Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 61-70

CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 71-79
Jeross Romano Aguilar
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera and Monsod Law Office for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating Section 38 in relation to
Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as The Labor Code of the Philippines. The charge
of illegal recruitment was set out in the information in the following terms:
That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused well knowing that
he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency (POEA) to
engage in recruitment of workers for placement abroad, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit Glicerio Teodoro, Agustin Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan,
Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz and Marcelino Desepida as workers abroad exacted
and actually received money from the above-named victims, to their damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law. 1
The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimony of the following
witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their testimonies
were summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:
. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was invited by the accused to his
house in Calamba, Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he was recruiting
workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was interested in getting (sic) him. Accused
likewise presented to him that he (accused) was a licensed recruiter (TSN, 22 Oct.
1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him to secure his birth certificate, an NBI clearance
and medical certificate. He was able to secure an NBI clearance which he showed to
the accused. The latter thereafter told him that he would secure the rest of his papers
like passport, visa and medical certificate for him and for this, accused asked him to
prepare the amount of P20,000.00. He did not have that money, so he mortgaged his
lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of the accused, Socorro Arlata. He immediately gave
this amount to the accused who assured him that he would be able to leave within
two months. The accused did not issue a receipt for that amount despite his request.
He did not persist in asking the accused because he trusted him, accused coming
from an affluent family and a member of a well-known Catholic organization, the
"Cursillo" (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However, accused failed to employ him at
Saudi Arabia within two months despite repeated promise (sic) to do so. Thus, he
demanded the return of his money but accused failed. Finally, he decided, together
with the other complainants, to file a complaint against accused before the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). . . .
Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually testified to the
following: sometime also in January 1986, they went to the house of accused for
work abroad as the latter had earlier told them that he was recruiting workers for the
Saudi Arabia. The accused asked money to process their papers. Alcaraz was able
to give the accused on 22 February 1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the accused
failed to issue him a receipt and he did not persist in asking for it because he trusted
the accused on (TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was able to give the accused
on 18 Feb. 1986, the amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which the accused
did not issue a receipt although he promised to issue one the next day. However, the
following day, when he reminded the accused of the receipt, he refused saying that
he (Desepida) should trust [the accused]. Francisco was able to give the accused
P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986 in the presence of the other applicants (TSN, 26
Nov. 1990, p. 5). But, the accused again failed to issue a receipt despite demand.
She was told by the accused to trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However, the accused failed to
return their money notwithstanding. Thus, all of them decided to file a complaint with
the POEA against the accused. There, they executed a joint affidavit (Exh. "A"). 2
During the trial, Duque denied the charges. He controverted the allegation that he had recruited
complainants for overseas employment. He also denied that he had received any monies in
consideration of promised employment. However, he acknowledged that his house had served as a
meeting place for a certain Delfin and one Engr. Acopado who allegedly were the persons who had
promised complainants, work abroad.
On the basis of the positive identification by private complainants of appellant Duque as the person
they had talked to for placement abroad, the person who had collected fees from them and who had
received information from them needed for arranging their departure for abroad, the trial court
concluded that accused Duque was primarily responsible for promising placement and inducing
private complainants to part with their money. The prosecution also submitted a certification from the
licensing branch of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") stating that no
records existed whatsoever of a grant to the accused of a license or authority to recruit for overseas
employment. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Wherefore, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, [of] violation
of [Art.] 38 in relation to [Art.] 39 of P.D. 442 otherwise known as the Labor Code of
the Philippines, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the offended parties: Agustin Ulat the amount of
P20,000.00; Marcelino Desepida the amount of P7,000.00; Norma Francisco the
amount of P9,000.00; and Elmo Alcaraz the amount of P3,000.00 and the cost of
suit. 3
Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) issue: that of prescription of the criminal
offense for which he was convicted.
The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary recruiting permit or
authority form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized, not by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by
a special law, i.e., Article 38 in relation to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290 of the Labor
Code provides, in relevant part, that:
Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
xxx xxx xxx
The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the mode of computation of the three-
year prescriptive period it established.
The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, that Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An
Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run" (emphasis supplied), supplied the
applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:
Section 2: . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Examination of the abovequoted Section 2 shows that there are two (2) rules for determining the
beginning of the prescriptive period: (a) on the day of the commission of the violation, if such
commission be known; and (b) if the commission of the violation was not known at the time,
then from discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment.
Appellant Duque contends that the prescriptive period in the case at bar commenced from the time
money in consideration of promises for overseas employment was parted with by complainants.
Duque thus contends that the prescriptive period began to run sometime in January 1986. The
information was, however, filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna on 22 May
1990, i.e., more than four (4) years later. Duque concludes that the offense of illegal recruitment had
accordingly prescribed by May 1990.
We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads as follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under
the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-license or non-
holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-
seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal
recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishments and entities
found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that illegal recruitment has two (2) basic elements, to wit: (a) recruitment activities as
listed in Articles 38 and 34 of the Labor Code; and (b) the lack of the necessary license or authority
from the POEA to engage in such activities. Recruitment for overseas employment is not in itself
necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license or permit that renders such
recruitment activities unlawful and criminal. Such lack of necessary permit or authority, while
certainly known to appellant Duque back in January 1986, was not known to private complainants at
that time. Indeed, private complainants discovered that appellant did not possess such authority or
permit only when they went to the offices of the POEA for the purpose of filing a claim for return of
the money they had delivered to appellant Duque. Since good faith is always presumed, the
complainants were entitled to assume the appellant Duque was acting in good faith when he
presented himself as a recruiter for overseas placement. Even if it be assumed arguendo that
ordinary prudence required that a person seeking overseas employment ought to check the authority
or status of persons pretending to be authorized or to speak for a recruitment or placement agency,
the offended parties' failure to do so did not start the running of the prescriptive period. In the nature
of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal
in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is
not known at the time, then prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery
of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A literal reading of Section
2 appears to suggest that two (2) elements must coincide for the beginning of the running of the
prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the commission of the violation of the special
law; and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." It is
then argued by appellant that because the co-existence of these two (2) requirements is necessary
under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run.
Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the literal reading that appellant
suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any
case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few months after the POEA
and the complainants had discovered that appellant had no governmental authority to recruit for
overseas work and was merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to
receive money therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate employment abroad for
complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for such a literal reading of Section 2.
As is well-known, initiation of proceedings for preliminary investigation of the offense normally marks
the interruption of the period of prescription. Under appellant Duque's literal reading, the prescription
period would both begin and be interrupted by the same occurrence; the net effect would be that the
prescription period would not have effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the
simultaneous interruption of that same period. A statute providing for prescription of defined criminal
offenses is more than a statute of repose and constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after
the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. A
statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the State in favor of the
offender. 5 The applicable well-known principles of statutory interpretation are that statutes must be
construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the legislative authority, 6 and so as to
give a sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd
results, 7 departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal language of the statute. Appellant's
literal reading would make nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment" may
be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus,
Section 2 may be read as:
law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;
or as:
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
(Emphasis supplied)
We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began to run from
the time the recruitment activities of appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by
the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The
discovery by the complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter, simultaneous in
character and occurred sometime in December 1989 when the complainants went to the POEA with
the complaint for recovery of the placement fees and expenses they had paid to appellant Duque,
and the POEA, acting upon that complaint, discovered and informed the private complainants that
Duque had operated as a recruiter without the essential government license or authority.
Accordingly, the offense of illegal recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint was filed with
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was filed in court in May
1990.
It is relevant to note that the same result would be reached by giving supplemental effect to
provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the application of Article 290 of the Labor Code. 8 Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription

shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive period in respect of the offense of illegal
recruitment began to run on the date of discovery thereof by the private complainants and the
authorities concerned (POEA) sometime in December 1989 and was interrupted on 16 April 1990
when the affidavit-sworn complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, 9 and
certainly by May 1990 when the criminal information was filed in court by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna. Once more, the appellant's defense of prescription must fail.
Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the penalty of life imprisonment is properly
imposable where the illegal recruitment is committed "in large scale," i.e., where it is "committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the case at bar, private
complainants are more than three (3) in number. Moreover, appellant Duque had represented to the
public at large, including private complainants, that he was a licensed
recruiter.11 Duque's house served as his business office and he asked the private complainants to
see him in his house. 12 There, complainants were "briefed" as to the requirements for overseas
employment before their supposed departure and were each required to secure a clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation. 13Considerable sums were collected from each of the complainants
supposedly to "facilitate" the processing of passports, medical certificates and other working
papers. 14 Complainants were, in addition, shown documents which purported to be job placement
orders. This organized modus operandi was repeated in respect of each of the complainants and
presumably in respect of other persons who were similarly victimized by appellant. There is no
question that the recruitment activities of Duque were organized and "large scale" in nature. 15
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the solemodification that the penalty properly imposable and hereby imposed is life imprisonment
and not reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 023873 affirming with modification the December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias "Joseph, "
finding accused-appellants Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder as principal and accomplice, respectively.
On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed
against accused-appellants.
On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants were
causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by.
At around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the
street. Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante retorted:
"Anong pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a
knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter,
Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante,
meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.6
The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante sustained eight stab
wounds: five located on the chest area and three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two fatal
wounds: one which severed the left ventricle of the heart and another wound puncturing the lower
lobe of the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr. Dominic Agbuda, medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy, stated that:
CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.
The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred the following expenses
in connection with the death and burial of Alfante:
a) ₱17,000.00 for the coffin
b) ₱3,000.00 for the nicho
c) ₱250.00 for the mass
d) ₱15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and
e) ₱16,000.00 for the burial lot.
Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death earning ₱500.00 a
day.9
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February 10,
2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for
"baon" the following day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go
to the 7-11 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and
proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of
the knife and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his
side for the duration of the incident.10 Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police
station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his
right palm sustained during the tussle.11
Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his medical examination
and treatment of Vergara’s injury caused by a bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11,
2001.12
After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001, the RTC
found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders
judgment finding the accused GARY VERGARA Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y
PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of
Murder, as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and appreciating in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the Court hereby sentences said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and the other accused Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay, jointly and severally the Heirs of the deceased
Miguelito Alfante the sums of Php51,250.00, as actual damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for
loss of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages, plus costs (sic).13
Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the Supreme Court.14 The
appeal was accepted by this Court in its Resolution15 dated September 4, 2002 but was
subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.16
As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quo’s finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of the crime of murder were not proven.17 On
March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the
Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable to pay the heirs
of the victim, to the exclusion of his common-law-wife, the following amount, to wit:
a. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnification;
b. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
c. ₱51,250.00 as actual damages.18
Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants’ confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections
on April 11, 2007.20
The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.
On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to withdraw his appeal
stating that he is no longer interested to pursue an appeal.22 This Court, in a Resolution dated June
25, 2008, granted the motion of appellant Inocencio and declared the case terminated as far as he is
concerned.23
Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergara’s counsel to file a supplemental brief, the Court, in a
Resolution dated November 19, 2008, resolved to dispense with its filing.24
We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification respecting the
award of damages.
The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis
added.)
Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the
credibility of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.25 People v.
Clores26 reminds us that:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which
are that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is
a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2)
the findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect
since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and,
therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial
courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility.27 On the other hand, this Court is
far detached from the details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the case in its
review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its
limitations and acknowledges the advantage of the trial court whose findings we give due deference.
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the records reveals that
accused-appellant Vergara failed to negate the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that
it had overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it stated
that:
The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted by
[appellant Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and stabbed him
repeatedly in his chest and left forearm with a knife handed to him by [appellant Inocencio]. This is
an overwhelming evidence, and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and
self-defense. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily
fail.28 (Citation omitted.)
Anent accused-appellant Vergara’s claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be
proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof.
He must prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for
self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.30
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful
intent to cause injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely
threatening and intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one’s life."31
In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all the
witnesses, the victim’s actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force
employed by accused-appellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home
albeit drunk when he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of any
untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that he had by accused-appellant Vergara’s
hands. As succinctly stated by the RTC:
The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the appellants
into a fight. Appellant Vergara was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the
victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim."32
It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of accused-
appellant Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-defense.
We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara
constituted treachery qualifying the crime committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon,
treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.33
Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his arm around the
victim’s shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally unaware of the evil that would
befall him. The number and severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was
rendered immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly raising his
arm to ward off the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Though there was an appreciation of
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.34
However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for
death and exemplary damages awarded by the courts a quo.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.35
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial
court, actual damages in the amount of ₱51,250.00 based on the receipts36 they submitted to the
trial court.
1âw phi1
We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTC’s award respecting the indemnity
for the loss of earning capacity. As we have already previously ruled that:
Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be
duly proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s
line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.37 (Citations and emphasis
omitted.)
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals since no documentary
evidence was presented to buttress the claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed
by his common-law wife. Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by the exceptions
mentioned in the above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:
Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost caused by the crime,
must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty and on the best evidence to prove obtainable
by the injured party. The prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support
the contention of the common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-employed mason earning
₱500.00 a day. Hence, this Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the common-law-
wife of the victim which lacks specific details or particulars on the claimed loss earnings.38 (Citation
omitted.)
Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We have ruled as
follows:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence
to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.39(Emphasis omitted.)
We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to conform to existing
jurisprudence.40
We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00 to conform to recent
jurisprudence.41
Lastly, we sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 even in the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs.42 As borne out by human
nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victim’s family.43 While no amount of damages may totally compensate the
sudden and tragic loss of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at
least assuage them.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.44
WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02387 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts of ₱51
,250.00 as actual damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal
rate of 6o/o per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175781

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
- versus VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
FRANCISCA TALARO,*GREGORIO DEL CASTILLO,****
TALARO,**NORBERTO (JUN) ABAD,
ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS, VILLARAMA, JR.,
***
RODOLFO DUZON, RAYMUNDO PEREZ,
ZAMORA** and LOLITO AQUINO, MENDOZA,
Accused. SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, Promulgated:

RENATO RAMOS and LOLITO March 20, 2012
AQUINO,
Accused-Appellants.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)

promulgated on December, 15, 2005, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 125, in
relation to Section 3 of Rule 56, of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed with
modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, thereby finding accused-appellants Norberto (Jun)
Adviento, Renato Ramos and Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentencing them to death, but acquitting accused Rodolfo
Duzon.
Accused-appellants were charged before the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with the
crime of murder under an Information reading as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of April 1994, in the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Laoac, Province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring ,
confederating with each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery, and evident
premeditation, in consideration of a price, and by means of motor vehicle, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one MELVIN ALIPIO, with
a handgun hitting the latter in the different parts of his body and the wounds being mortal
caused directly the death of said MELVIN ALIPIO, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.[2]
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses showed the sequence of events shortly

before and after the killing of victim Melvin Alipio to be as follows.
Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio Talaro, the husband of Francisca

Talaro. In the morning of April 24, 1994, when Zamora went home for breakfast
after driving his tricycle, he found Francisca Talaro, Lolito Aquino, Renato Atong
Ramos, and Norberto Jun Adviento conversing among themselves under a santol
tree in front of his (Zamora's) house. He went near the group to find out what they
were talking about and he learned that his aunt, Francisca Talaro, was transacting
with the other three accused-appellants for the killing of Atty. Melvin Alipio. He
was merely a meter away from the group so he heard the group's conversation. He
learned that Francisca Talaro would give the three accused-appellants an advance
payment of P30,000.00 and then another P30,000.00 after Atty. Melvin Alipio is
killed, with said last payment to be delivered in Barangay (Brgy.) Bactad. The three
accused-appellants then nodded their heads in agreement. After learning of the
group's plan, Zamora got scared and stayed away from the group, but three days after
that meeting in front of his house, he was asked by Francisca Talaro to drive her and
her husband Gregorio to Brgy. Bactad. The Talaro spouses alighted at a place
in Brgy. Bactad, while Zamora stayed in his tricycle and merely waited for them. He
assumed that the couple delivered the payment of P30,000.00 to someone in Brgy.
Bactad.[3]
Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino, when questioned during preliminary

