D.

Last Clear Chance

Picart vs. Smith| Street March 15, 1918 | 37 Phil 809

FACTS • Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php 31,100 as
damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by Smith. The incident happened on Dec
12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union.
• Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith
approached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12 miles per hour.
• Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was not observing rules of the road.
Smith continued his course and made two more blasts.
• Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the right side of the
railing.
• As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its left, that being the proper side of
the road for the machine.
• Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he continued without diminution of speed.
• When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other side, Smith drove his car
to the right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close proximity to the horse
that it became frightened and turned its belly across the bridge with its head towards the railing.
• The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
• The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
• It showed that the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing was
probably less than one half meters.
• The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil obligation
to repair the damage done to Picart and his pony.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI;

Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the amount of P200. The sum is
computed to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage
occasioned to articles of his apparel.

• In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred while the automobile was still some distance
away. From this moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a
place for greater safety.
• The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to an
immediate stop or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
away from the horse to avoid collision. There was an appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with
vehicles would react that way.
• The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
• The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
• A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Court’s opinion would have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. (DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE)

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District | Bautista Angelo L-7644 August 29, 1958 |

FACTS • Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara, Quezon City
• It charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its pools
• Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went to the pools along with his 2
brothers
• He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers that he would get something to
drink. His brothers left him and went to the Deep pool
• Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person was swimming to long under water
• Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ong’s lifeless body.
Applying first aid, the lifeguard tried to revive the boy.
• Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary
inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the
security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon
arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in
order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued
the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator
until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted
• Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion in water
(pagkalunod)
• The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against Metropolitan, alleging negligence on
the selection and supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had the last clear
chance to revive Ong.
• It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety measures in place: they had a male
nurse, six lifeguards, ring buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also
a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic established for the benefit of the patrons.
Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the
use of the pools, one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any
attendant. Although defendant does not maintain a full- time physician in the swimming pool
compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or
operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

• W/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its negligence

• W/N the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in this case
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

No. Metropolitan is not negligent

• Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons. It
has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors
so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they
had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on
schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to
look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided
with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.

• The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the
pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. When they found that
the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When
the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents
were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the
University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body found him to be
already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the
circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

The Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable in this case

• The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record
discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a
bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was
retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding
his negligence

• Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent
that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards
the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee
had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the
application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee.

Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware vs NLRC| NARVASA G.R. No. 70493 May 18, 1989|

FACTS • Engineer Orlando Calibo, Agripino Roranes and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the
Bacnotan Consolidated Industries Inc.
• Calibo was driving the car as they were approaching the Lizada Bridge towards the direction
going to Davao City.
 • At about that time, Paul Zacarias was driving a truck loaded with cargo. The truck just crossed
the said bridge coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South
Cotabato.
• At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the jeep and the truck collided and as a
consequence of which Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias
was unhurt.

• A civil suit was filed by the wife of Calibo against Zacarias and the owner of the truck
• At the lower court, the case was dismissed for the plaintiff failed to establish the negligence by
preponderance of evidence. The court highlighted that moments before the collision, the jeep
was “zigzagging.”
• Zacarias immediately submitted himself to police investigation while Roranes and Patos
refused to be investigated. Zacarias presented more credible testimony unlike Roranes and
Patos.
• The evidence showed that the path of the truck had skid marks which indicated that the driver
applied brakes. The court accepted the evidence that even if there was negligence on the part of
Zacarias who intruded about 25 centimeters to the lane of Calibo, the latter still had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident.
• The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Ths was on the
grounds that Zacarias saw the jeep already at about 150 meters and Zacarias did not have a
driver’s license at the time of the incident. The Appellate Court opined that Zacarias negligence
gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of his employer and their liability is both
primary and solidary.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether Zacarias should have an actionable responsibility for the accident under
the rule of last clear chance.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:

No. • The evidence indicates that it was rather Engineer Calibo’s negligence that was the
proximate cause of the accident. Assuming there was an antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias,
the physical facts would still absolve him of any actionable responsibility under the rule of the last clear
chance.
• From the established facts, the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep has the
clear chance to avoid the accident.
• The respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed
into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioner’s imputation that they also admitted the
truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still 30 meters away. From these facts the logical
conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the
last clear chance to avoid the accident. While still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by
stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which the driver of the jeep had
sufficient time to do while running at 30 kilometers per hour.
• In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on
a supposed right to expect, as the appellate court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him in a
clear path.
 • The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as a valid and complete defense to accident
liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs Smith.

