#11
[31]Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. CA
Facts:
PASUDECO, sugarcane transporter, requested permission from Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB) to pass through NCLEX as the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles
and SapangMaragul via Magalang, Pampanga were heavily damaged by the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. PNCC, franchisee that operates and maintains
NCLEX, was furnished with the copy of the request to comment on. Thereafter, TRB
and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum Agreement wherein PNCC was also
furnished with a copy. The latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX
provided they abide to the terms and conditions agreed upon. At around 2:30 a.m.
on January 23, 1993, Alex Send in, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-
employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going
north of the NLEX and saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion. Sendin,
Ducusin and Pascual requested PASUDECO to clear the area as it was hazardous for
the travelers. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECO's equipment supervisor
and transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was
available as it was still very early. Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km.
72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived,
and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at
the side of the road leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As
the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the
roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn
was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane
dividers. Sendin went to his office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the
necessary report. At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz was driving his two-door
Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers
per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend RicardoGeneralao on
their way to Baguio to attend their grandmother's first death anniversary. As the
vehicle ran overthe scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle
several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the
scattered sugarcane. Latagan sustained injuries and Arnaiz car was totally wrecked.
Issue:
Whether or not there was gross negligence on the part of Pasudeco and PNCC and
the latter be made to pay for damages.
Held:
Pasudeco and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable. There are three elements of a
quasi-delict:(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;(b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and(c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed b y the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.[32]It
also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure
to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance
justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.[33]The Court declared the
test by which to determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith ,[34] viz
:In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The petitioner should have
foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing
by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. The petitioner cannot escape
liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan
was not a party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA: Both
defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC,
in charge of the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the
performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by
virtue of a private agreement, to other parties. PNCC declared the area free from
obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were
still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an
observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation
demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices considering that there
were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the toll way. The records show, and
as admitted by the parties, that Arnaiz's car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled
from a hauler truck.[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Moreover, the MOA refers to
accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property
or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA
.PASUDECO's negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps,
and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive
negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan's injuries. As
such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.
#12
Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc.,
G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012
1

