#11

Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. CA

Facts:
PASUDECO, sugarcane transporter, requested permission from Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) to pass
through NCLEX as the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang,
Pampanga were heavily damaged by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. PNCC, franchisee that
operates and maintains NCLEX, was furnished with the copy of the request to comment on. Thereafter,
TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum Agreement wherein PNCC was also furnished with a
copy. The latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX provided they abide to the terms and
conditions agreed upon. At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Send in, the PNCC security
supervisor, and his co-employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going
north of the NLEX and saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion. Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual
requested PASUDECO to clear the area as it was hazardous for the travelers. However, Engineer Oscar
Mallari, PASUDECO's equipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them that no
equipment operator was available as it was still very early. Thereafter, Sendin and company went back
to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started
clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road leaving a few
flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred
along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was already
approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went to his office
in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the necessary report. At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S.
Arnaiz was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65
kilometers per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend RicardoGeneralao on their way
to Baguio to attend their grandmother's first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran overthe scattered
sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen
paces away from the scattered sugarcane. Latagan sustained injuries and Arnaiz car was totally
wrecked.

Issue:
Whether or not there was gross negligence on the part of Pasudeco and PNCC and the latter be made to
pay for damages.
Held:
Pasudeco and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable. There are three elements of a quasi-delict:(a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff;(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.[31]Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed b y the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would do.[32]It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm
to another, the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance
justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.[33]The Court declared the test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith ,[34] viz :In the case at bar, it is clear that
the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The
petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing
by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. The petitioner cannot escape liability under the
MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was not a party thereto. We agree with
the following ruling of the CA: Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held
liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of
its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other
parties. PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but
evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an
observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should
have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left
along the toll way. The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaiz's car ran over scattered
sugarcanes spilled from a hauler truck.[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Moreover, the MOA refers to
accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to
motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA .PASUDECO's negligence in transporting
sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning
devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan's
injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.

#12

Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc.,

G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012

Facts:
On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her friend, Dr. Genevieve
L. Huang, for a swim at the hotels pool.
At around 7:00 p.m., the hotels pool attendant informed them that the swimming pool
area was about to be closed. The 2 went to the shower room adjacent to the swimming
pool to take a shower and dress up. When they came out of the bathroom, the entire swimming pool
area was already pitch black and there were the only ones there. The doors were also locked. After some
time, Huang saw a phone behind the lifeguards counter. As she went inside, the wooden countertop fell
on her head and knocked her down almost unconscious. Delia immediately notified the hotel phone
operator of the
incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the swimming pool area and
gave her an icepack.Huang demanded the services of the hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr.
Dalumpines, instead of immediately providing the needed medical assistance, presented a Waiver
and demanded that it be signed by Huang, otherwise, the hotel management will not render her any
assistance. Huang refused to do so and left the hotel. Thereupon, Huang consulted several doctors (7
neuro, 1 optha) because she began experiencing on and off severe headaches that caused her
three sleepless nights. They all said she had a serious brain injury. In defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the
material allegations. According to them, a sufficient notice on the glass door of the hotel leading to the
swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is
open only from 7am to 7pm. Nevertheless, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security
reasons; (2 )housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings; and (3)
people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmers World Gym, which was open until 10pm. Even
granting that the lights in the hotels swimming pool area were turned off, it would not render the area
completely dark as the Slimmers World Gym near it was well- illuminated. Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie
(hotel nurse) was informed that there was a guest requiring medical assistance. She hurriedly went to
the pool area. Although Huang looked normal as there was no indication of any blood or bruise on her
head, Ms.Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention to which she replied that she is a
doctor, she was fine and she did not need any medical attention. Instead, requested for a hirudoid cream
to which Ms. Pearlie acceded. Dr. Dalumpines came to check Huangs condition. Huang insisted that she
was fine and that the hirudoid cream was enough. Dr.Dalumpines requested Huang to execute a
handwritten certification regarding the incident that occurred that night. An X-Ray test was also
suggested to Huang but she replied that it was not necessary. She also refused further medical attention.
On Aug 1996, Huang filed a complaint for damages against respondents. The trial court dismissed the
Complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, Huang belatedly raises the defense on breach of contract. She
maintains that that an implied contract existed between them in view of the fact that the hotel guest
status extends to all those who avail of its services its patrons and invitees. The CA
affirmed the TCs decision. MR denied. Hence, this Petition for certiorari under Rule 45. She also avows
that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case. It was an
accident caused by the fact that the hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter top for Huang as
is normally expected of them because they negligently locked the main entrance door of the hotels
swimming pool area.

Issue:
Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to Dr. Huang.

Held:
NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their negligence but not on any breach of
contract. Presently, she claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and breach of
contract. A perusal of the complaint evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-
delict (negligence). It is evident from the complaint and from her open court testimony that the reliance
was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by respondents, through their management
and staff. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured
party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed. In a
breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the
contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of
the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed. It is now too late to raise the said
argument for the first time before the SC without causing injustice. As Huangs cause of action is based
on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the following requisites before
respondents PHI and Dusit can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since her case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon her.
Second element Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents.
Other than herself-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotels swimming pool area were shut off
and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding
wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was presented to substantiate
the same. Even her own companion during the night of the accident inside the hotels swimming pool
area was never presented to corroborate her allegations. On the other hand, the witnesses presented by
the respondents positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel management not
to put off the lights until 10pm. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings, including the toilets and counters. There is a remote possibility that the hotels swimming
pool area was in complete darkness as the aforesaid gym was then open until 10pm, and the lights
radiate to the hotels swimming pool area. Ergo, she cannot fault the Hotel for the injury she allegedly
suffered because she herself did not heed the warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from
7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus, when the own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
she then cannot recover damages. Even Huangs assertion of negligence on the part of respondents
in not rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own Complaint affirmed that respondents
afforded medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate accident inside the hotels swimming
pool facility. Moreover, the Hotel shouldered the expenses for the MRI services at the Makati Med. Res
Ipsa Loquitur &Respondeat Superior :With regard to Huangs contention that the principles ofres ipsa
loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds
otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes
the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or
presence of negligence. In the case at bench, even granting that respondents staff negligently turned off
the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on Huangs head had
she not lifted the same. Records showed that she lifted the said folding wooden counter top that
eventually fell and hit her head. Doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of
any showing that the employees of respondents were negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the
CA found no negligence on the part of the employees of respondents, thus, the latter cannot also be held
liable for negligence. With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner
stayed in the hotels swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden
counter top that eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents extended medical assistance to her. As
such, no negligence can be attributed either to or to their staff and/or management. Third element: On
the issue on whether Huangs debilitating and permanent injuries were the result of the accident she
suffered at the hotels swimming pool area, the Court holds that there is no cogent reason to depart from
the lower courts findings. (1) Huang had a past medical history which might have been the cause of her
recurring brain injury.(2) The findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June
1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms
being experienced might have been due to factors other than the head trauma she allegedly suffered.(3)
Dr. Sanchezs testimony was hearsay. (4) Medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of
doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified to by
those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative value. All told, in the
absence of negligence on the part of respondents as well as their management and staff, they cannot be
made liable to pay for the millions of damages prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it necessarily
follows that First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract of Insurance.

#13

Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals (324 SCRA 147)

Facts:
Mallari Jr. was the driving a passenger jeepney owned by his father, co-petitioner herein. The jeep
collided with the delivery van of Bulletin Publishing Corp. while travelling on the National Highway in
Bataan. Mallari Jr. proceeded to overtake a fiera which had stopped in front of him. He negotiated the
curve and moved in the opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. As he passed the vehicle he saw
the delivery van of Bulletin and the vehicles collided. The points of collision were the and the left rear
portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van. The 2 right wheels of
thedelivery van were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces ofdebris from the accident were found
scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger
jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to
its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from Mallari, Jr. and Sr. and Bulletin as well.
The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the
Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped
the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney. On appeal, the court reversed the decision of the lower
court and held that it was Mallari Jr. who was negligent. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the death of Reyes.

Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that Mallari Jr. and Sr. who are
responsible for the death of Reyes. The collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the
highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by
Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and
(b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The rule is
settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in
safety. Article 2185 of the NCC, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving a
motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Petitioners herein failed
to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. Therefore they shall be liable for the
loss of Reyes life.
#14
 #15

PLDT v CAGR No. 57079September 29, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth mound and fell in an open trench on
the road resulting to slight injuries to the husband and serious injuries to the wife. The windshield of the
jeep was also shattered due to the accident. Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack
of warning signs placed near the manhole dug resulting on the earth mound on the road causing injuries
to the wife. PLDT contends the injuries were the result of the negligence of the independent contractor
the company hired (Barte) and should be the one held liable and not the company. RTC ruled in favour of
the spouses while the CA under Justice Agrava as ponente reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
W/N PLDT can be held liable for the injuries caused to spouses Esteban

Held:
PLDT and Barte contends that the independent contractor placed signs on the road and that it was the
fault of Mr. Esteban because he did not diligently drive the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly
swerved from the outer lane thereby hitting the earth mound. SC finds no error in the findings of the
respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to
the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the
part of petitioner PLDT. The findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was
not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of
the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The
presences of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
 #16

SERVANDO vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.

Facts:
Clara UY Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the Philippine Steam Navigation vessel, FS-176, for
carriage from Manila to Pulupundan, Negros Occidental, cargoes of rice and colored paper as evidenced
by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the carrier Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the
morning of November 18, 1963,the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the
warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. About 2:00 p.m. of the same day, said warehouse was razed by
afire of unknown origin, destroying Servandos cargoes.

Issue:

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the loss of the goods.

Held:No.

1. Article 1736 of the CC imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe extraordinary diligence
from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession "until the same are delivered,
actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive
them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738. The court a quo held that the delivery of the
shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by
Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of
the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant.

2. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question, the
parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier. The stipulation is valid not being contrary to law,
morals or public policy.

3. The petitioners however, contend that the stipulation does not bind them since it was printed at the
back of the B/L and that they did not sign the same. However, as the Court held in OngYiu vs. CA, while it
may be true that a passenger had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions
thereof. Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding
upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation.

4. Also, where fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt
from liability for non-performance.In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an
extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have
foreseen the event.

5. There is nothing in the record to show that the carrier incurred in delay in the performance of its
obligation. It appears that it had not only notified UyBico and Servando of the arrival of their shipment,
but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, UyBico had taken
delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.
6. Nor can the carrier or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the
Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by UyBico and Servando was undoubtedly made with
their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government,
it would be unfair to impute negligence to the carrier, the latter having no control whatsoever over the
same.

#17

MERCURY DRUG v. SPS. HUANG

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with plate
number PRE 641 Page 20 of 25 (truck). It has in its employ petitioner
Rolando J. del Rosario asdriver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang arethe parents of
respondent Stephen Huang and own the red1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with plate number
PTT 775(car).These two vehicles gured in a road accident within the municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the car, while petitioner Del Rosario was
driving the truck. Both were traversing the C-5
Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going toPasig City. The car was
on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly
swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over
the island where it hit a lamp post, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit
a lamppost, ran over the car
and zigzaggedtowards, and nally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.At the time of the
accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Trac Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers license had been
conscated because he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving. The car was a total wreck.
Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung.
Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his
chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. Respondents fault petitioner
Del Rosario for committing grossnegligence and reckless imprudence while driving, andpetitioner
Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of
itsdriver.In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate andproximate cause of the accident
was respondent Stephen Huangs recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he was
driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the trucks front right tire. The
truck then swerved to the left, smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and
stopped on the other side of the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center
island and landed on the same portion of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it
exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of all its employees.
ISSUE:

Whether mercury drug failed to exercise the diligence required in supervising its employees despite
the evidences presented by the petitioners.

HELD:

The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. To be relieved of liability, petitioner
Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision ofthe performance of
his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine
them as to their qualications, experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures
for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence. In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented
testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to Mrs.Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment
and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical
and actual driving tests, and psychological examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however,
Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for
the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic
also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a
truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills
development, perceptual speed, visualattention, depth visualization, and eye and hand coordination and
steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner
Del Rosarioattended only three driving seminars on June 30, 2001, February
5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In eect, the only seminar heat tended before the accident
which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.It also appears that petitioner Mercury
Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner
Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without
any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testied that she does not know of any company policy requiring back-
up drivers for long trips.Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that itexercised due diligence
on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del
Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testied that
he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or
reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore
armthe nding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed todischarge its
burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
 #18

Filcar Transport Services vs. Jose A. Espinas

G.R. No. 174156

FACTS:

Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila when he was suddenly
hit by another car. Upon verifying with the LTO, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car is Filcar.
This car was assigned to Filcar's Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor and, at the time of the incident,
was driven by Atty. Flor's personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.
Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming that the incident was not due to its fault
or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be
held liable for the damages caused to the Espinas

HELD:
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable
under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to
Espinas' car. It is on this basis that Filcar is primarily and directly liable to Espinas for damages.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be
held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is laid down in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by one's act or
omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who committed the negligent act or
omission. The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or
omission of another.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee's
act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or
omission committed by his employee.
Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of
the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one's
subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
employer may invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the
tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the
negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily and
directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required.
It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in
order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable: The rationale for the rule that a registered
owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the
principle behind motor vehicle registration, viz: The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify
the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries
to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant
means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,
that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. Employer-employee relationship between
 registered owner and driver is irrelevant. Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship
between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered
owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by
the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.
The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of innocent third persons
who may have no means of identifying public road malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult if
not impossible to seek redress for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and
other damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by
victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be available to them.
To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation
where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on the blame to anther
who may have no means to answer for the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of
road accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their
registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have the financial means to
pay for the damages caused in case of accidents.
Filcar cannot pass on the liability to another party
The agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not bind
Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only recourse is to
the motor vehicle registration. Filcar cannot use the defense that the employee acted beyond the scope
of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code that the employee
acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it
could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to Espinas. Filcar's recourse is against the
actual employer of the driver and the driver himself.This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left
without any recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law
principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by
the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the
injury caused to another.

o Registered owner is deemed employer of the driver and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
o The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on public highways, responsibility therefor can be
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
o The motor vehicle registration law modified Article 2180 to a certain extent so that the defense available
thereunder cannot be used by the registered owner
o The registered owner can recover from the actual owner and the driver under the doctrine of unjust
enrichment

#19
Professional Services, Inc. V. Natividad And Enrique Agana
Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil Code

FACTS:
April 4, 1984: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty
of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from
cancer of the sigmoid.
April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad and found that
the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of
certain portions of it
Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana to perform hysterectomy.
After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about the excruciating
pain in her anal region. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist.
May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment and was told she was
FREE from cancer.
August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil
proceeded to her house and extracted by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width and
assuring that the pain will vanish.
When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General Hospital where Dr. Ramon
Gutierrez found a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her
vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal fistula forcign her stool to excrete through the vagina.
October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage
February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by her children
RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for negligence and malpractice
 CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from the PRC Board of Medicine for failure to show
that he placed the guages or concealed the fact from Natividad

ISSUE:
W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso loquitor

HELD:
NO. CA affirmed
Dr. Ampil as the negligent party
surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation
immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in their report 2
sponges lacking
2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana
element 3 "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil
who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the
surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation
res ipsa loquitur
not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate
ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
accreditation and supervision
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant
staff
control test is determining
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack
of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf
without authority.
By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital
created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services
for its patients
doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the
Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns