THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN | Tarawa Was a Brawl | Afrikakorps Logistics | German East Front Fortifications

The Strategy & Tactics of World War II #19 AUG–SEP 2011

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 The Strategy & Tactics
of World War II
#
19 | AUG–SEP 2011

6 22 34

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6 20 any aspect of military history. Contact Ty Bomba,
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The Hardest Days: Design Corner
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Turning Points in the Battle of Britain by Joseph Miranda & Tactics and World at War magazines. We value critical
In 1940 the Germans used their analysis over summaries alone. Maximum word count is 500.
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55 Dr. Christopher Cummins
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ASSISTANT PUBLISHER
Tarawa Was a Brawl: • Military History on Money Callie Cummins
Tactical Analysis of a Pivotal Battle Too Little, Too Late
SENIOR EDITOR
The US landing on Tarawa resulted by Ty Bomba Ty Bomba
from a decade of preparatory work. • Pure Speculation
EDITOR
Success came down to the bravery of The Port Chicago Blast Joseph Miranda
Marines in the face of failed doctrine. by Andrew Hind DESIGN
by James I. Marino • Skill vs. Luck C.J. Doherty
Battle of the Komandorski Islands COPY EDITORS
34 by Ken MacFarlane Jon Cecil, Dave Kazmierczak, Tim Tow
Logistics in the Western Desert: • Movers & Shakers Senior Game Developer
1941– 42 Guy Anson Maunsell Eric Harvey
The story of the logistical struggle behind by Jon Cecil MAP GRAPHICS
the rise and fall of the Afrikakorps. Meridian Mapping
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German East Front Fortifications
The war in Russia is most often NEXT ISSUE (#20)
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by John Butterfield

4 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

 WACHT am Rhein

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ON 16 December 1944 the “ghost front” of the First US Army in the Ardennes suddenly erupted as 20 German divisions embarked on Hitler’s

le
dg

ON
last attack in the west. The objective was Antwerp, which provided Allied supply for the drive into Germany. Most Americans believed the

ei
nf
war against Germany would be over by Christmas; yet Hitler was convinced it could still be decided in his favor. The German armies destroyed

or
m
in France were reorganized. A massive surprise against the weakly held Ardennes sector of the American front was prepared.

at

! io
n.
WACHT am Rhein is a grand-tactical simulation of that enormous battle. The more than 2,380 counters represent every formation, at company and battalion
levels, which fought there, including US, German, British, French, Canadian and Belgian units. Infantry, armor, anti-tank, reconnaissance, engineer, assault
gun, howitzer, rocket, parachute, ranger, glider and headquarters units are all fully represented. The four maps are an accurate representation of the region.
Compiled from 1944 German staff maps and 1943– 44 1:50,000 US Army maps, they shows all roads, trails and other types of terrain, along with all the towns
and villages that became bastions of the American defense, as well as every creek and river that couldn’t be crossed by wheeled vehicles without a bridge.

PLAYERS may use single maps for six smaller scenarios. There is also a campaign game that utilizes all four sections and portrays three
weeks (50 game turns). In that one the Germans race for the Meuse, the last hurdle before the open country leading to Antwerp, in the face
of increasing concentrations of Allied infantry, armor and air power. Extensive supply, weather and air power rules are included.

THIS edition of Wacht am Rhein presents modifications to the combat, artillery and supply systems of the first edition in order to better
depict tactical and operational warfare. For example, an “exploitation mode” has been added in order to allow mechanized units to take
advantage of breakthroughs in the enemy line. Exploitation is interleaved with the opposing player’s movement, recreating the fluid situation
that existed in the first week. Other changes include the addition of “vantage points,” which function as high ground, enabling units to spot
more effectively for artillery, as well as “constricted terrain,” which represents the channeling caused by steep gullies and ravines.

THE orders of battle have also been redone to provide an accurate depiction of the armies of both sides. Units are now in the organizations
within which they fought, not the administrative formations that were discarded due to the requirements of combat.

GAME COMPONENTS
• 4 22x34” Four Color Mapsheets
• 2,380 Die-Cut Playing Pieces
• One Rule Booklet
• One Scenario Booklet
• Assorted Player Aid Charts
• Two 10-sided Dice
• Storage Bags

GAME SCALE
• Map: 1 mile per hex
• Time: 3 Game Turns per day
• Units: Infantry and Artillery units are battalions.
Armor is depicted at the company level.
• Each strength step is equal to a company.

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com
6 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
The Hardest Days:
Turning Points in the Battle of Britain
H
itler was always circumspect
about broadly sharing his
true intentions for the war in
Europe. In line with that, he developed
the habit of taking aside individual
military leaders and ostensibly telling
his inner thoughts to them. In that
way he disguised his deeper intentions
while deflecting worries about getting
into a war Germany wasn’t prepared
to win. For example, in the late 1930s
he assured his nervous naval chief
Grand Adm. Erich Raeder that there
would be no war until 1944. To other
commanders in the army and Luftwaffe
he gave assurances any war would
be limited to dealing with territorial
issues directly affecting Germany.
by Roger Mason
If the war was several years away, and
its goal was correcting nearby territorial
disputes, military planners could con-
centrate on devising the strategies and
weapons systems that would be appro-
priate for such a situation. It seemed
logical, then, the German military
concentrate on developing forces not
intended for broader-ranging strategic
conflicts. There would be no need for
huge battle fleets or heavy bombers.
German planners therefore
developed innovative weapons and
tactics that met the needs of the
actual early-war campaigns. The
Luftwaffe was admirably suited to
conduct rapid attacks supporting
mobile ground forces in areas close-by
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 7
Germany. In 1939 and 1940 the wisdom
of that approach seemed validated
by a year of continuous victory.
Unlike those German planners,
however, some key leaders in Britain
were under no illusions about the
potentially expansive nature of any
new war. The anti-appeasement crowd,
led by Winston Churchill, was firm
in their belief about the potential for
a massive and far-ranging conflict.
Men like Air Marshall Hugh Dowding
of Fighter Command believed
every resource available must be
directed at preparing for an all-out
and sustained attack from Germany.
Depression-era resources and bud-
gets for the RAF remained tight, though,
 even as Dowding worked on developing
The Intelligence War aircraft that would be capable of suc-
cessfully defending England. Hurricane
The five keys to intelligence gathering for the British were: the Chain Home radar and Spitfire fighters were put into
system, signals intelligence, the ability to decipher the German Enigma code, examination production. One important innovation
of downed German aircraft, and the interrogation of captured German aircrew. was adding additional machineguns
The Chain Home radar system gave the British real-time tactical intelligence that would be needed to speedily knock
that allowed them to optimize their fighter deployment. While the radar’s range was down larger aircraft like a Heinkel 111
limited, the information provided by it gave the origin of the attack, its direction or Dornier 17 bomber. The Hurricane
and approximate size, thereby also providing clues to its intended target. was a rugged and steady gun platform,
The “Y” signals intercept system was based on a series of receiving stations which was perfect for attacking bomb-
that monitored German radio traffic. Data involving aircraft and unit call signs ers. The Spitfire was fast and was a
were analyzed against other intelligence sources. Those data, along with raw match for the German Me-109 fighter.
encrypted messages, were passed to the code breakers at Bletchley Park. Even Effort was also put into to the
Fighter Command and Air Marshall Dowding weren’t initially given access to development and survivability of
Enigma intelligence, but by the end of the campaign that had changed. command and control systems. Even
Because the battle was fought over England, nearly all crashed German as the first early warning radars were
aircraft landed in what was for them enemy territory. The wrecks were carefully installed, Dowding insisted com-
examined for whatever intelligence they might yield. Likewise, German crews who munications and power lines to that
bailed out were usually captured on landing. The only exceptions being some men system’s various command and control
and aircraft that crashed in the more distant parts of the Channel and North Sea. centers all be laid underground.
The Germans had no such advantages. On their air staff, intelligence was Hitler believed his 1940 invasion of
under the Operations Staff and was known as Abteilung V. That unit’s preliminary France, while risky, would ultimately be
intelligence estimate of British air defenses was completed in July 1940: almost all successful; however, no one, not even he,
of its conclusions were faulty. It minimized the capabilities and quantity of existing could’ve predicted just how successful
RAF fighters while also greatly underestimating the rate of fighter production. The that attack would be. In six weeks the
Germans therefore expected the RAF to quickly run out of fighters. Further, the same Germans were on the Channel, while
report described the British radar system as “inflexible” and “ineffective.” the British ground force was effectively
Correspondingly, neither were the Germans able to use their Freya mobile radar toothless after the Dunkirk evacuation.
system to gather much information about the RAF. They were at times able, by collecting Both sides’ generals and admirals
“shadows” from Chain Home radar transmissions, to spot RAF squadrons as they took off. realized command of the airspace over
Only a handful of British pilots fell into German hands. The Luftwaffe had gathered some the Channel and southern England was
intelligence on Fighter Command before the war, and their airfield strikes were based on that mandatory to stop decisive intervention
information. Unfortunately for them, many squadrons had since been moved and the Germans by the British fleet against any amphibi-
therefore repeatedly bombed airfields that were only being used as emergency landing strips. ous invasion. The first step to being
The British also conducted several deception operations. Dummy radio stations were able to launch any invasion therefore
set up to transmit simulated radar transmissions and radio traffic in case a Sector Control lay in destroying the RAF. The differ-
or Chain Home station was damaged. That led to the false impression among the Germans ence between the British and German
those facilities couldn’t be destroyed by bombing. The British also placed fake battle appreciations of the situation came
damage and dynamited some empty buildings on their airfields. That fooled the Germans from the fact the latter’s successes in
into believing the bombing campaign was having a serious impact on British operations, the war up to that time had been based
and led them to the mistaken belief in early September that the RAF was finished. Overall, on tactical and operational innovations
then, the British clearly won the intelligence battle from July to September 1940.  ★ related to ground warfare. The Germans
had given little thought to what a
strategic air campaign would be like.
After three weeks of assessing the
new strategic potentials inherent in the
surrender of France, Hitler was ready for
his next move. On 30 June 1940 a new
directive was issued, under the hand of
Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering, for
an air war against Britain. That gave little
time for planning and preparation.
It was followed on 1 August by a directive
(No. 17) from Hitler himself, which
defined the mission of the Luftwaffe as
being to intensify operations against
England to the point that nation’s
ultimate defeat would be assured. Targets
would be aircraft units and their support
organizations, aircraft production facili-
A German ties and, more generally, the entire British
Enigma defense industry. Secondary targets
machine
would be shipping and ports, in order
to cut the import of food and supplies.

8 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

 Those were sound strategic objec-
tives. The problem was such a campaign
would, given the tactical nature of the
Luftwaffe, have to be based on impro-
visation and luck. The British had for
several years correctly estimated Hitler’s
deeper intentions and objectives con-
cerning their country. They had therefore
prepared to defeat just such a campaign.
10 July – 7 August:
Shadow Boxing
German staff officers began drawing
up detailed plans for the invasion of
England, codenamed Operation Sea
Lion. Preliminary discussions were held
between the navy and army. Hitler was
told it would take a minimum of five
weeks to collect and retrofit enough
barges and other watercraft to move
the required ground force across the
Channel. While the army and navy
prepared, the goal of achieving air supe-
riority was turned over to the Luftwaffe.
Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering
ordered preliminary probes against the
RAF defense system. British fighters
seemed to be scarce except for patrols
over ships in the Channel. Luftwaffe
unit commanders were told to get
their aircrews familiar with that coast
and the interior of southern England
just beyond it. German mobile radar
units were moved to the French coast,
but they were only used to watch
for convoy traffic in the Channel.
On 1 August the Germans conducted
small raids and reconnaissance flights
against targets from Scotland south to
the Channel ports. RAF fighters remained
scarce. The Germans also attempted to
influence public opinion by dropping
leaflets containing Hitler’s latest speech
to the Reichstag, which offered the British
terms for an armistice. That morning
Goering called his commanders to
Amsterdam for consultations. He wanted
to know what the enemy was doing: was
withholding fighters a calculated tactic or
were the British low on pilots and planes?
Goering also outlined what he called
his “bull’s eye strategy.” The Luftwaffe
would begin the campaign by launching
attacks against targets 90 to 125 miles
from the center of London. Each week
the goal would be to destroy 100 RAF
fighters, and the targeting ring would
also be tightened around London. As
the targeting grew closer to London, the
British government would be compelled
to negotiate in order to avoid what
today would be called “socio-political
collapse.” At the same time, some 400 to
500 British fighters would be destroyed
during the tightening process. By then
the invasion force would be ready and
Sea Lion could be launched, if indeed
it were still necessary. The five-week
plan would be started on 8 August.
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 9
The British quickly formed a good
idea of what was coming. The Luftwaffe’s
“Yellow Code” had been cracked in
the early spring by the cryptanalysts
at Bletchley Park (see sidebar). The
Germans made a change to a new
“Red Code” in April that resulted in
a temporary decryption blackout,
but by late May the British were
again reading German messages.
Dowding determined the RAF didn’t
have to decisively beat the Luftwaffe
to win the coming campaign. The
important thing was to preserve an
effective fighter force that would be
available if the Germans launched
an invasion. The RAF therefore didn’t
take the bait of the early attacks on the
Channel ports and sites in southern
England. From the German viewpoint
the situation remained vague and
British capabilities uncertain. Goring
therefore decided to step up operations.
5 August – 6 September:
Destroy Fighter Command
British intelligence could see
the Germans were making invasion
preparations. Photoreconnaissance
flights showed coastal craft and
barges being readied. Bletchley Park
noted the acceleration of German radio
traffic directing units to the coast.
continued on page 12 »
Chain Home Radar & RAF Fighter Control
In the early 1930s visionaries like Hugh
Dowding recognized the RAF had no effective
countermeasure to use against high altitude
heavy bombers. Some suggested the answer
was an H.G. Wells-type “death ray.” Early
experiments soon validated the mainstream
belief such a weapon was impossible with the
technologies then available. Those experiments
did, however, yield one interesting result: the
radio waves beamed at test aircraft bounced off
their surfaces and, by being continuously recol-
lected and analyzed, could be used to reveal
those planes’ location, elevation and direction.
Robert Watson-Watt and his staff at the
National Physical Laboratory then began work-
ing on a dependable system for spotting aircraft
using radio waves. That system was called
“R.D.F.” for “Radio Direction and Finding.” The
Germans were also working on RDF technology,
but their systems were at first intended only
for use by warships. An early version of their
naval Wurzburg targeting radar was fortu-
itously recovered by British intelligence from
the scuttled battlecruiser Graf Spee in 1939.
The design for the first British radar
system was developed by Arnold Wilkins, who
reported his findings to Watson-Watt. He in
turn advised Dowding that RDF worked. He then
further requested 10,000 pounds to establish
such a system to protect all of England.
10 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
Dowding replied he wouldn’t support any such
development until he’d seen a successful test.
A test was set up in which an RAF bomber was
flown back and forth while being successfully
tracked by RDF. Dowding approved the new
system, which was codenamed Chain Home.
The system consisted of a series of 360-foot
fixed towers with wire strung among them.
It could determine: range, bearing, formation
size and altitude. Altitude remained the most
problematic factor throughout the Battle of
Britain, in that atmospheric conditions could
alter those readings. RAF fighter pilots soon
learned to always add several thousand
feet to any radar intercept vector given to
them in order to be sure they didn’t arrive
beneath the plotted enemy aircraft.
Another challenge was the radar’s range.
The first RDF systems had a 50-mile range,
which was then gradually increased to 120. That
allowed Fighter Command to “see” into occupied
France and watch as the German formations
actually took off. In addition to maximum range,
the radar had a minimum range as well. As
aircraft crossed the English coast they became
too close for Chain Home to continue to monitor.
That led to the redeployment of the Observer
Corps, which had first been established to
report Zeppelin raids during World War I.
In that regard, popular fiction and movies
often portray elderly English spinsters with
field glasses patiently counting German
bombers as they roar overhead toward
London. That simplistic representation
masks the true workings of the system. By
the start of the Battle of Britain over 30,000
observers were in place and organized into
groups covering all England. They tracked
enemy aircraft, confirmed kills and provided
post-raid information on enemy flight paths.
The OC members wore RAF overalls known
as “boiler suits,” and standard “soup plate”
steel helmets with the letters “O.C.” stenciled
on the front. Each observation post had a
telephone wired for direct contact with Fighter
Command headquarters at Bentley Priory and
the closest Sector Control. The system was
at once large, simple, robust and effective.
When an incoming attack was detected,
that Chain Home station’s tracking team
contacted Fighter Command, where the hostile
contact was plotted on a large map. That
information was telephoned to the Fighter
Group nearest the attack. The information was
also phoned to the relevant Sector Control.
Sector Controls were individual air defense
sectors responsible for fixed defenses like
barrage balloons and anti-aircraft artillery
as well as fighter squadrons. Sector Controls
coordinated local air defenses and in turn
transmitted the orders of the Group Commander.
As RAF squadrons scrambled, their
flight paths were tracked by direction finding
stations. RAF fighters carried a transponder
that identified them as RAF aircraft. That was
known as “I.F.F.” or “Identification, Friend
or Foe.” Reports from the ground observers,
RAF pilots, and direction finding stations kept
Sector Controls informed of the progress and
location of each battle as it moved inland.
That information was sent back up the chain
to the Group Commands and Fighter Command.
It was also broadcast to all sectors to help them
track the course of the battle. That allowed
other nearby sector controllers to take over if the
primary Sector Control station was destroyed
or knocked off line. As each battle progressed,
Fighter Command was always ready to order
in squadrons from neighboring groups if the
primary squadrons required reinforcement.
The Chain Home system supported by
Sector Control was never even temporarily, let
alone completely, destroyed. Faulty German
intelligence estimates had convinced Goering
the system wasn’t worth the effort to destroy it.
When attacks in August did threaten to collapse
the system, the Germans switched strategies
due to the lack of visible results. Thereafter
they simply ignored the tall towers along the
English coast. That proved a costly error.  ★