Pantranco North Express, Inc vs Baesa | Cortes G.R. Nos. 79050-51| November 14, 1989

FACTS • The spouses Baesa, their four children, the Ico spouses, the latter’s son and 7 other people
boarded a passenger jeep to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the
Baesa spouses. The jeep was driven by David Ico.
• Upon reaching the highway, the jeep turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed
of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from
Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and
collided with it.
• As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for one daughter, as well as David Ico, died, and the
rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, the surviving daughter, through her guardian filed separate
actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
• PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico’s (the driver) alleged negligence as a
proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its driver. The RTC ruled in favor of Baesa, which was upheld by the CA
• The petitioner now contends that the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of the “last clear
chance” against the jeepney driver. Petitioner contends that under the circumstances, it was the driver
of the jeep who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Does the “last clear chance” doctrine apply?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. • The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of a prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences
• Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant
liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim for damages.
• It is the petitioner’s position that even assuming arguendo, that the bus encroached into the
lane of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney towards the spacious dirt
shoulder on his right without danger to himself or his passengers. This is untenable
• For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who
allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or
should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident
or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril.
• In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending
danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the
bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite
direction.
 • Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. The Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine “can
never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.”

E. Prescription (Art. 1146) – The following actions must be filed within one year: 1. Upon the injury to
the rights of the plaintiff; (2.) Upon a quasi- delict.

Ferrer vs. Ericta | Kapunan G.R. No. 129329, July 31, 2001 | 362 SCRA 56

FACTS • Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car. At about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon of December 31, 1970, their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was then only
sixteen (16) years of age, without proper official authority, drove the for pick-up, without due regard to
traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent injury to persons or
damage to property. The pickup car was overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer,
who was then a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and
confinement at different hospitals for more than two (2) years; that as a result of the physical injuries
sustained by Annette, she suffered unimaginable physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also
suffered mental anguish, moral shock and spent a considerable sum of money for her treatment.
• The complaint was only filed on January 5, 1975.
• At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only Ferrer and counsel were present. As such the Pfleiders
were declared in default and the court rendered judgment against them.
• Upon filing a motion for reconsideration, respondent judge, without setting aside the order of
default, issued an order absolving defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint
states no cause of action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at
the time of the vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only responsible for the damages caused by their
minor children who live in their company; and (b) that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since
the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the date of the accident, and the action to recover
damages based on quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant petition for mandamus.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private
respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION NOT DEEMED WAIVED.

• Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the
defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not
constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. The defense of prescription, even if not raised in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact not
appearing upon the preceding pleading.
• It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such
in the answer of the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because
the defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows
that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of
limitations
• In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of
prescription. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within
four years. 8 The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the
accident

Kramer, Jr. vs. CA | Gancayco, J.: G.R. No. 83524, October 13, 1989 | 178 SCRA 518

FACTS • On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernest Kramer, Jr. and Marta
Kramer was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.
• Somewhere near the Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-
island vessel (M/V Asia Philippines) owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
• Due to the collision, F/B Marjolea sank, taking along its fish catch.
• The captains of both vessels filed a protest with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast
Guard for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision
• On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the collision was due to the negligence of the
employees of private respondent (Trans-Asia).

• On the basis of such decision, the Philippine Coast Guard, on April 29, 1982, suspended M/V Asia
Philippines from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.

• On May 30,1985, petitioners filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, Pasay City.

• Private respondent filed a MTD on the ground of prescription based on Art. 1146 of the Civil Code
which provides, ‘An action based upon quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years from the day the
quasi-delict was committed.

• The RTC denied the MTD on the basis of the Board’s resolution that there was a need to rely on highly
technical aspects attendant to such collision, hence, the prescriptive period under the law should begin
to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of M/V Asia Philippines had
been finally ascertained.

• On appeal to the CA, the said court reversed the RTC’s decision and granted the MTD, hence the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N a complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private
respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

YES. • The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
elements, namely: o A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created o an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right
o an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
• The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arises
• Aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body that the collision was
caused by fault or negligence of the other party before he can file action for damages Petition is
DISMISSED.

