TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ v. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT.

Facts: Petitioner
Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project. On that unfortunate
day, he encashed the checks for the salaries and wages of the workers. However, it took him until
afternoon so he opted on going home for the night as it would be more practical than heading straight
to Ternate. On his way to Marilao, he was robbed. He tried to chase after the robbers and caught up
with one of them. He requested to be relieved from money accountability and the General manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority indorsed it to the Regional Director of COA, until it reached the COA
Chairman who denied the request stating that Hernandez was negligent.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Hernandez was acted with negligence or recklessness in encashing the
checks and taking the money to Marilao and not ternate in view of lateness of hour.

Ruling: No. As for Hernandez’s choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily
agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in
the trips to the two places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not
be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be
expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in
broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it
cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a
fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been reasonably
foreseen although it could have happened, and did.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC.,

petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DEDIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO,
CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROSDIMAANO,

respondents;

PURISIMA,

.:FACTS:

Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay while petitioner owns a four-
storey schoolbuilding along the same College Road. That on October 11, 1989, a powerful typhoon hit
Metro Manila. Buffeted by

very strong winds, the roof of the petitioner’s building was partly ripped o
ff and blown away, landing on and destroying

portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. When the typhoon had passed, an ocular
inspection of the

destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official.In their
report, they imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and
improperanchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause for the roof be ripped off the building, thereby
causing damage to theproperty of respondent.Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery
of damages based on culpa aquiliana. Petitioner interposeddenial of negligence and claimed that the
typhoon as an Act of God is the sole cause of the damage. RTC ruled intheir favor relying on the
testimony of the City Engineer and the report made after the ocular inspection. Petitionersappeal before
the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC.Hence this present appeal.

ISSUES:A

(1) Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of
the falling

portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was, within
legal

contemplation, due to fortuitous event?(2) Whether or not an ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to
prove negligence?

HELD:

1.

Yes

, petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the damage caused by the typhoon. Under
Article1174 of the Civil Code, Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation,or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those eventswhich could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be
free from any previousnegligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.

12

An act of God cannot be invokedfor the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence
in not trying to forestall its possible adverse

consequences. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to
ano
ther,such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damages or injurywas a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the
participation of man

whether it be fromactive intervention, or neglect, or failure to act

the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from therules applicable to acts of God.In the
case at bar, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team that subject
school

building’s roofing had “no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong
winds.” Based

on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to
privaterespondents.There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but isunavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care.
In order to be exempt from liability arising from anyadverse consequence engendered thereby, there
should have been no human participation amounting to a negligentact. In other words; the person
seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, ascommonly
understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be
thefailure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justify
demand, or theomission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by
considerations which ordinarily regulatethe conduct of human affairs, would do.2. It bears emphasizing
that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving theexistence of
fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must
beaffirmatively established by competent evidence,

19

not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.Private respondents, in establishing
the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submittedby a team which
made an ocular

inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an

Facts: Napocor vs Ca
At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing
deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the
reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents
within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the
water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the
selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended
that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their
part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a
fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.

Issues:

(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a fortuitous
event

(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents

(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria

Held:

(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was
no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law
on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God or
force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to
foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must
be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at
bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of serious
importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety's sake.
The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible officials of the municipalities
concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary
employees and policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people
concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not
receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent the notice or
warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their second assignment of error, that
the sending of said notice has absolved them from liability.

(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the
opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although
there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no
question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the
facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention
may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to
counterclaim.

Art 221. Family Code provides that parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the act or omission or their unemancipated children
living in their company and under parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law.

The Basis of the civil liability which is primary-direct and solidary imposed by law is the necessary
consequence of parental authority exercise over their children. This authority imposed a duty upon
parents to support them, keep them company, educate and instruct them, and grand the right to
correcting punish with moderation. The parents are relieved of this liability only upon proof that they
have exercise the diligence of a good father of a family (Exconde vs Capuno, 101 Phil 843) to prevent
damage.

George Mckee and Araceli Koh Mckee vs. IAC , Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda manalo | Davide G.R. No. L-
68102, July 16, 1992| 211 SCRA 517 FACTS Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977,
in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a
head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and
Manalo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, resulting in the deaths of Jose Koh,
Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee
and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort Immediately before the collision, the cargo
truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward
from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other
hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters
away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road
and into the lane of the car moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other
side or turn back Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to
return to his lane. But before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the
lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge As a result of the accident, 2 civil
cases were filed for damages for the death and physical injuries sustained by the victims boarding the
Ford Escort; as well as a criminal case against Galang During the trial, evidence were presented
showing that the driver of the Truck was speeding resulting in the skid marks it caused in the scene of
the accident The lower court found Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil cases were
dismissed On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the decision in the civil
cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the McKee family On
MR, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of the owners of the truck ISSUES &
ARGUMENTS W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THE OVER SPEEDING OF
THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and
could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover,
under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence" Considering the sudden intrusion of
the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the
given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty
of negligence In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in the records. He
himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof Applying the foregoing
doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care
to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck
driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which
they failed to do Petition GRANTED. Resolution SET ASIDE and previous DECISION REINSTATED.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company v CA GR No 53401 | Nov 6, 1989 When an act of God combines with
defendant’s negligence to produce an injury, defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but
for his own negligent conduct. FACTS  Typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake.  After the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased, Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out, and proceeded to
the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise
that might have been damaged.  Wading in waist-deep flood, Isabel was followed by 2 of her
employees. Suddenly, the deceased screamed “Ay” and quickly sank into the water. The two girls
attempted to help, but failed. There was an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like
fashion in the water.  Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio
Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting
that the water was grounded.  When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in- law
had been electrocuted, they requested the police to ask the people of INELCO to cut off the electric
current.  The body of the deceased was recovered about two meters from an electric post. Upon the
request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body. The skin was grayish or, in
medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found
an “electrically charged wound” or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand
was a burned wound. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as
“circulatory shock electrocution”  In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of
its officers and employees, and sought to prove that on and even before the day of Isabel Lao Juan’s
death, the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, did not suffer from any
defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO
equipment had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator and in
line with its business of supplying electric current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to
prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as
floods, typhoons, fire and others.  An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250000 was
instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI.  INELCO, however, theorizes that the deceased
could have died simply by either drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to
herself. it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner’s knowledge, caused the installation of
a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the

iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch
is on. This might have caused the electrocution.  The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed the
complaint but awarded P25000 in moral damages and attorney’s fees of P45000.  The CA set aside the
CFI decision and ordered INELCO to pay actual damages of P30229.45, compensatory damages of
P50000, exemplary damages of P10000, attorney’s fees of P3000, plus the cost of the suit. ISSUE W/N
INELCO is liable for damages since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events – NO RATIO  While it is
true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible,
it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim’s death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner’s negligence that death took place.  Engr. Juan from the NAPOCOR stated that when he set
out that morning for an inspection, there was no INELCO line man attending to the grounded and
disconnected electric lines. The INELCO Office was likewise closed around the time of the electrocution.
 At the INELCO, irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because “amperes of the switch
volts were moving”. And yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request
that defendant’s switch be cut off— but the harm was done. Asked why the delay, Loreto Abijero, one of
INELCO’s linemen answered that he “was not the machine tender of the electric plant to switch off the
current.”  In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence
does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men
(linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office.  The negligence of petitioner
having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s death was
solely due to a fortuitous event.  “When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his
own negligent conduct or omission”  A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he
voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to
exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased’s property, a source of her livelihood, was faced
with an impending loss. RULING CA Decision affirmed with modification, increasing actual damages to
P48229.

SABINA EXCONDEvs.DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNOG.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957FACTS:Dante
Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through recklessimprudence for the
death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. During the trial,Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased
Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right tobring a separate civil action for damages against the Dante. After
trial, Dante was foundguilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the
decision.Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.In line with her
reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against DelfinCapuno and his son Dante Capuno
asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. The
Capuno’s set up the defensethat if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is
DanteCapuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was notunder the
control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained bythe lower court and, as a
consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay thedamages claimed in the complaint.Dante was a
member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the BilintawakElementary School situated in a
barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in
said city upon instruction of the cityschool's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students,
boarded a jeep andwhen the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the
driver saton his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of itspassengers,
Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father
of Dante, was not with his son at the time of theaccident, nor did he know that his son was going to
attend a parade. He only came toknow it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the
parade uponinstruction of his teacher.ISSUE:Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable,
jointly and severally with hisson Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused
by thenegligent act of minor Dante Capuno.DECISION:Yes.The case comes under Article 1903 of the
Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5,which provides:

ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceablenot only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whomanother is responsible.The father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for anydamages caused by the minor children who
live with them.x x x x x x x x xFinally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damagescaused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.Sabina contends that
defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante
because at the time the latter committed thenegligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he
was a minor and was thenliving with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil
liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving thefather
from liability.It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades
areliable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but
this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not toany academic educational
institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557).Dante Capuno
was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he
attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal uponinstruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was
in connection with that parade thatDante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it,
the accident occurred.In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city
school'ssupervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not thena student
of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.The civil liability which the law impose upon the
father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children wholive with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority
theyexercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,keeping them in
their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion totheir means", while, on the other
hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish themin moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which theycan relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligenceof a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last
paragraph,Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.

Elcano vs. Hill

Facts:

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally

After... due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake.

when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on
account of the death of their son, the appellees... filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
Issues:

Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein
the action for civil liability was not reserved?

May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,... Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

Ruling:

Article

2177

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from neglige... acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa... aquiliana'.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child... it is, however,
also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by... marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer... his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of
his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or... guardian."
Now, under Article 2180

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the... mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company."

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in... question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180
is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to... prevent them from
causing damage to third persons the order appealed from is reversed.

1 | P a g eARTICLE 2180 (VICARIOUS LIABILITY/ IMPUTED ABILITY) DIGESTED CASES:PART 1 AND 2

(PARENTS AND GUARDIANS):Basis Bonus Pater FamiliasBAHIA v LITONJUA AND LEYNESMarch 30,
1912FACTS:Fausta Litonjua purchased an automobile and later turned it over toInternational garage,
which is owned and managed by his son Ramon Ramirez.As part of the daily operations of his business,
Ramirez rented the automobiledonated by his mother to Mariano Leynes. Ramirez also supplied Leynes
achauffeur and a machinist for the purpose of conveying to and from Balayanand Tuy.While in Balayan,
the automobile refused to obey the direction of the driver inturning a corner due to a defect in the
steering gear. As a consequence, itrammed into the wall of a house against which the daughter of
plaintiff Bahiawas leaning at the time. The automobile crushed the child to death.Bahia then filed an
action against the Fausta (donor of auto), and Leynes,underwho was directing and controlling the
operation of the automobile at the timeof the accident. Ramirez was not made a party.TC found Leynes
liable but dismissed complait against Fausta.ISSUE: Who should be held responsibleHELD:SC opined
that the action as to Fausta was properly dismissed. Although themother purchased the automobile, she
turned it over to the garage of her sonfor use therein. The establishment belonged to the son, Ramirez,
and he hadthe full management and control of it and received all the profits therefrom.It appears that
Fausta was not aware of the contract with Leynes. While shemay have been in one sense the owner of
the machine, that fact does not,under the other facts of the case, make her responsible for the results of
theaccident.The judgment against Leynes must be reversed and the complaint against himmust be
dismissed. While is may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who wasdriving the auto
was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derivedfrom the trips of the auto belonged to him and
the auto was operated under hisdirection, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him
responsible forthe negligence of the chauffeur or for the defects in the auto itself.Under Article 1903 of
the CC (now Article 2176), 2 things are apparent:1.presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer whenever there isan injury caused by the negligence employee2.presumption is juris tantum
and may be rebutted.In the instant case, the death of the child caused by a defect in the steeringgear
immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was negligence inselecting a defective automobile or in
his failure to maintain it in good conditionafter selection.As to selection, SC found that defendant had
exercised due diligence when heobtained the machine from a reputable garage, which so far as
appeared ingood condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,were duly
licensed, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the
accident occurred and itis clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual
orconstructive of the defective condition of the steering gear. Sufficient time hadnot elapsed to require
an examination of the machine by the defendant as apart of his duty of inspection and
supervision.While it does not appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulationsfor the
guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions designed forthe protection of the public and
the passengers, the evidence shows that thedeath of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate
rules andregulations. It was caused by a defect in the machine as to which thedefendant has shown
himself free from responsibility.____________________Bahia vs Litonjua and LeynesFACTS:On May 14,
1911, Leynes rented a car fromInternationalGarageowned andoperated by Ramirez. As per
thearrangement, Ramirez would also provide forthedriverand a machinist. Leynes was to used the carto
transportpeople

