Case No.

1
Tobias vs Abalos
Gr No. L-114783. December 8, 1994

Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, An Act Converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
Municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the
incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675,
President Ramis signed it into law. Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was
deemed ratified in effect. Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is
unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the one subject one bill rule. They also alleged that the subject law
embraced two principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the
division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners argue that the
division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representative beyond that provided in the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may increase.
3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.

Ruling:
1. No. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than 250, 000
indubitably ordains compliance with the one city one representative as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the
Constitution. The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that
general subject. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequence of the
proposed law and its operation.

2. Yes. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress
itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

3. No. Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party. It should
be noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamoras
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Petition dismissed.

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Case No. 2

TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied
and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree,
education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,
wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of
the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of
the First District of Leyte.

HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7
months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her
father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and
concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean
the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board
of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

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Case No. 3
BANAT v. COMELEC

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the
Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats." BANAT
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a
motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same
day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can
the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August
2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law
which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the
two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps
in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is
the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the
two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to
a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of
seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate
is entitled.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-
22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.
In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941
also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A.
No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the computation of
seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula
propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5
3
of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of party-list
representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties
are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in
2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear
expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it
to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an
average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only
obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major
parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their
members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8
out of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987
Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this
systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless
sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate
our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we
will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the
Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list system.
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)
However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote required for
entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list
system presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine
Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective
expressed in the enabling law, to allow the peoples broadest representation in Congress,the raison detre for the
adoption of the party-list system.
Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th
Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can
never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than
50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for
such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate
concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating
in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative
body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to
an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given
by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace
with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote
requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is,
in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But
when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional
provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of
realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an
inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional
provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that
renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

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Case No. 4
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised
is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered
it justiciable.
2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so
as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a
trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court
decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court
ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

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Case No. 5
G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an
effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013
party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled,
among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations
or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines
which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the
party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral
parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the
Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition of parties."
Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political
partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party.
A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two
criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or
more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
6
and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-
economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include
the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by
this Court.
Petitions Granted

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Case No. 6

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa v. Comelec

Petitioners: Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM)

Respondents: Commission on Elections
Topic: House of Representatives
Summary: The petition assails COMELEC for prematurely and erroneously allocating additional seats to certain party-list
groups proclaimed as initial winners in the 2013 automated elections. The Court ruled that the COMELEC did not err in
the allocation of additional seats because it is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining
uncanvassed returns will not affect the result of the elections and COMELECs allocation of additional seats was in
accordance with the BANAT ruling.

Facts:
Petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the respondent COMELEC for grave abuse of discretion in
prematurely and erroneously allocating additional seats to certain party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners
in the 2013 automated elections
Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the national and local
elections held on May 13, 2013.
On May 24, 2013, COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list groups which obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast
for the party-list system and were thus entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
Petitioners arguments:
o COMELECs allocation of additional seats for those two-percenters and 38 other groups proclaimed as
initial winners greatly prejudiced its interest and those other parties or organizations as potential
winners
o Proclamation was hasty and premature because at the time the canvassing was still ongoing, there were
still uncanvassed and untransmitted results from Mindanao, uncanvassed overseas and local absentee
votes and results from special elections.
o Projected figures of COMELEC were difficult and impracticable considering there existed a considerable
number of untransmitted results due to breakdown and malfunctioning of the PCOS machines.
o Allocation of votes did not conform with Sec 11, RA 7941 and BANAT product of the percentage of
votes multiplied by additional seats available is not an integer
OSGs comment:
o COMELEC faithfully adhered to the procedure prescribed in BANAT. Party-list groups with products of
less than one were still allocated seats depending on their rank and availability of seats.
o Votes yet to be canvassed did not materially affect the results of the elections

Issue: WoN COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for the 38 party-list candidates
proclaimed as winners in the May 13, 2013 elections
NO
COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining uncanvassed election returns will
not affect the result of the elections
o Sec 233, Omnibus Election Code authorizes the board of canvassers to proclaim winning candidates in
cases of delayed or lost election returns if the missing returns will not affect the results of the election
o Barbers v. Comelec
o There was no significant change in the rankings as per the latest canvass and therefore COMELEC had
sufficient basis for proclaiming the initial winners and reserving only five buffer seats
o No competent evidence had been presented by petitioner in support of its allegations on irregularities
and glitches in the POCS machines
o Factual question of number of uncanvassed votes should have been raised before the COMELEC because
this Court is not a trial of facts.
o COMELEC enjoys presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty
COMELECs allocation of additional seats for party-list in accordance with ruling in BANAT
o additional seats maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats
o Allocation of additional seats not limited to the two-percenters
o Two steps in the second round of seat allocation
1. Percentage x Remaining Available Seats = whole integer partys share in the remaining available
seats
Remaining available seats = maximum seats reserved under the party-list system (55)
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters (17) = 38
2. We assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed.

8
o Party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation
of additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round.
o Petitioner mistakenly assumed that the statement in BANAT disallowing fractional seats insofar as the
additional seats for the two-percenter in the second rond should also apply to those party-list groups
with less than 2% votes

9
Case No. 7

Benjamin Ligot v. Ismael Mathay

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his
second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of
Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from 7,200.00 to 32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, section
12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the
basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the
rates of pay as provided by law. The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then
Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended
December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for
members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed,
because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of
increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly.
Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office
ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments
to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited
by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in
effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of Ligots colleague, ex-Congressman
Melanio Singson, Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by
enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

10
Case No. 8
Sarmiento vs Mison
156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS: Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the
appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING: Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of
the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of the
CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

11
Case No. 9
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING: No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment
of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the
title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No.
720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon
may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from
a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be
deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services
it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking
privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

12
Case No. 10
COMELEC V. JUDGE QUIJANO-PADILLA and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP.
(2002 Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez)

Pursuant to the Voters Registration Act of 1996, COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the
supply and installation of information technology equipment and ancillary services for the Voters Registration and
Identification System Project. The said Project envisioned a computerized database system or the May 2004 Elections.
PHOTOKINAs winning bid amounted to 6.588 Billion Pesos. COMELEC issued a Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA.
However, under the General Appropriations Act FY 2000, the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs
modernization project was only 1 Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of
Funds were only 1.2 Billion Pesos. COMELEC did not formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Subsequently, PHOTOKINA
filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC. The RTC sided with PHOTOKINA.

The Supreme Court held that mandamus does not lie. The Constitution clearly provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since the bid is beyond the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered
void. Facts RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996) was passed providing for the modernization and
computerization of the voters registration list and the appropriation of funds thereof. Pursuant thereto, COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution approving in principle the Voters Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS
Project). The VRIS Project evisioned a computerized database system for the May 2004 elections. The COMELEC issued
invitations to prequalify and bid for the supply and installation of information technology equipment for the VRIS
Project. Private respondent PHOTOKINA pre-qualified. PHOTOKINA, with its bid in the amount of 6.588 Billion Pesos, was
declared the winning bidder. The parties proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Sadain and Atty. Sta.
Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.

However, under RA 8760, the budget appropriated by Congress for COMELECs modernization projectwas only 1
Billion Pesos and the actual available funds issued by the Chief Accountant of COMELEC was only 1.2 Billion Pesos.
Subsequently, the term of COMELEC Chairman Demetriou and Commissioners Desamito and Dy-Liacco expired.
Appointed their successors were Chairman Benipayo and Commissioners Borra and Tuason, Jr. Chairman Benipayo
announced that the VRIS Project has been set aside. He further announced his plan to re-engineer the entire
modernization project of the COMELEC. Commissioner Sadain submitted a draft of the contract providing a price that
would not exceed the certified available appropriation but covering only Phase 1 of the VRIS Project issuance of
registration cards for 1,000,000 voters in certain areas only. Under the draft, the subsequent completion of the whole
project shall be agreed upon in accordance with the bid Documents and annual funds available for it. PHOTOKINA
wrote several letters to the COMELEC requiring formal execution of their contract, but to no avail. It filed a petition for
Mandamus, Prohibition and Damages against COMELEC and all its Commissioners. The RTC ruled in favour of
PHOTOKINA.

Issue
1) Is a petition for mandamus the proper remedy to enforce contractual obligations? NO.
2) May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its
bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project? NO.

Held/Ratio
Issue 1 Mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. Mandamus never lies to
enforce the performance of private contracts. The remedy, if any, is by an original action in the CFI to compel the city to
pay the agreed price or to pay damages for breach of contract. (Quiogue v. Romualdez) In the present case, what
PHOTOKINA sought to enforce are its rights under the accepted bid proposal. It is worth stressing that mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. Here, the alleged
contract is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is illegal and against
public policy. While there may be cases where the writ of mandamus has been used to compel public officers to
perform certain acts, it will be observed that in these cases, the contracts have been completely performed and nothing
remained to be done except for the government to make compensation (Isada v. Bocar). In the present case, the alleged
contract has not yet been fully performed by PHOTOKINA; and though it avers readiness to perform, COMELEC raised
serious questions as to its validity. COMELEC cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
Issue 2 The contact is patently void and unenforceable. Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI of the Constitution states that no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Thus, in the execution of
government contracts, various agencies must limit their expenditure within the appropriations made by law for each
fiscal year. Complementary to this constitutional provision are pertinent provisions of law and administrative issuances
that are designed to effectuate the said Constitutional mandate. (See Secs. 46 and 47 , Chap. 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V
of the Admin Code.) The existence of appropriation and the availability of funds are indispensible prerequisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The SC cannot accede to PHOTOKINAs contention
13
that there is already a perfected contract. While the SC, in MMDA v. Jancom, held that the effect of an unqualified
acceptance of the offer of the bidder is to perfect the bidder, however such statement would be inconsequential in a
government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise is to allow a public
officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate the government in an amount in excess of the appropriations
for the purpose for which the contract was attempted to be made. This is a dangerous precedent. In the present case,
there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the bidding stage.

The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee is to determine whether the bids comply with the requirements.
The amount of PHOTOKINAs bid is 6.588 Billion Poses. However under the Appropriations Act for that year, the only
fund appropriated was 1 Billion Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds only 1.2 Billion pesos was available.
There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was beyond the
amount appropriated by law. The Committee should have rejected the bid right away. The draft contract submitted by
Commissioner Sadain that provides for a contract price of 1.2 Billion Pesos covers only the Phase 1 of the VRIS Project
(issuance of identification cards for only 1,000,000 voters in specified areas). In effect, the implementation of the
contract will be segmented into several phases. This arrangement is disallowed by the budgetary laws and practices. It is
also disadvantageous to the COMELEC because of the uncertainty that will loom over its modernization project for an
indefinite period of time. The completion of Phase 1 of the VRIS Project would do no good. Entering into a multi-year
contract without a multi-year obligational authority is prohibited by law .

The contract is inexistent and void ab initio. It cannot be validated either by lapse of time or ratification.
PHOTOKINAs remedy is found in Sec. 48 of EO 292, which explicitly provides that any contract entered into contrary to
the legal requirements shall be void, and the officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or
other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if the transaction had been wholly between private
parties. When the contracting officer acts beyond the scope of his legitimate powers, the Government is not bound
under the contract. It would be as if the contract were a private one, where the officer binds only himself, and thus,
assumes personal liability thereunder. The proposed contract is unenforceable as to the Government.

Procedural Issues
1. COMELEC contends that OSG has no standing to file a petition since its legal position is contrary to that espoused by
COMELEC Commissioners. (Note: OSG filed the present petition for certiorari in behalf of then Chairman Benipayo and
Commissioners Borra and Tuason, Jr.) SC: The OSG is an independent institution. Its hands are not shackled to the cause
of its client agency. In the discharge of its task, it must see to it that the interest of the government is upheld.
Furthermore, petitions are also public officials entitled to be represented by the OSG, The OSG is the lawyer of the
government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents.
2. The present petition violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. SC: The said doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In
cases of national interest and of serious implications, the SC never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the
judicial determination of the case. The present case is of national interest involving the disbursement of public funds and
the modernization of the countrys election process.
SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be
entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is
sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure;
SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in the case of a contract for personal service, for
supplies for current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3)
months, or banking transactions of government-owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of
public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the
agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated
for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available
for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate signed by the
proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the
proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose until
the obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.
SECTION 33, RA 8760. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. - In the implementation of multi-year projects, no agency shall
enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational Authority issued by the Department of Budget and
Management for the purpose. Notwithstanding the issuance of the multi-year Obligational Authority, the obligation to
be incurred in any given calendar year, shall in no case exceed the amount programmed for implementation during said
calendar year.

14
Case No. 11

BENSON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 [Section 21, Article 6: Aids in Legislation: On Legislative Investigation]

FACTS: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege
before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies
or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with
regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on
the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they
know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify,
invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in
case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring
their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.

RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The Court has provided that the
allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as
held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of
the principle in appropriate cases." The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.

2. No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to
any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. It appears, therefore, that the
contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group
is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and,
secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private
citizens.

4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the
right of persons should be respected. What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness
testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution
allows him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his
court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness stand completely.

15