Understanding Kant's Distinction Between Free and Dependent Beauty

Understanding Kant's Distinction between Free and Dependent Beauty
Author(s): Philip Mallaband

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Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 206 (Jan., 2002), pp. 66-81
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ThePhilosophical Vol.
52,No.206
Quarterly, 2002
January
ISSN0oo3-8094
UNDERSTANDING KANT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN

FREE AND DEPENDENT BEAUTY
BY PHILIP MALLABAND
I interpret between
Kant'sdistinction freeanddependent beautyina waythatmakes itpossiblefor
tobejudgeddependently
an object beautifulwithoutbeingjudgedfreely
beautiful.Thisis an alter-
nativetotheanalyses
provided byMalcolm BuddandChristopher Janaway, which bothfacea
dilemma becausetheyentailthatan objectmustbejudged freely in order
beautiful tobejudged
Thedilemma
beautiful.
dependently is that thedeterminant
either ofajudgementofdependent beauty
is baseduponnon-aesthetic
criteria(iftheobjectis notfreely orelsethe
beautiful), judgement is
foran account
superfluous ofaesthetic value.My analysis ofthedistinction
allowsbothkinds of
beauty roleina theory
toplaya meaningful ofaesthetic
value.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is my purposein thispaper to challengetwo receivedinterpretations of
Kant's distinction in ?I6 of the Critique
of]udgementbetween freebeauty and
dependentbeauty.' The picturepaintedby Malcolm Budd is one in which
the distinctionis takento be betweenkindsofjudgement.A judgementof
freebeautyis a singular(pure)judgementof taste,and a judgementof de-
pendentbeautyis a complexjudgementmade up froma purejudgement
of taste and a judgementof goodnessof kind. Christopher Janawaycon-
ceives of the distinction as holdingbetweena judgementwhose groundis
the subject'saesthetic
pleasureand a judgementwhosecomplexgroundis an
aesthetic
pleasure and an intellectual pleasure. I considerthese analysesto-
gether,because the same dilemmaarisesforeach: eitherdependentbeauty
is a conceptsuperfluous foran aesthetictheory,or else it is a subspeciesof
freebeauty.The dilemmais a directconsequenceof the inabilityof these
accountsto deal withthe possibility thatan objectmay be judged depend-
ently beautiful but not judged freelybeautiful.Given that an interesting
I See M. Budd,'Delightin theNaturalWorld:Kant on theAesthetic Appreciationof
Nature:PartI: NaturalBeauty',British 38 (1998),pp. i-I8; C. Janaway,
ofAesthetics,
Journal
'Kant's Aesthetics
and the EmptyCognitiveStock',ThePhilosophical
Quarterly,47 (g997),
to Critique
pp. 459-76.References aretothetranslation
ofJudgement byJ.C.Meredith (Oxford
UP, 1952)-
? The Editorsof ThePhilosophical
Quarterly, PublishedbyBlackwellPublishers,
2oo002. io8 CowleyRoad, Oxford
ox4 yJF,UK, and 350
Main Street,Malden,MA02148,USA.

KANT'SDISTINCTIONBETWEENFREEANDDEPENDENTBEAUTY 67
distinction oughtnotto renderdependentbeautyredundant,and thatthere
is a lack of evidencein the Critique forthe treatment
ofJudgement of depend-
ent beautyas a subspeciesof freebeauty,I offeran interpretation which
allows that an object may be judged to be dependentlybeautifulbut not
freelybeautiful,and whichdoes not analysedependentbeautyjudgements
as complexjudgements,or as based on complexgrounds.
II. A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KINDS OF OBJECT
This is how Kant introducesthedistinction

(?I6, p. 72):
Thereare twokindsofbeauty:freebeauty(pulchritudo vaga),or beautywhichis merely
dependent(pulchritudo The first
adhaerens). presupposesno conceptofwhattheobject
shouldbe; the seconddoes presupposesuch a conceptand, withit, an answering
perfectionoftheobject.Those ofthefirst kindare said to be (self-subsisting)
beauties
of thisor thatthing;the otherkindof beauty,beingattachedto a concept(con-
ditionedbeauty),is ascribedto objectswhichcomeundertheconceptofa particular
end.
He goes on to illustratethis by contrastingthe kinds of object that are
judged in termsoffreebeautywiththosetypically
typically judged in terms
ofdependentbeauty.He first givesus theseinstances:
... designsa la grecque,
foliageforframework or on wall-papers,
etc.,have no intrinsic
meaning;theyrepresent nothing- no objectundera definite
concept- and are free
beauties.We may also rankin the same class what in musicare called fantasias
(without a theme),and,indeed,all musicthatis notsettowords.
And then
...thebeauty
ofa man(including
underthisheadthatofa man,woman, orchild),
the
beautyofa horse,or ofa building
(suchas a church, or summer-
palace,arsenal,
a concept
house),presupposes oftheendthatdefines whatthethinghastobe,and
ofitsperfection;
consequently and is therefore
merelyappendant[dependent]
beauty.
This looks as if Kant is claimingthat wallpapermay be freelybeautiful
because ofsome intrinsicfeatureofthewallpaper,and thata churchmaybe
dependently beautiful
because of some otherintrinsic
feature.Withregard
to this,Paul Guyerwrites
[Kant]speaksof'thebeauty'ofa humanbeing,horse,or buildingas presupposing a
conceptofpurposeand perfection, as ifthesethingscouldbe beautiful
onlyin con-
nectionwithsucha concept,or as ifthenatureoftheseobjectsthemselves required
thattheybejudgedas dependentbeauties.2
2 P.
Guyer,KantandtheClaimsofTaste(HarvardUP, 1979),p. 249-
C The Editorsof ThePhilosophical 2002
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68 PHILIPMALLABAND
Of course an interpretation accordingto which the distinctionis con-

struedin termsof objectivefeaturesof objectswould hardlybe trueto the
spiritof Kant's essentiallysubjectivisttheoryof aestheticvalue. One does
not just discoverwhat propertiessome object possessesand use thisas a
basis foran aestheticjudgement.Perhaps our insistenceshould ratherbe
upon a storythatexplainswhypossessionof certainpropertiesdetermines
an object to be considereda candidatefora judgementof freebeauty('an
F-object'),and whycertainotherpropertiesdeterminean objectto be con-
sidereda candidatefora judgementofdependentbeauty('a D-object').
What can be inferred fromtheabove passagesabout thedistinction Kant
is drawing?There are severalpossibilities.The firstis thatthe difference is
betweenthe meaninglessand the meaningful. The idea would be thatifan
objecthas no meaningthenitis an F-object,whereasifit is meaningful then
it is a D-object.However,sincehorsesare givenas D-objectsand are essen-
tiallymeaningless,thiscannotbe the groundforthe distinction. (We might
make theweakerclaim thatit is necessaryforsomethingto be an F-object
thatit is meaningless.)Nor is thepointto distinguishbetweenthepurpose-
less and thepurposeful, forwallpaperhas a purpose.(Holdingthata lack of
purpose is sufficient
forclassification as an F-object,but not necessary,is
consistent withKant's illustrations.)
Kant providesfurther evidenceforthedistinctionhe has in mind(p. 72):
Flowersare freebeautiesof nature.Hardlyanyonebut a botanistknowsthe true
natureof a flower,and even he, whilerecognizing in the flowerthe reproductive
organoftheplant,paysno attentionto thisnaturalend whenusinghistastetojudge
ofitsbeauty.
So a floweris an F-object (a candidate for a positivejudgementof free
beauty).It seemsthatKant is makingthisclaim on the assumptionthatwe
can judge its beautywithoutrecognizingits true nature(or the functions
of its constituent
parts).A flower(truistically)
has a truenature,and is an
F-object. But now ifwe contrast
a flower
with a church,bothare constituted
by elements defined in functional
terms,and yetthe formeris a candidate
fora judgementof freebeauty,and the latterfora judgementin termsof
dependentbeauty.In orderto see whythismightbe thecase, letus see ifthe
distinctioncouldbe groundedin a differencebetweenkindsofjudgement.
III. A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR DEPENDENT BEAUTY
As I shallmakeclearin thefollowing
sections,bothBudd andJanawayhold
thattheconditionsformakinga judgementoffreebeautymustbe satisfied
if
? The Editorsof ThePhilosophical 2002
uarterly,

KANT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN FREE AND DEPENDENT BEAUTY 69
one is to make a judgementofdependentbeauty.(The important difference
betweenthesetwoaccountswillbecome apparentin ?V.) The generalworry
I wishto expresshere concernsthe potentialredundancyof the conceptof
dependentbeauty.If we wantbothkindsof beautyin our aesthetictheory,
thenwe mustbe able to makethesetwoclaims:
(a) All dependentlybeautifulobjectsare aesthetically

valuable
(b) All beautiful
freely are
objects aesthetically valuable.
And if a positivejudgement of free beauty is necessaryfor a positive
judgementofdependentbeauty,thenwe get
(c) All dependently
beautifulobjectsare freely
beautiful.
So ifwe are enquiringinto o's aestheticvalue, we mightask 'Is o depend-
entlybeautiful?'.In orderto answerthis,we need to see whethero is freely
beautiful.If it is, thenwe can inferfrom(b) thato is aesthetically valuable
withoutconsideringfurther whethero is dependently beautiful.Hence (a) is
redundantin a theoryof aestheticvalue (althoughit may stillbe true).We
can onlyassigna roleto (a) ifwe acceptthato maybe dependently beautiful
withoutbeingfreelybeautiful:i.e.,we mustdeny(c). But if(c) is a falsehood,
then any account of the Kantian distinction that entailsthe truthof that
claimmustbe invalid.
Are thereindependentreasonsforaccepting(c)? Well,we could enquire
into what the circumstances mustbe forus to be willingto assertthatall
dependently beautifulobjectsare also freelybeautiful.'All Fs are Gs' maybe
truefordifferent reasonsas different relationshold betweenF and G. For
instance, if F = G, then the statement is true.However,Kant mustbe at the
very least making the minimal claim that dependentbeautyis not identical
withfreebeauty.The generalformis also trueifF is a subspeciesof G. So
'All scarletobjectsare red' is truenotbecause ofan identity relationholding
betweenthe coloursscarletand red, but because scarletis a subspeciesof
red. The statementis informative because redis a more generaltermthan
scarlet.There is no evidence to suggest,however,that Kant intendedhis
notion of dependentbeauty to be a subspeciesof freebeauty:indeed he
writes(p. 72) 'There are two kindsof beauty:freebeauty(pulchritudo vaga),
or beauty which is merelydependent(pulchritudo adhaerens)',ratherthan
'There is a kindofbeauty- freebeauty,a subspeciesofwhichis dependent
beauty'.An aesthetictheorymay be hierarchically structured - the claim 'o
is aesthetically valuable' is a more generalclaim than,say, 'o is beautiful'
(o maybe aesthetically valuable in virtueofbeingsublime).3And theremay
3 Some mightdeny that 'is aestheticallyvaluable' picks out a concept different
from'is
beautiful':see MaryMothersill,
BeautyRestored(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),ch. 9.
C The EditorsofThePhilosophical 2002
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70 PHILIP MALLABAND
be subspeciesof (free)beautysuch as gracefulnessor dynamicism(although

the judgement 'o is aestheticallyvaluable in virtue of being dynamic'
valuable overall,
requiresa protantoclause,since o may not be aesthetically
givenitsgarishcolours).But thenotionofdependentbeautydoes notbelong
in thesame classas theseterms.
The alternativeis to deny that a positivejudgementof freebeauty is
necessaryfora positivejudgementof dependentbeauty.If thisis our strat-
egy,thenaccordingto theinterpretation ofdependentbeautyjudgementsas
beingin some sensecomplex,an objectmaybe judged dependently beauti-
fulon thegroundthattheotherjudgement(whateveritmightbe) is positive.
Fromsucha clause as we are givenwhenKant writes(p. 73) thatdependent
beauty'presupposesa conceptof theend thatdefineswhatthethinghas to
be, and consequentlyof itsperfection',it seemsnaturalto supposethatifa
of
judgement dependentbeauty is a complex,thenthe secondjudgementis
oftheobject'sgoodnessofkind.
IV. BUDD'S ANALYSIS OF THE KANTIAN DISTINCTION
Budd considersthejudgementof dependentbeautyto be a complexjudge-

ment, in which the aestheticaspect is not to be distinguishedfroma
judgementof freebeauty.And the otheraspectis a judgementof goodness
ofkind.He writes(p. io):
Kant does notconstrue 'beautiful' as a predicative
adjectivein thejudgementthato is
a beautiful K, in thesensethathe does notanalysethisjudgement- thejudgement
thato is dependently beautiful (as a K) - as thecombination ofthejudgement thato is
a K and thejudgementthato is beautiful. Ratherhe analysesitas thecombination of
thejudgementthato is a goodspecimenofkindK and thejudgement thatthesensory
manifoldof o has a beautifulform.In otherwords,'o is a beautifulK' = 'o is a
qualitatively perfectK and o is [freely] wherethefirstconjunct(likethe
beautiful',
second) is assertedon the basisof the lookof o.
In otherwords,thejudgement'o is a beautifulobject of kind K' breaks
downintothetwoindependent
judgements
(i) o is a perfectexampleof kindK, wherethismeans is thato is perfectly
well suitedto performthe functionthatan object of kindK performs,
e.g., o is a perfectexample of a chair onlyif it can supportsomeone's
weightwithoutcollapsing(in other words, the notion of qualitative
perfection is a notionofgoodnessofkind)
(ii) The formoftherepresentation ofo is beautiful.

O0Qarterl,

If Budd wereto claimthatthejudgementoffreebeautyis notnecessaryfor

a positivejudgementof dependentbeauty,then thatthe object is a good
instanceof itskindwould be sufficient fora positivejudgementin termsof
dependentbeauty. If we want to make thissufficiencyclaim,and stillhold
(a), that of
judgements dependentbeauty are aestheticjudgements,thenwe
shallend up withsome strange-looking of
examples beauty,whichcould be
A
supposed counter-examples. particularcommon European toad might
be a good exampleof a toad - verywartyskin;theabilityto inflateitselfto
deter potentialpredators;stronglimbs; big eyes. But such a toad is not
beautiful.(In factitis likelyto be ugly.)
What are the non-subjective groundsforthejudgementof goodnessof
kind?We mightsay thatit is necessarythata good tokenof kindK must
possesspropertiesP, Q and R. (This seemsa naturalway of accountingfor
goodnessof kind.)Is o a good instanceof kindK? Yes, ifit possessesP, Q
and R. No, ifthisis notthecase. But a necessaryelementofKant's account
of what makes a judgementaestheticis that it is based on a subjective
ground.We do notjust investigate whatpropertiesan object has, compare
thesewitha listof good-makingcharacteristics forobjectsof thatkind,and
inferthatitis beautiful.So unlesswe tella moreinvolvedstoryabout how a
judgementof goodnessof kind may have a subjectiveground,we are not
entitledto claimthatan objectwhichis notfreelybeautifulmaybe depend-
entlybeautiful.
Budd agrees(p. 9) thatan object'sbeinga good exampleofitskindis not
sufficient for that object to be dependentlybeautiful(in other words a
positivejudgementoffreebeautyis necessary):
This is easy to see fromthe factthatit is possiblethatnothingof kindK is, or is
experienced by thejudgingsubjectas being,beautiful - as, perhaps,withspidersor
octopi.
So Budd avoids the possibilityof strangecounter-examples. However,in
doing so, he subscribes to (c), and hence his interpretation the riskof
runs
entailingthatdependentbeauty is a redundant aestheticconcept.Therefore
Budd mustprovidea reasonformakingthedistinction: he mustprovidean
accountofthereasonfordrawingtheKantiandistinction in thefirst
place.
It would be simplerto claim thato has aestheticvalue (is judged freely
beautiful)and thato is a good exampleofitskind.Whyconfusetheissueby
makingthe claim thato is dependently beautiful?Perhapsin some circum-
stancesitwouldbe usefulto saythatthecompoundjudgementofdependent
beautyis an appropriateone to make.It could be used as shorthandforthe
twosimplejudgements.Butwhycall itan aesthetic judgement?Whethero is
a good example of its kind may be determinedby establishingwhether
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72 PHILIP MALLABAND
o possessesthe propertieswhicha good exampleof itskindwould possess.

Accordingto Kant, a judgement(be it complexor simple)whichinvolvesa
referenceto a groundotherthan the groundingin the hedonicresponseis
a flawedaccount of aestheticvalue. Budd's analysisdoes this,and hence
suffers as a result.
It is likelythatsomeone sympathetic to Budd's analysiswould replyby
claiming that the ground forthe aesthetic componentof thejudgementof
is
dependentbeauty subjective; hence this givesus reason to call the com-
plexjudgement aesthetic. The problem seems to be this:ifa judgementcan
be determinedby non-subjective grounds, then thatjudgementis notof the
right kind to be called an aesthetic judgement.And since a freelybeautiful
object may be judged negativelyin termsof dependentbeauty on the
of
grounds non-subjective criteria,thatjudgementis notan aestheticone. A
response to this mighturge that if the judgementof goodness of kind is
determinedsomehow by a subjectiveground,then both aspects of the
complexjudgementwould have subjectivegrounds;hence thejudgementof
dependentbeautyis oftherightkindto be called aesthetic.Budd does go on
(p. II) to discussthepossibility thatthejudgementofgoodnessofkindcould
be groundedin thehedonicresponseto knowingthato is a good exampleof
itskind,butinsiststhat
... seeinga natural
itemas beinga qualitatively ofitskindimplies
instance
perfect
neither of thetwoforms of delight
thatmightbe occasioned by itsqualitative
perfection:pleasurethattheitemis a qualitatively
perfect
specimenofkindK or
pleasure intheitem's
qualitative as a K.
perfection
Hence sinceBudd makesexplicithis claim thatthejudgementof goodness
ofkindneed nothave a subjectiveground,myargumentabove stands.4
So it seemsthat,as faras Budd is concerned,everyjudgementofbeauty,
be itfreeor dependentbeauty,has as itsaestheticelementa purejudgement
of taste- in otherwords,a judgementoffreebeauty.But thisanalysisdoes
not provideany insightintothe reasonformakingthe Kantian distinction.
If the onlydifference is as Budd suggests,thenthe distinctionis due simply
to the factthatsometimeswe recognizethatthe objectof appreciationis a
good example of its kind,and sometimeswe do not. Perhaps we would
expect that the groundingof the distinctionin the (purported)difference
betweenthe actual judgementsshould provideus withreasonswhy,say,
flowersare F-objects and churches are D-objects. Kant describes the
judgementof freebeautyas a 'pure' judgementof taste,so any aesthetic
4Budd does acknowledge(p. 2) that according to Kant 'an aestheticjudgement is a
judgementwhose "determining
ground"cannotbe otherthan"subjective",whichmeans that
itsdetermining
groundcannotbe otherthanthefeelingofpleasureor displeasure'.
C The EditorsofThePhilosophical 2002

Quarterly,

judgementmusthave at itshearta judgementoffreebeautywhichis based

upon nothingbut the hedonic response in the subject caused by a
conceptuallythinexperienceof the object.This does notimplythatwe can
have experienceswhichhave no conceptualcontent.And ifBudd is correct,
thejudgementof dependentbeautyis the complexof a judgementof free
beauty and a judgementof goodness of kind. If we do not considerthe
object'sfunctionor purpose,then,by default,we can be judgingit onlyin
termsof freebeauty;hence it is possibleto judge one and the same object
in termsoffreebeautyand in termsofdependentbeauty;hencetheattempt
to categorizeobjectsas either
F-objectsorD-objectsis misplaced.
Kant writes(?I6, p. 74):
In respectofan objectwitha definiteinternal
end a judgementoftastewouldonlybe
pure wherethe personjudgingeitherhas no conceptof thisend, or else makes
abstractionfromit in hisjudgement.But in cases likethis,althoughsuch a person
shouldlaydowna correct judgementoftaste,sincehe wouldbe estimatingtheobject
as a freebeauty,he wouldstillbe foundfaultwithbyanotherwhosaw nothingin its
beautybuta dependentquality(i.e.,who lookedto theend oftheobject)and would
be accusedby himof falsetaste,thoughbothwould,in theirown way,be judging
correctly.
So whenI say 'o is freelybeautiful'and you say 'o is dependently beautiful',
it is possibleforus both to be correct.It may be just thatI have made a
pure judgementof taste,and you have made a complexjudgement:you
have judged o to be freelybeautifuland to be a good instanceof itskind.
(I, notbeinga botanist,mightjudge thisflowerto be freelybeautiful,and a
botanistmightjudge it to be dependently beautiful.)So now we see whywe
mustappreciatethetruenatureof an objectin ordertojudge it in termsof
dependentbeauty- withoutknowinganythingabout o, we shall not be in
a positiontojudge it as a good instanceof itskind,and thisjudgementis a
necessaryelementofthecomplexjudgementofdependentbeauty.
If Budd is correct,then,it is notpossibleforan objectto be judged to be
dependentlybeautifulwithoutbeingjudged freelybeautiful.There are two
questionsthatrequireanswering:(a) does Kant intenditto be thecase thato
could be dependentlybeautifulwithoutbeing freelybeautiful?(b) Should
Kant hold thatthisis a possibility? We have alreadyseen thatKant writes
thata churchhas 'merely appendant [dependent]beauty' (myitalics).It is
naturalto inferfromthisthatthe fullclaim is thatthe aestheticvalue of a
church consistsnot in being freelybeautiful,but in being dependently
beautiful.This is to say thatit is onlyonce we have understoodthato is a
church,and thatchurcheshave particularfunctions, thatwe can judge it to
be beautiful(henceitcan be judged onlyin termsofdependentbeauty).
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74 PHILIP MALLABAND
Kant goes on
(?I6, p. 73)
Much mightbe added to a buildingthatwouldimmediately please theeye,wereit
notintendedfora church.A figuremightbe beautiful withall mannerofflourishes
and lightbut regularlines,as is done by theNew Zealanderswiththeirtattooing,
werewe dealingwithanything but the figureof a humanbeing.And hereis one
whoseruggedfeatures might softened
be and givena morepleasingaspect,onlyhe
has gottobe a man,or is,perhaps,a warrior thathas tohavea warlikeappearance.
It is not at all clear what Kant's claim is. On the one hand, he mightbe
sayingthata churchis freelybeautiful, butwhenthebuildingis cognizedas
a church(as performing the functions of thatkindof building),it is judged
not to be dependently beautiful.It would remainthecase thatthechurchis
judged to be freelybeautiful;hence thejudgementthatit lacks dependent
beautymustderivefromits beingjudged not to be a good instanceof its
kind.This interpretation is consistentwiththe'complex'theory.
However,thepassage maybe reinterpreted. Kant could be claimingthat
a buildingwould be freelybeautifulbut forthe factthatit is a church.It
mightbe the case that we would judge a building'sinteriorto be freely
beautifulif(Kant's own example)it is decoratedwithwallpaperof typeW.
(Assumethisis the onlyway by whichan interiorcan be freelybeautiful.)
And buildingC (whichis a church)is not decoratedwith W; therefore the
lack of W is citedas preventing a positivejudgementof freebeauty.How-
ever,whenwe come to appreciatethefunctions ofa church,we realizethat
decorating it with W would be quite inappropriate;hence we are setting
unattainable(false)standards- we shouldnotbe lookingforWin a church.
And giventhefunctions of a church,we come to regardthestuccofinishing
as aesthetically valuable, and we reach a positivejudgementin termsof
dependentbeauty.W-dicor would make thechurchfreelybeautiful, but that
wouldbe an inappropriate addition(giventhefunctions ofthebuilding).
Similarly,withregardto Maori tattoos,the idea would be thata decor-
ated Maori could onlybe judged aesthetically valuable once thefunctionof
the tattoosis recognized.Once we realize thatthe man is a warriorand
requiresa 'warlikeappearance', then the functionof the tattoosbecomes
apparent,and we can make a positivejudgementin termsof dependent
beauty, whereas before we made a negativejudgement in terms of
freebeauty.The pointis notthata churchcan onlybe aesthetically valuable
as a church,but thatone needs to have the cognitionthata particularbuild-
ingis a churchifone is to makea positiveaesthetic judgementofit.
One finalillustration.The mayfly is a smallinsect.It cannotflyfar,and is
a weak flier;manyliveonlyforlessthana day,so thatoftentheydie before
producingany offspring. Withoutthese considerations, one would not be
? The Editors of The PhilosophicalQ2arterly,

200oo2

inclinedto judge theseinsectsas beautiful:theyhave dull colorations,are
small,and are barelydistinguishable by the laymanfromcountlessother
insects.However,when in possessionof thesecognitionsabout the mayfly,
one mightperceivethe insectto possessa rarefragility, and thusjudge it to
be aestheticallyvaluablein virtueofthis.So themayfly could be considered
to possessa propertythatis a bad-makingpropertyforinsects(extremely
shortlifespan),but which is the ground for the good-makingaesthetic
property(rare fragility) which groundsa positiveaestheticjudgement.In
otherwords,my claim is thatthe mayflyis an object which is not freely
beautiful(a conceptually thinexperienceofitdoes notcause theappropriate
hedonicresponse),and yetis dependently beautiful.
The upshotof thissectionis as follows.If we interpret thejudgementof
dependentbeauty as a complexjudgementinvolving an aestheticelement
(judgement of freebeauty) and another element (judgement goodnessof
of
kind), then we face a dilemma: either the notion of dependentbeautyis
superfluous for an aesthetic theory(if positivejudgementof freebeauty
a
is necessaryfor a positivejudgementofdependentbeauty);or else we could
make a judgementof dependentbeauty on non-aestheticgrounds(if a
positivejudgementof freebeautyis not necessaryfora positivejudgement
of dependentbeauty),in which case it is not a genuine aestheticjudge-
ment.In eithercase Kant's reason forintroducingthe distinction has not
been explained.I have made the suggestion(to be builtupon in the last
section)thatKant oughtto be holdingthatan object may be dependently
beautifulwithoutbeingfreely beautiful.
V. JANAWAY'S ANALYSIS OF THE KANTIAN DISTINCTION
Janaway'spositionin 'Kant's Aestheticsand the EmptyCognitiveStock',

portrayedschematicallyin his Figures6 and 7 (pp. 472, 474, reproduced
here),is thattheKantian distinction
is based upon a difference
betweenthe
S's experienceof
in which Ss pleasure
(=-S'sconsciousnessofformal
The freeplay of S's imag- caus or subjectivepurposiveness
in
inationand understanding thepresentation of o)
accompanies is theevidential
S's cognitionofoas falling groundfor
underconceptsF, G, H, ... S's judgement(oftaste)thato is
beautiful(= imputationofuniversal
pleasurein theexperienceof o)
Figure6. Fullerpicture
Janaway's ofthejudgement
oftaste
? The Editors of The PhilosophicalQuarterly,

o2002

76 PHILIP MALLABAND
S's experienceofo
in which
S's aestheticpleasure
The freeplayof S's imag- causes (=S's consciousnessofformal
inationand understanding in
or subjectivepurposiveness
of
thepresentation o)
accompanies
S's cognitionofo as falling
underconceptsF, G, H,..
S's intellectual
pleasure
S's beliefthatF, G, H, .. cause (= S's likingforo as perfectly
purposeP
objectsfulfil fulfillingpurposeP)
S's desire that purpose are jointly
evidential
P be fulfilled grounds
for
S's judgementthato
is dependently
beautifhl
Figure7. Thejudgement
Janaway's ofdependent
beauty
evidentialgroundsforeach typeofjudgement.So whereasthegroundfora

judgementoffreebeautyis simplythe appropriatehedonicresponsecaused
by the experienceof the object'saestheticqualities,thejoint groundsfora
judgementofdependentbeautyare thehedonicresponse(Janaway'saesthetic
pleasure)to the aestheticqualitiesof the object,and thepleasurecaused by
thecognitionthattheobjecto is ofkindK, thebeliefthatobjectsofkindK
fulfil
purposeP, and thedesirethatpurposeP shouldbe fulfilled (intellectual
pleasure).(And in addition,ifwe are to introducecriteriaforcorrectness, it
mustbe the case thato is indeed of kindK, and thatobjectsof kindK do
perform purposeP.)
Primafacie,thisanalysislooks good. It retainsthe idea thatan aesthetic
judgementmusthave subjectivegrounds(and mustnothave non-subjective
grounds);and a relatedpointis thatJanawaydoes notreducethejudgement
of dependentbeautysimplyto a judgementofgoodnessofkind- ifG is the
groundforjudgingo to be freelybeautiful, thenthejudgementofo in terms
of dependentbeautymusthave G as one of its grounds:' ... it looks as if
judgementsof dependentbeautycontainall the conditionsof freebeauty
withinthem'(Janaway,p.
473).
Even withinJanaway'sanalyses,thisclaimis onlypartlytrue.Yes, all the
positiveconditionsthat requiresatisfaction fora judgementto be of free
beautyappear in Fig. 7, but what about the negativeconstraint thatit is a
conditionof freebeautythatthereshouldbe nothingmore to a judgement
than,say,thatwhichappearsin Fig. 6? In otherwords,it is a conditionofa
judgementof freebeautythatexactlythe kindof additionsmade so as to
? The Editors of The PhilosophicalQuarterl,,2002

formFig. 7 oughtnotto be present.So we maysay thatJanawayis claiming

thatsatisfaction of the positiveconditionsof a judgementof freebeautyis
necessaryfora judgementofdependentbeauty.
AccordingtoJanaway,whatmay countas theevidentialgroundsforthe
judgementof dependentbeautyneed not take the formof two pleasures
whichare independent, butitmaybe thatthereare twoaspectsto thesingle
groundingpleasure.Janawayquotes Mothersill(Beauty p. 297): 'To
Restored,
have enjoyedthe food,thewine,the company,the conversation, is to have
enjoyedthe dinnerparty'.But it is not necessarythatone mustenjoyeach
elementof the dinnerpartyin orderto enjoy the partyas a whole. One
mighthave enjoyedit withoutenjoyingthe food,or withoutenjoyingthe
conversation.However,the partycannot be judged a success unless this
judgementis groundedin some pleasurablestateof the party-goer. If the
analogy is to go through, thenit could be thecase thatthesubject'saesthetic
displeasure(thisperhapscould be used as a groundforjudgingtheobjectto
lack aestheticvalue) is outweighedby the intellectualpleasure. So a
subject could judge an object as dependentlybeautiful,despite having
a responseto theobject'saestheticqualitieswhich,ifit had notbeen accom-
panied by an intellectualpleasure,would have groundeda judgementof
aestheticdisvalue.But thisis inconsistent withJanaway'sclaim thatsatis-
factionof the conditionsfora judgementof freebeautyis necessaryfora
judgementof dependentbeauty.(So we oughtto be carefulwhenusingthis
analogy.)
What is the statusof a judgementof dependentbeauty?Is it an aesthetic
judgementor not?It certainlylooks as ifthe introduction of the subjective
ground- intellectualpleasure - lends weightto the suggestionthat it is
aesthetic,but thiswould relyon theidea thatifa judgementis groundedin
pleasure(i.e.,ifthejudgementhas subjectivegrounds),thenit is an aesthetic
judgement.However,Kant saysin ?11(p. 62)
... thejudgementoftastecannotreston anysubjectiveend as itsground... the
judgement oftaste
isan aesthetic
and nota cognitive
judgement.
The thoughtis that not just any subjectiveground counts as a suitable
groundforan aestheticjudgement.So it could be the case thatintellectual
pleasureis not therightkindof subjectiveground.But,it could be claimed,
the notionof a judgementof dependentbeautywhichKant had in mindis
such thatit is not a purejudgementof taste,and the impurity derivesfrom
the factthatintellectual pleasureis not relevantly
aesthetic.But ifthe claim
is thatintellectualpleasureis not a groundfora pure aestheticjudgement,
then given that the aestheticnatureof a judgementof dependentbeauty
derives fromthe satisfactionof the conditionsfor a judgement of free
? The Editors of The Philosophical 2002
Quarterly,