investigation, admitted that he and co-accused Renato Ramos conducted a
surveillance on Atty. Alipio in the afternoon of April 25, 1994.[4]
Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo Duzon
was at the parking area in the poblacion of Urdaneta waiting for passengers, when
accused-appellant Renato Ramos approached him. Accused-appellant Ramos
offered to pay Rodolfo Duzon P200.00 for the latter to drive Ramos' motorcycle to
Laoac, Pangasinan to take some onions and turnips there. Duzon agreed, so after
bringing his own tricycle home to his house in Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove
Ramos' motorcycle to the poblacion of Urdaneta. At the poblacion, Ramos bought a
basket where he placed the onions and turnips. Ramos then told Duzon to drive the
motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed by Garcia Street in Urdaneta. At a house
along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and talked to someone whom Rodolfo Duzon
later came to know as accused-appellant Lolito Aquino. Ramos then told Duzon that
after coming from Laoac, Duzon should leave the motorcycle at that house on Garcia
Street with Lolito Aquino. Ramos and Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, stopping at
a gas station where they fueled up. Ramos alighted from the motorcycle at the gas
station and, taking along the basket of onions and turnips, walked towards Guardian
Angel Hospital (the clinic owned by the Alipios). Five minutes after Ramos alighted,
Duzon heard three gunshots coming from the west, and moments later, he saw
Ramos, who was coming toward him, being chased by another man. When Ramos
got to the motorcycle, he ordered Duzon to immediately drive away, and poked a
gun at Duzon's back. Ramos then instructed Duzon as to the route they should take
until they reached Urdaneta where Ramos alighted, leaving Duzon with instructions
to bring the motorcycle to Garcia Street, leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him
(Ramos) again at the poblacion where he (Duzon) will be paid P200.00 for his
services. Duzon did as he was told, but when he met with Ramos at
the poblacion and asked for the P200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted invectives at
him. A few days later, he again ran into Ramos who warned him to keep his silence,
threatening to kill him (Duzon) too if he tells anyone about the killing. Accused-
appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento also threatened him not to reveal to anyone
whatever he knows about the crime. That was why Duzon decided to keep
quiet.Later, however, he revealed the matter to his brother, Victoriano Duzon, who
accompanied him to the Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) Office in Urdaneta
so he could give his statement. He executed affidavits, assisted by a lawyer from the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO), attesting to what he knew about the crime, in his
desire to be a state witness.[5]
Witness Rene Balanga, who was the helper of the spouses Atty. Melvin and Dr. Lina
Alipio, was cleaning the windows at the clinic of Dr. Alipio around 8 o'clock in the
morning of April 26, 1994. He heard three gunshots coming from the garage of the
clinic, which was around ten meters away from where he was. Immediately after the
gunshots, he saw a man quickly walking out from the garage, going towards the main
gate, but he was not able to clearly see the face of the man. He merely observed that
the man was around 5'4 to 5'5 in height, medium-built, wearing a blue jacket and
faded maong (denim) pants. He ran towards the garage and there, he saw Atty.
Melvin Alipio lying dead. He then chased after the man so he could identify him
better but he did not succeed in doing so because the driver of the motorcycle that
the gunman was boarding was already drawing something out from the rear portion
of the motorcycle. After the assailant sped off, Balanga went to the police station in
Laoac to report the crime and give his statement before the CIS. Sometime later, at
the CIS Office, he identified Rodolfo Duzon as the driver of the motorcycle used by
the gunman to get away.[6]
Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo, whose son was confined at the clinic, was
sitting at a bench in the garage of the clinic on the morning of April 26, 1994. Two
other women who were looking for Atty. Alipio also sat at the bench with him after
he told them that Atty. Alipio was still having his breakfast. After a few minutes, a
man arrived looking for Dr. Alipio, and also sat at the bench.Thereafter, Atty. Alipio
came out to the garage and talked to the two women. When Atty. Alipio finished
talking to them, the man sitting with them on the bench suddenly stood up and shot
Atty. Alipio three times. Atty. Alipio was merely one meter away from the assailant
when the latter shot him. After the shooting, the assailant walked away. Hidalgo then
saw the helper at the clinic, Reny Balanga, run after the assailant, but the latter had
whistled to his companion who was waiting on his motorcycle and the two were able
to speed away aboard said vehicle. Hidalgo identified the assailant from a
picture[7] shown to him.[8] The picture was that of Renato Ramos.[9]
A few weeks after Atty. Melvin Alipio had been killed, Zamora was in the parking
lot in Sta. Maria Norte in Binalonan, when accused-appellant Aquino approached
him and told him to remind Francisca Talaro that she still has to pay him
(Aquino) P10,000.00. Zamora then immediately told his uncle Gregorio Talaro
about Aquino's message and the very next day, Gregorio went to Zamora's house
with the P10,000.00. Gregorio could no longer wait for Aquino so he just left the
money with Zamora, instructing him to hand it over to Aquino when the latter
arrives. Later that day, Zamora saw Aquino so he told him (Aquino) to just get the
money from his house. About three weeks later, Aquino again went to Zamora's
house, this time saying he needs another P5,000.00 just in case he needs to
escape. Zamora then contacted Francisca Talaro and conveyed Aquino's message to
her. The following day, Gregorio again went to Zamora's house and left
the P3,000.00 for Aquino. That afternoon, Zamora again told Aquino to just pick up
the money from his house. Zamora observed that Aquino seemed happy enough with
the P3,000.00 he received.[10]
Zamora said that he thinks the Talaros had Atty. Alipio killed because the latter was
not able to comply with his contractual obligations to the Talaros to complete the
construction of a building. Dr. Lina Alipio, the wife of the victim Atty. Melvin
Alipio, confirmed that indeed, the victim entered into an agreement with Rodolfo
Talaro, the Talaro spouses' son, for the construction of a building, but the
construction was not finished within the agreed one-year period because of the
sudden rise of prices for materials. Atty. Alipio asked Rodolfo for additional
payment so he could finish construction, but the latter refused to pay more. Dr.
Alipio stated that eventually, Atty. Alipio and Rodolfo agreed that Atty. Alipio
would return all the money he received from Rodolfo and the whole property would,
in turn, be turned over to Atty. Alipio. Atty. Alipio was unable to return the money
despite several demands made by Rodolfo, and Dr. Alipio believes this is the reason
why the Talaros had her husband killed. Dr. Alipio further testified on matters
regarding expenses for the wake and burial, and the earnings of her husband.[11]
Dr. Arnulfo Bacarro conducted the autopsy on the victim and stated that three slugs
were taken from the body of the victim, and the cause of death was internal
hemorrhage.[12] Police officers testified on how they conducted the investigation,
stating that accused-appellant Aquino and Zamora's statements were taken in the
presence of their respective lawyers. They maintain that no bodily harm was
inflicted on the accused-appellants while they were being investigated.[13]
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lolito Aquino stated that he was taken by CIS
men without a warrant of arrest; that he was mauled by police authorities while under
detention, but could not undergo a medical check-up due to fear from threats that he
would be killed by police authorities if he did so; that he was assisted by a PAO
lawyer when he made his confession, but he did not read the contents of the
document, Sgt. Tomelden just ordered him to sign the same; that the PAO lawyer is
not his own choice; that he does not know Rodolfo Duzon and Raymundo Zamora;
and that he was not present at the meeting held in Raymundo Zamora's yard. He
admitted, however, that the motorcycle used by the gunman belongs to him; and that
he first agreed to be a state witness because he was promised to be paid P20,000.00
and that he would be placed in the witness protection program.[14]
Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento's defense is denial and alibi. He claimed

that he was not present during the April 24, 1994 meeting held to plan the killing of
Atty. Alipio, because on said date and time, he was in the house of Congressman
Amadito Perez, for whom he works as driver-messenger, and that morning, he also
drove the Congressman's family to church to hear mass. On April 26, 1994, he also
reported for work at the house of the Congressman from 8 o'clock in the morning
until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. He likewise denied personally knowing any of his
co-accused except for Duzon whose face is familiar to him.[15]
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations discussed above, this court
hereby finds and holds the accused Francisca Talaro, Norberto (Jun)
Adviento, Renato Ramos, Rodolfo Duzon and Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under the
provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby
imposes on each of the accused the death penalty and to pay proportionately
the costs of the proceedings.
The court further orders the accused to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of the deceased the sum of P83,000.00 as actual
damages; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as death
indemnity; P10,000.00 as [attorney's fees] paid to their private prosecutor
and P2,400,000.00 as loss in the earning capacity of the deceased without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Taking into consideration that accused Francisca Talaro is already 75 years

