraph of Rule IX,
Section 1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8371 should be declared
null and void because it is contrary to the provision of
Section 66 of the IPRA. It is well-settled that an
administrative rule or regulation must conform, not
contradict, the provisions of the enabling law.12 A rule or
regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law
it is intended to implement.13 Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void.14 Since
the rule in question is at war with Section 66 of R.A. No.
8371, then it must be excised.
_______________
11 Heirs of Fernando Vinzons v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 541, 549

(1999).
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 175707, November 19, 2014, 740 SCRA 640.
13 Id.
14 Id.

161
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 161

Anent the resolution of the substantive issue in the case

at bar, I agree with the ponencia that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the instant dispute.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur to DENY the Petition for
Review.

SEPARATE OPINION

BRION, J.:

I concur with the ponencias conclusion that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case. I write this Separate Opinion to
express my own approach to the case, and to elaborate on
relevant points that may need emphasis.
I base my concurrence on the following grounds:
(1) The CA correctly ruled that the RTCs February
14, 2005 order is not tainted with grave abuse;
(2) Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by law and the allegations of the
complaint;
(3) The National Council for Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) jurisdiction over disputes is limited to cases
where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP.

I also concur with the ponencia that the NCIP has
jurisdiction over adverse claims, boundary disputes, and
cancellation of fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Titles (CADTs), regardless of the parties involved.
But I clarify and emphasize my view that while the NCIP
possesses quasi-judicial powers, its jurisdiction is only
primary, and not exclusive.

162

The RTCs February 14, 2005 order is

NOT tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The present petition is an appeal from the CAs
dismissal of the petitioners petition for certiorari. Hence,
this Court must determine whether the CA correctly ruled
that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing
the February 14, 2005 order.
The petitioners alleged before the CA that the February
14, 2005 order is tainted with grave abuse because it: (i)
denied the petitioners motion to refer the case to the NCIP;
(ii) declared the petitioners in default; and (iii) issued the
writ of preliminary injunction.1
Jurisprudence2 has traditionally defined grave abuse of
discretion as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
Based on this definition, I share the view that the RTC
did not abuse its discretion, much less commit any grave
abuse of discretion.
At the time the respondents amended the complaint, the
petitioners had yet to file their answers to the original
complaint, hence, the amendment was still a matter of
right. The rule on amendments as a matter of right applies
to a codefendant who has yet to file his responsive
pleading, even if his
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 62-63.

2 Ganaden v. Court of Appeals, 665 Phil. 267; 650 SCRA 117 (2011).

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 163

codefendants have already done so.3 Thus, while

Macapayag and Brazil have filed their answers, the
respondents still have the right to amend the complaint
with respect to the rest of the petitioners.
Likewise, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in
declaring the petitioners in default and in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction.
The RTC declared the petitioners in default only after
they failed to file their answers within the period allowed.
On the other hand, the writ of preliminary injunction
sought to maintain the status quo to prevent both parties
from committing further acts of violence; there is no caprice
in maintaining the peace.
Nevertheless, default orders are issued on the
presumption that the defendant no longer opposes the
allegations and reliefs demanded in the complaint.4 In this
case, the petitioners vehemently opposed the RTCs
cognizance of the complaint, and refused to file their
answers because they believed that jurisdiction belongs to
the NCIP.
In the interest of justice, I support the CA in lifting the

order of default to allow the parties to try the case on the
merits.

Jurisdiction is determined
by the allegations of the complaint

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
law and by the material allegations of the complaint.5
Under these standards, the petitioners argument, i.e., that
the NCIP has jurisdiction because the case involves the
rights of ICCs/IPs, is without merit.
_______________
3 See Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999,
103 Phil. 430; 303 SCRA 186.
4 See Delbros v. IAC, No. L-72566, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 533.
5 Mendoza v. Germino, 650 Phil. 81; 635 SCRA 537 (2010), citing
Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, G.R. No. 123417, June 10, 1999, 308 SCRA 167.

164

As the ponencia pointed out, both the original and the

amended complaints do not allege that the respondents
were ICCs/IPs, or that the dispute involves an ancestral
dominion.6 Hence, on the face of the respondents
complaint, the RTC has jurisdiction over the injunction
case.7
Neither am I impressed with the petitioners argument
that, where the actual issue is evidenced by the subsequent
pleadings, jurisdiction does not depend on the complaints
literal averments. This Court has consistently ruled that
jurisdiction never depends on the defenses set up in the
answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration.8

The NCIPs jurisdiction over disputes is limited
where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP.

I join the ponencia in ruling that the NCIP does not
have jurisdiction over disputes where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of
different ICC/IP.
My concurrence is based on the following: (i) Section 66
contains a proviso that limits the NCIPs jurisdiction;
(ii) the RTC, not the NCIP, has jurisdiction to
adjudicate violations of ICC/IP rights; (iii) Congress
had no intention to apply customary laws to non-
ICCs/IPs.
I. Section 66 contains a proviso

that limits the NCIPs jurisdiction.
The NCIPs jurisdiction is outlined in IPRAs Section 66:
_______________
6 Ponencia, p. 146.
7 Section 19(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
8 Nuez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12,
2010, 618 SCRA 142.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 165

SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The

NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such
dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
(emphasis supplied)

Section 66 is composed of three parts: the first states
the NCIPs jurisdiction; the second requires the prior
exhaustion of remedies under customary law; and the
third states that a certification from the council of
elders/leaders is a condition precedent to the filing of a
The first part lays down the NCIPs jurisdiction, i.e.,
over all claims and disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs. The NCIPs jurisdiction is not dependent on who
the parties are, but on whether the dispute involves the
rights of ICCs/IPs.
However, the second part contains the proviso
Provided, However, That no such dispute shall be brought
to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. The third part
begins with the phrase for this purpose; the purpose
referred to being the exhaustion of remedies under their
customary laws.
Jurisprudence tells us that the office of a proviso is to
limit the application of the law.9
_______________
9 Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 326 (1921), citing 25 R. C. L., p. 984, et

seq.; and specifically, the leading cases of McKnight v. Hodge [1909], 55
Wash., 289, 104 Pac., 504, 40 L. R. A. [N.S.], 1207; McCormick v. West
Duluth [1891], 47 Minn., 272, 50 N.W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. v.
Blomquist [1916], 26 Idaho, 222; 141

166

Taking these considerations into account, while the

NCIPs jurisdiction is initially couched in general terms to
include any and all disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs, the second and third parts limit the NCIPs
jurisdiction to disputes where both parties have remedies
to exhaust under customary laws.
Consequently, the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over
disputes involving non-ICCs/IPs because non-ICCs/IPs
have no customary laws to exhaust.
The limitation likewise applies to disputes where the
opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs.
Each ICC/IP has its own set of customary laws and
council of elders/leaders. To require members of a
particular ICC/IP to appear before the council of
elders/leaders of another ICC/IP would be to require the
former to observe the customary laws of the latter. This is
repugnant to the right of each ICC/IP to use its own
commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution
institutions, and peace building processes or mechanisms.10

II. The RTC, not the NCIP, has
jurisdiction over violations
of ICC/IP rights committed
by Non-ICC/IP.
As I had earlier discussed, the first part of Section 66

shows that jurisdiction is not dependent on who the parties
are to the dispute, but on whether the dispute involves
the rights of ICCs/IPs.
Guided by the rule that provisos should not be construed
to limit the main provisions of the statute;11 this Court
must not
_______________
Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these principles concerning
provisos are applied.
10 Section 15 of the IPRA.
11 Supra note 9.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 167

read Section 66 in isolation but must read it together with

the related provision. In this case, the Court must identify
the rights of ICCs/IPs, and determine whether the NCIP is
the proper venue for the enforcement of these rights.
The IPRA grants ICCs/IPs rights: (i) over ancestral
domains/lands;12 (ii) to self-governance and employment;13
(iii) to social justice and human rights;14 and (iv) to cultural
integrity.15 These rights are spread throughout several
chapters, mainly under Chapters III to VI.
_______________
12 Chapter III grants the ICCs/IPs the right to own and possess their
ancestral domains/lands including the right to: claim ownership; develop;
not to be relocated; be resettled, and to return in case of displacement;
regulate the entry of migrants; access integrated systems for the
management of inland waters and air space; claim parts of reservations;
resolve land conflicts in accord with customary laws of the area; transfer
lands to/among the members of the same ICCs/IPs; redeem property sold
to a nonmember of an ICC/IP, whenever necessary.
13 Chapter IV grants ICCs/IPs the right to: use their own justice
system, conflict resolution institutions and peace building processes;
determine their priorities for development; form tribal barangays.
14 Chapter V grants the ICCs/IPs the right to: equal protection of
laws; protection during armed conflicts; equal employment opportunities
and benefits; associate and to collectively bargain; basic services. In
addition, IPRA declares that ICC/IP women shall enjoy equal rights and
opportunities with men.
15 Chapter VI grants the ICCs/IPs the right to: preserve and protect
their culture, traditions and institutions; access to education; practice and
revitalize their traditions and customs; restitution of intellectual property
taken without their free consent; maintain and protect their religious and
cultural sites; use and control ceremonial objects; repatriate human
remains; full ownership, control and protection of their cultural and
intellectual rights; prevent access to biological, genetic resources and
indigenous knowledge without their free and prior consent; receive from
the national government funds earmarked for their archaeological and
historical sites.

168

It must be noted, however, that most of these rights are

state policies, and only the following are clearly
demandable and enforceable: the rights over ancestral
domains and lands;16 the right against unlawful
intrusion;17 the right to equal protection and to
nondiscrimination;18 the right against unlawful acts
pertaining to employment;19 the rights to religious, cultural
sites and ceremonies, including archaeological artifacts;20
and the right to withhold access to biological and genetic
resources.21
Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who
violates the rights of ICCs/IPs shall be punished in
accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs
concerned....without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP
concerned to avail of the protection of existing laws...[i]n
which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine,
and damages, upon the discretion of the court.22
_______________

22 SECTION 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties.Any
person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such as,
but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any
ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall
commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24,
Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall be punished in accordance
with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no
such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment: Provided,
further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be
imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any
ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In which case, any
person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more
than twelve (12) years or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000)

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Existing laws refer to national laws as opposed to

customary laws; while the court refers to the regular
courts as opposed to administrative bodies like the NCIP.
Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection
under national laws and file an action before the regular
courts, in which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment
and/or fine, and damages. From this perspective, Section
72 is a special penal law that applies to ALL persons,
including non-ICCs/IPs.
The phrase without prejudice, however, means without
limiting the course of action that one can take.23 Thus, a
recourse under customary laws does not take away the
right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under existing
national laws. An express caveat under the customary law
option is that the penalty must not be cruel, degrading, or
inhuman, nor shall it consist of the death penalty or
excessive fines.24
Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction
over national laws, then the NCIPs jurisdiction is limited
to punishment under customary laws.25
The NCIPs power to impose penalties under customary
laws presents two important issues: first, whether it is
legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties
under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a
particular
_______________
or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. In
addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever
damage may have been suffered by the latter as a consequence of the
unlawful act.
23 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/without prejudice.
25 Under Section 46(g), the NCIP-Legal Affairs Office (NCIP-LAO)
shall conduct preliminary investigations on violations of ICC/IP rights and
on the basis of its findings, initiate the filing of appropriate legal or
administrative action to the NCIP. The Legal or Administrative Action
that Section 46(g) refers to is the action to enforce punishment under
customary laws.

170

ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary

laws of another ICC/IP.
Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, must be published.26
Most customary laws are not written, much less
published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or
even the regular courts have the power to penalize non-
ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A
contrary ruling would be constitutionally infirm for lack of
due process.
Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the
customary law of another. Otherwise, the former would be
forced to observe a nonbinding customary law.
Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over
violations of ICC/IP rights, its jurisdiction is limited to
those committed by and against members of the same
ICC/IP.
This view does not detract from the IPRAs policy to
protect the rights of ICCs/IPs. ICCs/IPs, whose rights are
violated by non-ICCs/IPs or by members of a different
ICC/IP, can still file criminal charges before the regular
courts. In this situation, the NCIPs role is not to
adjudicate but to provide ICCs/IPs with legal assistance in
litigation involving community interest.27
III. Congress had no intention to apply

customary laws to non-ICCs/IPs.
Some might conceivably argue that Congress passed the
IPRA and created the NCIP precisely to bind non-ICCs/IPs
to customary laws.
I do not agree with this view.
_______________
26 See Taada v. Tuvera, No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 146 SCRA 446.
27 Section 46(g) of the IPRA.

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The records of the Senate and the bicameral committee

hearings show that the legislators focused mainly on: (i)
the grant of Ancestral Domains/Lands to ICCs/IPs; (ii) the
NCIPs organizational transition from its predecessor-
agencies; and (iii) budgetary concerns. Section 66s
controversial proviso was not even discussed on the Senate
floor or during the bicameral committee hearings.
In the course of the bills28 early development, the
Senate technical working group29 realized that it would be
difficult for the NCIP to adjudicate rights of non-ICCs/IPs
under national laws, on one hand, and the rights of
ICCs/IPs under customary laws, on the other. They were
likewise concerned with the possible conflict between the
customary laws of contending ICCs/IPs.
As a solution, the Senate technical working group
proposed the creation of the Office on Policy, Planning and
Research (OPPR) and a Consultative Body that will
compile all customary laws, and assist the NCIP in its
exercise of quasi-judicial powers:
Mr. Mike Mercado
(representative of Sen. Juan Flavier):
Sir, its over and above the customs and tradition. What Im trying to point
out is, its the whole plan for the sector. Two issues po ang sinasabi ko.
Number one is regarding the need to put it down because we talked
about conflict of rights here
The Presiding Officer:
With the Non-IPs.
_______________
28 The IPRA is the product of Senate Bill 1728 and House Bill 9125.
The bill originated from the Senate, and was the consolidation of four
separate bills: S.B. Nos. 343, 618, 1476, and 1486. Then as senator, former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo authored Senate Bill No. 618, which
proposed the creation of the NCIP.
29 July 30, 1996 Committee on Cultural Communities; Senate
Technical Working Group.

172

Mr. Mercado:
With the non-IPs possibly which would happen. It would be easy if the
conflict could be between IPs of the same group. So it would be easier
to resolve. But paano po yung if there would be a conflict between an
IP and non-IP.
Mr. Raiz:
Non-IP.
Mr. Mercado:
Because the assumption nga oo, yong sa civil law relations, may mga
conflicts po na possible na mangyayari. So, actually, sabi ko nga,
maybe we can do away with it. Thats one issue. xxx
Mr. Austria:
Yong point ni Mike is very meritorious, yon dapat, Dahil unang una, the
IPs should themselves show to the other sectors kung ano ba yon rule
nila sa society. xxx
Ms. Damaso:
Lets go back to that discussion on the creation of a separate office on
planning and policy, and research.
I think its more germane to mention those points that Mike has
enunciated earlier that this be a primary function of that office xxx
continuing documentation of customary laws and other usage
no for complete mediation or resolution, which would be
derived from the culture base of the IPs.
........
The presiding officer:
You were mentioning iyong other groups. What about the commission?
Should they be mandated to do the research and to, you know, to
compile such laws. Kasi yung nakikita ko doon sa idea ni Mike is, like
for example, kung may conflict iyong IPs and Non-IPs, paano mo
sasabihin, although sa-
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sabihin natin na yung customary law nga yung mag-go-govern, pero paano
natin i-po-prove although kailangan natin i-recognize na mayroon
ganuong problem. Sabihin natin its an oral practice, its an oral
customary law pero mas maganda siguro kung iyon nga kung i-
compile mo tapos eto ganito yon. So mayroon tayong pang...
Mr. Mercado:
For example po on practical ground, I think ang power is lodged with the
Commission which is collective in nature iyong mga adjudicatory
power. Assuming not all of them would belong to one tribe, they would
belong to a different sector or group. I know that it is being practiced
and its not written down, so I have to make decision also as a part of
that Commission as a commissioner based on something, so I have
to also acquaint myself on the practices of other groups because that is
part of the power of the commission to adjudicate. For practical
purposes only, how would I know the practices of the particular
groupings, which I am supposed to adjudicate, assuming that we only
have 113 tribes or groupings and we have five commissioners. Those
other five or those other commissioners who are not aware of that
particular practice, to that they will depend their judgment on. So,
there is also a need for this five commissioners to be familiar with the
practice of other groups because they will make decisions also.
Ms. Damaso:
Yeah, Mike, I think your point is to compile, meaning document.
Mr. Mercado:
Document only, hindi ho isabatas.
Ms. Damaso:
But not to codify. Its a different ball game to codify.
174

Mr. Mercado:
Actually ginamit ko yung term, nag-usap kami ni Didith, sabi ko, its
compile only. Because, its beyond the power of this commission
to make codifications. But yung point kanina ni Datu Sulang is
actually going a step further. Kunwari like Muslims, bakit nare-
recognize na yong three marriages. Because there is four marriages
and they have specific law for that. If we will not compile it,
mahihirapan tayong ma-attain yong level na yon na sana mas
maganda kung yong all practices, for example on marriage sa
ibat ibang tribes ma-recognize rin ng law. Pero if we will not
document the practices, hindi natin maa-attain yong level na yon.
Kaya mas maganda kung mayroon tayong documentation that when
legislators if and when they decide to make it a law, mayroon silang
existing na gagamitin. xxx
........
Ms. Chavez:
Couldnt NCIP hire or form a consultative body from which each
tribe will be represented by a co-tribal consultant aside from
the documentation of customary laws? Pwede ba yon ganoon?
Kasi kahit may documentation... (emphasis supplied)
The presiding officer:
Baka pwede isama sa IRR, implementing rules and regulations yong mga
tribal tribal consultancy.
Ms. Chavez:
Sa IRR.
The Presiding officer:
Pwede naman siguro yon gawin. Anyway, specifics na yon. General lang
yong functions na ilagay natin.
xxxx

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While the IPRA did create the OPPR, and directed the
NCIP to form a consultative body, their functions had
nothing to do with the NCIPs exercise of quasi-judicial
powers.
The OPPRs objective is to document customary laws for
monitoring, evaluation, and policy purposes to assist
Congress in formulating appropriate legislations benefiting
ICCs/IPs.30 On the other hand, the consultative bodys role
is to advise the NCIP on matters relating to the problems,
aspirations, and interests of the ICCs/IPs.31
The variance between the deliberations and the law
suggests that Congress passed the IPRA without
considering the inevitable conflict of rights under national
and customary laws. In my opinion, this casts doubt on
whether Congress did give the NCIP the mandate to settle
disputes between non-ICCs/IPs and ICCs/IPs.
It is true that the IPRA echoed our Constitution32 in
[recognizing] the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.33 However, I do
not subscribe to the idea that customary laws should bind
non-ICCs/IPs simply because Congress ordered the NCIP
to compile them.
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,34 former Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug
opined35 that customary laws should not apply to non-
ICCs/IPs simply because Congress parroted the
Constitution:
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of

the Constitution allows Congress to provide for the
ap-
_______________
30 Sec. 46(b) of the IPRA.

32 Constitution, Section 5, Art. XII.
33 Section 2(b) of the IPRA.
34 G.R. No. 135385, 400 Phil. 904; 347 SCRA 128 (2000). In this case,
the divided Court upheld the IPRAs Constitutionality.
35 Id., Separate Opinion.

176

plicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains. I do not see this
statement as saying that Congress may enact a
law that would simply express that customary
laws shall govern and end it there. Had it been
so, the Constitution could have itself easily
provided without having to still commission
Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has
explained this authority of Congress, during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention,
thus: (emphasis supplied)
Mr. Davide. xxx Insofar as the application of
the customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is
respectfully submitted that the particular
matter must be submitted to Congress. I
understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is
for the possibility of the codification of these
customary laws. So before these are codified, we
cannot now mandate that the same must
immediately be applicable. We leave it to
Congress to determine the extent of the
ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in
relation to whatever may have been codified
earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart
ahead of the horse.
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to
get Congress to look closely into the customary
laws and, with specificity and by proper
recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of,
the stream of laws. The due process clause, as I so
understand it in Taada v. Tuvera would require an
apt publication of a legislative enactment before it is
permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary
laws, when specifically enacted to become part of
statutory law, must first undergo that publication to
render them correspondingly binding and effective as
such. (emphasis in the original)
I share Justice Vitugs view. Laws must be
published before they take effect. The publication of
all laws of a public

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 177
nature or of general applicability is mandatory.36

Without publication, non-ICCs/IPs would be deprived of
due process of law.37
The NCIP has Primary Jurisdiction over Claims

regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/IPs,
or members of a different ICCs/IPs.

I note that Section 66 applies only to disputes and not
to claims:
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The

NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such
dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws. x x x x x x (emphasis and
omissions supplied)

The word claim in section 66 relates to rights of ICC/IP
over ancestral domains/lands.38
_______________
36 Supra note 26.

37 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1.
38 The IPRA classified claims as either communal or individual. The
word claim or claims appeared fifteen times in the IPRA in different
sections and subsections, all of which are connected with ancestral
domains and lands: First, under Sections 3(a) in defining ancestral
domain; second, Section 3(b) in defining Ancestral Lands; third, Sec. 3(e)
in defining Communal Claims; fourth, in Sec. 3(h) in classifying ICCs/IPs;
fifth, in Sec. 3(j) on defining individual claims; sixth, in Sec. 3(l) in
defining native titles; seventh, Sec. 4 on the concept of ancestral lands;
eighth, in Sec. 7(a) on the right of ownership of ancestral domains; ninth,
in Sec. 7(g) on the right to claim parts of reservations; tenth, in Sec. 52(d)
on proof of Ancestral Domain Claims; eleventh, in Sec. 52(h) discussing
when NCIP can favorably endorse an action upon a claim on Ancestral
Land; twelfth, in Sec. 53 in the Identification, Delineation and
Certification of Ancestral Lands; in Sec. 54 on fraudulent claims;
thirteenth,

178

Four sections in the IPRA are dedicated to the NCIPs

jurisdiction over claims: first, Section 52(h), which
refers to the power of the NCIP Ancestral Domains Office
(NCIP-ADO) to deny applications for CADTs; second,
Section 53, which refers to the NCIP-ADOs power to
reject applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles
(CALTs); third, Sec. 54, on fraudulent claims; lastly, Sec.
62, which refers to the resolution of adverse claims.
Sections 52(h) and 53 require the NCIP-ADO to publish
and post applications for CADTs/CALTs to notify all
persons, including non-ICCs/IPs. Section 62 allows all
interested persons, including non-ICCs/IPs, to file adverse
claims over disputes arising from delineation of ancestral
domains.39
Under Section 54, the NCIP may, upon the written
request of ICCs/IPs, review existing claims and after notice
and hearing, cancel CADTs and CALTs that were
fraudulently acquired by any person or community.40
_______________
in Sec. 62 on resolving adverse claims in delineated ancestral lands;

fourteenth, in Sec. 63 on the applicability of laws with respect to claims
of ownership of property disputes, and fifteenth, under Section 66.
39 SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts.In cases of conflicting
interests, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as
delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP
shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes
arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if
the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional
boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall
be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That
any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain
dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for
Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof.

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In these cases, the NCIP has jurisdiction even if

one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, or where the
opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs.

The NCIPs jurisdiction is
primary and not exclusive.

Finally, I wish to point out that while the NCIP
possesses quasi-judicial powers, its jurisdiction is not
exclusive.
The word jurisdiction in the first part of Section 66 is
unqualified. Section 66 (then Section 71) of Senate Bill
1728 was originally worded exclusive and original
jurisdiction.41 During the Bicameral Committee
42
Conference, the lower house objected to giving the NCIP
exclusive and original jurisdiction:
Sen. Juan Flavier:

(Chairman of the Senate Panel)
There is exclusive original. And so what do you suggest?
.... ....
Rep. Zapata:
(Chairman of the Panel for the House of Representatives)
Chairman, may I butt in?
Sen. Flavier:
Yes, please.
_______________
41 The Commission, through its Regional Offices, shall have exclusive

original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
indigenous people: Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies under
their customary laws. For this purpose a Certification shall be issued by
the Council who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the Commission. (underscoring
ours)
42 October 9, 1997; Bicameral Conference Meeting on the Disagreeing
Provisions of SBN 1728 and HBN 9125.

180

Rep. Zapata:
This was considered. The original, we were willing in the
house. But the exclusive, we objected to the word
exclusive because it would only be the commission that
would exclude the court and the Commission may not be
able to undertake all the review nationwide. And so we
remove the word exclusive so that they will have
original jurisdiction but with the removal of the
word exclusive that would mean that they may
bring the case to the ordinary courts of justice.
Sen. Flavier:
Without passing through the commission?
Rep. Zapata:
Yes. Anyway, if they go to the regular courts, they will
have to litigate in court, because if its (sic) exclusive, that
would be good.
Sen. Flavier:
But what he is saying is that
Rep. Zapata:
But they may not have the facility.
Rep._______:
Senado na lang.
Rep. Zapata:
Oo, iyong original na lang.
Sen. Flavier:
In other words, its not only the Commission that
can originate it, pwedeng mag-originate sa courts.
Rep. Zapata:
Or else, we just remove exclusive original so that they
will say, the National will have jurisdiction over claims. So
we remove both exclusive and original.
Sen. Flavier:
So what version are you batting for, Mr. Chairman?

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Rep. Zapata:
Just to remove the word exclusive original. The
Commission will still have jurisdiction only that, if
the parties will opt to go to courts of justice, then this
have (sic) the proper jurisdiction, then they may do so
because we have courts nationwide. Here there may be
not enough courts of the commission.
Sen. Flavier:
So we are going to adopt the senate version minus the
words exclusive original?
Rep. Zapata:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, thats my proposal.
Sen. Flavier:
No, problem. Okay Approved.
xxxx

The Bicameral Committees removal of the words
exclusive and original meant that the NCIP shares
concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Thus, I
agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra vires
for NCIP to promulgate rules and regulations stating that
it has exclusive jurisdiction.

The NCIPs jurisdiction, however, while not
exclusive,
is primary.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must
refrain from determining a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.43
_______________
43 Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November

17, 2010, 635 SCRA 140, 153.

182

On the other hand, when Congress confers exclusive
jurisdiction to a judicial or quasi-judicial entity over certain
matters by law, its action evinces its intent to exclude other
bodies from exercising the same.44
Having primary jurisdiction is not equivalent to having
exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, to avoid confusion, and to
prevent future litigants from claiming that the NCIP has
exclusive jurisdiction, the Court should remind the NCIP
and other administrative bodies to refrain from claiming
that they have exclusive jurisdiction when no such
jurisdiction is conferred by law.
Accordingly, the NCIPs Implementing Rules and
Regulations, which state that the NCIP has exclusive
jurisdiction45 should be modified to read primary
jurisdiction.
_______________
44 Pua v. Citibank, G.R. No. 180064, September 16, 2013, 705 SCRA
684.
45 RULE III. The NCIP shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of the ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to
the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371,
including but not limited to the following:
A. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing
Office (emphasis supplied)
1. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs, except those which involve oppositions to
pending applications for CALT and CADT;
2. Enforcement of compromise agreements or decisions rendered by
ICCs/IPs;
3. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371;
4. Interpretation, implementation, or enforcement of Memorandum of
Agreements (MOA) entered into by parties as a result of the Free Prior
and Informed Consent (FPIC) process;
5. Cases involving Projects, Programs, Activities within ancestral
lands/domains being implemented without the required FPIC of the
affected/host IPs/ICCs;

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Conclusion

In sum, the laws intent is neither to grant the NCIP
sole jurisdiction over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to
disregard the rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws.
However, the NCIP maintains primary jurisdiction over: (i)
adverse claims and border disputes arising from
delineation of ancestral domains/lands; (ii) cancellation of
fraudulently issued CADTs; and (iii) disputes and
violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same
ICC/IP.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the petition. The RTC
should forthwith continue with the injunction case.
_______________
6. Petitions for annotation on CADTs and CALTs or cancellations

thereof, except notice of lis pendens and those that will result to transfer
of ownership;
7. Actions for damages including, but not limited to, claims for royalties
and other benefits;
8. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs
that have not been settled under customary laws; and
9. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
B. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commission En
Banc (emphasis supplied)
1. Petition for cancellation of registered CADTs and CALTs alleged to
have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or
community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371, provided that
such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration;
2. Actions for cancellations of Certification Precondition (CP),
Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), issued by the NCIP, as well as,
rescissions of FPIC-MOA; and
3. Any other case that deems to vary, amend, or revoke previously
issued rulings, resolutions, or decisions of the Commission En Banc.

184

CONCURRING OPINION
PEREZ, J.:

While I agree with the holding in this case that
jurisdiction over the original and amended complaint,
accion reivindicatoria and injunction, before the court a
quo, correctly lies with the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs):
(1) an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action involving
interest in real property with an assessed value of
P683,760.00; and (2) an injunction, a civil action incapable
of pecuniary estimation, I offer my view on the complex
nature of the jurisdiction of the National Commission of
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) conferred in the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), Republic Act No. 8371.
Even if in this case the complaint was amended from an
accion reivindicatoria to one for injunction, both containing
allegations clearly falling within the RTCs jurisdiction,
petitioners insist and maintain that as indigenous persons,
except for two (2) petitioners, with the subject property
claimed as their ancestral land, the NCIP has exclusive
and original jurisdiction over the case. For the petitioners,
with a submission that the ponencia already dismissed, the
mere fact that this case involves members of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Persons (ICCs/IPs) and
their ancestral land, automatically endows the NCIP,
under Section 66 of the IPRA, with jurisdiction over
petitioners complaint. Even the NCIP is of the view of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction over both the original
and amended complaints. Hence, the two (2) Motions to
Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office-National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP) filed by
the NCIP Hearing Officer before the court a quo.
I concur with the ponencia on the basis of the principle
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint, and that the averments in the complaint and
the character of the

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relief sought are the ones to be consulted. As clearly

delineated in the ponencia, upon a careful review of Section
66 and based on the qualifying proviso, the NCIP shall
have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP. And, as clearly alleged by
the petitioners in their complaint, the defendants they
impleaded are not indigenous people.
I submit that the jurisdiction of the NCIP ought to be
definitively drawn to settle doubts that still linger due to
the implicit affirmation done in The City Government of
Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.1 of the NCIPs
jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are not
ICCs/IPs.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority, conferred by the
Constitution and by statute, to hear and decide a case.2 The
authority to decide a cause at all is what makes up
jurisdiction.
The enabling statute, Section 66 of the IPRA, is the
measure of quasi-judicial powers the NCIP may exercise:3

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP,
through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however,
That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws.
For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not
been resolved, which certification shall be a con-
_______________
1 G.R. No. 180206, 597 Phil. 668; 578 SCRA 88 (2009).

2 Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. Nos. 154470-
71 and G.R. Nos. 154589-90, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 521, 556.
3 Id.

186

dition precedent to the filing of a petition with the

NCIP. (Emphasis supplied)

The conferment of such jurisdiction is consistent with
state policy averred in the IPRA which recognizes and
promotes all the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of
the Constitution. Such is likewise reflected in the mandate
of the NCIP to protect and promote the interest and well-
being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions and institutions.4

The other provisions point out that the NCIP is the
primary government agency responsible for the formulation
and implementation of policies, plans and programs to
promote and protect the rights and well-being of the
ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as
well as their rights thereto.5 Nonetheless, the creation of
such a government agency does not per se grant it primary
and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction, excluding the
regular courts from taking cognizance, and exercising
jurisdiction over cases which may involve rights of
ICCs/IPs.
Significantly, while Section 66 uses the word all to
qualify the ICCs/IPs claims and disputes covered by
NCIP jurisdiction, it unmistakably contains the proviso,
that restrains or limits the initial generality of the grant of
jurisdiction.
As outlined in the ponencia, the elements of the grant of
jurisdiction to the NCIP are: (1) the claim and dispute
involves the rights of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. Both elements must be present prior to the invocation
and exercise of the NCIPs jurisdiction.
We cannot, therefore, be confined to the first phrase that
the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and therefrom deduce
primary
_______________
4 Section 39 IPRA.
5 Section 38 IPRA.

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sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and

disputes to the exclusion of the regular courts. If it
were the legislative intention that: (1) the NCIP exercise
primary jurisdiction over, and/or (2) the regular courts be
excluded from taking cognizance of, claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature could have
easily done so as in other instances conferring primary, and
original and exclusive jurisdiction to a specific
administrative body.
Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior
Resort, is the power and authority vested by the
Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to
act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.6 The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents the court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed
with special competence.7 In one occasion, we have held
that regular courts cannot or should not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the
question is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where
the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered.8 The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdic-
_______________
6 Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125339, June 22, 1998, 291
SCRA 122, 132.
7 See Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. v. NTC, 388 Phil. 624, 636;
332 SCRA 819, 829 (2000).
8 Abejo v. De la Cruz, 233 Phil. 668, 684-685; 149 SCRA 654, 669
(1987).

188

tion until after an administrative agency has determined

some question arising in the proceeding before the court.9
Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily
denote exclusive jurisdiction.10 It applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been
placed within the special competence of an administrative
body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its view.11 In some instances, the Constitution and
statutes grant the administrative body primary
jurisdiction, concurrent with either similarly authorized
government agencies or the regular courts, such as the
distinct kinds of jurisdiction bestowed by the Constitution
and statutes on the Ombudsman.
The case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice12 delineated
primary and concurrent jurisdiction as opposed to original
and exclusive jurisdiction vested by both the Constitution
and statutes13 on the Ombudsman concurrent, albeit
primary, with the Department of Justice.
Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the

Constitution, viz.:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions, and duties:
_______________
9 Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 403; 388 SCRA 574, 585
(2002).
10 Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 67.
11 Fabia v. Court of Appeals, supra.
12 Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, supra.
13 Republic Act No. 6770, known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989
and the 1987 Administrative Code.

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1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any

person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked
by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving
public officials. If it were the intention of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly
declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the
Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same
Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.
Pursuant to the authority given to the
Ombudsman by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its own rules
and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman
promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated
November 8, 1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying
Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the
Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer
or employee including those in government-owned or -
controlled

190

corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be

illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an
Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the
subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or
both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution,
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be
subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference
between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to
investigate as distinguished from the authority to
prosecute, such cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary
investigation on any Ombudsman case may be
exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City
Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular
capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive
control and supervision of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular
Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense
defined above. The law recognizes a concurrence of
jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and
other investigative agencies of the government in the
prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the
Ombudsman had properly differentiated the
authority to investigate cases from the
authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note
that the Court will first dwell on the nature or
extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to
the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15
of the Ombudsman Act which specifically
provides that the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 191


stage, from any investigating agency of the
That the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent
with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government such as the provincial, city and
state prosecutors has long been settled in
several decisions of the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court
expressly declared:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the
Constitution does not show that the power of
investigation including preliminary investigation
vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of the Ombudsman
Act, the Court held in said case:
Under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770
aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it
may take over at any stage from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government. Such
investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG
and the provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial
court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened
up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all
investigatory agencies of the government duly
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation
under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the only

192

qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at

any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his
primary jurisdiction.
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso v.
Domingo, pronounced that the Ombudsman, under
the authority of Section 13(1) of the 1987
Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime
committed by a public official, elucidating thus:
As protector of the people, the office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials (Sec. 12) and to investigate
x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x
when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. (Sec. 13) The
Ombudsman is also empowered to direct the officer
concerned, in this case the Special Prosecutor, to
take appropriate action against a public official xxx
and to recommend his prosecution (Sec. 13).
The clause any [illegal] act or omission of any
public official is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not
qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public official or employee that the Ombudsman may
investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise
from, the performance of official duty. Since the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in
the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from
the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to
penetrate judges and fiscals offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials,
and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public
officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create
a special office to investigate all criminal complaints
against public officers regardless of whether or not
the acts or omissions complained of are
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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 193
related to or arise from the performance of the duties

of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance,
and non-feasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof,
during his tenure of office (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission
that created the Ombudsman as a special body to
investigate erring public officials would be wasted if
its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of
minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related
to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those
grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of
official powers and prerogatives, for it is the
investigation of the latter where the need for an
independent, fearless, and honest investigative body,
like the Ombudsman, is greatest.
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views
in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case
and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more
apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court
elucidated on the nature of the powers of the
Ombudsman to investigate.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez v. Demetriou,
that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal
act or omission of any public official, the authority of
the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary
and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under
Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official. However as we held only two years ago in the
case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this authority is not
an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged.
Petitioners finally assert that the information and
amended information filed in this case needed the
approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that
the in-
194

formation and amended information here did not have

the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not
believe that such approval was necessary at all. In
Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court
held that the Ombudsman has authority to
investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the
part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a
public official. It must, however, be pointed out that
the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any
[illegal] act or omission of any public official (191
SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the
noninvolvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the
present case does not have any adverse legal
consequence upon the authority of the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or
amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the
government such as the Department of Justice in
connection with the charge of sedition, and the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill
gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.
In Natividad v. Felix, a 1994 case, where the
petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the
Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over
his case for alleged Murder, the Court held:
The Deloso case has already been reexamined in
two cases, namely Aguinaldo v. Domagas and
Sanchez v. Demetriou. However, by way of
amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history
of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsmans primary
jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by
the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of
the law, with reference to the subject matter, has
been in a state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the
following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, the first law
on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606
which ex-

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pressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No.
1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of
Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or -
controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher that prisin correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prisin correccional
or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000
shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two
requirements must concur under Sec. 4(a)(2) for an
offense to fall under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction,
namely: the offense committed by the public officer
must be in relation to his office and the penalty
prescribed be higher then prisin correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that
although the second requirement has been met, the
first requirement is wanting. A review of these
Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, would reveal that the crime committed by public
officers or employees must be in relation to their
office if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to
Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained

196

by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the

Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its
power to investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in
pari materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the
1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsmans
power to investigate is dependent on the cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or thing
or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or
cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a
statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent
with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on
the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed
in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi, or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the
application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections
12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must
be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that
when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers
had in mind previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or
amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with
existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph
(b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise
provides that for other offenses, aside from those
enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by
public officers or employees in relation to their office.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the

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Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to

the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate offenses committed by public
officers or employees. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is concurrent with
other government investigating agencies such
as provincial, city and state prosecutors.
However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any
stage, from any investigating agency of the
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not
precluded from conducting any investigation of
cases against public officers involving
violations of penal laws but if the cases fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman
may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
take over at any stage. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to
investigate or conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against any public
officers or employees may be exercised by an
investigator or by any provincial or city
prosecutor or their assistants, either in their
regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in
effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under
the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor
deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed
with it because the DOJs authority to act as the
principal law agency of the government and
investigate the commission of crimes under the
Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised
Administrative Code which had been held in
the Natividad case as

198

not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus,

there is not even a need to delegate the conduct
of the preliminary investigation to an agency
which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its
primary jurisdiction at any stage of the
investigation. (Emphasis supplied)

I referred to Honasan II to emphasize the point that the
NCIP cannot be said to have primary jurisdiction over all
the ICC/IP cases comparable to what the Ombudsman has
in cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. We do not find such specificity in the
grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in Section 66 of the IPRA.
Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs.
Here, I revert to the point on the investiture of primary
and/or original and exclusive jurisdiction to an
administrative body which in all instances of such grant
was explicitly provided in the Constitution and/or the
enabling statute, to wit:
1. Commission on Elections exclusive original
jurisdiction over all elections contests;14
2. Securities and Exchange Commissions original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under
Section 5
_______________
14 Article IX-C, Section 2, paragraph 2.

SEC. 2. The Commission on elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction. xxx

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of Presidential Decree No. 902-A15 prior to its transfer to

courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional
Trial Court by virtue of Section 4 of the Securities
Regulation Code;
3. Energy Regulatory Commissions original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees,
fines and penalties imposed by it in the exercise of its
powers, functions and responsibilities;16
4. Department of Agrarian Reforms17 primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and its exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
except those falling under
_______________
15 Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative

functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving.
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of
directors, business associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to
fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest
of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of
associations or organizations registered with the Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates;
between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates,
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association
and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to
exist as such entity; and
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,
officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
16 RA 9136, Section 43, paragraph u.
17 Including the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).

200

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture

and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources;18
5. Construction Industry Arbitration Commissions
original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving
contracts of construction, whether government or private,
as long as the parties agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration;19
6. Voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies;20
7. The National Labor Relations Commissions original
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases listed in Article 217 of
the Labor Code involving all workers, whether agricultural
or nonagricultural; and
8. Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigrations primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all
deportation cases.21
That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is
exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving
rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP,
is reflected
_______________
18 The DARs jurisdiction under Section 50 of RA 6657 is two-fold: (1)

Essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and administration
of laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance, while the second is judicial and involves the determination of
rights and obligations of the parties.
19 Except for disputes arising from employer-employee relationships
which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines;
EO No. 1008 or the Construction Industry Arbitration Law.
20 Articles 260-261 of the Labor Code.
21 Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 10, Section
31.

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in the IPRAs emphasis of customs and customary law to

govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special
and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute
involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power
and authority to decide on a controversy involving as
well rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought
before a court of general jurisdiction within the
legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a
practical concern, non-IPs and nonmembers of ICCs ought
to be excepted from the NCIPs competence since it cannot
determine the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof,
between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-
ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily contemplating
application of other laws, not only customs and customary
law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with
jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on
customs and customary law in a given controversy against
another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and
every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing
non-ICC/IP.
In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,22 the Court
delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, specifically paragraph 3 thereof, as all money
claims of workers, limited to cases arising from employer-
employee relations. The same clause was not expressly
carried over, in printers ink, in Article 217 as it exists
today, but the Court ruled that such was a limitation on
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus:
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National
Labor Relations Commission is outlined in Article 217
of the Labor Code xxx:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and
the Commission.(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide
_______________
22 G.R. No. 80774, 244 Phil. 741, 747; 161 SCRA 719, 725 (1988).

202

within thirty (30) working days after submission of

the case by the parties for decision, the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
nonagricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those
based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages,
overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement,
except claims for employees compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265
of this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.
While paragraph 3 above refers to all money
claims of workers, it is not necessary to suppose
that the entire universe of money claims that
might be asserted by workers against their
employers has been absorbed into the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In
the first place, paragraph 3 should be read not in
isolation from but rather within the context formed by
paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor practices),
paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and
conditions of employment), paragraph 4 (claims
relating to household services, a particular species of
employer-employee relations), and paragraph 5
(relating to certain activities prohibited to employees
or to employers). It is evident that there is a unifying
element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and
that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising
out of or in connection with an employer-employee
relationship. This is, in other words, a situation
where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully
invoked in clarifying the scope of

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paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217

of the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the above
conclusion from an examination of the terms
themselves of Article 217, as last amended by BP Blg.
227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of
the Labor Code expressly brought within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC
cases arising from employer-employee relations,
which clause was not expressly carried over, in
printers ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it
cannot be presumed that money claims of workers
which do not arise out of or in connection with their
employer-employee relationship, and which would
therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the
regular courts of justice, were intended by the
legislative authority to be taken away from the
jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor
Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The Court, therefore,
believes and so holds that the money claims of
workers referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217
embraces money claims which arise out of or in
connection the employer-employee relationship, or
some aspect or incident of such relationship. Put a
little differently, that money claims of workers which
now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have
some reasonable causal connection with the employer-
employee relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the phraseology of all claims and disputes

involving rights of ICCs/IPs does not necessarily grant the
NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case
involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard to the status of
the parties, i.e., whether the opposing parties are both
ICCs/IPs.
In all, for the reason that under the provisions of the
IPRA, specifically Section 66 thereof, the jurisdiction of the
NCIP is special and limited, confined only to cases
involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both such parties
belong to the same ICC/IP, the original and amended
complaint herein properly fall within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts, specifically the RTC. Thus, I concur in the
denial of the petition.

204

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur with the ponencia in holding that respondents
action, alleged to be involving a claim over the ancestral
domain of an indigenous cultural community/indigenous
people (ICC/IP), does not fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP).
A careful reading of Section 661 of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997, with particular emphasis on its proviso will
reveal that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited to
disputes where both parties are members of ICC/IPs and
come from the same ethnolinguistic group.
Thus, the assailed Decision dated August 17, 2006 and
Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00204-MIN must be affirmed.
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari2 is an
offshoot of a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria with prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary prohibitory injunction with damages3 (Original
Complaint) filed by respondents against petitioners before
the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon on
March 3, 2004,
_______________
1 SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP, through its

regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute
shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not
been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the
filing of a petition with the NCIP.
2 Rollo, pp. 21-50.
3 Id., at p. 60, Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006.

