2016 PREBAR REVIEW NOTES

IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY

- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

A group of islands, including parts of the islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are
closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other
natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic,
political entity or to have historically regarded as an
archipelago.

- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by

one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat

Kalayaan Group of Islands (KGI) and Scarborough
Shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the
baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of
islands.

- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of

Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of
DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of
Palawan.

- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as

scarborough reef, Panatag Shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found
in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the
province of Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of
reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around
with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of
Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire

archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located.
The Philippines essentially claims only the western section
of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.

- RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general

configuration of the archipelago, including the extended
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it
more compliant with the UNCLOS.
- It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS
requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding
the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough
shoal from the main archipelago and classifying them instead
as regime of islands. They excluded from the baselines.
The national territory constitutes a roughly triangular
delineation which excludes large areas of waters within 600
miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine
archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.

- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of

islands or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water
that remain above water during high tide. The principle
forces claimant states over a certain territory to maintain
peace in the area because no country can claim exclusive
ownership of any of these islands. The islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.-

- UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the

Constitutions delineation of internal waters.- Whether
referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of
the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS
III (Article 49[1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over
the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.

- UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of

territory. It is a multi-lateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea use rights over maritime zones (i.e. the territorial waters
(12 nautical miles from the baselines), contiguous zone (24
nautical miles from the baseline), exclusive economic zones
(200 nautical miles from the baselines) and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades
long negotiation among UN members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and
submarine lands along their coasts.

- UNCLOS defines major zones where different standards,

rights and rules are applicable:

- internal waters: all waters landward of the baselines (e.g.

low-water line) and all harbours (Any law in force in the
country, including the common law, shall also apply in its
internal waters and the airspace above its internal waters. The

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 right of innocent passage does generally not exist in the
internal waters.)

- territorial waters: the sea within a distance of 12 nautical

miles (22 km) from the baselines (Any law in force in the
country, including the common law, shall also apply in its
territorial waters and the airspace above its territorial waters.
The right of innocent passage shall exist in the territorial
waters. In the territorial sea, submarines and other
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface
and to show their flag.)

- contiguous zone: the sea beyond the territorial waters but

within a distance of twenty-four nautical miles (~44 km)
from the baselines (Within its contiguous zone and the
airspace above it, the country shall have the right to exercise
all the powers which may be considered necessary to prevent
contravention of any fiscal law or any customs, emigration,
immigration or sanitary law and to make such contravention
punishable.)

- maritime cultural zone: the sea beyond the territorial

waters but within a distance of twenty-four nautical miles (44
km) from the baselines (Subject to any other law the country
shall have, in respect of objects of an archaeological or
historical nature found in the maritime cultural zone, the
same rights and powers as it has in respect of its territorial
waters.)

- exclusive economic zones (EEZ): the sea beyond the

territorial waters but within a distance of two hundred
nautical miles (367 km) from the baselines (Subject to any
other law the country shall have, in respect of all natural
resources in the exclusive economic zone, the same rights
and powers as it has in respect of its territorial waters.)

- continental shelf: comprises the seabed and subsoil of the

submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full

and complete power of a nation within its territories is by
virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy
premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain
of the host State. The ground occupied as embassy premises

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 is not the territory of the foreign State to which the premises
belong.

- Kalayaan Island Group

a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
f) RA 3046 (demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State)
g) RA 5446 (reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah in North Borneo
h) RA 9552

- Scarbororough Shoal Philippine Claim Basis:

1. is based on the juridical criteria established by public

international law on the lawful methods for the
acquisition of sovereignty. Among the criteria
(effective occupation, cession, prescription,
conquest, and accretion), the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has asserted that the
country exercised both effective occupation and
effective jurisdiction over the shoal, which it terms
Bajo de Masinloc, since its independence.

2. The DFA also claims that the name Bajo de Masinloc

(translated as "under Masinloc") itself identifies the
shoal as a particular political subdivision of the
Philippine Province of Zambales, known as
Masinloc. As basis, the Philippines cites the Island
of Palmas Case, where the sovereignty of the island
was adjudged by the international court in favor of
the Netherlands because of its effective jurisdiction
and control over the island despite the historic claim
of Spain. Thus, the Philippines argues that the
historic claim of China over the Scarborough Shoal
still needs to be substantiated by a historic title, since
a claim by itself is not among the internationally
recognized legal basis for acquiring sovereignty over
territory.

3. The Philippine government argues that since the

legal basis of its claim is based on the international
law on acquisition of sovereignty, the Exclusive
Economic Zone claim on the waters around
Scarborough is different from the sovereignty
exercised by the Philippines in the shoal.

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 4. President Ferdinand Marcos, by virtue of the
Presidential Decree No. 1596 issued on June 11,
1978 asserted that islands designated as the Kalayaan
Island Group and comprising most of the Spratly
Islands are subject to the sovereignty of the
Philippines, and by virtue of the Presidential Decree
No. 1599 issued on June 11, 1978 claimed an
Exclusive Economic Zone up to 200 nautical miles
(370 km) from the baselines from which their
territorial sea is measured.

- Key Points on Permanent Court of Arbitrations Verdict

on the PH-China Dispute over Scarborough Shoal: On July
12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal agreed unanimously with the
Philippines. In its award, it concluded that there is no
evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive
control over the waters or resources, hence there was "no
legal basis for China to claim historic rights" over the nine-
dash line. The tribunal also judged that China had caused
"severe harm to the coral reef environment", and that it had
violated Philippines sovereign rights in its exclusive
economic zone by interfering with Philippine fishing and
petroleum exploration, for example restricting the traditional
fishing rights of Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal.

- Basis of claim over Sabbah: under Section 2 of RA 5446-

The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial
sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES

- Republicanism

- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue
Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003;

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 Executive privilege - Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No.
180643, Mach 25, 2008)

- Because the three great powers have been by constitutional

design ordained in this respect, each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within the
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. Thus, the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and
the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law
(Belgica vs. Ochoa).

- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,

et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of

legislative and executive powers in the office of the local
chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded,
so that either department now comprises different and non-
intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a
system of check and balance between the two. The avowed
intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of
its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the
Governor of the executive functions. (Atienza vs.
Villarosa, May 10, 2005).

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro

Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).

Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)

Tests of valid delegation:

1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17,
2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,

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 3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.

- Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice,

GR No. 203335, February 11, 2014- In order to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only
thing to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to prevent the delegation
from running riot.

- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the

country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimente vs.

Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of
customary law (Mejoff vs. Director of
Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no

obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.

- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8,

2016 - Foundlings are likewise citizens under international
law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method

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 requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally
accepted principles of international law include international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
International customary rules are accepted as binding as a
result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and
a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it. "General principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning"
or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
systems generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e.,
the general principles of fairness and justice," and the
"general principle against discrimination" which is embodied
in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights

- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582,

April 8, 2010- At this time, we are not prepared to declare
that these Yogyarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlines in said Principles which are not reflective
of the current state of international law, and do not find basis
in any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Xxx Using even the most liberal lenses, these
Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by
various international law professors, are at best - de lege
refenda- and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
rights, most of which amounts to no more than well-meaning

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 desires, without support of either State practice or opinio
juris.

- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted

principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.

- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever

municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution
or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996
ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it
in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international
law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
[Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,

June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interest.

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- Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of
the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference
with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious
activity.

- Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014-

Conception refers to the moment of fertilization and the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. Xxx Only
those contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
would be prohibited.xxx ection 7 of RH law which excludes
parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had miscarriage is anti-
family and violates Section 12 of Art. II. Also, Section 23(a)
(ii) is unconstitutional as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical
procedures.

- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the countrys
resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of
Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

- Arigo vs Swift, GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014- The general rule

on states immunity from suit applies in this case. First, any
waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to
petitioners claim, the US government could not be deemed
to have waived its immunity from suit.

- Second, the US respondents were sued in their official

capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who have
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
Since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials
would require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds
by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against
the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity in
correlation with the principle of States as sovereign equals

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 par in parem non habet non imperium bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court over their persons.

- The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a

restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to
the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this
rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the
latters internal waters and the territorial sea. Although the US
to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy, the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the traditional uses of
the oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS. As to the non-
ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to
join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with
UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which
considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by the
US of customary international rules on navigation. (Justice
Carpio) Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines
as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It
is thus expected of the US to bear international
responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs.

- As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains

only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions.
Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the respondents for
being immuned from suit, there is no way damages which
resulted from violation of environmental laws could be
awarded to petitioners.

- In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a

criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling on
the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan.

- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local

government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle

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 of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state of an imperium in imperio
(unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing
or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and
hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or
delegate it to local governments.

- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No.

183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory
for independence.

- An association is formed when two states of unequal power

voluntarily establish durable links. Xxx In international
practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been
used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way
to full independence. Xxx The concept of Association is not
recognized under the 1987 constitution.

- Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270- It

should be emphasized that autonomy granted to local
governments is not to be understood as independence.

ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8,

2016- As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-
born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. xxx Domestic
laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted.xxx Foundlings are
likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through
a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. xxx it
has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that

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 even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

- Natural born: Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born

citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling
status is done not by the child but by the authorities.121
Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election
of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act
to perfect it.

- Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No.

195649, April 16, 2013- Citizenship is not a matter of
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the State to its
citizens, It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to ones flag and country.

- The act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts

enumerated in CA No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss
of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. Xxx The
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any
act which violates the oath of renunciation opens citizenship
issue to attack.

- Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007-

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a
foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or
her the privileges of a citizen. Xxx Under current and existing
laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a
citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant
to CA No. 473 , as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization
in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.

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- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino
father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an
Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration
does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship
and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.

- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons

citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions

in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is
effective:
1. the mother of the person making the
election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority.

- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the

evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-
born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion
that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration
of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of
the right to Philippine citizenship.

- The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent.

It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any.

- Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no

specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct
filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts. CA 625- election within reasonable
time is 3 years from reaching the age of majority

- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had

under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the
allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other
time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and
economic necessity.

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- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is
an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b)
of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To
claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age
at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the
parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR.
No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas parents
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity].

- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance

to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the

taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil
registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones

application for repatriation. Supra.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.

If he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born
Filipino.

- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,

amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens
repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those
repatriated.

- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307

SCRA 630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for
naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the
person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign
citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of
candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

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- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the LGC
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. It should suffice if, upon filing of their certificate
of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship.

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009-

The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who
also possesses American citizenship having been born of an
American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for
public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has
applied the twin requirements to cases which involve natural-
born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another
country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In
the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a
natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized
citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No.
9225 do not apply to him.

- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008

Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his
citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply
with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that
the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008

Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual
allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.

- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January

19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs
the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it
does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born
Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general
intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born

1
 Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or
in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in
the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.
Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19,

2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they
are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must
be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as
follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines

shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing
of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The
rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable
because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of

Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens
may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court
and upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore
their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.

- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The

Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international

1
 law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not
applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article
5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality
Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more
than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status
and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in
which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of
the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in
fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but
a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the
outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which
had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated
all his properties on the ground that he was a German national.
Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen,
against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was
more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23,

1989

- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11,

2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep.
Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5,
Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is
not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the
law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress

1
 was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to
dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether
or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not

distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a
Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil
status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA

292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.

- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res

judicata principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as a material

1
 issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by
the Supreme Court.

- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants

Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born
and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for
judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.

- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The

alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status
by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent
Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father.

- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R.

No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and
jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It
is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino

citizens acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in
the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a
renunciation on ones status as a resident of the Philippines.

ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)

- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is

subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law.

- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon

certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act
of 1996).

- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of

residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains

2
 attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile:

1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly
acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any
given time.

- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception

to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.

- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in

the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise
as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

- Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is

synonymous to domicile, not necessarily with a persons home
address. A man may have several places of residence but has only
one domicile. Or he may be a nomad or travelling salesman with
no permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one domicile
for him.

- There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of originthat is,

a child follows the domicile of the parents; 2) domicile by
operation of law; and 3) domicile of choice made freely by a
person of legal age.

- Domicile of choice imports not only the intention to reside in one

fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent for business or
pleasure or for like reasons, one intends to return. Makalintal vs.
COMELEC, July 10, 2003. In short, domicile of choice is a
question of fact. One intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent (animus
revertendi).

2
- Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a persons
domicile: First, everyone must always have one of the three kinds
of domicile; second, once established, a domicile remains the same
until a new one is acquired; and third, a person can have only one
domicile at any given time.

- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC- There are three requisites to

acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new
locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

- Applied to Poe. As a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired

the domicile (and citizenship) of her parents who, according to
generally-accepted principles of law, are presumed to be
Filipinos. So, her domicile of origin is Jaro, Iloilo. After she
married an American and moved to and worked in the United
States, she lost her domicile of origin and followed the domicile of
her husband in America. When she and her husband moved back
for good here after the death of Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a
new domicile of choice in the Philippines. As to when she
acquired it depends, on her clear intention, conduct and
physical presence in the new location.

- In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held

that the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy, [is] decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the Constitutions residence qualification
requirement. The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos
made an honest mistake in writing seven months residence in her
certificate of candidacy for a congressional seat, a period less than
the constitutional requirement of not less than one year for that
position.

- Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held

that residency is not dependent on citizenship because even a
foreigner can establish a Philippine domicile.

- More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a

former Filipino who was naturalized abroad may choose to

2
 reestablish his/her domicile here even prior to the reacquisition of
citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law.

- Said the Supreme Court: [I]n order to acquire a new domicile

by choice, there must concur: 1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, 2) an intention to remain there, and 3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

- Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the

abandonment of a home in Australia, renunciation of Australian
citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and settling
down in Zamboanga Sibugay show an intent to change domicile
for good.

- Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that the

use of an American passport after a renunciation of American
citizenship effectively reverses such renunciation and disqualifies
one who reacquired citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law
from being elected to a public office.

- (References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino

citizens acquisition of permanent resident status abroad constitutes
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The
green card status in the USA is a renunciation of ones status as a
resident of the Philippines.

- But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA

9225 have the effect of restoring his Philippine domicile?

- A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to

stay in the Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence
from the recovered domicile does not have the effect of removing
him from the domicile for as long as he manifests animus manendi
et revertendi (Japzon vs. Ty, January 19, 2009)

ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,

2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule
still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of

2
 election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As
with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he
prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2)
questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the
board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity
and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in
Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.

- Non delegation of legislative power

- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in
its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient
instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public
convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and
efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure
the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet
the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These
are sufficient standards.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere

constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not
bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA
No. 8177.

- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-

Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by filling the details which Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules

2
 issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has
made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual
matters outside of the control of the executive.

- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the

President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to
12% came from Congress and the task of the President is
simply to execute the legislative policy.

- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The

requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected
to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity
violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism
and the rule of presentment. A valid exercise of legislative
power requires the act of both chambers. It can be exercised
neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee
of either or both chambers.

- The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rule-

making authority in implementing and executing
constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are
constitutional powers vested in the Executive that are self-
executory.

- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No.

166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR,
the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative
of the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR

No. 180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the
CHED under RA 7722.

- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008-

Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power
to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is
vested exclusively in Congress.

2
- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.
1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject
of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The
last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of
the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is
certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to
read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec
from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec
virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional
duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups

- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244,

October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC,
March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable
parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total
membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold:
only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes
cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the
House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4)
proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total
number of votes.

- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%

threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found

2
 in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.

- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives

under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall
be observed:

- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from

the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall

no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.

- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not

limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share
in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list
seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply
the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled.

2
- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections:
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that
allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major

political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.

- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should
not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in
the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political
parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can
establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
the same for the urban poor.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the

filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically

2
 prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives
from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number
of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,
remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.

- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling

in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

- ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646,

April 2, 2013- In determining who may participate in the coming
13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC
shall adhere to the following parameters:

- 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

- 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or

organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.

- 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided

they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

- 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized

and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

- 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations

that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties

2
 or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

- 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not

be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

- The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013

partylist elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1)
all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a
track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of
non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

- Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is

no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000
minimum population that must compose legislative district. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative with nothing
mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly situated.

- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25,

2010- In this case, there is no official record that the population of
the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected
prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution.

3
- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April
8, 2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting
standards that the marginalized and underrepresented sector must
demonstrate (1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by
the group; (2) an immutable or distinguishing characteristic,
attribute, or experience that define them as a discrete group; and
(3) present political and/or economic powerlessness.
- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector
has been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against
because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of
violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by
reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added
that the magnitude of opposition against petitioners participation
in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sectors
lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed
legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against
LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.

- LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689)

The history of the provision granting Senators and
Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of

innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.

- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete

freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecnoming of a member thereof
(Osmea vs. Pendatun).

- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard

Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his
election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
PNRC is a private organization merely performing public
functions, and that the PNRC Chairman is not a
government official or employee. Not being a government
office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any
individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of

3
 Congress. NRC is autonomous, neutral and independent of
the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that
does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is
not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC
Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987
Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly serve as the
Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial
position.

Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a

majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not
mean all the members. The base in computing majority is
normally the total membership of the body, within the
coercive power of the House.

Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority

simply means the greater number or more than half. Who
shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate.
(Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and
another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the
Senate President shall be elected by the majority it does
not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority.
The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate
presidency are not necessarily the minority.

- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277

SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation
of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary
rules are mere procedures which may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.

- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The

House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in
any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as

congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his
offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his
case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend
sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and
movement.

3
- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to
shield a member of congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses,
punishable at most by correctional penalties.

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by

Congress to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in
Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a
preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a
member of Congress.

- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The

members of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of
the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of
the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over
electoral contests in which contestant seeks not only to
oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into
office.

- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles;

Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1,
2009- once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over the election
contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications,
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation.

- RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. -

clearly under law and jurisprudence, it is the State thru
its reps. Designated by statute, that may question the
illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization
in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. HRET
no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry
with it authority to delve into the legality of the judgment
of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is
not permissible. (Aug. 23, 2011).

- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates

in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may
assail ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or
disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an

3
 election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the
period provided by the HRET Rules.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10,

2002- Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the 2nd Division. The
said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis
for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the
duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.

- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the

validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2 nd Division was
seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his
motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.
Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase

election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in
its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can
say that election referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation
of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and qualifications to matters that
could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or
the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has

exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies
involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election
Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not
allowed in elections for President, V-President, Senator
and Members of the House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in

the certificate of canvass or election returns. To be
manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates
of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the board of

3
 canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings.

Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest

errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has
jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation
of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

- This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and

resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion
implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic
exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of

congressional election contests are entitled to security of
tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution.

- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is

not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated.

- Tanada vs. HRET, GR 217012 March 1, 2016-HRET lacks

the authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance
candidate. xxx Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal
only has jurisdiction over two types of election contests:
election protests and quo warranto cases. xxx An election
protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions
constituting electoral frauds or anomalies in contested polling
precincts, and for the revision of ballots. xxx On the other
hand, the eligibility of a member representative is impugned
in a quo warranto case. But the HRET Rules do not prescribe
procedural guidelines on how the COC of a political aspirant
can be cancelled on the ground that he or she is a nuisance
candidate. Rather, this remedial vehicle is instituted in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 245
thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
xxx HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over
rulings on cancellation cases promulgated by the COMELEC
en banc. It is the SC which has jurisdiction and the power to
review such rulings from the Commission. xxx The
jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed under Article VI,
Section 17 of the Constitution, is limited to the election,
returns, and qualification of the members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest

3
 involving a non-member. xxx To be considered a member of
the Lower House, there must be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper
oath, and (3) assumption of office.

- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts

jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET
operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It
is absent in this case.

- Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 &

189506, respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list
nominees are considered as elected members of the House,
the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications.

- Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808,

June 26, 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the
COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-
list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each
nominee and that no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the COMELECs First Division and COMELEC
En Banc which had declared President Villanueva the proper
party to submit CIBACs Certificate of Nomination instead of
Perla, who allegedly served as acting secretary-general. As
provided in Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC
also possesses the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as
a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to
enforce election laws and register political parties. The
power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership
is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its
enforcement powers, the Court declared

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is

the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating
to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of

Representatives is authorized to change its representation in
the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its

3
 membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do
not include temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one
political party to another.

- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is

mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to
the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A
political party must have at least two senators to be able to
have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so
that any number less than 2 will not entitle such party a
membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA
789).

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even

assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to
the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests
with the House of Representatives and not with this Court.
Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution,
party-list representatives must first show to the House that
they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to
seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to
comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can
the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under
its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before
petitioners may bring the instant case to the court.
Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is
premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members
to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

- APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to

the requirement that appropriations bills original exclusively
in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate
to propose or concur with amendments.

- While there may be no specific amount earmarked for

the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated
by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the
President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA
may be properly sourced from the President's own
office budget without committing any illegal
appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the
legislature's power to appropriate funds when the

3
 President simply allocates the existing funds previously
appropriated by Congress for his office (Pichay v.
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, 667
SCRA 408).

- In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of

individual menbers of Congress to propose and identify
priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in
nature and is also recognized that individual members of
Congress far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs
of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project (LAMP vs. DBM Secretary, GR No. 164987,
April 24, 2012)

- Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November

19, 2013- Pork barrel- commonly referred as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Legislature,
although its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds
of the Executive. Xxx declared unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. Insofar
as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations,
non-oversight, post enactment authority in vital areas of
budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto the
legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriation bills, it has flouted the prescribed procedure
of presentment and, in the process denied the President
the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators
a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public
funds under the broad classification of priority infrastructure
development projects, it has once transgressed the
principle of non delegability.

3
- Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014- the
transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under section 25(5),
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites,
namely: (1) there is law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the HR, the Chief
Justice and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to
be transferred are saving generated from the appropriations of
their respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer is
to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. The following were declared
unconstitutional: 1) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments
from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year
and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the GAA; 2) the cross-border transfers of
the savings of the executive to augment the appropriations of
other offices outside the Executive; 3) The use of
unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by
the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded
the revenue targets for non compliance with the conditions
provided in the relevant GAA (Araullo, MR Feb. 3, 2015).

- The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the

President the years program of expenditure for each
agency of the government on the basis of authorized
appropriations. The approved expenditure program shall
constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal
period, subject to such policies, rules and regulations
as may be approved by the President. [TECHNICAL
EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (TESDA), v. THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR;
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.; AND
COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN
BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No. 196418, February 10,
2015]

- Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason

to spend funds made available by Congress.xxx there was no
instance of executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment is prohibited by the GAA, unless there will be
an unmanageable government budget deficit.

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14,
2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding
appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no

3
 dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or
not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior
appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a
loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds
enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the
government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds
to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan
proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan
falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law
authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in
the National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the
loan is what is covered by the automatic appropriation.

- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs.

Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that
seeks the determination whether a law has been violated is not
in aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore,
violative of separation of powers. To allow the Committee to
investigate the matter would create the possibility of
conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same
justiceable controversy would be an encroachment on the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much
earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).

- Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining

to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice (Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2,
2009).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on

Banks, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing
of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy
to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint.

- The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the

power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-
preservation as the branch of government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can
assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
Except only when the Congress and/or its Committee exercise
the power of contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if
there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. It can
only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever

4
 irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation,
although it may include in its Report a recommendation for
the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable.

- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional

power of the President to withhold information requested by
other branches of the government. The Constitution does not
expressly grant this power to the President but courts have
long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary
and proper in carrying out powers and functions
expressly granted to the Executive under the
Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions have
recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of
Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002
case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the 2006
case of Senate v. Ermita.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief

Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military
and national security matters affecting the nation. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to withhold sensitive military and national
security secrets from the Legislature or the public.

As the official in control of the nations foreign service by

virtue of the Presidents control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of
the foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents role
as chief implementer of the States foreign policy is
reinforced by the Presidents constitutional power to negotiate
and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets
to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have
conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is
every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal
secrets that its allies have shared with it.

There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of

the internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet
and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough
exchange of views, the Presidents communications with
his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare
of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential
advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President
policy issues and executive matters knowing that their
discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the
President of candid advice.

4
 Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The
interest of protecting military, national security and
diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential
communications, must be weighed against other
constitutionally recognized interests. There is the
declared state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest, the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, the
accountability of public officers, the power of legislative
inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial and
documentary evidence in deciding cases.

The balancing of interests between executive privilege

on one hand and the other competing constitutionally
recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of
the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on
the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts
on executive privilege between the Executive and the
Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary,
have been decided by the courts.

Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

-Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is
clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the
offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that historic
confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these
offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as
Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as
privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged
in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.

- Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee,

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications
elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the

4
 President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you
dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President
said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received
by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance

with publish rules.

- Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the

Philippines, GR No. 180308, June 19, 2012- the wide
latitude given to the Congress in the conduct of legislative
inquiries and would not fault the Senate for approving the
resolution on the very same day that it was submitted. The
court also held that the petitioners were invited as resource
persons at the inquiry, and as such, they do not have the
constitutional right to counsel.

- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas

corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17,
2006- The Congress power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.
It even extends to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG
belongs to this class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights
of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners,
will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is
their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the
facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to
respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation

4
- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a
mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately,

the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information.

- Varieties of Executive Privilege

1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.

- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the

executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it
and state the reason therefore and why it must be
respected.

- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only

way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-
equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,

must be construed as limited in its appearance of department
heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of

4
 Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress oversight function.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken

by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence
over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its

oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party

List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing
of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent
and the certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment.

- A bill originating in the House may undergo such

extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced.
The power of the Senate to propose amendments, it cal
propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The

Supreme Court recognizes the long standing legislative
practice of giving said conference ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House.
It can propose amendment in the nature of a substitute, so
long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the
bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to
become valid as an act of the legislative department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160
in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is
burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it
is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are
actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable

4
 purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to
the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or
enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to
exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words
dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for
the words used exclusively without doing violence to the
Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with
exclusively

ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a

sitting president evolved through case law.

- It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys

immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office
or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non--
sitting president even for acts committed during his or
her tenure (Lozada v. Arroyo, 670 SCRA 545;
Estrada v. Disierto, 356 SCRA 108).

- Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President

by virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice
of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative.

- Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that

the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term
to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is
clear that the immunity of the President from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period
during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as a matter of right).

- Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive

immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not

proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law.

4
- Former President cannot use the presidential immunity
from suit to shield himself/herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
abduction of a person (Rodriguez v. Macapagal
Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84).

- Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the

extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b)
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii)
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii)
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of
criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of
command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to
ascertain responsibility and accountability within these
foregoing definitions.

- Doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in

amparo proceedings. The president, as commander--
in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. To hold someone liable under the
doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain: a. the existence of a superior-
subordinate relationship between the accused as superior
and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b.
the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime
was about to be or had been committed; and c. the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof (Ibid). Commanders may therefore
be impleaded not actually on the basis of command
responsibility but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability (Balao v.
Macapagal- Arroyo, 662 SCRA 312).

- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the
law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election
contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or
separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the

4
 Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for

President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with
the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA
1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers,
charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said
declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified
by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other
hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power
to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns
have been irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the
true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if
not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass
upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same
shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which
Congress has no power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has

effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election
protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253
SCRA 559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that

Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when
she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of
the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No.
003, Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008.

- Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain

reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals
a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In
the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme
Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision,
the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's
method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for
the purpose."

- It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,

resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it

4
 performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P.
Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional
channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution
is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that
time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1,
paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions

contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are
post election remedies, namely, regular election contests and
quo warranto. The word contest means that the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of the President or Vice-President there can be
no contest before a winner is proclaimed.

- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No.

191988, August 31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected President
the second time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on
the second election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case.

- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-

Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read:
TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The
question whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is
a political question beyond the Supreme Courts power of
review. The decision that President Arroyo is the dejure
President made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO

DOCTRINE) Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064,
October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in
the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated
to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President.
Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem
plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that
there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must

4
 be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers
by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
(PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the
benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These
distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain
presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension
of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence
of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal
branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of
the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the
President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within
the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to
contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest,
but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the
sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident,
but from the established functions of governance.

- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT-

Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs.
Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the
constitution by increasing those officers who need prior
confirmation by the CA.

- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002,

De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR
No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In
Re Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v.
JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No.
191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March
17, 2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing
President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that
the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations

5
 of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation
made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should
prevail. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so.

- Province of Aurora vs. Marco, GR 202331 April 22, 2015-

The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to
presidential appointments, and not to those made by local
executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because
there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.

- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,

2002- An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once an appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is
effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a
recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can
no longer be extended a new appointment. If by-passed,
the President is free to renew the ad-interim appointment.

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462

SCRA 622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to
make such acting appointment. The President may even
appoint in acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-

gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of
her choice could assume office. It may be extended any time
there is vacancy, given while Congress is in session.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- Under

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the

5
 heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of
lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. xxx The President appoints the first group of officers with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is
the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional.

- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position

of department manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is
not a third level position and does not require presidential
appointment.

- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES

AND THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited
from holding multiple positions and receiving compensation
therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12,
2004.

- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod

ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general
rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office
is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is
that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control
may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry
out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our
laws, has the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.

- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935,

December 7, 2010- The creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The President's
power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the
faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on

5
 public accountability and transparency - is inherent in the
President's powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to say
that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.

- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the

Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093,
July 31, 2007 The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct
of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17
of the 1987 Constitution. The Presidents power to
reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O.
No. 292 which grants the President broad organization
powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it
may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out
the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive
department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.

- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential

Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.

- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003

The Presidents power (EO 292) to reorganize offices
outside of the Office of the President Proper is limited
merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office
of the President to Departments or Agencies and vice-
versa. The DECS is indisputably a Department of the
Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office
of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly
authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of
the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter,
the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to the

5
 Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the
authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities of
DECS related to sports development to the PSC, making EO
81 a valid presidential issuance.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The

presidential power of control over the Executive branch of
government extends to all executive employees from the
Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents
power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that
the President shall have control of all executive x x x offices,
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt
any executive office one performing executive functions outside
of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents
power of control. xxx The Presidents power of control applies to
the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is
true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or
decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion.

- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs.

Perez, May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of
state of rebellion during or in the aftermath of the May 1,
2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative of the separation of
powers doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of
Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call upon such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.

- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656,

February 3, 2004- The Presidents authority to declare a
state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her calling out
power.

- Calling out power of the president. President as

Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network
to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security
of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on--
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives

5
 and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision
to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless
violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were
to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not
farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill
over the other parts of the country. The determination
of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected
to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable
prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly
straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining
order every time it is exercised (Integrated Bar of
The Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81).

- Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The

President does not need any congressional authority to
exercise his calling out power.

- That the authority of the President to conduct peace

negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she
has no such authority. Similarly, the President's power
to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in
her powers as Chief Executive and Commander- in--
Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty
to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence
(The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government
of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402).

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President

that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and
all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Supreme
Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes
that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President or
the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to
appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.

5
- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The
President has full discretion to call the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.

- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006-

PP 1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the president; and
(3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In
the absence of legislation, the President cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected
with public interest.

- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of

national emergency even in the absence of congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.

- Colmenares, et al. vs. Department vs. National Defense

Secretary, et al., GR No. 212426-212244- January 12, 2016-
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and
rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that
goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal
or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the
exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when
he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of
our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.

- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT-

Requisites: 1) there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the
delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation
must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may
prescribe and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the

second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to
war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of
the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the

5
 President the authority to declare a state of national
emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out
power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have
provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before he can declare a
state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is
that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a
state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

- Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling

out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive
to the President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief
and that a provincial governor is not endowed with the power
to call upon the Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that
only the President is authorized to exercise emergency powers
as provided under Section 23, Article VI and the calling out
powers under Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
While the President exercises full supervision and control
over the police, a local chief executive, such as a provincial
governor, only exercises operational supervision over the
police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day
operations. As discussed in the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission, only the President has full
discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, the Court stressed.

- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370-

The pardoning power of the President is final and
unappealable.

- Former President Estrada was granted an absolute

pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective,
and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the
petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal
against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No.

5
 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the
LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is,
having been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral
turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified
to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding
the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes
a statement expressing "he is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes
that former President Estrada is disqualified from
running for Mayor of Manila in he May 13, 2013
Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local
elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to
him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason
that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the
remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, particularly the restoration of his
(former President Estrada) right to vote and be voted
upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her
theory. (ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO
S. LIM, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015)

- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13,

2009.- The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it
extends to all persons who committed the particular acts
described in the provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.

- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342

SCRA 449-It is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105
Phil. 1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus

that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President,
being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was
echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court
held:

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office,

the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the
chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the
field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers

5
and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international

agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain
solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law
itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of

state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority
to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to

negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by
him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into

treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this
light, the authority of the President to enter into trade
agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464
may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power
already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis
to hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to

enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of
Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that
all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant
provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above
discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty

5
 negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of
the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to
concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate.

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under

our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for
its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a
state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such
decision is within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
mandamus. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over
actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ
of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government
to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

- The terms exchange of notes and executive

agreements have been used interchangeably, exchange
of notes being considered a form executive agreement
that becomes binding through executive action. Om the
other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President sometimes take form of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols.
Under international law, there is no difference between
treatises and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as
long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their power (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641
SCRA 244).

- An executive agreement, according to the Supreme

Court, is a treaty within the meaning of that word in
international law and constitutes enforceable domestic
law (Nicolas v. Romulo,578 SCRA 438). Unlike a
treaty though, an executive agreement does not require
legislative concurrence, is usually less formal and deals
with a narrower range of subjects (China Machinery

6
 and Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 665
SCRA 189). All that would be required for its
efficacy would be the agreement must be between
states; it must be written; and it must be governed by
international law (Ibid).

- An executive agreement that does not require the

concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may not
be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution,
is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive
and the Senate (Ibid).

- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL

THE SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable
belongs to the President. Only lands, which have been
classified as alienable, may be sold. There must be a law
authorizing its sale or alienation by the President or by
another officer before conveyance can be executed on behalf
of the government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987
Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797-
The President may not convey valuable real property of the
government on her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized
by a law enacted by Congress.

- POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS- to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively.

ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)

- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs.

Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children);
Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper
party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper
party).

- A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act

complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to the
assertion of JKG-Power Plates, MVPSP clearly
involves the expenditure of public funds. While the
motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license

6
 plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP
indicate, that the government shall bear the burden of
paying for the project. Every portion of the national
treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be
properly allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an
allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851
billion shall be used in a project that has undergone
an improper procurement process cannot be easily
brushed off by the Court. (Reynaldo M. Jacomille, vs.
Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, in his capacity as
Secretary of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), et.al., G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

- Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally

recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the
great responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the
allocation of powers among the three great branches of the
government.

- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April

24, 2009- Although the courts are without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government and are not empowered to execute absolutely
their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,
the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or
not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of
discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered,

under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to
arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive
branches of government on the proper constitutional
parameters of power.

- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court

adopts the DIRECT INJURY test. In People vs. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.

- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the

requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when
the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have
been allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental

6
 importance; of overreaching significance to society or of
paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO;
CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA
449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739;
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, December 7, 2010.

- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may

be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.

- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For

a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his
right of suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to
the third party; the third party cannot assert his constitutional
right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the
party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys
constitutional claim.

- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme

Court is not concerned with whether the petitioners are real
parties in interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA
BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421
SCRA 148.

6
- Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department
of Energy, GR 180771 April 21 2015- The Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens
suit. A citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino
citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental
law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are
not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the
real party in interest.

- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND

ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to adjudicate the
substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the
constitution; to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public and capable of repetition, yet evading
review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429
SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula

that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved, third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the
public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.;
SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS.
GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS.
COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19,
2013.

- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues

dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from
exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether
or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under
its EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS.
COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.

- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3,

2007 - Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as
peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter
involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional
importance, namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship

6
 of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. xxxx
This case is a matter of primordial importance involving
compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting
claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the
proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has
the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore,
that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision
of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.

- Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a

Legislative or Executive Act- The doctrine operative fact
doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as
an operative fact that produced consequences that always
be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the
void law or executive act but sustains its effects. xxx It
applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist
and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application. Xxx Its
application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play.
The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related
issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
(Araullo vs. Aquino)

- As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law;

it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it
has not been passed at all. The general rule is
supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary (Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management,
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011). The doctrine of
operative fact serves as an exception to the
aforementioned general rule. The doctrine of operative
fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that
the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration
(Ibid). The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of

6
 unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it (Ibid).
The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an
exception when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous
and would send a wrong signal that an act may be
justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of
law (Ibid).

- While the 1987 Constitution has provided the

qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does
not preclude the JBC from having its own set of
rules and procedures and providing policies to
effectively ensure its mandate. The functions of
searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing
and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However,
the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the
process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main
function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the Constitution
and law for every position. The search for these long
held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility
in order to determine who is most fit among the
applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not
unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
(FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING
JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,
COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, v. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R. No. 211833, April 07,
2015)

- Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBCs

principal function is to recommend appointees to the
Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the
President a list of at least three nominees and the President
may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy
in the SC is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90
days from the occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be
compromised only because the constitutionally named Chair
could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if
the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still

6
 operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the list of
nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named
ex-officio Chair does not sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.

The Court held that considering that the complete

membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its
supervisory power over the JBC, it should not be deprived of
representation. It ruled that the most Senior Justice of the
High Court, who is not an applicant for the position of Chief
Justice, should participate in the deliberations for the
selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside
over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally
named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 296, or
the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reads: In case of vacancy in
the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his
inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they
shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief
Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall
apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of
the Chief Justice.

- Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court

held that the use of the singular letter a preceding
representative of Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. The word Congress is used in its
generic sense. Considering the language of the subject
constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, there is no
need to resort to extrinsic aids such as the records of the
Constitutional Commission.

- The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended

to create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the
public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the
appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial
independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped
that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal
voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. To
allow the Legislature to have more quantitive influence in the
JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one
full vote or one-half a vote each, would, as one former
congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government
which is enshrined in the Constitution, declared the Court.

- The Court also held that the JBCs seven-member

composition serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a

6
 solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It further held
that under the doctrine of operative facts where actions prior
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized
as a matter of equity and fair play, all JBCs prior official acts
are valid.

- The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to

who should remain as sole representative of Congress in the
JBC and that such is best left to the determination of
Congress.

- Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In

cases where an objection to an applicants qualification is
raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor
renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to
recommend. The unanimity rule of the JBC-009 resulted in
the deprivation of his right to due process.

- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief

Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.

- AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and

the Supreme Court en banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits
they may extend to the justices, judges, court officials and
court personnel within the parameters of the courts granted
power.

- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1)
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.

- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the

problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.

- FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy

matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court-
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government.

- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A

motion to change the venue of (and authority to conduct)
preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the
courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary
investigation is a function of the Executive department and
not of the judiciary.

6
- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it
should be resolved in favor of change of venue.

- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31,

2006- In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or
the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June
24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion
perpetua, thus:

- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby

prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death
penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated

makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code;
or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated

does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.

- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of
law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure;
uniform; not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

- GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14,

2010- The Supreme Court has now the sole authority to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, pactice and procedure
in all courts, Viewed from this perspective, the claim of
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees
under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a

persons rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of
rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The

6
writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.

Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final

judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or

judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by
an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping
and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the
Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it
shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions
shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in
detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of
national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing
in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The
movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the
person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and
may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after
the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable
reasons.

(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession, custody or control of any designated

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 documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic
form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection,
copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The
motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or
of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or
judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all the parties.

(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge,

upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also
refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to
accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping
and securing their safety.

- Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A

petition for a writ of amparo is improper remedy to regain
parental authority and custody ove a minor child who was
legally put up for adoption.

- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17,

2008- To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an
ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we
see no point in separately and directly intervening through a
writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie
showing that the right to life, liberty or security the
personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger
or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying

7
 by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with
a separately filed criminal case.

- WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any

person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires

the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
- (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or

threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
- (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
secure the data or information;

- (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the

government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;

- (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the

updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

- Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule

requires that the petition must sufficiently allege the manner in which
the right to privacy is violated or threatened with violation and how
such violation, or threats affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party.

- Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012-

The forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zenarosa
Commission was not unlawful act as that violates or threatens to
violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or security as to entitle the
petitioner to the writ of habeas data.

- Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666, September 29,

2014- petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy that

7
would warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data when their
daughters shared the incriminating pictures with their Facebook
Friends. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her
Online Social Network activity, it is necessary that the user in this
case, the sanctioned students, should manifest the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or limit its visibility.

Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The

COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.

Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19,

2005- Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence
of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as
meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power.
RA 8974 which requires full payment before the State may
exercise proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires
only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the

fundamental law requires mandatory review by the Supreme
Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more

squarely within the rule making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law making power of Congress.
The rule allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.

- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA

604- does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not
decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and
the petition to review decision of the CA is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is no need
to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the CA decision.

- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA

329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the

7
 constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a
resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and
stating the legal basis thereof.

- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The

constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the
validity of memorandum decisions, which adopt by
reference the finding of fact and conclusions of law contained
in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No.

181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion
to decide whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu
of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the
Supreme Court explained that the grant of due course to a
petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error
committed by the CA, there is no need to fully explain the
Courts denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees
with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. There
is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of
denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear
presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where
the petition is given due course, but not where the petition
is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis for the dismissal.

- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14
does not preclude the validity of Memorandum Decision
which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is
intended to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision
(or portions thereof) of the lower court.

ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil
Service Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority
to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to

7
 enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or
orders. The authority to decide cases would be inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been
decided is carried out.

- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The

CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since

the responsibility of the establishment, administration and
maintenance of qualification standards lies with the
concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is
limited to assisting the department agency with respect to
these qualification standards and approving them.

- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The

Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire
civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including every government-owned or controlled
corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career
service positions. Career service positions are those where:
(1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical
qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A
state university president with a fixed term of office
appointed by the governing board of trustees of the
university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was
appointed by the chairman and members of the governing
board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a
non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of
the CSC.

- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though

the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided
by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the
authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its
discretion opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the
investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The
Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed
directly with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction
shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.

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- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no
report, no release policy may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic
connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund releases to it
may be imposed.

- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs,

as a general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But
a distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be
made. If the GOCC was established through an original
charter (or special law), then it falls under the civil service,
e.g., GSIS and SSS. However, corporations which are
subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is
excluded from the coverage of the civil service.

- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of

government refers to any of the various units of the
government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality or government-owned or controlled
corporation or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national
government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and
government-owned or controlled corporations,

- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed

in a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law
applies. It is not true either that with respect to money claims,
the Labor Code applies. Regardless of the nature of
employment or claim, an employee in a GOCC with original
charter is covered by the Civil Service Law.

- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the

appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service
may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys
security of tenure.

- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent

appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service
does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required

7
 qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature
of appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or
lack of it.

- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented

transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary
is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the
Constitution.

- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims
by indirect method to terminate services or to force
resignation constitutes removal.

- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious

exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that
its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will
also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such
state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.

- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party

aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency
of the government involving termination of services may
appeal to the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June

28, 2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by the
Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil
Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73
SCRA 285, on two instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: (1) President declares the
position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of
of the CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there
exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing
authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is

primarily confidential.

PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position

of Casino Operations Manager is not primarily confidential.

7
- Funa vs Agra, GR 191644 Feb 19 2013-The designation of
Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional
prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987
Constitution.

- It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or

temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so
far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official
must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the
objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.

- gras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in

an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the
holding of one office being the consequence of holding the
other.

- Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section

13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad
exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the
Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor
General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show
that his holding of the other office was allowed by law or the
primary functions of his position. To claim the exemption of
his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his
concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the
Constitution.

- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There

must intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from
public office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a
part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an
acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by

7
 reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284
SCRA 276, 1997)

- Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman
as board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
is unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the
CSC, and for violating the rule against holding of multiple
government positions as well as the concept ex-officio
positions.

- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double

compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive
such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government
position to which another compensation is attached.

- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG

Chair Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution
from simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are
incompatible offices since the CPLC reviews actions of the
PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the general rule to hold more
than one office is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position/

- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21,

1997- When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his
reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents
and purposes he is considered as not having left his office,
and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled
to payment of back salaries.

- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The

Supreme Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect
Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages
can be awarded in his favor.

- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil

service officer or employee, who has been found illegally
dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to
back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of
his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement,
and if at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated,
he is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to
back wages but also to full retirement benefits.

- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an

aggrieved party, may appeal the decision of the Court of

7
 Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a
decision exonerating a civil service employee of
administrative charges.

- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes
of an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil
service system, and does not fall under the provision on
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the
provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases
instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system
and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of
the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those
who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished
from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.

- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular
No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O.
180.

COMELEC

- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs.

Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase without reappointment
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not
such person completes his term of office which could be seven,
five or three years. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.

- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs.
Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.

- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009-

The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct
investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the
explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

8
 Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases

of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon

it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code,
may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power,
the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7

- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the

power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines
Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:

- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the

other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner
is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of

8
 specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be
observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

- Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to

probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the
elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious,
and whether an election offense had possibly been committed
could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or
administrative function.

- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was

exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth
behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force
conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to
argue and support their respective positions.

- The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law

on a government institution hinges on its authority to compel
attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings
or proceedings.

- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power

to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-
finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to
attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative
power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was
however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to
appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding
the various election documents which, he claimed, were
stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such
contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a

board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to
appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the
powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial.
The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the
function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted
to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of
Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various
candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of

8
 canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on
the issue of whether the election documents coming from
Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner
unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted
within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed resolutions.

- Grace Poe vs. COMELEC- The COMELEC cannot itself,

in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate.

- The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of

grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in
their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds
specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate
from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.

- Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications

for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified
from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a
public office and vice versa.

- Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC, GR 222731, March 8

2016- The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under
Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory.
xxx The law is clear that a voter verified paper audit trail
requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify
whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and
(b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based.
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must
implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated
election system to have the capability of providing a
VVPAT. The COMELECs act of not enabling this

8
 feature runs contrary to why the law requires this feature
in the first place.

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS

IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et
al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011- The power to fix the
date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident
from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the
Constitution:

- Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular

election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]

Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable
solely to the President and Vice-President, states:

xxx xxx x x. Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by

law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall
be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours while
Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government

code which shall provide for . . . the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, terms, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours

- Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC

does not have the requisite power to call elections, as the
same is part of the plenary legislative power.

- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 -

The COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of
the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers is
a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this
authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which
vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the
discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with
ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free,
orderly and honest elections.

8
- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007
COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of
leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate
officers and leaders. xxx The COMELEC is endowed with
ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free
and orderly honest elections.

- Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16,

2010- While the question of party leadership has implications
on the COMELECs performance of its functions under
Section 2 of Art. IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be
said of the issue pertaining to Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from
the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party
membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot
interfere, given the limited scope of its power over political
parties.

- Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793,

February 22, 2011)- In election cases involving an act or
omission of a municipal or regional trial court, petition for
certiorari shall be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28,

2005- Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the
COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides that absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section

3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the
COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration,
decisions or resolutions decided by a division. Since the
petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of the Second Division suspending his
proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the
validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said
Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be

8
 used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.

- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The

COMELEC en banc does not have the authority to hear and
decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC
Rules, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases
and in compliance with the provision of the Constitution, the
two divisions of the COMELEC are vested with the authority
to hear and decide these special cases.

- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC

cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws
and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by
the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the
sufficient standard tests.

- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for

initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through
its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct

of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been
the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts.
Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best
left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional
body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the

8
 indisputable expertise in the field of election and related
laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties.

- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997

Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC

may validly order a manual count notwithstanding the
required automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law
authorizing the commission to use an automated election
system, if that is the only way to count votes. It ought to be
self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a

valid exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the
conduct of the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines
for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the
COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the
sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and
fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose
disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the
elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes
from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.

- Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987

constitution vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving barangay officials decided by the trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011-

Final orders of a COMELEC Division denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before the
Supreme Court even via a petition for certiorari.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

- COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs.

Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COAs auditing
powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private
corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA
jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental
entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly

8
 from or through the government are required to submit to post
audit.

- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since
even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will
still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public
funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the
clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable
conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to
examine and audit government agencies. The framers of
the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in
addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private
investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as
in the case at bar when the government borrows money from
abroad.

- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits

accruing to a public officer may not, without his consent, be
withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.

- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA,

acting by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a
decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues
relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting
as a collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any
case brought before it.

- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil

868, COAs power over the settlement of accounts is
different from power over unliquidated claims, the latter
of which is within the ambit of judicial power.

- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurers salary and
other emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage
but no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage
for which her liability is still being litigated.

- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.

8
- DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February
7, 2012]- There is nothing in the said provision that requires the
COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for
all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that
a post audit is mandated for certain government or private entities
with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control
system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-
audit, to correct the deficiencies.

- Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this

Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part
is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has
the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit,
there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can
the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.

- GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The

appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional; the appointing authority cannot validly shorten
the full term of seven years in case of the expiration of the term as
this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed
by the Constitution;
- Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D);
- Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission;

- A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for

less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chair. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioners and the unexpired period of the term of
the predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided further
that the vacancy in the position of Char resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment; and that
- Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

8
- Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of
RA 6758 prohibits officials and employees of COA from receiving
salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from
any government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA
out of its appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.

ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)

- Local Autonomy- Local Autonomy means that local

governments have certain powers granted by the
Constitution which may not be curtailed by the
National government, but that outside of these, local
governments may not enact ordinances contrary
to statutes (Bernas, 1987 Philippine Constitution,
Reviewer, 2011).

- Veloso, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 16,

2011- LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still
within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

- In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy

signified "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to
"break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units x x x."
Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing
self-government.

- Decentralization simply means the devolution of national

administration, not power, to local governments. Local
officials remain accountable to the central government as the
law may provide. The difference between decentralization of
administration and that of power was explained in detail in
Limbona v. Mangelin[16] as follows:

- "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration

or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments 'more responsive and accountable.

9
- Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole,
the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President
and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the
national government.

- Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10,

2014- At any rate, LGUs must be reminded that the local
autonomy granted to them does not completely severe them
from the national government or turn them into impenetrable
states. Autonomy does not make local governments sovereign
within the state. Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy
being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws. Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation
of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.

- Pimentel vs. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012- While

the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally funded projects, facilities, programs and services.
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has
no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU. xxx The national government is,

9
 thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS

IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al-
[G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of
local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally,
allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to
the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for
local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another

term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create
a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This
view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally
infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term
of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done
directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act
of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence,
holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where

the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though
differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and
Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the elective
officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of

elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in
the case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when
the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining
the least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was
not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by
the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the

9
 authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM
for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years
as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution as we ruled in Osmea.

- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to

undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark
back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:

- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered
to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case
of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with
the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the
absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government
Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may
not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents
contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power.
This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have
no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.

- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation

under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of
representation and governance in their own local government.

- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through

their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc.,
the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor
or the Vice-Governor is missing. (Emphasis ours.)

- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice

Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may
arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to
appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

9
- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS-
Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however,
does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long
as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election
but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23,

2009- The preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive
suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption
of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation.

- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the

three-term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss
of the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the
suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his
office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt
or liability.

- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009-
Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he ran
for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the
position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as
punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation
of said office.

- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the

recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of
three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an
elective officials terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a
candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but
later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be stitched
with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior
to the recall term, when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.

- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary

renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term

9
 provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit
rule to apply, the local official concerned must serve three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must be
one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by
virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term.

- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office

constitutes, for Francis Ong, service for the full term, and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for
a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule,
notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation.
There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis Ongs service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID.

- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No.

176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for
cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the ,
explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from the said
increased income requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending
cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and that the year
before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already
met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of
1991.

9
- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY-
Its function is limited to the delivery of basic services. RA 7924
does not grant the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. The MMDA is a development authority. It is not a
political unit of government. There is no grant of authority to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village
Association, 328 SCRA 836).

- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood

by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the
power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses
without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was intended
to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local
political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided
by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and
traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the
petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of
Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the
MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner
must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized
by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a
legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).

- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009-

MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of
advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3
(MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDAs powers were
limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore, it
had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of police
and legislative power.

- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657,

August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its powers
and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the
Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by E.O
179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA
cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.
Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must
necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts
subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

9
 INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of
income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds
of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA
695).

- LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY

RELEASED WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL
FROM ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of
the 1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily
see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a
just share in the national taxes; and (2) just share shall be
determined by law; (3) that just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.

(ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)

- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that

pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation,
the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to
local government units shall be withheld is declared in
contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art
X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles

of local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code.
The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local
governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes,
fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to
congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local
autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally
enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate
enforcement by this Court. The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum,
was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but
restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The
subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were
assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code
provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of
Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005).

- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of

Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial

9
 Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from
paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax,
the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw
such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in
National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.

- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is

primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it
may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by
virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An
agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of
the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein; while an
instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned and controlled corporations. It had already
become, even if it be conceded to be an agency or
instrumentality of the Government, a taxable person for such
purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section
234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which,
as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.

- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the
port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the
general public does not exempt it from the payment of real
property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and
appurtenances are the petitioners corporate patrimonial properties,
not for public use, and that the operation of the port and its
facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of
ordinary business.

- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties
of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of
MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands
and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are

9
 devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion.
As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and
Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property
Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.

- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national

government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the
tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable
is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force
when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities.

- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against

the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress
grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality
from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in
favor of the national government instrumentality.

- PRESIDENTS SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,

September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng
mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or
his alter ego.

- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a

local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory
powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of
his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the
law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President
or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-
conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is
a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy
and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs.
COA, December 3, 2002).

- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of

LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion
the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on
the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local
autonomy is ensured.

- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no
power to grant franchises.

9
 ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)

- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section

3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an
impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment
proceeding is not required before the public officer subject of
impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for
criminal offenses committed.

- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives,

November 10, 2003- definition of TO INITIATE
IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice.

- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on

Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred
to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.

- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary

either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution,
De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa,
September 3, 1995.

- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond

the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.

- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010-

The doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed
coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of
the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine
would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit,
provide civil servants, particularly local government, with blanket
immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed
abuse of bureaucracy.

- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions

of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).

1
- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of
bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.

- OMBS POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,

March 20, 2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts.

- Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231,

September 4, 2012 January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770
providing that the President may remove a deputy ombudsman is
unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over her deputies.

- Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear

constitutional design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the Ombudsman. The
inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of
the Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded
the same levels of constitutional independence as that of the
Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.

- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has

consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely
a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power
to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no
mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this
exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power
to preventively suspend.

- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,

April 13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive
but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of
the government such as the provincial, city and state
prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations
of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

- Pichay vs. IAD-ODESLA- Contrary to petitioner's contention, the

IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary

1
 jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit
filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and
administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations
before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the
investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. xxx
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of
the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits
of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-
ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose
determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon
by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the
Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority
to determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and com the head of the office or
agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June

16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the
Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power
is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears
out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority,
including the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers
envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist
watchman, not merely a passive one.

- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011-

Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.

- CONDONATION:

- Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the
respondent is absolved of the charge or in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or suspension

1
 for the period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to one
months salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor
and unappelable, subject to judicial review.

- Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015-

Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances of the
Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before
the Supreme Court. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong
(March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman was - similar to this case -
assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public
officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was
certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as
sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."

- The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary

requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with
the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the
fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a
prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light
of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses.

- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011-

The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases may be
executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly states
that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Also, the power of the Ombudsman to implement the penalty is
not merely recommendatory but mandatory.

- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584,

January 22, 2008 Supreme Court reiterated this ruling in Office
of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that the
Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually mandatory. Implementation of
the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through
the proper officer.

1
 - Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be
in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due
process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that
R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the
DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive
procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A.
No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the
1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987
while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is
basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its
meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the
Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and
employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the
Judiciary.

- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC

is originally created by charter or not. What is decisive is that
it has been acquired by the government to perform functions
related to government programs and policies.

- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan,

376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and
Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to
direct any officer or employee of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters to perform any
act or duty required by law or to stop any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.

- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding

Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272-
Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery
of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.

ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)

0
- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No.
161881, July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542
is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use
or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State
has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or
mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit
which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled,

1
 amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so
requires. The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily
vested in the State as owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a
privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection
under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's
welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter,
as well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license is
not even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested
right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx

- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to

recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by
many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a long
and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice,
abhors a further delay in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to
its fitting conclusion by denying the petition.

- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371

categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have
never been public lands and are private. The right of ownership
granted to indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains does
not cover the natural resources. The right granted to IP to negotiate
the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only
their exploration to ensure ecological and environmental
protection.

- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized the

existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as
an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore

and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas
are also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable,
unless converted into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.

- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the

public domain may only be leased and not sold to private
parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain which the government
could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a
law authrizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx The
ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the

1
 Regalian Doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the
public domain belong to the State

- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable

lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to private
corporations which can only lease the same. The State may only
sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar
private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and
being paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the
Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is
for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public
domain. There is no prohibition on the directors, officers and
stockholders of private corporations, if they are Filipino
citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain. They can acquire not more than 12
hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes private
land.

- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.

Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property,
can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by
the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property
which even private corporations can acquire by purchase.
Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold or
transferred to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary
consideration become patrimonial property in the hands of the
public or municipal corporation. Once converted to patrimonial
property, the land may be sold by the public or municipal
corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations.

- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR

No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become
patrimonial property or private property of the government only
upon a declaration that these are alienable or disposable lands,
together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.

- in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration

Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that
those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,

1
 under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title, to such lands based on
the length and quality of their possession. The Court clarified that
the Public Land Act merely requires possession since June 12,
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.
The possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of
title as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable and
disposable. This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020
deadline imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
9176.

- Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least 30 years or
at least since May 8, 1947.

- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No.

17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State
except for the lot areas with existing titles. The continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these
give them a right to apply a title to the land they are presently
occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the Regalian
Doctrine.

- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme

Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400 hecs of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural land). Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
Forest lands do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land
or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.

- Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678,

April 24, 2009 The classification of lands of the public domain
is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. The agricultural
lands of the public domain may further be classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary
classification. Congress, under existing laws, granted authority to a
number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or
industrial or other urban uses.

1
- Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014- The
DENR Secretary is empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.

- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009-

While the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the
country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the
Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties from
the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by

PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity, such
reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public domain
which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a
private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO
525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public
domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that
it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA is a
government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under
its charterThe Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The
NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to administer
and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over
reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to
the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically
converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be
sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of
which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the
reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once
transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the
NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public
domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes
and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the
SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-
hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been
reclassified as patrimonial property.

- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the
Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or

1
 released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.

- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the

prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land.
It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined
under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a
strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such
as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land would be
limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.

- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the

Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public
domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. A homestead patent, such
as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire
title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes.

- La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004

Foreign corporations are confined to technical and financial
assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or utilize the
countrys natural resources by entering into the necessary
agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of visible
operations. Service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State.
Control by the state must be on the macro level, through the
establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry
standards and similar measures that would enable the
government to control the conduct of the affairs in various
enterprises and restrain activities deemed not desirable or
beneficial.

- Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of

Energy- As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words
service contracts in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a
ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of the members of
the Constitutional Commission show that in deliberating on Art
XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used
the term service contracts in referring to agreements involving
technical or financial assistance.

- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose

Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al.,
March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows service

1
 contracts in the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance as provided by law. The Court
said that these agreements with foreign corporations are not
limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State.

- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast

Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No. 152619-20, Balite
Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No. 152870-71, The Mines
Adjudication Board and its Members, et al. v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within
the full control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore,
within the full control of the State through the executive branch.
Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either directly
undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of the area
or it can enter into agreement with qualified entities.

- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426

SCRA 517 Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does
not apply retroactively to a license, concession or lease
granted by the government under the 1973 constitution or
before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution.

- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of

law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.

- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA

316 The operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.

- Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both

voting control test and beneficial ownership test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a Filipino national.xxx The
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
Thus, 60 percent of the capital assumes, or should result in,
controlling interest in the corporation. Full beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60
percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest

11
 in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the
constitutional mandate.

- Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, February

23, 2015- a franchise is not required before each and every public
utility may operate. There is no law that states that a legislative
franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities. What
constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to
the public.

- Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc.,

556 SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public utility has the
imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its
apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.

- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum,

it does not appear that, in approving 23 of R.A. No. 7925,
Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict
construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that
doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we
hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having
amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption
from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not
authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience (CPCs)
and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly issued
legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had violated the
terms of their franchise. As legislative franchises are extended
through statutes, they should receive recognition as the ultimate
expression of State policy.

- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353-

Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the
public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to
alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted
away.

- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 The

constitution is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall not
be exclusive.

- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7,

2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It

11
 mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so
requires.

ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)

- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have

revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo
v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).

- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs.
Com. on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of
civil and political rights only either by government official or
private individual.

- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial

powers to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to Section
5- perform such other functions and duties as may be provided by
law.

- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although

admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.

- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the

eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted
in a just and humane manner does not mean validity or legality of
the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of
resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.

ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)

- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR

No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A review center is not an institution
of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722[i]t does not offer
a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction
of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review course is only intended to
refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees, and it does not require enrollment, attendance, a grade
or submission of a thesis in order to complete the review center
course requirements or take the licensure examination.

- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational

institution and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court

11
 sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil service rules
on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private petitioner
and even promoted him despite his absence, the University was
exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or who may
continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).

- Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The

Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondnets
academic freedom as it does not dictate upon the law professors
the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. They are free to determine what they will teach their
students and how they will teach. Moreover, it is not inconsistent
with the principle of academic freedom for the Supreme Court to
subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers. The right to freedom expression of members
of the BAR may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as
lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics
faith in the legal profession and the justice system.

- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As

enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos v.
Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion
may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not
disturb the Universitys decision not to confer honors to petitioner.

- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with

academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of
higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and determine whether these standards have been met. At
the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee
on probation, belongs to the university as the employer alone.

- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic

freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom encompasses the
autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith,
who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other
academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong: As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the

11
 right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure.

- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2),

Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
interest calls for some restraint. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself
(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

- It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching the

student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any
field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom what to teach. Indeed,
while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982
that students have a right to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation, such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by
the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very
well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice
of students for admission to its school.

ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)

- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general

principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3, 2006)-
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of
official functions against an officer of the government by a private
citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability
to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. However,
government immunity from suit will not shield the public official
being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in
the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal
because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her
duties.

- UP vs. Dizon, August 23, 2012- The funds of UP are government

funds that public in character. They include income accruing from
the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for

11
 the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds,
subject of the action could not be validly made the subject of writ
of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered
against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was
not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

- COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13,
2009- The COA is an unincorporated government agency which
does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own, Hence,
even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its
primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its
consent.

- Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June 26,

2009- Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary
contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be
sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be
the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

- GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint health
insurance project of the German and Philippine governments, is
not entitled to immunity from suit in the Philippines as GTZ, being
the equivalent of a government-owned-and-controlled corporation,
has the power and capacity to sue and be sued under the
Corporation Code. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or
controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of
the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued,

- PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the

government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where,
as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case,
immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as
jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized
officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it
thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens
itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have
against it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil
Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit.
Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set
up its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in
the same case.

- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs.

Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion,
January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the members of the
former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which accordingly
abolished.

11
- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or
indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They
cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the government,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or

enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a
civilian position to speak of.

- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino

ownership.

- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%

- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools

established by religious groups and mission boards.

ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)

- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591,

183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The Court noted
that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of
Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to
the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees
that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the
laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing
a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through
the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can
ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an
undue influence or interference with that process.

- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting

as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers to propose
amendments or to call a convention. The grant to Congress as a
Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue
of the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to
the effective exercise of principal power granted, such as the power
to fix qualifications, apportionment, etc..

11
- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is
insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives for
constitutional amendments. While the Constitution recognizes the
right of citizens to propose amendments, the people cannot
exercise such until Congress provides for its implementation.

- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006

-Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of
the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and
shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.

- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS.

COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution
or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative power to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of
the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a Constituent Assembly.

- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals

for amendments, it does not have the final say on whether or not its
acts are within constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly
subject to judicial review.

- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times

necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be
validly held together with general elections.

- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no

piece meal ratification.

- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of

amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed
amendments/revisions so provide.

11
 ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)

- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April 11, 2002- Section 25 of the

Transitory Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign
military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only
be way of direct exception.

- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from

engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The Supreme
Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations that the Arroyo
administration is engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a
mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on
native soil.

- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342
SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not
submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty
days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the
relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the
United States Senate.

- Saguisag, et al. vs. Ochoa, GR No. 212426-212444, January 12,

2016- The President also carries the mandate of being the sole
organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The role of the President
in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief
Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty
of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the
right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination. In
specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least
shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war; Sections
20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and
international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII

11
 on the judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of
Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into
prior to the Constitution and on the presence of foreign military
troops, bases, or facilities.

- EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and

conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country.
It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly,
in June 2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the
completion of all necessary internal requirements for the
agreement to enter into force in the two countries.

- Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole

authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly
limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in
Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate." The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the
Transitory Provisions.

- The constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of

the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is
authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the
limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine
law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a
treaty.

- Executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not

affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. Xxx Under international
law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement
or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of
determining international rights and obligations. xxx Executive
agreements may cover the matter of foreign military forces if it
merely involves detail adjustments.

- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,

Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No.
170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty
under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to
its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that
has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the
treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

11
- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith,
et al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R.
No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the
VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby
ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention
facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10
of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until
further orders by this Court.

ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)

- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052,

February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for
their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions
of pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence
over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local government
unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals right to property, the former should prevail,.

- Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca

Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the
constitution is a limitation on government powers. It does not
apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code.

- Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for

Legal Affairs, et al., GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012- Pichays
right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. IN
administrative proceedings, the filing of the charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process, which simply means having thte opportunity to
explain ones side.

- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm
is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a
vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of ones residence
maybe revoked at anytime.

1
- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to
operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege
granted by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the
State in the exercise of police power.

- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process

suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.

INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-

legislative functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se;
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers);
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR
Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling
abroad;
10.Suspension of banks operations by the Monetary Board upon
a prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11.Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs.
Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000);
12.Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13.TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013)

- SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April

23, 2014- Prior notice and hearing, as elements of due pocess of
law, are only required in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, not
when the government agency is engaged in the performance of
quasi legislative or administrative functions.

- Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that
they were denied due process during the NBI Investigation. The
functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is
incapable of granting any relief to any party, it cannot even
determine probable cause.

- Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41,

January 21, 2015- there is no law or rule that requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.

Equal Protection of the Law

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- Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the
strict scrutiny standard, an American constituted construct, useful
in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a
class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard
was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender or race as well as other fundamental rights, as
expansion from its earlier application to equal protection. In the
cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls
for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially condemnable act- accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is universally condemned act.

- Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935,

December 7, 2010- the Arroyo administration is but just a member
of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election

to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a

Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of

Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

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- Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10,
2003, Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by virtue of
their designation by an appointing authority.

- PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR

cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the
constitution. It was granted a franchise , subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by Congress.

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense

vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of
protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the
writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to
life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and
the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec.
2.

- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs.

Felix; Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago;
Aniag vs. COMELEC.

- Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The
confiscated items having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to
warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible
in evidence since a barangay tanod is an agent of a person in
authority under the Revised Penal Code.

- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in

plain view is justified only when:

1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest

in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search
conducted.
5. Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid
warrantless searches and seizures:
6. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405
SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);

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 7. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
8. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit
nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent and established
until after they have been turned over to the Chinese embassy
and the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not
considered as evidence in plain view);
9. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
10.waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person
waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or constructively;
and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the right.)
Silahis Intl Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People,
538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given;
11.stop& frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search (Terry
vs, Ohio, 1968; Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a
person by law enforcement officer based upon reasonable
suspicion that a person may have been engaged in criminal
activity, whereas an arrest requires probable cause that a
suspect committed a criminal offense;
12.Armed conflict (war time);
13.Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No.
129756-58, January 28, 2000);
14.Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233
SCRA 716), where a warrantless search was allowed where
there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an
ongoing coup;
15.Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation Drives in the
exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa,
181 SCRA 623);
16.Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23,
2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).

WARRANTLESS ARREST

- Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the
Rules, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. As a
corollary, neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense. xxx In this case, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a
traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
-
HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer

must be continuous from the time of the
commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.

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 There must be no supervening event which breaks
the continuity of the chase.

- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest

proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant.

- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be

availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a
crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officer.

- PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large

measure of immediacy between the time of the offense was
committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an
appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission
of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited
to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of
the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an
earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the
commission of the crime.

- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection

against the State. The protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. Right applies only against the
government and agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By

administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of

the Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner
who has been ordered to be deported.

- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued

to more than one offense.

- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO

BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE
SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that
the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute

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 detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities; TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED-
It is only necessary that there be reasonable certainty or
particularity as to the identity of the property to be searched for
and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.

- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you
can be arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to do
so. You will be freed as soon as you no longer represent a
threat to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are
questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

- Disini Jr., et al. vs. Secretary of Justice- Two constitutional

guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right
to be left alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the state has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the expectation has
been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano,

et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters
alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The
petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier
and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing.
In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If
the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read
the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an

1
 executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to
persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of
those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the
very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from

attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free
speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these
rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated,
his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of
contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be
used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not
be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio,

October 17, 2006- In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.

- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870,

November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office and persons accused of crimes.
However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
said RA insofar as random drug testing for secondary and tertiary
school students, as well as for officials and employees of public
and private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at
least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individuals privacy interest under the premises.

- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the

right to be let alone is not an absolute right where the person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or
to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.

- Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the
prohibition in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from a

1
 court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.

- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, January 21, 2015- There is no

compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the freedom of expression.

- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of

unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of his
right without violating his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.

- GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the

COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within which national
candidates and political parties may air political advertisements on
television and radio, it unduly restricted and constrained the ability
of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people.

- RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire

Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits not only the
unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a) the
possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as
illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person; and
(c) to communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in
writing, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential jail
term, if convicted, ranges from six months to six years.

- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code

- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to

the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official
and members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals, listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any mode,
form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or
intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other
suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication,
message, conversation, discussion or spoken or written words
between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or any person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception and
recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors
and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.

Section 4- Freedom of expression-

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- 1 Utak vs COMELEC, GR 206020 April 14 2015- The
COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate
and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. The
posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public
transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political
expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing to do with
the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.

- A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine

may not be justified if the supposed captive audience may avoid
exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the commuters
are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they
find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not
applicable.

- It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to

freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others
to agree with them.

- he prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are

content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be posted, but the
prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.

- The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport

terminals is not necessary to a stated governmental interest. First,
while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on
posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there are more than
sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure
equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections.
Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation
was not satisfied.

- Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880
practically codify the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-
65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569. By way of a
summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place,
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal

1
 possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead
in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition
to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.

B.P. No. 880

SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.--

A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made
in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a
government-owned and operated educational institution which shall
be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period
as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit

shall comply with the following guidelines:
(b) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names
of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or
streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the public
address systems to be used.
(c) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of
applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(d) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of
the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended
activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
(e) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly
acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

-SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that the public assembly will

1
 create a clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2) working days from the
date the application was filed, failing which, the permit
shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept
the application for a permit, said application shall be
posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of
the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial
or modification of the permit, he shall immediately
inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served
on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies
the application or modifies the terms thereof in his
permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on
appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the
applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be
decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.

- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban
of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies.
- In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding
the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses,
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to
uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He
said that in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should

1
 weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.
Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to
the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These
laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.
- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and
is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand,
B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not
curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far
from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard.

- IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza

gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform
the IBP which should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that
may warrant the changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public
Assembly Act. It found that Atienza failed to indicate how he had
arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of
a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition
to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank
denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny
thereto,

- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election

surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of expression as
they refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters
as regards to a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the
voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues
during the campaign period.The prohibition imposed by Section
5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes
prior restraint on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period; and 3) the government
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than the suppression of freedom of expression.

- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of

speech may either be content-based (the subject of the speech or
utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it
regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the

1
 time, place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any
content-based regulation must show that the government has a
compelling or overriding interest in the subject regulation. A
content neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only show an
important government interest, as long as it leaves open
alternative channels of communication.

- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15,

2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning
television stations against playing the Garci tapes under pain of
revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions and
should be subjected to the clear and present and danger test.

- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR

No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate
implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the
burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to
prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners
constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the
absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.

- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special

application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for
testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law.

- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.

- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth

doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected.

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- A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied
challenge.

- Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only

extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on
the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.

- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial

challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified

by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As
reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes
that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially
harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and
penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it
refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.

- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free

speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the
grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised.
A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted,
there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating
the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied
to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.

- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the

overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,

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 owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only
to free speech cases.

- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a

facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed
for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigant.

- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the

Court, in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court
has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment,and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In
Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is
not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct.
Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.

- American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that

do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of
the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the
statute's facial validity.

- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under

the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the
Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the
crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three
cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases,
were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike
in the present case.

- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited

Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1)
the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the
offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand.

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- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the
crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech.

- Read: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-

vis Section 4(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the transmission
of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
even if unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial
speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the
same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless is entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of his right without violating
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitmate forms of expression.

- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The

prohibition of publication of exit poll or electoral survey would be
unreasonably restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of
exit poll data not only for election day projections, but also for
long term research.

- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986
gives petitioner the power to screen, review and examine all
television programs, emphasizing the phrase all television
programs. Thus, when the law says all television programs, the
word all covers all television programs, whether religious, public
affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the
legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word
or expression. It then follows that since The Inside Story is a
television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over
which it has power of review.

- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No.

165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that Sorianos
statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a G
rating for general viewership. The Supreme Court said the
MTRCB suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating
Daan, not Soriano, as the MTRCB may not suspend television
personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction.

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- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is
essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not necessary
that he be named. It must also be shown that a third party could
identify him as the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following:

1. private communication made by any person to

another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty;

2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without

remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceeding which are not confidential in
nature including any statement made therein or act
performed by public officer.

- A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged

(those which are not actionable or even if author acted in bad faith,
e.g. speech by member of Congress therein or any committee
thereof) or qualified privileged (those containing defamatory
imputations which are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention or justifiable motive, e.g., private
communications and fair and true reports without any
comments/remarks).

- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and

constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA

256 - members of Jehovahs witnesses may validly refuse
participating in flag ceremonies (singing the national anthem,
saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious beliefs.

- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated when it will bring about clear and
present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a duty to
prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas
does not constitute clear and present danger.

- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 Freedom of

religion does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales

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 and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious
organization. For the purpose of defraying cost of registration.

- Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary,

405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards are drawn from the Quran and
Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim Affairs
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organization to
interpret what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The
State has in effect forced Muslim to accept its own interpretation
of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.

- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that
[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thus, it found a grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad.
The Court held that moral disapproval is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party list system. Upholding equal protection,
the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political process,
LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. As such, laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a
transgression of AngLadlads fundamental right of freedom of
expression since, by reason of the COMELEC action, the former
was precluded from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political process
with other party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)

- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared

that the COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin did not violate
freedom of religion, It does not convey any religious doctrine of
the catholic church.

- Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the

obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information
on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the

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 basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience.

- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10,
2005- The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.

Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-

- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA-

Relate to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected
countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs.
Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.

- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The

persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice.
Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for
humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the courts
discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6, 2001).

- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that

everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country.

- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that

no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.

- Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM

NO. MTJ-10-1770-July 18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003-
does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to
be complied by judges and court [personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a
person from doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct
according to rule.

Section 7- Right to Information

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The

constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final contract is consummated. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.

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 - Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under
Section 17, Art. XI has classified the information disclosed in the
SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a
duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of
constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a
permission. Hence, there is a duty on the part of members of the
government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner
provided by law. xxx While public officers in the custody or
control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner
in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by
interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of
the records. After all, public office is a public trust.

- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC

- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official

records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA

15- Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited
supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to strike does
form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation

- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the

procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the
solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private
property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code
governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power
of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there
is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure projects.

- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently

more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably
applies in instances when the national government expropriates
property for national government infrastructure projects.

- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551

SCRA 303- There are at least two crucial differences between the
respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the
statute, the government is required to make immediate payment to
the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled
to a writ of possession, whereas Rule 67, the government is

1
 required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized
government depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which provides, as the
relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant
zonal value of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost
method.

- LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February

29, 2012- When the State exercises the power of eminent domain
in the implementation of its agrarian program, the constitutional
provision which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the
constitution which provides that the State shall, by law, undertake
an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the farmers
and regular farm workers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. Notably, the provision
also imposes upon the State the obligation of paying landowner
compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the governments
agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the fair and full price if the
taken property.

- LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust
account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45
we struck down as void the DAR administrative circular46 that
provided for the opening of the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit
in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No.
6657.47 We pointedly declared that the explicit words of Section
16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only cash or bonds,
as valid modes of satisfying the governments payment of just
compensation.

- Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process, the
Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after
recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a
forbearance on the part of the government. Had the finality of the
judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should have
been imposed from the time the RTC decision fixing just
compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed
from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation
proceedings and took the property.

- LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015- the

Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases
where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation
due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance

1
 on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of
12% interest p.a. from the time of taking.

- Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As

often ruled by this Court, the award of interest is imposed in the
nature of damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the
obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to
ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the
opportunity loss of the owner. However, when there is no delay in
the payment of just compensation, the Supreme Courthas not
hesitated in deleting the imposition of interest thereon for the same
is justified only in cases where delay has been sufficiently
established.

- Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR 179334 Apr 21 2015- The

governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation
proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the
States exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the
property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public
use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify
said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would
certainly diminish or weaken one of the States inherent powers,
the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.nThus,
the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead
to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the
landowner is the right of compensation.

- While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an

outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair
equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time of
payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose
of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property
taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should
be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he
loses is the actual value of the property at the time it is taken.

- The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental
duty is the application of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when such literal application is
impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just
compensation, contrary to those established by law and
jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic
policies a matter which this Court has no competence to take
cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only come into full
play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.

- For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should

be determined from the time the property owners filed the

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 initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold
otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation in
spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to
unjust enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such acts
would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with
constitutional requirements in taking private property.

- Villanueva vs JBC, GR 211833 April 7, 2015- Discretionary

execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39
simply does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. Since PPAs
monies, facilities and assets are government properties, they are
exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or
pending appeal.

- It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be

sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
the claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments. This is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot
be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law. (Commissioner of Public Highways vs San Diego, 1970).

- The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the

manner of payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot
owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural, matter. This is
because the right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to
acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a
proprietary right. RA 8974, which specifically prescribes the new
standards in determining the amount of just compensation in
expropriation cases relating to national government
infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the
provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession, is a substantive law. Further, there is nothing in RA
No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied
from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot
be applied retroactively in relation to this case.

- RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but

only with regard to the expropriation of right-of-way sites and
locations for national government infrastructure projects. On
the other hand, in all other expropriation cases outside of right-of-
way sites or locations for national government infrastructure

1
 projects, the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall still
govern.

- Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The

twin elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by
themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain,
arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The simple
fee does not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse,
expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner
being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the
expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private
owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the
mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the
purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible
from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has
now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public necessity the very
reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first instance, the
expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there
is no more cogent point for the governments retention of the
expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the
government devotes the property to another public use very
much different from the original or deviates from the declared
purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that
the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to
renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will
use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive
to our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to
its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot
plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases
and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is
not in keeping with the idea of fair play

- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners
who were able to prove the commitment of the government to
allow them to repurchase their land.

- Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The
State, through expropriation proceedings may take private property
even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another
private party as long as there is public purpose to the taking.

1
- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a
property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.

- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16,
2009 - For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two
requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors
passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review
by the LWUA.

- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the
detriment of the individuals rights. Given this function, the
provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property
owner.

- While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just

compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.
To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in
keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent

domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community).

- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private

capacity (patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must be
paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or
otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of
Baguio vs. NAWASA).

- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs.

Dulay).

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- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land
Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total
prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees
from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the
National Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations.
It added that the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to
a taking of respondents property without payment of just
compensation.

- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June

26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083,
July 21, 2006 The tax credit given to commercial establishments
for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is
a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State
for public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does
not come directly from the State, but from private establishments
concerned.

- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into
play. It is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long
as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).

- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of

property for socialized housing is for public use.

- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following

order: 1) government lands; 2) alienable lands of the public
domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within
the declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement
program sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites which
have not yet been acquired; 5) BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands (City of Mandaluyong
vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real

estate transactions entered or perfected even prior to its imposition.
The contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of the States
power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been
granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)

- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts

that impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

- Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR

No. 195540, March 13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791 did not

1
 divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right
by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No.
3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of
foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of
sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is
likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period
because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties
foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain
their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights

- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs.

Illinois.

- People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay

based organizatios in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of
bantay bayan, are recognized by local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by Banting and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and objective
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, section 12 of the constitution. The
Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession of
Lauga which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.

- Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial
investigation, nor it can be considered a formal arrest, by the very
nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.

- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer

need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client.
The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should
not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

- PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the

constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has
not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning.

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- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private
person is admission in evidence.

- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is

inadmissible.

- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by

counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).

- Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The
court sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements of the
other accused, explaining that the investigations performed by the
PNP were administrative and not custodial in nature.

- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an

administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.

Section 13- Bail

- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense

but later convicted of non-capital and which he appeals, bail
cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA
281).

- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal

proceedings. The right is not available in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any provision in
the constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not
granting bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade
their prosecutors.

- Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in

extradition cases, bail may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing: 1) that, once
granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling reasons (Govt. of USA vs. Purganan, September 24,
2002).

- Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge

Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007 Potential extraditee may be granted
bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the person
is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes
of the extradition court.

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Section 14- Rights of accused

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

2. The right to be heard

- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of

certainty for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November 19,
2001).

- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused

appellant may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the
failure of the information to allege relationship to the victim. It
would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process (PP
vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476).

- A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign

State is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. An extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal proceeding which will
call into operations all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. The extraditees right to notice and hearing is
present only when the petition for extradition is filed in court- it is
only then when he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against
him (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).
-
- Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11,
2014- the burden of demonstrating political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present
evidence.

3. Right to public trial

- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only

implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001).

- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE

OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
[A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The impossibility of holding such judicial
proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the
interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology

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 tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations
of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open
and public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS
PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and
radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre
cases, subject to the guidelines outlined therein.
-
- Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to
speedy trial maybe waived except when otherwise expressly
provided by law. One's right to speedy disposition of his case must,
therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert
his right, he is considered to have waived it.

4. Right to face to face confrontation

- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the

supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render
the deceaseds testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can be
attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike
out all that has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs.
Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

Section 16- Speedy disposition

- Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending
for preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for
3 years and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was
prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was violation
of the accuseds right to speedy disposition of case. Right to
speedy disposition extends to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

- The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative

hearings when the nature of the penalty is penal in nature (like
forfeiture of property or dismissal from employment) and the
hearing partakes the nature of criminal proceeding (Cabal vs.
Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059).

- Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of

the privilege to practice medical profession (Pascual vs. Board of
Medical Examiners).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541

SCRA 456- The right against self incrimination is extended in an
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are
analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently

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 been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all
cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party of not.

- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature

of documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).

- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May
19, 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and
probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first
ever Supreme Court decision on the admissibility of DNA
evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002,
382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar, held that in assessing the
probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter
alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests

- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant

contended that the blood sample taken from him as well as the
DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent
as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17
of Art. III of the Constitution.

- The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the
right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987,
151 SCRA 279. It held that the right against self- incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt and that it does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.

- Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999,

320 SCRA 383, the Court held that although accused-appellant
insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against
him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or
any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.

- Hence, according to the Court, a person may be compelled to

submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. It cited People v.
Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835,
where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took

1
 pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel. In that
case, the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right
against self-incrimination. It further stated that the accused may
be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised

Penal Code)
Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state
3. naval enlistment;
4. posse comitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patriapotestas

Section 19- Death penalty

- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total

abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper
for Congress to determine its reimposition because of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA
682).

Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

- The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview of
the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non payment
of debt
-
- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the
Constitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a
criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is covered by
the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because

it places the accused under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs.
People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not

concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to declare the
impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted nor
was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express
consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the
claim of double jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3,
2001).

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- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional
dismissal of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one year
for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six
years or a lapse of two years for offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years.

- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against
the accused, the following must be established: 1) the provisional
dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional
dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the offended
party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no
justification to file a subsequent case beyond the period of one or
two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).

- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a

judgment of conviction. It merely approved the agreement between
the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the accused and the
condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)
-
- Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the
offender under both section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of
RPC is unconstitutional because it constitutes a violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy. Same with charging the
offender under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti
Child Pornography constitute double jeopardy.

- Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double

jeopardy if the subsequent information charges the accused with
different offense, even if it arises from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense.

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on
jurisdiction whose retroactive application is constitutional (Lacson
vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be

considered ex-post facto law as long as it operates prospectively
since its stricture would cover only offenses committed after and
not before its enactment.

- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to

court doctrines pursuant to the maxim legisinterpretatiolegis vim
obtinet- the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA
602).

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- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying
circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc,
398 SCRA 62).

- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being

unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was tantamount
to the application of an ex-post facto law- Describing the argument
as specious, the Supreme Court held no ex-post facto law was
involved in the case at bar. It added that the science of DNA
typing involved the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas, an ex-post
facto law referred primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the
evidence presented. (PP vs. Yatar, May 19, 2004)
-