old, the death penalty meted upon her shall be commuted to reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised
Penal Code.
And considering that the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the
accused Gregorio Talaro is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of the
offense filed against him, the court hereby declares accused Gregorio
Talaro not guilty. The court likewise declares Raymundo Zamora acquitted
of the offense filed against him.
Let an order of arrest be issued against accused Renato Ramos who escaped
from jail during the pendency of this case, to be served by the NBI, CIC
and PNP of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view of the penalty
of death imposed on accused-appellants. However, in accordance with the ruling
in People v. Mateo,[17] and the amendments made to Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122,
Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the Court transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review.
On December 15, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 38 of Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. U-8239,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Rodolfo Duzon is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and his release is
hereby ordered unless he is being held for some other legal cause.
Further, in lieu of the awards made by the trial court in favor of the heirs
of deceased Atty. Melvin Alipio, accused-appellants are ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the following
amounts: (1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (2) P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (3) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
SO ORDERED.[18]
The case is now before this Court on automatic review. The prosecution opted not
to file a supplemental brief with this Court. Accused-appellants Lolito Aquino and
Renato Ramos jointly filed their supplemental brief where it is argued that the two
should be acquitted because (1) the prosecution evidence is insufficient to prove that
Lolito Aquino was part of the conspiracy to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio; and (2) the
identity of Renato Ramos was never established. Accused-appellant Noberto (Jun)
Adviento argued in his Appellant's Brief filed with the CA, that the prosecution's
evidence is insufficient to establish conspiracy, and there are no aggravating
circumstances to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
The Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that the evidence on record proves
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants Lolito Aquino, Renato Ramos, and
Norberto (Jun) Adviento, together with Francisca Talaro, conspired to kill Atty.
Melvin Alipio.
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the unlawful
killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances
such as treachery or evident premeditation. The presence of any one of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing
as murder.[19]
In People v. Sanchez,[20] the Court held that [t]he essence of treachery is the sudden
attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.There can be no cavil that the
evidence on record shows treachery in the killing of Atty. Alipio, thus qualifying the
crime as murder. The assailant, identified as accused-appellant Renato Ramos, just
suddenly fired upon Atty. Alipio at a very close distance, without any provocation
from said unarmed victim, who was then just conversing with some other people.
There is also evident premeditation because the evidence shows that a couple of days
before the actual shooting of Atty. Alipio, Raymundo Zamora already saw and heard
accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos, and Lolito Aquino,
talking to Francisca Talaro and coming to an agreement to kill Atty. Alipio.
Pitted against the prosecution evidence, accused-appellants' only defense is that the
evidence is insufficient to prove they are part of the
conspiracy to commit the murder. Said defense is sorely wanting when pitted against
the prosecution evidence.
In People v. Bautista,[21] the Court reiterated the hornbook principle of conspiracy,
to wit:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where
all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the
offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or
common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts
which such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose
or design to commit the felony.
xxxx
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by

his confederates which follows incidentally in the
execution of a common design as one of its probable and
natural consequences even though it was not intended as part
of the original design. x x x[22] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been established by the testimony of
Raymundo Zamora, positively identifying all three accused-appellants as the ones
he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro on April 24, 1994 to kill Atty.
Melvin Alipio for the price of P60,000.00, and pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one
who demanded and received part of the payment after Atty. Alipio had been
killed. The credibility of Raymundo Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by
Lolito Aquino's admission[23] that he and Renato Ramos even conducted surveillance
on the victim a day before Renato Ramos carried out the shooting, and that the
motorcycle used as a getaway vehicle belonged to him. Rodolfo Duzon also pointed
to Renato Ramos as the gunman; he also pointed to Renato Ramos and Norberto
(Jun) Adviento as the ones who threatened to kill him if he talks to anyone about the
shooting. All the proven circumstances point to the conclusion that accused-
appellants acted in concert to assure the success of the execution of the crime; hence,
the existence of a conspiracy is firmly established.
Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of

Raymundo Zamora and Rodolfo Duzon cannot be belied by accused-appellants'
mere denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the witness' positive identification of the accused-appellants.[24] Moreover, accused-
appellants could not give any plausible reason why Raymundo Zamora would testify
falsely against them. In People v. Molina,[25] the Court expounded, thus:
In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution

witnesses and since no ill motive on their part or on that of their
families was shown that could have made either of them institute the
case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime
he did not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It
is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being inherently
weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied)
Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his participation in

the crime out of fear of the police authorities who allegedly manhandled him,
however, the trial court did not find his story convincing. The trial court's evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it
is the trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of
witnesses.[27] The Court again explained the rationale for this principle
in Molina,[28]to wit:
As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect
because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the
manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can
better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of the
trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled
to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of
Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any
showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances
which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.[29]
The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule.
Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that he was not properly identified in open
court, and considering that there are so many persons named Renato Ramos, then
there can be some confusion regarding his identity. There is no truth to this
claim. Ramos was properly identified in open court by Raymundo Zamora, as one
of the men he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro for the killing of Atty.
Alipio.[30] Hence, there can be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is being convicted
for the murder of Atty. Alipio.
Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the fact that
they escaped from detention while the case was pending with the trial court. Renato
Ramos escaped from prison on December 20, 1994,[31] while Lolito Aquino escaped
on May 5, 1996.[32] It has been repeatedly held that flight betrays a desire to evade
responsibility and is, therefore, a strong indication of guilt.[33] Thus, this Court finds
no reason to overturn their conviction.
Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellants

Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos. In People v.
Tinsay,[34] the Court explained that:
On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitled An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, took
effect. Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby

prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred
Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees
insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be

imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated

makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
xxxx
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished

with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. No. 9346 has
retroactive effect, to wit:
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in

this case pursuant to the principle in criminal
law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal
laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive
effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the

time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section

3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of
offenses pushed with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be

sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[35]
The awards for damages also need to be modified. In People v. Alberto Anticamara
y Cabillo, et al.,[36] the Court held that in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence
on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be
increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages,
in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, should be P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 15, 2005 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00071 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole in accordance
with R.A. No. 9346; and INCREASING the award of moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, and the award of exemplary damages
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The rest of the award of the Court of Appeals is
hereby maintained.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,

vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-
Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan
and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the
crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to
Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:
That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a
10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut
shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby
hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong
who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the
instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of
Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is
registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage
of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-
mentioned.
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner
was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed
a motion for leave of court to file an amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of
abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned
the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only
extracted from the car by the by-standers."7
On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the
motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted
the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was
granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the
prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless
imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.
In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the
crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to
establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:
An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence
presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said
allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven.
It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.
xxxx
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who
committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who
has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused
who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime.
The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the
time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the
allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in
evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were
not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor
presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not
established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence
was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it
was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to
Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified
only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the
incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime
and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled
this case from its inception.
xxxx
The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively show
that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the
proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and
can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane
of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2
shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1’s ramming into the rear left portion
of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out
together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting
the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards
the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of
the accused.
xxxx
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the crime, i.e.,
the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove
these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the
accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO
DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary
liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
representative.
SO ORDERED.13
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTC’s
dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed
as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of
the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the
remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC
ruled that the MTC’s recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it
failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that
the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to
the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC
however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accused’s civil liability, especially since the
judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and
resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s acquittal is
AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings
on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack
of merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005.
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and
resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the
MTC are
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos
v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or
physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case
is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support
in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure,
which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed ₱10,000.00. As there was no
proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount of
₱1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The dispositive portion
of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of
the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over
the case is determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on
Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the
RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the
RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious
killing as well as abandonment of the victims.
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal
case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which
confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally
unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also
faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense
charged pertained to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29
December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but
aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however
that respondents’ attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was
unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their motion
to amend the information. The information filed before the trial court had remained
unamended.23 Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the
original Information without any aggravating circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless
imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article
imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less
serious physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were
he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4
years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2)
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691
extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It
explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall
within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the
same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the
case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the
offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such
as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted,
it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to
an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence
may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.29 But while the
dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still
reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual
findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse
and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial
court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in
resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules
of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby
disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records
also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the
matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused
files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35
A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished
by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence
which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible
for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime
as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck
at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is
the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear
left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly
establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need
to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s
acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case
No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the
offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174659

Plaintiff-appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,**
REYES,***
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BRION, JJ.
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK

and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK,
Accused-appellants. Promulgated:
July 28, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for
others.
Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost
her two-year old son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on December 13,
1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 months later when he could
neither recognize her nor remember who he was.
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation
of mother and child be punished to the full extent of the law.
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and
her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonalds outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St.,
Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida
proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher
followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mothers sight
when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for
him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their
continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest
police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the
public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. Despite the
publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christophers whereabouts.

Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery.
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like
a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000
in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed
Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center
in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent
picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the
cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed
her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not
raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning
of April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3[1] Juliet Palafox was
designated to act as Teresas niece.
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001.
On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting
place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs
Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad
Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who
they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma
Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in
Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato.
Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was
already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato.
Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had
Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they
refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched
Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told
Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her
but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the
carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with
Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was
unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in
the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name with
Taurak as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money.
She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter,
Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under
Tauraks watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money
to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the
PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the
incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher
was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly,
eventually died.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom
under the following Information:
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year
old minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting
ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for his
release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) to the
damage and prejudice of Christopher Basario in said amount and such
other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective evidence.
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak
testified that at the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares
in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering about aimlessly,
she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She took the boy under her
care and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00
p.m., she brought the boy home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost
but no one was there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep
the boy until his parents could claim him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander,
Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked for Christophers
picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak arranged a meeting at
Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 7, 2001. She did not bring
the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa was
the boys mother did she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked when
members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was
innocent. There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.
Mamantak corroborated her sister Tauraks testimony. She claimed that she
was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not
know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom she had not
seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia but only
by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later,
Taurak talked to her and then left, returning after a few hours with Christopher whom
Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was
returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting
for her ride home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly
arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and there was no
warrant for her arrest.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a
decision[2] on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused

LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA
[MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both
accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher
Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of
PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs against the accused.
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone
by them during the pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision[4] dated
March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering
the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the
imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of
Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death.[5] Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative
Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and
accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.[6]
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuato
death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three

days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon

the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except

when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention

or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.
The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the
victim[7] or a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain
a person;[8]
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a
public official.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise,

if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and
becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.[9]
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims
liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.[10] It includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form
and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited to mere physical
restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to
such restraints necessary for the common welfare.[12]
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and

was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of
them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire time the
boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or restrained of his
liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants custody and
return to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers, go
with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such a
very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his
family, specially his mother.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even
brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded P30,000 in exchange for his return
to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantaks actions (e.g., her presence in
the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt that she was
aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual
findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as
they are sufficiently supported by evidence.
Tauraks story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was
like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that
he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that there was a cow tied to
the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the proper authorities or
surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and Developments social
workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time during the 16 months he was
with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak
when they were total strangers to each other?
Similarly, Mamantaks account that she was at Pitangs Carinderia only by

coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw Christopher invites nothing
but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on her role
in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release of the kidnap victim (e.g.,
confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money)
showed otherwise. The evidence clearly established that Mamantak was a principal
in the kidnapping of Christopher.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself.[13] The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled
that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve credence. Moreover,
factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive,
value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[14]
The Court of Appeals considered the demand for P30,000 as a qualifying

circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the other
hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to what must have
been actually spent for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two years.
It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses
incurred for taking care of the child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it
reimbursement for board-and-lodging.)
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the

redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity.[15] No specific
form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as
long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims
freedom.[16] The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
In this case, the payment of P30,000 was demanded as a condition for the
release of Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
it as a demand for ransom.
One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code[17] is death, RA 9346[18] has banned the death penalty and
reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 civil

indemnity[19] was proper. Pursuant to People v. Garalde,[20] the award
of P50,000[21] moral damages is increased to P200,000 considering the minority of
Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and
by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to P100,000 exemplary
damages.[22]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak and
Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They are further ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, P50,000 civil indemnity, P200,000 moral damages
and P100,000 exemplary damages to their young victim Christopher Basario.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732

AGENCY, INC., and ADMER
PAJARILLO,
Petitioners,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson)
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,

VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN
LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE
TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO
and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated:
Respondents. December 14, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security

Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the
Decision[1] dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004 issued
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m.,
Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology
Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the
banks cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm
holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled
out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping.
Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal
case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and
assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action
in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently
convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.[3] On appeal
to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a
Decision[4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch

273, Marikina City, a complaint[5] for damages against Pajarillo for negligently
shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint

and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines death was not due
to Pajarillos negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a
compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorneys fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision,[7] the dispositiveportion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs, the heirs of EvangelineTangco, and against
defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering
said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR

HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual
damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death
indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral
damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00),
as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorneys
fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. [8]
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It

rejected Pajarillos claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence
to Pajarillos bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to
the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and
the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the
situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary
care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her
instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case
No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the
instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and

severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard
had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo,
there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguards evidence
simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is
not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons
and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to
see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA
issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc.s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art.
103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.[9]
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the
applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty
of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence
in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action
is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the
offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed
extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the
fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil
liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a
family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and
irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability
of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a

Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding

petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and
other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied

Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment
of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that

petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from
any liability.[10]
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in
shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the
damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[11] of the Civil Code, in which case, its
liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo.However, since it has established that
it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should
be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing
a separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages
arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer
under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code[12] is subsidiary and the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available
to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a

criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the

offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed
the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime
of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence
thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as
those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the
Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to
file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of
the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.[13]
It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The

nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action.[14] The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in
his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief.[15]
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and

posted in the Ecology BankKatipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was
employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a

good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing

Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly
without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the
use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco,
killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly
and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]
Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are invoking their
right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the
injury caused by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article
2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he
is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquilianaincludes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal
liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.[18] The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not
an act or omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether

the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict,
we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime

in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case
(Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a
separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the

assumption that defendant Pontino'snegligence in the accident of May 10,
1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of
that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the
offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in
a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is
reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That
was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is
inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under
Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may
hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee,
subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict.The fact that appellants reserved their
right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not
preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-
delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of

Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or
importance to this case.[21] It would have been entirely different if respondents cause
of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in
finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.[22]
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of

action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the
injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting
Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or

not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition
for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of
law.[23] Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason
for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA
that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in going to the

bank was to renew her time deposit.[25] On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that
Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting
instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of
about one meter or one arms length[26] he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of
his gun and shot her.[27] It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could
still make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any
movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on

his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such
claim is befuddled by his owntestimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident,
he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from
the bank[28] and saw her talking to a man thereat;[29] that she left the man under the
fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare
testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen
roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting
incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head
guard or the banks branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the
same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she
could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank,
was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank [30] manning
the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she
would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage
a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after
surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the
bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have
no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[31]
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and
was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when
petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached
the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who
was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and
killed the deceased out of pure instinct;[32] that the act of drawing a gun is a
threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against
petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that the fear that was created in the mind of
petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was
suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.[34]
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is

absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such
claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his
testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillos apprehension that Evangeline will
shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the
alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillos imagination which
caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence.

Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in
such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that
had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the
gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of
the bank; that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed
at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that

Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously
prior to the shooting incident. Evangelines death was merely due
to Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will
rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately
shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of
its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary
training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the
RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did
not exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard
further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel,
wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security
guards which include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post and
with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees
performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguards
operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty
of proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent
in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not properly implemented by
reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable

not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for

the quasi-delictcommitted by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in
the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption
may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care
and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of
its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine

them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records .[35] On the other
hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom
the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern
of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report
on their supervisory functions.[36] To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in
the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a
psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin
de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification
on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI
clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence
required in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while
Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified
on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards
Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,[37] Weapons Training,[38]Safeguard Training

Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,[39] Disciplinary/Corrective
Sanctions,[40] it had also been established during Cameros cross-examination
that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and
[41]
regulations. Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct examination
that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of
the instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy
of the same,[42] the records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom
instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and
continuous evaluation of the security guards performance. Pajarillo had only
attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his
first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with
Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security
of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees.[43]
It had not been established that after Pajarillos training in Toyota, Safeguard
had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard
a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In
fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty
in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.[44]
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just depositing her

firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was
no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human
psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors
who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security
guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily
inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious
act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual
damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by
respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by
receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is
likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides
that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed
at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[45] The intensity of the pain experienced by
the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and
bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.[46]
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by

Evangelines death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a
mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People
v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47] we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of
a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation
v. Court of Appeals,[48] we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as
moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also
their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girls death left a void
in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of
one million pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of her husband and
minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount

of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to
socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.[50]
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the
award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July
16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC
ENOC, WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO LIMAMA, Accused,
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and PASOT

SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed with modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
conviction2 of appellants Jojo Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig (Carding),
and Pasot Saloli (Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).
Factual Antecedents
Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio Limama, were charged
with double murder and double frustrated murder in an Amended Information,3 the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill
with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
simultaneously strafe the house of Eugenio Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and
RollySantander and seriously wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which would have
caused their death had there been no timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their
arraignment,5 faced trial. The other accused could not be located and remain at-large to this day.
Factual Antecedents
The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry),
together with Eugenio Santander (Eugenio) and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenio’s
house in SitioOverland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun bursts and
saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family werehaving dinner.
Jerry and Mario recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused.
The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted,
"At last, I have retaliated!" In the aftermath, the children of Eugenio’s other son Remegio6 Santander
(Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy,7 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel, sustained gunshot
wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while Rolly was pronounced
dead-on-arrival. Marissa sustained gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left wrist, while Micel
was wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.
Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time of the
incident, he claimed to be in the house of his parents-in-law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub,
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime on October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound he earlier
sustained in his left knee and anus. He maintained that it was only in January 1999 that he was able
to walk without the aid of crutches. However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will against the Santander
clan since he believed that they were the ones responsible for the massacre of his family in February
1998.
Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He contended that at the
time of the shooting, he was in Dalmandang, Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours
walk away from the crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was withhis wife at
the house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe time the crime was committed.
Bothclaimed total ignoranceof the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder and double frustrated
murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death. It further ordered them to indemnify,
jointlyand severally, the heirs of Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
the surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of ₱50,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. However, it found merit
in appellants’ argument that the crime committed could not have been a complex crime since the
death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and distinctacts of
shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended Information and sufficiently proven during
trial, appellants should be convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA disposed ofthe case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and
Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as follows –
Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli, are found guilty
beyondreasonable doubt of:
a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua;
b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua;
c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporalas maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporalas maximum. All accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of Crisjoy Santander and Rolly Santander the sum of ₱100,000.00 and the
surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel Santander ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been convicted of the complex crime
of double murder and frustrated murder as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already
concedes to the same,11 the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is as follows:
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE
CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.12
It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the pendency of this
appeal.13 "[I]n view of [this] supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Carding’s]
appeal. Whether x x x he was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since, following
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that Carding] had incurred any
criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because [the] appeal was still
pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him [before] he died, his civil
liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,was likewise extinguished by his death."14
Appellants’ Arguments
Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings and vendetta Jojo harbored
against the Santander family. They contend that this motive for committing the crime is not a
substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojo’salibi that it was impossible for him to
be at the crime scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and anus is amply corroborated by a
medical prognosis.
Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim of total ignorance on
almost about everything to beincredulous, still, his conviction must not rest on the weakness of his
defense but on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.

Appellants’ conviction was based on
their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.
True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of Jojo for committing the
crime as well as Pasot’s incredulous claim of ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note,
however, that the said court neither based the appellants’ conviction on the existence of such motive
nor on Pasot’s weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the prosecution witnesses’ identification
of appellants as the assailants, viz:
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we see a less than glaring
hint of vendetta. As part of his defense, the accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was
massacred by Jerry Santander, brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting
the crime, Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against Jerry and
Carlos Santander but also against their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the Santander family
has been established giving credence to prosecution witnesses’ allegation that after the strafing Jojo
Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to wipe out the said family
became even more apparent.
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his family, he did not file any case
against them. It was only after he was arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos
Santander.
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as Dr. Quirapas appeared
determined to rule out the possibility that he could walk without crutches five months after his
discharge, the same was based on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain
exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself that the healing period
may vary depending on the age and physical condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was
then 23 years old.
What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander
of all of the accused.
The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig claimed total ignorance of
almost anything only served to arouse incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write,
tell time, day, month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand Visayan, which is
of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did
not know what day [it] was when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed
they did not know the complainants or of the massacre that took place.
xxxx
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the evasiveness by which all three
accused answered in obvious effort to avoid criminal responsibility. Behind the façade of ignorance
and lack of education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe innocence to the
accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness characterize their testimonies.
All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the positive and spontaneous
identification of the assailants/accused by credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio
Santander.15
There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Mario’s identification of the appellants considering that (1)
Jerry was just six meters away from them;16 (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all
the accused as most of them are his relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he was
small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecution
witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more
credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary weight."19
Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that "[a]libi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of a credible witness."20
There was conspiracy among the accused.
"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it."21 It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime.22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such leadto a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interest."23
Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series of events
that clearly established conspiracy among them. First, they were all armed with firearms. Second,
they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of the
intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the
same time and fled together. Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and immediately after strafing
the house of Eugenio evince their unanimity in design, intent and execution.24 Treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods orforms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the
execution, without risk to himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party might make."25
Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the
victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their persons. This is considering that the
victims were unaware that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their
firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack, without the slightest
forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x x in such a position that they could not have defended
themselvesfrom the aggression x x x."26
The crime committed is two counts of

murder and two counts of frustrated
murder.
As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This qualifies the killing of
Cresjoy and Rolly to murder.
With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was silent as to the nature of
injuries sustained by them, the CA correctly ruled on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal
report of Marissa shows that she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right breast and left
wrist27 while the Certificate of Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that she sustained gunshot
wounds in the area of the sternum and elbow.28As aptly found by the CA, the girls would have died if
not for the timely medical attention provided to them. The crimes committed by the appellants
against them were thus frustrated murders.
The Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetuato death. With both penalties being indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance
1âwphi1
other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two penalties which is reclusion
perpetua was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for each count of murder.29 However,
appellants are not eligible for parole.30
As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser by one degree shall be
imposed on appellants.31 Accordingly, the penalty that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor each
count of frustrated murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of
modifying circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum penalty
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayorin any of its
periods, the range of which is from six (6) years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term
imposed by the CA on appellants must therefore be modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporalas maximum, which is within these ranges,32 for each count of frustrated murder.
Awards of Damages
For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs are entitled to an award
of civil indemnity, however, the amount of the award must be ₱75,000.00 for each death pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence.33 The awards of moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 each and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 each are proper.34 In addition, the heirs of the
victims are entitled to temperate damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual
damages.35
For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and exemplary damages by
the CA must be decreased to ₱40,000.00 and ₱20,000.00, respectively for each victim.36 They are
likewise entitled to temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 each in lieu of actual
damages.37
All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom the date of finality of
thisjudgment until fully paid.38
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00187-MIN which
affirmed withmodification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur,
Branch 19, finding appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of murder and two counts offrustrated murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas
follows:
For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the prison tenn of reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder without eligibility for parole;
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
₱5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of each victim;
(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages for each death.
For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count
of frustrated murder; and,
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay moral damages and
exemplary damages to each of the victims in the reduced amounts of ₱40,000.00 and
₱25,000.00, respectively.
All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum commencing
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final judgment, his criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto as found by the Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are extinguished. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed insofar as
Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.
Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y
TOMAS, Accused-Appellant.:
G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-Appellant.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-

Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 06-93, finding accused-
appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas guilty of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In an Information3 dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-appellant
was charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling,
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having
conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while
inside their residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly
stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner and form in the execution thereof
which tender directly and specially to insure its commission without danger to the person of said
accused, the result of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body
which directly caused his instantaneous death.
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.
Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at
around 5:00 o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the Camiling
Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand,
suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his father. Hearing accused-
appellant's statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant and
turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.5
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-appellant
suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife. Accused-appellant
proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed accused-
appellant's father. Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!"
PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed
the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado (Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the
residence of Jose Guting (Jose), accused-appellant's father, to verify the reported crime, while
other police officers informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-appellant's mother),
who was still in the market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son (accused-
appellant's brother), who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito,
PO1 Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had
witnessed the crime, but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and
saw Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito
brought Jose to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Subsequently, Flora and
Emerlito executed their respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for Parricide against
accused-appellant.6
On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1 Torre for
safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his father. Neither
did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he used in stabbing Jose. All that
accused-appellant said was, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also
admitted that he did not request for the examination of the knife because it was clean; any trace or
stain of blood on it would have been washed away by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was
further questioned as to why he did not put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he
killed his father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it escaped his mind as he was still new at the job
then and he was carried away by the fast flow of events.7
Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by accused-appellant,
their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-appellant's surrender from the
police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared that she spent for the wake and burial
of Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had been earning around P200.00 a day at the
time of his death.8
Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose's body. Dr.
Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen,
and extremities. Jose's internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab wounds, resulting in his
instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also showed several pictures of Jose's body which were taken
before he conducted the autopsy.9
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of Parricide
based on his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-
appellant's admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still
able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken collectively, pointed to accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the brutal killing of his father. The dispositive portion of the RTC
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and
hereby sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another amount of
P30,000.00 as temperate damages.10
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23, 2012, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68 convicting herein accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.11
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of
errors he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.12
We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal.
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the
assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant violation of his
constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.13
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to
"custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody
and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police
officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission.14 As we expounded in People v. Marra15:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to
operate. (Citation omitted.)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when
he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father
to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and
was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi
asked accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-
appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had
no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in
his father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in
front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody.
Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy,16 where we held that an
uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in
writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. The situation of accused-
appellants in Cabintoy is not similar to that of accused-appellant herein. The accused-appellants
in Cabintoy, when they executed their extrajudicial confessions without assistance of counsel, were
already suspects under custodial investigation by the San Mateo Police for robbery with homicide
committed against a taxi driver. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own volition,
approached unsuspecting police officers standing in front of the police station with a knife in his
hand and readily confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested and
subjected to custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession.
Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is
not in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed into evidence
the uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under the following circumstances:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the
mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control"
over the local police and may arguably be- deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When
appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that
the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we
hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death made to PO1
Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police officers, falls under Rule
130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the
notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.18 Accused-
appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part
of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three
requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are present
in this case. Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is,
his father's death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only a few
minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence, before he had
the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in
shock when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in his
hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police
Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The police officers who immediately went to the
house of Jose, accused-appellant's father, found Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his
stab wounds. As res gestae, accused-appellant's spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence
against him.
Accused-appellant's confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial evidence.
To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be