78 PHILIPMALLABAND
beauty,the reasonfordistinguishing betweentwokindsof aestheticvalue is

lost.
My nextworryconcernsthe thirdconditionforintellectual pleasure(S's
desirethatpurposeP shouldbe fulfilled). Suppose two subjectsare viewing
the same church.Both have the appropriatehedonic responseto the aes-
theticqualities,both know that the object beforethemis a church,both
understandthe functions performedby a church;but whereasone desires
thatthosefunctionsshouldbe fulfilled, the otherdoes not. Hence the first
judges the church to be dependently beautiful,and the seconddoes not.But
it seemsa serious(open) questionwhetherthe churchitselfis dependently
beautiful.On theJanawayanalysis,the answeris yes and no, dependingon
the individualsmakingthejudgement,and theirdesires.But does not this
relativizationtrivializethenotionofdependentbeauty?Unlesswe can tella
story about the rationalizationof desires- such as thatdesiringsthatsome
purposes should be fulfilledare appropriatedesires,and thatotherdesirings
are not- thenthereis goingto be a question-mark hangingovertheuse of
thenotionofcontingent desirein an accountofaestheticvalue.
Even supposingthat such a coherentstorycan be devised,a problem
remains.It concernstheway in whichtheconceptualcontentoftheexperi-
ence whichformsthe basis forthe aestheticjudgementaffectsthatjudge-
ment.I have previouslyarguedforthe plausibility of the view thatcertain
objects may be judged to be dependentlybeautifulwithoutbeingjudged
freelybeautiful.Again my positionis that the Kantian distinctionwas
devised to account for exactlythose instancesin which a subject,upon
learningwhattheobjectis (thatis by importing a certainconceptualcontent
into the experience),could come to the judgementthat the object does
possess aestheticvalue (is dependentlybeautiful),despite its havingbeen
judged beforetheconceptualimportas notbeingfreelybeautiful.And there
is no way in whichJanaway'sanalysiscan be adapted to allow thisscenario
withoutwholesalechanges. Figs 6 and 7 show that if S's experienceof o
does not cause aestheticpleasurein the case of a judgementof freebeauty
(Fig. 6), thenthereis nothingin Fig. 7 thatallowsthe conceptualimportto
affectthe subject'saesthetichedonicresponse.Yes, the conceptualcontent
mightbe the cause of the subject'sintellectual pleasure;but by itselfthisis
not, by Janaway's own criteria,sufficientfor a positivejudgement of
dependentbeauty.
Althoughthereare fundamentalstructuraldifferences betweenthe two
accountsoftheKantiandistinction whichI have presented,I hope thattheir
similarities are clear. And just as thiswas a problemforBudd, so also the
fact thatJanaway's analysis does not allow for the scenario in which
an object is judged dependentlybeautifulbut not freelybeautiful(whilst
? The Editors of The PhilosophicalQuarter~y,
2002

KANT'SDISTINCTIONBETWEENFREEANDDEPENDENTBEAUTY 79
retainingtheessentialaestheticnatureofsuch a judgement)willprovefatal.
the Kantian dis-
It will be my purpose in the finalsectionto reinterpret
tinctionso thatthisscenariobecomesa possibility.
VI. A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EXPERIENTIAL

GROUNDS FORJUDGEMENTS
I now wantto suggestan entirely plausibleanalysisof the differencewhich

classifiesboth kindsofjudgementas aestheticjudgements.I feelthatboth
Budd and Janawaymake too much of the distinction. This does not mean
I
that shall be attempting to eliminateit,just thatthe two kindsofjudge-
ment may be broughttogetherwithoutlosing the Kantian emphasison
subjectiveground,and yetmaybe sufficiently to merita meaning-
different
fuldistinction.
To beginwith,I make thepresumption thata main tenetofKant's thesis
is that an aestheticjudgementmust have as its (sole) basis a subjective
ground.This mustbe uncontroversial (?I, pp. 41-2):
The judgementof taste,therefore,
is not a cognitive
judgement,and so not logical,
- whichmeansthatit is one whosedetermining
butis aesthetic groundcannot beother
than
subjective.
What thismeans is that in orderto make an aestheticjudgementof o, a
subjectmusthave a hedonicresponseto theexperienceofo. This is because
the rightkind of responseis one that is caused by an experienceof the
object. So the idea is that the subject'sexperienceof o causes a hedonic
response,and this pleasurablestate is the groundfor makinga positive
aestheticjudgementoftheobject.My positionis thatthisis thebroad causal
storythatwe shouldbe tellingto explainthe difference betweenwhat it is
fora judgementto be aestheticand what it is fora judgementto be non-
aesthetic.Details clearlyrequirefillingin: we need to be able to give an
account of what kinds of response would be suitable,but this is the
framework.
The detailon whichI shallconcentrate, as it groundsthe differentiation
I am making,concernsthe kindsof experiencewhichare appropriate.An
experienceis constitutedby a conceptualcomponentand a perceptual(non-
conceptual)component.An appropriateexperienceforthispurpose,then,is
one in which the perceptualelementsare structured in such a way as to
initiatethe causal networkoutlinedabove. In order for the perceptual
elementsto have any structure whatsoever,we mustconcede thatthe ex-
perience containssome conceptualcontent.(Though if one is comfortable
? The Editors of The PhilosophicalQjarter~y,
20oo02

