THE JUDICIARY

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Judicial Power
All courts can exercise Judicial Review (Decentralized)
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments
and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. (Ynot
v. IAC)

The Supreme Court

Jurisdiction
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

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Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.

Section 30. Article VI. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

En Banc vis--vis Division

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen (14) Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three (3), five (5), or seven (7)
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules
of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When
the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine
or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Manotok v. Barque
It is a constitutional principle that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. It has been
argued that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving
that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion within the bar
and bench, with lawyers, academics and judges quibbling over whether the earlier ruling of the Division
constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration
system is too vital to be stymied by such esoteric wrangling and the administrators and courts which
implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.

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Composition
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen (14) Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof.
Prevails over the 2 Month Prohibition in Section 15, Article VII
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court. (De Castro v. JBC)

Appointment and Qualifications

Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must
be at least forty (40) years of age, and must have been for fifteen (15) years or more, a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine
Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and
a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. (6 members)
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
years (4) with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed,
the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four (4) years, the professor of law for
three (3) years, the retired Justice for two (2) years, and the representative of the private sector
for one (1) year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.

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 (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for
the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees (3) prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days (90) from the
submission of the list.
Only One Representative from One House of the Congress
Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to
the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure
judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector
and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the
members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC
by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one
former congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution. (Chavez v. JBC)

Salary
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and
of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased.
Section 17. Article XVIII. Until the Congress provides otherwise, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each (240,000); the Senators, and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, , two hundred four thousand pesos each (204,000).

Security of Tenure
Section 2. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years (70) or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Reorganization to be Done in Good Faith

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Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate
body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes reiterated such a
doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of
petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal
issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents. The abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal vis--vis Termination
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint
of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a
member of the judiciary. (De la Llana v. IAC)

Removal
Section 11. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,
or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Section 2. Article XI. The Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

Requirements as to Decisions
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc
or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any
Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution, must state
the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Memorandum Decision Exception
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of memorandum
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decisions which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of
inferior tribunals. In Francisco v. Permskul, this Court held that the following memorandum decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. (Oil & Gas v.CA)

Mandatory Period for Deciding Cases

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four (24) months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve (12) months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three (3) months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to
such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the
case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

Section 18 (3). Article VII. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty (30) days from its filing.

Section 12. Article XVIII. The Supreme Court shall, within one year (1) after the ratification of this
Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters
pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A
similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.

Section 13. Article XVIII. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution,
of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for
adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable.

Section 14. Article XVIII. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this
Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when
the applicable period lapses after such ratification.

Presidential Electoral Tribunal

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 Section 4 (7). Article VII. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Macalintal v. PET
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with
jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of
cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests
only after a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo warranto
may be filed after the proclamation of the winner.
On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither
does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations which, though
unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his restrictive view one which really does not offer a solution.

Administrative Powers
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

Section 11. The incumbent Members of the Judiciary shall continue in office until they reach the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or are
removed for cause.

Supervision of Lower Courts

Not in the Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
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 However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. (Maceda
v. Vasquez)

Dismissal of a Judge
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness that a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical
principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people
in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved. There is simply no place
in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity. (In Re: Demetria)
Temporarily Assign Judges to other Stations of Public Interest
Order a Change of Venue or a Place of Trial
Appointment of Officials and Employees
Promulgation of Rules concerning the Enforcement and Protection of Constitutional
Rights
Promulgate Rules concerning Pleading, Practice and Procedure
Admission to the Practice of Law
Integration of the Bar
Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged

No Quasi-Judicial and Administrative Work for Judges

Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise
any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and
being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or
power, or perform any other duty.
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446
contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established,
and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators. (MERALCO v. Pasay Trans Co.)
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the
practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
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principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to
decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a
subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication.
Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied
with nothing less. (In Re: Judge Manzano)

Report on the Judiciary

Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days (30) from the opening of each regular
session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the
operations and activities of the Judiciary.