F. Fortuitous Event (Article 1174) Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which, could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were investable.

TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ v. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT.

Facts: Petitioner Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project. On
that unfortunate day, he encashed the checks for the salaries and wages of the workers. However, it
took him until afternoon so he opted on going home for the night as it would be more practical than
heading straight to Ternate. On his way to Marilao, he was robbed. He tried to chase after the robbers
and caught up with one of them. He requested to be relieved from money accountability and the
General manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority indorsed it to the Regional Director of COA, until it
reached the COA Chairman who denied the request stating that Hernandez was negligent.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Hernandez was acted with negligence or recklessness in encashing the
checks and taking the money to Marilao and not ternate in view of lateness of hour.

Ruling: No. As for Hernandez’s choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily
agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in
the trips to the two places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not
be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be
expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in
broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it
cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a
fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been reasonably
foreseen although it could have happened, and did.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs. CA

FACTS: Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay while petitioner owns a
four-storey school building along the same College Road. That on October 11, 1989, a powerful typhoon
hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of the petitioner’s building was partly ripped
off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house.
When the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team
of engineers headed by the city building official. In their report, they imputed negligence to the
petitioner for the structural defect of the building and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams
to cause for the roof be ripped off the building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondent.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana. Petitioner
interposed denial of negligence and claimed that the typhoon as an Act of God is the sole cause of the
damage. RTC ruled in their favor relying on the testimony of the City Engineer and the report made after
the ocular inspection. Petitioners appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence
this present appeal.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the
impact of the falling

portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was, within
legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event?

HELD: Yes, petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the damage caused by the
typhoon. Under Article1174 of the Civil Code, except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable. In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that
he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been
occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross
negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.
When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to
another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of
the damages or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the
participation of man whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. In the case at
bar, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team that subject school
building’s roofing had “no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong
winds.” Based on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for
damages to private respondents.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which
may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be
exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have
been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words; the person seeking
exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is
conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, or the
omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.2. It bears emphasizing that a person
claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence,not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned
report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the
typhoon.
G. Exercise of Diligence (Art. 2180) –

H. Mistake and Waiver

Gatchalian vs. Delim | G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991 | 203 SCRA 126

FACTS • Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames mini bus owned by Delim. The bus was headed for
Bauang, La Union. On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang,
Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle
bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a
ditch.
• Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany
Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was
found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
• Mrs. Delim paid for all the hospital expenses. She also asked the passengers to sign a
document [Joint Affidavit] stating, “That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil
against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and
owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
• Even if Gatchalian signed this document, she still filed this case.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the document Delim had Gatchalian sign at the hospital constitutes a valid
waiver.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT A VALID WAIVER. • A waiver, to be valid
and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as
to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
casually be attributed to a person when the terms that do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to
abandon a right vested in such person.
• The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by Gatchalian need to be
considered. Gatchalian was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the
hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented
to her for signing, while reading the document, she experienced dizziness but since the other passengers
who had also suffered injuries signed the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint
Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether
Gatchalian understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by Delim) she signed and
whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action.
• Moreover, for a waiver to be valid, it must not be contrary to law, public policy, morals and
good customs. In this case, Delim was the owner of the minibus which takes passengers around La
Union. She has a contract of carriage with them and is required to exercise extraordinary diligence when
fulfilling these contractual duties. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an
injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken
the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render
that standard unenforceable. The waiver is offensive to public policy.
I.Damnum Absque Injuria – although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury.

NAPOCOR VS. CA

Facts: At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam,
causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to
the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the
residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have
kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises
diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It
further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged
negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what
happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.

Issue: Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria.

Ruling: We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the
opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although
there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no
question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the
facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention
may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to
counterclaim.

J. Emergency Rule – one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails not to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be the better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

Mckee vs. IAC

FACTS: Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur
Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between
an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and Manalo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Escort
car driven by Jose Koh, resulting in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of
the Ford Escort. Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of
rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles
City from San Fernando.
When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2
boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car moving back and forth,
unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car,
swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. But before he could do so, his car
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on
the said bridge. As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filed for damages for the death and
physical injuries sustained by the victims boarding the Ford Escort; as well as a criminal case against
Galang During the trial, evidence were presented showing that the driver of the Truck was speeding
resulting in the skid marks it caused in the scene of the accident. The lower court found Galang guilty in
the criminal case, but the civil cases were dismissed. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of
Galang, and reversed the decision in the civil cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and
physical injuries of the McKee family. On MR, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of
the owners of the truck.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI: THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THE OVER SPEEDING OF
THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE. The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the
side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence,
if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence". Considering the
sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adopted the best
means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear
that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said
that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the
doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages
if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided
the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear
chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence
in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows
from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage, which they failed to do Petition GRANTED. Resolution SET ASIDE and previous
DECISION REINSTATED.
K. Violenti Non-Fit Injuria

Ilocos Norte Electric Company v CA GR No 53401 | Nov 6, 1989 When an act of God combines with
defendant’s negligence to produce an injury, defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but
for his own negligent conduct.

FACTS: Typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede,
the deceased, Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out, and proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she
was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise that might have been damaged.
Wading in waist-deep flood, Isabel was followed by 2 of her employees. Suddenly, the deceased
screamed “Ay” and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but failed. There was an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but
at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. When Antonio
Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in- law had been electrocuted, they requested the
police to ask the people of INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body of the deceased was
recovered about two meters from an electric post. Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased,
Dr. Castro examined the body. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated
death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an “electrically charged wound” or a first
degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The certificate of
death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as “circulatory shock electrocution”
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees,
and sought to prove that on and even before the day of Isabel Lao Juan’s death, the electric service
system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a
hazard to life and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment had been newly-
installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator and in line with its business of
supplying electric current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid
injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire
and others.  An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250000 was instituted by the heirs of
the deceased with the CFI. INELCO, however, theorizes that the deceased could have died simply by
either drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself. it was pointed out
that the deceased, without petitioner’s knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by
connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the
latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. This might have caused the electrocution. The CFI
ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint but awarded P25000 in moral damages and
attorney’s fees of P45000. The CA set aside the CFI decision and ordered INELCO to pay actual damages
of P30229.45, compensatory damages of P50000, exemplary damages of P10000, attorney’s fees of
P3000, plus the cost of the suit.

ISSUE: W/N INELCO is liable for damages since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events.

RULING: While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may
be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim’s death. It was through
the intervention of petitioner’s negligence that death took place. Engr. Juan from the NAPOCOR stated
that when he set out that morning for an inspection, there was no INELCO line man attending to the
grounded and disconnected electric lines. The INELCO Office was likewise closed around the time of the
electrocution. At the INELCO, irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because “amperes
of the switch volts were moving”. And yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr.
Juan to request that defendant’s switch be cut off— but the harm was done. Asked why the delay,
Loreto Abijero, one of INELCO’s linemen answered that he “was not the machine tender of the electric
plant to switch off the current.” In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of
electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb.
The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there
were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office. The negligence of
petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s
death was solely due to a fortuitous event. “When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission” A person is excused from the force of the rule,
that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased’s property, a source of her
livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.

Vicarious Liability (Article 2180)- the basis of vicarious liability of a person over the other persons under
their legal authority, control or influence. Violation or remission of duty arising from such relationship
makes them liable for damages caused by other person under their care or charge.

Parent & Guardian

1. Parent- father, if dead or incapacitated, mother is responsible for damages caused by minor
children living in their company (Art 2180 NCC)
2. Guardians – are liable for damages caused by minors or incapacitated person who are under
their authority and live in their company.

Art 221. Family Code provides that parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the act or omission or their unemancipated children
living in their company and under parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law.

The Basis of the civil liability which is primary-direct and solidary imposed by law is the necessary
consequence of parental authority exercise over their children. This authority imposed a duty upon
parents to support them, keep them company, educate and instruct them, and grand the right to
correcting punish with moderation. The parents are relieved of this liability only upon proof that they
have exercise the diligence of a good father of a family (Exconde vs Capuno, 101 Phil 843) to prevent
damage.

SABINA EXCONDEvs.DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNOG.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957

FACTS: Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as
mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right tobring a separate civil action for damages
against the Dante. After trial, Dante was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court
Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.In
line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son
Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro
Caperiña. The Capuno’s set up the defense that if anyone should be held liable for the death of Isidoro
Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former
was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the
lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint. Dante was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949he attended a
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the
school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of
the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further
appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he
know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the
accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.

ISSUE: Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son
Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor
Dante Capuno.

RULING: Yes. The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which
provides:

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The father,
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody. Sabina contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is
liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter
committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is
evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. It is true
that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies
to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law,
1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557).Dante Capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in
honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with
that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident
occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's
supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not the student of an
institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
 The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious.
This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon
the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and
instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish the min moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This
defendants failed to prove.

Elcano vs. Hill

Facts: It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was
not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their
son, the appellees... filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.

Issues: Whether or not, the Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

Ruling: Article 2177: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence... acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. It
results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child... it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by... marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer... his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of
his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or... guardian."

Now, under Article 2180, The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the... mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in... question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180
is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to... prevent them from
causing damage to third persons the order appealed from is reversed.

FACTS: Fausta Litonjua purchased an automobile and later turned it over to International garage, which
is owned and managed by his son Ramon Ramirez. As part of the daily operations of his business,
Ramirez rented the automobile donated by his mother to Mariano Leynes. Ramirez also supplied Leynes
a chauffeur and a machinist for the purpose of conveying to and from Balayan and Tuy. While in
Balayan, the automobile refused to obey the direction of the driver in turning a corner due to a defect in
the steering gear. As a consequence, it rammed into the wall of a house against which the daughter of
plaintiff Bahiawas leaning at the time. The automobile crushed the child to death. Bahia then filed an
action against the Fausta (donor of auto), and Leynes, under who was directing and controlling the
operation of the automobile at the time of the accident. Ramirez was not made a party.The court found
Leynes liable but dismissed complaint against Fausta.

ISSUE:Whether or not Leynes is liable in the case at bar.

HELD:No. While it may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was driving the
machine was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of the automobile
belonged to him and the automobile was operated under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not
conclusive in makinghim responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in theautomobile
itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides
when that liability shall cease. It says:The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentionedtherein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family toavoid the
damages.From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused bythe negligence of
a servant or employeethere instantly arises a presumption of alaw that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantumand notjuris et dejure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in selection and supervisionhe has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

As to selection, Leynes has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligenceof a good
father of a family. He obtained the machine from areputablegarageand it was, so far as appeared, in
good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from astandardgarage, were duly licensed bythe
Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent.The car had been used but
a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clearfrom the evidence that Leynes had no notice,
either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of thesteering gear.While it does not appear that
Leynes formulated rules and regulationsfor theguidance of thedriversand gave them properinstructions,
designed fortheprotectionof the public and the passengers, the evidence shows that thedeath of the
child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rulesandregulations. It was caused by a defect in the car
as to which Leynes hasshown himself free from responsibility.

Tamargo vs. CA
Facts: Adelberto Bundoc,... a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle... which...
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed... by petitioner Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's
natural parents, against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he... was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition a criminal information for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was filed Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal... liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment. Prior to the incident,... the
spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption
was granted... after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer,... , Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action... since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto... was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption. petitioners... contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable
parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. The natural
parents of Adelberto,... aintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the
time of the filing of the petition for... adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with ad air
rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Issues: whether or not the effects of... adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be
given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged
with the... biological parents.

Ruling: The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
reads: "The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of... the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. the basis of parental liability for the
torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with
them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise... supervision and control. We do not
believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do
not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the... decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical
custody over the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they... could not have forseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in
the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable... no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time
the... tort was committed.

Sps Libi vs. IAC

FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong (18 y.o.) and Wendell Libi (19 y.o.) were sweethearts until December, 1978
when Julie Ann brokeup her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell demandedreconciliation with Julie, but was refused by the latter. This prompted
the former to resort to threats against her.Julie, in order to avoid Wendell, stayed in the house of her
best friend. Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime insidethe residence of private respondents at the corner of
General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city. Due to the absence of an eyewitness
account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the
contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts. Private
respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death
byshooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.
On the otherhand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the
imputation andcontended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his workas a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti- Narcotics Unit
(CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification. As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-
17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence, and the counterclaim of the defendants were likewise denied for
lack of merit. On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint
of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-
appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to
make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

RULING: The Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the
provisions of Article2180 of the Civil Code to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply
only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving
mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this
civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code