80 PHILIP MALLABAND
with the idea that an experiencecould contain no conceptual content

whatsoeverand stillbe to some extentrepresentational, thenone may take
thatkindof experienceas thebasis forwhatI say aboutjudgementsof free
beauty.)It will thenbe the case thatif a conceptuallythinexperienceof o
causes thehedonicresponse,thenwe can claimthato may be judged freely
beautiful.If,however,such an experiencedoes notcause theresponse,then
if an experiencewithmore substantialconceptualcontentdoes cause the
subjectto have an appropriateresponse,theno maybe judged dependently
beautiful.The conditionsthatrequiresatisfaction fora judgementof o as
freelybeautifulare
(i) S has an experienceE ofo

(ii) o fallsunderthesubstantial conceptC
(iii) E causes S to have a hedonicresponse
(iv) If E causes S to have a hedonicresponse,thenit is not the case thatS
experienceso as fallingunderC.
And thosefora judgementofo as dependently
beautifulare
(i) S has an experienceE ofo

(ii) o fallsunderthesubstantial conceptC
(iii) E causes S to have a hedonicresponse
(iv) If it is not thecase thatS experienceso as fallingunderC, thenit is not
thecase thatE causes S to have a hedonicresponse.
So hereinlies the distinction - a judgementof freebeautyis based on an
experienceof o which does not contain substantialconceptualcontent,a
judgementofdependentbeautyis based on an experienceofo whichdoes.
But is this a plausible analysis?As a psychologicalclaim, it looks un-
deniablethatsometimeswhenwe are makingdescriptions (and evaluations)
we need help in the way of additionalimportedconceptualcontent.So
when we are confronted witha whale shark,and we want to categorizeits
movements, we shall be unable to make an authoritative descriptionon
the basis of a 'conceptuallythin'experience.This is because althoughthe
creaturelookslike a whale,it is in facta shark.And ifour experiencedoes
not containthe contentexpressibleas somethinglike'This is a shark',then
we mightdescribeit as dynamic insteadof cumbersome.
So by 'substantialcon-
ceptual content' I mean that contentpertaining
to thetruenatureoftheob-
ject over and above the conceptsthatallow us to make some sense of the
worldthroughour experiences.5 The idea in myillustration
ofa mayfly was
5Perhapsminimalconceptualcontentcontainsonlythosetheory-neutral
conceptswhichare
observational,in the sense intended by JerryFodor in his 'Observation Reconsidered',
ofScience,
Philosophy 51(1984),pp. 23-43-
Quarterly,

thata conceptuallythinexperienceofa mayfly would notcause us to have a

hedonic response,but an experienceof a mayflywhich included such
specificcontentas 'is a weak flier'and 'is unlikelyto produce offspring'
would have its perceptualelementsstructured in such a way thatit would
cause sucha response.So a mayfly is dependently butnotfreely beautiful.
There are twopointsto make clear. First,myclaim is not thata mayfly
can onlybe beautifulas a mayfly(or as a weak insect),but thatit is only
when an experienceof a mayflyhas specificconceptualcontentthat the
perceptualelementsare so structured as to cause an appropriateresponse.
an
Secondly, appropriateexperience causes a hedonicresponsein virtueof
the structure ofitsperceptualelements,notin virtueofwhateverconceptual
contentitmaycontain,whichis merelyofinstrumental worth.
Kant's talkofmeaningand purpose,then,was a red herring.The pointis
thatif,to cause the appropriatehedonicresponse,an experienceof o must
containsubstantialconceptualcontentpertainingto the truenatureof the
object,theno cannotbe describedas freelybeautiful.But whydoes Kant
giveus theexampleshe does?The answerto thisis notthathorses,churches
and arsenalsare such as to requireour experiencesof themto be concep-
tuallythickifthoseexperiencesare to cause appropriatehedonicresponses.
Kant is makingan empiricalclaim about us. Our mentalstructure is such
thatwe are not disposedto respondwithpleasureto our conceptuallythin
experiencesof these kindsof object,whereaswe are disposed to respond
thusto our conceptuallythinexperiencesofflowers,wallpaperand designs
a la grecque.
So I could come acrossa churchwithoutknowingwhat it was
(whatfunctionit performed). As a result,my conceptuallythinexperience
does not have the kind of perceptualstructureto cause an appropriate
response.Hence I do not judge the buildingbeautiful.However,I later
learn about churchesand come to appreciatetheirfunction.Now when I
experiencethe same buildingas a church,and my experienceis laden
withsubstantialconceptualcontentrelatingto thischurch,the perceptual
elementis so structuredthatI do respondwithpleasureto myexperience.
This analysisis trueto the spiritof Kant's project.If it is not trueto the
letter(in otherwords,ifKant did notintendthatan objectcould be depend-
entlybeautifulbut notfreelybeautiful), thenI proposethatifthedistinction
betweenfreebeautyand dependentbeautyis to be incorporatedusefully
withina theoryof aestheticvalue, then reconstructing it along the lines I
have setforthwillallowtheprojectto be realized.6
ofLeeds
University
6 I am to MatthewKieran forhis commentson an earlierversionofthispaper.
grateful
? The EditorsofThePhilosophical
Quarterly,
2002


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Author(s): Philip Mallaband

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