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 11

» continued from page 9 Spitfires and Hurricanes to intercept. Wight escorted by several squadrons
The first significant aerial action by The Germans then withdrew. of fighters. The Germans launched
the Germans occurred on Monday, 5 August 6 and 7 were relatively quiet, three successive attacks of 100 planes.
August at 8:30 a.m. The Chain Home with only some small raids and some That afternoon a second convoy off
system detected some 50 hostile aircraft reconnaissance flights. The lull ended Bournemouth was hit by five similar
on route to the Dover area. Fighter on Thursday the 8th when an inbound attacks. Fighter Command responded by
Group 11 sortied four squadrons of merchant convoy passed the Isle of launching over 600 fighters and patrol
planes, for a total loss of 17 aircraft.
The fighting continued throughout
Tactics the week. The Germans were enduring
mounting losses, but they hadn’t
For the Battle of Britain the Germans and the British developed tactics suited to destroyed the 100 British fighters their
their respective strategies and aircraft inventories. The Germans didn’t have a heavy planners estimated were needed weekly
bomber; however, they had three medium bombers: the Junkers 88, the Heinkel 111 and to crush the RAF. The attacks on the con-
the Dornier 17. In addition they had the Ju-87 Stuka, which had been a highly effective voys had brought out Fighter Command,
tactical dive bomber against the Poles and the French during the previous year. but there seemed to be no fewer Spitfires
To protect those bombers the Germans had large numbers of Me-110 “heavy fight- and Hurricanes than when they’d
ers.” Those twin-engine aircraft carried two-man crews and were better armed than started. Goering decided it was time for
single-engine machines. The Me-110 had two 20mm cannon and four machineguns in a knockout blow, and scheduled a major
the nose as well as one rear-facing machinegun. The Germans also had the Me-109 effort for the morning of 12 August.
fighter. It was a high-performance interceptor armed with 20mm cannon. A special unit called
The initial German strategy was to use Stukas to hit pinpoint targets. The medium Erprobungsgruppe 210 (Operational
bomber formations would be protected by close-in Me-110 escorts, while the Me-109s Trials Wing 210) was readied. Me110s
conducted free-range sweeps with large formations to destroy enemy fighters. had been modified along with some
The British had two fighter types making up the bulk of their aircraft arsenal, the Me109s to carry small bomb loads.
Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane. The Spitfire was the faster of the two and The idea was those aircraft would
a great air superiority fighter. It could deal with German fighter escorts, thereby protecting approach at low altitude and make
the Hurricanes as they went after the bombers. The Sector Control and Chain Home radar precision strikes. Their targets were
systems meant the amount of time patrolling and watching for enemy formations was cut the British radar towers. The attackers
to a minimum. After each fight the RAF pilots could land and standby until the next attack. successfully hit several of them.
As the campaign progressed, the Me-110s fell victim in nearly every The Germans then waited to see
engagement due to their lack of speed and maneuverability. The Stukas were if the overall system would fail.
simply too slow to operate in that kind of battle environment, proving easy targets The British, however, had anticipated
for the Spitfires and the Hurricanes. The Me-109s were therefore seldom free to attacks against their radar and had pre-
conduct the massive sweeps they’d planned; they had to stay close to the bombers pared a deception plan. Dummy stations
and help fight off the combination attacks from the Hurricanes and Spitfires. capable of broadcasting simulated radar
Dowding’s strategy was to avoid all fighting that wasn’t directed at destroying German transmissions and radio traffic were
bombers. When German fighter sweeps appeared the British pulled back, leaving the M-109s standing by and immediately began
with no one to fight. Later, when the Luftwaffe concentrated on London, the British employed transmitting. To the Germans there
a tactic called the “big wing,” whereby six or more squadrons would intercept an incoming
bomber formation. The big wings were awkward to organize and employ, but they were instantly
and deeply demoralizing to Luftwaffe pilots who’d been told Fighter Command was finished.
Due to their range limits, German fighters had a maximum of 20 minutes flying time
once they crossed the British coast. Their bombers had longer range, but were slower.
Engaging in midair melees with the RAF rarely accomplished anything decisive other than
using up fuel. When the German fighter escorts turned for home, the Hurricanes attacked.
The Germans were only able to destroy a handful of British aircraft on the ground.
In Poland, France, and later in Russia, great numbers of Allied aircraft were destroyed
while parked on their airfields. The Chain Home radar system gave the British warning
of incoming attacks, and the British also built concrete revetments for their aircraft and
dispersed them around the airfields. That limited losses due to nearby explosions.
The most effective tactic the Germans came up with was to simultaneously send
small formations of bombers and fighters to many targets. Such efforts were hard
for the British to track, and reserves had to be constantly kept back in case a mas-
sive raid followed. That meant many of the smaller attacks got through.
One of the worst German tactics was forcing Me-109 fighters to
carry a single 500 lb. bomb. That reduced those planes’ comparative
performance from that of a racehorse to that of a plow horse
The tipping point came in late August, when Hitler ordered the switch from
targeting airfields to going after cities. While horrifying for the helpless civilians
who lived through the “Blitz,” that approach could never be decisive in crippling the
RAF. Fighter Command’s numbers remained stable. Dowding therefore knew the RAF
would survive and there could thus be no invasion. The fighting continued into the
new year, but the window of opportunity for the Luftwaffe had closed.  ★

12 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

seemed to be no break in radar service.
Throughout the day the Germans
conducted raids of 150 to 200 aircraft
against RAF airfields, Channel ports
and convoys. The airfields at Manston
and Hawkinge were heavily damaged.
Preliminary estimates indicated the day
had been successful for the Germans
even though there’d been no discernable
impact from the radar station attacks.
Goering decided the next three days
would see a concentrated series of
attacks starting on the morning of the
13th. He designated that day as Adlertag
(Eagle Day). The goal was to strike a
decisive blow against Fighter Command.
The morning of Eagle Day didn’t
begin well for the Germans. Spotty
weather resulted in numerous sortie
cancellations. The problem was all
units didn’t receive the abort code,
and several attacks went ahead,
resulting in scattered and disjointed
continued on page 15 »

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 13

Code Breaking at Bletchley Park
When war with Germany became imminent in
1938, the British government purchased a 60-acre
Victorian estate, Bletchley Park, in the town of
Bletchley about 50 miles northwest of London.
The site included a gabled mansion with spacious
grounds and a lake with ducks. That estate was
to be the secret headquarters for the Government
Code and Cipher School (GCCS) and the Security
Intelligence Service (SIS). A plaque quoting
Shakespeare (Henry V, Act II, Scene II) in the man-
sion’s entrance hall cites Bletchley Park’s mission and
accomplishment: “The King hath note of all that they
intend, by interception which they dream not of.”
The Foreign Office sought mathematicians,
linguists, Chess champions and crossword
puzzle experts to become cryptanalysts. The
intelligence center became known as “Station
X,” since it was the 10th intercept station set
up by the British. When the cryptanalysts were
hired, they didn’t know their mission would be to
break the codes of what had been advertised as
an “unbreakable machine,” the German Enigma
device. The task would be daunting: the German
military sent over 3,000 such signals a day.
Dr. Arthur Scherbius, a German engineer,
had invented the Enigma in 1922. (The word
“enigma” comes from the Greek ainigma, meaning
“to speak in riddles.”) It was first exhibited at
the 1923 Congress of the International Postal
Union in Bern, Switzerland, and was intended for
traveling businessmen to use to provide secu-
rity for their telegrams. As it turned out few
businesses were interested, but the German
military quickly took notice of the device’s potential.
The Wehrmacht would use a total of 40,000
Enigma machines throughout World War II.
There were many versions of the Enigma, but
the standard machine had a keyboard containing
letters in the pattern of a normal “QWERTY”
typewriter but without keys for numerals or
punctuation. The machine contained a scrambler
system of electrically connected revolving drums
(rotors) powered by dry-cell batteries.
That arrangement changed the 26 letters
of the alphabet as its operator typed each
letter of a message on the keyboard. The original
Enigma, with the three-rotor set up therefore
provided (26x26x26) for 17,576 possible start
states. When a movable ring was reset on which
the letters A to Z were printed, and 10 cables
were also reset between the letters, there were
Bletchley Park mansion
14 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
a total of 150 billion possible substitutions.
The Germans sent the encoded messages
between their various headquarters and units in the
field by Morse code. Those dots and dashes were
recorded at intercept locations (“Y Stations”) located
on the British coast. The intended recipient’s Enigma
machine, set up the same way as the sender’s by
previous arrangement, would decode the message
back into plaintext. Such a complex system of
letter substitution appeared to be unbreakable, but
in 1939 the Poles provided the French and British
with two reconstructed Enigma machines, and
from that start Bletchley Park went on to become
the code breaking capitol of the Allied world. The
intelligence received through those intercepts and
subsequent decodings became known as Ultra.
The code breakers found the Enigma coding
process too complicated to solve entirely by manual
methods. Such methods did, however, identify com-
mon phrases, like “Heil Hitler” or “please respond.”
Further, the Germans often aided manual decoding
by sending those expressions in plaintext.
The code breakers called successful guesses
at plaintext messages “cribs.” Routine weather
reports often provided excellent cribs, while captured
codebooks also provided help as the war went
on. With a probable plaintext fragment, and
the knowledge no letter could be enciphered
as itself, the code breakers could sometimes
identify a corresponding cipher text fragment.
The leading cryptanalysts Alan Turing, Gordon
Welchman and their team — then managed to
design an electro-mechanical device they anach-
ronistically dubbed “the Bombe,” because it made
a ticking noise when operating. They connected
the Enigma rotor wiring to the Bombes using a
schematic (“menu”) based on cribs previously deter-
mined manually. The Bombes then disproved every
incorrect setting and determined potential settings.
The Bombes, located in outstation locations,
ran 24 hours a day. Almost 2,000 Women’s Royal
Navy Service (WRENS) personnel and over 200
RAF technicians staffed those locations.
German units in the field primarily used the
Enigma, while their higher headquarters used a
different machine, the Lorenz Cipher, to produce their
coded messages. The larger Lorenz machine required
a teletype — a device that allowed conversation
in printed form over telephone lines — and fixed
circuits. The code breakers nicknamed the German
teletype “Tunny,” and called its coded output “Fish.”
Alan Turing
One of Turing’s team members, Tommy
Flowers, then designed an electronic “Colossus,”
the world’s first programmable computer, to attack
the even more complex Lorenz machine code. The
Colossus was successful, by 1943 proving able to
handle thousands of daily intercepted messages.
(At war’s end, Churchill ordered the destruction of
the Colossus machines because of their top-secret
nature. One has since been rebuilt at the Bletchley
Park Museum based on original design schematics.)
The number of persons allowed to receive Ultra
intelligence was strictly limited. Those who knew
the source of the intercepts were never allowed
in areas where they might be captured. When
information was distributed, there was always
a cover story as to how it had been obtained (for
example, via high altitude fly-over photography, spot-
ter planes, spies on the ground, etc.). The “Special
Liaison Unit Officers” who delivered the messages
to Allied commanders destroyed the sheets of
paper after the recipient read them. Messages
weren’t allowed to be transmitted or repeated.
Those who actually did the decoding were
never allowed to see the larger picture of what
they were doing (“compartmentalization”).
Similarly, they weren’t allowed to tell anyone the
nature of their work, not even their families.
Everyone in the Bletchley Park intelligence
community was required to sign the Official
Secret’s Act, which gave their oath to never
reveal their work. Churchill later expressed pride
in the success of the code breakers, lauding their
dedication and secrecy by calling them “the geese
that laid the golden eggs and never cackled.”
Only 120 people started at Bletchley Park
in 1939. By the beginning of 1944 that number
had increased to 7,000; ultimately, by V-E Day,
12,000 worked there. Yet, despite all those
thousands of potential security leaks, the work
done at Bletchley Park remained unknown
until Frederick Winterbotham’s (authorized)
publication of The Ultra Secret in 1974.
Allied supreme commander Gen. Dwight
D. Eisenhower said Ultra was “decisive” in
winning the war. It’s since been estimated the
work of the code breakers hastened the war’s
end by at least two years. Throughout the war
the Germans remained unaware their Enigma
and Lorenz codes had been broken.  ★
— Annie Laura Smith
The working rebuilt bombe
» continued from page 13
operations. The British responded
quickly, and many German aircraft
were destroyed or damaged.
By the afternoon the weather
improved. The afternoon attacks were
therefore more successful, but scattered
cloud cover still made overall bombing
results inaccurate. Two RAF airfields
were damaged. Fighter Command lost
a total of 13 aircraft, but all pilots were
recovered. The results for the Germans
were therefore much less than decisive.
August 15 wasn’t much better for
them. The raiders hit some of the same
airfields in southern England and
bombed the Channel ports. Only four
RAF personnel were killed, including
three pilots. The attacks on the airfields
were inaccurate, resulting in devasta-
tion to surrounding pastures but only
moderate damage to the airfields.
An attack headed toward Edinburgh
was picked up by Fighter Command.
The Germans intended it to draw off
defenders from the south. The prevail-
ing wisdom was Fighter Command
had its hands full trying to stop the
southern attacks and wouldn’t be able
to respond. Due to the extreme range,
the 72 He-111s of KG26 were coming
unescorted from Stavanger. Dowding
had anticipated such a move, and had
Group 12 rested and ready to meet it.
The bomber force was decimated.
By that evening it was clear Eagle Day
had generated greater hype than results.
Lots of unconnected real estate and pri-
vate buildings had been destroyed, along
with civilian casualties. Some airfields
had been hit, but the damage was being
repaired. The RAF had lost 34 aircraft,
with a majority of the pilots recovered.
The Luftwaffe had lost 75 aircraft with
few pilots or aircrews saved. Luftwaffe
pilots called it “Black Thursday.”
Goring responded by declaring
attacks on the Channel ports and
convoys a “waste,” and ordered
that henceforth all efforts would be
directed against airfields and aircraft
factories. The news convoy attacks
would cease was encouraging to
Dowding; however, the correspond-
ing decision to concentrate against
airfields was a great concern.
August 16 and 17 were relatively
quiet, but the 18th became known as the
“hardest day” for Fighter Command.
Starting at noon, hundreds of attacks
hit RAF fields all over southern England.
The British lost 22 aircraft. Churchill sat
at Group 11 headquarters to watch the
battle unfold. All of that group’s aircraft
were committed, including the reserve.
It was on the way home from watching
the epic battle that Churchill uttered
his now famous phrase: “Never was so
much owed to so few by so many.”
At the end of the day one statistic
stood out above all others: on 1 August
the British had 245 Spitfires and 341
Hurricanes; by the evening of the
18th the tally was 228 Spitfires and
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 15
396 Hurricanes. That was an overall
increase, with just a slight decrease
in Spitfire strength. Besides the
material totals, losses of RAF pilots
had also been kept to a minimum.
Fighter Command was surviving.
August 24 was another day of
maximum effort by Luftflotte II. It sent in
a variety of attacks using some 200 air-
craft. Southern airfields were hit again,
and Fighter Command was stretched
to the limit. In the intense combat 20
aircraft were destroyed, including two
fighters lost to friendly fire. RAF airfields
across southern England were pounded.
That night a small flight of
Heinkels followed the course of the
Thames to bomb some oil terminals.
The bombers overshot their target
and instead mistakenly struck the
London dock district, causing civilian
casualties. The next day Churchill
and his War Cabinet met and ordered
nighttime retaliatory attacks against
five German cities including Berlin.
German losses were starting
to climb. In August they lost 774
aircraft and 216 pilots. Most of those
losses were from fighter attacks. Pilot
and aircrew losses were also rising.
Squadron commanders were reporting
a significant number of accidents due
to engine failure on take off. There was
growing suspicion foreign workers
in aircraft plants in Germany were
sabotaging newly made engines.
Another factor in the German attri-
tion rate was the type of ammunition
used by the RAF. The Me-109s were
well armed with 20mm cannon, but
the British were using incendiary
ammunition in their Browning .303
machineguns. German aircraft that
were hit therefore tended to catch
fire and were rarely able to return to
friendly airspace before crashing.
British loses were also climbing.
Dowding asked that Channel convoys
be limited. The large number of aircraft
required to defend that shipping
invited massive air battles, and most
of the pilots shot down in them were
lost due to drowning in the cold water.
In battles fought over land the British
pilots’ survival rate was excellent, and
aircraft production for Spitfires and
Hurricanes was exceeding losses. The
German quota of 100 British fighters
16 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
a week was still not being met.
Attacks on the Chain Home tow-
ers had caused damage and some
temporary loss of coverage. The
Germans were therefore increasingly
able to surprise Fighter Command and
strike targets unopposed. From the
German perspective, however, attacks
on the radar system seemed to have
no effect due to the aforementioned
deception operation. Goering, though,
put it all together to mean the British
were weakening and their radar had
actually been of little use from the start.
For Fighter Command the biggest
problem with the radar was estimating
the altitude of tracked attacks. Fighter
Command had dispatched interceptors
to nearly every attack, but the techno-
logical inaccuracy in determining alti-
tude often meant the defenders arrived
late or out of position. What Goering
interpreted as systemic and material
weakness was actually a continuing
struggle to achieve effective command-
control. Even so, the airbases of Group
11 were becoming badly damaged and
barely functional. Momentum was start-
ing to move in the Luftwaffe’s direction.
7 September – 5 October:
The Blitz
The affect of Bomber Command’s
retaliatory strikes against German cities
struck home with Hitler. In his view
those raids were an important political
development. He’d been at his home at
Berchtesgaden since 17 August, moni-
toring the campaign from there. On the
29th he returned to Berlin, having been
moved by the bombing of the German
cities to declare the time had come to
finally and fully break the British.
He selected London as the new
primary target: attacks would switch
from airfields and factories to that
population center. To give more time
for that change to work its effect,
he also moved back the invasion
launch-date from 15 to 21 September.
On the morning of 7 September,
Goering moved his headquarters in
his private train to the French coast.
He wanted to be in place to personally
direct the attack against London.
From Enigma intercepts the
British were informed as to what was
happening. Fighter Command knew
it would be a big day; they waited for
the Germans to make the first move.
Mid-morning a group of 70 bombers
attacked two airfields in the south. At
about 4:00 p.m. radar reported another
large enemy contact. From 4:30 to 6:30
p.m. over 350 bombers struck targets in
southern England. That was followed by
attacks on London all night. The fighting
was intense. All of Group 11 and five
squadrons of Group 12 were committed.
Twenty-seven RAF aircraft were lost.
The rest of the month saw the con-
stant night bombing of London. Fighter
Command was losing aircraft, but most
pilots were recovered and new produc-
tion kept operational aircraft levels with-
in acceptable limits. Civilian casualties
were mounting, especially during the
night raids, which were nearly impos-
sible to stop. The Luftwaffe pilots were
facing hundreds of RAF fighters during
the daytime raids; however, and Fighter
Command remained far from defeated.
Dowding was distressed over the civilian
losses, but he recognized the momen-
tum of the fighting had again turned
to Fighter Command’s advantage.
Attacks on airfields lessened as
more and more effort was directed
at London. The high attrition rate of
the German bombers dropped with
the move to nighttime bombing,
but so did their bombing accu-
racy (never great to begin). Daytime
bombing became prohibitive due
to the heavy sustained losses.
September 27 brought a small victory
for the Luftwaffe when a raid hit the
Supermarine factory in Southhampton,
resulting in the temporary halt of
Spitfire production. Even so, by
the end of the month Hitler had to
indefinitely postpone Operation Sea
Lion. Fighter Command had won.
Conclusion
After three months of combat, the
Battle of Britain evolved into a stalemate
with the Luftwaffe legendarily but
ineffectively night-bombing British
cities. The RAF kept control of the
daytime airspace over England.
The first cause of that German defeat
came from the simple fact the British
were prepared for the battle while the
Germans weren’t. The British hadn’t pre-
pared for the mobile ground warfare of
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 17
the Blitzkrieg, but they were prepared for
an air defense struggle over their home-
land. The Fighter Command defenses
were robust, with each component
overlapping the next. That prevented
sudden catastrophic failure. When
the Germans knocked out part of the
Chain Home radar system or a Sector
Control center, the rest of the system
was able to cover the temporary loss.
The aircraft of Fighter Command
were well suited for the missions they
were called to fly. The majority of British
interceptors were Hurricanes. While not
the most agile fighter of World War II, it
was rugged, dependable, easy to build
and deadly against German bombers.
The Spitfire was less plentiful. During
the three-month battle the total number
of operational Spitfires varied from
about 250 to 200. Spitfire performance
equaled or exceeded that of the best
German fighter, the Me-109. Because the
British concentrated on the production
of those two aircraft types, the Germans
were never able to force the RAF past the
tipping point of irreplaceable losses.
The Germans weren’t prepared to
fight anything like the Battle of Britain.
Their Luftwaffe generals had been told
to prepare for a limited territorial war.
They’d therefore produced aircraft
intended for close air support of mobile
warfare near Germany. Their star plane
for close air support, the Ju-87 Stuka dive
bomber, was slow and nearly defenseless
against fighter attack. The short range of
their fighters limited escort protection
and exposed their bombers to repeated
attack. As the Germans transitioned
to night attacks, civilian losses went
up but bombing accuracy dropped.
Yet another significant difference
between the Luftwaffe and the RAF
lay in the minds and intuition of
their leaders. Churchill recognized
Dowding and his Fighter Command
group leaders were competent and
prepared for battle. The prime minister
therefore watched the battle unfold
but didn’t interfere with it. He also
understood the British people were
determined to see the conflict through.
He concentrated his personal efforts on
supporting that critical morale factor.
The Luftwaffe was victim to frequent
intervention by Goering and Hitler,
which often led to poor choices, like
requiring fighters to carry a 500 lb. bomb
that robbed them of speed and agility.
The Germans started with a workable
plan, but it was discarded when Hitler’s
desire to punish the British took over.
Over the course of the campaign the
18 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
Germans ended up lurching from
objective to objective, with little effort
given to actually analyze and evaluate
efforts against results. Just when they
were realizing results from their attacks
on the airfields, they changed tactics.
That demonstrated the inability of
Hitler and Goering to make patient and
rational decisions based on factual data.
The crucial fact was the importance
Hitler placed on concentrating on
defeating the will of his opponents. In
the earlier campaigns against France,
Belgium and Holland, those nations’
governments, high commands and
citizenry had rapidly become demoral-
ized and then lost their will to resist.
The British, spared by geography
from having to fight a mobile ground
battle, hadn’t fallen into that trap.
Instead of the British, then, it was
the Germans who became demoralized.
The overall course of the Battle of
Britain was controlled by the RAF and
played to that service’s strengths and
advantages. The Luftwaffe pilots and
crews had been assured the RAF was
already as good as defeated at the start
of the fighting. During the daylight
raids of mid-September, German
bomber formations were faced with
over 600 RAF fighters the pilots of which
proved both capable and determined.
It was therefore soon clear to all the
British were far from defeated.  ✪
Sources
Bungay, S. The Most Dangerous Enemy.
London: Aurum Press, 2000.
Churchill, W. Their Finest Hour.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949.
Fisher, D. A Summer Bright and Terrible.
New York: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005.
Lund, E. The Battle of Britain: The German Perspective.
Montgomery, AL: USAF War College, 1996.
Murray, W. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933 –1945.
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993.
Ziegler, P. London at War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.
Design Corner
Joseph Miranda
The Hardest Days
T
his issue’s wargame is John
Butterfield’s The Hardest
Days, a purpose-designed
solitaire simulation. Some military
situations automatically make
for a good solitaire game. One of
those is the Battle of Britain, the air
campaign in which the Royal Air
Force defeated the Luftwaffe’s bid to
gain control of the skies over England
in 1940. There are two reasons the
campaign works well in that way.
One of those factors is “fog of war.”
Both the RAF and Luftwaffe high com-
mands had a difficult time fully figuring
out what the other was up to. That was
in part because of the limited military
intelligence available to both sides.
The Germans also had misconcep-
tions about the efficacy of strategic
airpower. There had been a prewar
theory postulating civilian morale
would crack under sustained bombing.
While the Germans had dismissed
that concept in the 1930s, the experi-
ence of the campaigns of 1939 and
1940 then seemed to give it renewed
credence. There were Luftwaffe
raids on Warsaw and Rotterdam
that did much to encourage those
nations’ governments to capitulate.
On the other side, the British had to
deal with air raids coming from various
directions and an enemy who changed
his targeting strategy several times over
20 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
the course of the campaign. The British
did, however, have the edge when it
came to the overall intelligence war.
One part of that edge was tactical, inso-
far as they had set up radar and ground
observer stations in advance, which
gave them an adequate and timely
picture of aerial intruders. Another part
was strategic, from their various signals
intelligence programs. So the British
had a better view of the “big picture.”
That’s reflected in the game by
having the player actively command
the Royal Air Force while the game
system runs the Luftwaffe. The player
can make decisions that model the
real command-control advantages the
British had in the original campaign.
Of course, it also means he has the
opportunity to make errors that can
be disastrous in the course of play.
Another thing that facilitates this
solitaire design comes from the fact
many of the original actions were
linear: Luftwaffe intruders moved along
predetermined paths to targets and
then returned home. Their actions,
such as bombing and escort, are cut
and dried at this scale. They can be
modeled by simple game sub-systems,
such as the process of moving them
across the map from area to area.
The rules tend to be procedural as a
result. Every possibility for the enemy
force has to be thought through and
given a specific rule. The player can’t
make decisions for the other side.
Variable Luftwaffe decision-making
is there insofar as certain random
events can vary the tactical situation.
There are some unique aspects to
air warfare modeled here. You have to
manage RAF squadrons: they can be
“ready,” “scrambling,” or at various
altitudes. Altitude was an important
tactical consideration; so it’s in the
game. There are other tactical consid-
erations, such as if Luftwaffe fighters
are conducting independent sweep
missions or are escorting the bombers.
There are also purely random
events that model the chaotic factors
of air warfare. Raiders may not have
formed up correctly, or there may
have been navigational errors, or the
enemy has more effective tactics and,
as always in air warfare, weather can
change quickly. The random event rule
brings in an added dimension in that it
prevents the player from reducing the
situation to one that can be gotten at
purely through quantitative thinking.
A couple features that give the
game a historical look, such as the Tote
Board, are deliberately reminiscent
of RAF control rooms. Those features
put players into the spirit of the situa-
tion. It all adds up to a tense game of
aerial conflict in which you can win
or lose the war in a few days.  ✪
The Hardest Days
The Hardest Days (THD), designed by John Butterfield, is a To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in
purpose-designed solitaire wargame of intermediate complexity this issue send your name and address along with:
covering five critical days in the Battle of Britain, the five days that
saw the heaviest air action in the sky over England in the summer of $30 US Customers
1940. Each of those days is presented as its own scenario. THD puts $36 Canadian Customers
you in control of British Fighter Command, responding to air raids $38 Overseas Customers
launched by the Luftwaffe, which is controlled by the game system.
Each one-day scenario represents up to 14 hours during All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
which the Luftwaffe launches raids against targets in southern CA residents add $1.98 sales tax.
England, defended by the squadrons of RAF Fighter Command.
German raids include bomber Gruppen (groups), attempting to Send to:
hit specific targets, and fighter groups protecting those bombers Decision Games
and attacking British fighter squadrons. The German goal is ATTN: WaW Game Offer
twofold: inflict damage on targets and destroy squadrons to gain PO Box 21598
air superiority in preparation for the invasion of England. Bakersfield, CA 93390
The game system controls German strategy and tactics.
You use your fighter squadrons to respond to the raids in an attempt
to destroy or turn back the raiders and prevent their effective
bombing of their targets, while minimizing your own fighter losses.

Detail of the The Hardest Days map

 Tarawa Was
a Brawl:
Tactical Analysis of
a Pivotal Battle
by James I. Marino

A Marine fires on a
Japanese pillbox.

22 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

T
arawa was a deadly brawl, the
nastiest kind of close-quarter
fighting between two dedicated,
relentless and ruthless forces. The
eventual US success in that fight made
it appear our amphibious doctrine
was already firmly established and,
indeed, was the underlying reason we
succeeded in capturing the island. In
that first battle of the Central Pacific
“atoll war,” however, it was actually
the training and determination of
individual Marines that won through,
despite the failures and weaknesses
of our amphibious doctrine, and thus
saved that doctrine from discredit.
The year 1933 was the crucial turn-
ing point for the USMC in the pre-war
era. With the end of its Nicaraguan
deployment, concentration was
shifted to training for amphibious
warfare. Along that line, Maj. Gen.
John H. Russell, then the assistant
commandant, suggested a “Fleet
Marine Force” be created. His idea
was accepted, and he drew up a set of
general guidelines for it that the Navy
Marines seek cover behind a sea wall on Red Beach 3, Tarawa.
Department authorized in General
Order No. 241 on 8 December 1933.
That general order committed the
Marines to the idea their paramount
mission in wartime would be to
serve the fleet by seizing bases.
By 1934 the new curriculum was
established at the Marine Corps
School in Quantico. The next step
was to prepare a detailed manual
for landing operations. Classes were
halted at Quantico on 14 November
1934 in order for the entire staff
there to assemble that document.
The result was the Tentative
Manual for Landing Operations.
The manual attempted to take
the most complicated and difficult
military task, amphibious assault,
and provide practical solutions
for all its many problems. It broke
down amphibious warfare into six
component parts, each representing a
particular feature of that type of oper-
ation: 1) command relations; 2) naval
gunfire support; 3) aerial support; 4)
ship-to-shore movement; 5) securing
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 23
the bridgehead; and 6) logistics.
Each component was seen
to have unique problems within
it, and each of them had to have
clear-cut solutions coordinated
between the involved naval and
landing forces. The key problem
and solution for each component
was summarized as follows.
Command relations required a
clear chain of command within and
between the landing force and the
naval support group. It had to take
into consideration service rivalries
that might impact decision-making.
Naval gunfire support had to be
heaviest when the actual landing
operation was most vulnerable: just
before and after the first Marines
went ashore. A concise chain of
communication between ship and
shore therefore had to be organized.
That was to be achieved through the
use of fire-control parties consisting
of naval personnel and Marine
artillery personnel. A primary aim
continued on page 26 »
24 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 25
» continued from page 23
was to coordinate naval gunfire
with unit movement ashore.
Aerial support’s most impor-
tant function was to neutralize
strongpoints in the beach defense
before they were encountered
by the landing riflemen.
Ship-to-shore movement marked
the beginning of the actual attack. It
was to start as soon as the pre-inva-
sion naval gunfire lifted. The boats
were to be dispatched as quickly
as possible, and troops should be
disembarked expeditiously, but
the overarching need was to avoid
breaking up the organizational
integrity of the landing units.
A “secure beachhead” was defined
as having been achieved when: “a
zone contiguous to the beach the
possession of which permits the
continuous landing of troops, equip-
ment and supplies without serious
interference from the enemy, and
ensures the maneuver space and the
terrain features requisite for a further
advance” had been established.
Logistics, always key in any
military operation, took on special
characteristics because, the manual
explained: “One of the most essential
[logistical] conditions for successful
landing operations is the proper
loading of the vessels carrying troops
and their supplies.” That is, combat
units and their supplies had to
be loaded onto their transports
such that the last on were the first
off during the actual landing.
Not until the summer of 1943
did anyone know that 10 years of
theoretical work, and countless hours
of preparation, were to be aimed at
Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. Seizure
of the Gilbert Islands was deemed
a necessary preliminary to the US
entry into the Marshalls (which was
in turn deemed necessary as the next
in a series of island-base seizures
that would eventually culminate with
decisive landings in the Japanese
home islands). Thus the Gilberts cam-
paign was instigated by Adm. Chester
Nimitz as the essential means of
obtaining a jump off position for the
rest of the grand strategic campaign
to follow. Operation Galvanic, as the
landing was codenamed, was there-
fore aimed at Betio Island within the
Tarawa Atoll, because it held the larg-
est airfield in the Gilbert Island group.
Theory Into Practice:
Command-Control
The 2nd Marine Division launched
the invasion on 20 November 1943. At
the end of the first day that invasion
was in deep trouble. In fact, the
landing has since been described by
most historians (and its survivors)
as a disaster. D-Day ended with
the Marines committed, but with
several hundred already dead and
hundreds more gravely injured.
Only four howitzers, four tanks
and two halftracks had been gotten
ashore. No major objectives had been
secured. Ammunition, food, water
and medical supplies weren’t getting
ashore, nor were the many wounded
being taken off the island. Mistakes
in the execution of all six parts of the

Lt Alexander Bonnyman
(4th from right) and his assault
party storming a Japanese
stronghold. Bonnyman received
the Medal of Honor posthumously.

26 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

carefully thought out doctrine had
accumulated to place the invasion
close to overall defeat and failure.
To begin, Adm. Nimitz,
Commander-in-Chief Pacific,
declared the need for “strategic sur-
prise” limited the preliminary bom-
bardment to no more than two and a
half hours on the morning of the ini-
tial landing. Then Maj. Gen. Holland
M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, commander
of V Amphibious Corps, announced 6th
Marine Regiment would be held back
as floating reserve. That meant Maj.
Gen. Julian Smith, commander of 2nd
Marine Division, would initially attack
the island with only a 2:1 superiority
in troops, well below the doctrinal
minimum of 3:1. Those command
decisions, taken out of fear and lack
of experience, were momentous.
Beyond that, the overall command
set up was so entangled and convo-
luted it required the concurrence of
two officers, Maj. Gen. Smith and
Rear Adm. Kelly Turner (commander
of the amphibious force), to release
the 6th from reserve status. Those
characteristics also extended to
the chain of command between
the invasion force and the air com-
mand supporting the invasion.
The commanders of the invasion
then also placed themselves in an
isolated position away from the main
battle. Turner and Smith stayed
near Makin Island, 85 miles north
of Tarawa — where another, much
smaller, landing took place on the
same day — which meant they were
out of close touch with the disaster
that developed on Tarawa on D-Day.
Even had they been at Tarawa,
another problem for the kind of
command-control called for by
doctrine came from the fact no one
had thought to set aside a dedicated
and specially equipped command
ship. Communication to and from
the invasion’s high command was
relegated to an improvised com-
munication center on the battleship
USS Maryland, which was repeatedly
knocked out from the concussion of
that ship’s broadsides. That meant,
in almost all cases, crises on Tarawa
had to be resolved by on the spot
decisions taken before the higher
command had time to intervene.
Thus the planned communications
scheme failed almost in its entirety.
Theory Into Practice:
Naval Gunfire Support
Another mistaken assumption
the high command made was the
preliminary bombardment by naval
guns and aircraft would destroy
the fortifications on the island.
Naval gunfire support was, accord-
ing to doctrine, supposed to be the
crucial element enabling the landing
force to reach shore and then assault
inland. The Navy in fact committed
three battleships, five cruisers and
nine destroyers to hurl over 3,000 tons
of shells at Betio, which worked out
to about 10 tons of high explosives
per acre. Nimitz’s time limit,
however, affected the accuracy and
concentration of the bombardment,
World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011 27
the effects of which were then further
degraded by other mistakes. That is,
many Marines noticed shells fired
by the navy actually skipped across
the island to explode harmlessly over
water on the far side. Col. Merritt
Edson, regimental chief of staff and
Guadalcanal veteran, rendered the
following assessment of the whole
bombardment: “Navy gunners make
the mistake of thinking of shore
targets as ships. When you hit it, it
sinks. On land, you need a direct
hit on every gun emplacement.”
What that meant was the ships
had come in too close and therefore
had an incorrect angle of fire. Their
guns were aimed too low and flat. Had
they stood farther out and lofted their
shells at higher angles, there would’ve
been much more target destruction.
Beyond even all that, the
high-explosive shells employed
by the bombarding ships usu-
ally went off before penetrating
into the interiors of the armored
Japanese defense works. That made
for impressive explosions, but
often did little real damage even
when direct hits were scored.
To compound those mistakes in
execution there was also a fateful 25
minutes of near-total curtailment of
naval gunfire during the final run in
by the assault craft. That permitted
the Japanese to shift their fires and
reinforce the landing beaches.
In sum, the failure of the pre-
liminary bombardment on D-Day
was the most critical shortcoming
of the initial attack. Gen. Smith,
after the battle, inspected every the arrival of the carrier-based strike.
Japanese pillbox and blockhouse on That is, the planners in the carrier air
the northern portion of the island group changed their plans, postponing
and discovered only one had been their strike by 30 minutes. That was
destroyed by naval gunfire. All the approved by Adm. Turner, but no one
rest had to be taken by Marines using thought to tell Adm. Hill, commander
hand grenades and other explosives. of the amphibious force. When the
initial landing was held back to await
Theory Into Practice: the air strike, a second mission group,
Aerial Support still timed for the original H-Hour,
arrived at the old time. Hill was able to
Aerial support, which might’ve get that mission to remain on station
made up for the naval gunfire until the new H-Hour, but it was then
mistakes, also failed in its mission. sent in with depleted fuel levels.
The initial air strike began late; the
seven-minute attack proved too short, Theory Into Practice:
and the bombs failed to penetrate the Ship-to-Shore Movement
heavily protected fortifications. The
principal targets of the planes were the Even as the first Marines waded
coastal defense guns on Betio. The car- ashore, it was obvious the men of the
rier-based aircraft dropped almost 200 landing force would have to seize the
tons of explosives on those targets, but island using little support. The arrival
the enemy weapons remained intact. A of that landing force in solid, cohesive,
planned B-24 raid never materialized. functioning units was therefore
That “lost request” for the heavy imperative, but that part of the doc-
bombers was another casualty of trine also ran into problems. The trans-
the convoluted chain of command. ports that were to unload the assault
Similarly, it was yet another com- troops had to relocate because they’d
munication failure that had affected initially stationed themselves too
Japanese Heavy Weapons on Betio
Weapon Type Number On Hand
8-inch Coastal Defense Guns
140mm Coastal Defense Guns
80mm Coastal Defense Guns
127mm Twin Anti-Aircraft Guns
70mm Twin Anti-Aircraft Guns
13mm Anti-Aircraft Guns
13mm Twin Anti-Aircraft Guns
75mm Type 94 Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns
70mm Type 92 Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns
37mm Type 94 Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns
13mm Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns
37mm Anti-Tank Guns
28 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
close to the Japanese shore batteries.
Unfortunately, some of the land-
ing craft were loaded, while other
troops were still climbing down the
cargo nets, when the transports
began their positional shift. As the
landing craft followed the transports,
matching specific boats with their
assigned teams and cargoes became
haphazard. The new location had the
landing craft loading outside the reef,
where a 10-mile trip was required.
The Amphtracs (amphibious
tractors) and LVT (Landing Vehicles
Tracked), here being used for the first
time as assault craft, could make only
four knots. That in itself wouldn’t have
been a problem, but a heavy chop
and a strong westerly current caused
the landing to finally take place at
9:13 a.m., which was 28 minutes after
the already postponed H-Hour.
Given the ineffective naval
bombardment and air strike, that time
gap allowed the Japanese to further
concentrate heavy and accurate
fire on the approaching boats. “The
Americans appeared to be surprised
and confused [by the intense fire],”
recalled Japanese Warrant Officer
Kiyoshi Ota, “many of the landing
boats collided with each other.”
LVT made up the first wave of
4
the assault, and they could swim or
4 crawl across the reef. The follow-on
6 waves rode Higgins boats that needed
4 four feet of water. Sadly, due to an
unexpected “dodge tide,” the reef was
8
covered by only three feet of water. The
27 men in the follow-on waves therefore
4 had to wade across the reef, all the
10 while exposed to fire. They were depos-
ited in chest-deep water and subjected
6 to the ordeal of a 500-yard struggle
9 to shore, wading through shallows
31 lashed by Japanese bullets and shells.
Other combat arms were also
14
affected by the reef. Tank-loaded
LCM (Landing Craft Mechanized)
discharged Sherman tanks into
three feet of water, which drowned
out some of their engines.
In the early afternoon the tide
still refused to rise; so the incoming
battalions continued to have to wade
across the shallows under murderous
fire. Disaster loomed due to the
inadequate movement of men and
materiel from ship to shore. During
the first day and a half of battle, no
unit reached the beach intact.
The extraordinary requirement
to wade across the coral reef while
exposed to machinegun fire and
artillery salvos was faced by almost
every Marine in the division. Lt. were only four 75mm pack howitzers, ride. Just as crucial was the inadequate
Commander Robert A. McPherson, two halftracks, four Shermans and a number of LVT available. In another
a pilot flying over the atoll, later few 37mm anti-tank guns ashore. sense, however, the division had
described what he saw: “The water arrived with too many other types
never seemed clear of tiny men, their Theory Into Practice: Logistics of vehicles. It had embarked with
rifles held over their heads, slowly more than 650 vehicles and 200
wading beachward. I wanted to cry.” The Marines were poorly equipped trailers, which placed a stupendous
to deal with fortifications. They lacked requirement for square footage in
Theory Into Practice: tanks, bazookas and flamethrowers. the cargo holds of the amphibious
Securing the Beachhead When the division left New Zealand, ships, area that would’ve been much
it had been provided with a company better used to bring along more of the
The first 1,500 Marines who got of tanks and a few flamethrowers, but tanks and equipment needed by the
to the beach were mostly pinned 243 bazookas had simply missed the leading edge of the assault force.
down at the coconut-log and coral
barricade the Japanese had erected
along its inner edge. By the start
of that first evening they held only
about 10 percent of their planned
objectives in two separate enclaves.
The failure to quickly gain a secure
beachhead had two main reasons.
First, the overall 2:1 US-Japanese
manpower ratio meant there
simply wasn’t the surplus of attacking
strength needed for the Marines
to be able to move rapidly inland.
Further, 1st Battalion of 8th Marine
Regiment, though needed and
called for, remained on their
landing craft all night, in reserve,
because of yet another breakdown
in the communication system.
Second, though the Marine
commanders at all levels had known
there would be enemy pillboxes,
there had been no pre-attack pill-
box-busting practice, nor had a
communication system been set-up
between rifle and tank units.
By the end of the first night, then,
along with some 1,500 Marines, there

World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011 29

 During the first 24 hours the in enemy waters as fast as possible, and Winning Through
Marines ashore also ran dangerously further motivated by Nimitz’s stricture
low on water, food, medical supplies to protect the fleet at all cost, made no The US doctrine of amphibious
and small arms ammunition. What effort to meet the combat needs of the warfare may have been sound on
was particularly galling was the fact land force. In sum, the lack of a secure paper, but an inadequate and insuf-
the men ashore could see some 100 beachhead and the chaos on the ficient application of each part of it
small craft, all circling aimlessly in transport ships resulted in only three brought the Marines to the verge of
the nearby lagoon. In short, what or four boats an hour unloading their defeat on Betio. All six parts of the
amounted to a general and almost supplies ashore during the first day. doctrine were rendered useless or
random unloading of the transports Faced with daunting logistical otherwise failed; yet the Marines
began early on D-Day and produced support problems, the men ashore went on to victory and a seeming
nothing more than logistical chaos. stripped the many dead of their endorsement of the doctrine therefore
That had its root cause, again, in the ammunition, canteens and first followed from their success.
convoluted command structure, which aid pouches. The situation was so At Tarawa, though, it wasn’t
had placed the unloading under the serious there seems little doubt a doctrine, equipment or strategy,
control of the naval commander rather Japanese counterattack during that but the Marines, that saved the day.
than the land force commander. first night would’ve knocked the Further, they were Marines who
Adm. Hill, guided by the general Marines off the island, and the inva- for the most part hadn’t gone to the
Navy priority of unloading transports sion would’ve failed (see sidebar). Amphibious Warfare School and
hadn’t taken part in prewar training
exercises. Robert Sherrod, a journalist
The Japanese on Tarawa embedded with them, claimed: “We
might easily have lost [on Betio], but
For the Japanese, Tarawa administratively came under the joint command of Vice for the superb courage of the Marines.”
Adm. Jinichi Kuska, Commander-in-Chief Southeast Asia, and Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo, Gen. Smith, in his after-battle
Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet. Their only contribution to the actual battle, however, came analysis credited the victory to “the
from their earlier sending of land forces to the Gilberts. The construction of Betio’s defenses invincible spirit of the Marines. Only
and airstrip was the responsibility of the 111th Construction (Pioneer) Battalion. Yard for men with the highest morale and will-
yard, Tarawa was the best-fortified island the Americans would assault during the war. ingness to die rather than be defeated
In September 1943, Rear Adm. Keiji Shibasaki was sent ashore on Betio to could have captured this well-nigh
take command there. He was a veteran of Japanese amphibious landings on the impregnable chain of fortifications.”
Chinese coast, and he therefore understood the challenges facing the US Marines. Adm. Nimitz agreed when he
He made his primary goal to prevent them from getting ashore in cohesive units. wrote in 1953: “At the time we did the
He viewed the shelf-like reef surrounding the island as his first line of defense, best with what we had, and in that
concentrating his heavy weapons, from artillery to machineguns, at the coastline, all ‘best’ was the resolute courage of our
set up with interlocking fields of fire zeroed in on the channels within the reef. Marines, who in spite of all obstacles
He incorrectly anticipated the assault would come either against the western or seized the island in four days.”
south coasts. Caught off guard by the attack on the north, he then smoothly shifted his Marines fought singly, in small
men and weapons in that direction. Shibasaki was killed late on the afternoon of the first groups of twos and threes, and in
day. Indications are, had he remained alive, he intended to launch a banzai attack against ad hoc units. They created their
the shallow Marine beachhead that night. Post-war analysis has led many analysts to own methods to defeat the enemy,
argue such an effort would’ve ended the battle disastrously for the Americans.  ★ which weren’t part of any doctrine.
They fell back on the fundamental,
aggressive combat doctrine instilled
in them since basic training, and
they coupled that with a willingness
to reorganize and improvise as
necessary. Col. William K. Jones,
commanding officer of 1st Battalion,
6th Marines, later summed it up:

I do not believe that heroism alone

would have sufficed — although
without it in extraordinary amounts
Tarawa would never have been
captured. What tipped the scales in
our favor was the traditional ingenuity
and flexibility Marines have called
upon many times in the past as they
will in the future. Decimated units
were regrouped into new, and efficient
fighting organizations, not on orders
of higher authority but simply through
Japanese prisoners of war the initiative of those officers and
men in the immediate vicinity.

30 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

 Marines who never had their deeds
recorded or recognized by earning a
medal nevertheless went about the
deadly business of winning the battle.
Here and there small groups, most led
by privates, took patches of ground.
War correspondent Richard
W. Johnston, who landed with the
Marines, described them in action:
“In those hellish hours the heroism
of the Marines, officers and enlisted
alike, was beyond belief. Time
after time they charged Japanese
positions, ignoring the deadly fire
and refusing to halt until wounded
beyond human ability to carry on.”
Even the wounded made the
ultimate determination as to their
continued fitness for combat.
Johnston observed an aid station:
“Under the seawall on Beach 3 the
line of wounded stretched nearly 50
yards, and only those too badly hurt
to move were there — the ‘walking
wounded’ were still fighting.”
those about him became casualties.”
Lt. Col. Howard J. Rice, executive
officer of the 2/2, also focused on
the morale factor: “Before we hit the
beach we knew it would be grim busi-
ness. But we intended and expected
to win, even when we held only a nar-
row naked beach. But, I must admit
this confidence was based on nothing
more tangible than a faith, a faith
shared by all Marines, that Marines
always finished a job assigned.”
Lt. Col. William T. Bray, com-
mander of Company A/1/2, was
more succinct: “The value of sound
American corpses sprawled on the beach of Tarawa.
training and the spirit of comrade-
ship, which comprises a fundamental
pillar of Marine Corps life, still stand
foremost in my mind as the primary
reason for victory at Tarawa.”
Richard Wheeler, a veteran
who later also fought on Iwo Jima,
explained in his book A Special
Valor, how Marine esprit emerged on
Tarawa: “They were all Marines, and
they were in this thing together, and
they would do the best they could
to uphold the Corps’ reputation and
sustain one another. Few men talked
in terms of ‘death before dishonor,’

Motivation

The qualities that led to the

Marine victory on Betio can perhaps
best be identified by the men who
commanded them there. Col. T.
A. Culhane, Jr., the operations
officer of 2nd Marines, identified
those intangibles as follows: “More
important than all the techniques [of
amphibious doctrine], was the high
state of training and discipline of the
individual Marine, his morale, and
his confidence and determination
to continue the attack even though

World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011 31

but the ancient code applied.”
In sum, it was inconceivable
to most Marines on the island
that they would be the one to let
down another Marine, or that they
would be responsible for dimming
the reputation of the Corps. That
Marine Cemetery, Tarawa, March 1944
32 World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011
was demonstrated by the Marines
who held the tiny strip of beach on
the first night. Henry Shaw, chief
historian of the USMC Historical
Branch wrote of them: “There was
no sense of panic in the lines as the
Marines set up for night defense.”
Conclusion
Tarawa didn’t turn out to be a
proving ground for amphibious
doctrine. In fact, every subsequent
move in the drive across the Central
Pacific was made with avoiding the
mistakes of Tarawa in mind. The
lessons learned and adjustments made
to doctrine helped take the Marshalls
twice as fast with half the casualties.
Total Marine casualties on Tarawa
were 990 killed and 2,391 wounded.
It took the Marines to save doctrine
from failure, men who relied on the
traditional bedrock foundations of
the Corps to win through. Without the
heroism of the Marines on Tarawa, the
course of the war in the Central Pacific
would’ve undoubtedly changed.
Tarawa thus doesn’t stand as proof of
amphibious doctrine, but as a symbol
of raw courage and Marine tradi-
tion. The bottom line for the battle
can be summed up as: individuals
advanced — doctrine followed.  ✪
1st Battalion 6th
Marines insignia.
Sources

Alexander, Col. Joseph H. USMC (Ret). Across the Reef:

The Marines Assault of Tarawa — 
Marines In World War II Commemorative Series.
Washington DC: Marine Corps Historical Center. 1993.
Alexander, Col. Joseph H. USMC (Ret). Utmost Savagery.
New York: Ivy Books, 1995. (paperback)
Baldwin, Hanson. Battles Lost and Won.
New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
Berry, Henry. Semper Fi, Mac. New York: Arbor House, 1982.
Costello, John. The Pacific War 1941–1945.
New York: Quill, 1981.
___________. Great Battles of World War II.
New York: Shooting Star press, 1995.
Hoyt, Edwin. Storm Over the Gilberts.
New York: Mason/Charter Publishers, 1978.
Isley, Jeter A., and Crowl, Philip A.
The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean Navy.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.
Potter, E.B. Nimitz. Japanese World War II Defenses on Tarawa
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
Shaw, Jr., Henry I. Tarawa: A Legend Is Born.
New York: Ballantine Books, 1968.
Sherrod, Robert. Tarawa: The Story of a Battle. Fredrickburg,
Type 95 Ha-Go
Texas: The Admiral Nimitz Foundation, 1973.
Simmons, Brigadier General Edwin H. USMC (Ret). tank ruin at Tarawa,
The United States Marines: The First Two Hundred Years, March 2010
1775 –1975. New York: Viking Press, 1985.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against The Sun.
New York: The Free Press, 1985.
Steinberg, Rafael. Island Fighting.
Alexander, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978.
Tapert, Annette. Lines of Battle.
New York: Pocket Books, 1987.
Wheeler, Richard. A Special Valor.
Edison, New Jersey: Castle Books, 1996.

Disabled U.S. LVTs and a Japanese Type 95

light tank on Tarawa beach after the battle.

World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011 33

Logistical Factors in the
Western Desert: 1941– 42
Ed’s Note: Axis units are in italics;
Allied units are in plaintext.
Balance of Forces
T
he armies committed to the
Western Desert campaign were
small by European Theater of
Operations (ETO) standards, less than 10
divisions on each side in 1941, and never
growing to much more than a dozen or
so divisions even after both sides built
up the following year. Understanding
why those forces remained so small
is, in turn, critical to understanding
the nature of their operations.
To give one example, as his forces
34 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
by Joseph Miranda
swept toward the Egyptian frontier in
mid-1941, Rommel appealed to the
Axis high command for reinforcement.
That presented Berlin and Rome with a
dilemma, due to the fact there was a lack
of suitable units. The Germans had com-
mitted most of their panzer and motor-
ized infantry divisions to the invasion of
the Soviet Union, which had kicked off
on 22 June. A third division of motorized
infantry was formed from miscellaneous
formations, initially called the Afrika
Division and later the 90th Light Afrika.
There was some consideration of
deploying the 22nd Air Landing Division
to Africa, but it was deemed unsuitable
because it lacked motorization.
Rommel really didn’t need more
divisions; rather, he needed more
mechanized units (formations
moved by tracked and/or wheeled
vehicles). The overarching lesson
of the campaign, from its very start,
was that foot-mobile units were of
little value in the desert. They couldn’t
maneuver fast enough, and were
therefore easily cut off and destroyed,
as had happened to most of the ill-fated
Italian Tenth Army during the British
offensive in the winter of 1940 – 41.
The Italians, who had primary
responsibility for Axis operations in
the Mediterranean, also just gener-
ally lacked mechanized units. In
pg. 35
1941 they committed their Ariete
Armored Division, followed by the
Trieste and Trento Motorized Infantry
Divisions. In 1942 they added the
Littorio Armored Division. Those units
represented every Italian mechanized
division available at the time.
Other Italian divisions in the
desert were only partially motorized,
due to the fact Italy lacked both the
petroleum and the industrial resources
to support a mechanized army. What
also needs to be remembered is
Mussolini committed considerable
forces to fight on the eastern front, as
well as taking part in the occupation
of Yugoslavia and Greece. The already
strained Italian war economy was thus
simply facing too many demands.
In 1941– 42, Hitler viewed North
Africa as a sideshow: the war was going
to be decided by defeating the Soviet
Union. Once the Germans had gained
victory there, unlimited numbers of
divisions, transport, petroleum and
industrial resources would be freed for
campaigning on the Axis periphery.
Rommel saw it differently, however,
claiming an Axis army seizing the Suez
Canal would thereby gain an important
strategic victory against the Allies.
Both approaches had merit, but the
limit on what could be done in North
Africa was actually set by logistics.
The British faced similar challenges
reinforcing North Africa. The Western
Desert was only one part of their Middle
Eastern Command, which covered the
Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle
East and the Persian Gulf. The British
frequently found themselves having to
move forces out of North Africa in order
to fight campaigns elsewhere: against
the Italians in Ethiopia (1940 – 41), the
Germans in Greece (March – May 1941),
pro-Axis rebels in Iraq (April – June)
and Vichy forces in Syria (June – July).
Additionally, the British also had to
keep an eye on Iran, the Gulf emirates,
Sudan and even Egypt itself, the latter
having an anti-British nationalist
movement. Those requirements
tied down several divisions. Making
the situation worse was that, in the
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 35
wake of Japanese entry into the war
in December 1941, Commonwealth
units had to be redeployed to support
the fighting in the Far East. Their
presence would be missed in 1942.
Nonetheless, both the Axis and Allies
each fielded army-sized formations for
most of the 1941 – 42 desert war. What
counted wasn’t so much the number of
divisions deployed, but their combat
effectiveness. It was in that regard
logistics came even more fully into play.
Logistics — Strategic Factors
There were two major dilemmas
in the Western Desert. The first was
getting supplies to bases in North Africa;
the second was moving forward that
supply from those bases to the front.
The British had a strategic
advantage in logistics, given their
secure petroleum supply from the
Middle East and the US. They also had
the advantage of having begun the
war with a largely mechanized army.
British units were generally motorized,
with troops and supplies transported
on wheeled and tracked vehicles.
Nonetheless, the British still found
themselves facing restraints when trying
to exploit those advantages. For most of
the campaign the Allies couldn’t use the
Mediterranean as a shipping route to
North Africa, owing to its interdiction by
Axis air and naval forces. Allied convoys
had to sail around the Horn of Africa.
The need to go around Africa meant an enormous amount
of shipping was tied up in the Atlantic Ocean-Indian Ocean-
Red Sea “pipeline” simply to get men and equipment to the
Middle East. The longer the sea voyage, the more those ships
were unavailable to carry cargoes on other routes. There
was also the issue of the return voyage: a cargo ship might
be sent fully loaded to Suez, but usually returned empty.
All that contributed to a global Allied shipping
shortage that was then further exacerbated by the
expansion of the war into the Pacific when the Japanese
entered. Even more, that occurred at a time when the
German U-boat campaign was taking a heavy toll of
merchant ships. The shortage wasn’t ended until later in
the war, after the North African campaign was over.
As noted, the British also committed many divisions to
their vast Middle East Command. Those units came from
across the British Empire, as well as including contingents
from overrun Allied nations made up of volunteers who’d
escaped Nazi-occupied Europe. The influx of those units
meant Middle East Command had to create what amounted
to an entire modern infrastructure to support them. Training
bases, ports, airfields, railroads, roads, telephone lines, ware-
houses, hospitals and post offices: all such facilities had to
be either expanded or, more usually, built up from nothing.
On the Axis side, strategic lines of communication were
several times shorter than those of the Allies, having only to
transit the Mediterranean. The Italians were largely respon-
sible for the shipping support to Axis forces in North Africa,
36 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
and their convoys could sail from ports in the southern part
of their country. Owing to the short sailing time, an Axis
cargo ship could be “turned around” and used more often
than a similar Allied vessel, effectively providing an efficiency
multiple of the tonnage transported. To be sure, those
convoys had to run the gauntlet of Allied aero-naval attack,
especially from the British island-base of Malta; however,
most of the supplies and manpower made it through.
In addition to naval convoys, the Axis also made use
of transport aircraft to move supplies. Based in southern
Europe, those aircraft could rapidly move men and supplies
to North Africa. While aircraft deliveries weren’t as efficient as
ship-borne operations, requiring higher ratios of fuel to car-
go, they nonetheless provided additional tonnage, especially
in emergency situations. When Allied ULTRA intelligence
pinpointed Italian tankers for sinking, Axis fuel shortages
could be made up, at least in the short term, by flying in more
POL (petrol, oil, lubricants) from Europe directly to Africa.
Thus, despite the usual picture of Allied forces having
a logistical advantage in the Western Desert campaign, the
reality was the strategic lines of communication were much
shorter for the Axis. A comparison of tonnages offloaded
by each side at ports in North Africa shows Axis bases were
often receiving more supplies than those of the Allies.
Since that was the case, the perception the Afrikakorps
was beset by supply shortages while Eighth Army was
operating at a surplus needs to be more deeply examined.
Logistics — Operational Factors
Axis forces in North Africa required 60,000 to 72,000 tons
of supply a month to function at full combat effectiveness.
That was to support both ground and air operations during
periods of major activity. For most of the desert campaign,
Axis (as well as British) forces were usually involved in build-
up and training phases that required only a fraction of those
tonnages. For light combat operations, supply requirements
would be reduced by about half from those peak numbers.
For periods of inactivity, they could be as low as 25 percent
of peak needs. Lulls between offensives could therefore be
used to create supply surpluses that could later be utilized
in major offensives. As the chart below indicates, sufficient
supplies were delivered to Rommel to create such surpluses.
Given those figures, it can readily be seen the main
reason for Rommel’s supply problems occurred in-theater.
Railroads, the usual means of moving troops and supplies
in Europe, weren’t generally available in the Western Desert.
In fact, the rail situation in North Africa was abysmal.
In all of Libya there were only 38 miles of rail line.
The British had a rail system in the Nile delta and
along the Suez Canal. One line from it ran west along
the coast, terminating around Mersa Matruh (it would
later be extended farther west). The British made use of
that railroad to move supplies, but once they reached
the end of the line everything had to be trucked.
To give an example, a German panzer division
consumed 10,000 tons of supplies in a month of sustained
combat. Therefore, for an Afrikakorps panzer division
to engage in battle, 10,000 tons of supplies would have
to be landed at a port or airfield and then moved via
truck to the unit. That also presumes the right types
of supplies were landed and there were no losses in
transit due to enemy action, pilferage or accidents.
It was that combination of supply and transport
requirements that put a limit on reinforcements that
could be deployed in the Western Desert. Each potential
reinforcement division meant additional increments of
supply would have to be delivered to North Africa to support
it, and additional trucks would have to be available for the
transport of that additional supply. All that was in addition
to the trucks and other vehicles that would then be needed
to actually move the supplied division’s men, weapons
and equipment. On top of all that, the division would then
require even more men, vehicles and equipment shipped
in and moved forward to replace losses due to combat,
disease and the inescapable wear and tear of warfare.
To give a smaller-scale example, a German replace-
ment tank that landed at Tripoli or Benghazi, destined
for an armored unit fighting at Tobruk, would have to be
driven over several hundred miles of roads and desert
tracks. Along the way the tank would have to be kept
fueled, its crew fed, and any incidental damage owing
to mechanical breakdown or enemy air attack repaired.
One expedient was the use of tank transports, flatbed
trucks, to move them over large distances across friendly
territory. They saved wear on the tracked vehicles, but the
transports in turn had their own logistical requirements.
All that created a vicious cycle for both sides, as the
large numbers of trucks required their own fuel and
maintenance to operate, which in turn put additional
demands on the already strained logistical system. Moreover,
those demands were then effectively doubled by the
fact the trucks had to return to bases in the rear to pick
up more men and supplies. A tanker truck carrying
gasoline might have to expend 10 percent of its own load
to keep itself fueled, and there were additional cargo
losses due to spillage, evaporation and enemy action.
The dilemma didn’t lie simply in moving forward men
and materiel. There was also always movement to the rear
of vehicles sent to depots for overhaul, soldiers evacuated
for medical reasons, prisoners to be interred in camps, mail
posted back to Europe (vital for morale), and so forth.
Again, an initial advantage the Axis had was in their
fleet of transport aircraft. They amounted to some 260
planes based in Europe and Africa, and they were useful for

Tons of Supply Delivered to North

Africa in Selected Months of 1942

Month Axis British

June 32,327 75,790
July 91,491 74,461
August 51,655 72,192
September 77,226 27,072

Note: Axis figures don’t include additional shipments via air. British figures
are only for supply from the United Kingdom, not counting Lend-Lease.

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 37

movement in-theater. They couldn’t
move much in the way of heavy
equipment, however; and aircraft
based in North Africa again created
their own logistical requirements in
terms of fuel and maintenance.
Another alternative was coastal
shipping: moving supplies by light
craft between North African ports.
Such vessels, though, could provide
only a limited amount of lift and
they were often vulnerable to
enemy air and naval attack.
Those limits on transport for
both sides, taken altogether, meant
any offensive had to be preceded
by a considerable period of passive
build-up. The usual practice was to
create chains of logistical depots where
ammunition, POL, water, rations,
replacement parts, medical items and
everything else could be stockpiled, and
semi-permanent facilities such as com-
munication centers, repair shops and
hospitals, could be built. Those depots
would then, in effect, be expended in
support of combat operations or, if
farther back, they would eventually be
consumed to support the rear echelon.
Consequently, an army that
advanced too far would go beyond
the distance at which depots could
support it, while a retreating foe would
be falling back toward his source of
support. That led to the pattern in the
desert war in which an offensive would
coast to a halt while its spearheads
waited for their logistics to catch up;
meanwhile, the other side could launch
a counterattack and seize victory
from the proverbial jaws of defeat.
That’s why ports such as Benghazi
and Tobruk were critical objectives.
They were so not simply for their use in
landing supplies, but for bringing them

Railroads, Distance & Logistics

Railroads were the primary means to move supplies, equipment and personnel in Europe during World War II.
Compared to trucks, railroad engines require a low ratio of manpower and fuel for the tonnage they move.
A standard German supply train of 25 to 40 rail cars could move an average of 450 tons, depending on cargo type, up to 185 miles per day.
In comparison, a German motorized supply column of 15 to 20 trucks could move 60 tons 125 miles per day.
In Europe, trains ran from industrial centers and depots to railheads where they would debark their passengers and cargoes.
They would then make their way to units via truck or wagon transport, or by the time-honored method of walking.
The distance from the railhead to the front determined much of the efficiency of an army’s logistical system.

38 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

in at points forward enough to support
forces in the field without too much
more transport having to be involved.
Possession of a forward port cut several
hundred miles of trucking from bases
farther to the rear. Tobruk therefore
became the major objective of the
campaigns in 1940 – 42 because it was
in a good position to provide logistical
support to the entire Western Desert.
those special maintenance require-
ments was the need to repair vehicles
that had been damaged in combat.
Combat effectiveness in the desert
proved, in large part, to be a function
of the number of motor vehicles an
army could deploy in working order,
what the men called “runners.” A
tank out of action for a thrown track
was just as useless as one that had
been fully destroyed by an anti-tank
round, at least until it was repaired.
If tanks were critical, then so
were trucks. Without trucks an
army couldn’t move nor could it be
supplied. Desert conditions meant
trucks were used up quickly. Rommel
found that during rapid advances up
to 35 percent of his trucks were daily
inoperable for mechanical reasons.

Runners

The transportation situation

was only the start of the logistical
challenges inherent in the desert
war. Motor vehicles require routine
maintenance simply to function. Those
requirements were exacerbated by the
desert, with its extreme temperatures
overheating engines, sandstorms
blowing dust into moving parts, the
lack of decent roads playing havoc
with tires and tracks, and a general
scarcity of water to cool engines and
clean out the grit. Engines needed to be
replaced more often than in temperate
climates. Vehicles had to have special
desert-compatible components, such
as filters that would keep out the fine
dust always blowing about. Added to

During the 1940 campaign in France, German railheads were 10 to 45 miles behind the lead troops.
During the opening stages of the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, the front ranged from 85 to 110 miles forward of the railheads, and that was
often enough to cause operations to come to a halt. Distances in the Western Desert made those distances seem trivial in comparison. From Tripoli to
El Agheila was 375 miles; driving to Benghazi added another 185, and to make it to Tobruk meant another 250; Tobruk to Alexandria was a final 375.
The diagram shows the German rail supply system as it was supposed to function. Of course, what made it mostly useless in North Africa
was the fact there was no usable rail line in Libya west of the Egyptian frontier. The result was everything had to be trucked from Axis army-level
bases (Tripoli, Benghazi, Tobruk), through what would otherwise have been corps-level and division-level railheads had there been railroads. When
Rommel overran western Egypt in the summer of 1942, he made some use of the captured rail line along the coast. The Axis could move up to 9,000
tons per month on it but, obviously, supplies coming from Tobruk, Benghazi or Tripoli still had to be moved by truck to reach the railhead.  ★

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 39

 As a further example of the impor-
tance of trucks, an Afrikakorps panzer
division in 1941 had 150 to 220 tanks
of various types, 120 other armored
fighting vehicles (AFV, mainly halftracks,
armored cars and self-propelled guns),
140 halftrack prime-movers, over 1,600
trucks and another 1,000 or so miscella-
neous vehicles (autos and motorcycles).
The overall operational mobility of the
division was thus a function not just of
tracked vehicles but of wheeled ones.
Even that wasn’t all: every German
mobile division required another 1,200
trucks at non-divisional echelons in
order to move forward its supplies.
Much of that requirement could’ve been
eliminated had their been a function-
ing railway in the Western Desert.
Consequently, obtaining more
trucks became a major issue for
desert logisticians. At one time in 1942,
Rommel requested 8,000 trucks from
the Axis high command — at a time
when the Wehrmacht’s motor vehicle
inventory was already overstretched by
the requirements of the Russian front.
Some trucks could be gotten from the
Vichy French, but with vehicle shortages
everywhere in the Reich the requirement
could never be fully met. One expedient
was in trading-off trucks otherwise
assigned within units. For example,
in 1941 the Italian Trento Division,
originally a motorized formation, had
its trucks taken from it when it landed
in Africa. They were used to support the
logistics of the rest of the Axis force.
British forces were, in theory, com-
pletely motorized. In practice, however,
there were different levels of vehicle
assignment, depending on unit type.
All infantry battalions in an armored
division were supposed to have their
own vehicles, but those in an infantry
division might have to draw vehicles
from higher echelon truck pools.
Again, while units might be listed as
fully motorized “on paper,” the number
of vehicles actually on hand would
be dependent on their operability.
There was an ace in the hole for the
Allies: US Lend-Lease provided large
numbers of trucks, thereby allowing
them to maintain a lead in that
critical regard. Indeed, by late 1942

Deliveries of Tanks & Other Vehicles to Eighth Army in Selected Months of 1942

Month Tanks (from the United Kingdom) Vehicles (from the United Kingdom) Tanks (from North America) Vehicles (from North America)
June 179 3810 3 7694
July 114 4573 33 4618
August 254 3289 132 3371
September 34 1512 407 2016

40 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

US truck deliveries to Eighth Army
exceeded those from Britain. That
did as much as anything else to
win the desert war for the Allies.
All the armies in North Africa
made use of captured equipment.
Overrunning a depot would mean
access to vehicles, weapons, POL
and assorted amenities. During
Rommel’s 1942 drive into Egypt, much
of Panzerarmee Afrika was lifted on
Allied trucks, 2,000 of which had been
seized when he took Tobruk in June.
Holding a battlefield at the end
of a fight, aside from any tactical
advantage, also allowed for the salvage
of damaged or otherwise immobilized
equipment. The Germans had a good
tank recovery organization that pulled
damaged friendly and enemy vehicles
off the battlefield, repaired them,
and quickly turned them around into
combat. That was a “force multiplier”
that wasn’t apparent from a simple
examination of the Axis order of battle.
Using captured equipment had a
downside, though, in that it meant the
capturing side had to have maintenance
crews trained to keep such equipment
running, along with the proper spare
parts and ammunition to utilize them.
There were yet other aspects of
logistics that can be only summarized
here. Pay and mail were big parts of
troop morale: their neglect could
adversely affect combat performance.
Medical care was also vital in dealing
with wounded soldiers, disease and
hygiene. The British had an advantage
in the morale department, as their
troops could be rotated for leave in
major Egyptian cities to take advantage
of the distractions they offered.
Operations in North Africa,
therefore, can be seen as a function of
the efficiency of an army’s logistical
organization. One of Montgomery’s
unsung talents came from the fact he
paid more attention to logistics than did
Rommel. Of course, he had a better situ-
ation with which to start when he took
command of Eighth Army in August
1942. The British were making their
stand at El Alamein, just in front of their
main Middle East base area in the Nile
delta. Rommel had advanced to the end
of a logistical tightrope. Montgomery
exploited his position to build up
sufficient support to ensure victory for
Eighth Army. El Alamein was funda-
mentally different than prior actions
in that it was a battle of position rather
than maneuver, one in which material
support was key from start to finish.
As Eighth Army pursued the
shattered Panzerarmee Afrika back
across Egypt and into Libya in late
1942, Montgomery ensured the desert
railroad was refurbished and extended
west. That time around the British
didn’t fall into the trap as they had in
early 1941, when logistical shortfalls
not only stopped their advance but
also set them up for Rommel’s riposte.
Planning
The campaign in the Western
Desert can be divided into a series of
discrete operations. They all followed
a distinct cycle of build-up, offensive,
counteroffensive and mutual exhaus-
tion. The entire time both armies
spent in sustained combat operations
amounted to less than 10 weeks in 1941
and another 16 to 20 weeks in 1942
(depending on how you count pursuits).
As shown below, the desert armies
spent much of their time in build-up.
Indeed, between Operations Battleaxe
and Crusader there was a period of
five months in which no major combat
actions took place. To launch a major
offensive an army had to accomplish
a number of things: move forward
its logistical system and establish
depots, absorb replacements into
existing formations, train units, build
airfields, perform reconnaissance
and intelligence operations, draw
up battle plans and rehearse the
expected attack. Additionally, long
periods of time were spent reorganiz-
ing depleted units and assimilating
the lessons of the last campaign.
Once an offensive kicked off,
operations usually became a matter of
maneuver and counter-maneuver. The
conditions of desert warfare — poor
communications, sandstorms, the
danger of being cut off from logistical
support — caused units to loose cohe-

Axis Sealift of Supplies to North Africa

Monthly Average Major Military Activity in North Africa

Tonnage Delivered to Axis offensives in italics, Allied in plaintext.
Axis Ports in Africa

February – June  89,560 30 March – 10 April: Rommel’s first offensive in Cyrenaica, launched from
1941 the El Agheila position; Axis forces reach Tobruk, which they besiege.
15-17 May: Operation Brevity, unsuccessful British reconnaissance
in force on the Egyptian-Libyan frontier.
15-17 June: Operation Battleaxe, main British summer offensive, defeated by Axis forces.
July – December  59,380 14-15 September: Operation Midsummer’s Night Dream,
1941 Afrikakorps raids across the Egyptian frontier.
18 November – 31 December: Operation Crusader, Tobruk relieved,
British retake Cyrenaica, Rommel back at El Agheila.
January – June  73,650 21 January – 6 February: Rommel’s’ second offensive reaches Gazala.
1942 26 May –21 June: Operations Theseus (sometimes called Venezia),
Rommel defeats British at Gazala, Axis forces take Tobruk.
22 – 28 June: Operation Aida, Rommel pursues into Egypt, defeats British at Mersa Matruh.
July – December  52,210 1 – 26 July: Rommel continues pursuit, stopped at El Alamein.
1942 20 August – 7 September: Rommel launches offensive at El Alamein
planning to break through to Alexandria, but is repulsed.
23 October – 3 November: Montgomery launches second Battle of El Alamein, defeats
Axis forces. Rommel orders withdrawal, doesn’t stop until he reaches Tunisia.

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 41

sion quickly. Battles degenerated from maintained control of the battlefield. seen as a masterpiece of leadership,
division-level affairs down through One reason the British failed to exploit if for no other reason than, despite
brigade-regiment-battalion, and finally their Crusader offensive was they lacked all those factors, Panzerarmee Afrika
into small-unit actions. An advantage an on-hand reserve of tanks to replace made it to the gates of Alexandria and
the Germans had throughout most of the losses they’d taken, thereby giving could still fight when it got there.
the campaign was their units had better Rommel the opportunity to recover.
cohesion than did those of the British. Losing a battle, though, was never What If?
Their officers tended to lead from only a matter of attrition. Mass panics
“up front,” where they could respond weren’t uncommon, when the loss of A reasonable “what if” would’ve
more quickly to opportunities, but that unit cohesion and the threat of being had Mussolini making a greater effort
in turn increased casualties among cut-off could cause units to fall back pre- to build up the Libyan infrastructure
commanders. Still, German units could cipitously. One British after action report prior to Italy entering the war. If
hold together longer than their Italian following the retreat of their 7th Armored nothing else, a functioning railroad
counterparts or Allied foes. Of course, Division during the Battle of Gazala system from Tripoli through Benghazi
the overarching Axis dilemma came (May 1942) referred to an “unneces- and on to Tobruk would’ve overcome
from the fact there were never enough sarily rapid movement” to the rear. many of the logistical difficulties
German divisions in the Western Desert. The pursuit phase of an operation Rommel faced in 1941 and 1942.
Despite all the planning and maneu- also created its own logistical dif- Similarly, port facilities might also
ver, battles could also become contests ficulties, since it was far too easy to have been expanded in preparation for
of attrition, especially of tanks, due to advance past the distance at which war. Of course, that might’ve worked
combat, breakdowns and assorted fog of one’s depots could provide support. both ways, since the British could’ve
war effects. It wasn’t unusual for a major Another risk was advancing too far exploited such rails and ports during
operation to result in the loss of 80 meant operating beyond the radius at their 1940 – 41 Compass offensive.
percent or more of the tanks involved on which airpower could cover advancing Interestingly, in 1942 Mussolini
both sides, though most of them could columns. Rommel’s drive into Egypt advocated to Hitler that Germany find
be recovered and repaired if an army during the summer of 1942 has to be some way to end its war with the Soviet
Union so as to be able to deal with the
growing Anglo-American threat in the
Port Capacity west. While it’s hard to imagine Stalin
negotiating a peace while Axis armies
Assuming Axis supply convoys sailing from Italian ports to North Africa arrived safely were still inside the USSR, Mussolini
at their destinations, their cargoes had to be offloaded. The main Italian port was Tripoli. It understood the growing Allied threat
could handle up to 45,000 tons of supply a month. Tripoli could be supplemented by Benghazi to Italy and the Axis southern flank was
and Tobruk if they were in Axis hands. Both had theoretical monthly capacities of at least going to have to be addressed — and
30,000 tons. While on paper those totals should’ve been sufficient to offload all Axis supply soon. Had the Italians committed the air
ships, it didn’t work that way in reality. Allied air raids reduced those capacities to less than and land forces they sent to fight in the
40 percent, in part due to damage, in part due to dockworkers refusing to report to duty for USSR to the Mediterranean instead, per-
fear of being killed by bombs. Moreover, Italian convoys were frequently routed away from haps they could’ve attained a decision.
Benghazi and Tobruk, owing to the risk of interception from British air and naval attack. Another possible “what if” would’ve
There were several smaller ports, such as Derna, Bardia and Mersa Matruh, but they had seen each side committing fewer
limited capacities with often only a single dock and no heavy cranes. The Axis negotiated with divisions to North Africa, but providing
the Vichy French to open the port of Bizerta in Tunisia, which would’ve allowed for another those divisions they did send with
20,000 tons to be offloaded, but that resulted in little that was useful. Bizerta would only
have added several hundred more miles to the already over-extended Axis supply lines.  ★

42 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

higher levels of support. For example, Sources
the Italians might’ve deployed a smaller
Van Creveld, Martin.
number of infantry divisions while at Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.
the same time using their on-hand London: Cambridge Univ., 1977.
Dear, I.C.B., ed. The Oxford Companion to World War II.
trucks to mechanize the army they Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1995.
already had in Africa. Similarly, the Greene, Jack & Alessandro Massignani.
Rommel’s North African Campaign.
Germans might’ve shipped more Cambridge: Da Capo, 1994.
replacement AFV to North Africa, Griffith, Paddy. World War II Desert Tactics.
Oxford: Osprey, 2008.
thereby ensuring the two Afrikakorps Joslen, Lt. Col. H. F. Orders of Battle Second World War.
panzer divisions had sufficient London: HMSO, 1990.
reserves to survive the attrition of
desert battles. Such a move wouldn’t
have created additional logistical
requirements, as did adding extra
divisions to the overall order of battle.
On the Allied side the British
might’ve maintained concentration
on the Western Desert and avoided
pulling out units to fight elsewhere. A
fully supported Western Desert Force
could’ve conceivably reached Tripoli
in early 1941, before the Afrikakorps
was in place, thereby avoiding (in
retrospect) two more years of fighting in
North Africa and perhaps hastening the
political fall of Mussolini. Of course, that
would’ve meant accepting Axis victories
elsewhere, but the Greek campaign
turned into a Dunkirk-sized debacle
for the British anyway, with the loss of
several divisions for no good effect.
What all that goes to indicate is
winning and losing battles in the
Western Desert wasn’t simply a matter
of tactical skill or weapon quality. It was
in large part due to strategic factors that
extended beyond the theater of opera-
tions, and to the capacity to support
modern warfare in North Africa. The
final British victory should be seen as a
function of their having been better able
to exploit both those factors. Therein
lies the lesson of the campaign.  ✪

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 43

German East Front
Fortifications
I
n the last third of the 19th century,
warfare changed significantly with
the advent of massive conscript
armies, automatic weapons, breech-
loading artillery and high-explosive
shells. At the same time, new forti-
fications were developed that were
intended to defend large sections of the
frontier (or front) rather than simply
be clustered at key points along it.
Those newly developed fortified
lines shouldn’t be confused with
“fieldworks,” such as trenches and
obstacle belts, which have been in
use for a long time, mostly in siege
warfare. During the American Civil
War, for example, trenches were used
extensively to secure the Confederate
front from Richmond to Petersburg.
Though fieldworks and fortified
lines are often confused, there are
significant differences between them. A
Rows of dragons teeth and a heavily eroded anti-tank ditch within the OWB
44 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
by J.E. Kaufmann
fortified line consists largely of positions
of a permanent nature that normally
require civilian labor and technicians
to build. Their construction entails the
use of a great deal of material, such
as concrete, which in turn requires
the use of specialized equipment and
machinery. A line of fieldworks consists
mostly of emplacements of a temporary
nature, few of which require civilian
labor. (Construction of both types of
defenses is usually labor intensive.)
Early in the 20th century, modern
large-scale fortifications appeared
along the frontiers of many European
countries in the form of “fortified rings”
or “ring-stands,” which consisted of
several forts encircling a key town
or city with intermediate positions
among them. The spaces between and
within the rings could be defended
with weapons firing from inside
individual fortified positions and/or by
obstacles, and that same space could
also serve as an assembly and maneuver
area for friendly mobile forces.
Several of those rings remained
in use during World War II in Europe,
including on the eastern front, even
though many of them had not been
modernized between the wars. The
most notable of the rings that were
fully or partially in use during World
War II were those of Antwerp, Liege
and Namur in Belgium, and Maubeuge
and Verdun in France. On the eastern
frontier of Germany in 1914 there were
Koenigsberg, Marienburg, Graudenz,
Thorn, Kustrin, Posen, Glogau and
Breslau, all of which the Germans put
back into service in 1944 – 45. Some
forts from the old Austro-Hungarian
ring at Krakow, and the Russian posi-
tions at Warsaw and other locations,
also returned to service during World inside the OWB. By the time it was halt- turret emplacements for 105mm and
War II. The most modern pre-World ed in 1938, it included 20 miles of galler- 150mm howitzers. As things turned out,
War I positions, known as Feste, can ies at depths of up to 44 yards below the work was begun only on one battery.
be attributed to the Germans, who surface. The final entrances, which were Hitler, motivated by his own experi-
built them at Muetzig (linked to the to have been located 1.25 miles to the ence with gas warfare during the Great
Strasbourg ring), Metz and Thionville in rear, were never built. The underground War, issued instructions requiring the
Alsace-Lorraine. In 1940 and 1944 both galleries were to serve as a logistical engineers include anti-gas features
the French and the Germans made use support area for all the Werkgruppen in in all new fortifications. The system
of those fortifications (respectively). the OWB and were to be linked to each they developed consisted of airtight
After the First World War, when of them by a tunnel. A regimental-sized doors, hand-operated ventilators with
Germany was stripped of much of its unit of about 4,000 men was to serve the filters and, in most blockhouses, a
former borderlands, it was forced to underground facilities, which included decontamination area near the entrance
cede the fortifications in Alsace-Lorraine a railroad, barracks, magazines, that included a shower. The Germans
and western Poland to its erstwhile powerhouses and medical facilities. The later incorporated a similar system
enemies. Only much older fortifications plans also called for the construction in almost every concrete bunker they
then remained under its control. of fortified battery positions behind built during the war. The entranceway
Though Germany had fewer restrictions the Werkgruppen, and included was L-shaped to keep the interior
on its eastern frontier, its early attempts individual blockhouses with single- continued on page 47 »
to create new fortifications there in
the 1920s were stopped by Allied
protests. In the 1930s, Hitler’s Third
Reich started work on the first major
German fortified line begun since the
previous war. It became known as the
“East Wall,” and it consisted of three
main sections: the Oder-Warthe River
Bend Line (OWB), the Pomeranian
Line, and the Oder Defenses.
The heaviest fortified area, the
OWB, was the central part of the overall
eastern defense structure and was
formed by the Oder and Warthe Rivers.
In the early 1930s it consisted mainly
of water defenses with small dams that
controlled flooding in the area. In the
mid-1930s the Germans began building
heavy fortifications, which included a
number of Werkgruppen, forts consist-
ing of several dispersed positions usually
linked by tunnels. Those fortifications,
which were among the largest the
Germans would build before or during
the war, were partially modeled on the
older Feste but they lacked artillery.
They generally consisted of up to
three combat blockhouses, though
sometimes there were more. As little
as possible of the blockhouses was
exposed at the surface. Though the
majority of them had a small entrance
on an exposed wall covered by its
own weapons embrasures, some had
no exposed walls at all. On the roofs
there were often positions for an
automatic mortar and housing for the
nozzle of a flamethrower. A shaft in each
blockhouse connected them to a tunnel
system that linked all of them. The bar-
racks, munitions areas and other facili-
ties were below ground, leaving little
Photo courtesy of Alex Goss

exposed at the surface, unlike the older

Feste. Generators supplied the power
necessary to operate each position.
In the 1930s secret construction also
began on an extensive tunnel system Inside view of a German bunker near St. Petersburg (Leningrad)

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 45

 Organizing for Construction
Building fortifications of concrete and steel was a task
beyond the normal capabilities of most armies in World War II.
The German Army normally provided its own specialized staff
of engineers who planned and supervised the civilian contract
work involved. In Germany that role was assigned to the Festung
Pioneer Stab (Fortress Engineer Staff), which was organized at a
regimental level but consisted mostly of just staff personnel.
The small pre-war army didn’t have the technicians to
operate the heavy cranes and other equipment required
for building large works. Before the war that work was
contracted to civilian companies. Eventually the Organization
Todt (OT) took over handling those contractors.
The OT, formed in 1933 by the early Nazi supporter Fritz Todt,
evolved into a kind of paramilitary organization by the time it
built the autobahns. Eventually it undertook other tasks, such
as the construction of fortifications, beginning with the West
Wall in 1938. The OT was organized into Einsatzgruppen or task
forces (not to be confused with the infamous SS formations of
the same name), which operated on each major front in Europe.
Two Einsatzgruppen worked on the Atlantic Wall while several
others were responsible for maintaining lines of communication.
Later they also assumed responsibility for the construction
of the fortifications on the eastern front. When Todt died in a
plane crash early in 1942 he was replaced by Albert Speer.
The Reicharbeitsdienst (RAD or Reich Labor Service)
was an organization created in 1934 that remained under
the direction of Konstantin Hierl until the end of the war. It
included a section for men and one for women. Before entering
the military, most young men were required to serve in the RAD
for at least six months. Though it wasn’t officially categorized
as a military organization, its members carried weapons once
the war began. The RAD performed less specialized tasks than
the OT, and it was organized into battalion-sized formations.
46 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
During the pre-war years the RAD was associated with
draining marshes, agricultural projects, roadwork and other
such tasks. Many of its battalions were assigned to work on
the East and West Walls, where they performed some of the
less specialized work such as the creation of obstacles.
When the war began many RAD battalions were converted into
army construction battalions. The army hadn’t maintained such units
before the war, though in the First World War it had construction
units with the capability of building ferroconcrete bunkers.
During the war both the OT and the RAD were involved in
fortification building on all fronts. Beyond that, it wasn’t uncommon
for civilians and prisoners to be involuntarily involved in the
construction of trenches and anti-tank ditches on the eastern
front. The construction battalions were more often engaged in
bridgework or similar projects, but they also sometimes participated
in the preparation of fortifications. The pioneer (combat engineer)
battalions of the infantry and armored divisions often also did
such work. They were equipped with explosives, flamethrowers
and other equipment for use in their primary functions, which
included opposed river crossings and assaults on enemy
fortifications as well as emplacing minefields and barbed wire.
Concrete bunkers, be they for a machinegun position or a U-boat
shelter, require specially manufactured metal components like doors,
embrasures and turrets. Emplacement requires heavy equipment,
and the installation of most of the parts entails work by a variety
of technicians. The Germans kept a standardized catalogue of
armored components and plans (referred to as Regelbau) for their
bunkers, casemates, munitions stores and troop shelters.  ★
above
A photo of the
Reichsarbeitsdienst
Translation:
« Our whole life
should be a big labor
service in Germany. »
far left
A German soldier
in front of the Todt
compound
left
Fritz Todt, founder of
Organization Todt
» continued from page 45
armored door out of the direct line of
enemy fire, and included an embrasure
for covering the outer access door.
Another important feature of
most German fortifications, from the
smallest to the largest, was they could
be manned with either some small
number of specialized personnel or,
often, using no specialists at all. Basic
instructions were painted on the interior
walls for the benefit of soldiers new
to the facility. All eventualities were
covered, including a reminder in the
latrine to shut the cover to prevent light
escaping and alerting the enemy.
On his final visit to the OWB, Hitler
became enraged when he learned the
expensive works completed up to that
time couldn’t hold any weapon larger
than a machinegun or field mortar.
He immediately put an end to all work
on the East Wall, including the linking
tunnel system and planned batteries.
By that time he’d changed the main
construction effort to the West Wall,
which included few large positions,
none of which was as ambitious
those for the East Wall. Plans for large
Werkgruppen similar to the forts of
the French Maginot Line and the East
Wall were scrapped. From that time
on the Germans concentrated on
the construction of smaller bunkers
and obstacles — including mines
and anti-tank obstacles — aimed at
creating lines of impenetrable depth.
The East Wall’s Pomeranian
Line included several Werkgruppen
similar to those of the OWB, but
with no tunnel complex. The
southeast part of the East Wall, the
Oder Defenses, consisted mainly of
unlinked bunkers along the river.
OWB Werkgruppen
Most weapons, equipment and
fortification designs were first tested
at Hillersleben, west of Magdeburg.
Since building a complete Werkgruppe
at that site wasn’t practical, the
Germans decided to use the OWB
as their test ground. Thus the
prototype of the new Werkgruppe, the
Ludendorff Group, was built there.
Construction of the OWB
Werkgruppen had begun before
Ludendorff was completed. As a result, a
number of changes were implemented
on those Werkgruppen while they were
still under construction. Between 1935
and 1936 the Ludendorff position
came to consist of a large entrance
blockhouse and two small combat
blockhouses linked by an underground
gallery. By 1938, three additional combat
blockhouses had been added, and
obstacles on the surface were divided
into three sections. The largest position
at Ludendorff was the entrance block-
house (Panzer Werke 865), which wasn’t
duplicated in any other Werkgruppe.
A military road of concrete plates
led from the main road to the entrance
of Ludendorff. Like most large Panzer
Werke (PzW), it consisted of two levels
and had standard features including
emergency exits that were normally
kept blocked with sand, which then had
to be drained in case of need. PzW 865
mounted a large six-embrasure turret
for machineguns. A smaller position,
PzW 687, had a three-embrasure turret
for a single machinegun. That type of
turret didn’t project far above ground;
it was embedded with only a little more
than half its top section exposed.
PzW 866 was a large one-level work
whose only exposed positions were
its three-embrasure half-turret and a
gunroom for a 37mm Festungs-PAK
(fortress anti-tank gun), with a steel roof
and a steel plate on its exposed façade.
Except for its emergency exit, its only
access was through the tunnel system.
The largest single-floor position was
PzW 864, with two standard entrances
for troops, an observation turret with
small embrasures and a periscope,
and a mortar turret that was flush with
the surface of the roof and had an
automatic 50mm mortar. Its exposed
façade included two entrances covered
by a machinegun position. The larger
blockhouses included a ventilator and
Armored air vent and automatic mortar turret with a mortar shell placed on its roof for scale
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 47
filter room, a machine shop, a munitions
room, a rest area for the garrison, a
latrine and storage areas. A com-
munications room served to connect
it to other Werkgruppen. The barracks
and other facilities were located in
the tunnel system below the blocks.
Twelve additional one-to-five-block
Werkgruppen were built in the OWB.
Most consisted of three or four blocks,
for a total of 83. They were all classified
as B-Werke based on the thickness of
their concrete walls and armor, which
could resist a single 300mm round or a
hit by a 1,000 lb. bomb. Type B concrete
thickness ranged from 60 to 79 inches
while that of their armor was 10 inches.
The various thicknesses for concrete
and steel were rated from A (11.5 feet)
to D (one foot). Type A was the heaviest
type, and was equal to the thickest walls
of French Maginot Line forts; however,
it was only intended for the three-gun
artillery positions that were never
completed. In 1938, on Hitler’s insis-
tence, mortars and flamethrowers were
added to those positions. The heavy
fortress flamethrowers had a nozzle
protruding through the block roofs
that could cover 360 degrees, spraying
the surface of the block, and beyond
if needed, to repel an enemy assault.
Werkgruppe Scharnhorst in the OWB
characterized most of the fortifications
in its sector. It consisted of three
completed B-Werke and a fourth that
was planned but not built. One block
included two entrance doors; the
others had none, but all were linked to
a barracks by an underground gallery
connected to the tunnel system. The
 East Walls Old & New

In the late summer of 1943, Hitler gave permission for the The Soviets then simply bypassed the German strongpoints and
construction of fortified lines on the eastern front. The plan was “fortress cities” such as Warsaw and Graudenz. Before the end of the
to build a new East Wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea to hold month they stood before the old East Wall. The Germans meanwhile
off the Red Army. The section referred to as the Panther Line, clung to Hitler’s fortress cities of Breslau, Glogau, Kustrin and Danzig.
which contained subsidiary back up lines within it, ran through the East Prussia was soon isolated and fighting there raged around
sectors of Army Groups North and Center. As it turned out, those “Fortress Koenigsberg.” At the end of March, Kustrin was eliminated,
forces had until June 1944 to work on it. The other section, the allowing the Soviets to establish a bridgehead over the Oder and
Wotan (Odin) Line, ran along the Dnepr River to the Black Sea. prepare for the drive on Berlin. During January, when Hitler had the
Before significant work could be completed in the south, however, opportunity to transfer divisions from the failed Ardennes offensive to
the Soviets overran large parts of the Wotan Line during October stabilize the situation along the Oder, he instead sent them to Hungary.
1943 (in the sectors of Army Groups South and A). By December The heavily propagandized “Alpine Fortress” was actually
1943 the Soviets had taken Kiev and had almost completely cleared almost non-existent, except for positions in the south and southeast
Army Group South from the Dnepr south of the Pripet Marsh. By that used sections of old Italian fortifications to form the Ingrid
mid-April 1944, Soviet forces were on the Rumanian frontier after Line along the Yugoslav border; however, the weapons originally
having overrun the nascent Gneisenau Line in the Crimea, and in place there had mostly been removed earlier in the war. Even if
they were moving directly on Sevastopol. By June 1944 the only the Alpine Fortress had been better fortified, it would’ve been of
fortifications of any significance on the eastern front consisted little value, since it couldn’t support large forces once the economic
of the Panther Line. The renamed Army Group North Ukraine and base on the German plain to the north had been lost.  ★
South Ukraine hastily attempted to establish new defensive lines.
On 22 June 1944 a massive Soviet offensive struck Army Group
Center, shattering it and the Panther Line. The remnants of that army
group were unable to stop the Red advance. Before long, Army Group
North faced isolation in the Baltic States as the Soviets advanced past
it on its southern flank. In July, Soviet forces shattered the front of
Army Group North Ukraine north of the Carpathians. By September the
Soviets established a major bridgehead over the Vistula at Baranów, as
the forces that had destroyed Army Group Center approached Warsaw.
In late July, Gen. Heinz Guderian, who’d become chief of staff,
tried to create new defensive lines and restore old ones roughly
along the 1940 eastern border of the Reich. He also ran out of
time, however, as the Soviets advanced, pushing back the Germans
on a line from the border of East Prussia to the Vistula at Modlin,
then along that river until they came to a halt when the Poles in
Warsaw rose against the Germans. The Soviets chose not to break
through to Warsaw at that time, thereby giving the Germans time to
crush the uprising and stabilize their front. Taking advantage of the
respite, the Germans worked feverishly on their new Government
General Line, which ran through the heart of Polish territory.
Guderian had new positions added to the old East Wall, mostly
various types of concrete bunkers and ring-stands. When he called
for volunteers, thousands of Germans of all ages responded and
began to work on building trenches, obstacles and anti-tank ditches.
Guderian soon formed over 100 fortress infantry battalions by
using men otherwise unfit for field duty. He also established other
specialized fortress units to man the defenses, but 80 percent of them
then ended up being sent to the western front. He also wasn’t sent any
weapons larger than 50mm for the new defenses. As he pointed out
in his memoirs, it did little good to prepare new defense lines without
also having the troops and weapons needed to properly man them.
Guderian, based on his discussions with front line commanders,
wanted to form the main line of resistance 12.5 miles behind
the forward defensive line. That would allow the troops to pull
back when the Soviet preliminary bombardment for their next
major offensive began, leaving behind only a rear guard and thus
Photo courtesy of Alex Goss

negating the effect of the enemy’s normally massive barrages.

Hitler, however, refused to tactically sacrifice so much territory;
he only agreed to allow the main line of resistance to be about
1.85 miles to the rear. Thus the defenders, outnumbered by
as much as 11:1 in the main Soviet attack zones, were easily Present-day Russian historical re-enactors atop a
overrun when that new offensive began on 12 January 1945. German bunker near St. Petersburg (Leningrad)

48 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

crews for each of the three blocks
ranged from 30 to 50 men. Scharnhorst’s
largest weapons consisted of 50mm
automatic mortars and machineguns.
In the summer of 1939 older troops
occupied the positions of the OWB,
since the stretch of front that covered
the eastern approach to Berlin was
to remain static while the Germans
attacked along the northern and
southern fronts. Some of those positions
included not only wire obstacles but
also concrete dragons teeth and wooden
posts, despite the fact the Poles had
few tanks. (Some sources claim the
dragons teeth were only added in 1944.)
In February 1940 a group of foreign
military attachés was taken on an official
tour of Werkgruppe Ludendorff. The
American attaché made a full report
that included a diagram drawn from
memory. By showing those men the
fortifications in the east, the Germans
hoped to circulate the idea their West
Wall was equally well fortified.
There’s no evidence the Germans
employed minefields on a large scale
along the East Wall. The Germans were,
however, the first to mass-produce
anti-personnel mines, making it pos-
sible to create large minefields. Before
the mass production of anti-personnel
mines, anti-tank mines were generally
deployed only along routes that could
be used by heavy vehicles, whereas
anti-personnel mines had been mostly
handmade booby traps usually planted
among wire entanglements. Even the
French employed their anti-personnel
mines like booby traps early in the
war. The Germans were careful to
record the location of all their own
mines, not only to mark safe paths
through them for their troops, but
to avoid accidental explosions when
the time came to remove them.
1939 –1941
After the occupation of Poland in
October 1939 the East Wall no longer
served a useful purpose, and the West
Wall lost its relevance when France fell
the following summer. As a result the
Germans removed much of the equip-
ment installed in those fortifications.
In the west, meanwhile, many anti-
tank bunkers only had a firing chamber
for a machinegun and a storage space
for a 37mm anti-tank gun that was to
be rolled out and moved to a firing
position just above and in front of the
bunker. Those bunker designs on the
West Wall posed a serious problem for
the Germans in 1944 because, though
there was no shortage of such positions,
their firing chambers were only able
to accommodate weapons that had
become obsolete early in the war.
The only major fortified line under
construction in the east between
October 1939 and June 1941 was a
Soviet position along their new border,
which was dubbed the Molotov Line.
The Red Army abandoned the Stalin
Line along the former border and
began to concentrate on creating new
works, including ferroconcrete artillery
casemates and infantry blockhouses.
The Molotov Line covered a smaller
area than had the Stalin Line, running
from the border with East Prussia to
the foothills of the Carpathians. It was
longer than the German West Wall, how-
ever, and the Germans couldn’t match
it because they’d just begun major
construction projects along the Atlantic
coast in the west, including massive
submarine pens and artillery casemates.
The German plan for the invasion
of the USSR was unlike the initial one
for the 1940 campaign in the west,
where Hitler had calculated his armies
would advance into northwest France
and then stop and take defensive
positions while preparing for the
next and final move. His plan for the
east called for rapid advances deep
into the European portion of the
Soviet Union to take Leningrad and
the Ukraine before coming to a halt.
That strategy was intended to bring
complete and final victory by causing
the overall collapse of the Soviet Union
via economic and psychological shock.
Armored air vent and six-embrasure turret with circular openings for optical equipment
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 49
There was thus initially no question
of building fortified positions in the
east. Of course, even before 1941 drew
to its close, it had become clear the
situation wasn’t developing as he had
planned. During that first winter the
German armies needed to create their
own fieldworks, not only to defend
against counterattacks but also for
shelter against the fierce weather.
1942 & 1943
In 1942 the Germans returned to
the strategic offensive in the east. At
that time, from the Gulf of Finland to
west of Moscow a largely static front
formed as the Germans dug in to keep
Leningrad under siege and to stabilize
the fronts of Army Groups North and
Center. Army Group South had also been
hard-pressed by the expanded Soviet
winter offensive that continued through
March. Hitler refused, however, to allow
the construction of fortifications except
in logistically critical urban areas for
local control and for protection of lines
of communication against partisans.
The summer offensive of 1942 into
the Caucasus and to Stalingrad ended
in disaster for the Germans. The forces
that escaped destruction during that
debacle fell back and tried to hold
new positions with hastily erected
fieldworks. The summer of 1943 saw
one last major offensive in the east
around Kursk, which coincided with
the Allied landings in Sicily. It wasn’t
until September 1943, after the defeat
at Kursk and the transfer of units to the
west, that Hitler grudgingly allowed his
eastern forces to build fortifications.
He believed such fortifications,
once built, served as magnets that
invariably drew nearby units into them,
thereby guaranteeing the quick loss of
all territory in front of them. Similarly he
feared, once any portion of such lines
had been broken, that knowledge would
quickly spread along the entire defense,
thereby setting off a panic that wouldn’t
stop until those forces had retreated
into the next such fortified line.
Nonetheless, once given the go-
ahead, troops and impressed civilian
laborers feverishly excavated anti-tank
ditches and trenches, while engineer
units deployed barbed wire obstacles
and laid minefields. Even so, the con-
struction and proper “curing” of con-
crete bunkers required time; time the
Germans didn’t have. Though the new
lines included a few concrete positions,
50 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
such as ring-stands and tank turrets
mounted in concrete, most of the posi-
tions were log-lined dugouts and bun-
kers, a far cry from formal fortified lines.
Panther & Wotan
Between 1942 and 1944 the most
important position on the front near
Leningrad and around Lake Ilmen was
the Rollbahn (Highway) Line. Beyond it,
toward Lake Ladoga, was the Mga Line,
where the Germans created numbers
of strongpoints, often by adding field
fortifications to existing stone structures
in the towns. Some of the positions were
further reinforced with concrete, such
as machinegun bunkers, ring-stands
(“Tobruks”) and troop shelters.
Elsewhere in the sector of Army
Group North, other positions extended
between the Gulf of Finland and Lake
Ilmen. One of the strongest of those
lines stretched along the Luga River.
It was anchored in the northwest at
the fortified town of Kingisepp. In the
south lay a similar position at Luga.
When 18th and 16th Armies pulled
back to the Narva River and sections
of the Panther Line early in 1944, the
Organization Todt (see first sidebar) had
already prepared positions for them.
Since building concrete structures
during the frigid winter was practically
impossible, most of those bunkers were
made of wood. Even so, in the difficult
terrain of the Army Group North front
the Panther Line proved to be one of
the strongest positions built in Soviet
territory. That was because the OT had
from the fall of 1943 until the spring
of 1944 to work on it. The Panther
Line was anchored at Narva in the
northwest, and it followed the river to
Lake Peipus and then along the lakes
and rivers south of Pskov and Ostrov.
 A complicating factor in the AGN to heavily fortify it, it actually consisted Last Stands
sector came from the fact much of its of little more than fieldworks that relied
area of operations was low-lying and on the river for defensive strength. By mid-1944 the Germans had
swampy. In many places you were By the end of 1943 the Soviets had begun to fall back into the defensive
beneath the water table as soon as crossed a large part of the Dnepr, lines inside their pre-1941 borders.
you stuck a spade into the ground. thereby overrunning much of the They threw up new defensive lines
That often meant entrenching to uncompleted Wotan Line. By May 1944 and worked on the old East Wall,
any degree had to be accompanied they had pushed the Germans almost restoring old fortifications and
by drainage work, or else the entire completely out of the Ukraine. The creating new ones. In addition to
effort had to be kept above ground. Germans therefore had to race to build trenches and obstacles they built many
The southern part of the Panther additional defensive lines before the small concrete positions, including
Line in the sector of Army Group Center next blow fell. Army Group Center was ring-stands. Concrete bunkers also
wasn’t as strong, even though it included smashed, along with the Panther Line, appeared, some using new designs that
concrete ring-stands, machinegun by the massive Soviet summer offensive included retractable radio antennas.
bunkers and some positions mounting in June. Within a matter of weeks the During the last months of 1944, as
old tank turrets (mostly Panzer IIs Soviets surged across the old Polish Soviet forces advanced onto the Polish
with 20mm guns). The Panther Line border toward East Prussia, eventually plain, the Germans added a system of
ran through the sector of AGC east isolating Army Group North in Courland. trenches, positions for 47mm anti-tank
of the Dnepr River to a point in the
vicinity of the northeast corner of the
Pripet Marsh. Just a few miles behind
it was the Bear Line. Details about that
line are few and in many cases not
reliable. Both lines consisted mainly
of fieldworks ranging from trenches to
wooden bunkers with the usual scat-
tered assortment of concrete structures.
Barbed wire and mines were used
whenever they were available, which
meant in some areas the defenses were
skimpy as almost all those items were
at the time being sent to try to hurriedly
build up the Atlantic Wall in the west.
A few prefabricated four-ton porta-
ble steel machinegun positions, known
as Panzer Nesten (armored nests), were
used in the Panther and Bear Lines.
They could be quickly installed or
removed for relocation if time permit-
ted. They included a machinegun, two
periscopes, an air filter and a pedal-
operated ventilation fan. Those nests,
which came to be used in most German
defensive lines, were never available
in large numbers. In 1944 a one-man
concrete bunker was developed and
it may have been used in occupied
Soviet territory; it was certainly
incorporated in the defenses in Poland.
The Germans also occupied aban-
doned Soviet bunkers, but it’s not known
precisely where and on what scale
they did so. In one case they used old
Soviet machinegun bunkers to defend
a railway line in the Mozry Fortified
Region southeast of Minsk. “Fortress
Borisov,” located between the Panther
Line and Minsk, included a number
of ring-stands with tank turrets and
Panzer Nesten. It‘s likely other “fortress”
positions had similar defenses.
South of the Panther Line was the
Wotan (Odin) Line, which ran mainly
along the Dnepr River through the
Ukraine. Since the Germans had no time Photos from opposing angles of a fortified sluice within the OWB, built in 1936 at “A Strength”

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 51

guns, about 200 ring-stands and other
positions on the OWB and in front of
and along the Pomeranian Line. The
concrete ring-stands came in several
types for machineguns and mortars,
and they were used throughout what
remained of German-occupied Europe.
Koch Bunkers, named after the Nazi
Party leader of East Prussia, were one-
man concrete tubular positions made
in prefabricated sections. Some models
included a roof section, and they could
be used for observation or machine-
guns. Thousands were produced and
they appeared in East Prussia, Poland,
southern France and the West Wall
in 1944. In addition, mass-produced
one-man concrete bunkers were also
52 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
hauled into position. Trenches, anti-tank
ditches and other fieldworks were also
prepared. In spite of those efforts, those
positions failed to withstand the Soviet
offensive that began on 12 January 1945.
After that Soviet offensive broke
through the Vistula Line and other
positions beyond it, their 1st Guards
Tank Army penetrated the OWB on
29 January. Three days after first
engaging those Soviet troops, the
German garrison destroyed Werkgruppe
Ludendorff and retreated from it. Other
garrisons also abandoned the remain-
ing Werkgruppen, since they didn’t
have the weapons to neutralize Soviet
tanks and artillery. Before long Soviet
forces reached the Oder River, while
pg. 50
the Germans held only bridgeheads at
Kustrin and Frankfurt-am-Oder. The
old fortress town of Kustrin was the
last barrier on the road to Berlin. That
town then had to do what the entire rest
of the OWB had failed to do; however,
after a two-month siege 5th Shock Army
leveled Kustrin. Only about 1,000 of
its garrison of about 18,000 escaped.
The positions in the Pomeranian
Line fared somewhat better. The central
portion of that line was attacked by 2nd
Guards Tank Army on 24 January 1945.
Most of the southern part of the line
had fallen by the 30th, while its central
sector held until 13 February. The 1st
Polish Army attacked the northern
part of the line early in February, but
it wasn’t until 3 March that 3rd Guards
Tank Corps smashed through the last
German positions to reach the Baltic
coast. With most of the East Wall in their
hands, the Soviets had thus secured their
flanks against counterattack and were
poised for the final assault on Berlin.

Conclusion

To summarize, the situation

concerning fortifications on the eastern
front became a classic case of “too little
too late” when Hitler belatedly autho-
rized their construction in mid-1943.
Further Soviet offensives then pushed
the Germans toward the pre-invasion

Photo courtesy of Valery Tadra

border of 1941, still with little in the way
of fortified positions behind them to
aid in stopping the Red Army. Hitler’s
attempts to declare as “fortresses” towns
and cities that lacked actual heavy forti-
fications merely worked to suck in more
troops that were then lost to the defense
of the Fatherland. The original East Wall
within Germany proper, though hur-
riedly reinforced in 1944, consisted of
Werkgruppen inadequate for post-1940
warfare. The Atlantic Wall soaked up
most of the resources that otherwise
could’ve been used for the construction
of a massive fortified line in the east.
In 1945, Hitler committed even
more troops to holding his declared
“fortresses” such as Breslau and
Konigsberg, thereby leaving tens of
thousands of men encircled in those
places and further reducing the
number available to hold the Oder
Line covering Berlin. The result was a
massive collapse on that main front and
the Soviet assault into Berlin leading
to the end of the Third Reich.  ✪

Sources

Burk, Kurt. Die Deutschen Landebefestigungen Im Osten,

1919 –1945. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1993.
Fleischer, Wolfgang.
Feldbefestigungen Des Deutschen Heeres 1939 –1945. top — A German bunker just outside Minsk
Ein Typenkatalog. Germany: Podzun Pallas, 1998.
Glantz, David. The Siege of Leningrad 1941 –1944.
above — One of the many machinegun bunkers of the Oder Line viewed from the rear
London: Brown Partworks Ltd., 2001.
Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. bottom-left — Guard post within the tunnel system of the OWB
New York: DaCapo Press, 1996. bottom-right — Unusual tepee-shaped concrete German guard post and machinegun bunker in Minsk
Kaufmann, J.E. & H.W. Kaufmann. Fortress Third Reich.
Cambridge, MA: DaCapo, 2007.
Kedryna, Anna & Robert Jurga.
Grupa Warowna Werkgruppe “Ludendorff.”
Poland: Donjon, circa 1996.
_______. Grupa Warowna Werkgruppe “Scharnhorst.”
Poland: Donjon, 1996.
Miniewicz, Janusz & Boguslaw Perzyk.
Miedzyrecki Rejon Umocniony 1934 –1945.
Warsaw: ME-GiSp. Cyw, 1993.
_______. Wal Pomorski.
Warsaw: Militaria Bogusalwa Perzyka, 1997.
Rolf, Rudi. Die Entwicklung Des Deutschen Festungssytems
Photo courtesy of Valery Tadra

Seite 1870.
Zuiderdiep, Netherlands: Fortress Books, 2000.

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 53

Game Preview
Rhineland ‘36
T
he Rhineland War, 1936-37 (RW),
designed by Joseph Miranda,
is a strategic-level simulation
of intermediate complexity that
covers an alternative World War II
in Europe, one that began in 1936.
The assumption is, when Hitler
ordered his army to march into the
Rhineland, the Allied powers, instead
of appeasing him, ordered their armed
forces to resist. The ensuing chain
of events leads to the war expanding
throughout Europe. A war fought at
that time would’ve found all European
militaries woefully unprepared.
Central to the play of the game are
its “crisis chits.” They represent various
diplomatic and military events that could
bring other powers into the war. Players
54 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
pick crisis chits depending on the number
of crisis hexes (printed on the map) they WaW Upcoming
control. The more such hexes they control, Features
the greater the chances they have of gain-
ing more allies. At the same time, grabbing #
20: Gross Deutschland Panzer
too much territory can lead to political #
21: Rhineland ‘36
collapse at home, as domestic foes work #
22: Minsk 1944
to undermine your power before the #
23: Guadalcanal
conflict explodes into a wider war. #
24: Sedan 1940
Rhineland War is a two-player
Visit STRATEGYandTACTICSpress.com
game. One player commands the Axis,
for previews of these issues.
controlling Germany and the countries
that choose to align with Berlin. The
other is the Allied player, who controls
the anti-German forces. Each hex on the
map represents 62 miles (100 km) from
side to opposite side. Each full game
turn represents one month. Units of
maneuver are corps and armies.  ✪
 Observation Post
Military History on Money

Too Little, Too Late

T
his 500 Franc note was issued by the French Bank of West Africa in 1950, which was then the monetary authority
for all their still-vast colonial holdings in that part of the continent. Its front commemorates the region’s manpower
contribution — in this particular case in the form of naval infantry — to the Free French cause in World War II. (At the
same time, though, note the white officer in the center of the illustration.) On the bill’s obverse is an African “Marianne,”
a black version of the French republic’s white female “national icon.” Chalk it all up to too little, too late. (Shown at 100%)

PLE
AM
S
PLE
AM

S World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 55
Observation Post
Pure Speculation
The Port Chicago Blast
N
umerous mysteries have
come out of World War II,
most of them the result of
the inescapable and eternal “fog of
war,” secrecy over national security
matters, or revisionist history. One of
the most enduring mysteries occurred
not on some distant battlefield,
but here in the United States: the
explosion that destroyed Port
Chicago. That is: was it actually a
nuclear blast, the result of a planned
trial to determine the effects of that
untested weapon on infrastructure?
Conventional wisdom says that’s
a preposterous assertion, while con-
spiracy theorists bring out “evidence”
in support of a massive cover-up. Sixty-
seven years after the tragedy, it’s perhaps
time to reexamine the controversy.
As war clouds darkened the horizon
in 1941, Port Chicago was built from
scratch 35 miles north of San Francisco.
As tensions with Japan worsened,
the US military had recognized the
logistical requirements of any future
war in the Pacific would be beyond
the capacities of existing seaports. A
new port, one dedicated for military
use, was clearly needed. Port Chicago
was built to serve that need.
During the war, Port Chicago served
as a major nexus for shipping ammuni-
tion and ordnance to US forces fighting
across the expanse of the Pacific. Every
day, thousands of tons of bullets,
bombs, mines, grenades and other
explosive and combustible materials
were transferred from trains to ships and
then shipped across to the war zones.
The loading of such deadly materials,
at a frenzied pace that at times saw
safety measures overlooked for the sake
of expediency, meant Port Chicago
always balanced on the knife edge
of disaster. Just a simple slip-up, the
smallest of mistakes, could lead to death
and destruction. Yet for several years the
dockyard operated without incident.
56 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
Then, on 17 July 1944, the fires of hell
were unleashed. At 10: 20 p.m., though
darkness had descended, Port Chicago
remained a hive of activity as men
labored under the glare of artificial lights
to load a pair of merchant ships, the SS
E.A. Bryan and SS Quinault Victory.
Without any warning a cataclysmic
blast wiped out the entire facility. The
E.A. Bryan and a train on a nearby pier
were vaporized, while the Quinault
Victory was left a hulk. The blast was
so powerful it made a crater 22 yards
deep and 219 yards across. Body parts
of victims were found up to a mile
away. Buildings in Port Chicago town,
two miles distant, suffered severe
structural damage, and windows
were broken in buildings in adjacent
counties. Tremors measuring 3.5 on
the Richter scale were recorded as
far away as Nevada, leading many to
initially believe it was an earthquake.
In the days immediately after,
newspapers quoted eyewitnesses who
reported a “mushroom-like cloud”
rising in the aftermath of the explosion.
Lending credence to those reports was
the official statement made by an Army
pilot before a Navy Court of Inquiry. The
pilot was clear in his recollection of hav-
ing seen a white flash, a smoke ring, and
a “ball of fire” that reached to 12,000 feet.
The Navy inquiry, though, found
there was nothing particularly unusual
about the tragic incident. After 39
days of eyewitness testimony and
deliberation, the investigation con-
cluded the explosion occurred because a
“supersensitive element was detonated
in the course of rough handling by
an individual or individuals.”
The explosion, experts claimed,
started on a pier loaded with several
thousand tons of diesel fuel and 429
tons of ammunition, and then engulfed
the E.A. Bryan, which at the time
held 4,600 tons of munitions, half of
it high-explosive artillery shells.
Other factors contributing to the
explosion were said to include bad
loading procedures, defective muni-
tions, and a neglect of safety procedures
for the sake of haste. That conclusion
remains the official verdict on the event.
Peter Vogel is one man who ques-
tions that official explanation. He
believed the eyewitness testimonies of
the event sounded eerily like a nuclear
explosion, and he embarked on a
two-decade quest to prove the blast was
in fact caused by an atomic bomb. He
subsequently published the results of
his findings in an online e-book, The
Last Wave from Port Chicago, which
summarizes his findings. In his mind,
and in that of others won over by his
argument, there’s evidence to suggest
Port Chicago was no accident, but rather
a test of nuclear capability orchestrated
by Manhattan Project scientists.
There’s no doubt Los Alamos
scientists took interest in the Port
Chicago blast. We know, for example,
that then-Capt. William Parsons, who
later served on the Enola Gay during its
bombing mission over Hiroshima and
still later, as a rear admiral, oversaw the
nuclear tests on Bikini Atoll, submit-
ted a report on the disaster within a
week. It’s possible that was merely
the result of professional curiosity,
but there may have been more to it.
Supporting that assertion is a report
written later in 1944 by the director of
the Manhattan Project, James Conant.
In it, Conant suggested foregoing
development of the earliest A-bomb
prototypes, small tactical weapons
called “gun bombs,” in favor of larger
models. He cited an unidentified test
in July 1944 — the same month as the
Port Chicago blast — as evidence the
larger bombs would be more destructive
and of greater value in ending the war.
History records no such atomic test at
the Los Alamos facility at that time.
Even more curiously, officials at
Los Alamos ordered destroyed the
content records for two of the boxcars
that had been at Port Chicago on 17
July. Of course, what suggests itself
is they contained an atomic bomb
that, accidentally or otherwise,
was responsible for the disaster.
There is evidence to suggest just that.
The transport E.A. Bryan was bound
for Tinian, in the Marianas Islands, an
important staging base for B-29 bomb-
ers raiding the Japanese home islands. In
fact, it would be from Tinian the Enola
Gay would take off in 1945. As well, Port
Chicago lies in a county that, even today,
has one of the highest cancer rates
in the US. That might be the result of
contamination by an A-bomb explosion.
As with all “conspiracy theories,”
there are counter-arguments historians
and others have used to undermine the
idea of a nuclear blast at Port Chicago.
It’s been pointed out, for example, the
unusual cancer rate among people
near Port Chicago may actually be
the result of the nearby presence of
the Concord Naval Weapons Station,
where ships exposed to the Pacific
atomic test blasts in the 1940s and
1950s were cleaned of contamina-
tion and later decommissioned.
Further, it’s important to remember
there was an all-out war going on at the
time of the blast. Even as war-weariness
was growing at home, US forces were
making vigorous attacks against the
Japanese Empire. They advanced on
two main fronts, with Gen. Douglas
MacArthur pushing north into the
Philippines as the Navy “island hopped”
across the Central Pacific. At the
same time, we were also materially
supporting a third front in China and
Southeast Asia. Those three massive
efforts required ammunition and stores
in previously unheard of quantities,
and any logistical let-up would cause
those advances to slow or pause. The
resulting lull would give the Japanese
an opportunity to revive their defense,
thus prolonging the war and causing
more US and Allied casualties. Viewed
in that regard, it’s difficult to imagine
anyone in the US would knowingly
destroy a vital ammunition hub during
some of the fiercest fighting in the
war. It makes no strategic sense.
In addition, with Port Chicago
located on the seaboard, where Japanese
submarines and spies were known
to lurk, exploding a secret weapon
there would’ve risked tipping off the
enemy. The possibility of the blast being
witnessed by civilians was also real. If
the “true” story then somehow came
out, what then if the American populace
was so horrified they put pressure on the
government not to wield such destruc-
tive power? Finally, from an atomic
researcher’s point of view, exploding an
atomic bomb at Port Chicago would’ve
had only diluted value, because
the mass of follow-on explosions
would’ve distorted the assessment
of the effects of the original blast.
At the same time, though, the
greatest amount of evidence for the
Port Chicago atomic blast theory, and
its original foundation, remains based
on the eyewitness testimony. What
those survivors saw and experienced
were: a mushroom cloud, devastation
on a massive scale, and earthquake-like
after shocks. Certainly those are all
characteristics of nuclear explosions,
though they aren’t exclusive to them.
A conventional blast of sufficient
size will produce the same effects.
Estimates of the size of the explosion
at Port Chicago range from 1.5 to 2.2
kilotons (compared to 12 kilotons
for the Hiroshima bomb). Many
Port Chicago shortly after the July 17, 1944 explosion (looking north). Source states,
“[Showing] the wreckage of Building A-7 in the center and ship pier beyond .. Bulldozer
and damaged automobiles in the foreground, railway crane at left, and scattered pilings.”
explosives experts agree the 5,000 tons
of conventional munitions present
on the docks and ships would’ve
been capable of producing the effects
recalled by the eyewitnesses. While
rare, there have been instances when
conventional explosions occurred large
enough to produce effects comparable
to nuclear blasts, the most famous of
which was the Halifax Harbor munitions
explosion of 1917, which was every
bit as violent and destructive as that
which occurred at Port Chicago.
The most damning evidence of all,
the one that seems to drive the final
nail into the coffin of the atomic bomb
theory, is there are no traces of radiation
or fission-related products detectable at
the blast site. They are the fingerprints
of every atomic explosion, and can still
be detected everywhere on the planet
an atomic explosion has taken place.
Taken in sum, then, it seems
improbable anyone knowingly and
willfully exploded an atomic bomb at
Port Chicago. It was more than likely
exactly what the Navy Board of Inquiry
concluded: a massive but accidental
explosion of conventional munitions.
— Andrew Hind

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 57

Observation Post
Skill vs. Luck
Battle of the Komandorski Islands
Unique among the sea battles
fought in the Pacific during World
War II, the Battle of the Komandorski
Islands (at the western extreme of
the Aleutians) was fought as a purely
daylight surface action without the
participation of submarines or
combat airpower. For four hours on 26
March 1943, Japanese and American
seamen fought the kind of traditional
naval engagement for which they’d
trained for decades. Cruisers of both
sides expended large percentages of
their main gun ammunition in an
effort to secure control of the North
Pacific wastes and their dominance
of the Aleutian Island chain.
The Aleutian Island chain attracted
the attention of both Japanese and US
strategists, who perceived them as a
potential military highway pointing
toward the northernmost Japanese
home island of Hokkaido. The Japanese
sought to cut that highway and simul-
taneously anchor the north end of their
empire by taking the islands of Attu and
Kiska during their otherwise disastrous
Midway campaign. The Americans saw
in the Aleutians a chain of island air-
The cruiser USS Salt Lake City, damaged by Japanese cruiser gunfire, starts losing speed prior to
going dead in the water during the battle under a smoke screen laid by accompanying destroyers.
58 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
bases that would allow them to project
retribution against the enemy. The FDR
administration was also eager to liber-
ate the only US national territory occu-
pied by the Axis. (The Komandorskis
were territory of the Soviet Union.)
Signals intelligence had gleaned
that two supply convoys had been
dispatched from Japan to reinforce the
garrison on Attu. There was also a sub-
stantial naval escort of two heavy cruis-
ers, two light cruisers and four destroy-
ers. Unfortunately the intelligence
effort missed the sailing of the escort
group; so the American commander,
Rear Adm. Charles McMorris, was to be
unpleasantly surprised by encountering
a much stronger enemy force than
he’d been led to believe was involved.
Initially in command of the old light
cruiser Richmond and the destroyers
Bailey and Coghlan, McMorris went
on patrol south of Attu, where he
then rendezvoused with the heavy
cruiser Salt Lake City and the destroyers
Dale and Monaghan on 22 March.
A major storm broke over the next
few days as the ships stood watch
southwest of Attu, causing moderate
damage and stressing the crews.
The morning of 26 March found
the American task force cruising
south of the Komandorskis while
heading north, and the Japanese Fifth
Fleet, commanded by Adm. Boshiro
Hosogaya, awaiting the arrival of a
slower merchant ship and destroyer.
The Japanese, when they sighted masts
to the south, happily assumed their
own slow ships had arrived. When
the Americans sighted masts on the
horizon they at first congratulated
themselves on having found the help-
less transports. During the time it took
the six US ships to concentrate into a
battle line from a 30-mile wide scouting
line, the Americans’ changed from
hunter to hunted. As the situation clari-
fied, Hosogaya believed he was on the
verge of a great victory, finding himself
between the Americans and their home
base with a 2:1 superiority in firepower.
McMorris made the only reasonable
choice in such a circumstance: he
turned tail. He ordered his cruisers
to launch floatplanes, but it was too
late to fuel and prepare them for flight
before shooting began. At 8:40 a.m.
the Japanese heavy cruisers Nachi and
Maya opened fire on the Richmond at
a range of 21,000 yards. The opening
salvo came in concentrated and a
mere 1,000 yards short. It did, however,
destroy one of Nachi’s floatplanes,
which caught fire from the muzzle blast
and had to be jettisoned. Nachi, the
Japanese flagship, was also hampered
by cold boilers that had to be warmed
in order to give her full speed. (Not
expecting a fight, most of the ships
had half their boilers off-line, and it
took time to prepare them for battle.)
As the US ships closed up and
turned northwest, the two battle lines
closed range to the point the opposing
destroyers were able to exchange
gunfire. For several minutes both
sides’ main guns thundered at one
another as the Americans continued
to turn to port until they were heading
southwest, toward the Japanese home
island bases only 500 miles away.
Besides being struck by several
destroyer shells, causing minor dam-
age, the Nachi received three hits
from the Salt Lake City: one hit the
bridge and killed several signalmen;
one severed part of the mainmast, and
one destroyed the starboard catapult
and torpedo room. At 8:42 a.m. the
Japanese launched eight torpedoes, but
all missed because they were set too
deep and passed under the American
cruisers. A total of 42 torpedoes were
launched by the Japanese during the
battle, but not one found its mark.
The only aircraft to participate
was a spotter floatplane catapulted
from the Nachi at 8:54 a.m. It could’ve
potentially provided vital information
for the Japanese gunners to adjust
their fire, but it was repeatedly driven
off by anti-aircraft fire that eventually
damaged the plane and caused it to
have to fly to Attu for repair. Thus the
battle retained a purely traditional
surface-naval-only character.
The hits on the Nachi also damaged
her gun directors, silencing her fire
until repairs were completed at 9:25
a.m. (The gun directors’ function was to
find the range and coordinate the fire of
the main turrets.) Meanwhile the other
Japanese cruisers kept up their fire,
but they also failed to make any hits.
Near misses on the Salt Lake City
damaged her gun directors; so her
accuracy also suffered. Eventually
one Japanese salvo landed next to
her and she lost rudder control,
followed by an insignificant hit at
10:10 a.m. The US destroyers were
then ordered to drop back to make
a smoke screen to cover the cruiser,
and that created a lull in the battle.
At 10:59 a.m. Salt Lake City was hit
in her mid-ship catapults, wrecking
those aircraft. At 11:03 a.m. another
shell hit a propeller shaft and started
flooding in the engine room. As the ship
lost power, McMorris ordered three of
the destroyers to make a risky torpedo
attack to discourage the Japanese
from pressing their advantage. Though
only five torpedoes were launched,
Hosogaya turned away his fleet and
gathered his transports to head back
to Japan. The destroyer Bailey paid
for leading the attack, receiving two
heavy shell hits that almost sank her.
Fearing an attack by American
bombers based farther east in the
Aleutians, Hosogaya believed he’d
pressed his luck far enough. Attu there-
fore remained without supplies, making
the US assault on the island in May less
costly. The damaged US ships retired
to the west coast for repairs, where
many hull-plates were found to have
been damaged by near misses. All three
heavy cruisers expended 64 percent
or more of their 8-inch ammunition.
While the Japanese shooting had been
considered accurate by their potential
victims at the time, the American
captains had been even more skillful in
maneuvering their ships to dodge the
salvoes — and they’d all been lucky.
— Ken MacFarlane
Movers & Shakers
Guy Anson Maunsell
Guy Anson Maunsell was born in
Srinagar, India, in 1884, the second
child of Edward Henry and Rosalie
Harriet Maunsell (née Anson). His
father served with the Indian Army for
37 years, retiring as a lieutenant colonel
in 1897. Young Guy was sent home to
be educated in Britain, as was common
at the time. He excelled academically
and graduated with honors in 1906.
He gained technical experience in
structural engineering while working in
a variety of positions in Europe and the
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 59
UK. In 1917 he was commissioned an
officer with the Royal Engineers, served
in France, then returned to England to
work on ship construction methods.
In 1919, Maunsell submitted his
idea for a cross-Channel connection
between Britain and France, but
the Ministry of Transport shelved
the plan. The idea was realized as
the Channel Tunnel in 1994.
The 1920s and 30s were a difficult
time in Maunsell’s career due to the
Great Depression, but he eventually
established his own consulting firm.
By nature he lived for his work, was
temperamental, prickly, and didn’t
suffer fools gladly. His ideas were
always straightforward, practical,
functional and cost-effective.
In October 1940 the harbormaster
for the Port of London contacted
Maunsell to ask his advice about
protecting the world’s busiest port
from the German threat. Maunsell
prepared a paper outlining his views
on coastal fortifications. Shortly
thereafter he met with Royal Navy
Capt. John Hughes-Hallett (1901–72,
later vice admiral) concerning the
construction of “four twin tower Navy
forts for the [Thames] estuary.”
Within a month Maunsell
completed the design work, but
some members of the Admiralty
initially balked, declaring the structures
“unstable.” Maunsell overcame those
objections, and construction on the
forts was started soon thereafter.
Two types of fort were ultimately
Observation Post
constructed, one for the Navy and
one for the Army. Both designs were
prefabricated at a Gravesend dry dock
and then towed on concrete barges to
their permanent locations in the estu-
ary. Once in position they were lowered
onto the seabed in a controlled sinking.
The forts for the Navy were capable
of housing up to 120 men inside the
leg of their structure. Each leg was
26 feet in diameter and seven stories
tall. Their armament included two
6-inch (150mm) gun emplacements
along with two 3.7-inch anti-aircraft
guns, along with 40mm Bofors guns
on top. They were supplied so as to
be self-sufficient for over a month.
Four forts were constructed in the
following order: Fort Roughs Tower (U1,
codenamed Uncle One) in February
1942; Fort Sunk Head (U2) and Fort
Tongue Sands (U3) in June; and Fort
Knock John (U4) in August. A fifth Navy
fort was contemplated but never built.
Tours of duty were of six weeks
duration followed by 10 days leave, after
four days training ashore. Men could
spend up to 18 hours below sea level in
their artificially lighted living quarters.
The isolated conditions and cramped
quarters were made as comfortable as
possible within the limits of wartime
austerity, but it was still a tough tour
of duty for the men working in the
underwater portion of the concrete legs.
After completion of the Navy forts,
Maunsell was commissioned to design
Army forts to be located in the Thames
and Mersey (Liverpool) estuaries. That
second-generation design was used
for anti-aircraft defense. Comprising
60 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011
seven interlocking steel platforms,
they looked something like the Arc
de Triomphe sitting in water. Heavy
anti-aircraft artillery was mounted
on five of the towers, which were
arranged in a circular fashion around
the central control tower, with a single
seventh tower located away from the
others to serve as a searchlight base.
Each second-generation tower
was crewed by 265 men, which served
four weeks on followed by 10 days
ashore. Altogether three Maunsell
artillery installations were built
for the Thames estuary. Each was
constructed approximately 10 miles
from shore and six miles from the
next-nearest fort. The 1st Anti-Aircraft
Fort Regiment Royal Artillery (Thames)
manned the forts named Great Nore
(U5), Red Sands (U6), and Shivering
Sands (U7). All forts were in place
and operational by the end of 1943.
Concurrent with his design of the
forts, Maunsell also began work on the
artificial harbors that became known
as Mulberries and were used in the
cross-Channel attack into Normandy
in 1944. Lessons learned from the failed
1942 Dieppe raid had convinced the
Allied high command a harbor was
needed at the very start of an invasion.
Maunsell only later received official
credit for the original highly classified
floating harbor concept. In addition, he
also designed concrete floating docks.
One anecdote from that episode
illustrated his famous temper. Told
his design wouldn’t work by some
members of the Admiralty, he retorted:
“Gentlemen, as you know, I live on a
dairy farm. When I leave the office, I
go home and the first thing I do is go
into the field where my cows are and
discuss my day with them. I must say,
I get more bloody sense from them
than I ever get from talking to you!”
The objections were overturned
and Maunsell completed designs
for three 406-ton reinforced
concrete floating dry docks.
Maunsell’s fort designs are argu-
ably one of the most innovative and
technologically challenging pieces
of military architecture made during
World War II. Nothing quite like them
had been attempted before, and the
fact their pre-stressed concrete technol-
ogy is still in use today is testament to
Maunsell’s remarkable engineering
skill. While not decisive to the overall
British war effort, the forts were credited
with the destruction of 22 aircraft, 30
V-1 flying bombs and one E-Boat.
After V-E Day the Thames estuary
Army forts became the responsibility
of the Anti-Aircraft Fort Maintenance
Detachment. Their radar systems were
upgraded because of Cold War fears
of attack from Warsaw Pact bombers;
however, in 1956 the Army declared
them obsolete and dismantled
their heavy guns and radars.
The Thames Estuary Special Defense
Unit serviced the Navy forts. Two
were subsequently used as postwar
light ships. By the mid-1960s private
“pirate radio stations” had taken over
the forts because they were located
outside the three-mile territorial limit.
One fort, Roughs Tower, is occupied
to this day by the family of a former
British Army officer who declared
it the “Micronation of Sealand.”
The three Army forts deployed in
the Liverpool estuary never saw any
action. They were demolished in 1946.
Red Sands (U6) is now a candidate
for historical preservation due to
its importance as one of the best
surviving examples of a rare World War
II design. Fundraising has begun to
restore it and create a museum on it.
Maunsell went on to an even more
successful postwar international engi-
neering career. Though he was never
lauded with honorary titles or public
recognition for his wartime accomplish-
ments, the fact remains he was an
outstanding individual in the engineer-
ing profession of the 20th century. One
of his most significant legacies is the
platform technology used in the offshore
oil and gas platforms in the North Sea.
While not the inventor of reinforced
or pre-stressed concrete, his vision
pushed the envelope in his creation of
the sea forts, artificial harbors, floating
concrete dry docks and other important
infrastructure projects. Maunsell retired
in 1959 and passed away two years later.

— Jon Cecil
✪

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World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 61

Media Reviews

11 enemy submarines and received Bormann, Hitler’s factotum in charge of

The US Coast Guard in World War Two,
by Alejandro De Quesada
(Osprey Publishing, 2010).
Reviewed by Andrew Hind
over 2,000 personal decorations.
If the role of the CG is little
remembered, even more obscure is
that of the Coast Guard Auxiliaries.
That story of the home front was the
most intriguing part of the book. The
all-volunteer Auxiliaries filled a number
of important roles to free Coast Guard
personnel for duty elsewhere. There
was the Volunteer Port Security Force,
for example, which protected from the
sabotage the countless warehouses,
piers and other facilities that kept the
American shipping industry in business.
In the Osprey tradition, the book
is brought to life with numerous
photographs and color drawings.
If I had a quibble with the book
it would be that a broad topic is
covered in a slender volume, and
the most fascinating sections
were those briefest on detail.
It’s a great read and at least
partly fills an important niche in
all his cars, chauffeurs and daily office
routine. The Todt Organization began
the project in 1937 and handed it over as
a gift from the Nazi Party to its Fuehrer
on his 50th birthday in 1939. Ironically,
he feared becoming stuck in its solid
brass elevator and only visited the
expensive structure with its magnificent
Alpine views a total of 14 times, the last
in October 1940. He worried about the
prominent place being easily bombed
by the Allies, or serving as an easy
locale for assassins. RAF Lancasters
did bomb the Berghof on 25 April
1945, destroying the homes of Hitler,
Goering and Bormann, but the teahouse
remained unscathed and is in pristine
condition today as a tourist destination.
This fascinating work is
well-illustrated, researched and
detailed, complete with architectural
renderings, construction costs,
mini-biographies of the major figures
involved, and pictures of Hitler and

T
he participation of the US Coast
Guard in World War II is generally
overlooked. In addition to
fulfilling its traditional life-saving and
law enforcement duties, it effectively
became America’s fifth armed service.
During the course of the war the Coast
Guard took on a number of invaluable
duties, including escorting convoys
in the Atlantic, securing ports and
beaches, and operating landing craft
at the Normandy invasion and in
amphibious assaults across the Pacific.
After Pearl Harbor the Coast Guard
experienced a dramatic increase in
size: by war’s end it operated 800
cutters, 351 other naval vessels, 288
ships for the army, and thousands of
smaller craft including amphibious
landing craft. The Coast Guard
rescued more than 1,500 survivors of
torpedo attacks in the Atlantic, sank
the literature of World War II. his mistress Eva Braun on-site.  ✪
History of the Eagle’s Nest,
by Florian M. Beierl
(Anton Plenk Verlag, 2008).
Reviewed by Blaine Taylor.
There have been several German-
published books in English on the
ever popular topic of Adolf Hitler’s
mountain chalet, the Berghof, atop
the Obersazlberg at Berchtesgaden
in Bavaria, but there has never been
one like this on the Fuehrer’s second
teahouse building on Kehlstein
Mountain overlooking the Berghof.
The first teahouse was on the
Mooslahnerkopf, to which Hitler and
his inner circle of aides, secretaries and
special guests walked daily when he was
in residence. Construction of the more
famous second one was begun by Martin

62 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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Saipan was a ME SERIE
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BATTALION
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PLAYING TIME
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Each counter repres
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A product of
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Copyright © ,
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Copyright ©
2010, Decisio
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All Rights Reserv
www.decisi ed. Made & Printed
ongames.com in U.S.A.

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P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | info@decisiongames.com | decisiongames.com