2 | P a g efromfiestafor profit. The car was actually brand new and was only used a fewhours. On May
16, 2011, while driven on the road,the automobile, by reason ofa defect in thesteering gear, refused to
obey the direction of thedriverin turninga corner in the streets, and, as a consequence, ran across the
street and into thewall of a house against which thedaughterofBahiawas leaning at the time. Thefront of
the machine struck the childin the centerof the body and crushed her todeath.ISSUE:Whether or not
Leynes is liable in the case at bar.HELD:No. While it may be said that, at the time of the accident,
thechauffeurwho wasdriving the machine was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derivedfrom
the trips of the automobile belonged to him and the automobile wasoperated under his direction,
nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in makinghim responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or
for defects in theautomobile itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishesliabilityincases of
negligence, but also provides when that liability shall cease. It says:The liability referred to in this article
shall cease when the persons mentionedtherein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family toavoid the damages.From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury
is caused bythe negligence of a servant oremployeethere instantly arises a presumption of alaw that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in theselection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after theselection, or both; and (2) that presumption isjuris
tantumand notjuris et dejure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if
theemployer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervisionhe has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family, thepresumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.As to selection, Leynes has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligenceof a good
father of a family. He obtained the machine from areputablegarageand it was, so far as appeared, in
good condition. The workmenwere likewise selected from astandardgarage, were duly licensed
bytheGovernmentin their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent.The car had been
used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clearfrom the evidence that Leynes had no
notice, either actual or constructive, of thedefective condition of thesteering gear.While it does not
appear that Leynes formulated rules andregulationsfor theguidance of thedriversand gave them
properinstructions, designed fortheprotectionof the public and the passengers, the evidence shows that
thedeath of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rulesandregulations. It was caused by a
defect in the car as to which Leynes hasshown himself free from responsibility.

Tamargo vs. CA

Facts:

Adelberto Bundoc,... a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle... which...
resulted in her death.

Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed... by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he... was living at
the time of the tragic incident.

In addition

, a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed

Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal... liability on the ground that he had
acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident,... the spouses

Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc

This petition for adoption was granted... after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer,... , Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action... since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto... was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.

petitioners... contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for
damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.

The natural parents of Adelberto,... aintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by the
adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting
parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for... adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot
Jennifer with ad air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental
responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Issues:

whether or not the effects of... adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with
the... biological parents.

Ruling:

he law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:

"The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It
would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of... the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the
parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise...
supervision and control.

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred
to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened.
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the... decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child.

In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they... could not have forseen
and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable... no presumption of
parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the... tort was committed.

Sps Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong (18 y.o.) and Wendell Libi (19 y.o.) were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie
Ann brokeup her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell demandedreconciliation with Julie, but was refused by the latter. This prompted
the former to resort to threats against her.Julie, in order to avoid Wendell, stayed in the house of her
best friend.

Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith
and Wessonrevolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the
scene of the crime insidethe residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D.
Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both
minors, theirparents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn
from their interpretation ofcircumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of
physical facts.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her
death byshooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide. On the otherhand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son,
rejected the imputation andcontended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his workas a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-

Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then

shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.c

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First
Instance

of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability
under Article

2180 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, and the
counterclaim of thedefendants were likewise denied for lack of merit.


On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
thereinplaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-
appellees who, aspetitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make
petitioners liable forvicarious liability.

RULING:

The Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the
provisions of Article2180 of the Civil Code to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply
only to quasi-delicts and not tocriminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving
mere negligence the parents would be liable butnot where the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall beeffected against the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and YouthWelfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon
themother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by arelative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family
Code, this civil liability is now, without suchalternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and
those who exercise parental authority over the minoroffender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance withArticles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code