Facts:
On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her
friend, Dr. Genevieve L.Huang, for a swim at the hotel‘s pool.
At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel‘s pool attendant informed them that the
swimming pool area was about to be closed. The 2 went to the shower room
adjacent to the swimming pool to take a shower anddress up. When they came out
of the bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and there
were theonly ones there. The doors were also locked. After some time, Huang saw
a phone behind the lifeguard‘s counter.As she went inside, the wooden countertop
fell onher head and knocked her down almost unconscious. Delia immediately
notified the hotel phone operator of the
incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the swi
mming pool area and gave her an icepack.Huang demanded the services of the
hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr. Dalumpines, instead of immediately
providingthe needed medical assistance, presented a ―Waiver‖ and demanded
that it be signed by Huang, otherwise, the hotelmanagement will not render her
any assistance. Huang refused to do so and left the hotel.Thereupon, Huang
consulted several doctors (7 neuro, 1 optha) because she began experiencing
―on‖ and ―off‖ severeheadaches that caused her three sleepless nights. They all
said she had a serious brain injury.In defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the material
allegations. According to them, a sufficient notice on the glass door ofthe hotel
leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel
guests, that the swimming pool areais open only from 7am to 7pm. Nevertheless,
the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons;
(2)housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings;
and (3) people doing their exercise routineat the Slimmer‘s World Gym, which was
open until 10pm. Even granting that the lights in the hotel‘s swimming pool
areawere turned off, it would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmer‘s
World Gym near it was well- illuminated.Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie (hotel nurse)
was informed that there was a guest requiring medical assistance. She
hurriedlywent to the pool area. Although Huang looked normal as there was no
indication of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms.Pearlie still asked her if she
needed any medical attention to which she replied that she is a doctor, she was fine
and shedid not need any medical attention. Instead, requested for a hirudoid cream
to which Ms. Pearlie acceded. Dr. Dalumpinescame to check Huang‘s condition.
Huang insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was enough.
Dr.Dalumpines requested Huang to execute a handwritten certification regarding
the incident that occurred that night. An X-Ray test was also suggested to Huang
but she replied that it was not necessary. She also refused further medical
attention.On Aug 1996, Huang filed a complaint for damages against respondents.
The trial court dismissed the Complaint for lackof merit. On appeal, Huang belatedly
raises the defense on breach of contract. She maintains that that an implied
contractexisted between them in view of the fact that the hotel guest status
extends to all those who avail of its services — its patrons and invitees. The CA
affirmed the TC‘s decision. MR denied. Hence, this Petition for certiorari under Rule
45.She also avows that the doctrines ofres ipsa loquitur andrespondeat
superior are applicable in this case. It was anaccident caused by the fact that the
hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter top for Huang as is
normallyexpected of them because they negligently locked the main entrance door
of the hotel‘s swimming pool area.
Issue:
Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to Dr. Huang.
Held:
NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their negligence but not
on any breach of contract.Presently, she claims that her cause of action can be
based both on quasi-delict and breach of contract. A perusal of thecomplaint
evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict
(negligence). It is evident from thecomplaint and from her open court testimony
that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her
byrespondents, through their management and staff. In quasi-delict, there is no
presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the
negligence ofthe defendant, otherwise, the former‘s complaint will be dismissed. In
a breach of contract, negligence is presumed solong as it can be proved that there
was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there
was nonegligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of
respondeat superior is followed. It is now too late toraise the said argument for the
first time before the SC without causing injustice.As Huang‘s cause of action is
based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the
followingrequisites before respondents PHI and Dusit can be held liable, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connectionof cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. Further, since her case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established as it is the basis of heraction. The burden of proof is
upon her.Second element Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed to prove the
alleged negligence of respondents. Other than herself-serving testimony that all the
lights in the hotel‘s swimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked,
whichallegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden
counter top fell on her head causing her injury,no other evidence was presented to
substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the night of the accident
insidethe hotel‘s swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her
allegations.On the other hand, the witnesses presented by the respondents
positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel management not
to put offthe lights until 10pm. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the
2
swimming pool surroundings, including thetoilets and counters. There is a remote
possibility that the hotel‘s swimming pool area was in complete darkness as
theaforesaid gym was then open until 10pm, and the lights radiate to the hotel‘s
swimming pool area.Ergo, she cannot faultthe Hotel for the injury she allegedly
suffered because she herself did not heed the warning at the pool to the effect that
itwas only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus, when the own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of hisinjury, she then cannot recover
damages.Even Huang‘s assertion of negligence on the part of respondents in not
rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous.Her own Complaint affirmed
that respondents afforded medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate
accidentinside the hotel‘s swimming pool facility. Moreover, the Hotel shouldered
the expenses for the MRI services at the MakatiMed.Res
Ipsa Loquitur&RespondeatSuperior :With regard to Huang‘s contention that the
principles ofresipsaloquitur andrespondeat superior are applicable in this case, this
Court holds otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase whichliterally means ―the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.‖ It relates to the fact of an injury that sets
out an inference tothe cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff‘s prima facie case.
The doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of
negligence. In the case at bench, even granting that respondents‘staff negligently
turned off thelights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still
not fall on Huang‘s head had she not lifted the same.Records showed that she
lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her
head.Doctrine ofrespondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any
showing that the employees of respondentswere negligent. Since in this case, the
trial court and the CA found no negligence on the part of the employees
ofrespondents, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence. With the
foregoing, the following were clearlyestablished, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed in the
hotel‘s swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding
wooden counter top that eventually hit her head;and (3) respondents extended
medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can be attributed either to or to
their staff and/or management.Third element:On the issue on
whetherHuang‘sdebilitating and permanent injuries were the result of the accident
she
suffered at the hotel‘s swimming pool area, theCourt holds that there is no cogent
reason to depart from thelower courts ‘findings.(1)Huang had a past medical
history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain injury.(2)The
findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995
accident and the brain damagesuffered by Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified that
the symptoms being experienced might have been due to factors other than the
head trauma she allegedly suffered.(3)Dr. Sanchez‘s testimony was
hearsay. (4)Medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors
whom petitioner sought for examinationor treatment were neither identified nor
testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, theycannot be
given probative value.All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of
respondents as well as their management and staff, they cannot bemade liable to
pay for the millions of damages prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it
necessarily follows that FirstLepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract
of Insurance.
#13
Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals (324 SCRA 147)
Facts:
Mallari Jr. was the driving a passenger jeepney owned by his father, co-petitioner
herein. The jeep collided with the delivery van of Bulletin Publishing Corp. while
travelling on the National Highway in Bataan. Mallari Jr. proceeded to overtake
a fiera which had stopped in front of him. He negotiated the curve and moved in
the opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. As he passed the vehicle he saw
the delivery van of Bulletin and the vehicles collided. The points of collision were
the and the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of
the delivery van. The 2 right wheels of thedelivery van were on the right shoulder of
the road and pieces ofdebris from the accident were found scattered along the
shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger
jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side
resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually
died due to the gravity of his injuries.
The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from Mallari, Jr. and Sr.
and Bulletin as well. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision
was the negligence of the driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact
that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped the left rear portion
of the passenger jeepney. On appeal, the court reversed the decision of the lower
court and held that it was Mallari Jr. who was negligent. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the death of Reyes.
Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that Mallari Jr. and
Sr. who are responsible for the death of Reyes. The collision was caused by the sole
negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before
the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook
a Fierawhich had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by
Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of
Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his
3
proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation
has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so
in safety. Article 2185 of the NCC, there is a presumption of negligence on the part
of a person driving a motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a
traffic regulation. Petitioners herein failed to present satisfactory evidence to
overcome this legal presumption. Therefore they shall be liable for the loss of
Reyes’ life.

#15

PLDT v CAGR No. 57079September 29, 1989

Facts:
#14
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth mound andfell
in an open trench on the road resulting to slight injuries to the husband and serious
injuries to the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered due to the
accident.Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack of warning
signs placednear the manhole dug resulting on the earth mound on the road
causing injuries to thewife. PLDT contends the injuries were the result of the
negligence of the independentcontractor the company hired (Barte) and should be
the one held liable and not thecompany. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses while
the CA under Justice Agrava asponente reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
W/N PLDT can be held liable for the injuries caused to spouses Esteban

Held:
PLDT and Bartecontends that the independent contractor placed signs on theroad
and that it was the fault of Mr. Esteban because he did not diligently drive
the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly swerved from the outer lane thereby hitting
the earthmound. SC finds no error in the findings of the respondent court in its
original decisionthat the accident which befell private respondents was due to the
lack of diligence ofrespondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent
omission on the part ofpetitioner PLDT. The findings clearly show that the
negligence of respondent AntonioEsteban was not only contributory to his injuries
and those of his wife but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as
one of its determining factors, andthereby precludes their right to recover
damages. The presences of warning signs couldnot have completely prevented the
accident; the only purpose of said signs was toinform and warn the public of the
presence of excavations on the site. The privaterespondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack ofknowledge of these excavations
which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into theexcavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lanetowards the accident
mound.

4

#16
SERVANDO vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.
Facts:
Clara UY Bico and AmparoServando loaded on board the Philippine
SteamNavigation vessel, FS-176, for carriage from Manila to Pulupundan, Negros
Occidental,cargoes of rice and colored paper as evidenced by the corresponding
bills of lading issued by the carrierUpon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the
morning of November 18, 1963,the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good
order, unto the warehouse of theBureau of Customs.About 2:00 p.m. of the same
day, said warehouse was razed by afire of unknown origin, destroying Servando’s
cargoes.
Issue:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the loss of the goods.
Held:No.
1. Article 1736 of the CC imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe
extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in
their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738.” The court a quo held that the delivery
of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the
delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse
occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the
loss is chargeable against the appellant.
2. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the
cargoes in question, the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier. The
stipulation is valid not being contrary to law, morals or public policy.
3. The petitioners however, contend that the stipulation does not bind them since
it was printed at the back of the B/L and that they did not sign the same. However,
as the Court held in OngYiu vs. CA, while it may be true that a passenger had not
signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Such
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to
the regulation.
4. Also, where fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss,
the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance.In the case at bar, the
burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the
event.
5. There is nothing in the record to show that the carrier incurred in delay in the
performance of its obligation. It appears that it had not only notified UyBico and
Servando of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be
withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, UyBico had taken delivery of 907
cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.
6. Nor can the carrier or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of
the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by UyBico and
Servando was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the
warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair
to impute negligence to the carrier, the latter having no control whatsoever over
the same.
#17
MERCURY DRUG v. SPS. HUANG
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of asix-wheeler 1990
Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641Page 20 of 25(truck). It has in its
employ petitioner
Rolando J. del Rosario asdriver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are
the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red1991 Toyota Corolla GLI
Sedan with plate number PTT 775(car).These two vehicles figured in a road accident
within themunicipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent StephenHuang was
driving the car, while petitioner Del Rosario wasdriving the truck. Both we’re
traversing the C-5
Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going toPasig
City. The car was on the left innermost lane while thetruck was on the next lane
to its right, when the truck suddenlyswerved to its left and slammed into the
front right side of thecar. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit
alamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. Thetruck also hit
5
a lamppost, ran over the car and Training Manager ofpetitioner Mercury Drug,
and zigzaggedtowards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.At the applicants are required to taketheoretical and actual driving tests,
time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had aTraffic Violation Receipt and psychologicalexamination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however,Mrs.
(TVR). His driver’s license had beenconfiscated because he Caamic admitted that
had been previously apprehended forreckless driving.The car was a total wreck. he took the driving tests andpsychological examination when he applied for the
Respondent Stephen Huangsustained massive injuries to his spinal position ofDelivery Man, but not when he applied for the position ofTruck Man.
cord, head, face, andlung. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner DelRosario used a Galant which is a light
Despite a series of operations, respondent StephenHuang is paralyzed for life vehicle, instead of atruck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were
from his chest down and requirescontinuous medical and rehabilitation conductedon the motor skills development, perceptual speed,
treatment.Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for visualattention, depth visualization, and eye and hand coordination andsteadiness
committing grossnegligence and reckless imprudence while driving, andpetitioner of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and policeclearances were
Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence ofa good father of a family in the also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del
selection and supervision of Rosarioattended only three driving seminars on June 30, 2001,February
itsdriver.In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate andproximate cause of 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar heattended before the accident
the accident was respondent StephenHuangs recklessness. According to petitioner which occurred in 1996 was heldtwelve years ago in 1984.It also
Del Rosario, hewas driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumpedthe appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not providefor a back-up driver for
trucks front right tire. The long trips. At the time of the accident,petitioner Del Rosario has
truck then swerved to the left,smashed into an electric post, crossed the center been out on the road for more thanthirteen hours, without
island, andstopped on the other side of the highway. The car likewisecrossed over any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testifiedthat she does not know of any company policy
the center island and landed on the same portionof C-5. Further, requiring back-up drivers for
petitioner Mercury Drug claims that itexercised due diligence of a good father of long trips.Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that itexercised due
a family in theselection and supervision of all its employees. diligence on the supervision and discipline overits employees. In fact, on the
day of the accident, petitioner DelRosario was driving without a license. He was
ISSUE: holding a TVRfor reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incidentto his
Whether mercury drug failed to exercise the diligence required in supervising its superior, but nothing was done about it. He was notsuspended or reprimanded. No
employees despite the evidencespresented by the petitioners. disciplinary action whatsoeverwas taken against petitioner Del Rosario.
We therefore affirmthe finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed todischarge
HELD: its burden of proving that it exercised due diligencein the
selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner DelRosario.
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of theCivil Code is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned on aprior recourse against the negligent employee,
or a priorshowing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint andsolidary
with the employee.To be relieved of liability, petitioner
Mercury Drug shouldshow that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision ofthe performa #18
nce of his duties. Thus, in the selection of itsprospective employees, the employer is
required to examinethem as to their qualifications, experience, and service Filcar Transport Services vs. Jose A. Espinas
records.With respect to the supervision of its employees, the
G.R. No. 174156
employershould formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
theirimplementation, and impose disciplinary measures
for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements,employers
FACTS:
must submit concrete proof, including documentaryevidence.In the instant case,
petitioner Mercury Drug presentedtestimonial evidence on its
Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila
hiring procedure. According to Mrs.Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment
when he was suddenly hit by another car. Upon verifying with the LTO, Espinas

6
learned that the owner of the other car is Filcar. This car was assigned to Filcar's
Corporate Secretary Atty. CandidoFlor and, at the time of the incident, was driven
by Atty. Flor's personal driver, TimoteoFloresca.
Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming that the incident
was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that
of Atty. Flor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an
accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to the Espinas
HELD:
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is
thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil
Code
It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit
and caused damage to Espinas' car. It is on this basis that Filcar is primarily and
directly liable to Espinas for damages.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person
will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by
another. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
provides to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage
caused by one's act or omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the
person who committed the negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides
for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of
another.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed
by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
x xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
x xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action
predicated on an employee's act or omission may be instituted against the
employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his
employee.
Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously
liable on the basis of the civil law principle ofpater familias for failure to exercise
due care and vigilance over the acts of one's subordinates to prevent damage to
another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may
invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the
tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter
under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered
merely as an agent of such owner.
Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor
vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish
that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order
that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable: The rationale for the
rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the
operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor vehicle
registration, viz:The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on
public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to
the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest
of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways.Employer-employee relationship between registered owner and
driver is irrelevant. Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship
between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the
liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle
in the streets and highways.
The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of
innocent third persons who may have no means of identifying public road
malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult if not impossible to seek redress
for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other
7
 damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for the damages
sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be
available to them.
To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would
also prevent a situation where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily
escape liability by passing on the blame to anther who may have no means to
answer for the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road
accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are driven
not by their registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do
not have the financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of accidents.
Filcar cannot pass on the liability to another party
The agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the
latter does not bind Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the
agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration.Filcar
cannot use the defense that the employee acted beyond the scope of his assigned
task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code –
that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised
the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage – because the
motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the
vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to
Espinas.Filcar's recourse is against the actual employer of the driver and the driver
himself.This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse
against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law
principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a
right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he
may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.
o Registered owner is deemed employer of the driver and is thus vicariously liable
under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
o The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on public
highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner.
o The motor vehicle registration law modified Article 2180 to a certain extent so that
the defense available thereunder cannot be used by the registered owner
o The registered owner can recover from the actual owner and the driver under the
doctrine of unjust enrichment
#19
Professional Services, Inc. V. NatividadAnd Enrique Agana
Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil Code
FACTS:
 April 4, 1984: NatividadAgana was rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the
sigmoid.
 April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad
and found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left
ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it
 Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana to
perform hysterectomy.
 After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
about the excruciating pain in her anal region. Dr. Ampil recommended that
she consult an oncologist.
 May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment
and was told she was FREE from cancer.
 August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from
her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house and extracted by hand a piece of
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width and assuring that the pain will vanish.
 When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General Hospital
where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches
in width which badly infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal
fistula forcign her stool to excrete through the vagina.
 October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage
 February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by her children
 RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for
negligence and malpractice
 CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from the PRC Board of
Medicine for failure to show that he placed the guages or concealed the fact
from Natividad
ISSUE:
W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso loquitor
HELD:
NO. CA affirmed
8
 Dr. Ampil as the negligent party
 surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient during
the surgical operation
 immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted
in their report 2 sponges lacking
 2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana
 element 3 "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to
be wanting
 Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his
work to Dr. Ampil who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room
 Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation
 res ipsa loquitur
 not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule
 mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
 failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the accreditation and supervision
 private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting ‘consultant’ staff
 control test is determining
 for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians
 ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal,
from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency,
knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
 By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients
 doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility
 knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of
PSI
 It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with
the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident
doctors, nurses, and interns
19/20.Professional Services, IncvsAgana
FACTS
NatividadAgana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr.Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering
from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr.Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on
her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the
consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his
work to Dr.Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes
to leave the operating room. Dr.Ampil was about to complete the procedure when
the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation: “sponge
count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue for
closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing). A “diligent search” was conducted but
they could not be found. Dr.Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the
doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery.Dr.Ampil
recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes
which were not removed during the operation. After months of consultations and
examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after
coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her
vagina, so Dr.Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will
go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital,
where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent
another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City),
Dr.Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for
leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body, and malpractice for concealing their
acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross
negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the
9
 case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr.Ampil was abroad). Pending the
outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found
PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the
case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
1. WON CA erred in holding Dr.Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO;
DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr.Ampil’s negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the
ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of
the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes’ alleged
negligence, Dr.Ampil examined his work and found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown
that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen because of
the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient
within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so
she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her
condition might permit. What’s worse in this case is that he misled her by saying
that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation.
Medical negligence; standard of diligence
To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove
that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldn’t have done],
and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
 Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision;
if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it
 Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient
 Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery
 Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of
closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2
pieces of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later
extracted from patient’s vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’ does not
convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur
1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the
defendant [DR. FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR.
AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That
Dr.Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision
HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND
DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize
that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating
medical care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others.
Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat
superior. Here are the Court’s bases for sustaining PSI’s liability:
 Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire,
power of control]
 Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in somehow
misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations of
their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory, leading
the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.
o
10
  If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars the
quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability
for its agents’ acts.
 Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility
 consult an oncologist.
o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability for
the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the
application of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed
to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from harm all
patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct
an investigation of the matter reported in the note of the count nurse, and
this established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment
about the gauzes.
o  October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage

PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report
of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried on with
the assistance of various hospital staff
o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice
medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the negligence
committed
 PSI also liable under NCC 2180

o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr.Ampil
OTHER VERSION
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006
Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil Code
FACTS:
 April 4, 1984: NatividadAgana was rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the
sigmoid.
 April 11, 1984: Dr.Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad
and found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left
ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it
 Dr.Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana to
perform hysterectomy.
 After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
about the excruciating pain in her anal region. Dr.Ampil recommended that she
 May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment
and was told she was FREE from cancer.
 August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from
her vagina. Dr.Ampil proceeded to her house and extracted by hand a piece of
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width and assuring that the pain will vanish.
 When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General Hospital
where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches
in width which badly infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal
fistula forcign her stool to excrete through the vagina.
 February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by her children
 RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for
negligence and malpractice
 CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from the PRC Board of
Medicine for failure to show that he placed the guages or concealed the fact
from Natividad
ISSUE: W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso loquitor
HELD: NO. CA affirmed
 Dr.Ampil as the negligent party
 surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient during
the surgical operation
 immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted
in their report 2 sponges lacking
 2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs.Agana
 element 3 "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to
be wanting
 Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his
work to Dr.Ampil who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room
 Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation
 res ipsa loquitur
 not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule
 mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence
11
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
 failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the accreditation and supervision
 private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting ‘consultant’ staff
 control test is determining
 for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians
 ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal,
from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency,
knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
 By accrediting Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients
 doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility
 knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of
PSI
 It is worthy to note that Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with
the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident
doctors, nurses, and interns
21.Manila Doctors Hospital vs So Un Chua
Notwithstanding the provision of R.A. 9439 [antidetention law] that “[i]t shall be
unlawful for any hospital or medical clinic in the country to detain” patients, there
are instances wherein hospitals can legally detain a patient against his will. In the
case of Manila Doctors Hospital v. So Un Chua and Vicky Ty1, the Supreme Court
enumerated these instances, to wit, (1) the patient is a detained or convicted
prisoner, (2) the patient is suffering from a very contagious disease where his
release will be prejudicial to public health, (3) when the patient is mentally ill such
that his release will endanger public safety, (4) in other exigent cases as may be
provided by law. Considering the total physical restraint of a detained or convicted
prisoner prior to his admission, he can no longer complain that he is being held as a
patient against his will in the hospital. In fact, through the instrumentality of the
State, it is entirely valid to prevent him from escaping. Not all patients afflicted with
contagious diseases must be detained. However, “where his release will be
prejudicial to public health”, it is best to confine him in the hospital even against his
will. The hospital is even required to report such “very contagious disease” to the
Department of Health wherein in the authorities, invoking the police power of the
State, can lawfully detain the patient in any appropriate hospital facilities. Similarly,
a patient who is mentally ill should be detained if his release will endanger public
safety. In reality, detaining the mentally ill will also prevent the patient from
harming himself, not to mention avoiding professional liability for improper
discharge of the patient. The law2 states that “[f]or the purpose of preventing or
suppressing dangerous communicable diseases, any person may be inoculated,
administered or injected with prophylactic preparations of recognized efficiency
and standard and no person shall refuse to permit or receive such inoculation,
administration or injection or to hinder or obstruct in any way such protective
measures as may be deemed advisable by the Director of Health or his authorized
representative.” A person or patient cannot refuse any “prophylactic preparations”
for “preventing or suppressing dangerous communicable diseases. “The law makes
treatment compulsory due to some communicable disease.”3 If such treatment
entails hospital confinement against a patient’s will, such treatment, nonetheless, is
a valid exercise of police power to address public health concerns.
22. Merritt vs Government of the Pilppine Islands
34 Phil 311 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Liability of the State for acts of special
agents
Political Law – Non-Suability of the State – Waiver of Non-Suability is Not Admission
of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was
excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre
12
Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance
was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was
hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he
could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at
least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which
later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the
legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of
the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that
the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees
in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only
be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which
these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from
the government. “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.”
Merittvs Government of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
Facts:
Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour,
collidedwith an ambulance of the General Hospital which turned suddenly
andunexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn.Merrit was
severelyinjured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as
acontractor was affected. The inquiry at once arises whether the Government
islegally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom even if the collision was due
tothe negligence committed by an agent or employee of the government whichis
the chauffeur.
Issue:
Whether or not the Government may be held in this case.
Held:
No.That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and theprinciple
laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904,in a damage case,
the responsibility of the state is limited to that which itcontracts through a special
agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite
purposewhich gives rise to the claim
, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrativeor technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in themanner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trialcourt in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to
the paymentof damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has
byerroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903of the
Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ.,146.)It is, therefore,
evidence that the State (the Government of the PhilippineIslands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the SupremeCourt of Spain, for the acts
of its agents, officers and employees when they actas special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, andthat the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such anagent.
23. FontanillavsMaliaman
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven
officially by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit
for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court
awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA
appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and
primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver
Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
ISSUE:
13
May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent? becomes liable as an ordinary employer. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963
& 61045, December 1, 1989)
HELD:

Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and 24.FontanillavsMaliaman February 27, 1991
distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law – Government Agency,
for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special Proprietary Functions)
agent. (Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held
RATIO: liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses
caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA
■ Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government agency invested with a maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not
corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.
by the Corporation Law. Section 2, subsection f of PD 552 provides that NIA also has
its own assets and liabilities and has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA may sue and be sued
in court. HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government, because its community services are only incidental
■ Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency
(NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766, which propounds the with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of
thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing governmental functions; their employees.
rather it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of providing water
supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of 25. Aquinas School vsInton
government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole
and the goal is for the general interest of society. SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011, AQUINAS SCHOOL,
PETITIONER, VS.SPS.JOSE INTON AND MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, ON THEIR BEHALF
Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not created for AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, AND SR. MARGARITA
purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a YAMYAMIN, OP, RESPONDENTS.


service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government- Jose Luis was a grade three student at the Aquinas School, while Sister Margarita
function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, was a religion teacher who started teaching at the school only that year. On July 14,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, 1998m while Sister Margarita was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his
including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the assigned seat and went to a classmate to play a prank on the latter. Despite Sister
community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but Margarita’s instruction for him to go back to his seat, Jose Luis kept on going back
these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the again. Unable to tolerate anymore the child’s behavior, Sister Margarita
irrigation of lands. approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the leg several times; pulled and shoved his
head on his classmate’s seat, and told him to stay in on the floor and finish copying
NOTES: the notes on the board while seated on the floor. Because of this, Jose Luis’s
parents, Jose and Ma.Victoria, filed a case for damages against Aquinas School and
■ The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: Sister Margarita. They also filed a separate criminal case for violation of Republic
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special Act 7610 against Sister Margarita, to which she pleaded guilty. The RTC held Sister
agents only. Margarita liable for damages but absolved the school. Upon appeal to the Court of

14
Appeals, the latter affirmed the RTC judgment but found the school liable for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between it and Sister Margarita. Both parties appealed the CA
decision. On one hand, the school contended that it cannot be held liable, insisting
that it was the congregation who selected Sister Margarita to catechise its grade
three students, pursuant to the school’s agreement with the congregation for the
latter to send sisters so it can fulfil its ministry of catechising students. On the other
hand, the spouses sought to increase the amount of damages awarded by the
courts.
The Supreme Court:
“The Court has consistently applied the “four-fold test” to determine the existence
of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the
employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over
his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the
right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work
of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the
same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students.
Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation
that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much
like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public
schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have
control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school
directress’ testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it
cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper
conduct towards the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she
was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a
legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the
school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school’s Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend
a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to
ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation.Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school
year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any
rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school
learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons’ plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the Court
finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision of the CA.
The Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus
cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that the CA
already granted them in its decision.”
AQUINAS SCHOOL, G.R. No. 184202
FACTS:This case is about the private school’s liability for theoutside catechist’s act
of shoving a student and kicking himon the legs when he disobeyed her instruction
to remain inhis seat and not move around the classroom.In 1998, Jose Luis Inton
(Jose Luis) was a grade threestudent at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent
SisterMargarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher whobegan teaching at
that school only in June of that year,taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class.Jose
Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to playa joke of surprising him.
Yamyamin noticed this and senthim back to his seat.After a while, Jose Luis got up
again and went over to thesame classmate.Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and
kicked him on thelegs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head onthe
classmate’s seat.She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboardwhile
seating on the floor.Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed anaction
for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis againstYamyamin and Aquinas before
the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427.The Intons also filed a
criminal action against Yamyamin forviolation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guiltyand was sentenced accordingly.With regard to the action for
damages, the Intons soughtto recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as
wellas attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and hismother Victoria
suffered.The RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled inJose Luis’ favour,
holding Yamyamin liable to him for moraldamages of P25,000.00, exemplary
damagesof P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus thecosts of suit.They
elevate the case to the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas
solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
ISSUE:Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinassolidarily liable with
Yamyamin for the damages awarded toJose Luis.
HELD:No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had anagreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, inorder to fulfil its ministry, the congregation
would sendreligion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to itsstudents.Aquinas
insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’sreligious congregation that chose
15
her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much likethe way
bishops designate the catechists who would teachreligionin public schools. Aquinas
did not have control overYamyamin’s teaching methods.The Intons had not refuted
the school directress’ testimonyin this regard.Aquinas still had the responsibility of
taking steps to ensurethat only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teachits
young students. In this regard, it cannot be said thatAquinas took no steps to avoid
the occurrence of improperconduct towards the students by their religion
teacher.They showed records, certificates and diploma thatYamyamin is qualified to
teach. There is no question thatshe came from a legitimate congregation of sisters.
Theyprovided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students.They pre-approved the
content of the course she wanted toteach. They have a classroom evaluation
program for herunfortunately, she was new, and therefore do not havesufficient
opportunity to observe her.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETSASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitionerAquinas
School not liable in damages to respondent JoseLuisInton
SISTER’S ACT: How an “Outside Catechist” Saves A School From Liability (Aquinas
School vs Spouses Inton and Sr. Margarita Yamyamin, OP, G.R. No. 184202, January
26, 2011)
By Siesta-friendly
First of all, we note the long length of time to resolve this issue. The incident subject
of this case occurred in 1998. The trial court issued its decision only in 2006. The
CA decided in 2008 and the SC only this April 2011. The award was for moral
damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees
of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. It took 13 years for complainants to be
paid P50,000 in damages.
Anyway, the case as Ponente Justice Abad summarizes, is “about the private
school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a student and kicking him
on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move
around the classroom.”
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision below, an outside catechist is apparently a
religion teacher provided by a congregation to teach religion in a school and whose
conduct is nobody’s responsibility but himself/herself.
The Facts
“In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a
religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught
Jose Luis’ grade three religion class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his
assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him.
Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis
got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate
the child’s behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs
several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. Finally,
she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying
the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an
action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons
also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to
which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral,
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and
his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC … ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin
liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00,
and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). They asked
the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas
and Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however,
declined to increase the award of damages. Jose Luis moved for partial
reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this
Court from the CA decision through a petition for review on certiorari.”
The Ruling
So is the school liable for harm brought by a teacher to a student? Not in this
case. Why not? Because, believe it or not, Aquinas School – named after St.
Thomas Aquinas, the patron saint of Catholic schools of all things – does not have
control over its catechists. So the school says and so the Supreme Court believes.
The SC found that –
16
“Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to
fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to
provide catechesis to its students. The SC favored Aquinas’ insistence that “it was
not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of
catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate
the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances,
it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching
methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this
regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin.”
Wow, it’s hard enough to imagine that any school would have an arrangement
where they lose control over how their students are educated but who would
believe that a private catholic school would even think of losing control over the
religious education of their students?
The SC refers to Sr. Margarita as an “outside cathechist” yet Sr. Margarita is from
the same order, O.P. or OrdoPraedicatorum, the Dominican Order. Why then when
it comes to religious teaching, is she deemed “outside”? The only reason she is
“outside” is likely because Aquinas is an exclusive school for boys run by Dominican
fathers. Aquinas’ lay teachers would be more “outside” when it comes to
catechism as they are outside the Dominican Order.
Anyway, the SC writes it “applied the “four-fold test” to determine the existence of
an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the
employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over
his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the
right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work
of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the
same.”
The SC does not specify, beyond finding the existence of the teaching agreement
with the congregation, where the loss of Aquinas’ control over Sr. Margarita
Yamyamin’s work begins.
The SC admits that “[O]f course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps
to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students.” The SC enumerates the steps Aquinas took to “avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher”:
“First, Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she
was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a
legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the
school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the
students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school’s Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend
a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of
1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to
ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school
year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any
rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school
learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright
neglect.”
But why does the SC limit its findings on the school’s responsibility only to the
above 5 steps to justify absolving Aquinas of neglect? In any case, aren’t they
applicable as regards any teacher “outside” or not?
What now prevents a school from having an agreement with other
congregations/groups under which the latter would provide teachers to teach other
school subjects so that the school is absolved from any responsibility for any of said
teachers’ misconduct?
It seems parents must now check what kind of teaching arrangements their
children’s schools have. As these arrangements may matter when a school’s
liability is raised once a teacher does wrong to their children. Obviously, a Catholic
school is not beyond doing a Pontius Pilate by washing its hands of liability for a
sister’s act.
26. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC. G.R. Nos. L-66102-04 August 30, 1990. A
TRANSPORTATION CASE.BY C Y.
Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.
FACTS.
17
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by
Manalo to bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio SinayoanTarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was
detouch so the driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south where
it come from and its rear face the north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the
death of the three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of
SanMiguelTarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of
Delos Reyes was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil
damages before the court of first instance impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the
jeepney?
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear
chance in this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers
demand responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. IAC
DOCTRINE
: (1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between the
owners anddrivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility fromthe carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it
would be inequitable to exempt the negligentdriver and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
(2)In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is
presumed to havebeen at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable
presumption may only be overcome byevidence that he had observed extra-
ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756of the New Civil
Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
(3) The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of
breach of thecontract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the
carrier and the passenger, and inthe event of contractual liability, the carrier is
exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if suchbreach be due to the
negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liabilityon
the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his.
Secondly, thatwould make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious
and consequently, entitled torecover only the share which corresponds to the
driver contradictory to the explicit provision of Article2181 of the New Civil Code.
FACTS:
At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, AdelaidaEstomo,
ErlindaMeriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and ZenaidaParejas boarded
the jeepney owned byspouses Isidro Mangune and GuillermaCarreon and driven by
TranquilinoManalo at Dau, Mabalacat,Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan to spend Christmas with their families for P 24.00.Upon reaching barrio
Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepneydetachedcausing it
to run in an unbalanced position. Driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the
jeepneyto make a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the opposite lane of
the road (the jeepney'sfront faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced
the north (towards where it was going)).The jeepney occupied and blocked the
greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming
from the north.Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines claims that almost immediately
after the sudden U-turn the busbumped the right rear portion of the jeep.
Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the bus stoppeda few minutes before
hitting the jeepney. Either way, as a result of the collision, three passengers of the
jeepney (Catalina Pascua, ErlindaMeriales and AdelaidaEstomo) died while the
other jeepneypassengers sustained physical injuries.A criminal complaint was filed
against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. The case against delosReyes (driver
of Phil. Rabbit) was dismissed for insufficieny of evidence. Manalo (jeepney
driver),however, was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.3 complaints
for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of Pangasinan. (1)
SpousesCasiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while
Caridad Pascua sued in herbehalf Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. (2) Spouses
Manuel Millares and FidenciaArcica sued asheirs of ErlindaMeriales. And (3)
spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento sued as heirs of AdelaidaEstomo.
All three cases impleaded spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo (jeepney
owners),Rabbit and delos Reyes as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits
against spouses ManguneandCarreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As
against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs basedtheir suits on their culpability for a
quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. wasalso impleaded as
additional defendant in the first case only.
27. Coca-Cola Bottlers vs CAG.R. No. 110295
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
18
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland
Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained
to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter
and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH
and it was found out that the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a result, her per day
sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12
December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC
which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of
Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article
1561 of the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is
found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years
and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is
supported by the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the
reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold
for public consumption."
28.Jimenez v. City of Manila
Jimenez v. City of Manila (1987)
J. ParasBy P.R. Manalo
Facts
Petitioner Bernardino Jimenez bought bagoong in the Sta. Ana Public Market on a
rainy day. It was flooded by ankle-deep and dirty rainwater. Then petitioner turned
around, he stepped on an uncovered drainage opening, causing a 4-inch rusty nail
to penetrate his leg. Petitioner fell sick and was unable to supervise his bus business
for a long time. &e sued the City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp. as
administrator of the said public market. (he trial court sentenced the City of Manila
and Asiatic solidarily liable for damages. On appeal, the CA modified and held that
only Asiatic is liable. Hence this petition.HELD— City of Manila liable under article
2189 of the Civil Code.
Argument:
The City of Manila argues that it cannot be held liable because under the
Management and operating contract with Asiatic# the latter assumed sole
responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for anycause
attributable to it.
The City of Manila also argues that under the Revised Charter of Manila, it shall not
be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance# or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
Issue:
Whether the Cityof Manila is liable for the injuries suffered by the petitioner
despite the contract and the Revised Charter of Manila.
Held:
YES.
The Revised Charter of Manila establishes a general rule regulating the liability of
the City of Manila for 2damages or injury to persons or property arising from the
failure of city officers2 to enforce the provisions of said Act, “or any other law or
ordinance or from negligence2 of the city “Mayor Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. On the other hand, Art.
2189 of the Civil Code provides that “Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of
defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works under their control or supervision.
The said article constitutes a !articular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities ... liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any
person by reason2 3 specifically 3 2of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or su!er$ision.2
In other words the Revised charter of Manila refers to liability arising from
negligence# in general, regardless of the objects thereof, while Article 2189 of the
Civil Code governs liability due to defective streets, public buildings and other public
works in particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case
JIMENEZ v CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Jimenez boughtBagoongat the Santa Ana public market at the time that it
was flooded with ankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he stepped
on an uncovered opening w/c could not be seen because of dirty rainwater. A dirty
and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a
19
depth of1½ inches. His left leg swelled and he developed fever. He was confined for
20 days, walked w/ crutches for 15 days and could not operate his school buses. He
sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose administration the 29. Nakpil& Sons vs CA October 3, 1986
Sta. Ana had been placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract. TC
found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved City of G.R. No. L-47851 October 3, 1986
Manila. ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with
Facts of the Case:
Asiatec
The private respondent (Philippine Bar Association) hired the services of the
HELD: YES petitioner to make the plans and specifications for the construction of their office
building. The building was completed by the contractor but subsequently, an
RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, earthquake struck causing its partial collapse and damage.
which City of Manila is invoking in this case, establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of City Of Manila while Art 2189 NCC governs the liability due to “defective Issue: Is the petitioner liable for damages in this case?
streets, public buildings and other public works” in particular and is therefore
decisive in this case. It was also held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control HELD: Yes. The petitioner made substantial deviations from the plans and
and supervision by the province, city or municipality over the defective public specifications and failed to observe requisite workmanship standards in the
building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such construction of the building while their architect drew plans that contain defects
province, city or municipality. In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana and other inadequacies. Both the contractor and the architect cannot escape
public market remained under the control of the City as evidenced by: liability for damages when the building collapsed due to an earthquake. Other
1.the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that “prior approval” of buildings in the area withstood the tremor. The lower court also found that the
the City is still spirals in one of the columns in the ground floor has been cut. One who creates a
needed in the operations. 2.MayorBagatsing of Manila admitted such control and dangerous condition cannot escape liability even if an act of God may have
supervision in his letter to Finance Sec. Virata intervened as in this case. As such, the liability of the contractor (herein petitioner)
(“The City retains the power of supervision and control over its public markets…) and the architect for the collapse of the building is solidary.
3.City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose primary
duty is to take direct supervision and control of that particular public market 4.Se
c. 30 of Tax Code “
The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision, NAKPIL & SONS v. CA
administration and control over public markets…
To be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the engineer/architect/contractor
It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market must not have been negligent in the construction of the building.
reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs.
Ordinary precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize
danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls FACTS:
rather than the passageways. The City should have seen to it that the openings
were covered. It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5
Private respondents – Philippine Bar Association (PBA) – a non-profit organization
months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings that
formed under the corporation law decided to put up a building in Intramuros,
during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water.
Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil& Sons,
Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of
while United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by
impending danger was evident. Petitioner had the right to assume there were no
the Board of Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building
openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately
was completed in 1966.
covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it. Thus the
negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Asiatec and City
are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable. In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused the building heavy

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damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the
premises. United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but United Construction
subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and
specifications.
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr.Hizon, as a court appointed
Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the building, but was opposed.
PBA eventually paid for the demolition after the building suffered more damages in
1970 due to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were
deviations in the specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of
the building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from liability parties who
would otherwise be due to negligence?
HELD:
Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor are liable for damages
should the building collapse within 15 years from completion.
Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be responsible for
events, which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt from liability due to an act
of God, the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the industry to the
creditor.
In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately caused by the earthquake
which was an act of God, the defects in the construction, as well as the deviations in
the specifications and plans aggravated the damage, and lessened the preventive
measures that the building would otherwise have had.
30. Nakpil& Sons vs CA
Case Title: Nakpil vs. CA (April 15, 1988)GR numbers: L-47851, L-47863, L-
47896Ponente: Paras, J
FACTS:
Philippine BarAssociation (PBA) decided to construct an office building on its
840square meters lot located at the corner of Aduana and Arzobispo Streets,
Intamuros, Manila.For the plans, specifications and design, PBA contracted the
services of Juan F. Nakpil& sonsand Juan F. Nakpil (Nakpils). For the construction of
the building, PBA contracted the servicesof United Construction Company (UCCI) on
an administration basis. The building wascompleted in June 1966. On Aug. 2 a
strong earthquake hit Manila and the building in questionsustained major damage.
The front columns of the building buckled causing the building to tiltforward
dangerously. As a temporary remedial measure the building was shored up by UCCI
atthe expense of 13,661.28. On Nov. 29, 1968 PBA commenced action for recovery
damagesagainst UCCI. UCCI then filed a complaint against Nakpils alleging in
essence that the collapseof the building was due to the defects of architect plans.
Upon the investigation of theCommissioner it was found that the damage of the
buildings were caused by the defect in theplans and specifications prepared by the
Nakpils and UCCI deviations from said plans and specifications and its failure to
observe the requisite workmanship in the construction and PBA’s failure to
supervise the construction of the building. The lower court agreed with the findings
of the Commissioner and ordered UCCI to pay. Court of Appeals modified the
decision. Hence thispetition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not UCCI as wells as Nakpils are liable even if the damage was due to an
Act of God.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Civil Code provides that when there is
afortuitous event the debtor is exempt from liability however there is an exception.
If fraud,negligence, delay in the event on the part of the party then the party liable
cannot be exemptedtherefore PBA can recover damages from UCCI. The negligence
of the defendant was shownwhen and proved that there was an alteration of the
plans and specification that had been sostipulated among them. Therefore,
therefore there should be no question that NAKPIL andUNITED are liable for
damages because of the collapse of the building.
“
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One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape hability for
thenatural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person,
or an actof God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.
”
PREMISES CONSIDERED, UNITED's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED;
theNAKPILS" motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration is also
DENIED, the latters"first motion on the same grounds having been already denied
with finality in the resolution of April 3, 1987. Needless to say, the Motion to Refer
this case to the Court En Banc is DENIED, inview of all the things stated in this
Resolution.SO ORDERED.

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