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VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 205

docketed as Civil Case No. 04-03-01. This Petition for

Accion Reivindicatoria was subsequently amended by
respondents into a Complaint for injunction, damages, and
other relief4 (Amended Complaint).
On March 20, 2004, petitioners Brazil and Macapayag
filed their Answer to the original Complaint, asserting that
respondents had no cause of action against them.5
On March 23, 2004, the other petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss. They argued that the Regional Trial Court had
no jurisdiction over the case. They asserted that they were
members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan Talaandig
Tribal Association or the Talaandig Tribe, and claimed
residence in Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon. They
noted that on July 25, 2003, Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Claim No. R-10-TAL-0703-0010 was issued in
favor of the Talaandig Tribe through NCIP En Banc
Resolution No. 08-2003. On October 30, 2003, this
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim was formally
awarded to the Talaandig Tribe by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. The Certificate covered a total area of
11,105.5657 hectares in Barangay Miarayon, Talakag,
Bukidnon.6 Petitioners argued that as the case filed by
respondents entailed a dispute over the ancestral land of
an ICC/IP, it fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the NCIP.7
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP filed a Motion to Refer the
Case to the Regional Hearing Office-National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (Motion to Refer). As with
petitioners who filed the Motion to Dismiss, the NCIP
insisted that the Regional Trial Court did not have
jurisdiction over the case.8
On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend
and Supplement the original Complaint into one for
injunction,
_______________
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 79, Original Certificate of Title.
7 Id., at pp. 30-32, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
8 Id., at p. 60, Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006.

206

damages, and other relief. Attached to this Motion was the

amended Complaint.9
On July 30, 3004, petitioners filed their Opposition to
the Admission of the amended Complaint. On August 1,
2004, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss the amended
Complaint, insisting on the Regional Trial Courts lack of
jurisdiction.10
On August 10, 2004, the Regional Trial Court issued the
Order granting the Motion to Amend and Supplement. The
same Order declared the NCIPs Motion to Refer and
petitioners Motions to Dismiss moot and academic.11
On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to
Refer and another Motion to Dismiss.12
On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their
Opposition and a Motion for Judgment by Default.13
On February 14, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued
the Order denying the Motion to Refer, declaring
petitioners (except Macapayag and Brazil, who had earlier
filed an Answer) in default, and calling the case for pretrial
(against Macapayag and Brazil) and for ex parte
presentation of evidence (against the other petitioners).
The court also issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
subject to respondents posting of a P100,000.00 bond.14
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals.
In the Decision15 dated August 17, 2006, the Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification (i.e., lifted the order of
de-
_______________
9 Id.
10 Id., at p. 61.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id., at pp. 61-62.
15 Id., at pp. 57-68.

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fault) the Regional Trial Courts February 14, 2005

Order. In the Resolution dated July 4, 2007, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Petitioners pray that the Court of Appeals August 17,
2006 Decision and July 4, 2007 Resolution be reversed and
set aside and that a decision be rendered declaring that the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction, enjoining the
Regional Trial Court from proceeding, ordering that the
case be referred to the NCIP, and declaring void the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners insist that the NCIP has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the case as it involves the
ancestral domain of an ICC/IP. They also assail the
amendment of the Complaint from accion reivindicatoria to
one for injunction, saying that the amendment was made
merely to clothe the Regional Trial Court with jurisdiction
and to downplay how the case is ultimately concerned with
an ICC/IPs rights over its ancestral domain. Likewise, they
claim that the NCIP should not be deprived of jurisdiction
merely on account of the Complaints failure to allege that
parties to the case belong to ICCs/IPs.
This case concerns the issue of which, between the
Regional Trial Court and the NCIP, has jurisdiction over
the case.
The case filed by respondents does not fall within the
scope of the NCIPs jurisdiction as laid out in Section 6616
of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.
_______________
16 SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP, through its

regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute
shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of [a] tribunal
to hear, try and decide a case.17 Moreover, [j]urisdiction
over a subject matter is conferred by law.18 It could not be
conferred by any other source, such as the parties action or
conduct and any judgment, order or resolution issued
without it is void.19
I

The NCIP does not have jurisdiction over cases where
one of the parties does not belong to an indigenous cultural
community.
Section 38 of the Act created the NCIP to carry out the
policies set forth in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Per
Section 38, the NCIP shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the formulation and implementation
of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the
rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of
their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.
Section 39 provides for the NCIPs mandate to protect and
promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with
due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and
institutions.
_______________
not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the
filing of a petition with the NCIP.
17 Veneracion v. Mancilla, 528 Phil. 309, 325; 495 SCRA 712, 726
(2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
18 Machado v. Gatdula, 626 Phil. 457, 468; 612 SCRA 546, 559 (2010)
[Per J. Brion, Second Division], citing Vargas v. Caminas, 577 Phil. 185;
554 SCRA 305 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]; Metromedia Times
Corporation v. Pastorin, 503 Phil. 288; 465 SCRA 320 (2005) [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division]; and Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 229
Phil. 234, 242; 145 SCRA 211, 221 (1986) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
19 Magno v. People, 662 Phil. 726, 735; 647 SCRA 362, 371 (2011) [Per
J. Brion, Third Division]; citing Machado v. Gatdula, id.

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Chapter IX of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

pertains to the quasi-judicial powers of the NCIP. Thus,
Section 6920 expressly enables the NCIP to exercise powers
that are necessary incidents of this quasi-judicial power:
the promulgation of rules and regulations; the
administration of oaths; the power to summon parties,
issue subpoenas, and contempt power; and the power to
issue writs of injunction. Section 6821 enables the NCIP to
issue writs of execution. Section 6722 provides for the mode
of appeal from decisions of the NCIP.
_______________
20 SECTION 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.The NCIP

shall have the power and authority:
a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and
disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its
internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this Act;
b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue
subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements and
other document of similar nature as may be material to a just
determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted
in pursuance of this Act;
c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose
appropriate penalties therefor; and
d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending
before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect
social or economic activity.
21 SECTION 68. Execution of Decisions, Awards, Orders.Upon
expiration of the period herein provided and no appeal is perfected by any
of the contending parties, the Hearing Officer of the NCIP, on its own
initiative or upon motion by the prevailing party, shall issue a writ of
execution requiring the sheriff or the proper officer to execute final
decisions, orders or awards of the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP.
22 SECTION 67. Appeals to the Court of Appeals.Decisions of the
NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
review.

210

Section 7023 bars inferior courts from restraining

proceedings in the NCIP. Section 6524 establishes a
framework for resolving disputes by recognizing the
primacy of customary laws and practices.
Section 66 specifically provides for the jurisdiction of the

NCIP:
SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP,
through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute
shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall
be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that
the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
Section 66s grant of jurisdiction is ostensibly cast in
absolute terms: over all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs.
However, further into Section 66 are two clauses that
qualify the NCIPs jurisdiction. First is the proviso that no
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties
have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. Second is that a certification . . . issued
by the Council of
_______________
23 SECTION 70. No Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction.

No inferior court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the NCIP or
any of its duly authorized or designated offices in any case, dispute or
controversy arising from, necessary to, or interpretation of this Act and
other pertinent laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.
24 SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices.When
disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve the dispute.

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dispute that the same has not been resolved . . . shall be a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the
NCIP.
A cursory reading of these clauses shows that they state
a procedural requirement (i.e., exhaustion of remedies
under customary law) and a formal requirement (i.e.,
certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders) that
must first be complied with before the NCIP may take
cognizance of a case. However, these procedural and formal
requirements are not all there is to the qualifying clauses
of Section 66.

II

Attention must be drawn to the provisos choice of
words. To reiterate, the proviso reads: Provided, however,
That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws.
The proviso uses the plural term the parties. It also
uses the plural their, which is a possessive pronoun
substituting for the noun phrase the parties.
The use of the plural the parties necessarily means
that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies provided
under customary laws is a requirement that is not
exclusive to a singular party.
The basic framework of adversarial litigation, as is the
case in our jurisdiction, is one that entails two (2) parties:
first, the one initiating or bringing the action (i.e., the
plaintiff/complainant/ claimant/petitioner); and the one
against whom an action is initiated or brought (i.e., the
defendant/respondent).
Thus, for Section 66 to say that the parties must
exhaust all remedies is to say that both
plaintiff/complainant/
claimant/petitioner, on one hand, and
defendant/respondent, on the other, must comply. In a case
brought by A against B, both A and B must comply with
the requirement.

212

Had Section 66 intended that compliance with the

requirement by only one party shall suffice, it should have
used the singular a party, similar language like either
party, or permissive language like a/the party/ies. Had
Section 66 intended that the requirement must be complied
with by a specific party, it should have used specific
language like the petitioner.
One may point out that the plural the parties can be
taken to mean two or more of several petitioners, or two or
more of several respondents where there are multiple
petitioners and/or respondents. This interpretation is
untenable. Precisely, it would find application only in
situations where there are multiple petitioners and/or
respondents. To adopt this interpretation would, therefore,
be to unduly restrict and to render inutile under general
circumstances the requirement of exhaustion of remedies.

III

The phrase their customary laws is significant in two
respects. First, their is a plural possessive pronoun
substituting for the noun phrase the parties. Second,
their is a possessive determiner indicating possession (or
otherwise a sense of belonging) of the words that follow it.
Section 66s use of the phrase their customary laws is,
therefore, to say that the parties have customary laws.
Considering what the phrase the parties refers to (as
explained previously), it follows that both the petitioner(s)
and the respondent(s) must have or adhere to customary
laws in order that a case between them may fall under the
jurisdiction of the NCIP.
Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act defines
customary laws as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms.For purposes of
this Act, the following terms shall mean:

213
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 213

....
f) Customary Laws refer to a body of written
and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices
traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and
observed by respective ICCs/IPs[.] (Emphasis supplied)

It is evident that only those belonging to ICCs/IPs have
or adhere to customary laws. Since Section 66 refers to
parties having customary laws, it follows that the NCIPs
jurisdiction, as defined in Section 66 of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act, is limited to parties who belong to
ICCs/IPs. It excludes those who do not.
To hold otherwise is to summarily compel those who do
not belong to ICCs/IPs to adhere and subject themselves to
customary laws despite their not having traditionally and
continually recognized, accepted[,] and observed25 these
laws. This runs afoul of fair play and violates their right to
due process.
Thus, Section 66s qualifiers as specifically worded
indicate that cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the
NCIP must be limited to those where both parties belong to
ICCs/IPs.

IV

The requirement that both parties must exhaust all
remedies provided under their customary laws necessarily
means that both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP.
The word respective denotes belonging or relating to
each one of the people or things that have been
mentioned.26
_______________
25 Rep. Act No. 8371 (1997), Sec. 3(f).

26 Merriam Webster Online <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/respective> (Visited October 21, 2015).

214

Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

conceives of customary laws as refer[ring] to a body of . .
. rules, usages, customs[,] and practices traditionally and
continually recognized, accepted[,] and observed by
respective ICCs/IPs. Thus, inherent in the Acts
conception of customary laws is a recognition that each
ICC/IP has a set of continually recognized, accepted, and
observed rules, usages, customs, and practices that is
distinct and separate from those of other ICCs/IPs.
The recognition that ICCs/IPs have distinct customary
laws is similarly a recognition that each ICC/IP has a
distinct dispute settlement mechanism pursuant to their
respective customary laws. To belong to a specific ICC/IP
is, therefore, to say that one adheres not only to a specific
set of customary laws but also to a specific dispute
settlement mechanism applicable to that ICC/IP.
Thus, much as interpreting Section 66 as encompassing
disputes where a party does not belong to an ICC/IP runs
afoul of fair play and violates the (non-ICC/IP members)
right to due process, so does interpreting Section 66 as
encompassing disputes where the parties belong to
different ICCs/IPs. As with the former, to make such a
conclusion is to summarily compel a party who adheres to a
specific set of customary laws and dispute settlement
mechanisms to adhere and be subjected to another set of
customary laws.
Rule IV, Section 14 of NCIP Administrative Circular No.
1-03, the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure
Before the NCIP (NCIP Rules) provides for situations
[w]here one of the parties . . . does not belong to the same
IP/IC Community as an exception to the requirement of a
certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute. This is a
recognition that the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act does
not provide a dispute settlement mechanism where the
parties belong to different ICCs/IPs. However, even as Rule
IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules does away with the
certification requirement, it cannot serve to

215
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 215

extend the NCIPs jurisdiction to disputes involving parties

from different ICCs/IPs.
V

Extending the NCIPs jurisdiction to those who do not
belong to an indigenous cultural community or are not
indigenous peoples finds no support elsewhere in the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.
Section 66 is the sole provision of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act that spells out the NCIPs jurisdiction
in respect of the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.
This court has defined quasi-judicial power as follows:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it. It is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in
a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power
to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for
their official action and exercise of discretion in a
judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are
affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of
quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in
the conduct of the proceedings.27 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
27 Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, 538 Phil. 817, 860-861; 509 SCRA
332, 369-370 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division],

216

Judicial power, in turn, has been defined in Macasiano

v. National Housing Authority,28 as the right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants.29
In Lopez v. Roxas:30

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.31
It is true that the other provisions of the Indigenous

Peoples Rights Act pertain to the competencies of the
NCIP. However, a reading of these provisions will show
that they do not extend the NCIPs jurisdiction, in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial power, to those who do not
belong to ICCs/IPs.
Section 3832 creates the NCIP and states its purpose as
the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation
_______________
citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil.

987, 1018-1019; 261 SCRA 236, 256-257 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First
Division].
28 G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236 [Per J. Davide, Jr.,
En Banc].
29 Id., at p. 243.
30 124 Phil. 168; 17 SCRA 756 (1966) [Per CJ. Concepcion, En Banc].
31 Id., at p. 173; p. 761, citing Black, Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., p. 82;
Ruperto v. Torres, 100 Phil. 1098 [Per J. Labrador, Unreported Case], in
turn citing 34 C.J. 1183-1184; Wheeling & Elm Grove Railroad Co., Appt.
v. Town of Philadelphia, et al., 4 LRA (NS) pp. 321, 328-329.
32 Section 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).To carry out the policies herein
set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs
(NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to
promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto.

217
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 217

and implementation of policies, plans and programs

to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the
ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as
well as the rights thereto.
Section 3933 articulates in broad language the mandate
of the NCIP to protect and promote the interest and well-
being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions and institutions.
Section 4434 provides that the NCIP shall have the
powers, jurisdiction and function provided therein in
order that it
_______________
33 Section 39. Mandate.The NCIP shall protect and promote the

interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions and institutions.
34 Section 44. Powers and Functions.To accomplish its mandate,
the NCIP shall have the following powers, jurisdiction and function:
a) To serve as the primary government agency through which
ICCs/IPs can seek government assistance and as the medium, through
which such assistance may be extended;
b) To review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs including existing
laws and policies pertinent thereto and to propose relevant laws and
policies to address their role in national development;
c) To formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects
for the economic, social and cultural development of the ICCs/IPs and
to monitor the implementation thereof;
d) To request and engage the services and support of experts from
other agencies of government or employ private experts and
consultants as may be required in the pursuit of its objectives;
e) To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;
f) Subject to existing laws, to enter into contracts, agreements, or
arrangement, with government or private agencies or entities as may
be necessary to attain the objectives of this Act, and subject to the
approval of the President, to obtain loans from government lending
institutions and other lending institutions to finance its programs

218

may accomplish its mandate. Section 44 lists 17 of such

powers, jurisdiction and function:
_______________
g) To negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts and/or

properties in whatever form and from whatever source, local and
international, subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines, for the benefit of ICCs/IPs and administer the same in
accordance with the terms thereof; or in the absence of any condition,
in such manner consistent with the interest of ICCs/IPs as well as
existing laws;
h) To coordinate development programs and projects for the
advancement of the ICCs/IPs and to oversee the proper implementation
thereof;
i) To convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review,
assess as well as propose policies or plans;
j) To advise the President of the Philippines on all matters relating to
the ICCs/IPs and to submit within sixty (60) days after the close of each
calendar year, a report of its operations and achievements;
k) To submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals intended to
carry out the policies under this Act;
l) To prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the
President;
m) To issue appropriate certification as a pre-condition to the grant of
permit, lease, grant, or any other similar authority for the disposition,
utilization, management and appropriation by any private individual,
corporate entity or any government agency, corporation or subdivision
thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain taking into
consideration the consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned;
n) To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various
offices within the Commission;
o) To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Act;
p) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be directed by
the President of the Republic of the Philippines; and
q) To represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international
conferences and conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and other
related concerns.

219
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 219

(1) Item (a) identifies the NCIP as the primary

government agency through which ICCs/IPs can seek
government assistance and as the medium, through
which such assistance may be extended.
(2) Item (b) authorizes the NCIP [t]o review and
assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs . . . to propose
relevant laws and policies[,] a function which is
evidently not (quasi-)judicial in nature.
(3) Item (c) refers to the formulat[ion] and
implement[ation] [of] policies, plans, programs and
projects[.]
(4) Item (d) permits the NCIP to avail itself of the
services and support of experts and consultants,
whether from government or the private sector.
(5) Item (e) places in the NCIP the authority [t]o issue
certificate[s] of ancestral land/domain title.
(6) Item (f) enables the NCIP to enter into contracts,
agreements, or arrangement[s] . . . and . . . to obtain
loans.
(7) Item (g) enables the NCIP [t]o negotiate for funds
and to accept grants, donations, gifts[,] and/or properties .
. . and administer the same.
(8) Item (h) makes the NCIP the coordinat[or] [of]
development programs and projects.
(9) Item (i) enables the NCIP [t]o convene periodic
conventions or assemblies of IPs to review, assess as
well as propose policies or plans.
(10) Item (j) spells out the NCIPs advisory and
reportorial duties vis--vis the President of the Philippines,
i.e., [t]o advise the President of the Philippines on all
matters relating to the ICCs/IPs and to submit within sixty
(60) days after the close of each calendar year, a report of
its operations and achievements.

220

(11) Item (k) allows the NCIP [t]o submit to Congress

appropriate legislative proposals.
(12) Item (l) spells out the budgetary duty of the NCIP,
i.e., [t]o prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the
Office of the President.
(13) Item (m) relates to the issu[ance] [of] . . .
certification[s] as a precondition to the grant of authority
for the disposition, utilization, management[,] and
appropriation by any private individual, corporate
entity or any government agency, corporation or
subdivision thereof on any part or portion of the
ancestral domain[.]
(14) Item (n) provides for the NCIPs appellate power, i.e.,
[t]o decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all
the various offices within the Commission.
(15) Item (o) provides for the NCIPs rule-making power,
i.e., [t]o promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
for the implementation of this Act.
(16) Item (p) is a catch-all provision enabling the NCIP
[t]o exercise such other powers and functions as may be
directed by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
(17) Item (q) allows the NCIP [t]o represent the
Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences
and conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and
other related concerns.

None but two (2) of these 17 powers, jurisdiction and
function[s] are directly related to the NCIPs exercise of its
quasi-judicial power. These two (2) items are item (n) on
the NCIPs appellate power and Item (o) on the
NCIPs rule-making power which may be read vis--vis
Section 69s investiture upon the NCIP of the power [t]o
promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing
and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those
pertaining to its internal

221
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 221

functions and such rules and regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. Neither of
these two states that the NCIPs jurisdiction extends to
disputes where a party does not belong to an ICC/IP or to
those where the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs.
Item (m) enables the NCIP to exercise authority over
those who not belong to ICCs/IPs, i.e., any private
individual, corporate entity or any government agency,
corporation or subdivision thereof. However, item (m)
refers specifically to the issuance of certification[s] as a
precondition to the grant of . . . authority for the
disposition, utilization, management[,] and appropriation .
. . on any part or portion of the ancestral domain[.] It does
not refer to the exercise of discretion in a judicial nature35
and the determin[ation] [of] actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants.36
VI

Reliance on the Indigenous Peoples Rights Acts
Implementing Rules and Regulations and the NCIPs rules
in support of the assertion that the NCIP has jurisdiction is
misplaced. In extending the NCIPs jurisdiction, these rules
contradict statutory provisions.
Rule IX Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Acts
Implementing Rules and Regulations reads:

RULE IX JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands,
involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to
conflicting claims and bound-
_______________
35 Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, supra note 27 at pp. 860-861; p. 370,

citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, supra note
27 at pp. 1018-1019; p. 257.
36 Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, supra note 28 at p. 243.

222

ary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned

parties through the application of customary laws in
the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land
is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or
lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or
where the dispute could not be resolved through
customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in
accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on
Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or
Decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule III, Section 5 of the NCIP Rules, NCIP
Administrative Circular No. 1-03 reads:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP

through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the
implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the
Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies
over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the
requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of
ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws
or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places,
or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance
e. Such other cases analogous to the
foregoing.

223
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 223

(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional

Hearing Officer:
customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any
violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
Commission:
been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to,
any person or community as provided for under
Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided, that such
action is filed within one (1) year from the date
of registration. (Emphasis supplied)

Apart from these, Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the
NCIP Rules provide:

request of the proper party, members of the
indigenous dispute settlement group or council of
elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action
before the NCIP. In giving due regard to customary
laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it
states in substance the failure of settlement
notwithstanding the efforts made under customary
law or traditional practices.
Section 14. Exceptions.The certification shall not
be required in the following cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or
private corporation, partnership, association or
juridical person or a public officer or employee
and the dispute is in connection with the
performance of his official functions;

224


c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint
or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent
and irreparable damage or injury that may
result if not acted upon immediately; and
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse
to issue the necessary certification without
justifiable reasons. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions support the conclusion that the NCIP
has jurisdiction even over cases where a party does not
belong to an ICC/IP.
However, it is a basic principle in administrative law
that an administrative rule must conform to and not
contradict the provision of an enabling law. In Fort
Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue:37
As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code,38 an

administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene
the law on which it is based. . . . The rules and
regulations that administrative agencies promulgate,
which are the product of a delegated legislative power
to create new and additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should be within the scope of
the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the objects and purposes of
_______________
37 617 Phil. 358; 602 SCRA 159 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En
Banc].
38 Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

225
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 225

the law, and should not be in contradiction to, but in

conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation
must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the
enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation
cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is
intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent
with the statute itself is null and void.
While administrative agencies . . . may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are without
authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than
what it provides, or extend or expand the statute
beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit
provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or
an administrative agency for that matter cannot
amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a
discrepancy between the basic law and an
interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.39

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act does not extend the
NCIPs jurisdiction to disputes involving those who do not
belong to ICCs/IPs. The precise wording of Section 66 and
the silence of the remainder of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act on extending the NCIPs jurisdiction bear this
out.
Likewise, [j]urisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by law.40 No amount of administrative rule-
making can vest jurisdiction where neither Constitution
nor statute vests it.
_______________

Internal Revenue, supra note 37 at pp. 368-369; p. 167, citing Francel
Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407; 469 SCRA 424 (2005) [Per
Acting CJ. Panganiban, Third Division] and Sunga v. Commission on
Elections, 351 Phil. 310; 288 SCRA 78, 87 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, En
Banc].
40 Machado v. Gatdula, supra note 18, citing Vargas v. Caminas,
supra note 18; Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, supra note 18;
and Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 18.

226

Thus, Rule IX, Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples

Rights Acts Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III,
Section 5, and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP
Rules, insofar as they extend the NCIPs jurisdiction to
disputes where a party does not belong to an ICC/IP, must
be deemed null and void. They are inconsistent with the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act in that they modify and
expand the NCIPs jurisdiction as spelled out in Section 66.
In light of this discrepancy between a basic law and
administrative rules, the basic law the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act must prevail.

VII

In sum, the requirements for the proper exercise of the
NCIPs jurisdiction over a dispute, pursuant to Section 66
of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, are as follows:
(1) The claim or dispute must involve the rights of
ICCs/IPs;
(2) Both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP;
(3) These parties must have exhausted all remedies
provided under their ICC/IPs customary laws; and
(4) Compliance with this requirement of
exhausting remedies under customary laws must be
evidenced by a certification issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
settle the dispute, to the effect that the dispute has
not been resolved.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondents do not
belong to an ICC/IP. Their sole interest is in their supposed
ownership and possession of land which, in turn, appears
to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig
tribe.41 Thus, the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples may not exercise jurisdiction over the case filed by
respondents.
_______________
41 Ponencia, April 23, 2014, p. 2.

227
VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 227

VIII

Customary norms are as varied as there are tribes
within ethnolinguistic groups. If we are to animate the
spirit of both the Constitution and the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act, we should not stereotype all cultures as
homogenous or incapable of dynamic interfaces with each
other. Customary law is a descriptive label which should
acknowledge that each tribe lived through its own history
and endogenously emerged their own set of norms
reflecting their values and lifeways. To say that the
customary norms of the Kalinga are the same as those of
the Subanen betrays the same colonial mindset that
marginalized what our colonizers called as Non-Christian
Tribes in the distant past.
Neither should we straightjacket any culture as
incapable of dynamic interfaces or accommodation with
other cultures. Various groups of indigenous communities
are able to work with the entirety of our legal system in
appropriate cases. This case, which involves a party not of
their tribe, is certainly one such case.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition for
Review on Certiorari. The assailed Decision dated August
17, 2006 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00204-MIN must be
AFFIRMED.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.The National Commission on Indigenous

Peoples (NCIP) is the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and pro

228

grams to protect and promote the rights and well-being of

indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains
as well as their rights thereto; The National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is vested with jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs. (City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng,
578 SCRA 88 [2009])
Ancestral domains remain as such even when possession
or occupation of these areas has been interrupted by causes
provided under the law, such as voluntary dealings entered
into by the government and private individuals/corpora-
tions the issuance of TLA No. 43 in 1952 did not cause
the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) to lose their possession or occupation over the
area covered by TLA No. 43. (Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources,
Inc., 606 SCRA 444 [2009])

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G.R. No. 181284. October 20, 2015.

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 115

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Words

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 3(f) of the

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 119

such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ponencia that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 121

where both parties are ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 123

on the face of the respondents complaint, the RTC has

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ICCs/IPs shall be punished in accordance with the

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 125

observe a nonbinding customary law. Therefore, while the

126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 127

one occasion, we have held that regular courts cannot or

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dant/respondent). Thus, for Section 66 to say that the

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sole provision of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act that

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 131

the same as those of the Subanen betrays the same colonial

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

1 Rollo, pp. 21-50.

132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for

4 CA Rollo, pp. 29-42.

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 133

On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants [herein

5 Id., at pp. 74-80.

134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Answer to the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, let this case, as

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 135

dated February 14, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE SOLE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFER

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 137

such as harassment, threats, acts of terrorism, among

138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

is whether or not petitioners are guilty of wrongful acts of

10 SEC. 2. Parties-in-Interest.A real party-in-interest is the party

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 139

Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That

stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

plaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP, through its

VOL. 773, OCTOBER 20, 2015 141

On the matter of NCIPs jurisdiction and of procedures

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.All conflicts related

142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP through

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lently acquired by, and issued to, any person or