Fiscal Autonomy & Automatic Release of Appropriation

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

Judicial Review
Section 1. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Definition Nature & Principles

The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior
courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases
arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the
present case, because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
The question whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land is a question
deeply interesting to the United States, but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems
only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
A legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written Constitutions
are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. (Marbury v.
Madison)
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The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative
power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws.
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
(Angara v. Electoral Commission)

Justiciable and Political Questions

The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. (Taada v. Cuenco)

A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. (Casibang v.
Aquino)

Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be
enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a
political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the
Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate
arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
(Miranda v. Aguirre)

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The Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, not only in justiciable but political questions as well. (Avelino v. Cuenco)

In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon the Legislature. (IBP v. Zamora)

The Four Requisites of Judicial Review

There must be an actual case or controversy

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. (David v. Arroyo)

The object is not to assert a property right as against the Government, or to demand compensation for
alleged wrongs because of action upon its part. The whole purpose of the law is to determine the
constitutional validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property
right necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a proceeding against the Government in its
sovereign capacity, and concerning which the only judgment required is to settle the doubtful character of the
legislation in question. Such judgment will not conclude private parties, when actual litigation brings to the
court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. In a legal sense the judgment could not be
executed, and amounts in fact to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the acts in
question. (Muskrat v. US)

Pre-maturity
Petitioner in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until
after the enactment of the statute 11 for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to
the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary
had to keep its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither
direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action ..."
The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do. Judicial
inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may
pass on the validity of what was done but only "when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding." (Tan v. Macapagal)
Mootness
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead. Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on

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or before June 30, 1999. However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No.
70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work (Gonzales v. Narvasa)

Exceptions to Mootness
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (David v.
Arroyo)

The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

The records show that petitioner assailed the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 by way
of a collateral attack before the Court of Appeals. In Philippine National Bank v. Palma, we ruled that for
reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be collaterally attacked. A law is deemed valid
unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the
trial court.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not
raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not
be considered on appeal. In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we held:
We decline to rule on the issue of constitutionality as all the requisites for the exercise of judicial review are
not present herein. Specifically, the question of constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless,
at the first opportunity, it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case, adequately argued, and is
necessary to a determination of the case, particularly where the issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota
presented. (ABS-CBN v. PMMSI)

The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings
before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it
cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. Records
disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's appeal
with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with said labor tribunal, and reiterated in his
Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the
NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue. (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services)

The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party (Locus

Standi)

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The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Kilosbayan v. Morato)

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right"
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a
person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the
category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a" citizen" or "taxpayer." (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo)

Real Party-in-Interest
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
(Kilosbayan v. Morato)

The Direct Injury Test

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with
which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service,
the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later
reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power
to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members
of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. (David v. Arroyo)

Special Standing
Must involve a constitutional issue

For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of illegal disbursement
of public funds, or if public money is being deflected to any improper purpose; or when petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional

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law. In the instant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective,
the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation.
Accordingly, they seek to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making
any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners possess locus
standi. (ITF v. COMELEC)

Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being assailed
were appropriations ordinances. Petitioner alleged that these ordinances were passed for the business,
occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of
respondents) because even before they were passed, respondent Mayor Cafe and private respondents had
already entered into lease contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. (Jumamil v. Cafe)

For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question.

For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation
bill: Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises, to the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution, an act of the
Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress.
In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. (PHILCONSA v. Enriquez)

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. (Biraogo v. PTC)

For the government, there is already an assumed substantial interest for the state to
challenge the validity of its own laws

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For associations, there must be standing for a individual members of the group, on his own
right, and there the relief requested must not require participation of an individual member

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which
is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to
present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. (IBP v. Zamora)

For jus tertii (Third-party Suit), there must be close relationship to the third-party, and a
barrier or hindrance for the third-party to file case themselves.

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth
doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have
recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria
are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete
interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and
there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." Herein, it is
clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the
patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement
of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation
such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for
customers to bring suit. (White Light v. Manila)

For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early

Requisites of Transcendental Importance

Considerations of principle which called for the application of the transcendental importance doctrine: first,
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case is of major importance; second, the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; third, the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions; and fourth, the wide range of impact of the government act
assailed. (Justice Feliciano)

The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the

determination of the case itself, the lis mota of the case.
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Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy
below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative. We have examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade
us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the
thesis of petitioner Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing
Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely
during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the
financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be
deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan
trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged
invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
(Arceta v. Mangrobang)

The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is obviously not
within the province of this Court. Such determination belongs to the Executive branch. Moreover, in this case
the DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to determine whether a road can be safely constructed on
land beneath which runs the aqueducts. Without such study, the MWSS, which owns the land, cannot decide
whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road. Absent such DPWH study and MWSS decision, no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction can be alleged against or attributed to respondents
warranting the exercise of this Courts extraordinary certiorari power. (Torrecampo v. MWSS)

Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; (1) it confers no rights; (2) it imposes no duties; (3) it
affords no protection; (4) it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general
rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. (Yap v. Thenamaris)

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Planters v. Fertaphil)

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