such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.20 Rule
133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction, thus:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
chanRo blesvi rtua lLawl ib rary
(a) There is more than one circumstance; ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have been
satisfied in this case given the following circumstantial evidence:
1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to death.
2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station and
surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to the police authorities of
the said police station.
3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to appease his
responding mother. "It has always been said that criminal case are primarily about human nature."
Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his grieving mother. Such
inaction is contrary to human nature.
4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not object to his
continued detention.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.21 The incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by circumstantial
evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. We will
not disturb but shall accord the highest respect to the findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility
of the witnesses and their testimonies, it having had the opportunity to observe their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial.22
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim.23 All the
elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son.
Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC, establishes that
accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora.
The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With
one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the
imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant was proper.
We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.24
Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the
heirs of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each.25 The temperate damages awarded by the RTC
in the amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest
jurisprudence.26 It is fitting to additionally award exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00
considering the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the testimony of
his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our pronouncements in People v. Verde27 that:
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Francisco
Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages.
The testimony of the victim's wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband
Francisco Gealon sufficiently establishes the basis for making such an award. It was established
that Francisco Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his death in 1991. His average income was
P200.00 a day. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in
several cases decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of
documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the
fact that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.28
In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily wage of
P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50 minimum wage rate for non-
agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for Region III. We take judicial notice
that there is no documentary evidence available to establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle
driver. We thus compute the award of damages for the loss of Jose's earning capacity as follows:
Net
Gross
earning life less living expenses (50% of gross
= x annual -
capacity expectancy annual income)
income
(x)
x= 2(80-67) x [73,000.00-36,500.00]
3
= 8.67 x 36,500.00
= P316,455.00
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for damages
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, finding
accused-appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity. All monetary
awards for damages shall be subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 200157, August 31, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOERY DELIOLA Y
BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA," Accused-Appellant.:
G.R. No. 200157, August 31, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOERY
DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA," Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 200157, August 31, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A.

"JAKE DELIOLA," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the 29 June 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435,
affirming the 22 December 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Silay City,
Negros Occidental, in Criminal Case Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, which found accused-appellant
Joery Deliola y Barrido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in both cases.
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape. The accusatory portions of
the Informations narrate: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
Criminal Case No. 5214-69
That sometime in the month of June, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, 15 years old, with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation,
with the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the accused
being the uncle of herein victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [MMM],3 a minor, 11 years old,
against her will, to the damage and prejudice.4 chan rob leslaw
Criminal Case No. 5215-69
That on or about the 1st day of July, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, 15 years old, with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation,
with the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the accused
being the uncle of herein victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [MMM], a minor, 11 years old,
against her will, to the damage and prejudice.5 chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.6 At the joint pre-trial7 of the
cases, the following stipulation of facts were admitted: (1) that the court has jurisdiction over the
case (2) the identity of accused-appellant as the accused in the two criminal cases; (3) that
accused-appellant is the uncle of MMM; (4) that MMM, was 11 years old when the incidents giving
rise to the present criminal actions were allegedly committed; (5) that at the time of the incidents
on June and 1 July 2002, accused-appellant and MMM were neighbors; (6) that MMM was then a
grade school pupil; and (7) that accused-appellant was not attending school at the time of the
submitted incidents giving rise to these criminal actions. Trial on the merits ensued afterwards.
The Facts
The facts culled from the records and as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
When the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years old,8 while the accused-appellant, MMM's
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
uncle,9was 15 years old.10 The prosecution submits that sometime in the first week of June 2002,
at about three o'clock in the afternoon, MMM went to the nipa plantation to defecate but before she
was able to do so, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, suddenly appeared. He approached
MMM, poked a knife at her neck, ordered h bend over, and took off her shorts and underwear.
Fearing for her life, MMM obeyed the orders of accused-appellant. MMM tried to resist but accused-
appellant was still able to force his penis inside MMM's vaginal MMM felt pain and cried. After
satisfying his lust, accused-appellant put on his briefs and shorts then left. When she got home,
MMM immediately took a bath and noticed bloodstain on her underwear. Afraid of accused-
appellant's threats of killing her, MMM kept mum and did not disclose to anyone the tragedy that
happened to her that day.11 chanro bleslaw
On or about the 1st day of July 2002, MMM was at the nipa plantation again when accused-
appellant suddenly arrived. He poked MMM's back with a knife and threatened to stab her unless
she followed accused appellant's orders. MMM was fearful and was left with no choice but to submit
to accused-appellant's commands. She was directed to bend over and to lower down her shorts
and underwear. While MMM was bending over and half naked, accused-appellant held the victim's
waist and inserted his penis into MMM's private part. MMM could not do anything but cry. Before
leaving, he again threatened to kill MMM if she would reveal happened between them.12 chanro bles law
MMM still remained silent about her ordeal. However, about two weeks after the second rape,
MMM's grandmother noticed that there was something unusual in the way MMM was walking. This
prompted her to confront MMM.13 Upon learning of what happened to MMM, the vie aunt, brought
the former to the Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros Occidental for examination,14 and
thereafter to the police authorities, before whom the victim executed her sworn statement.15 chan robles law
Dr. Edbert Jayme (Dr. Jayme), the Municipal Health Officer who conducted a physical and internal
examination upon MMM, testified as an expert witness for the prosecution. Dr. Jayme's internal
findings showed that the victim had positive hyperemia of the vulva or congestion, redness, and
swelling around the area, which may have been caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the
human being or an erect penis. The victim was also found to have a positive incomplete hymenal
laceration at 3:00 and 7:00 positions, which was similarly caused by a blunt object such as the
finger of the human being or an erect penis.16 According to Dr. Jayme, the lacerations may have
been inflicted within two weeks prior to the examination since the lacerations were fresh.17 Dr.
Jayme also found that the victim's vagina could admit two (2) fingers with ease, which is unusual
for an 11-year old.18 A Medical Certificate19 dated 12 July 2002 was issued by the Municipal Health
Center of Manapla.
As lone witness for the defense, accused-appellant denied raping the victim and claimed that he
was fishing with his grandfather during the times MMM was raped.20 He testified that he is MMM's
uncle and that he was only fifteen years old when the alleged crime occurred.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 22 December 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts
of Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Cases Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, this Court
finds accused, JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Guilty of the crimes of Rape,
as defined in Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph 1, of Republic
Act No. 8353, as his guilts had been established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.
Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority, this Court, in Criminal
Case No. 5214-69, sentences accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola,
is, further, ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in
Philippine Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, this Court likewise sentences accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a.
Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the
National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y
Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, likewise, ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is remanded to the custody of the Jail Warden
of the Provincial Jail of Negros Occidental, until he is finally committed to the National Penitentiary
at Muntinlupa City, Rizal.
In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this Court, accused named shall be given full
credit for the entire period of his detention pending trial.21
chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 2011, affirmed the judgment of
conviction of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision insofar as the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
accused-appellant Joery B. Deliola of the two crimes of rape in Criminal Cases No. 5214-69 and
5215-69 is AFFIRMED. However, as accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido is a child in conflict
with the law, the pronouncement of his sentence is hereby SUSPENDED and the case is REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros Occidental, for
appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Accused-appellant
is CONDEMNED to pay the victim MMM: 1) In Criminal Case No. 5214-69, the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 for moral damages, and P30,000.00 for exemplary
damages; and 2) In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000 for moral damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages.22 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
Accused-appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution dated 27 February 2012, we 23
required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. However, both parties
manifested24that they dispensing with the filing of supplemental briefs and, instead, adopting
respective briefs as supplemental briefs in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. His defenses of denial and alibi are bereft of merit.
Statutory Rape
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8353,25 define and punish Statutory Rape as follows:
cralaw red ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.- Rape is committed-
1) by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman x x x:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry xxxx
d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Art. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves that: (1) the offended party is under 12
years of age and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there
was force, threat or intimidation; whether the offended party was deprived of reason or
consciousness; or whether it was done through fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.
It is enough that the age of the victim is proven: and that there was sexual intercourse.26 chan roble slaw
The two elements were proven in the present case. The age of MMM was uncontested. In her Birth
Certificate,27 presented and admitted in open court,28 it was indicated that she was born on 5
March 1991 and, thus, only eleven years old when the crime was committed. The only controversy
left before us is whether or not accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim.
Credibility of Witness
Accused-appellant tried to dispute MMM's credibility by pointing out several inconsistencies in her
testimony. He argued that the victim testified that on the alleged second incident of rape, on 1 July
2002, she felt no and her vagina did not bleed. Accused-appellant maintains that such statement is
inconsistent with MMM's grandmother's claim that MMM was walking with great difficulty and pain.
Accused-appellant likewise argues that given the tender age of the victim, she could have felt pain,
if not suffered bleeding, even on the second incident of rape.
We disagree. It is carnal knowledge, not pain nor bleeding, which is essential to consummate
rape.29 It is also possible for physiological manifestations of rape, such as pain, to appear only after
the incident, more importantly, the testimony of MMM's grandmother was just an observation on
the victim's manner of walking. It is baseless and unreasonable to put the victim's and the
grandmother's testimonies side by side and claim them to be inconsistent. Moreover, as
consistently held by this Court, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness
referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not
impair her credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or rehearsed.30 chan roble slaw
Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Jayme's findings are not conclusive and that the non-
intact hymen of the victim could be congenital.
This argument is bereft of merit. The prime consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's
testimony, not necessarily the medical findings. Assuming arguendo that the non-intact hymen of
the victim is congenital, this Court has consistently held that the absence of laceration in the
hymen does not negate rape.31 Apart from the findings of Dr. Jayme, MMM was steadfast in
testifying that accused-appellant raped her twice. When a rape victim's testimony is
straightforward and consistent despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and
confidence.32 The victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.33 chanro bleslaw
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the victim's claim that she was penetrated from behind is
contrary to human experience. We are not persuaded. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals,
the animal in man may come out when he commits rape such that it is not unlikely that in the
process of his immersion and transformation into another character, he would prefer to mate in the
way lower creatures do.34 chan robles law
Accused-appellant further questions the fact that the victim did not attempt to escape from her
captor or even shout or call for help, and that she did not report the alleged rape to anyone after
its occurrence. However, as held in the case of People v. Rosales:35
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or victim of a crime can be
expected to act reasonably and conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. People may
react differently to the same situation. One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even
instinctive, response to a horrible and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another's may
be cold indifference. Yet, it can never be successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual
victims than the former.36 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli b rary
Given the nature of the crime of rape, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim
alone may be sufficient to convict the accused, more so, when the testimony is supported by the
medico-legal findings of the examining physician.37 chan robles law
MMM's testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant as the person who raped her is
believable. We uphold the ruling of the trial court on the credibility of MMM and the truthfulness of
her testimonies, to wit: ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
[MMM], though a minor, thirteen (13) years old at the time she took the stand, demonstrated to
this Court her capacity of observation, recollection, and communication. She showed that she can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known her perception to this Court as she clearly and capably
related the details of her sad and horrible experiences at the hands of the accused. She withstood
a thorough and exhaustive examination. There is no doubt that she is a competent witness.
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451, G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001; People vs.
Rama, 350 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 136304, January 25, 2001). [MMM] gave a clear, straightforward,
spontaneous, frank and consistent narrative. It was a positive and credible account she presented
before this Court. There was not a motive ascribed or, in the very least, suggested by the defense
that might have raised doubt on her credibility and on the credibility of the statements she made
before this Court.38 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of MMM's testimony. Deeply entrenched
in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best
left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts; and when his findings
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court.39chanroble slaw
Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a
girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.40 No
young woman would admit that she was raped, make public the offense and allow the examination
of her private parts, undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial and endure the ordeal of
testifying to all the gory details, if she had not in fact been raped.41 chan roble slaw
Denial and Alibi as Inherently Weak Defenses
In contrast to MMM's direct, positive and categorical testimony identification of her assailant,
accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi could not prevail. This Court has consistently held that:
"denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for which reason it is
generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establishes two
elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission.42" Accused-appellant
failed to establish these elements. His claim that at the time of the alleged crime, he was at sea
fishing with his grandfather was uncorroborated. For some reason, he did not even present his
grandfather Clemente Gabayeron to testify in court. As. opposed to MMM's convincing recital of
facts, accused-appellant's denial and alibi will not stand.
Time of commission not an essential element to establish rape
Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the Information43 stating that the first crime of rape was
committed "sometime in the month of June 2002" is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to
inform him of the date on which the criminal act was alleged to have been committed.
Accused-appellant is mistaken. This Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon the
victim to establish the date when she was raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator.44 The
date of commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape; what is material is its
occurrence. Thus, there is no need to prove the exact date of commission; an approximation
thereof will suffice.45 chan roble slaw
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused-appellant's belated objection to the
Information cannot prosper, to wit: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Moreover, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial by cross-examining the
prosecution witnesses on the particular dates and circumstances of the two offenses of rape as
alleged in the informations without prior objection to the validity or propriety of the informations. It
is now too late in the day for the accused-appellant to claim that any of the Informations was
defective. Objections relating to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the
first time on appeal. If the appellant had found the Information insufficient, he should have moved
before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date
of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform
with the prescribed form.46 chan roble svirt uallawlib ra ry
Penalty and Damages
To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the pertinent law on the matter. According to
R.A. No. 9344,47 as amended:48
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — x x x
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birth date. In A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC49 dated November 24, 2009, the
Supreme Court likewise defined the: age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen
(15) years and; one, (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an
offense with discernment.
Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April 1987,50 making him 15 years and 2
months old when the crime was committed. We are now left with the question of whether or not
accused-appellant acted with discernment. In People v. Jacinto,51 we explained that discernment is
the mental capacity of a minor to fully grasp the consequences of his act, known and determined
by taking into account all the facts and circumstances presented by the records in each case.
That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the victim is demonstrated by
the following surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim was a helpless minor; (2) accused-
appellant secured the consummation of the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by
penetrating the victim from behind; and (4) he threatened the victim not to report what happened.
Taking all these facts into consideration, accused-appellant clearly knew that what he did was
wrong.
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven
during trial,52 accused-appellant shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape.
However, given that accused-appellant was only 15 years old and 2 months when the crime was
committed, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.53 In accordance with
the controlling jurisprudence on the matter,54 for purposes of determining the proper penalty
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the lower courts and impose upon
accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant was qualified for suspension of sentence when
he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A. 934455 provides that the same extends only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years old. Nevertheless,
in extending the application of RA No. 9344 to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said
law, we ruled in People v. Jacinto,56 as cited in People v. Ancajas,57 that the promotion of the
welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age lirr
it of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child.
The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in order
that he/she may be given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community.58 Thus, accused-appellant is ordered to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities, in accordance with
Section 5159 of R.A. 9344.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,60 we modify the award of damages of the lower courts.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to indemnify MMM, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count of rape, P75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. The damages awarded shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.61
c han robles law
WHEREFORE, the 29 June 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO.
00435 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE
DELIOLA," is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Statutory Rape
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. Appellant
is ORDERED to indemnify MMM the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of
rape, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. All monetary awards for damages
shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Branch 69 for its
appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Caguioa,*JJ., concur.

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CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 71-79

Jeross Romano Aguilar

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.

a) ₱17,000.00 for the coffin

b) ₱3,000.00 for the nicho

c) ₱250.00 for the mass

d) ₱15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and

e) ₱16,000.00 for the burial lot.

a. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnification;

b. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and

c. ₱51,250.00 as actual damages.18

The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175781

NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, Promulgated:

This is an automatic review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)

CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.[2]

The testimonies of prosecution witnesses showed the sequence of events shortly

Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio Talaro, the husband of Francisca

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino, when questioned during preliminary

Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento's defense is denial and alibi. He claimed

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

Taking into consideration that accused Francisca Talaro is already 75 years

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by

Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his participation in

Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellants

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a

defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section

Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174659

RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK

July 28, 2008

publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christophers whereabouts.

That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused